ONS-2015-071, Submittal of Emergency Plan Revision 2015-004

Submittal of Emergency Plan Revision 2015-004

ML15183A011
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	06/25/2015
From:	Batson S Duke Energy Carolinas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ONS-2015-071, FOIA/PA-2016-0071
Download: ML15183A011 (239)

Text

DUKE ENERGYVice Scott L. Batson Presiden Oconee NuclearStation Duke Energy ON01VP 17800 Rochester Hwy Seneca, SC 29672 ONS-2015-071 o: 864.873.3274 t 864.873.4208 Scott.Batson@duke-energy.com June 25, 2015 10 CFR 50.54(q)

Attn: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2746

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, and -287 Emergency Plan Revision 2015-004 Please find attached for your use and review copies of the revisions to the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan along with the associated revision instructions and 10 CFR 50.54(q) evaluation.

This revision is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) and does not reduce the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. Ifthere are any questions or concerns pertaining to this revision please call Pat Street, Emergency Preparedness Manager, at 864-873-3124.

By copy of this letter, two copies of this revision are being provided to the NRC, Region II, Atlanta, Georgia.

Sincerely, Scott L. Batson Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Attachments:

Revision Instructions Emergency Plan Revision 2015-004 10 CFR 50.54(q) Evaluation(s)

A4L-ý www.duke-energy.com

ONS-2015-071 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 25, 2015 xc: w/2 copies of attachments Mr. Victor McCree, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 w/copy of attachments Mr. James R. Hall, Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 11555 Rockville Pike Mailstop: O-8G9Q Rockville, MD 20852 2738 (send via E-mail)

Mr. Jeffrey A. Whited, Project Manager (by electronic mail only)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 11555 Rockville Pike Mailstop: O-8B1A Rockville, MD 20852 w/o attachments Mr. Eddy Crowe NRC Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station ELL - EC2ZF

June 2, 2015 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

SUBJECT:

Emergency Plan Revision 2015-004 Please make the following changes to the Emergency Plan:

REMOVE INSERT Cover Sheet Rev. 2015-003 Cover Sheet Rev 2015-004 EPA Record of Changes Rev 014 EPA Record of Changes Rev 015 EPA Section D Rev 008 EPA Section D Rev 009 EPA Section F Rev 007 EPA Section F Rev 008 EPA Section H Rev 006 EPA Section H Rev 007 EPA Section K Rev 001 EPA Section K Rev 002 EPA Section P Rev 008 EPA Section P Rev 009 EPA Appendix 3 Rev 002 EPA Appendix 3 Rev 003 q"4" < a-Pat Street ONS Emergency Preparedness Manager

¢**DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PLAN APPROVED:

Scott L. Batson Date Approved REVISION 2015-004 May, 2015

RECORD OF CHANGES REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS Revision 1 April 1, 1981 Meteorological Update Revision 2 December 31, 1981 Rewrite Emergency Plan in Nureg 0654 Format Revision 3 March, 1982 Update Emergency Plan Revision 4 April, 1982 Revisions & Changes to update Emergency Plan Revision 5 September 1, 1982 Revision to coincide with Crisis Management Plan Revision 6 November 1, 1982 Revision update Revision 7 December 14, 1982 Review and update 83-1 June 10, 1983 Changes required by action items due to annual exercise and review and general update 83-2 November 17, 1983 Changes required by review and general update 84-1 March 26, 1984 Revisions as determined by QA audit and minor editing 84-2 November 15, 1984 Revisions as determined by annual review 85-1 June 7, 1985 Revisions/changes/editing 1

85-2 Revisions/changes/editing-annual review 86-1 March 8, 1986 New Oconee Brochure 86-2 November 13, 1986 Revisions/changes/editing-annual review 86-3 December 9, 1986 Correct changes identified as deficiencies by the NRC in Rev. 85-2.

87-1 February 4, 1987 Revision update, minor editing changes, included failed fuel accident assessment information.

87-2 Revision update, minor editing changes Review Section D. Agreement letters updated.

87-4 December 10, 1987 Incorporate alternate TSC and OSC into Emergency Plan 88-1 June 7, 1988 Revised EALS in Section D.

88-2 October 14, 1988 Annual review. Minor editorial revisions.

89-1 February 28, 1989 Major revision to Section D. Added Appendix 7. Minor editorial changes.

89-2 August 14, 1989 Change to Section D. Minor editorial revisions.

89-3 January 5, 1990 Annual Review 1

Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 90-1 March 1, 1990 Changes to Section D as required by NRC commitment.

90-2 June 1, 1990 Changes reflect upgrade of radiation monitor system and minor editing.

90-3 July 2, 1990 Change to Section D, Emergency Classification.

90-4 October 31, 1990 Annual Review 91-1 January 21, 1991 Section D revision. (RIA upgrade) 91-2 February 20, 1991 Section D revision. (TS to SLC) 91-3 March 22, 1991 Section D revision. (RIA upgrade); Section D revision. (SLB revision) 91-5 September 19, 1991 Section D revision. (RIA upgrade) 91-6 December 16, 1991 Annual review.

92-1 March 1, 1992 Section D (RIA upgrade). Minor editorial changes.

92-2 June 30, 1992 Major Revision 92-3 October 29, 1992 Annual review 92-4 12/31/92 Section B, D, H, J, Appendix 4, 5 & 6 changes.

93-1 03/01/93 Sections D, G, H, N, P, and Appendix 6 93-2 05/07/93 Sections A, B, D, Appendix 5 and 6 93-3 07/23/93 Sections A, B, G, H, I, J, L, M, N, & Appendix 6 93-4 08/11/93 Sections B, D, and Appendix 5 93-05 01/01/94 Annual Review, Incorporation of EPA-400 guidelines.

94-01 03/15/94 Additions of Appendix 8 and 9. - (Minor revisions) 94-02 05/09/94 Changes to Appendix 5, Pages 1 and 2; Changes to Appendix 6, Pages 2 and 4; State of South Carolina Agreement Letter 94-03 05/25/94 Changes to Appendix 5, Page 2; Changes to Appendix 6, Pages 4 and 5; INPO Agreement Letter 94-04 06/06/94 Changes to Appendix 5, Page 2; Change Teledyne Isotopes Badge Service agreement letter to Northeast Utilities Service Company 94-05 08/08/94 Changes to Section D 94-06 12/29/94 Annual review. Editorial changes, minor revisions.

2 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 95-01 02/23/95 Changes to Sections B, G, Appendix 5.

95-02 10/23/95 Annual review and changes 95-03 11/01/95 Section D. Change, Incorporated new EAL'S.

95-04 12/31/95 Calendar 1996, HAZMAT Changes, RP/14 deleted 96-01 02/13/96 Changes to Sections B, D, and N.

96-02 06/25/96 Changes to Section D 96-03 07/96 Changes to Section D 96-04 12/96 Annual review, editorial changes, minor changes with major change to Appendix 10.

97-01 07-97 Section B, I, Appendix 5 & 7, with editorial/minor changes to Section H & P 97-02 12-97 Annual review and editorial/minor changes 98-01 02-98 Section D, page 35. Correction of title on Enclosure 4.3 98-02 03-98 Section N, page 1 & 2, Added part a (General) to Section N.2 to ensure drills conducted between NRC evaluated exercises are performed in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.b 98-03 04-98 List of Figures page number corrections, Added Emergency Operation Facility to Figure H-15, Figure H-20 reformatted. Added Agreement Letter with Keowee-Key Volunteer Fire Department, Appendix 5, #24. Appendix 10 - Hazardous Materials Response Plan, corrections on Table of Contents with minor revisions. Headings on Appendix 10, Figure 2 with minor revisions.

98-04 12-98 Annual review and editorial/minor changes.

99-01 03-99 The ONS Technical Specifications have been converted to a set of Technical Specifications based on NUREG 1430. "Standard Technical Specifications Babcock and Wilcox Plants."

Replaced the description phrases (titles) in Section D for Operating Modes with the Mode number from Improved Technical Specifications. In Section I the portion describing leak rate volume percent per day was changed to percent of the containment air weight per day. The reference to Tech Spec 4.4.1.1 was changed to reference Improved Technical Specification 5.5.2.

NOTE: The implementation date of Improved Tech Specs was moved from March 4, 1999 to March 27, 1999, therefore the revision date for revision 99-01 will depict February when the actual administrative changes were completed.

3 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 99-02 12-99 Annual review and editorial/minor changes 2000-01 04-2000 Addition of List of Effective Pages 2000-02 05/2000 Editorial /minor changes 2000-03 12/2000 Annual review and editorial/minor changes 2001-01 02/07/2001 Additions and corrections as result of 50.54(t) audit.

Additional information added to Basis Document and additional EAL's resulting from EP drill critiques.

2001-02 08/2001 Changes in areas of responsibility. Added note concerning RVLS to Fission Product Barrier Matrix; 2001 calendar; information added to EP Functional Area Manual; added/updated information on annual average meteorology; Appendix 5; Appendix 6; editorial/minor changes.

2001-03 12/2001 Added information in Basis Document concerning a reactor building containment break. Replaced the 2001 calendar with the 2002 calendar. Editorial/minor changes.

2002-01 01/02 The present Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Operating Procedure is written in a different format and with some different terms than the earlier version. The term PTS (Pressurized Thermal Shock) has replaced TSOR (Thermal Shock Operating Range). This is only a change in terminology.

The additional EAL is to ensure a site specific credible threat results in a declaration of a notification of Unusual Event (NOUE). This change is also intended to achieve an appropriate level and consistent response Nationwide.

2002-02 06/02 Section B - minor'changes; Section D - Added information requested by Emergency Coordinators to Enclosure 4.1; Section G - Rewrite of entire section; Section H - Updated information on Figure H-4 relating to Met Data; Appendix 5 -

Updated Letters of Agreement; and miscellaneous spelling/grammar errors.

2002-03 09/02 Section A - Compliance with the NRC Security Interim Compensatory Measure (ICM) issued 02/25/02; Section P - Audit frequencies per revised 10 CFR 50.54 (t) as stated in Federal Register Vol 64, 03/29/99.

Appendix 1 - Added definition of monthly and Semi-Annual; Appendix 5, Agreement Letters, updated #17, Appendix 6 - Changed name on 78A.

Miscellaneous corrections.

2003-01 02/03 Section D - RIA setpoints change, Section G - 2003 Calendar, Appendix 3 - Siren upgrade, new map (i-5) ; Appendix 5 - Agreement Letters, Appendix 6 - Issued To change, Section B, E, F editorial/minor changes 2003-02 08/03 Section D - incorporates additional guidance for the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director related to classification of a high energy line break, such as a Main Steam Line Break. In addition, Section D has been retyped using a consistent font style -

no changes in content resulted from the retype.

4 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 2004-01 02/04 Incorporates a retype of the majority of the sections as an editorial change to adopt a consistent format: Section G - Added information concerning One Mile Exclusion Area Signs; Section H - Strip Chart Recorders were removed under an NSM; Section J - Incorporated guidance on the use of KI as a protective action recommendation; Section K - changed KI dose to 5 REM CDE from 25 REM; Appendix 4 - Incorporate results of Evacuation Time Estimate; Appendix 5 -

Revised Agreement Letters 2004-02 12/21/04 Editorial changes to correct typos, drawings, and title/organizational names. This revision also incorporates clarifying information from the latest Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE); clarification of offsite agency responsibilities for protective actions for impediments and special populations; revised EAL #2 for Enclosure 4.3, Unusual Event IC #2; clarification of ERO activation after normal working hours; and revisions to the site's SPCC Plan included in Appendix 8. In addition to these changes, applicable references have replaced generic references in Figure P-1. This revision also incorporates the 2005 Calendar distributed to the 10 mile EPZ population.

2005-01 02/01/05 Section D, Enclosure 4.7, Page 66 - Duke Power Hydro-Electric Group has revised the Lake Keowee water level from 807 to 815.5 feet for initiating a Condition B. This elevation is used in Enclosure 4.7 for classifying the event as an Unusual Event. The Hydro -Electric Group notifies the Control Room when Condition B has been declared. No protective actions by the plant are changed.

.2005-02 05/17/05 Section I & Letters of Agreement - Incorporates an editorial revision that describes the makeup of Field Monitoring Teams and updated Agreement Letters.

1.7&8 replaced "....personnel from Radiation Protection and Chemistry." with "..a RP Technician and a Driver." Editorial Change - Chemistry personnel no longer perform the function of FMT Driver. FMT Drivers are now provided by other groups.

2005-03 08/24/05 Revision 2005-03 incorporates an addendum for the Fire Department/Volunteer Fire Department Agreement Letters. This addendum was added as a result of NRC guidance provided to utilities. The addendum to these letters provides guidance on the use of the Incident Command System at ONS and identifies the ONS Fire Brigade Leader as the on-scene commander and site-interface for responding offsite fire departments.

2005-04 09/15/05 Revision 2005-04 is a change to Page 66, Enclosure 4.7, Emergency Action Levels #1 - Reservoir elevation greater than or equal to 807.0 feet with all spillway gates open and the lake elevation continues to rise. This change undoes Revision 2005-01 which changed Keowee Lake level from 807 feet elevation to 815.5 feet elevation. This revision was determined to be a non conservative change in that it delayed the Unusual Event emergency classification. Appendix 5, Agreement Letter #21 has been updated.

2005-05 01/09/06 Revision 2005-05 incorporates editorial changes that clarify organizational charts/responsibilities, revise procedure references, replaces public information calendar, and replaces obsolete survey instruments. Agreement Letters #16 and

1. 19 were updated.

5 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 2006-03 06/8/06 Section D - Change #1 Revised initiating condition #2 for the Alert classification for Enclosure 4.6 (Fire/Explosions and Security Events). This change is based on a correction to the NEI White Paper, Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs For Hostile Actions which was endorsed in a letter from the NRC on December 8, 2005. Change #2 - Renumbered Emergency Action Levels throughout Section D to match the numbering scheme found in RP/0/B/1000/001 (Emergency Classification) procedure - Renumbering makes it easier for procedure users to locate the correct emergency action level in the Basis Document. Appendix 5 - Agreement Letters #8, 14,15 & 23 were updated.

2006-04 11/06 Reference changes to the deletion of the Clemson EOF and incorporates reference to the Charlotte EOF. In addition, miscellaneous editorial changes are included in this revision.

2007-01 03/07 Appendix 5 Agreement Letters that have been updated/revised.

2007-02 12/07 Editorial changes including a revised 50 mile radius map (Figure B), a revision to the Emergency Classification Basis Section D , the 2008 Emergency Planning Calendar, a revised layout drawing for the JIC, a revised listing of portable survey instruments, the latest renewal of existing agreement letters and a revised Ground Water Monitoring Plan 2008-01 09/08 The original order of the EALs created a human performance trap. The first fission barrier column that the procedure user reviews is the RCS Barrier column which is on the left side of the page. The second fission barrier column that is reviewed is the Fuel Clad Barrier which is in the center of the page. This order gives the procedure user the mindset that the EALs are listed in the same order: RCS EAL followed by the Fuel Clad EAL. Changing the order of the EALs is not a deviation from the approved EAL scheme but is a difference. This change does not constitute a decrease in the effectiveness of the EPLAN since the EALs are exactly the same.

2008-02 10/08 As of this change 2008-02, the Emergency Plan is now available on NEDL/SCRIBE and has been completely re-issued. All changes in the future to the Emergency Plan will be completed thru NEDL/SCRIBE. The following Agreement Letters were also updated: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 19 and 21.

2009-01 02/09 Revised existing information relating to organization names that have changed, removed specific names and replaced with a title to mitigate the need for future revisions due to personnel changes, and changed staging location names based on changes made to area designation names; however staging will still occur in same area. Changes made only reflect actual organization names, functional position names, and current location names being used to make the E-Plan more accurately reflect current information. No changes are being made to the process or conduct of the how the E-Plan is to be implemented.

Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 2010-10 02/10 Revised existing information relating to changes made to the callback system, who performs the dose assessments, the basis information for the Containment Barrier EAL based on NEI 99-01 Rev 5 FAQ lessons learned. Made name change for Oconee Medical Center, corrected information relating to testing frequency for major elements referenced in the E-Plan, the new neutron instrument used by radiation protection, and street name change for figure H-3A. Changes made are the result of the Annual Review process and no changes are being made to the process or conduct of how the E-Plan is to be implemented. The following Agreement Letters were also updated: Number - 6, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, & 23.

2011-01 05/11 Figure B Redistribution of support for Field Monitoring Teams from Chemistry to Business Management and Work Control. Section D - Basis corrected to delete reference to USFAR Table 15-114 which has been deleted, revised ICs 4.3.A.3 and 4.4.A.3, EAL A to align with RP/O/B/1000/001, revised ICs and EALs to add levels of operating modes that represent the operating levels of hot shutdown, cold shutdown and hot standby were listed, added "AC" back to IC 4.5.A.I where it had been inadvertently deleted, add SSF to IC 4.6.U.1, correct IC 4.5.G.1, EAL 1 to reflect SSF maintaining Mode 3 (hot standby) rather than hot shutdown, add new ICs for Jocassee Dam condition A and B declarations, correct misprint in IC 4.7.A.2, EAL B, correct formatting errors, and add Security EALs. Section F - deleted onsite areas requiring phone notifications for site assembly due to new wireless system being installed in those areas. Section G - replace 2010 calendar with 2011 calendar.

Figure H revised room layout to reflect current arrangement. Section N - Revised the testing cycle for the EPLAN from a 5 year cycle to a 6 year cycle. Appendix 5 -

update letters of agreement.

2011-02 10/11 This evaluation supports a request to revise the Oconee (ONS), McGuire (MNS), and Catawba (CNS) Emergency Plans to allow for an alternate approach for compliance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) relative to meeting the minimum staffing requirement during emergencies for site Radiation Protection (RP) personnel and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) position staffing to that in Table B-I in NUREG-0654, endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.101.

2012-01 06/12 Section F - A change to the process for answering the 4911 emergency phone calls.

The new process will have both Operations and Security(SAS) answering the phone.

Appendix 7 -Will clarify the ERDS related system description verbiage from the modem based data transfer system to the new VPN System.

2012-02 06/12 The NRC published Federal Register notice [RIN 3150-AI 10], "Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations" on November 23, 2011. The amendments contained in the rule are summarized as twelve (XII) topics with varying implementation due dates. Emergency Plan changes to the following sections (C, D, H, I, J, P, and Appendix 1) are made in accordance with the rule and the appropriate guidance documents pertaining to Topic V - Emergency Action Level for Hostile Action, Topic VI - Emergency Declaration Timeliness, Topic VIII - Emergency Operation Facility (Performance Based), Topic IX - Emergency Response Organization Augmentation at Alternate Facility, and Topic XI - Protective Actions for On-site Personnel.

7 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 2012-03 06/13 Added Agreement Letter 25 - G&G Metal Fabrication to provide Hale pump technical support and Agreement Letter 26 Operating Agreement between Duke Energy's Lincoln Combustion Turbine Facility & MNS, CNS and ONS Nuclear Supply Chain concerning an Emergency Supply of Diesel Fuel.

2012-04 12/12 Section B - This change is to incorporate the new staffing analysis for the new EP rule and editorial changes.

2012-05 12/12 Revised Section D, Enclosure 4.3 to add threshold values for unit vent sampling as a compensatory measure. Unit vent sampling is performed on the 6th floor auxiliary building at sampling equipment where manual grab samples are retrieved per HP/0/B/1000/060-D. Additionally, the use of RIA 56 was added as a compensatory measure for Site Area Emergency and General Emergency Classifications.

This change allows for classification of gaseous radiological releases in the event of a loss of either RIA-45 or 46. This change only clarifies the values to be used in the event normal monitoring is not available.

The plan is also being revised based on annual review requirements, changes are mainly editorial or formatting. Additional changes are being made to reflect current name changes, update Agreement letters, Spill Prevention and Control, and Groundwater monitoring programs.

2013-01 10/13

• Section D - Added clarification in the basis for Loss of Shutdown function.

• Section I - Revised to reference procedures versus RPSM 11.7 which has been deleted.

• Section J - Revised to incorporate latest revision to ETE. Deleted climate data tables which were duplicative to information contained within the ETE (Appendix 4).

• Section P - Updated appropriate references.

• Appendix 4 - Added latest ETE as reference.

2014-01 03/14 0 Section B - Removed reference to having home addresses listed in the emergency telephone directory as these were never listed in the telephone directory and clarified EOF Services Group actions. Updated titles of ERO positions in the TSC and OSC consistent with duty roster.

• Section D - Added clarification for which RIA-45 is to be used. Respectively, it is expected that 1RIA-45, 2RIA-45 and 3RIA-45 would be used in connection with Enclosure 4.3, Abnormal Rad Level/Radiological Effluent. 4RIA-45 is not specifically related to a unit and therefore it is not applicable to Enclosure 4.3.

• Section G - Removed Calendar and replaced with Note that the calendar is retained on file with EP Staff.

• Section H - Eliminated drawings of Alternate TSC and Alternate OSC as these are for implementation and not needed in Emergency Plan. Removed implementation details from Primary TSC and Primary OSC drawings. Corrected Figure H-20 and shifted table alignment.

• Section J - Provided editorial corrections to procedure numerical references where applicable.

• Section M - Provided clarification of EOF Services listed on Figure M-2.

• Section P - Provided editorial corrections to procedure numerical references where applicable, and changed a reference from the EP Functional Area Manual to a fleet administrative procedure reference (EP FAM to AD-EP-ALL-0001). Eliminated reference to HR Emergency Plan.

• Appendix 5 - Removed all copies of the Letters of Agreement and indicated they are included by reference. The actual Letters of Agreement are retained on file by the EP Staff.

8 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 2014-02 10/14

• Section A - Revised for change from pagers to notify the ERO to using cell phones. Shift Manager delegates actual activation of notification device to Security if available or qualified operator if security is unable.

• Section B - Revised responsibility for Radwaste function from Chemistry Group to Operations Group.

• Section D - Revised responsibility for Radwaste function from Chemistry Group to Operations Group, including reference to chemistry procedures to operation procedures.

• Section F - Revised for change from pagers to notify the ERO to using cell phones. Shift Manager delegates actual activation of notification device to Security if available or qualified operator if security is unable.

• Section G - Procedure number changes

• Section H - Removed specific locations of kits as these were insufficiently detailed and did not contain all kit locations.

• Section I - Procedure number changes.

• Section J - Procedure number changes.

• Section M - Procedure number changes, title changes.

• Section N - Changes to show new rules including 8 year cycle, consistency with fleet documents practices, and format.

• Section P - Revised responsibility for independent audit from NSRB to NOS Manager, deleted duplicated paragraph and updated the listing of the implementing procedures.

• Appendix 6 - Updated distribution list to reflect new format of E Plan and associated implementing procedures.

2014-003 12/14 Changes made associated with the modification from Raddose V to URI, and updates to WEBEOC.

2015-001 01/15 Changes made to Section F, EOF Communications and Figure F-1.

2015-002 03/15 Changes made as a result of superseding SH/0/B/2005/002, EP Fam 3.19 and Appendix 5.

2015-003 04/15 Changes made to Section D consisting of Protected Service Water replacing the Station Auxiliary Service Pump as a result of system modification. Replaced Selective Signaling with DEMNET 2015-004 5/18 E-Plan changes made to Sections App 3, D, F, H, K, & P and the Table of Contents consisting of AD-EP ALL-0203 & AD-EP ALL-0204 procedure reference changes and changes from Selective Signaling to DEMNET. Also includes title changes from Operations Shift Manager to Shift Manager.

• Appendix 3: Revised Selective Signaling to DEMNET

• Section D: Revised Selective Signaling to DEMNET and removed OSM

• Section F: Revised Selective Signaling to DEMNET, removed OSM, and SH/0/B/2005/002 to AD-EP ALL-0203

• Section H: Removed specific equipment reference to reduce E-plan revisions

• Section K: Implementation for AD-EP-ALL-0204 for administration of KI, and title changes from Operations Shift Manager to Shift Manager

• Section P: Reference updates SH/0/B/2005/003 to AD-EP ALL-0204 9

Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

D. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM RegGuide 1.101, Rev. 3, August, 1992, approved the guidance provided by NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, as an Alternative Methodology for the Development of Emergency Action Levels. Oconee Nuclear Site used the NUMARC guidance for the development of initiating conditions and emergency action levels. The emergency action levels provided in this section have been modified to implement the guidance provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, NEI guidance as endorsed in Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-12 and to support the implementation of NEI 03-12.

The emergency classification system utilizes four categories for classification of emergency events.

D.1.a. UNUSUAL EVENT Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

The purpose of an Unusual Event classification is to provide notification of the emergency to the station staff, State and Local Government representatives, and the NRC.

Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D.1.b ALERT Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

The purpose of the Alert classification is to assure that emergency personnel are readily available to:

1. Activate the onsite response centers

2. Respond if the situation becomes more serious or to perform confirmatory radiation monitoring if required

3. Provide offsite authorities current status information Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D-1 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

D.l.c. SITE AREA EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

The purpose of the Site Area Emergency classification is to:

1. Activate the offsite response centers

2. Assure that monitoring teams are mobilized

3. Assure that personnel required for taking protective actions of near site areas are at duty stations should the situation become more serious

4. Provide current information to the public and be available for consultation with offsite authorities Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D.l.d. GENERAL EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

The purpose of the General Emergency classification is to:

1. Initiate predetermined protective actions for the public

2. Provide continuous assessment of information from onsite and offsite measurements

3. Initiate additional measures as indicated by event releases or potential releases

4. Provide current information to the public and be available for consultation with offsite authorities Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D-2 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

D.2 Initiating Conditions Initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency actions levels are contained in the BASIS document beginning on page D-4. Classification procedure (RP/O/A/1000/001) provides the guidance necessary to classify events and promptly declare the appropriate emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to cognizant facility staff that an emergency action level threshold has been exceeded. Specific response procedures are in place for the Control Room, Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility which delineate the required response during the appropriate classification.

D.3 LOCAL AND STATE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Pickens County FNF Plans Oconee County FNF Plans State of South Carolina FNF Plans (Site Specific)

D.4 LOCAL AND STATE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES Pickens County FNF Plans Oconee County FNF Plans State of South Carolina FNF Plans (Site Specific)

D-3 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION USING THE TABLE BELOW: ADD POINTS TO CLASSIFY. SEE NOTE BELOW RCS BARRIERS (BD 5-7) FUTEL CLA'D BARRIE RS (BD 8-9) CONTAINMEN'T BARRIERS (BD 109-12)

Potential Loss (4 Points) Loss (5 Points) Potential Loss (4 Points) Loss (5 Points) Potential Loss (1 Point) Loss (3 Points)

RCS Leakrate > 160 gpm RCS Leak rate that results in a loss Average of the 5 highest Average of the 5 highest CETC CETC _ 12000 F _>15 minutes Rapid unexplained containment of subcooling. CETC > 1200' F OR pressure decrease after increase

>700* F CETC Ž7000 F > 15 minutes with a OR valid RVLS reading 0" containment pressure or sump level not consistent with LOCA SGTR > 160 gpm Valid RVLS reading of 0" Coolant activity Ž300 gCi/ml DEI RB pressure > 59 psig Failure of secondary side of SG OR results in a direct opening to the RB pressure > 10 psig and no environment with SG Tube Leak >

NOTE: RVLS is RBCU or RBS 10 gpm in the SAME SG NOT valid if one or more RCPs are Entry into the PTS (Pressurized 1RIA 57 or 58 reading 1.0 R/hr running OR if LPI Hours RIA 57 OR RIA 58 Hours RIA 57 OR RIA 58 SG Tube Leak?: 10 gpm exists in Thermal Shock) Operation 2 RIA 57 reading > 1.6 R/hr pump(s) are rnning Since SD R/hr R/hr Since SD R/hr R/hr one SG.

NOTE: PTS is entered under 2 RIA 58 reading > 1.0 R/hr AND taking suction 0 - <0.5 > 300 150 0 - <0.5 >- 1800 860 AND NOThE:o foisthntere in d d 3RIA 57 or 58 reading > 1.0 R/hr from the LPI drop the other SG has secondary side either of the following:A5 r e line. 0.5 - < 2.0 > 80 > 40 0.5 - < 2.0 > 400 > 195 failure that results in a direct opening to the enviromnent AND

> 100"F/hr. has occurred. 2.0-8.0 > 32 > 16 2.0-8.0 >280 > 130 is being fed from the affected unit.

NIMhas operated in the injection mode while NO RCPs were operating.

HPI Forced Cooling RCS pressure spike Ž 2750 psig Hydrogen concentration > 9% Containment isolation is incomplete and a release path to the environment exists Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment Director judgment Director judgment judgment Director judgment Director judgment N U E T 3 aP tIALERT (4-6 Total PoI uIints :s) 'SITEIAREA EMERGENCY(7-10 TotalPoints) G..,ENERALEMERGENCYQ1-13 TotailPoints).ý OPERATING MODE: 1,2, 3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1,2, 3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 4.1.U.1 Any potential loss of Containment 4.1 .A.1 Any potential loss or loss of the RCS 4.1.S.1 Loss of any two barriers 4.1 .G. 1 Loss of any two barriers and potential loss of the third barrier 4.1.U.2 Any loss of containment 4.1.A.2 Any potential loss or loss of the Fuel 4.1.S.2 Loss of one barrier and potential loss of either Clad RCS or Fuel Clad Barriers 4.1.G.2 Loss of all three barriers 4.1.S.3 Potential loss of both the RCS and Fuel Clad Barriers NOTE: An event with multiple events could occur which would result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or potential loss threshold is IMMINENT (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT LOSS situation, use judgment and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

D-4 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE RCS BARRIER EALs: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5)

The RCS Barrier includes the RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary isolation valves.

1. RCS Leak Rate Small leaks may result in the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by normal operation of the High Pressure Injection System.

The capacity of one HPI pump at normal system pressure is approximately 160 gpm.

Leakage in excess of this value would call for compensatory action to maintain normal liquid inventory. As such, this is an indication of a degraded RCS barrier and is considered to be a potential loss of the barrier.

The loss of subcooling is the fundamental indication that the inventory loss from the primary system exceeds the capacity of the inventory control systems. If the loss of subcooling is indicated, the RCS barrier is considered lost.

2. SG Tube Rupture Small Steam Generator tube leaks may result in the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by normal operation of the High Pressure Injection System. The capacity of one HPI pump at normal system pressure is approximately 160 gpm. Leakage in excess of this value would call for compensatory action to maintain normal liquid inventory. As such, this is an indication of a degraded RCS barrier and is considered to be a potential loss of the barrier.

A tube rupture (> than 160 gpm) with an unisolable secondary line rupture is generally indicated by a reduction in primary coolant inventory, increased secondary radiation levels, and an uncontrolled or complete depressurization of the ruptured SG. This set of conditions represents a potential loss of the RCS and loss of containment fission product barrier and will result in the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. Escalation to a General Emergency would be indicated by at least a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier.

D-5 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE

2. SG Tube Rupture Secondary radiation increases should be observed via radiation monitoring of Condenser Air Ejector Discharge, Main Steam, and/or SG Sampling System. Determination of the "uncontrolled" depressurization of the ruptured SG should be based on indication that the pressure decrease in the ruptured steam generator is not a function of operator action. This should prevent declaration based on a depressurization that results from an EOP induced cooldown of the RCS that does not involve the prolonged release of contaminated secondary coolant from the affected SG to the environment. This EAL should encompass steam breaks, feed breaks, and stuck open safety or relief valves.

A steam generator tube leak less than 160 gpm would be classified under Enclosure 4.2, Systems Malfunctions, RCS leakage as an Unusual Event. If a release also occurs such as steam through a steam relief valve failed open, feedwater line break, steam line break on the affected steam generator then a loss of the Containment Barrier has also occurred.

Upgrade to a higher classification would be by Enclosure 4.3, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent or further degradation of RCS or Fuel Clad Barriers.

3. Entry Into PTS Entry into Pressurized Thermal Shock Operation could cause damage to the reactor vessel severe enough to cause a loss of coolant accident. Therefore, this situation represents a potential loss of the RCS. This EAL is satisfied if Rule 8 (Pressurized Thermal Shock) is implemented.

4. Reactor Coolant System Integrity HPI Forced cooling represents the failure of the steam generators to remove heat from the core. To use this mode of cooling indicates that all feedwater (both main and emergency) are not available for use and the pressure in the reactor coolant system is greater than or equal to 2300 psig. The power-operated relief valve must be opened to initiate the cooling through the high pressure injection system. In effect, a self-imposed loss of coolant is established. The condition is classified as a potential loss of the reactor coolant system.

A reactor coolant system pressure spike of greater than or equal to design pressure of 2750 psig represents a loss of the RCS barrier.

D-6 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE

5. Containment Radiation Monitoring A containment radiation monitor reading of> 1 R/hr on radiation monitors 1RIA-57 or 58 (Unit 1), 2RIA-58 (Unit 2), and 3RIA-57 or 58 (Unit 3) indicates the release of reactor coolant to the containment. A containment radiation monitor reading of >1.6 R/hr on radiation monitor 2RIA-57 (Unit 2) also indicates the release of reactor coolant to the containment. The difference in these values is due to the relative strength of the detector check source which affects the background readings for the detector (the source for 2RIA-57 is stronger than that for the remaining detectors). This reading is less than that specified for Fuel Clad Barrier EAL#3. Thus, this EAL would be indicative of a RCS leak only. If the radiation monitor reading increased to that specified by Fuel Clad Barrier EAL

1. 3, fuel damage would also be indicated.

There is no "Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

6. Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgment This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly but warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director to fall under either the loss or potential loss of the RCS Barrier.

D-7 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE FUEL CLAD BARRIER EALs: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4)

The Fuel Clad Barrier is the zircalloy tubes that contain the fuel pellets.

1. Core Exit Thermocouple Readings The "Potential Loss" EAL reading corresponds to loss of subcooling. The value of 700 °F is indicative of superheated steam and is a value referenced in the Emergency Operating procedure. The loss of subcooling may lead to clad damage and, therefore, this is a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier.

The "Loss" EAL reading (1200 °F) indicates significant superheating of the coolant and core uncovery. Clad damage under these conditions is likely; therefore, this is indication of loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

2. Primary Coolant Activity Level The value of 300 jiCi/ml DEI coolant activity is well above that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to about 4% fuel clad damage. This amount of clad damage indicates significant clad damage and thus the Fuel Clad Barrier is considered lost. Basis for determination is Engineering Calculation OSC-5283.

There is no equivalent "Potential Loss" EAL for this item.

3. Reactor Vessel Water Level A valid reading of 0" on the RVLS (Reactor Vessel Level System) is an indicator that the fuel could be uncovered and would signify a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier. RVLS is invalid if LPI pumps are running and taking suction from the LPI drop line.

4. Containment Radiation Monitoring Containment monitor readings on RIA 57/58 in the below listed table is higher than can be attributed to normal reactor coolant activity alone. These levels indicate that approximately 4% of the fuel cladding has failed which is consistent with the release of 300 uC/ml DEI to the containment atmosphere. Release of this amount of activity into containment corresponds to a loss of both the fuel clad and RCS barriers. Basis for the calculation which determined the activity levels can be found in engineering calculation OSC-5283.

Hours Since SD RIA 57 RIA 58 0-<0.5 >300 > 150 0.5- <2.0 > 80 > 40 2.0-8.0 > 32 > 16 There is no "Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

D-8 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE

5. Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgment This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly but warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director to fall under either the loss or potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

D-9 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE CONTAINMENT BARRIER EALs: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6)

The Containment Barrier includes the containment building, its connections up to and including the outermost containment isolation valves. This barrier also includes the main steam, feedwater, and blowdown line extensions outside the containment building up to and including the outermost secondary side isolation valve.

1. Containment Pressure

• Containment pressure above 59 psig (the design pressure) indicates that the containment or its heat removal systems are not functioning as intended. This degradation of containment pressure control represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

• Containment pressure of 10 psig with no reactor building cooling units or reactor building spray available represents degradation in the control of the containment conditions. Therefore, this situation represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

• A containment hydrogen concentration greater than 9 percent volume is sufficient to expect that any ignition would result in complete combustion of the hydrogen in containment and a significant pressure rise. At hydrogen concentrations near 9 percent volume no challenge to containment integrity would be expected. At levels somewhat higher the possibility of a deflagration to detonation transition raises the uncertainty as to the actual response of the containment. Therefore, it is prudent that this level of hydrogen in the containment be considered a potential loss of containment integrity.

• Rapid unexplained loss of pressure (i.e., not attributable to containment spray or condensation effects) following an initial pressure increase indicates a loss of containment integrity.

Containment pressure and sump levels should increase as a result of the mass and energy release into containment from a LOCA. Thus, sump level or pressure not increasing indicates an interfacing systems LOCA which is a containment bypass and a loss of containment integrity.

D-10 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE

2. Containment Isolation Valve Status After Containment Isolation Failure to isolate those containment pathways which would allow containment atmosphere to be released to the environment is a loss of the containment barrier.

The use of the modifier "direct" in defining the release path discriminates against release paths through interfacing liquid systems. The existence of an in-line charcoal filter does not make a release path indirect since the filter is not effective at removing fission product noble gases. Typical filters have an efficiency of 95-99% removal of iodine. Given the magnitude of the core inventory of iodine, significant releases could still occur. In addition, since the fission product release would be driven by boiling in the reactor vessel, the high humidity in the release stream can be expected to render the filters ineffective in a short period.

There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with this item.

The decision of whether this EAL is satisfied should be based on present and readily available information. This includes physical data seen and heard. It is not the intent of this EAL to use relatively long term calculations to make the determination. If there is a pathway which would allow containment atmosphere to be released to the environment, this EAL is satisfied.

There is no "Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

3. SG Secondary Side Release With Primary To Secondary Leakage Secondary side releases directly to the atmosphere include atmospheric dump valves and stuck open main steam safety valves. If the main condenser is available, there may be releases via air ejector, gland seal exhauster, and other similar controlled, and often monitored, pathways. These pathways do not meet the intent of a direct opening to the environment. These minor releases are assessed using Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent Initiating Conditions. A failure of the secondary side which results in a direct opening to the environment, in combination with Primary to Secondary leakage > 10 gpm in the same steam generator, constitutes a bypass of the containment, and therefore, a loss of the containment barrier.

D-11 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE Likewise, a failure of the secondary side which results in a direct opening to the environment, in combination with Primary to Secondary leakage > 10 gpm in the other steam generator, constitutes a bypass of the containment, IF the SG with the secondary side failure is being fed feedwater from the affected unit. Therefore, this condition also constitutes a loss of the containment barrier.

In combination with the SG Tube Rupture EAL under the RCS barrier section, the appropriate classification can be determined.

There is no "Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4. Significant Radioactive Inventory in Containment Containment radiation readings shown in the table below are values which indicate significant fuel damage well in excess of the EALs associated with both loss of Fuel Clad and loss of RCS Barriers. NUREG-1228, "Source Estimations During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents," indicates that such conditions do not exist when the amount of clad damage is less than 20%. This amount of activity in containment, if released, could have such severe consequences that it is prudent to treat this as a potential loss of containment.

By treating the radioactive inventory in containment as a potential loss, a General Emergency will be declared when the conditions of the fuel clad and RCS barriers are included in the evaluation. This will allow the appropriate protective actions to be recommended.

Hours Since SD RIA 57 RIA 58 0 - < 0.5 > 1800 > 860 0.5 - < 2.0 > 400 > 195 2.0-8.0 > 280 > 130 There is no "Loss" EAL associated with this item.

D-12 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE

5. Core Exit Thermocouple Core Exit Thermocouple temperatures > 1200 °F or > 700 °F with a valid RVLS reading for greater than 15 minutes, in this potential loss EAL represent imminent core damage that, if not terminated, could lead to vessel failure and an increased potential for containment failure. The potential for containment challenge as a result of events at reactor vessel failure makes it prudent to consider an unmitigated core damage condition as a potential loss of the containment barrier.

Severe accident analyses (e.g., NUREG-1 150) have concluded that function restoration procedures can arrest core degradation within the reactor vessel in a significant fraction of the core damage scenarios, and that the likelihood of containment failure is very small in these events. Given this, it is appropriate to provide a reasonable period to allow function restoration procedures to arrest the core melt sequence. Whether or not the procedures will be effective should be apparent within 15 minutes. The Emergency Coordinator should make the declaration as soon as it is determined that the procedures have been, or will be ineffective.

There is no "Loss" EAL associated with this item.

6. Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgment This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly but warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director to fall under either the loss or potential loss of the Containment Barrier.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 01/92, Table 5-F-3 D-13 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUALEVENT ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL EMERGENCY EMERGENCY RCS Leakage Unplanned Loss of Most or Inability to Monitor a All Safety System Significant Transient in Unplanned Loss of Most or Annunciation or Indication Progress All Safety System in Control Room With Either Annunciation or Indication (1) a Significant Transient in in the Control Room for Progress, or (2)

Greater than 15 minutes Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators are Inability to Reach Required Unavailable Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications Fuel Clad Degradation D-14 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT

1. RCS Leakage OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1,2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Unidentified leakage > 10 gpm B. Pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm C. Identified leakage > 25 gpm

• Includes SG tube leakage BASIS:

Reactor Coolant system (RCS) Leakage is defined in RCS Operational Leakage in the Technical Specifications Basis B 3.4.13.

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 10 gpm value for the unidentified and pressure boundary leakage was selected as it is observable with normal control room indications. Lesser values must generally be determined through time-consuming surveillance tests (e.g., mass balances).

The EAL for identified leakage is set at a higher value due to the lesser significance of identified leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage. In either case, escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs or IC, Enclosure 4.4, Loss of Shutdown Function, "Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown".

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SU5 D-15 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT

2. Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in the Control Room for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1,2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. Unplanned loss of> 50% of the following annunciators for greater than 15 minutes Units l&3 1SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14,15, 16 and 18 3SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16 and 18 Unit 2 2SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15 and 16 AND In the opinion ofthe Operations Shift Manager, the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

BASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment.

"Unplanned" loss of annunciators or indicator excludes scheduled maintenance and testing activities. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. Equipment monitored by referenced annunciator panel is shown on page 20.

This Unusual Event will be escalated to an Alert if a transient is in progress during the loss of annunciation or indication.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SU3 D-16 Rev. 2015-003 April 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT

3. Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1,2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Technical Specifications LCO Action Statement Time.

BASIS:

Technical Specification Actions Statements require the plant to be brought to a required shutdown mode when the Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored. Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition. In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site Technical Specifications requires a one hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)

Non-emergency events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shut down within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. An immediate Notification of an Unusual Event is required when the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications.

Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the LCO-specified action statement time period elapses under the site Technical Specifications and is not related to how long a condition may have existed. Other required Technical Specification shutdowns that involve precursors to more serious events are addressed by other System Malfunction, Hazards, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SU2 D-17 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT

4. Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Loss of all onsite communications capability (internal phone system, PA system, ERO notification system, onsite radio system) affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

B. Loss of all offsite communications capability DEMNET, ETS lines, offsite radio system, commercial phone system) affecting the ability to communicate with offsite authorities.

BASIS:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of communications capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant operations or the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities. The loss of offsite communications ability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than the condition addressed by 10 CFR 50.72.

This EAL is intended to be used only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (relaying of information from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.).

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SU6 D-18 Rev. 2015-003 April 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT

5. Fuel Clad Degradation.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. DEI > 5 uCi/ml BASIS:

Chemistry analysis which indicates the presence of> 5 uci/ml dose equivalent iodine in the reactor coolant system clearly denotes a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. The basis for the 5 uCi/ml is based upon the Oconee FSAR, Chapter 15, Table 15-14 of RCS Coolant Activity for 1%

failed fuel. Escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via the Fission Product Barrier Degradation Monitoring ICs, Enclosure 4.1 of this document.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SU4 D-19 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ALERT

1. Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in Control Room With Either (1) a Significant Transient in Progress, or (2)

Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators are Unavailable.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1,2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. Unplanned loss of> 50% of the following annunciators for greater than 15 minutes.

Units 1&3 1SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, and 18 3SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, and 18 Unit 2 2SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15 and 16 AND In the opinion of the Operations Shift Manager, the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

AND Either of the following:

A significant plant transient is in progress.

OR Loss of the OAC and PAM indications.

D-20 Rev. 2015-003 April 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION BASIS:

SA 1-9 ES, RPS, CRD breakers, basic information concerning primary system, fire alarms, seismic trigger, condenser cooling, HPSW and LPSW system status.

SA 14-16: Electrical load (Keowee emergency start, load shed, emergency power switching logic)

SA-18 : CRD shunt trip relay, ICS, PZR relief valve flow, hydrogen concentration in RB, chlorine gas leakage.

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment during a transient.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

"Significant Transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as scrams, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

Significant indication is available from the OAC (operational aid computer) and from post accident monitoring (PAM). Loss of this data in conjunction with the loss of other indications would further impair the ability to monitor plant parameters.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

This Alert will be escalated to a Site Area Emergency if the operating crew cannot monitor the transient in progress.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92/ SA4 D-21 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. Inability to Monitor a Significant Transient in Progress OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1,2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A Unplanned loss of> 50% of the following annunciators for greater than 15 minutes.

Units 1&3 ISA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, and 18 3SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, and 18 Unit 2 2SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, and 16 AND A significant plant transient is in progress.

AND Loss of the OAC and the PAM indications.

AND Inability to directly monitor any one of the following functions:

• Subcriticality

• Inadequate core cooling

• Heat sink

• Containment Integrity

• RCS integrity

• RCS Inventory BASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the inability of the control room staff to monitor the plant response to a transient. The inability to directly monitor indicates that computer data points or SPDS indicators are not available to monitor the critical safety functions.

D-22 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION SITE AREA EMERGENCY "Significant Transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as scrams, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power oscillations of 10% of greater.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SS6 D-23 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUALEVENT ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL EMERGENCY EMERGENCY Any Unplanned Release of Any Unplanned Release of Boundary Dose Resulting Boundary Dose Gaseous or Liquid Gaseous or Liquid from an Actual or Resulting from an Radioactivity to the Radioactivity to the Imminent Release of Actual or Imminent Environment that Exceeds Environment that Exceeds Gaseous Radioactivity Release of Gaseous Two Times the SLC 200 Times the SLC limits Exceeds 100 mRem TEDE Radioactivity that Limits for 60 Minutes or for 15 Minutes or Longer or 500 mRem CDE thyroid Exceeds 1000 mRem Longer for the Actual or Projected TEDE or 5000 mRem Duration of the Release CDE thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release Unexpected Increase in Major Damage to Irradiated Plant Radiation Levels or Fuel or Loss of Water Level Airborne Concentration that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown D-24 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds Two Times the SLC Limits for 60 Minutes or Longer OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. A valid indication on radiation monitor RIA 33 ofŽ> 4.06E+06 cpm for > 60 minutes. (See Note)

B. Valid indication on radiation monitor RIA-45 of> 9.35E+05 cpm or RP sample reading of_> 6.62E-2uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for > 60 minutes. (See Note)

C. Confirmed sample analysis of liquid effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11.1 for > 60 minutes as determined by Chemistry procedures.

D. Confirmed sample analysis of gaseous effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11.2 for > 60 minutes as determined by Radiation Protection procedures.

Note: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL AND the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this period, declaration must be made on the valid Radiation monitor reading.

BASIS:

The term "Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm setpoints, etc.) on the applicable package.

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

D-25 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT Chapter 16, Selected Licensee Commitments, of the Oconee Nuclear Station FSAR provides guidance to ensure that the release of liquid or gaseous effluent does not exceed the limits established in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II and Appendix I, 10 CFR 50.

Unplanned releases in excess of two times the selected licensee commitments that continue for 60 minutes or longer represent an uncontrolled situation and hence, a potential degradation in the level of safety. It is not intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes. The event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 60 minutes.

1. Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds Two Times the SLC Limits for 60 Minutes or Longer Monitor indications are based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Annual average meteorology (semi-elevated 1.672E-06 sec/m3) has been used. Radiation Protection will use HP/0/B/1 009/015 to quantify a gaseous release.

Operations will use OP/0/A/1 104/068 and/or OP/0/A/1 104/072 to quantify a liquid release.

BASIS:

References to RIA-45 are intended to be related to unit specific RIA-45 only. 4RIA-45 provides a concentration value, not in cpm, that is used by unit 1, 2, 3 RIA-45.

Additionally, a radionuclide concentration value of 6.62E-2 uCi/ml cannot be obtained in the Radwaste Facility (RWF) ventilation system discharge without the input of post-accident concentrations of gaseous radionuclides. There are no post-accident inputs to the RWF other than planned batch transfers of liquids and resins that would be transferred in a controlled manner. All gaseous radionuclides would be entrained in the liquids and resins since there are no gas storage tanks in the RWF to accept a transfer of gaseous waste.

Unit 1,2,3 RIA-45 could detect a concentration of 6.62E-2 uCi/ml post-accident since a LOCA in the Auxiliary Building could provide the source activity.

D-26 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT The Radwaste Facility is only used for waste water and resin processing. The type of waste processed, even if it contained entrained gasses from the reactor coolant system, cannot contain sufficient activity during normal operation to result in SLC limits being exceeded.

Liquid waste is not transferred to the Radwaste Facility during an event. The Radwaste Facility 4RIA-45 alarm set point is set at 5% of the station release limit. This set point is based on providing a set point that will not cause spurious alarms and will maintain total effluent releases below 100% of the station release limit. It is recognized that the Radwaste Facility is a less significant gaseous release pathway since the 4RIA-45 set point is set at one sixth of the 1, 2, or 3 RIA-45 set points. This EAL is only applicable to 1, 2, or 3 RIA-45 since the accident related source term that enters an intact Auxiliary Building will be released out of the unit vents.

Reference NUMARC/NESP/-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AUI D-27 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT

2. Unexpected Increase in Plant Radiation or Airborne Concentration.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. LT 5 reading 14" and decreasing with makeup not keeping up with leakage WITH fuel in the core B. Valid indication of uncontrolledwater decrease in the SFP or fuel transfer canal with all fuel assemblies remaining covered by water AND unplanned valid RIA 3, 6 or portable area monitor readings increase.

C. 1 R/hr radiation reading at one foot away from a damaged irradiated spent fuel dry storage module.

D. Valid area or process monitor exceeds limits stated in Enclosure 4.9 of RP/O/A/1000/001.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

EAL 1 indicates that the water level in the reactor refueling cavity is uncontrolled. If the area/process monitors reach the HIGH alarm setpoint, classification should be upgraded to an Alert.

All of the above events tend to have long lead times relative to potential for radiological release outside the site boundary, thus impact to public health and safety is very low.

In light of reactor cavity seal failure incidents, explicit coverage of these types of events via EALs 1 and 2 is appropriate given their potential for increased doses to plant staff.

Classification as an Unusual Event is warranted as a precursor to a more serious event.

EAL 3 applies to licensed dry storage of older irradiated spent fuel to address degradation of this spent fuel.

D-28 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT EAL 4 addresses unplanned increases in in-plant radiation levels that represent a degradation in the control of radioactive material, and represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. The RIA readings for an Unusual Event are 1000 times the normal value. Enclosure 4.9 of RP/0/A/1000/001 will provide the actual readings for the monitors.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AU2 NEI 99-01, Rev. 4, 08/00, AU2 D-29 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.9 (RP/O/A/1000/001)

UNEXPECTED/UNPLANNED INCREASE IN AREA MONITOR READINGS This initiating condition is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

UNIT 1, 2, 3 UNUSUAL ALERT EVENT mRad/hr normal MONITOR NUMBER normal levels mRad/hr RIA 7, Hot Machine Shop 150 > 5000 Elevation 796 RIA 8, Hot Chemistry Lab 4200 > 5000 Elevation 796 RIA 10, Primary Sample 830 > 5000 Hood, Elevation 796 RIA 11, Change Room 210 > 5000 Elevation 796 RIA 12, Chem Mix Tank 800 > 5000 Elevation 783 RIA 13, Waste Disposal 650 > 5000 Sink, Elevation 771 RIA 15, HPI Room NOTE* > 5000 Elevation 758 NOTE*: RIA 15 normal readings are approximately 9 mRad/hr on a daily basis.

Applying the 1000 x normal readings would put this monitor greater than 5000 mRad/hr just for an Unusual Event. For this reason, an Unusual Event will not be declared for any reading less than 5000 mRad/hr D-30 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT

1. Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds 200 Times Radiological Technical Specifications for 15 Minutes or Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Valid indication of RIA-46 of> 2.09E+04 cpm or RP sample reading of> 6.62 uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for > 15 minutes (See Note)

B RIA 33 HIGH alarm AND, Liquid effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11.1 for > 15 minutes as determined by chemistry procedure.

C. Gaseous effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11.2 for >

15 minutes as determined by RP procedure.

Note: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL AND required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this period, declaration must be made on the valid Radiation monitor reading.

BASIS:

The term "Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm setpoints, etc.) on the applicable package.

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

This event escalates from the Unusual Event by escalating the magnitude of the release by a factor of 100.

D-31 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT It is not intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. The event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 15 minutes.

Monitor indications are based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Annual average meteorology (semi-elevated release 1.672 E-06 sec/m3) has been used.

Chapter 16, Selected Licensee Commitments, of the Oconee Nuclear Station FSAR outlines the release limits for gaseous effluent is released by the Control Room. Liquid effluent is discharged by Operations from the Radwaste Facility. Effluent monitors have setpoints established to alarm should activity be detected that would exceed limits established by 10 CFR 20, Table B, Appendix II. Radiation Protection and/or Chemistry would calculate the release rate and quantify the amount being released.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AA1 D-32 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT

2. Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Valid radiation reading > 15 mRad/hr in the Control Room, CAS, or Radwaste Control Room.

B. Unplanned/unexpected valid area radiation monitor readings exceed limits stated in Enclosure 4.9 ofRP/O/A/1000/001.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation reading has been confirmed by the operators to be correct.

This IC addresses unplanned/unexpected increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations, or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually, in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

The Control Room, Central Alarm Station (CAS) and the Radwaste Control Room are areas that will need to be continuously occupied. No radiation monitors are in the CAS or the Radwaste Control Room.

Oconee has chosen to use a generic emergency action level of greater than or equal to 5000 mRad/hr for the Alert classification for areas in the plant that would need to be utilized for safe operation or safe shutdown of the unit. Enclosure 4.9 of RP/O/A/1000/001 provides the monitor number and the location of the area monitor.

This IC is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AA3 D-33 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT

3. Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Water Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Valid RIA 3*, 6, 41, or 49* HIGH alarm readings

• Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only B. Valid HIGH alarm reading on portable area monitors on the main bridge or spent fuel pool bridge.

C. Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered.

D. Operators determine water level drop in either the SFP or fuel transfer canal will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered.

BASIS:

This IC applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage and is not intended to address spent fuel which is licensed for dry storage.

The HIGH alarm for RIA 3 (containment area monitor) and RIA 49 (RB gaseous process monitor) corresponds to the setpoints established to assure that 10 CFR 20 limits are not exceeded.

The HIGH alarm setpoint for RIA 6 (SFP bridge area monitor) is designed to make operators aware of increased readings above 10 CFR 20 limits. The HIGH alarm setpoint for RIA 41 (Spent Fuel Pool gaseous atmosphere) is set to alarm if 4 times the limits of 10 CFR 20 are exceeded based upon Xe-133. RIA 49 monitors the reactor building gas.

Portable monitors are established during refueling outages and are located on the main bridge, and the spent fuel pool bridge.

D-34 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT There is time available to take corrective actions, and there is little potential for substantial fuel damage. Thus, an Alert Classification for this event is appropriate. Escalation, if appropriate, would occur via Abnormal Rad Level/Radiological Effluent or Emergency Coordinator Judgment.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AA2 D-35 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Radioactivity Exceeds 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Valid reading on RIA-46 of_> 2.09E+05 cpm or RIA 56 reading of_> 17.5 Rihr or RP sample reading of 6.62E+01 uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for > 15 minutes. (See Note)

B. Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on Enclosure 4.8 ofRP/O/A/1000/001.

(See Note)

C. Dose calculations result in a dose projection at the site boundary of 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid.

D. Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding 100 mRad/hr expected to continue for more than one hour; OR analysis of field survey samples indicate adult thyroid dose commitment (CDE) of 500 mRem for one hour of inhalation.

Note: If actual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes, then the valid monitor reading should be used for emergency classification.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

The calculation for RIA 46 (vent monitor) setpoint is based on whole body dose (100 mRem) using ODCM guidance: average annual meteorology (semi-elevated release 1.672E-6 sec/m3), vent flow rate of 65,000 cfm, and release duration of 15 minutes. No credit is taken for vent filtration.

The calculation for RIA 57/58 (in containment monitors) setpoints are based on the following: LOCA conditions which provide the more conservative reading, Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) thyroid (500 mRem), average annual meteorology (7.308 E-6 sec/m3), design basis leakage of 5.6E6 ml/hr, release duration of one hour, and time since unit trip. No credit is taken for filtration.

D-36 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY Dose assessment team members use actual meteorology, release duration, and unit vent flow rate or actual leakage rate from containment. Therefore, the predetermined monitor readings would not be used if dose assessment team calculations are available from the TSC or EOF in a timely manner (within approximately 15 minutes).

The 100 mRem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) and the 500 mRem Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) thyroid in this initiating condition is based on 10 CFR 20 annual average population exposure. The dose projection typically uses a 4-hour default for time of release. The Dose Assessment program will provide dose projection default times for specific release pathways. If the real time release time is known it will be used in the calculation. One order of magnitude is the gradient factor between the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classes. These values are 10% of the EPA PAG values given in EPA-400-R-92-001.

The field monitoring survey results are based on actual hand-held instrument readings at the site boundary. It is assumed that the release will continue for more than one hour.

Adult thyroid is considered to be the limiting factor.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AS I D-37 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

ENCLOSURE 4.8 (RP/o/A/1ooo/oo1)

RADIATION MONITOR READINGS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION NOTE: IF ACTUAL DOSE ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE COMPLETED WITHIN 15 MINUTES, THEN THE VALID MONITOR READING SHOULD BE USED FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION.

ALL RIA VALUES ARE CONSIDERED TO BE GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO.

HOURS SINCE REACTOR RIA 57 R/hr RIA 58 R/hr*

TRIPPED Site Area Emergency General Emergency Site Area Emergency General Emergency 0 - < 0.5 5.9E+003 5.9E+004 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 0.5 - < 1.0 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 1.LE+003 1.1E+004 1.0 - < 1.5 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.6E+002 8.6E+003 1.5 - < 2.0 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.5E+002 8.5E+003 2.0 - < 2.5 1.4E+003 1.4E+004 6.3E+002 6.3E+003 2.5 - < 3.0 1.2E+003 1.2E+004 5.7E+002 5.7E+003 3.0 - < 3.5 L.1E+003 L.1E+004 5.2E+002 5.2E+003 3.5 - < 4.0 1.OE+003 1.OE+004 4.8E+002 4.8E+003 4.0 - < 8.0 1.OE+003 1.OE+004 4.4E+002 4.4E+003

• Note: RIA 58 is partially shielded.

Assumptions used for calculation of high range in-containment monitors RIA 57 and 58:

1. Average annual meteorology (7.308 E-6 sec/m3)

2. Design basis leakage (5.6 E6 ml/hr)

3. One hour release duration

4. General Emergency PAGs are 1 rem TEDE and 5 rem CDE; SAE determination is based on 10% of the General Emergency PAGs.

5. Calculations for monitor readings are based on CDE (adult thyroid - 500 mRem) because thyroid dose is limiting.

6. No credit is taken for filtration.

7. LOCA conditions are limiting and provide the more conservative reading.

Assumptions used for calculation of vent monitor RIA 46:

1. Average annual meteorology (1.672 E-6 see/m3), semi-elevated

2. Vent flow rate 65,000 cfm (average daily flow rate)

3. No credit is taken for vent filtration

4. Fifteen minute release duration.

5. General Emergency PAGs are 1 rem TEDE and 5 rem CDE; SAE determination is based on 10% of the General Emergency PAGs.

6. Calculations for monitor readings are based on whole body dose (100 mRem).

7. Calculation is based on ODCM methodology and NUMARC guidance D-38 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY

2. Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 5, 6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

Loss of Reactor Vessel Water Level as indicated by:

A. Failure of heat sink causes loss of Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) conditions AND LT-5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS makeup.

B. Failure of heat sink causes loss of Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) conditions AND either train ultrasonic level indication less than 0 inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS makeup.

BASIS:

Under the conditions specified by this IC, severe core damage can occur due to prolonged boiling following loss of decay heat removal. Declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted under the conditions specified by the IC. Escalation to a General Emergency is via Enclosure 4.3, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent.

Note: Both the LT-5 and the ultrasonic level instrumentation are located in the center line of the hot leg.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev.2, 01/92, SS5 D-39 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Gaseous Radioactivity that Exceeds 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem (CDE) Adult Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release Using Actual Meteorology.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Valid reading on RIA 46 of> 2.09E+06 cpm or RIA 56 reading of> 175 R/hr or RP sample reading of 6.62E +02uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for > 15 minutes (See Note)

B. Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on Enclosure 4.8 of RP/0/A/1000/001.

(See Note)

C. Dose calculations result in a dose projection at the site boundary of> 1000 mRem TEDE OR > 5000 mRem CDE (Adult Thyroid).

D. Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding 1000 mRad/hr expected to continue for more than one hour; OR analyses of field survey samples indicate adult thyroid commitment (CDE) of 5000 mRem for one hour of inhalation.

Note: If actual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes, then the valid monitor reading should be used for emergency classification.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

The calculation for RIA 46 (vent monitor) setpoint is based on the following: whole body dose (100 mRem) using ODCM guidance, average annual meteorology (semi-elevated release 1.672E-6 sec/m3), vent flow rate of 65,000 CFM, and release duration of 15 minutes. No credit is taken for vent filtration.

The calculation for RIA 57/58 (incontainment monitors) setpoints are based on the following: LOCA conditions which provide the more conservative reading, Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE-adult thyroid 500 mRem), average annual meteorology (7.308 E-6, sec/m3), design basis leakage of 5.6E6 ml/hr, release duration of one hour, and time since unit trip. No credit is taken for filtration.

D-40 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT GENERAL EMERGENCY Calculations by the dose assessment team use actual meteorology, duration, and unit vent flow rate or actual leakage rate from containment. Therefore, the predetermined monitor readings would not be used if dose assessment calculations are available from the TSC or EOF in a timely manner (within approximately 15 minutes).

The 1000 mRem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) and the 5000 mRem Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) adult thyroid in this initiating condition is based on 10 CFR 20 annual average population exposure. These values are EPA PAG guidelines as expressed in EPA-400-R-92-001. The Dose Assessment program will provide dose projection default time for specific release pathways. This default value will be utilized until a corrected release time is determined.

Field monitoring results will utilize a one hour period of time for calculating survey results. .8 of RP/0/A/1000/001 is shown on page 34 of this document.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AGI D-41 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Unexpected increase in plant Failure of Reactor Protection Failure of Reactor Protection Failure of the Reactor radiation levels or airborne System Instrumentation to System Instrumentation to Protection System to Complete concentrations Complete or Initiate an Complete or Initiate an an Automatic Scram and Automatic Reactor Scram Automatic Reactor Scram Manual Scram was NOT Once a Reactor Protection Once a Reactor Protection Successful and There is System Setpoint Has Been System Setpoint Has Been Indication of an Extreme Exceeded and Manual Scram Exceeded and Manual Scram Challenge to the Ability to Was Successful Was NOT Successful Cool the Core Inability to Maintain Plant in Complete Loss of Function Cold Shutdown Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown Major damage to irradiated Loss of Water Level in the fuel or loss of water level that Reactor Vessel That Has or has or will result in the Will Uncover Fuel in the uncovering of irradiated fuel Reactor Vessel outside the reactor vessel D-42 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Unexpected Increase in Plant Radiation or Airborne Concentration.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. LT 5 reading 14" and decreasing with makeup not keeping up with leakage WITH fuel in the core B. Valid indication of uncontrolledwater decrease in the SFP or fuel transfer canal with all fuel assemblies remaining covered by water AND unplanned valid RIA 3, 6 or portable area monitor readings increase.

C. 1 R/hr radiation reading at one foot away from a damaged irradiated spent fuel dry storage module.

D. Valid area or process monitor exceeds limits stated in Enclosure 4.9 of RP/O/A/1000/001.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

EAL 1 indicates that the water level in the reactor refueling cavity is uncontrolled. If the area/process monitors reach the HIGH alarm setpoint, classification should be upgraded to an Alert.

All of the above events tend to have long lead times relative to potential for radiological release outside the site boundary, thus impact to public health and safety is very low.

In light of reactor cavity seal failure incidents, explicit coverage of these types of events via EALs 1 and 2 is appropriate given their potential for increased doses to plant staff.

Classification as an Unusual Event is warranted as a precursor to a more serious event.

EAL 3 applies to licensed dry storage of older irradiated spent fuel to address degradation of this spent fuel.

D-43 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT EAL 4 addresses unplanned increases in in-plant radiation levels that represent a degradation in the control of radioactive material, and represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. The RIA readings for an Unusual Event are 1000 times the normal value. Enclosure 4.9 of RP/0/A/1000/001 will provide the actual readings for the monitors.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AU2 NEI 99-01, Rev. 4, 08/00, AU2 D-44 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT

1. Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Scram Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Scram Was Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1, 2,3 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. VALID reactor trip signal received or required without automatic scram AND ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

DSS has inserted Control Rods OR Manual reactor trip from the control room is successful and reactor power is less than 5% and decreasing.

BASIS:

This condition indicates failure of the automatic protection system to scram the reactor.

This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus the plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded.

An Alert is indicated because conditions exist that lead to potential loss of fuel clad or RCS. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded (rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded) is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. If the reactor protective system fails, the Diverse Scram Signal system (which was installed at Oconee since 10/7/91 as a result of Generic Letter 83-28) will drop control rod groups 5,6,7 into the core.

A manual scram is any set of actions by the reactor operator(s) at the reactor control console which causes control rods to be RAPIDLY inserted into the core and brings the reactor subcritical.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SA2 D-45 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT Operator action to drive rods does NOT constitute a reactor trip, (i.e. does not meet the rapid insertion criterion).

Failure of Diverse Scram Signal and the manual scram would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SA2 D-46 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT

2. Inability to Maintain Plant in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown).

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 5,6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Loss of LPI and/or LPSW AND Inability to maintain RCS temperature below 200 °F as indicated by either of the following:

RCS temperature at the LPI pump suction OR Average of the 5 highest CETCs as indicated by ICCM display.

OR Visual observation BASIS:

LPI is the low pressure injection system LPSW is low pressure service water.

This IC is based on concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal."

number of phenomena such as pressurization, vortexing, RCS level differences when operating at a mid-loop condition, decay heat removal system design, and level instrumentation problems can lead to conditions where decay heat removal is lost and core uncovery can occur. NRC analyses show sequences that can cause core uncovery in 15 to 20 minutes and severe core damage within an hour after decay heat removal is lost.

Loss of the LPI system and/or the LPSW system causes an uncontrolled temperature rise in the reactor coolant system. Uncontrolled is understood to be "not as the result of operator action." Rising temperature of the reactor coolant system can be determined at the LPI pump suction, average of the 5 highest CETCs as indicated by ICCM display or through operator visual observation (steam or boiling) in the reactor building.

D-47 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT With a loss of LPI pumps there will be no RCS flow at the LPI pump suction and RCS temperature at that point will not represent RCS temperature in the reactor vessel. Also, with the reactor head in place, visual observation may not be possible.

Escalation to the Site Area Emergency is by, "Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel," or by Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent ICs.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SA3 D-48 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT

3. Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Water Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Valid RIA 3*, 6, 41 or 49* HIGH alarm readings Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only.

B. Valid HIGH alarm reading on portable area monitors on the main bridge or spent fuel pool bridge.

C. Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered.

D. Operators determine water level drop in either the SFP or fuel transfer canal will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered.

BASIS:

This IC applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage and is not intended to address spent fuel which is licensed for dry storage.

The HIGH alarm for RIA 3 (containment area monitor) and RIA 49 (RB gaseous process monitor) corresponds to the setpoints established to assure that 10 CFR 20 limits are not exceeded.

The HIGH alarm setpoint for RIA 6 (SFP bridge area monitor) is designed to make operators aware of increased readings above 10 CFR 20 limits. The HIGH alarm setpoint for RIA 41 (Spent Fuel Pool gaseous atmosphere) is set to alarm if 4 times the limits of 10 CFR 20 are exceeded based upon Xe-133. RIA 49 monitors the reactor building gas. Portable monitors are established during refueling outages and are located on the main bridge, and the spent fuel pool bridge.

D-49 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT There is time available to take corrective actions, and there is little potential for substantial fuel damage. Thus, an Alert Classification for this event is appropriate. Escalation, if appropriate, would occur via Abnormal Rad Level/Radiological Effluent, Loss of Shutdown Functions or Emergency Coordinator Judgment.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AA2 D-50 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Scram Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Scram Was NOT Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1, 2 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. VALID reactor trip signal received or required without automatic scram AND DSS has NOT inserted Control Rods AND Manual reactor trip from the control room was not successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

BASIS:

Automatic and manual scram are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to scram the reactor.

This EAL is met if a reactor trip is required and the manual reactor trip function fails.

A failure of the manual reactor trip pushbutton to initiate a reactor trip is indication of a failure of the Reactor Protection System.

Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS.

Although this IC may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response.

Escalation of this event to a General Emergency would be via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or Emergency Coordinator Judgment ICs.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SS2 D-51 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY

2. Complete Loss of Function Needed to Achieve or Maintain Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown).

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1,2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

Any of the following conditions exist:

A. Average of the 5 highest CETCs > 1200 OF on ICCM.

B. Unable to maintain reactor subcritical C. Inability to feed SGs prior to RCS pressure reaching 2300 psig and HPI Forced Cooling degraded by any of the following:

• Unacceptable HPI flow/pressure in either header per EOP Rule 4

• Only 1 HPI Pump available

• Either PORV (*RC-66) and/or PORV Block (*RC-4) closed BASIS:

This EAL addresses complete loss of functions, core cooling and heat sink, required for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressure and temperature. Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public. Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted.

Core exit thermocouple readings are considered to be the average of the five (5) highest thermocouple readings shown on the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor.

HPI Forced cooling represents the failure of the steam generators to remove heat from the core. To use this mode of cooling indicates that all feedwater (both main and emergency) are not available for use and the pressure of the reactor coolant system is greater than or equal to 2300 psig. The power-operated relieve valve must be opened to initiate the cooling through the high pressure injection system. In effect, a self-imposed loss of coolant is established.

Declaration of a Site Are Emergency is warranted with the total loss of main and emergency feedwater with SSF and PSW unavailable coincident with degraded High Pressure Injection.

D-52 Rev. 2015-003 April 2015

Escalation to General Emergency would be via Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, Emergency Coordinator Judgment, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

The installation of the PSW Pump enables the Station to NOT require a blow-down of the SG's in order to commence feeding to achieve shutdown cooling, as the PSW pump is a high discharge head pump. The installation and the use of the PSW pump provides a better margin of safety for the plant.

The SSF can provide the following: (1) makeup to the Reactor Coolant pump seals, (2) low pressure service water to the steam generators (additional method for heat sink), (3) capability to keep the unit in hot shutdown for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following an Appendix R fire.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SS4 D-53 Rev. 2015-003 April 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY

3. Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 5, 6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

Loss of Reactor Vessel Water Level as indicated by:

A. Failure of heat sink causes loss of Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) conditions.

AND LT-5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS makeup.

B. Failure of heat sink causes loss of Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) conditions.

AND Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 0 inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS makeup.

BASIS:

Under the conditions specified by this IC, severe core damage can occur due to prolonged boiling following loss of decay heat removal. Declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted under the conditions specified by the IC. Escalation to a General Emergency is via .3, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent.

Note: Both the LT-5 and the ultrasonic level instrumentation are located in the center line of the hot leg.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SS5 D-54 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Failure of the Reactor Protection System to Complete an Automatic Scram and Manual Scram was NOT Successful and There is Indication of an Extreme Challenge to the Ability to Cool the Core.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1,2 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. VALID reactor trip signal received or required WITHOUT automatic scram AND Manual reactor trip from the control room was not successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

AND Average of five highest CETCs> '1200 °F on the ICCM.

BASIS:

Automatic and manual scram are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to scram the reactor. Under the conditions of the IC and its associated EALs, the efforts to bring the reactor subcritical have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed. The extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core is intended to mean that the core exit temperatures are at or approaching 1200 OF. (Note:

CETCs reading > 1200 OF is also a good indicator that the reactor vessel water level is below the top of the active fuel. Oconee does not have an indication for the reactor vessel water level below the top of the active fuel.)

The General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the fission product barrier matrix declaration to permit maximum offsite intervention time.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SG2 D-55 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUALEVENT ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL EMERGENCY EMERGENCY Loss of All Offsite Power to Loss of All Offsite Power Loss of All Offsite Power Prolonged Loss of All Essential Busses for Greater and Loss of All Onsite AC and Loss of All Onsite AC (Offsite.and Onsite) AC Than 15 Minutes Power to Essential Busses Power to Essential Busses Power During Cold Shutdown Or Refueling Mode Unplanned Loss of Required AC power to essential Loss of All Vital DC DC Power During Cold busses reduced to a single Power Shutdown or Refueling Mode power source for greater for Greater than 15 Minutes than 15 minutes such that an additional single failure could result in station blackout D-56 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Loss of All Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. Unit auxiliaries being supplied from Keowee or CT5.

AND Inability to energize either MFB from an offsite source (either switchyard) within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout). Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Keowee Hydro station provides the emergency power to the Oconee Nuclear Site. CT5 is powered from the Lee Steam Station and provides back-up power to the site.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SUl D-57 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT

2. Unplanned Loss of Required DC Power During Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) or Mode 6 (Refueling Mode) for Greater than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 5,6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. Unplanned Loss of Vital DC power to required DC busses as indicated by bus voltage less than 110 VDC.

AND Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss.

BASIS:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling operations. This EAL is intended to be anticipatory in as much as the operating crew may not have necessary indication and control of equipment needed to respond to the loss.

"Unplanned" is included in this IC and EAL to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

If this loss results in the inability to maintain cold shutdown, the escalation to an Alert will be per Enclosure 4.4, Loss of Shutdown Functions "Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown."

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SU7 D-58 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER ALERT

1. Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses During Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) Or Mode 6 (Refueling Mode).

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 5,6, Defueled EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. MFB 1 and 2 de-energized.

AND Failure to restore power to at least one main feeder bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal, Spent Fuel Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be classified as an Alert, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the emergency busses, relative to that specified for the Site Area Emergency EAL. Escalating to Site Area Emergency, if appropriate, is by Enclosure 4.3, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, or Enclosure 4.7, Natural Disasters, Hazards, and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety, Emergency Coordinator Judgment ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SA1 D-59 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER ALERT

2. AC power capability to essential busses reduced to a single power source for greater than 15 minutes such that an additional single failure could result in station blackout.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1, 2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following condition exists:

A. AC power capability has been degraded to a single power source for > 15 min. due to the loss of all but one of the following:

Unit Normal Transformer (backcharged)

Unit Startup transformer Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned)

CT4 CT5 BASIS:

This IC and the associated EAL is intended to provide an escalation from IC, "Loss of All Offsite Power To Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes." The condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the offsite and onsite power systems such that an additional single failure could result in a station blackout. In this particular situation, a station blackout applies to the unit in question even though the other units may not be affected.

This condition could occur due to a loss of offsite power with a concurrent failure of either CT4 or CT5 to supply power to the main feeder busses.

The subsequent loss of this single power source would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency in accordance with IC, "Loss of All Offsite and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses."

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SA5 D-60 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1, 2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

A. MFB 1 and 2 de-energized AND Failure to restore power to at least one main feeder bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power.

BASIS:

Loss of all-AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink.

Prolonged loss of all AC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity, thus this event can escalate to a General Emergency.

Escalation to General Emergency is via Enclosure 4.1 Fission Product Barrier Degradation or IC, "Prolonged Loss of All 'Offsite Power and Prolonged Loss of All Onsite AC Power."

Loss of offsite power (6900V) eliminates the use of power from Duke Power grid and also eliminates distribution of power from the unit generator. Loss of onsite AC (4160V) which includes both Keowee Hydro units, eliminates the use of HPI pumps, LPI pumps, reactor building spray pumps, low pressure service water pumps, CCW pumps, condensate booster pumps, hotwell pumps, heater drain pumps and motor driven emergency feedwater pumps.

Turbine driven emergency feedwater pumps are assumed to be available. It is assumed for this scenario that the Standby Shutdown Facility would be available for RCS and secondary inventory control utilizing the RC makeup pump and the auxiliary service water pump.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SS1 D-61 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY

2. Loss of All Vital DC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1, 2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. Unplanned Loss of Vital DC power to required DC busses as indicated by bus voltage less than 110 VDC.

AND Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss.

BASIS:

Loss of all DC power compromises ability to monitor and control plant safety functions.

Prolonged loss of all DC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system.

Escalation to a General Emergency would occur by Enclosure 4.3, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, Enclosure 4.1, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, .7, Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety or Emergency Coordinator Judgment ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

D-62 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY The purpose of the onsite DC Power system is:

1. Provide a source of reliable, continuous power for instrumentation and controls needed for normal operation and safe shutdown of the unit through the vital DC power distribution system panelboards and essential DC power which feed Inverters for an uninterrupted source of AC power.

2. Supply DC motor operated valves and pumps required during normal operation and a total loss of AC.

Loss of DC power would place the plant in a situation of losing vital instrumentation, valves, and pumps needed to safely operate and shutdown the plant any time the unit is above cold shutdown conditions.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SS3 D-63 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Prolonged Loss of All Offsite Power and Prolonged Loss of All Onsite AC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1, 2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

Prolonged loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

A. MFB 1 and 2 de-energized AND Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) fails to maintain Mode 3 (Hot Standby).

AND AT LEAST ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

Restoration of power to at least one MFB within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NOT likely OR Indication of continuing degradation of core cooling based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink.

Prolonged loss of all those functions necessary to maintain hot shutdown will lead to loss of fuel clad, RCS, and containment.

The Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) is capable of providing the necessary functions to maintain Mode 3 (Hot Standby) condition for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. No fission product barrier degradation would be expected if the SSF is functioning as intended.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SG1 D-64 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER GENERAL EMERGENCY Analysis in support of the station blackout coping study indicates that the plant can cope with a station blackout for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> without core damage.

The likelihood of restoring at least one emergency bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation since a delay in an upgrade decision based on only a chance of mitigating the event could result in a loss of valuable time in preparing and implementing public protective actions.

In addition, under these conditions, fission product barrier monitoring capability may be degraded. Although it may be difficult to predict when power can be restored, it is necessary to give the Emergency Coordinator a reasonable idea of how quickly (s)he may need to declare a General Emergency based on two major considerations:

1. Are there any present indications that core cooling is already degraded to the point that Loss or Potential Loss of Fission Product Barriers is IMMINENT?

2. If there are no present indications of such core cooling degradation, how likely is it that power can be restored in time to assure that a loss of two barriers with a potential loss of the third barrier can be prevented?

Thus, indication of continuing core cooling degradation must be based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring with particular emphasis on Emergency Coordinator judgment as it relates to IMMINENT Loss or Potential Loss of fission product barriers and degraded ability to monitor fission product barriers.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SGl D-65 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Fire/Explosion Within the Fire or Explosion Affecting the HOSTILE ACTION within the Plant operability of plant safety Protected Area systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown Confirmed Security condition HOSTILE ACTION within the Other conditions exist which in HOSTILE ACTION resulting in or threat which indicates a OWNER CONTROLLED the judgment of the Emergency Loss of Physical Control of the potential degradation in the AREA or airborne attack threat Director warrant declaration of a Facility level of safety of the plant SITE AREA EMERGENCY Other conditions exist which Other conditions exist which in Other conditions exist which in in the judgment of the the judgment of the Emergency the judgment of the Emergency Emergency Director warrant Director warrant declaration of Director warrant declaration of a declaration of a NOUE an ALERT GENERAL EMERGENCY D-66 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Explosion or Fire Within the Plant OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL: Note: Within the plant means Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building, Reactor Building, Keowee Hydro, Transformer Yard, B3T, B4T, Service Air Diesel Compressors, Keowee Hydro and associated transformers and SSF.

A. Fire within the plant not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room alarm.

B. Unanticipated explosion within the plant resulting in visible damage to permanent structures/equipment.

• Includes steam line break and FDW line break BASIS:

The purpose of this IC is to address the magnitude and extent of fires/explosions that may be potentially significant precursors to damage to safety systems. This excludes such items as fires within administration buildings, waste-basket fires, and other small fires of no safety consequence. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant vital areas containing safety equipment or other significant buildings or areas. Verification of the alarm in this context means those actions taken in the control room to determine that the control room alarm is not spurious. The intent of the 15-minute duration of extinguishing efforts is to size the fire and to discriminate against small fires that are readily extinguished.

Only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the plant and Keowee Hydro should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. A high energy line break (e.g., Main Steam Line or Main Feedwater Line, Heater Drain Line, etc.) would satisfy this EAL IF no additional damage is done to ECCS (safety related systems) equipment/components. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of evidence of damage (e.g.,

deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. The Emergency Coordinator also needs to consider any security aspects of the explosion, if applicable.

D-67 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT Escalation to a higher emergency class is by, "Fire/Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown".

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HU2 D-68 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT

2. CONFIRMED SECURITY CONDITION or THREAT which indicates a potential degradation in the level of Safety of the plant.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. A SECURITY CONDITION that does NOT involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the security shift supervisor.

B. A credible site-specific security threat notification.

C. A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.

BASIS:

NOTE: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervisor and the control room is crucial in the implementation of effective Security EALs.

Security events which do not represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant are reported under 10 CFR 73.71 or in some cases under 10 CFR 50.72. Security events assessed as HOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under 4.6.A.2, 4.6.S.1, and 4.6.G.1 A higher initial classification could be made based upon the nature and timing of the threat and potential consequences. The licensee shall consider upgrading the emergency response status and emergency classification in accordance with the Safeguards Contingency Plan and Emergency Plans.

EAL A Reference is made to site specific security shift supervision because these individuals are the designated personnel on-site qualified and trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occurred. Training on security event classification confirmation is closely controlled due to the strict secrecy controls placed on the plant Safeguards Contingency Plan.

This threshold is based on site specific security plans. Site specific Safeguards Contingency Plans are based on guidance provided by NEI 03-12.

D-69 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT EAL B This threshold is included to ensure that appropriate notifications for the security threat are made in a timely manner. This includes information of a credible threat. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Notification of an Unusual Event.

The determination of "credible" is made through use of information found in the site specific Safeguards Contingency Plan.

EAL C The intent of this EAL is to ensure that notifications for the aircraft threat are made in a timely manner and that OROs and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat. It is not the intent of this EAL to replace existing non-hostile related EALs involving aircraft.

This EAL is met when a plant receives information regarding an aircraft threat from NRC.

Validation is performed by calling the NRC or by other approved methods of authentication.

Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Unusual Event.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an airliner (airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

Escalation to Alert emergency classification level would be via 4.6.A.2 would be appropriate if the threat involves an airliner within 30 minutes of the plant.

Reference NEI 99-01, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HU4 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006 Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-70 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT

3. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a NOUE.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

BASIS This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the NOUE emergency classification level.

Reference NEI 99-01, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HU5 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006.

Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-71 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT

1. Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL: Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

The following conditions exist:

A. Fire or explosion AND ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

Affected safety-related system parameter indications show degraded performance OR Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit.

BASIS:

With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe operation of the plant should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. A fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

The key to classifying fires/explosions as an Alert is the damage as a result of the incident.

The fact that safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit has been affected or damaged as a result of the fire/explosion is the driving force for declaring the Alert. It is important to note that this EAL addresses a fire/explosion and not just the degradation of a safety system. The reference to damage of the systems is used to identify the magnitude of the fire/explosion and to discriminate against minor fires/explosions.

D-72 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator Judgment ICs.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92 D-73 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT

2. HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL: (A or B)

A. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor.

B. A validated notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat within 30 minutes of the site.

BASIS:

Note: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

These EALs address the contingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. They are not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack or is an identified attack target with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires a heightened state of readiness and implementation of protective measures that can be effective (such as on-site evacuation, dispersal or sheltering).

EAL A This EAL addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the OCA.

D-74 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT Note that this EAL is applicable for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA. This includes ISFSI's that may be outside the PROTECTED AREA but still within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA.

EAL B This EAL addresses the immediacy of an expected threat arrival or impact on the site within a relatively short time.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure that notifications for the airliner attack threat are made in a timely manner and that OROs and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat. Airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant.

This EAL is met when a plant receives information regarding an airliner attack threat from NRC and the airliner is within 30 minutes of the plant. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Alert.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an airliner (airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

Reference NEI 99-01, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HA4 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006 Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-75 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT

3. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an ALERT.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

BASIS:

This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the Alert emergency classification level.

Reference NEI 99-01, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HA6 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006 Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-76 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (Security Shift Supervision).

BASIS This condition represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert in that a HOSTILE FORCE has progressed from the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA to the PROTECTED AREA.

This EAL addresses the contingency for a very rapid, progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. It is not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires ORO readiness and preparation for the implementation of protective measures.

This EAL addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the PROTECTED AREA. Those events are adequately addressed by other EALs.

D-77 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS SITE AREA EMERGENCY Reference NEI 99-01, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HS4 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006 Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-78 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS SITE AREA EMERGENCY

2. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts: (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

BASIS:

This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for Site Area Emergency.

Reference:

NEI 99-01, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HS3 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006 Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-79 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS: (A or B)

A A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions.

B. A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and IMMINENT fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool.

BASIS:

EAL A This EAL encompasses conditions under which a HOSTILE ACTION has resulted in a loss of physical control of VITAL AREAS (containing vital equipment or controls of vital equipment) required to maintain safety functions and control of that equipment cannot be transferred to and operated from another location.

Typically, these safety functions are reactivity control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown) RCS inventory (ability to cool the core), and secondary heat removal (ability to maintain a heat sink).

Loss of physical control of the control room or remote shutdown capability alone may not prevent the ability to maintain safety functions per se. Design of the remote shutdown capability and the location of the transfer switches should be taken into account. Primary emphasis should be placed on those components and instruments that supply protection for and information about safety functions.

If control of the plant equipment necessary to maintain safety functions can be transferred to another location, then the threshold is not met.

D-80 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL B This EAL addresses failure of spent fuel cooling systems as a result of HOSTILE ACTION if IMMINENT fuel damage is likely such as when a freshly off-loaded reactor core is in the spent fuel pool.

Reference:

NEI 99-01, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HGl Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006 Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-81 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS GENERAL EMERGENCY

2. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a General Emergency.

Operating Mode Applicability: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.

Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels off-site for more than the immediate site area.

BASIS:

This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for General Emergen\cy.

Reference NEI 99-01, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HG2 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006 Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-82 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Natural and Destructive Phenomena Natural and Destructive Phenomena Control Room Evacuation Has Been Other Conditions Existing Which in Affecting the Protected Area Affecting the Plant Vital Area Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be the Judgment of the Emergency Established Coordinator Warrant Declaration of Natural and Destructive Phenomena General Emergency Affecting Keowee Hydro Condition B Natural and destructive phenomena affecting Jocassee Hydro Condition B Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Keowee Hydro Dam Failure Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of Jeopardizes Operation of Systems the Plant Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Turbine Building Flood Coordinator Warrant Declaration of Site Area Emergency Other Conditions Existing Which in the Control Room Evacuation Has Been Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator Initiated Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event Natural and Destructive Other Conditions Existing Which in the Phenomena Affecting Keowee Hydro Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator Warrant Declaration of an Alert D-83 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Tremor felt and valid alarm on the "strong motion accelerograph".

B. Tornado striking within protected area boundary.

C. Vehicle crash into plant structures or systems within protected area boundary.

D. Turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals.

BASIS:

The protected area boundary is typically that part within the security isolation zone and is defined in the site security plan.

EAL 1. Damage may be caused to some portions of the site, but should not affect ability of safety functions to operate. Strong motion accelerograph will begin to record at .01g. As defined in the EPRI-sponsored "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake",

dated October 1989, a "felt earthquake" is:

An earthquakeof sufficient intensity such that: (a) the vibratoryground motion isfelt at the nuclearplant site and recognized as an earthquakebased on a consensus of control room operatorson duty at the time, and (b) valid alarm on seismic instrumentationoccurs.

EAL 2. A tornado striking (touching down) within the protected boundary may have potentially damaged plant structures containing functions or systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. If such damage is confirmed visually or by other in-plant indications, the event may be escalated to Alert.

D-84 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT EAL 3 Addresses such items as a car, truck, plane, or helicopter crash, or train crash that may potentially damage plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. If the crash is confirmed to affect a plant area containing equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit, the event may be escalated to Alert.

EAL 4 Addresses main turbine rotating component failures of sufficient magnitude to cause observable damage to the turbine casing or to the seals of the turbine generator. Of major concern is the potential for leakage of combustible fluids (lubricating oils) and gases (hydrogen cooling) to the plant environs. Actual fires and flammable gas build up are appropriately classified via other EALs. This EAL is consistent with the definition of an Unusual Event while maintaining the anticipatory nature desired and recognizing the risk to non-safety related equipment. Escalation of the emergency classification is based on potential damage done by the missiles generated by the failure.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HUI D-85 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT

2. Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting Keowee Hydro Condition B.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Reservoir elevation greater than or equal to 805.0 feet with all spillway gates open and the lake elevation continues to rise.

B. Seepage readings increase or decrease greatly or seepage water is carrying a significant amount of soil particulates.

C. New area of seepage or wetness, with large amounts of seepage water observed on dam, dam toe, or the abutments.

D. A slide or other movements of the dam or abutments which could develop into a failure.

E. Developing failure involving the powerhouse or appurtenant structures and the operator believes the safety of the structure is questionable.

F. Emergency Coordinator judgment BASIS:

Keowee Hydro is the emergency AC power source for the Oconee Nuclear Station and is covered by the site emergency plan. The conditions cited above are considered to be situations where dam failure may develop. The potentially hazardous situation may allow days or weeks for mitigative actions to prevent failure.

D-86 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT

3. Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting Jocassee Hydro Condition B.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Condition B has been declared for Jocassee BASIS:

Jocassee Hydro is located upstream of the Oconee Nuclear Station. The mitigation strategies for a Condition B for the Jocassee Dam includes shutdown of all operating Oconee Nuclear units and relocation and installation of other equipment in anticipation of the Condition B escalating to a Condition A.

D-87 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT

4. Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of the Plant.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Detection of toxic or flammable gases that could enter within the site area boundary in amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant.

B. Report by Local, County or State Officials for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event.

BASIS:

This IC is based on releases in concentrations within the site boundary that will affect the health of plant personnel or the safe operation of the plant with the plant being within the evacuation area of an offsite event (i.e., tanker truck accident releasing toxic gases, etc.)

The evacuation area is as determined from the DOT Evacuation Tables for Selected Hazardous Materials in the DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials.

Reference NUTMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HU3 D-88 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT

5. Other Conditions Exist Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator to fall under the Unusual Event emergency class.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HU5 D-89 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT

1. Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Tremor felt and seismic trigger actuates (.05g)

Note: Only one train of a safety related system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy these conditions.

B. Tornado, high winds, missiles resulting from turbine failure, vehicle crashes, or other catastrophic events AND one of the following:

Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit OR Affected safety related system parameter indications show degraded performance BASIS:

EAL 1 Based on the FSAR design basis. Seismic events of this magnitude can cause damage to safety functions.

EAL 2 is intended to address the threat to safety related structures or equipment from uncontrollable and possibly catastrophic events. Damage to safety-related equipment and or structures housing safety-related equipment caused by natural phenomena after striking the site is the key point of this EAL. Only one train of a safety-related system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition. This EAL is, therefore, consistent with the definition of an ALERT in that if events have damaged areas containing safety-related equipment the potential exists for substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

D-90 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT Structures/equipment which provide safety functions are designed to withstand sustained wind force of 95mph. These structures are designed to withstand external wind forces resulting from a tornado having a velocity of 300mph. Because high winds may disable the meteorological instrumentation well before the design basis speed is reached, the meteorological tower should not be used for assessment of tornado winds for emergency classification. For tornados, damage would be the prima facie evidence of winds exceeding design basis.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HAl D-91 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT

2. Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown).

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Report or detection of toxic gases in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel.

B. Report or detection of flammable gases in concentrations that will affect the safe operation of the plant.

Reactor Building Auxiliary Building Turbine Building Control Room BASIS:

EAL 1 is based on toxic gases that have entered a plant structure that are life-threatening to plant personnel. This EAL applies to structures required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown. It is appropriate that increased monitoring be done to ascertain whether consequential damage has occurred. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radioactive Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator Judgment ICs.

D-92 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT EAL 2 is based on the detection of flammable gases in areas containing equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit. It is appropriate that increased monitoring be done to ascertain whether consequential damage has occurred. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radioactive Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator Judgment ICs.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HA3 D-93 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT

3. TURBINE BUILDING FLOOD OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Turbine building flood requiring use of AP/1,2,3/A/1700/010, Turbine Building Flood.

BASIS:

This initiating condition is discussed in the Oconee Probabilistic Risk Assessment report.

A flood caused by the rupture of the Jocassee Dam could flood the turbine building basement which could disable the main feedwater pumps and the turbine and motor driven emergency feedwater pumps. Also, rupture of some portions of the condenser intake piping could result in a flood in the turbine building basement. Water tight doors have been provided to prevent the water from seeping into the auxiliary building. This scenario assumes that the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) would be available to provide water to the steam generators. Escalation of the event to a higher category would be based on the ability to maintain core cooling or shutdown functions.

D-94 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT

4. Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Evacuation of control room AND one of the following:

Plant control is established from the Aux SD panel or the SSF OR Plant control is being established from the Aux SD panel or the SSF BASIS:

The auxiliary shutdown panel will allow operators to use turbine bypass valves to maintain RCS temperature, one HPI pump for RCS inventory control, pressurizer heaters to maintain RCS pressure and control of the feedwater startup valves but not control over the feedwater pumps.

The standby shutdown facility can maintain hot shutdown by using auxiliary service water to the steam generators for primary heat removal and also to provide makeup to the reactor coolant system. The SSF is only used under extreme conditions since it may involve pumping lake water into the steam generators for heat removed purposes.

With the control room evacuated, additional support, monitoring and direction through the Technical Support Center and/or other Emergency Operations Facility is necessary.

Inability to establish plant control from outside the control room, as evidenced by the inability to maintain RCS or SG inventories, will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HA5 D-95 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT

5. Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Other conditions exist which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded AND that increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator to fall under the Alert emergency class.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HA6 D-96 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be Established.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. Control room evacuation has been initiated AND Control of the plant cannot be established from the Aux SD panel or the SSF within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

The timely transfer of control to alternate control areas has not been accomplished. This failure to transfer control would be evidenced by deteriorating reactor coolant system or steam generator parameters. For most conditions RCP seal LOCAs or steam generator dryout would be indications of failure to accomplish the transfer in the necessary time.

Escalation of this event, if appropriate, would be by Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator Judgment ICs Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HS2 D-97 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY SITE AREA EMERGENCY

2. Keowee Hydro Dam Failure OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Imminent/actual dam failure exists involving any of the following:

Keowee Hydro Dam Little River Dam Dikes A,B,C,D Intake Canal Dike Jocassee Dam - Condition A BASIS:

The Keowee Hydro Dam project includes the Keowee Hydro Dam, Little River Dam and Dikes A, B, C, D, and the Intake Canal Dike. Dam failure of any portion of the Keowee Hydro Dam would result in loss of the emergency AC power supply AND the potential to lose the ultimate heat sink source. Some flooding of the site may result. Evaluation of the plant status following failure of the dam would determine the need to escalate to a General Emergency. Failure of the Jocassee Dam has the potential to result in the failure of the Keowee Hydro Project Dams/Dikes.

D-98 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY SITE AREA EMERGENCY

3. Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator Warrant Declaration of Site Area Emergency.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Other conditions exist which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director to fall under the emergency class description for Site Area Emergency.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HS3 D-99 Rev. 20 15-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator Warrant Declaration of General Emergency.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Other conditions exist which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator/

EOF DIRECTOR indicate:

(1) Actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential for loss of containment OR (2) Potential for uncontrolled radionuclide release that would result in a dose projection at the site boundary greater than 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director to fall under the General Emergency class.

Releases (if made) can reasonably be expected to exceed EPA PAG levels outside the site boundary.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HG2 D-100 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

ENCLOSURE 4.8 Radiation Monitor Readings for Emergency Classification All RIA values are considered GREATER THAN or EQUAL TO HOURS SINCE RIA 57 R/hr e RIA 58 R/hr*

REACTOR TRIPPED Site Area Emergency General Emergency Site Area Emergency General Emergency 0.0 - < 0.5 5.9E+003 5.9E+004 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 0.5 - < 1.0 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 1.1E+003 1.1E+004 1.0 - < 1.5 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.6E+002 8.6E+003 1.5 - < 2.0 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.5E+002 8.5E+003 2.0 - < 2.5 1.4E+003 1.4E+004 6.3E+002 6.3E+003 2.5 - < 3.0 1.2E+003 1.2E+004 5.7E+002 5.7E+003 3.0 - < 3.5 1.1E+003 1.1E+004 5.2E+002 5.2E+003 3.5 - < 4.0 1.OE+003 1.OE+004 4.8E+002 4.8E+003 4.0 - < 8.0 1.OE+003 1.OE+004 4.4E+002 4.4E+003

• RIA 58 is partially shielded Assumptions used for calculation of high range in-containment monitors RIA 57 and 58:

1. Average annual meteorology (7.308 E-6 sec/m 3)

2. Design basis leakage (5.6 E6 ml/hr)

3. One hour release duration

4. GeneralEmergency PAGs are 1 rem TEDE and 5 rem CDE; Site Area Emergency determination is based on 10% of the GeneralEmergency PAGs

5. Calculations for monitor readings are based on CDE because thyroid dose is limiting

6. No credit is taken for filtration

7. LOCA conditions are limiting and provide the more conservative reading D-101 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

F. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations, emergency personnel, and to the public.

F.1 Emergency Response Organization The Emergency Response Organization has been developed in such a manner to list primary and alternate personnel. Primary and backup means of communication have been established between the Site, local government agencies, and State response organizations (Figure F-i).

F. L.a Calls to activate State/County agency's emergency function are the responsibility of the Shift Manager/Emergency Coordinator. These calls are made by:

1. Duke Emergency Management Network (DEMNET).

2. The site telephone system to a 24-hour emergency number.

Some agencies have numbers for designated work schedules. Numbers can be found in the Emergency Telephone Directory.

A back-up radio system provides alternate communications with Oconee and Pickens Counties emergency response organizations. (Figure F-2)

F. 1.b On a monthly basis, a communication check is made to state and local government warning points within the Emergency Planning Zone.

Communications during an emergency situation would be by DEMNET, site telephone system/commercial phone service, or by radio (where appropriate).

F. 1.c The EOF organization has the responsibility to ask for federal response.

However, communication with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from the emergency response facilities, would be by use of the Emergency Telecommunication System (ETS) located in the Control Room areas, Technical Support Center, or the Emergency Operations Facility.

F-1 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

F. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS F. 1.d The Emergency Response Organization has the following communications systems available for use during emergencies:

1) Oconee Nuclear Station Telephone System (Generator backed and battery backed)

Fiber-Optic to Charlotte GO (65 lines)

Telephone line to Easley (6 circuits)

Anderson (4 lines)

Six-Mile (4 lines)

Site Telephone System - Inward and outward direct dial available from the Control Room, TSC, and OSC

2) Commercial phone service does not go through the site telephone system

3) Duke Emergency Management Network (DEMNET)

DEMNET is the primary means of communication with the offsite agencies.

DEMNET uses digital voice manager technology and IP connectivity through either the internet or a dedicated satellite connection, resulting in redundant paths to ensure operability. DEMNET allows intercommunication among the EOF, TSC, control room, counties, and states.

Oconee County Pickens County State Warning Point State Emergency Operations Center (Columbia)

Emergency Operations Facility (Charlotte)

Technical Support Center Control Rooms 1&2, Backup TSC/OSC (OOB)

Alternate Reporting Location (Issaqueena Trail)

4) Emergency Radio System (Offsite System-Battery Backed)

Control Room Units 1&2 (48.5 MHZ)

Technical Support Center Field Monitoring Teams (800 MHZ)

Pickens County (48.5 MHZ)

Oconee County (48.5 MHZ)

State of South Carolina F-2 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

F. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

5) Radio Systems (Onsite) (Emergency Back-up Power by Keowee Hydro Units)

Control Room 1&2, 3 Fire Brigade Chemistry Safety Radiation Protection Maintenance Medical Emergency Response Team Hazardous Materials Response Team

6) Security Radio System (Emergency Back-up Power by Standby Shutdown Facility)

CAS/SAS All Security Guards Oconee County LEC Control Room 1&2, 3

7) Public Address (PA) System Oconee Nuclear Station (Protected Area)

Oconee Office Building Oconee Administration Building Oconee Complex Oconee Maint. Training Facility (Unique Page Number)

Oconee Garage (Unique Page Number)

Oconee Training Facility (Unique Page Number)

Keowee Hydro Station (Unique Page Number)

World of Energy

8) Site Assembly Warning System Paging by Control Room Warble Tone over PA Siren Assembly Horn (Outside Warning)

F-3 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

F. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

9) EOF Communication System (Energy Center has back-up generator power)

The emergency communications systems at the Charlotte EOF are designed to ensure the reliable, timely flow of information between all parties having an emergency response role. The DEMNET is the primary means of communicating changes in event classification and protective action recommendations to the state and counties. The Decision Line provides the state and counties with a dedicated line to discuss and coordinate protective action recommendations. Existing commercial telephone service will serve as the designated backup means for communications in the event of a DEMNET/

Decision Line failure.

Duke Telephone System (battery backed)

DEMNET (for state/county notifications)

Decision Line (for discussions/coordination of PARs)

Commercial telephones from the Charlotte switch network Radio System to communicate with the Field Monitoring Teams NRC Emergency Telecommunications System phones Satellite Telephone F.l.e Recall of Emergency Response Organization Should an emergency occur that will require activation of the Emergency Response Organization, the Shift Manger will require the following actions to occur:

Normal Working Hours (Figure A-2A)

1. Have announced over the Public Address system that the Emergency Response Organization (Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center) are to be staffed.

2. Security will activate the ERO. If security is unable to activate the ERO, the SM (or designee) will activate the ERO.

3. Notify Duty Operations Engineer who verifies Plant Manager and Superintendent of Operations have been notified.

4. Initiate a Site Assembly.

5. Individual groups will contact corporate personnel for support.

F-4 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS Weekends, Holidays, Backshift (Figure A-2B)

1. Security will activate the ERO. If security is unable to activate the ERO, the SM (or designee) will activate the ERO.

2. Duty Operations Engineer who verifies Plant Manager and Superintendent of Operations have been notified.

3. Announce over the PA system that the Emergency Response Organization (Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center) is to be activated.

4. Initiate a Site Assembly.

5. Individual groups will contact corporate personnel for support.

F.l.f Redundant two way communication exists for communication with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The ETS system, the regular site or EOF telephone system exists for the communication link with NRC. (Figure F-I)

F.2 Medical Support Communication Link Operations and/or Security will utilize the public address system and radio pager system to activate the Medical Emergency Response Team to respond to a medical emergency to assess the situation and render first aid. If an ambulance is needed, Operations and/or Security will call for an ambulance to be dispatched from the Oconee Medical Center by one of several ways:

1. Regular ONS switchboard line

2. Outside line (Commercial Phone Service)

3. DEMNET to Oconee County who then would contact Oconee Memorial Hospital. (Operations only)

4. Radio in the Control Room and/or CAS/SAS to Oconee County, who then would contact the Oconee Memorial Hospital.

F-5 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS However, should an emergency at the Oconee Nuclear Station cause the Emergency Response Organization to be activated, personnel will staff the Operational Support Center who can respond to a medical emergency.

Calls will be made from the Operational Support Center for additional medical assistance (i.e. ambulance transport and hospital contact).

F3 Periodic Testing of the Emergency Communications System Testing of the Emergency Communications System will be tested on a monthly and a quarterly basis in accordance with site procedures. Phones and radios will be checked to determine their availability.

F-6 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE F-1 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM Organization Commercial ONS DEMNET DPC DPC DPC State Decision ETS EOF Phone Phone Site Offsite Onsite Mcrwav. LGR Line System System Service Phone Radio Radio System Radio Private Line System System System System Control Room x x x x x x x x Technical Support Center x x x x x x x x Operational Support Center I Emergency Operations Facility xxxx Pickens LEC x x x x x x Pickens EOC x x x x x x x Oconee LEC x x x x x x Oconee EOC x x x x x x State EOC x x x x x x State FEOC x x x x x x x NRC Headquarters x x x x NRC Region I[ x x x x F-7 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE F-2 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY RADIO NETWORK The offsite emergency radio network at the Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) is specifically limited to use in an emergency event. The network consists of two radio frequencies which provide the following services:

A. 48.5 MHZ Backup communications between ONS, Pickens County Emergency Preparedness Agency and Oconee County Emergency Preparedness Agency.

Operating instructions are shown in the Emergency Telephone Directory and AD-EP-ALL-0203 (Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions)

B. 800 MHZ Provide communications between Field Monitoring Team Coordinator and field teams.

Base station radios are located in the TSC and backup TSC Operating instructions are located in AD-EP-ALL-0203 (Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions)

F-8 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

Emergency Facilities And Equipment H.1.a Technical Support Center (TSC)

A Technical Support Center has been designated for the Oconee Nuclear Station in the area known as the Operations Center, together with the nearby offices adjacent to the Control Rooms l&2 on the fifth floor of the Auxiliary Building. This area has the same ventilation and shielding as the Control Room enabling plant management and supporting technical and engineering personnel to evaluate plant status and support operations in conjunction with the Operational Support Center.

The Technical Support Center has the capability to display and transmit plant status to those individuals who are knowledgeable of and responsible for engineering and management support of the reactor operations in the event of an accident, and those persons who are responsible for the management of the accident. Upon activation, this facility will provide the main communication link between the Plant, Operational Support Center, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Headquarters, and the Emergency Operations Facility.

The Technical Support Center is staffed by plant management and technical personnel.

The Technical Support Center has access to the following capabilities and characteristics: (Figure H-i).

1. Redundant two-way communication with the Control Room, the Emergency Operations Facility and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center.

2. Monitoring for direct radiation and airborne radioactive contaminants, with local readout of radiation level and alarms if preset levels are.

exceeded. Laboratory analysis is required if it becomes necessary to detect radioiodines at concentrations as low as 1.0 E-7 microcurie/cc.

3. Display, printout or trending of comprehensive data necessary to monitor reactor systems status and to evaluate plant system abnormalities; in-plant radiological parameters and meteorological parameters are also available. This capability is provided via each unit's Operator Aid Computer.

Offsite radiological conditions are provided via radio from the field monitoring teams.

H-1 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

4. Ready access to as-built plant drawings such as general arrangement, flow diagrams, electrical one-lines, instrument details, etc.

5. Habitability during postulated radiological accidents to the same degree as the Control Room.

H. 1.b Operational Support Center (OSC)(Figure H-2)

An Operational Support Center has been established in the Operations Center located in the Unit 3 Control Room. Personnel assigned to this support center will include the following:

• Work Control

• Chemistry

" Radiation Protection

" Safety

• Maintenance

• Operations

• Engineering

" Nuclear Supply Chain

" Security The Operational Support Center has shielding and ventilation to the same degree as the Control Room. Breathing equipment and protective clothing are available in the Operational Support Center should any craftsman/technician be required to perform a task or function in an area that would require protective clothing and breathing apparatus.

H.1.c Backup Emergency Response Facility (ERF) (Figure H-14 and H-2A)

A BackuLp Technical Support Center has been established at the Oconee Office Building, Room 316. Radio and telephone communications are available to offsite agencies and the NRC to the same extent as the designated TSC.

A Backup Operational Support Center has been established in the Oconee Office Building, Room 316 A. Communication links are provided for information flow both to the Control Room and Technical Support Center.

H-2 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT The Issaqueena Trail Facility (JIC) serves as an alternate response facility that would be accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging area for augmentation of emergency response staff and having the following characteristics required collectively of the alternate facilities for use when onsite emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed during hostile action:

" The capability for communication with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security.

" The capability to perform offsite notifications.

" The capability for engineering assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation.

H.2 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) (Figures H3-A thru H3-E)

The Emergency Operations Facility is located at the Charlotte General Office in North Carolina. The facility is located approximately 120 miles from the Oconee Nuclear Station.

The EOF has the following capabilities:

a. The capability for obtaining and displaying plant data and radiological information for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves.

b. The capability to analyze plant technical information and provide technical briefings on event conditions and prognosis to licensee and offsite response organizations for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves.

c. The capability to support response to events occurring simultaneously at more than one nuclear power reactor site if the emergency operations facility serves more than one site.

H-3 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Two utility circuits feed Energy Center Phase 1 where the EOF is located.

Primary power to the Power Building is provided by commercial power. All electrical outlets, as well as lighting fixtures and the wiring closet that supports both the voice and data communications in the Energy Center EOF are on generator backed up power. A loss of commercial power should not impact any of the voice or data communications equipment located in the EOF. All common Duke Energy telecom infrastructures that support EOF functions, including, but not limited to, fiber optic transmission equipment, telephone switching equipment and data network routers, is configured to operate from at least one and usually multiple backup power sources in the event of a loss of commercial power. These backup sources include generator, DC battery and UPS systems. EOF HVAC loads are not backed up.

H.3 County, State Emergency Operations Center See Oconee County FNF Plan.

See Pickens County, FNF Plan.

See State of South Carolina FNF Plan, Site Specific.

H.4 Activation and Staffing of the Emergency Response Organization Activation and staffing of the Emergency Response Organization will be in accordance with the emergency action levels and the procedures developed for determining emergency response.

Division/Section Directives describe the Emergency Response Organization.

Figures A-2A, A-2B depicts the procedure for recall of the Emergency Organization.

H.5 Monitoring Systems On Site - If an emergency situation occurs at the plant, plant personnel continually monitor plant parameters with regard to limits and surveillance requirements specified in the appropriate Technical Specifications, Operating Procedures and Emergency Procedures. These parameters will affect the emergency classification and therefore affect decisions implementing specific emergency measures. In addition to monitoring plant parameters, radiological surveys may be used to verify, augment and/or delineate the assessment of the emergency. (Figure H-20).

H-4 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT H.5.a Natural Phenomena Monitors Natural phenomena instrumentation to monitor wind speed and direction, temperature and vertical temperature gradient (Figure H-4); and seismic activity (Figure H- 18).

H.5.b Radiological Monitors (H-5)

Area Radiation Monitoring System The area radiation monitoring system detectors are located throughout the plant in locations where significant radiation levels may exist, which may change with time and with the operation being performed. They are designed primarily for the protection of personnel performing such operations as routine coolant sampling, refueling, reactor building entry, radioactive waste disposal operations and for certain other operating and maintenance work. The system has sufficient range and flexibility to permit readout during routine operations and during any transient or emergency conditions that may exist. The equipment is self checking for proper operation and alarms both in the local area and in the respective control room. Where necessary or desirable, readout is also provided locally.

Process Radiation Monitoring System Radiation monitoring of process systems provides early warning of equipment, component, or system malfunctions or potential radiological hazards. The Process Radiation Monitoring System includes alarms, indications, and recording of data in the control rooms. In some cases automatic action is taken upon an alarm condition; in others the alarm serves as a warning to the operator so that manual corrective action can be taken.

Radioactive liquid and gaseous waste effluent are monitored and coordinated by Operations and controlled to assure that radioactivity released does not exceed 10 CFR 20 limits for the plant as a whole.

H-5 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Personnel Monitoring System Personnel monitoring equipment consisting of film badges and/or their equivalent (thermo-luminescent dosimeters, TLD's), are assigned by the Radiation Protection Section and worn by all personnel at Oconee whose job involves significant levels of radiation exposure as defined in 10 CFR 20. In addition, pocket chambers, electronic dosimeters, self-reading dosimeters, pocket high radiation alarms, wrist badges, and/or finger tabs are readily available for use by those persons who ordinarily work in the Controlled Area or whose job requires frequent access to this area.

Portable Monitors - sufficient numbers are available for use in assessing radiological conditions. (Figure H-6).

Sampling Equipment - sufficient numbers are available for use in assessing radiological conditions. (Figure H-7).

H.5.c Process Monitors - Non-radiological Monitoring Non-radiological monitoring capabilities include reactor coolant system pressure, temperatures, flows, and water level for detection of inadequate core cooling. Containment pressure, temperature, liquid levels, flow rates, and status of equipment components are monitored to assess containment integrity.

H.5.d Fire and Combustion products detectors - (Figure H-8).

H.6 Offsite Monitoring and Analysis for Emergency Response H.6.a Natural-Phenomena Monitors Facilities and equipment include two onsite meteorological towers. Also, an agreement has been established with the Greenville-Spartanburg National Weather service to provide meteorological information should our system become inoperable.

H..6.b Radiological monitors for emergency environmental monitoring are provided in emergency kits. The established environmental monitoring network and sampling equipment in the surrounding area are also available to provide emergency assessment data.

The existing radiological monitoring program will provide base line information as well as in-place monitoring for early assessment data.

(Figure A) (H-9 and H-10).

H-6 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Normal environmental monitoring equipment includes radioiodine and particulate continuous air samplers and thermo-luminescent dosimeters, located and collected according to pre-established criteria. Environmental monitoring will be expanded as necessary during an emergency situation in accordance with offsite monitoring procedures.

H.6.c Laboratory Facilities - Include mobile emergency monitoring capabilities available through the S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control, Bureau of Solid and Hazardous Waste Management and the DOE Radiological Assistance Team. In addition, Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) has emergency vehicles for mobile assessment purposes. Fixed facilities are available for gross counting and spectral analysis in the ONS counting laboratory (Figure H-11) and at the Duke Energy Environmental Laboratory near the McGuire Nuclear Station, Charlotte, North Carolina.

Should the plant lose the capability to use the count room onsite, samples can be counted at the backup count room or in one of the mobile assessment field monitoring vans. Portable equipment would be relocated to this area.

(Figure H-3)

H.7 Offsite radiological monitoring equipment is located in the storage area outside the protected area. Emergency kits are available for off-site monitoring teams who would be monitoring for radiation offsite. (Figure H-12).

H.8 Meteorological Instrumentation A primary and one auxiliary meteorological tower provides the basic parameters on display in the Control Room. (Figure H-4 shows the meteorological equipment.)

Meteorological measurement equipment meets the criteria of the milestones addressed in Appendix 2 of NUREG 0654 and Proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.23.

An operable dose calculation methodology is in use in the Control Room, Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility.

The dose assessment methodology for the Oconee Nuclear Station consists of calculations for three separate source terms. The first source term is based on the activity that has been or is actually being released through the unit vent; the second source term is based on a potential release using the reactor building dose rate and design basis assumptions for containment leakage; the third source term is based on the activity that has been or is actually being released through the steam relief valves.

H-7 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT The release rate is calculated for each source term using relative atmospheric dispersion factors calculated by the meteorological model and either actual sample data or radiation monitor readings. These release rates are then added together and used to calculate the dose rate or a projected dose over the duration of the release or over 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> if release duration is unknown at 1, 2, 5 and 10 miles downwind from the plant.

These dose assessment methods provide the capability to calculate the dose from actual or potential releases following an accident. A fifty-year committed dose equivalent (CDE) to the thyroid and a total effective doseequivalent (TEDE) from exposure to a semi-infinite cloud and a four-day ground shine as applicable are determined. The dose conversion factors are derived from EPA-400. Near real time radiation monitor readings, sample data, and meteorological data are combined to provide timely, realistic dose calculations.

This model will provide the capability to assess and monitor actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition.

Direct telephone access to the person responsible for making offsite dose calculations is available to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission through the use of the NRC Health Physics Network line. The physical location of this person is in the Emergency Operations Facility.

H.9 Operational Support Center - Emergency Supplies The Operational Support Center will have the same shielding, and ventilation as the Control Room. Protective clothing and breathing equipment are available to the personnel assembled in these areas. (See Figures H-13, H-14, H-17)

H.10 Inspection and Inventory of Emergency Equipment and Supplies All emergency equipment designated by the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan shall be inventoried and inspected on a quarterly basis or in agreement with established procedures. Supplies will be inventoried/replaced after each drill and/or exercise or actual emergency where supplies might have been used.

Calibration of any/all emergency equipment shall be at the intervals recommended by the supplier of the equipment.

H-8 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT H.11 Identification of Emergency Kits Emergency kits are located in various locations. See figures below and procedure for specific locations.

Protective Equipment Kits - Figures H-13, H-14, H-17 Communications Equipment - Figures H-12, H-16 Radiological Monitoring Equipment - Figures H- 12, H- 16, H-17 Emergency Supplies - Figures H-16, Figure H-17 Emergency Medical Supplies - L-l, L-2, L-3 Decontamination Supplies - K-3 Spill Cleanup Equipment/Supplies - H-19 H.12 Field Monitoring Data Collection The Emergency Operations Facility has been designated as the central point for the receipt and analysis of all field monitoring data and coordination of sample media. The Radiological Assessment Manager at the Emergency Operations Facility will be responsible for the coordination efforts.

H-9 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-1 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION TYPICAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC)

PRIMARY LOCATION UNIT 1&2 OPS CENTER I

N H-10 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-lA NO LONGER USED H-11I Rev. 2015-004 May2015

FIGURE H-2 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION TYPICAL OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER (OSC)

PRIMARY LOCATION UNIT 3 OPERATONS CENTER N Emer Status Boards J K M N

V G F

w C P R Brie ng Area B E A L RPStatus Board RPS/ICS CABINETS I i SPOC Maintenance/I&E Technicians F-1 RPS/ICS CABINETS RP Technicians Chen Operations17 RPS/ICS CABINETS UNIT 3 CONTROL ROOM A. OSC Manager B. Ops Liaison C. RP Manager D. Unassigned E. Technical Assistant I F. Chemistry Manager G. Maintenance Manager H. RP I. SPOC J. Electrical Engineering K. Maintenance Supervisor (SPOC)

L. Chemistry Supervisor M. SPOC N. Technical Assistant II

0. RP Admin. Supervisor P. Nuclear Supply Chain Liaison Q. RP Shift R. Assistant to RP Mgr.

V. Security Liaison H-12 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-2A NO LONGER USED H-13 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

FIGURE H-3A DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION CHARLOTTE EOF GENERAL OFFICE BUILDING LAYOUT - CHARLOTTE, NC I I I

-EI Iu~ Ij~

I DUKE Ir ENERGY ENERGY CENTER Lo I CHURCI 1 8 TREE r CHURCH STRI. L F F-uj Lu Lu w

CK WACHOVIA U)

F-CENTER 00 cn IIYO IR[ROU -R.

I1 I I The EOF is on the 1= Floor of the Energy Center.

H-14 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-3B DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION CHARLOTTE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY LAYOUT H-15 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-3C DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION TYPICAL OCONEE JIC SET UP (Alternate Emergency Response Facility)

I Rev. May 2015-004 H-16 2015

FIGURE H-3D DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION OCONEE MEDIA CENTER H-17 Rev. May 2015-004 2015

FIGURE H-3E DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION OCONEE JIC GENERAL LAYOUT ISSAQUEENA TRAIL OLD SHIRLEY ROAD U.S. HIGHWAY 123 H-18 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-3F DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION OCONEE BACKUP COUNT ROOM LOCATION ONS ADMIN BUILDING n

C 33 t

I S *i*

I ii H-19 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-4 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION METEOROLOGY EQUIPMENT Wind Speed Monitoring Systems Wind Direction Monitoring Systems Platinum (RTD) T Delta or T/AT Monitoring System Precipitation Monitoring System NOTE: The Meteorological Monitoring System monitors and records continuous data for upper and lower levels of wind speed and direction, ambient air temperature and temperature differential at Site

1. 1 (Northwest Met Tower). Wind speed, wind direction and precipitation is recorded at Site #2 (Keowee River Tower). All data points are included on each of the Units OAC computers where the data is averaged over a 15 minute period of time, except for precipitation.

IP/O/B/1601/003 (Meteorological Equipment Checks) gives range, accuracy and location.

H-20 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-5 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION RADIATION INDICATING ALARMS (RIA)

RIA# UNIT# TYPE RANGE FUNCTION LOCATION CLASS 1 1,3 GM .1 -1E4mRad/lr Control Room Control Room Area PAM* 1,2,3 GM .1 -1E4mRad/hr Main Bridge Reactor Building Area PAM* 1,2,3 GM .1 -IE4mRad/hr Aux. Bridge Reactor Building Area 3 1,2,3 GM, IC .1 -1E7mRad/hr Refuel Canal Transfer Canal Area 4 1,2,3 GM, IC .1 -lE7mRad/hr RB Entrance Personnel Hatch Area 5 1,2,3 GM .1 -1E4mRad/hr Incore Tank Outside Incore Tk Hatch Area PAM* 1,3 GM .1 -1E4mRad/hr Spent Fuel SF Bridge Area 6 1,3 GM, IC .1 -1E7mRad/hr Spent Fuel SF Pool Area Area Area/Pool 7 1 GM .1 -1E4mRad/hr Hot Machine Shop East Wall Area 8 1 GM .1 -1E4mRad/hr Hot Lab/ Chemistry Hot Chem. Lab Area 10 1,3 GM .1 -lE4mRad/hr Sample Primary Sample hood Area Hood/Primary 11 1,3 GM .1 -1E4mRadihr Corridor 796'(3rd Unit 1/2 Change Room, Area Level) Unit 3 Change Room 12 1,3 GM .1 -1E4mRad/hr Chem Addition Unit 1/2/3 Mix Tank Area 13 1,3 GM .1 -1E4mRad/hr Waste Disposal Sink Waste disposal Tk Area 15 1,3 GM, IC .1 -1E7mRad/hr HPI HPI Rooms Area 16 1,3 GM, IC .01 -lE7mRad/hr "A" Main "A" Main Steam Area Steam Line Lines 17 1,3 GM, IC .01 -lE7mRadihr "B" Main Steam "B" Main Steam Lines Area Line 31 1 Nal 10 -1E7cpm LPI cooler LPSW Turbine Building Effi Discharge Basement H-21 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

Figure H-5 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION RADIATION INDICATING ALARMS (RIA)

RIA# ] UNIT# TYPE RANGE FUNCTION LOCATION [ CLASS 32 1 P.Beta 10 - I E7cpm Aux. Bldg. Gas AB-1 SF Resin Tank Area 32 3 P.Beta 10- 1E7cpm Aux. Bldg. Gas AB-2 Elevator Lobby Area 33 NaI 10 - I E7cpm Normal LWD Radwaste Facility EMi 35 1,2,3 NaI 10 - I E7cpm LPSW Disch. Aux Turbine Building Basement Effi Building 37 1,3 P.Beta 10 - I E7cpm Normal GWD Purge Equipment or Pen Effi Room near elevator 38 1,3 GM 10 - IE7cpm High GWD Purge Equipment or Pen Effi Room near elevator 39 1,3 P.Beta 10 - lE7cpm CR-Gas 6th Fl. behind Em. Air Area Booster Pumps 40 1,2.3 P.Beta 10 - lE7cpm Air ejector off gas Purge Equip. room Effi 41 1,3 P.Beta 10 - I E7cpm SF Bldg. Gas Purge Equip, room Area 42 1,3 NaI 10 - I E7cpm RCW return Behind backwash pumps Sys 43 1,2,3 P.Beta 10 - I E7cpm Unit vent particulates Purge Equip. room Effl 44 1,2.3 Nat 10 - I E7cpm Unit vent iodine Purge Equip. room Effi 45 1,2,3 P.Beta 10 - 1E7cpm Unit vent gas normal Purge Equip. room Effi 46 1,2,3 CdTe 10 - I E7cpm Unit vent gas high Purge Equip. room Effl 47 1,2,3 P.Beta 10- 1 E7cpm RB particulate Purge Equip. room Effl 48 1,2.3 NaI 10 - 1E7cpm RB iodine Purge Equip. room Effi 49 1,2,3 P.Beta 10 - lE7cpm RB gas normal Purge Equip. room Effi 49A 1,2,3 CdTe 10 - I E7cpm RB gas high Purge Equip. room Effi 50 1,2,3 NaI 10 - 1E7cpm Component Cooling AB-I Sys H-22 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

Figure H-5 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION RADIATION INDICATING ALARMS (RIA)

RIA# UNIT# TYPE RANGE FUNCTION LOCATION CLASS 53 1IB P.Beta 10 - 1E7cpm Interim Bldg. Gas Interim Bldg. ] Efi 54 ] 1,3 Nal J 0-IE7cpm TB Sump TB Basement Efi 56 1,2,3 IC 1-lESRad/hr Vent Stack Effluent Vent Stack (Midway) Effi 57 1,2.3 IC 1 -IE8Rad/hr Containment High Reactor Bldg. Penetration Area range monitor 58 1,2,3 IC 1 -IE8Rad/hr Containment High Reactor Bldg. Penetration Area range monitor GM = Geiger Mueller IC = Ion Chamber PAM = Portable Area Monitor

• Portable area monitors do not have assigned RIA numbers and are local readout only.

IB = Interim Building H-23 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-6 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION PORTABLE SURVEY INSTRUMENTS INSTRUMENT RESPONSE TIME DETECTOR TYPE RANGES RADIATION TUBE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TYPE DETECTED SATURATION Ludlum 3 4-22 seconds Halogen quenched GM XO. I = 0-0.2 mR/hr Beta & Gamma Indicates offscale Typically 1200 cpm per mR/hr. Speaker XI.0 = 0-2.0 mR/hr indication. Contains battery check position.

XlO = 0-20 mR/hr X100 = 0-200 mR/hr Eberline RM14 2.2 - 22 seconds variable Halogen quenched GM X1=0-500 cpm Beta & Gamma Indicates offscale Has alarm setting. Speaker indication.

50 hr operation on fully charged battery.

X10=0-5000 cpm X100=0-50000 cpm MGPI Telepole 2-30 seconds variable Two GM tubes 0.05 mR/hr - 1000 R/hr Gamma Indicates over Automatic switching between GM tubes.

1 low range range 11' extension probe. Battery self check.

1 high range Eberline R020 5 seconds Ion-chamber 0-50Rad/hr. Beta & Gamma Indicates offscale Has battery check information Air filled. Vented to atmosphere Eberline R07 Variable Air filled ion chamber Med range: 0.1-199.9 Rad/hr Beta & Gamma Indicates over Digital ion chamber with cables to extend range detection up to 60' away or under water.

Hi range: 0-.01 - 19,900 Rad/hr H-24 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-6 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION PORTABLE SURVEY INSTRUMENTS Instrument Response Time Detector Type Ranges Radiation Tube Saturation Additional Information Type Detected Ludlum-12 4-22 seconds Cadmium loaded 0 - 100,000 mRad/hr Neutron Rejects Gamma Detector can be attached polyethylene sphere with up to 10 Radlhr. or moved from meter.

He tube in center. Tube operates in proportional region AMP-100 Variable Energy Compensated GM 0 - 1000 R/hr Gamma Over range alarm Can be used with variable tube length of cable.

AMP-200 Variable Energy Compensated GM 1 - 10,000 R/hr Gamma Over range alarm Can be used with variable tube length of cable.

ESP 2 Variable Sodium Iodide Variable Gamma Over range alarm Single channel analyzer Scintillator w/pulse height analysis Nal detectors H-25 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-7 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION AIR SAMPLERS INSTRUMENT NAME EXPECTED FLOW RATE AIR PUMP TYPE MAXIMUM LENGTH OF I OPERATION HD29A 2 CFM Centrifugal Carbon Vane Pump Continuous, constant flow air-cooled motor H-809V 2 CFM Two-stage turbine blower air- 15 minutes cooled motor RAP-I 2 CFM Oil Free, Carbon Vane Continuous, constant flow H-26 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-8 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION FIRE AND COMBUSTION PRODUCTS AND DETECTORS FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM - Inaccessible Detectors The purpose of this fire detection system is to detect visible and/or invisible smoke or other products of combustion in any space covered by detectors.

The principal parts of this system; Fire indicating unit, zone indicating units and detectors, with up to 8 zone indicating units-for each fire Indicating unit. Up to 4 detectors circuits (zones) on each zone indicating unit. Each detector circuit (zone) has up to 12 detectors.

When products of combustion are detected a flashing lamp on the detector base is turned on.

The zone lamp for the zone covering that detector will come on. The Red "Alarm" lamp on the fire indicating unit will come on. The statalarm in the control room will come on.

In the event of a failure in the system which makes the system inoperative, an amber "Trouble" lamp will come on, a buzzer will sound and the statalarm will come on.

FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM - Accessible Detectors The purpose of this fire detection system is to detect visible and/or invisible smoke or other products of combustion in any space covered by detectors.

The principal parts of this system include; Fire indicating unit, Zone indication units and detectors, with up to 8 zone indicating units for each fire indicating unit. Up to 4 detector circuits (zones) are on each zone indicating unit. Each detector circuit (zone) has up to 99 detectors.

When products of combustion are detected a red "LED" on the Honeywell detector will come on. The zone lamp for that detector will come on. The Red "Alarm" lamp on the fire indi-cating unit will come on. The statalarm in the control room will come on.

In the event of a failure in the system which makes the system inoperative, an amber "Trouble" lamp on the Honeywell will come on, a buzzer will sound and the statalarm will come on.

H-27 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

FIGURE H-9 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION NORMAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM ONSITE/OFFSITE TLD LOCATIONS See: Oconee Offsite Dose Calculation Manual H-28 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-1O DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION NORMAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM AIR SAMPLE LOCATIONS OFFSITE LOCATIONS See: Oconee Offsite Dose Calculation Manual H-29 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-11 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION COUNT ROOM EQUIPMENT (ONSITE)

INSTRUMENT TYPE DESCRIPTION Gamma Spectroscopy System Computer based gamma spectroscopy system with solid state germanium detectors for analysis of various sample media.

WBC6000 Body Burden Analyzer and Computer based gamma spectroscopy system with Nuclear Data people mover three sodium detectors mounted in a shielded chair which can analyze the thyroid, lungs, and lower torso simultaneously, along with a stand-up total body analyzer using large sodium iodine detectors.

APC Automatic Smear Counter An automatic smear counter using a GM detector which performs beta only analyses on up to 50 smears.

Liquid Scintillator Multiple sample liquid scintillation analysis systems that detect and quantify H-3 and gross beta using a computer to correct for quench and activity.

Alpha Scintillator An automatic smear counter using a zinc sulfide scintillator detector to detect alpha only. Analyzes up to 50 smears/air samples at a time.

H-30 Rev. 2015-004 April 2015

FIGURE H-12 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION CONTENTS OF EMERGENCY KITS FOR FIELD MONITORING TEAMS (Location World of Energy)

SEE HP/0/B/1009/001 H-31 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-13 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY KIT INVENTORY SHEET Control Room Locations See HP/O/B/1009/001 H-32 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-14 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY KIT INVENTORY SHEET Respiratory Equipment See HP/0/B/1009/001 H-33 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-15 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY SUPPLIES INVENTORY LIST Technical Support Center Operational Support Center Emergency Operation Facility See PT/O/A/2000/008 and ST/O/A/4600/086 H-34 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-16 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY CABINET INVENTORY SHEET INPLANT SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT (WORLD OF ENERGY)

SEE HP/O/B/1009/001 H-35 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-17 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION INVENTORY LIST FOR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER EMERGENCY CABINET See HP/O/B/1009/001 H-36 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-18 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM SEISMIC EQUIPMENT UNIT 1 CABLE ROOM UNIT 1 TENDON UNIT 1 REACTOR ACCESS GALLERY BUILDING Seismic Trigger (1) (Setpoint .05g and actuates a statalarm and x computer alarm in Control Room 1 & 3. Also actuates Unit 1 &

2 Events Recorder.

STRONG-MOTION ACCELEROGRAPH SYSTEM. x Starter (1) Setpoint .01g for 1 sec will actuate accelerometers and recorders on Control Panel. Also actuates a computer alarm in Control Room 1.

Accelerometers (2) Actuates recorders on Control Panel at .01g x x for 1 sec Recorders (2) Records for 10 additional sec following X completion of seismic events up to 30 minutes Control Panel (1) Event alarm-alarm light turns yellow to X indicate system is recording approximately 10 sec. Event Indicator-normally black but after an event is recorded, it is white PEAK ACCELERATION RECORDER (6) Records the peak x x acceleration experienced. Capability to measure up to 2g. Uses no power supply.

H-37 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-19 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION SPILL CONTROL EQUIPMENT/SUPPLIES SEE THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES/DOCUMENTS:

Emergency Planning:

PT/O/B/0250/030 PT/O/B/0250/045 ONS Prefire Plan Chemistry:

CP/O/B/2001/008 Safety Assurance:

Spill Prevention Control Countermeasures Plan (SPCC)

H-38 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

FIGURE H-20 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION SURVEYS Emergency Control Room In Station Site and Site Instrumentation Radiological Boundary Environs Unusual X X *

• Alert X X X

• Site Area X X X X General X X X X

• Conducted in the event effluent technical specifications are exceeded.

H-39 Rev. 2015-004 May2015

K. Radiological Exposure Control To assure that means for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency are established for emergency workers and the affected population.

K. 1 Onsite exposure guidelines have been established for the following categories:

MAXIMUM EXPOSURE LIMITS INREM CATEGORIES TOTAL LENS OF THE SKIN EXTREMITIES COMMITTED EFFECTIVE EYE DOSE DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT* (ORGAN)**

All 5 rem 15 rem 50 rem 50 rem 50 rem Protecting Valuable Property 10 rem 30 rem 100 rem 100 rem 100 rem Lifesaving or Protection of 25 rem 75 rem 250 rem 250 rem 250 rem Large Population VOLUNTEER BASIS: >25 rem >75 rem >250 rem >250 rem >250 rem Lifesaving or Protection of Large Population

• Note TEDE to non-pregnant adults from exposure during an emergency situation. Special precautions should be taken to limit dose to eye lens, and other organs, tissues, or extremities. With regard to maximum limit, EPA concluded that it was not possible to prejudge the acceptable risk for saving a life. Doses may be authorized to the limits established in this chart.

• • Note: Administration of stable iodine will be recommended for emergency workers if a dose of 5 rem CDE is projected to the thyroid from radioiodine. This action will require approval of the Radiation Protection Manager in the OSC for site Duke Energy and contractor personnel and offsite Duke Energy and contractor personnel until the EOF is operational. Once the EOF is operational, the Radiological Assessment Manager in the EOF approves the administration of stable iodine for offsite Duke Energy and contract personnel.

The following guidance is provided for use by the Emergency Coordinator or Radiation Protection Manager in determining appropriate actions concerning the rescue and recovery of personnel and the protection of health and property during periods of emergency.

Saving of Human Life Evaluate inherent risks by considering:

-limits of error in calculating the dose rate in subject area.

- effects (biological) upon rescue workers Assess the ability to reduce risk through use of protective equipment, remote manipulation equipment, portable shielding, or similar means.

K-1 Rev. 2015-004 April 2015

Weigh the risk to rescue personnel against the probability of success of the rescue attempt.

Ensure that all personnel planned for use in the rescue attempt understand their actions are voluntar and they are aware of the known or estimated extent of risk.

Recovery of Deceased Victim Recovery operation should be well planned as time is not a factor as above.

Radiation exposure should be controlled to remain within existing occupational exposure guidelines.

-In special circumstances where removal of a body or bodies cannot take place without entry of emergency workers, the Emergency Coordinator may determine it necessary to exceed occupational exposure standards.

K.2 Doses in Excess of 10 CFR Part 20 The Operations Shift Manager in the Control Room, the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC, or the Radiation Protection Manager in the OSC is responsible for authorizing emergency workers to receive doses in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits. Onsite radiation protection programs shall be implemented during emergencies which shall be consistent with ALARA conditions. The site will be responsible for providing medical treatment and rescue efforts for lifesaving missions. Procedures are in place for expeditious decision making with reasonable consideration of the relative risks involved in a lifesaving mission involving radiation exposure.

Protection of Health and Property Where the risk of the radiation hazard bears significantly on the health of people or may result in loss of property, so that immediate remedial action is required, the following criteria apply:

Planned exposures are not to exceed 5 Rad Total Effective Dose Equivalent. Under special circumstances, the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC or the Radiation Protection Manager in the OSC can extend limits to (personnel who volunteer) as shown in the table on page K-1.

K-2 Rev. 2015-004 April 2015

K.3.a 24-hour Capability to Determine Doses by Emergency Personnel Provisions have been made for maintaining records of emergency personnel during a radiological emergency. The Operational Support Center will provide a means for keeping track of dose to personnel involved in a nuclear accident. Distribution of dosimeters (self-reading and electronic) and TLD badges will be provided for all personnel.

Should any offsite agency respond to an emergency at the site during a nuclear emergency, dosimeters will be provided for their use to determine dose.

K.3.b Dose Records The Surveillance and Control Coordinator in the Operational Support Center shall have the responsibility of keeping records of the doses received by personnel involved in any nuclear emergency. (Figure K-5 thru Figure K-6). Personnel dose will be kept using the Electronic Dose Capture (EDC) system. Should this system not be readily accessible or is not available, dose will be kept using the Daily Exposure Time Record Card (Figure K-4). Normal operating procedures shall be followed for the use of dosimeters and the TLD badges. Distribution of additional dosimeters and badges shall be through the Operational Support Center.

K. 4 PAGS for Emergency Workers Oconee County FNF Plans.

Pickens County FNF Plans.

State of South Carolina FNF Emergency Plans, Site Specific.

K.5.a Action Levels for Determining the Need for Decontamination Guidelines as established in the Radiation Protection Policy Manual for Contamination Control and decontamination will be used to determine action levels for decontamination. Preplanning efforts have been established by the Surveillance and Control Coordinator.

K-3 Rev. 2015-004 April 2015

K.5.b Radiological Decontamination Emergency Personnel wounds - Medical decontamination kits (Figure K-1 thru K-3) are available in several locations. Wounds (if contaminated) will be decontaminated if the welfare of the patient is not at stake. Decontamination efforts will take place at the site prior to medical care if the situation warrants it. However, if the injury is considered serious, decontamination efforts will not take place and the patient will be transported to the hospital immediately for proper medical care. A radiation protection technician will accompany the patient to the hospital. See Radiation Protection Policy Manual, Section VI-04, Investigation of Unusual Radiological Occurrences.

Supplies - The Radiation Protection Manager will determine whether it may be more economical to dispose of a class of items, rather than to decontaminate them.

Instruments and equipment - For specific information refer to Radiation Protection Policy Manual, Section 111-9, Contamination Control.

Waste Disposal - Low-level solid wastes (contaminated trash) will be collected in labeled containers, and will normally be compacted. Intermediate and high level solid waste (spent resins, spent filters, evaporator bottoms, etc.) will be placed in containers and shielded as appropriate. All radioactive solid wastes will be shipped to an NRC-licensed or agreement state disposal facility offsite.

In accordance with Selected Licensee Commitments Manual Section 16.11, station discharge limits have been established for the disposal of airborne radioactive wastes.

These limits are calculated based on 10 CFR 50 Appendix I requirements, the composition and concentration of the waste, the flow rate in the unit vents, a factor for site meteorological dilution, and 10 CFR 20 Appendix B allowable concentration for Unrestricted Areas.

After the required sampling and laboratory analyses are completed, contaminated liquid waste is pumped from the Liquid Waste Tank(s), essentially on a batch basis, and discharged, with the necessary dilution, to the environment. The liquid waste effluent discharge line is monitored by a process instrument, and the release will be stopped if preset concentration limits are reached.

K-4 Rev. 2015-004 April 2015

K.6 Contamination Control Measures K.6.a Area Access Control - The plant site will be evacuated should station management determine the potential exists for non-essential personnel to be exposed to an unplanned dose in excess of 10CFR20 limits. Once the site has been evacuated, access to the plant will be limited by the Highway Patrol on the public highway and then Site Security will limit access to the plant except through an established access entrance. Contamination Control Areas and Restricted Areas will be established by Site Radiation Protection personnel.

Drinking Water and Food Supplies - Drinking water and food supplies can be brought in by private vendor if necessary. No eating or drinking is permitted in radiation areas or zones unless permitted by the Radiation Protection Manager.

K.6.b Recovery efforts will be determined by the Onsite Recovery Organization on a case by case basis. Decontamination measures to return areas and items to normal use will be the responsibility of the site during the recovery effort. However, the use of good radiation protection decontamination practices as evidenced by the Radiation Protection Policy Manual will be the general criteria used.

K. 7 Decontamination of Personnel at Relocation Assembly Area Should non-essential plant personnel be evacuated from the station to an offsite area, provisions for extra clothing and decontaminants suitable for any type of contamination have been made (Figure K-2).

Offsite assembly areas have been determined so that site personnel may be relocated to a safe site quickly and can be decontaminated (if necessary), monitored, and released (Figure J-2). Records will be made of the contamination levels of any/all personnel released from the site to an offsite assembly area (Figure K-5) and again when they are released from the offsite area (Figure K-5).

Offsite Evacuation Areas (Agreements appended to Appendix 5)

Pickens County Daniel High School, Central, S.C., east of the station, approximately 10 miles.

Oconee County Keowee Elementary School, Seneca, S.C., west of the station, approximately 7 miles.

K-5 Rev. 2015-004 April 2015

FIGURE K-1 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE MEDICAL DECONTAMINATION KIT See HP/O/B/1009/001 K-6 Rev. 2015-004 April 2015

FIGURE K-2 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE LIST OF SUPPLIES FOR DECONTAMINATION OFFSITE*

See HP/O/B/1009/001 K-7 Rev. 2015-004 April 2015

FIGURE K-3 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY DECONTAMINATION SUPPLIES (ONSITE)*

INVENTORY LIST See HP/O/B/1009/001 K-8 Rev. 2015-004 April 2015

FIGURE K-4 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE DAILY EXPOSURE TIME RECORD CARD Form 288347 (R5-97) DUKE ENERGY Previously Form 18555 DAILY EXPOSURE TIME RECORD RP BADGE #: WORK GROUP TEDE AT SHIFT START: REMAINING DATE mrem MAE:

mrem PERMIT # TIME RECORD DOSE RECORD RWP SRWP TIME ENTER TIME EXIT DOSIMETER DOSIMETER DOSE RECEIVED RCA/RCZ RCA / RCZ READING ENTER READING EXIT THIS ENTRY zD z9 L t .5 U CONTACT RADIATION PROTECTION IF YOU EXPERIENCE DOSIMETER PROBLEMS. (SEE REVERSE SIDE.)

Form 288347 (R5-97) DUKE ENERGY Previously Form 18555 THIS CARD IS TO BE USED BY INDIVIDULS TO RECORD THE DOSIMETER DOSE HE/SHE RECEIVED FOR ENTRY OR WORK DONE UNDER EACH RWP.

COMPLETION OF THIS DOSE CARD ALSO MEANS THAT THE INDIVIDUAL HAS READ AND UNDERSTOOD EACH RWP AND HAS COMPLIED WITH ITS REQUIREMENTS.

K-9 Rev. 2015-004 April 2015

FIGURE K-5 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE Individual Contamination Exposure Levels LICENSEE: DUKE ENERGY COMPANY IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION Name: Date:

Social Security Number: Time:

Employer: RP Badge #: ________

CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE LEVELS Instrument Used: Instrument Reading:

(RM-14 with thin window detector or equivalent)

Date: Employee Signature: _________

Remarks: Address:

To the individual named above _, this report is furnished to you so that you have a prompt record of your radioactive contamination level.

Radiation Protection Manager Date:

Copies to; Individual Individual File K-10 Rev. 2015-004 April 2015

FIGURE K-5 (Continued)

DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE RECORD OF DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURE NAME RP BADGE INITIAL DOSE DOSE RATE NUMBER RATE (mrem/hr) AFTER DECON K-11 Rev. 2015-004 April 2015

FIGURE K-6 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE RADIATION WORK PERMIT NUCLEAR STATION RP Version Radiation Work Permit # Revision #

Job

Title:

ED (MG) Set Points Dose Alarm:

Dose Rate Alarm:

Dress Category, Task Description, Special Dosimetry and Respiratory Requirement s Comments/Special Instructions Activation Date & Time: Termination Date & Time:

Approval Date & Time: Terminated By:

Approved By:

K-12 Rev. 2015-004 April 2015

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.2

§50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form Activity Description and

References:

Oconee E-Plan Section K changes resulting from 11LOCN  :

superseding SH/OIB1/2005/003, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release, with AD-EP-ALL-0204, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release See attached Emergency Plan markups for Section K.I.

LOCIC2Z Activity Scope:

0 The activity ji a change to the emergency plan El The activity is not a change to the emergency plan Change Type: Change Type:

El The change is editorial or typographical [I The change does conform to an activity that has 0 The change is not editorial or typographical prior approval The change does not conform to an activity that has prior approval Planning Standard Impact Determination: ........

0 §50.47(b)(1) - Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control)

El §50.47(b)(2) - Onsite Emergency Organization El §50.47(b)(3) - Emergency Response Support and Resources El §50.47(b)(4) - Emergency Classification System*

0l §50.47(b)(5) - Notification Methods and Procedures*

El §50.47(b)(6) - Emergency Communications

§50.47(b)(7) - Public Education and Information

§l El §50.47(b)(8) - Emergency Facility and Equipment El §50.47(b)(9) - Accident Assessment*

[ §50.47(bX10) - Protective Response* - Protective Actions for Emergency Workers, Authorization and use of KI

§§50.47(bXl 1) - Radiological Exposure Control - Resources for controlling radiological exposures for emergency workers El §50.47(bX12) - Medical and Public Health Support E] §50.47(bsX 3) - Recovery Planning and Post-accident Operations E1 §50.47(b)(14)- Drills and Exercises E] §50.47(bX15) - Emergency Responder Training E] §50.47(b)( 16) - Emergency Plan Maintenance

• FRiskSignificant Planning Standards 0l The proposed activity does NOT impact a Planning Standard Commitment Impact Determination: CK6 0 The activity does involve a site specific EP commitment Record the commitment or commitment reference:

El The activity does no involve a site specific EP commitment Not required per Step 3.10.4.1.6.3 if a Planning Standard is impacted.

Revision 12

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.2 The activity can be implemented without performing a §50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation The activity cannot be implemented without performing a §50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation parer Name: arer Signature Date:

estine M. Kuhr 'U, JApril

-. 8, 2015 iewer Name: Revie Si t ]Date:

Al. 727-/

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.3

§50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation Form Activity Description and

References:

conee E-Plan Section K changes resulting from t superseding SHJOBf0l5X03, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release, with AD-EP-ALL.-0204, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release See attached Emergency Plan markup for Section K.I.

Implementation of AD-EP-ALL-0204 requires changing the approval authority for administration of K! from the Radiation Protection Manager in the OSC or the Emergency Coordinator to Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) for site Duke Energy and contractor personnel and off-site Duke energy and contractor personnel until the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is operational and the Radiological Assessment Manager (RAM) for off-site Duke Energy and contractor personnel and EOF personnel once the EOF is activated, If the determination is made to distribute KI tablets, then the Emergency Coordinator (EC) and Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) Director are notified.

Activity Type: BLOCK 2 The M activity is a change to the emergency plan O The activity affects implementation of the emergency plan, but ino a change to the emergent.y plan Impact and Ucensing Basis Determination: :LOCK 3

1. [list offunctions, elements andiorcommitments impacted by the activity (organizedby planning standard as applicable)]

EP Function - Responsibility for emergency response is assigned. Continuous staffing and shift relief.

[I OCFRS0.47(b)(I)]

EP Function - A range of protective actions is available for plan emergency workers during emergencies,,

including those for hostile action events. Authorization and use of KI. [I.0CFR 50.47(b)(l0)]

EP Function - The resources for controlling radiological exposures for emergency workers are established.

Authorization and use of Emergency Exposure Limits. [IOCFR 50.47(bX l 1)]

Licensing Basis:

Oconee Emiergency Plan Revision.2015-02 A. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY (Or nizfional Control)

Overall Respons Oranization l.a The Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan is a coordinated effort involving:.site personnel, site, emergency plans, plant facilities and equipment, the emergency resources of Duke Energy Company

• corporate organization, emergency services of various local, state, and federal agencies having appropriate jurisdiction or concern for public health and safety. .

Conept of Oprtins for Emgeny=Roonse - 0com Nuclear Station L.b During the first critical hours (until outside agencies responsible for public health and safety can properly respond), the Operations Shift Manager on duty at the Oconee Nuclear Station assumes, responsibility for initiating protective action required for any location within the Site Boundary or Emergency Planning Zones that may be affected as a result of an emergency. The Operations Shift Manager will determine the emergency action level. Notification of Unusual Events dictate that offsite agencies be notified and that site management and corporate management are made aware of the event. If no further deterioration transpires, the event is closed out and agencies so notified. However, if the event is escalated and determined that a higher action level exists, the Emergency Response Organization. is activated.

1

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual

3. 10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.3 Pickens County, Oconee County, the State of South Carolina Warning Point, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are notified of any emergency status. The Corporate Office is noti fled of all emergency classifications and would provide support to the site as requested.

The Pickens County and Oconee County Emergency Management Agencies coordinate designated agency response through their Emergency Operation Centers. Until the State of South Carolina Emergency Organization is in a position to respond to the radiological emergency, the local county emergency preparedness offices will be responsible for the public and will make the necessary response required to provide for the health, safety and welfare of the public. Until the State of South Carolina is in place at their emergency operations center, direct contact will be made through the designated warning point in Columbia, South Carolina.

After the station manager assumes the role as Emergency Coordinator in the Technical Support Center, the Operations Shift Manager is then able to devote his full attention to the Control Room. The Technical Support Center will provide contact to offsite agencies until relieved by the Emergency Operations Facility.

Technical support and accident mitigation strategy will be provided to the control room by the Technical Support Center.

Once the EOF Director assumes control of the Emergency Operations Facility, the Technical Support Center will be relieved of the responsibility of contact with offsite agencies. The EOF Director is responsible for providing technical information to the local and state governmental agencies that will be utilized to determine actions required to protect the health and safety of the public.

During a security event involving an intrusion/attempted intrusion into the site by a hostile force after normal working hours, activation of the Technical Support Center will be delayed for personnel safety. In this situation the Emergency Operations Facility may be activated and relieve the Operations Shift Manager of his Emergency Coordinator responsibilities. This transfer of Emergency Coordinator responsibilities directly to the Emergency Operations Facility will allow the Operations Shift Manager to devote his full attention to the control room.

The Emergency Operations Facility will augment the plant emergency organization staff with additional Duke Energy management, (both administrative and technical personnel). The Charlotte EOF will be staffed with qualified personnel from the Duke Energy Nuclear General Office and Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations. The lines of authority, responsibilities and functions for the EOF Organization are established in the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan. Functions are:

-Management of offsite Duke Energy emergency response

-Coordination of radiological and environmental assessment

-Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) for the public

-Coordination of emergency response activities with federal, state, and local agencies.

Sections 1.5 & J.6 - Site Evacuation Procedures-Personnel Accountability After all non-essential personnel have been evacuated from the site, logsheets will be kept by Radiation Protection personnel in the Operational Support Center of all persons onsite together with their Radiation Protection records to include the following:

a. Individual respiratory protection

b. Protective clothing

c. Use of Radioprotective drugs 2

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.3 Section K. Radiological Exoosure Control To assure that means for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency are established for emergency workers and the affected population.

K.1 Onsite exposure guidelines have been established for the following categories:

MAXIMUM EXPOSURE UMITS IN REM CATEGORIES TOTAL LENS OF THE SKIN EXTREMITIES COMMITTED EFFECTIVE EYE DOSE DOSE EQUIALENT

... EQUIVALENT ,, (ORRAN)",

Al 5rem is rem 50rem 50 rem 50 rem Protecting 10rn 30 mm 100 rem 100 rem 100 rem Vatalbe Propney Lifesaving or 25 rem 75rein 250 ern 250 tern 250 rern Protection Of Large Populatio VOLUNTEER >25 rem >75 rem >250 rem >250 rem >250 rem BASIS:

Lifesaving or Protection of Large Populat*on _ __,

• Note TEDE to non-pregnant adults from exposure during an emergency situation. Special precautions should be taken to limit dose to eye lens, and other organs, tissues, or extremities. With regard to maximum limit, EPA concluded that it was not possible to prejudge the acceptable risk for saving a

..life. Doses may be authorized to the limits established in this chart.

• • Note: Administration of stable iodine will be recommended for emergency workers if a dose of 5 rem CDE'is projected to the thyroid from radioiodine. This action will require approval of the Radiation Protection Manager in the OSC or the Emergency Coordinator.

Section P. Figure PI Figure PI lists SH/0/B/2005/003, Distribution of Potassium 1odide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release, as a procedure that implements Sections J5/J6 and K Ia - g of the Emergency Plan.

Compliance Evaluation and Condusion: B LOCK 4 I. PSI Evaluation:.

§50.47(bXh) - primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee and by State and local organizations within the Emergency Planning Zones have been assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis.

This is further explained in NUREG-0654, Criteria A. L.a, A. L.b, and A. I.e A.1 .a Each plan shall identify the State, local, Federal, and private sector organizations (including utilities) that are intended to be part of the overail response organization for the Emergency Planning Zones.

A. L.b Each organization and suborganization having an operational role shall specify its concept of operations, and its relationship to the total effort.

A.I.e Each organization shall provide for 24-hour per day emergency response, including 24-hour per 3

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual

3. 10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.3 day manning of communications links.

Discussion This revision changes the approval authority for administration of KI from the Radiation Protection Manager in the OSC or the Emergency Coordinator to Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) for site Duke Energy and contractor personnel and off-site Duke energy and contractor personnel until the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is operational and the Radiological Assessment Manager (RAM) for off-site Duke Energy and contractor personnel and EOF personnel once the EOF is activated. If the determination is made to distribute KI tablets, then the Emergency Coordinator (EC) and Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) Director are notified, but their approval is not required.

Although the approval authority has been changed, the responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee are still assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis.

Therefore, the Oconee Emergency Plan continues to comply with PS 1.

2. PS 10 Evaluation

§50.47(b)(10) - A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. Evacuation time estimates have been developed by applicants and licensees. Licensees shall update the evacuation time estimates on a periodic basis. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.

This is further explained in NUREG-0654, Criterion J.6:

J.6 Each licensee shall, for individuals remaining or arriving onsite during the emergency, make provisions for:

a. Individual respiratory protection;

b. Use of protective clothing; and

c. Use of radioprotective drugs (e.g., individual thyroid protection).

Discussion The Oconee Emergency Plan, as revised, continues to provide information for distribution of Active Potassium Iodide (KI) tablets to Duke Energy and contractor personnel onsite in the event of a release of radioiodine resulting from emergency conditions. The scope has been expanded to include all Duke Energy and contractor personnel in the event of Hostile Action Scenario during radioiodine release.

Therefore, Oconee Emergency Plan, as revised, continues to comply with PS 10.

3. PS 11 Evaluation

§50.47(b)(1 1) - Means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established for emergency workers. The means for controlling radiological exposures shall include exposure guidelines 4

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.3 consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides.

This is further explained in NUREG-0654, Criterion K. I K. I Each licensee shall establish onsite exposure guidelines consistent with EA Emergency Worker and lifesaving Activity Protective Actions Guides (EPA 520/1-75/001 )...

Discussion EPA 520/1-75/001 has been superseded by EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides And Protective Actions For Nuclear Incidents (October 1991). EPA-400-R-92-001 specified a threshold of 25 rem committed dose equivalent to the thyroid from radioiodine as the threshold for administration of stable iodine. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), Guidance PotassiumIodide as a Thyroid Blocking Agent in Radiation Emergencies (December 1991) provided additional guidance on the threshold for administration of stable iodine. Based on a review of the latter, Duke Energy adopted a threshold for administration of stable iodine of 5 rem CDE projected to the thyroid from radioiodine.

The Oconee Emergency Plan, as revised, continues to use a threshold for administration of stable iodine of 5 rem CDE projected to the thyroid from radioiodine for distribution of Active Potassium Iodide (KI) tablets in the event of a release of radioiodine resulting from emergency conditions. The scope has been expanded to include all Duke Energy and contractor personnel in the event of Hostile Action Scenario during radioiodine release.

Therefore, Oconee Emergency Plan, as revised, continues to comply with PS 1i.

Conclusion:

The proposed activity Z dLoes/ E] doesnot continue to comply with the requirements.

Reduction in Effectiveness (RIE) Evaluation and

Conclusion:

I BLOCKS5 I. Evaluation:

The Emergency Plan revision changes the approval authority for administration of KI from the Radiation Protection Manager in the OSC or the Emergency Coordinator to Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) for site Duke Energy and contractor personnel and off-site Duke energy and contractor personnel until the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is operational and the Radiological Assessment Manager (RAM) for off-site Duke Energy and contractor personnel and EOF personnel once the EOF is activated. If the determination is made to distribute KI tablets, then the Emergency Coordinator (EC) and Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) Director are notified, but their approval is not required. Although the approval authority has been changed, the responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee are still assigned, the emergency responsibilities have been specifically established, and the emergency response organization continues to have staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis. This change aligns the approval authority with that in the currently approved procedure, SHI/O/B/2005/003, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the event of a Radioiodine Release.

The Oconee Emergency Plan, as revised, continues to use a threshold for administration of stable iodine of 5 rem CDE projected to the thyroid from radioiodine for distribution of Active Potassium Iodide (KI).

tablets in the event of a release of radioiodine resulting from emergency conditions. Log sheets will continue to be kept by Radiation Protection personnel of all persons onsite to the use of radioprotective drugs. The scope has been expanded to include all Duke Energy and contractor personnel in the event of Hostile Action Scenario during radioiodine release. This is considered an enhancement.

5

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual

3. 10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.3

Conclusion:

The proposed activity 0 ge doc. ngo constitute a RIE.

Effectiveness Evaluation Results ,WOC1( 6; 0 The activity doe continue to comply with the requirements of §50.47(b) and §50 Appendix E and the activity does not constitute a reduction in effectiveness. Therefore, the activity can be implemented without prior approval.

Ej The activity does not continue to comply with the requirements of §50.47(b) and §50 Appendix E or the activity does constitute a reduction in effectiveness. Therefore, the activity 6= be implemented without prior approval.

6

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES P. Responsibility for the Planning Effort: Development. Periodic Review and Distribution of the Emergency Plans To assure that responsibilities for plan development, review and distribution of emergency plans are established and that planners are properly trained:

P.1 Training for Emergency Preparedness Personnel Training for emergency preparedness personnel shall be provided in the form of workshop/seminar sessions on an annual basis. Courses developed by the Duke Training Center are also available in technically related subjects that will enhance the working knowledge of these people.

P.2 & P.3 Overall Authority The Site Vice-President has the overall authority and responsibility for all hazards emergency response planning. The planning effort is delegated to the Manager, Emergency Preparedness.

The Manager of Emergency Preparedness at the Oconee Nuclear Site shall have the responsibility for the development, review and coordination of the site emergency plans with other response organizations and shall be responsible for conducting the biennial exercise, drills and training sessions to test the Oconee Nuclear Site Emergency Plan. This person is employed in the Safety Assurance Group.

P.4 & P.5 Review and Update of Emergency Plan The ONS Emergency Plan shall be reviewed and updated annually. An in-depth review of the Emergency Plan will be made to determine if any/all changes have been made as a result of drills, exercises, commitments, audits, new regulatory requirements, and any other identified mechanism used to determine the appropriateness of the Emergency Plan. The Manager of Emergency Preparedness or designee is responsible for conducting the review and updating/revising the Emergency Plan and/or Implementing Procedures, as required. Once the review has been completed and changes made as determined, the Emergency Plan shall be certified as current.

Approved revisions of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures shall be distributed according to Appendix 6, (Distribution of Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures). Appendix 6 carries an itemized list of all organizations and individuals receiving copies of the Emergency Plan and P-1 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Implementing Procedures. Revised pages of the Emergency Plan shall be dated and marked to show where changes have been made.

P.6 Supporting: Plans Figure P-2 lists plans in support of the ONS Emergency Plan.

P.7 Implementing Procedures Written procedures will be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities associated with emergency plan implementation. Each procedure and changes thereto, shall be approved by the responsible manager prior to implementation.

Implementing procedures are indexed and cross referenced to the section applicable in NUREG 0654. (Figure P- 1)

P.8 Table of Contents The Oconee Nuclear Site Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures contain a table of contents and an index tab system.

P.9 Independent Audit The NOS Audit Manager will arrange for an independent review of Oconee Nuclear Station's Emergency Preparedness Program as necessary, based on an assessment against performance indicators, and as soon as reasonably practicable after a change occurs in personnel, procedures, equipment, or facilities that potentially could adversely affect emergency preparedness, but no longer than 12 months after the change. In any case, all elements of the emergency preparedness program will be reviewed at least once every 24 months. Guidance for performing the assessment against the performance indicators is provided in the Emergency Preparedness Administrative Procedure AD-EP-ALL-0001. The independent review will be conducted by the Independent Nuclear Oversight Division, which will include the following plans, procedures, training programs, drills/exercises, equipment, and State/local government interfaces:

1. Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan

2. Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures P-2 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

3. State/Local Support Agency Training Program

4. Site Emergency Response Training Program

5. Public & Media Training/Awareness

6. Equipment: Communications, Monitoring, Meteorological, Public Alerting

7. State/Local Plan Interface The review findings will be submitted to the appropriate corporate and nuclear site management. The part of the review involving the evaluation of the adequacy of interface with State and local governments will be reported to the appropriate State and local governments. Corporate or nuclear site management, as appropriate, will evaluate the findings affecting their area of responsibility and ensure effective corrective actions are taken. The results of the review, along with recommendations for improvements, will be documented, and retained for a period of five (5) years.

P.10 Phone Number Update The Emergency Telephone Directory is updated quarterly.

P-3 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented Assignment of Responsibility Ala ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 Agreement Letters Al b RP/0/A/l 000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/O/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/l000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure AD-EP-DEC-0107 Standard Procedure for EOF Services SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility Alc ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Fig Al Ald RP/0/A/l000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility Ale RP/0/A/l000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure A2a NA State/County Responsibility A2b NA State/County Responsibility A3 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 A4 RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/l000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility On-Site Emergency Organization Bl ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities RP/0/A/l000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/O/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/l 000/022 Procedure For Major Site Damage Assessment And Repair RP/0/A/l000/029 Fire Brigade Response AD-EP-DEC-0107 Standard Procedure for EOF Services B2 RP/0/A/lI000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/O/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility B3 RP/0/A/l000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/O/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility P-4 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented B3 NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities B4 RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities B5 OMP 2-16 Shift Turnover NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities RP/O/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility B6 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility AD-EP-DEC-01 07 Standard Procedure for EOF Services B7a-d NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities SR/O/AI2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility AD-EP-DEC-01 07 Standard Procedure for EOF Services RP/0/B/1 000/027 Re-Entry Recovery Procedure RP/0/A/1000/031 Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan B8 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 B9 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 Emergency Response Support and Resources Cla, b, c ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility RP/0/A/1000/031 Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan RP/0/A/1 000/037 Incident Command Post (ICP) Operations and Radiation Protection Liaison Guidelines C2a NA State/County Responsibility C2b EP FAM 3.11 State/County EOC Liaison Reference Manual RP/0/A/1000/037 Incident Command Post (ICP) Operations and Radiation Protection Liaison Guidelines C3 HP/0/B/1009/026 Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions C4 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility P-5 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented Emergency Classification System Dla, b, c ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan RP/0/A/1000/001 Emergency Classification D2 RP/O/A/1000/001 Emergency Classification D3 NA State/County Responsibility D4 NA State/County Responsibility Notification Methods and Procedures El RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/015A Offsite Communications From The Control Room RP/0/A/1000/015B Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1 000/024 Protective Action Recommendations SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility E2 RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure E3 RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/015A Offsite Communications From The Control Room RP/0/A/1000/015B Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/O/AI1 000/024 Protective Action Recommendations SRIO/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility SR/O/A/2000/004 Notification to States and Counties Facility for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee E4a-n RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/015A Offsite Communications From The Control Room RP/O/A/1000/015B Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/O/A/1 000/024 Protective Action Recommendations SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility E5 NA State/County Responsibility E6 EP FAM 3.3 Alert and Notification System (Siren Program)

E7 RP/0/A/1 000/024 Protective Action Recommendations SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility E8 RP/0/A/1000/017 Spill Response Emergency Communications Fla RP/O/A/1I000/002 1 1 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure P-6 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented Fla RP/0/A/l000/015A Offsite Communications From The Control Room RP/0/A/1000/015B Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center RP/O/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility Fl b PT/O/A/2000/002 Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment Flc RP/0/A/II000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/AI1000/015A Offsite Communications From The Control Room RP/OIA/10001015B Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center RP/O/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/B/1 000/003A ERDS Operation PT/0/B/2000/009 Emergency Response Data System Quarterly Test SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility Fld PT/0/A/2000/002 Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment ST/0/A44600/086 Standard Procedure For Periodic Verification of EOF Communication Equipment Operation and Equipment/

Supply Inventory-STIO/A/4600/094 Standard Procedure For Periodic Test Of The EOF Selective Signaling, ENS and ETS Fle RP/0/A/1000/002 -Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure Flf PT/O/AI2000/002 Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment RP/0/B/1 000/003 A ERDS Operation PT/0/B/2000/009 Emergency Response Data System Quarterly Test F2 PT/O/AI2000/002 Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment RP/OINA1000/016 MERT Activation Procedure For Medical, Confined Space, and High Angle Rescue Emergencies RP/O/AI1 000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure F3 PT/O/A/2000/002 Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment PT/O/B/2000/009 Emergency Response Data System Quarterly Test Public Education and Information Gla,b,c EP FAM 3.6 Alert and Notification System - Oconee Specific Supplement NPM Chapter 15 Corporate Communications Departmental Interface Agreement P-7 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented G2 EP FAM 3.6 Alert and Notification System - Oconee Specific Supplement NPM Chapter 15 Corporate Communications Departmental Interface Agreement G3a, b RP/OIAI1000/028 Nuclear Communications Emergency Response Plan RP/O/AI1000/031 Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan SR/0/B/2000/001 Standard Procedure For Corporate Communications Response To The Emergency Operations Facility G4a, b, c RP/O/A/1000/028 Nuclear Communications Emergency Response Plan RP/O/A/1000/031 Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan SR/0/B/2000/001 Standard Procedure For Corporate Communications Response To The Emergency Operations Facility G5 NPM Chapter 15 Corporate Communications Departmental Interface Agreement Emergenc Facilities and Equipment Hla, b, c RP/O/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/O/A/1000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check PTIO/A/2000/002 Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment PTIO/AI2000/008 Procedure to Verify the Availability of Supplies and Equipment in the Emergency Response Facilities PTIOIA/20001010 Review of Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures H2 SRIOIA/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility ST/0/A44600/086 Standard Procedure For Periodic Verification of EOF Communication Equipment Operation and Equipment/Supply Inventory STIO/A/46001094 Standard Procedure For Periodic Test Of The EOF Selective Signaling, ENS and ETS H3 NA State/County Responsibility H4 NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities RP/O/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure P-8 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented H4 RP/O/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1 000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure RP/0/A/1000/031 Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility SR/0/B/2000/001 Standard Procedure For Corporate Communications Response To The Emergency Operations Facility AD-EP-DEC-0107 Standard Procedure for EOF Services H5 RP/0/A/1000/001 Emergency Classification H5a, b, c, d ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan IP/0/B/1601/003 Meteorological Equipment Checks H6a, b, c ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan IP/O/B/1601/003 Meteorological Equipment Checks ONS ODCM ONS Offsite Dose Calculation Manual HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check HP/0/B/1009/023 Radiation Protection Emergency Response PT/0/A/2000/008 Procedure to Verify the Availability of Supplies and Equipment in the Emergency Response Facilities ST/0/A/4600/086 Standard Procedure For Periodic Verification of EOF Communication Equipment Operation and Equipment/Supply Inventory PT/0/B/0250/030 Quarterly Fire Brigade Equipment Inspection PT/0/B/0250/032 Quarterly Inspection Of Emergency Medical Equipment PT/0/B/0250/045 Quarterly Inspection Of Hazardous Materials Response Team Equipment CP/0/B/2001/008 Chemistry Safety Equipment And Spill Control

Response

RP/0/A/1000/017 Spill Response H7 HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check HP/0/B/1 009/023 Radiation Protection Emergency Response H8 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan IP/0/B/1601/003 Meteorological Equipment Checks AD-EP-ALL-0202 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment RP/O/A/1 000/024 Protective Action Recommendations H9 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan IP/0/B/1601/003 Meteorological Equipment Checks ONS ODCM ONS Offsite Dose Calculation Manual HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check P-9 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented H9 PT/O/A/2000/008 Procedure to Verify the Availability of Supplies and Equipment in the Emergency Response Facilities ST/0/A/4600/086 Standard Procedure For Periodic Verification of EOF Communication Equipment Operation and Equipment/Supply Inventory PT/0/B1/0250/030 Quarterly Fire Brigade Equipment Inspection PT/0/B1/0250/032 Quarterly Inspection Of Emergency Medical Equipment PT/0/B1/0250/045 Quarterly Inspection Of Hazardous Materials Response Team Equipment CP/0/B1/2001/008 Chemistry Safety Equipment And Spill Control Response RP/O/A/1000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure H10 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan IP/0/B/1601/003 Meteorological Equipment Checks ONS ODCM ONS Offsite Dose Calculation Manual HP/0/B1/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check PT/O/A/2000/008 Procedure to Verify the Availability of Supplies and Equipment in the Emergency Response Facilities ST/O/A/4600/086 Standard Procedure For Periodic Verification of EOF Communication Equipment Operation and Equipment/Supply Inventory PT/0/B1/0250/030 Quarterly Fire Brigade Equipment Inspection PT/0/B1/0250/032 Quarterly Inspection Of Emergency Medical Equipment PT/0/B1/0250/045 Quarterly Inspection Of Hazardous Materials Response Team Equipment CP/0/B/2001/008 Chemistry Safety Equipment And Spill Control

Response

H11 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Section H.11 H12 HP/0/B1/1009/023 Radiation Protection Emergency Response AD-EP-ALL-0203 Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility Accident Assessment 11 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Section D RP/0/A/1000/001 Emergency Classification 12 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan RP/0/B/1000/018 Core Damage Assessment CSM 5.1 Emergency Response Guidelines P-I0 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented 12 CSM 5.2 Procedure Use Guidelines During Emergency

Response

CP/l/A/2002/002 Rheodyne Sample Via Post Accident Liquid Sampling System (PALSS)

CP/2/A/2002/002 Rheodyne Sample Via Post Accident Liquid Sampling System (PALSS)

CP/3/A/2002/002 Rheodyne Sample Via Post Accident Liquid Sampling System (PALSS)

HP/0/B/1009/009 Procedure For Determining The Inplant Radioiodine Concentration During Accident Conditions HP/0/B/1009/015 Procedure For Sampling And Quantifying High Level Gaseous, Radioiodine And Particulate Radioactivity HP/0/BI/1009/026 Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions AD-EP-ALL-0202 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment AD-EP-ALL-0203 Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions 13a, b RP/0/A/1000/001 Emergency Classification RP/O/A/1 000/024 Protective Action Recommendations HP/0/B/1009/022 On-Shift Off-Site Dose Projections ONS ODCM ONS Offsite Dose Calculation Manual AD-EP-ALL-0202 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment 14 HP/0/B/1009/018 Off-Site Dose Projections HP/0/B/1009/022 On-Shift Off-Site Dose Projections AD-EP-ALL-0202 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment 15 RP/O/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/O/A/1 000/003 A ERDS Operation RP/0/A/1000/015 A Offsite Communications From The Control Room RP/0/A/1000/015 B Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center RP/O/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility SR/O/A/2000/004 Notification to States and Counties from the Emergency Operations Facility for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee 16 AD-EP-ALL-0202 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment 17 SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility P-11 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented 17 AD-EP-ALL-0203 Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions HP/0/B/1009/026 Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions 18 SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility AD-EP-ALL-0203 Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions HP/0/B/1009/026 Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions 19 HP/0/B/1009/026 Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions AD-EP-ALL-0203 Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions 110 AD-EP-ALL-0202 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment HP/0/B/1009/020 Estimating Food Chain Doses Under Post-Accident Conditions HP/0/B/1009/026 Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions Ill NA State/County Responsibility Protective Response J1 AP/O/A/1 700/045 Site Security Threats RP/O/A/1000/009 Procedure For Site Assembly RP/O/A/1000/010 Procedure For Emergency Evacuation/Relocation Of Site Personnel J2 NSD 114 Site Assembly/Site Evacuation HP/0/B/1009/016 Procedure For Emergency Decontamination Of Personnel And Vehicles On-Site And From Off-Site Remote Assembly Areas RP/O/AI1000/010 Procedure For Emergency Evacuation/Relocation Of Site Personnel AD-EP-ALL-0202 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment J3 NSD 114 Site Assembly/Site Evacuation AP/O/A/1 700/045 Site Security Threats HP/0/B/1009/018 Off-Site Dose Projections RP/O/A/1000/009 Procedure For Site Assembly RP/O/N1000/010 Procedure For Emergency Evacuation/Relocation Of Site Personnel AD-EP-ALL-0202 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment J4 HP/0/B/1009/016 Procedure For Emergency Decontamination Of Personnel And Vehicles On-Site And From Off-Site Remote Assembly Areas AD-EP-ALL-0202 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment RP/O/A/1000/009 Procedure For Site Assembly P-12 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented J4 RP/O/A/1000/010 Procedure For Emergency Evacuation/Relocation Of Site Personnel J5/J6 NSD 114 Site Assembly/Site Evacuation AP/0/A/1 700/045 Site Security Threats HP/0/B/1009/009 Procedure For Determining The Inplant Airborne Radioiodine Concentration During Accident Conditions RP/0/A/1 000/009 Procedure For Site Assembly AD-EP-ALL-0204 Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release RPM Radiation Protection Manual J7 RP/O/A/1000/024 Protective Action Recommendations SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility J8 ONS-ETE- ONS Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE) Dated 12142012 12/14/2012 J9 NA State/County Responsibility AP/0/A/1 700/045 Site Security Threats RP/0/A/1 000/009 Procedure For Site Assembly RP/O/A/1000/010 Procedure For Emergency Evacuation/Relocation Of Site Personnel J10a, b, c ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan RPM Radiation Protection Manual J10d - I NA State/County Responsibility J10m RP/O/A/1000/024 Protective Action Recommendations SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility J 11 NA State/County Responsibility J12 NA State/County Responsibility Radiological Exposure Control K1a - g RP/0/B/1000/011 Planned Emergency Exposure AD-EP-ALL-0204 Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release K2 RP/0/B/1 000/011 Planned Emergency Exposure K3a RPM Radiation Protection Manual K3a HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check HP/0/B/1009/023 Radiation Protection Emergency Response K3b RPM Radiation Protection Manual HP/0/B/1009/023 Radiation Protection Emergency Response K4 NA State/County Responsibility K5a, b, RPM Radiation Protection Manual P-13 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented K5a, b, HP/0/B/1009/016 Procedure For Emergency Decontamination Of Personnel And Vehicles On-Site And From Off-Site Remote Assembly Areas HP/0/B/1009/024 Radiation Protection Response To A Medical Emergency K6a, b, c RPM Radiation Protection Manual HP/0/B/1009/016 Procedure For Emergency Decontamination Of Personnel And Vehicles On-Site And From Off-Site Remote Assembly Areas K7 HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check HP/0/B/1009/016 Procedure For Emergency Decontamination Of Personnel And Vehicles On-Site And From Off-Site Remote Assembly Areas Medical and Public Health Support L1 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check L2 RP/O/N1000/016 MERT Activation Procedure For Medical, Confined Space, and High Angle Rescue Emergencies HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check HP/0/B/1009/024 Radiation Protection Response To A Medical Emergency PT/0/B1/0250/032 Quarterly Inspection Of Emergency Medical.

Equipment L3 NA State/County Responsibility L4 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 RP/O/AI1000/016 MERT Activation Procedure For Medical, Confined Space, and High Angle Rescue Emergencies HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check HP/0/B/1009/024 Radiation Protection Response To A Medical Emergency Recovery and Reentry Planning and Post Accident Operations M1 RP/O/A/1000/024 Protective Action Recommendations M1 RP/0/B/1 000/027 Re-Entry Recovery Procedure RP/O/A/1 000/028 Nuclear Communications Emergency Response Plan M2 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Section M RP/0/B/1 000/027 Re-Entry Recovery Procedure RP/O/AI1 000/028 Nuclear Communications Emergency Response Plan P-14 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented M3 RP/O/A1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/OIAI1 000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure RP/0/B/1000/027 Re-Entry Recovery Procedure SRIOIA/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility RP/O/A/1000/031 Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan NEWP 5.1 Oconee Nuclear Environmental Work Practice, Section 5.1, Spill Response.

M4 RP/0/B/1 000/027 Re-Entry Recovery Procedure Exercises and Drills Nla, b EP FAM 3.19 Drills and Exercises N2, c, d, e, f, g, EP FAM 3.19 Drills and Exercises A i N2a PT/O/A/2000/002 Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment ST/OINA4600/086 Standard Procedure For Periodic Verification of EOF Communication Equipment Operation and Equipment/Supply Inventory ST/O/A/4600/094 Standard Procedure For Periodic Test Of The EOF Selective Signaling, ENS and ETS N2b PT/0/B/2000/050 Fire Drill - Performance and Evaluation-N3 EP FAM 3.19 Drills and Exercises N4a, b EP FAM 3.19 Drills and Exercises N5 EP FAM 3.1 Administration of Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures EP FAM 3.19 Drills and Exercises Radiological Emergency Response Training 01 NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities ERTG-001 Emergency Response Organization and Emergency Services Training Program ETQS 7111.0 Emergency Response Training 02 NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities 02 ERTG-001 Emergency Response Organization and Emergency Services Training Program ETQS 7111.0 Emergency Response Training 03 NSD 119 Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) Program Organization, Training, and Responsibilities ERTG-001 Emergency Response Organization and Emergency Services Training Program P-15 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented 04.1, .2 NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities ERTG-001 Emergency Response Organization and Emergency Services Training Program ETQS 7111.0 Emergency Response Training 04.3 ETQS 3104.0 Radiation Protection Training and Qualifications ETQS 7104.0 Radiation Protection Staff Professional Development Program 04.4 ETQS 7111.0 Emergency Response Training 04.5, .7 NSD 119 Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) Program Organization, Training, and Responsibilities 04.6 ETQS 7111.0 Emergency Response Training 04.8 ETQS 7111.0 Emergency Response Training 04.9 ETQS 7111.0 Emergency Response Training 04.10 1OC507-N Appendix R Training OC6792-N Maint SPOC Team Emergency Response Training TTC 471-N Annual ERO Refresher/Update 04.11 ERTG-001. Emergency Response Organization and Emergency I Services Training Program 05 ERTG-001 Emergency Response Organization and Emergency Services Training Program Responsibility for the Planning Effort:

Development, Periodic Review and Distribution of Emergency Plans P1 EP FAM 3.20 Emergency Planner Training & Qualification Plan P2 & P3 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan P4 & P5 PT/O/AI2000/01 0 Review of Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures EP FAM 3.1 Administration of Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures P6 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan P7 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan P8 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan P9 AD-EP-ALL-0001 Emergency Preparedness Key Performance Indicators P10 PT/O/AI2000/004 Qrtly Emergency Phone Book Update P-16 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Appendices Appendix 1 Definitions Appendix 2 Meteorology and Offsite Dose Assessment Program Appendix 3 Alert and Notification System Description Appendix 4 Evacuation Time Estimates Appendix 5 Letters of Agreement Appendix 6 Distribution List Appendix 7 Emergency Data Transmittal System Appendix 8 Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plan ONS Pollution Prevention Plan Rev 11 Site Drawing Appendix 9 ONS Chemical Treatment Ponds 1,2 and 3 Groundwater Monitoring Sampling and Analysis Plan Appendix 10 Hazardous Materials Response Plan P-17 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES FIGURE P-2 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE SUPPORTING PLANS State of South Carolina Oconee County Pickens County DOE-IRAP Plan INPO-Fixed Facility Agreement NRC Region II P-18 Rev. 2015-002 March 2015

APPENDIX 3 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION GENERAL DESCRIPTION The Alert and Notification System for Oconee Nuclear Site will include an acoustic alerting signal and notification of the public by commercial broadcast (EAS). The system is designed to meet the acceptance criteria of Section B of Appendix 3, NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.

The emergency plans of the State of South Carolina and the counties of Oconee and Pickens include the individuals, by title, who will be responsible for decision making in regards to the alert and notification system. The county locations from which the sirens would be activated and, potentially, the request for an EAS message would come are manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day.

Each organization's plan describes provisions for use of public communications media or other emergency instructions to members of the public. The plan of the State of South Carolina includes a description of the information that would be communicated to the public under given circumstances.

A. Concept of Operations (Figure 2)

A system of 65 fixed sirens is installed in the 10 mile area around the Oconee Nuclear Site. A computerized feedback system is also available at the county level to poll each siren for activation response. Should a siren fail to activate, a backup means of alerting and notification is described in the State and County Plans. This backup method includes emergency service vehicles traversing the area and giving both an alerting signal and notification message.

Each county will control the activation of the sirens within its boundaries.

B. Criteria for Acceptance The alert and notification system for the Oconee Nuclear Site provides an alerting signal and an informational or instructional message to the population (via the EAS) on an area wide basis throughout the 10 mile EPZ within 15 minutes from the time off-site agencies have determined the need for such alerting exists. The emergency plan of the state of South Carolina includes evidence of EAS preparation for emergency situations and the means for activating the system.

1 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

C. Physical Implementation

1. The activation of this alert and notification system requires procedures and relationships between both Duke Energy Company and the off-site agencies that support Duke and Oconee Nuclear Site. When an incident is determined to have reached the level requiring public protective actions, Duke contacts the cognizant off-site agency via the "DEMNET" or other phone system and provides its recommendations. This system is available for use 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day and links the control room, TSC, EOF, SC (EOC), the county warning points, and the county EOC's.

2. The alert and notification system has multipurpose use built into it. The sirens are capable of producing a three minute steady signal for the nuclear plant emergency or a three minute wailing signal for natural disasters or nuclear attack. Procedures exist at the counties to allow activation of either signal.

The expected performance of the sirens used in this system is described in Figure

1. These sirens complement existing alerting systems. The ambient background sound level in the Oconee area is taken to be 50 db for areas of "less than 2000 persons/per square mile". On this basis, the siren coverage is designed to provide a signal 10 db above the average daytime ambient background (i.e., 60 db).

Furthermore, the sirens have been located to assure that the maximum sound levels received by any member of the public should be lower than 123 db.

Duke Energy installed this system without a field survey of ambient conditions.

The basis for selection of the 60 db(c) and 70 db(c) criteria is documented as follows:

Location of heavy industry - There is no "heavy industry" in the Oconee 10 mile EPZ.

Attenuation factors with distance - 10 db loss per distance doubled (See Figure 1)

Rev. 2015-004 May2015

MODEL TOP FREQUENCY SOUND PRESSURE LEVEL AT 100' Federal Signal 2001 AC 705 Hz 127dB(C)+1dB

• See Figure 1 for 10 dB loss column Map showing siren location, - See i-5 Mounting height of sirens - 50 feet (approximate)

Special weather condition considerations (such as expected heavy snow) - None The siren system will produce a 3 minute steady signal and is capable of repetition.

The siren system will be tested and maintained in accordance with the following schedule:

Test or Maintenance Period Silent Test Every two weeks Full Cycle Test Quarterly Repair Before returning to service Full-cycle* Annually Preventive Maintenance At least annually

• Note: Full-cycle tests may substitute for growl tests.

Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

APPENDIX 3 FIGURE 1 DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE SIREN RANGE IN FEET For Sirens Figured At 12 And 10 dB Loss Per Distance Doubled MINIMUM LEVEL 127dB(C) SIREN COVERAGETN dB FEDERAL SIGNAL 2001AC 12 10 85 1000 1600 80 1350 2250 75 1800 3200 73 2000 3700 70 2400 4500 68 2700 5200 63 3200 6400 60 4250 9050 NOTE: All range figures are rounded off to nearest 50 feet 4 Rev. 2015-004 May 2015

Form 703-1. Procedure Process Record (PPR)

(ROO810) Duke Energy (1) ID No. ONS E-Plan PROCEDURE PROCESS RECORD Revision No. 2015-004 PREPARATION (2) Station OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION (3) Procedure Title Oconee Nuclear Station Fnergency Plan (4) Prepared By* Natalie Harness Z, A__ cK NtXA- Date 04/28/2015 (5) Requires NSD 228 Applicability Determination?

Z Yes (New procedure or revision with major changes) - Attach NSD 228 documentation.

-] No (Revision with minor chan~es)

(6) Reviewed By* ba'- Q,* I " (QR)(KI) Date £-z'" -a.7 Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR)(KI) NAcreDate - -

Reactivity Mgmt Review By* (QR) NA tmeDate -

Mgmt Involvement Review By* (Ops. Supt.) NALA._Date -=.

(7) Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* A Date (8) Approved By* PridCa-/ Date ]-"

PERFORMANCE (Compare with control copy every 14c ndar days w e wo is being performed.)

(9) Compared with Control Copy* _ Date Compared with Control Copy* Date Compared with Control Copy* _ Date (10) Date(s) Performed Work Order Number (WO#)

COMPLETION (11) Procedure Completion Verification:

El Unit 0 El Unit 1 El Unit 2 El Unit 3 Procedure performed on what unit?

ii Yes El NA Check lists and/or blanks initialed, signed, dated, or filled in NA, as appropriate?

El Yes El NA Required enclosures attached?

El Yes El NA Charts, graphs, data sheets, etc. attached, dated, identified, and marked?

El Yes El NA Calibrated Test Equipment, if used, checked out/in and referenced to this procedure?

El Yes El NA Procedure requirements met?

Verified By* Date (12) Procedure Completion Approved Date (13) Remarks (Attach additionalpages, if necessary)

Changes as a result of a changefrom selective signaling to DEMNET, OSM to SM andprocedurereference updates; SH/O/B/2005/002 to AD-EP-ALL-0203 & SH/O/B/2005/003 to AD-EP-ALL-0204.

• PrintedName and Signature

Revision/Change Package Fill-In Form Rev. 04/23/2012 The purpose of this fill-in form is to provide a location to type in information you want to appear on the various forms needed for Major/Minor Procedure Revisions, and Major/Minor Procedure Changes. After you type in information on this form, it will be electronically transferred to the appropriate locations in the attached forms when you perform Step 3 below.

Step 1- press [F 12] (Save As) then save this form using standard file name convention in appropriate LAN storage location.

Step 2-type in basic information in the blanks below:

Note: place cursor incenter of brackets before typing.

1. ID No.: ONS E-Plan

2. Revision No.: 2015-004

3. Change No.: - Note: if this package is for a change, replace hyphen with a letter.

4. Procedure

Title:

Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan

5. For changes only, enter procedure sections affected: Record of Changes, E-Plan Sections: App 3, D, F, H, K, & P, and the E-Plan Table of Contents

6. Prepared By: Natalie Harness§

7. Preparation Date: 04/28/2015

8. PCR Numbers Included in Revision:

Step 3- go to Print Preview to update this information in all the attached documents.

Step 4- page down to affected pages and enter any additional information needed.

Step 5- when all information is entered, print package and review for correctness.

ONS E-Plan Revision 2015-004 Change No.

Page 1 of 1 Procedure

Title:

Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan _

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES: (DESCRIPTION AND REASON)

General Changes Changes as a result of a changefrom selective signalingto DEMNET, OSM to SM andprocedure reference updates, SH/O/B/2005/002 to AD-EP-ALL-0203 & SH/O/B/2005/003 to AD-EP-ALL-0204.

Selective Signaling System has been replaced with DEMNET in support of a Duke Energy fleetwide initiative and is an overall enhancement for offsite notifications during an emergency. This change continues to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b) planning standards and NRC requirements, as described in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

Applicable sections of the Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), and McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) Emergency Plans, emergency plan implementing procedures, and supporting procedures are being revised to reflect this change. These changes are being screened /

evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) under separate cover.

PCR Numbers Incorporated Enclosure

[Type text]

APPENDIX C. APPLICABILITY DETERMINATION (Rev. 10)

Pagge Lot 2 PART I - ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC SITE UNIT(S)

E] Oconee El McGuire El Catawba [] unit I Z] Unit 2 Z] Unit 3 ONS Emergency Plan Rev 2015-004 ACTIVITY TITLE/DOCUMENT/REVISION:

PART 11- PROCESS REVIEW For-each activity, address all of the questions below. If the answver is "YES" for any portion of the activity, apply the identified process(es) to; that portion. of thle activity. Note: It is not unusual to have more than one process apply to.a given activity.

Will implementation of the above activity require a change to the:

1. Technical Specifications (TS) or iZ" D If YES, process as a license amendment per NSD 227.

Operating License? NO YES

2. Quality Assurance Topical? Z' 0 If YES, seek assistance from Independent Nuclear Oversight.

NO YES

3. Security Plans? [Z E] If YES, process per the Nuclear Security Manual.

NO YES (See Appendix H)

4. Emergency Plan? D E If YES, process per the Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual.

NO YES

5. Inservice Testing Program Plan? D' Ej If YES, process per site IST Program for ASME code compliance and NO YES related facility changes.

6. Inservice Inspection Program Plan? [0, D If YES, process per Materials, Metallurgy and Piping Inservice Inspection NO YES FAM for ASME code compliance and related facility or procedure changes.

7. Fire Protection Program Plan? [; FD If YES, evaluate activity in accordance with NSD 320.

NO YES 7a -Utilize Appendix E to address Fire Check to confirm use of Appendix E Screening Questions.

Protection Program Plan Impact.

8. Regulatory Commitments? 2 D If YES, process per NSD 214.

NO YES

9. Code of Federal Regulations? [Z" 0 If YES, contact the Regulatory Affairs group.

NO YES

10. Programs and manuals listed in the [Z/ ED If YES, contact the Regulatory Affairs group.

Administrative Section of the TS? NO YES

[Type text]

Page 2 of 2 PART lIlta - 10 CFR 72.48 APPLICABILITY.

For each activity, address the question below. If the answer to question 11 is "YES," and questions 14 and 17 are answered "NO",

then process the activity per NSD 211 - 1_0 CFR 72.48 does apply.

11. Does the activity involve SSCs, procedures or conduct tests or experiments that support/impact the loading [2 [ YES or transport of the canister/cask to the ISFSI, the ISFSI facility, spent fuel cask design? NO

PART IJIb -10 CFR 50.59 APPLICABILITY For each activity, address all of the questions below. If the answer to question 18 is "YES," then 10 CER 50.59 does not apply. If the answer to questions IS is "NO," thlT process the activity per NSD 209 -- 10 CFR .50.59 applies.

12 Does the activity involve a procedure, governed by NSD 703 that has been excluded from the 10 CFR 50.59 [*' El YES process per NSD 703 and the exclusion status remains valid? NO 13 Does the activity involve an administrative procedure governed by NSD 100 or AD-DC-ALL-0201 that does E2-' E YES not contain information regarding the operation and control of Structures, Systems and Components? NO 14 Does the activity involve a type of Engineering Change that NSD 301 excludes from the 10 CFR 50.59 E2" D YES and/or 10 CFR 72.48 Processes? Consult NSD 301 for assistance. NO 15 Does the activity involve (a) maintenance activities that restore SSCs to their as-designed condition [' [] YES (including activities that implement approved design changes) or (b) temporary alterations supporting NO maintenance that will be in effect during at-power operations for 90 days or less?

16 Does the activity involve a UFSAR modification that NSD 220 excludes from the 10 CFR 50.59 Process? E [D YES Consult NSD 220 for assistance. NO 17 Does the activity involve NRC and/or Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC approved changes to the licensing basis? W" E YES NO 18 Are ALL aspects of the activity bounded by one or more "YES" answers to questions 1 through 17, above? ] [2/YES NO PART I'VI- USAR REVIEW 19 Does the activity require a modification, deletion, or addition to the UFSAR to satisfy the UFSAR content [7 D YES requirements of 10 CFR 50.34 (b), 10 CFR 50.71 (e), or Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.70? Consult NSD 220 for NO Assistance.

IF YES, process per NSD 220.

PART V-AIGNOFF7 (Print ... ... . ...... (Sign) A DA TE .... . ..

Name)

Applicability Determination Preparer

VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE Nuclear Policy Manual - Volume 2 NSD 228 APPENDIX E. FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM SCREENING The following screening questions are used to assist the Applicability Determination preparer to answer PART If - PROCESS REVIEW question number 7.

A "Yes" answer to any of the screening questions would indicate the Fire Protection Program Licensing Basis may be affected, and Question # 7 on the Applicability Determination Form (Appendix C) should be checked "Yes" and a review in accordance with NSD 320 is required.

PART A New procedure or a major procedure change FPP Licensing Applicability impact screening:

NOTE: IF the procedure change is a result of a Plant Modification or Engineering Change that has previously been evaluated for impact to the FPP, then question #7 should be checked "No".

Yes No Al. E Does the proposed activity change any plant responses, operator responses or emergency lighting associated with Post Fire Safe Shutdown (PFSS) response procedures?

A2. E Does the proposed activity add, remove or revise any fire protection features as described in the UFSAR or SLCs from any performance test procedures?

A3. E Does the proposed activity add, remove or revise any procedures related to fire protection features as described in the UFSAR or SLCs?

A4. E Does the proposed activity add, remove or revise any performance test Acceptance Criteria for any fire protection features as described in the UFSAR or S LCs?

PART B Plant Modification/Engineering Change FPP Licensing Basis impact screening:

Does the proposed activity impact ...... ?

B1. E E Any fire rated assemblies/boundaries (walls, floors, ceilings, etc.), including fire doors, fire dampers, penetration seals, fire rated wraps, radiant energy heat shields, structural fireproofing, etc. as described the UFSAR or SLCs?

B2. E E Any water based fixed fire suppression systems (including water supply flow paths and main fire pumps) as described in UFSAR or SLCs?

B3. E E Any gaseous fire suppression systems (C02, Halon) as described in the UFSAR or SLCs?

B4. E E Any manual fire fighting equipment such as hose stations and fire hydrants as described in the UFSAR or S LCs?

B5. E Any portable fire extinguishers located in safety-related and/or safe shutdown areas of theplant or power block?

B6. E E Any fire detection systems as described in the UFSAR or SLCs?

B7. E E Any water and/or combustible fluid containment devices such as curbs, dikes, drains, fire protection system spray shields, etc. located in safety-related and/or safe shutdown areas?

B8. E Any administrative control documents for the Fire Protection Program such as NSD 313 (Control of Combustible/Flammable Materials), NSD 314 (Hot Work Authorization), and NSD 316 (Fire Protection Impairment)?

B9. E Any fire brigade equipment, including communication equipment or fire brigade administrative controls as outlined in NSD 112 (Fire Brigade Organization, Training, and Responsibilities)?

BI0. E E The Reactor Coolant Pump Lube Oil Collection System?

B I 1. E E The Fire Safety/Hazards Analysis as documented in the plant level Design Basis Document for Fire Protection (CNS-1465.00-00.0006, MCS-1465.00-00-0008, OSS-0254.00-00-4008)?

B 12. E E Any PFSS/Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment/Non-Power Operations equipment, emergency lighting, commnuclations, circuits, and/or cable routes as described in the site PFSS DBD and associated analysis (CNS-1435.OO-00.0002, MCS-1465.00-00-0022, OSS-0254.00-00-4008)?

B13. E Combustible/Flammable Material or an Ignition Source?

B 14. E Any Site Fire Brigade Response Strategies as described in the Emergency Plan and Fire Protection Planning guide?

B I5. E E Any plant radiation control boundaries?

B 16. E E Any HVAC flow changes include air intake/exhaust changes in radiation control areas?

REVISION 10 VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE

3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual Attachment 3.10.7.2 EAL Change Review Form Change Description and

References:

BLOCK 1 Revision 2015-004 of ONS E-Plan Section D consist of the following changes:

• Removed "Selective Signaling" and replaced with DEMNET

• Changed title of Operations Shift Manager (OSM) to Shift Manager (SM)

Change Type: BLOCK 2 Z The change is considered a difference from the approved wording.

[D The change is considered a deviation from the approved wording.

Change Verification: BLOCK 3 Item Yes No N/A Resolution/Comments initiating Condition IC identification number is correct ED ED 0 See Change Justificatio:n Wording is consistent with the NRC approved IC EZ ED Z See Change Justification EALI/FPB,,

EAL/FPB identification number is correct ED ED Z See Change Justification Wording is consistent with the NRC approved EAL / FPB z El 0 Threshold values or conditions remain specific to ensure generic ED E] Z See Change Justification of the criteria are not substituted reducing clarity and accuracy EAL.

Sequencing/nesting logic format is correct Z ED E]

Source document inputs used for calculations and in thresholds are El El E See Change Justification correct Site specific content wording/tables/values are correct and specific: Z El LI

" Operations procedures are consistent with the change

• Instrument/display number and noun name are provided

• Alarm setpoints are equal to or below EAL/FPB values

" Radiation monitor values account for background

" Procedure references are correct The EAL/FPB Matrix is legible and intuitively organized Z El EL 4Mode Applicability _____ _________________

Operational mode alignment is consistent with the EAL licensing EL EL [0 See Change Justification basis Techial Baes Site specific bases is consistent with the EAL threshold El El Z See Change Justification Bases for calculations and threshold values are consistent with the El El 0 See Change Justification technical bases approved by the NRC Source document inputs used for calculations and in thresholds are EL El Z See Change Justification correct Site specific bases remains accurate and consistent with the EAL Z EL EI technical bases approved by the NRC Site specific bases has appropriate level of detail and is Z EL L unambiguous The change does not cause a change to the logic of the EAL scheme Z EL EL (i.e. gaps in classification thresholds)

Conflicts with the EAL/FPB wording have not been introduced [ L_

Revision 12 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual Attachment 3.10.7.2 References Source document references are correct 0 [] El Source document references are current N ED Dj Definitions Wording is consistent with the license basis definitions approved [] D E

by the NRC for the EALs and EAL technical bases Other Manual Content Wording is consistent with the license basis definitions approved Z ED ED by the NRC for the EALs and EAL technical bases Change Validation: BLOCK 4 Fl In-Plant Walkdown El Simulator [ Other DEMNET installed and procedure changes incorporated.

Dl Training E] Tabletop El N/A Item Yes No N/A Resolution/Comments EAL/ FPB Information and/or values are available in all facilities where E ED El classifications are required to be made Instrumentation and computer points are compatible: ED ED N See Change Justification

" Instrument/display designation matches

" Instrument/display units are correct

" Proper significant digits are indicated and within the accuracy capabilities of the instrument/display

• The instrument/display range is on scale for the threshold value

• Instrument/display provides separation for escalating values Conditions are easily recognizable and able to support declaration 0 ED 0 within 15 minutes.

Information and/or values are easily obtained and able to support N ED 0 declaration within 15 minutes The change does not introduce a time delay to classification Z D [

Change Justification: ý BLOCKI5 Selective Signaling System has been replaced with DEMNET in support of a Duke Energy fleet-wide initiative and is an overall enhancement for offsite notifications during an emergency. This change continues to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b) planning standards and NRC requirements, as described in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

The change from OSM to SM was made due to position title changes post-merger and are considered editorial in nature.

BLOCK 6 EAL Change Review Results:

Z The EAL change can be implemented without prior NRC approval.

El The EAL change cannot be implemented without prior NRC approval.

!§rgw Revision 12

3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual Attachment 3.10.7.2 Page 1 of 050.54(a) Screening Evaluation Form Activity Description and

References:

ONS Emergency Plan Rev 2015-004 BLOCK 1 Changes as a result of a changefrom selective signalingto DEMNET, OSM to SM andprocedurereference updates, SH/O/B/2005/002 to AD-EP-ALL-0203 & SH/O/B/2005/003 to AD-EP-ALL-0204.

Selective Signaling System has been replaced with DEMNET in support of a Duke Energy fleetwide initiative and is an overall enhancement for offsite notifications during an emergency. This change continues to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b) planning standards and NRC requirements, as described in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

Activity Scope: BLOCK 2 Z The activity is a change to the emergency plan E] The activity is not a change to the emergency plan Change Type: BLOCK 3 Change Type: BLOCK4 FD The change is editorial or typographical ED The change does conform to an activity that has prior approval Z The change is not editorial or typographical 0 The change does not conform to an activity that has prior approval Planning Standard Impact Determination: BLOCK 5

[] §50.47(b)(1) - Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control)

D] §50.47(b)(2) - Onsite Emergency Organization

[I §50.47(b)(3) - Emergency Response Support and Resources Z §50.47(b)(4) - Emergency Classification System*

Z §50.47(b)(5) - Notification Methods and Procedures*

Z §50.47(b)(6) - Emergency Communications

[] §50.47(b)(7) - Public Education and Information Z §50.47(b)(8) - Emergency Facility and Equipment D] §50.47(b)(9) - Accident Assessment*

D] §50.47(b)(10) - Protective Response*

FD §50.47(b)(l 1) - Radiological Exposure Control F- §50.47(b)(12) - Medical and Public Health Support

[] §50.47(b)(13) - Recovery Planning and Post-accident Operations F] §50.47(b)(14) - Drills and Exercises D] §50.47(b)(1 5) - Emergency Responder Training Z §50.47(b)(16) - Emergency Plan Maintenance

• Risk Significant Planning Standards F-1 The proposed activity does not impact a Planning Standard Commitment Impact Determination: BLOCK*6

[] The activity does involve a site specific EP commitment Record the commitment or commitment reference:

[ The activity does not involve a site specific EP commitment Results: B LOCK 75 D1 The activity can be implemented without performing a §50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation Z The activity cqannot be implemented without performing ]'P rep~~~~~er n effectiveness evaluation ea §50.54(q) Da --. ...... ..........

.i

.~u.....

Preparer Name: P ture Date:

Natalie Harness 4/28/15 Reviewer Name: Reviewf) SignatuJe Date:

Dat" Don Crowl '.I le "7 -7 F,

rNo Revision 12

I 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual Attachment 3.10.7.3 Page 2 of

§50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation Form Activity Description and

References:

ONS Emergency Plan Rev 2015-004 BLOCK 1 Changes as a result of a changefrom selective signalingto DEMNET, OSM to SM andprocedure reference updates; SH/O/B/2005/002 to AD-EP-ALL-0203 & SH/0/B/2005/003 to AD-EP-ALL-0204.

Selective Signaling System has been replaced with DEMNET in support of a Duke Energy fleetwide initiative and is an overall enhancement for offsite notifications during an emergency. This change continues to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b) planning standards and NRC requirements, as described in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

Activity Type: BLOCK2 H The activity is a change to the emergency plan M The activity affects implementation of the emergency plan, but is not a change to the emergency plan Impact and Licensing Basis Determination: 3BLOCK.3 Licensing Basis:

• 10CFR50.47(b)4 - A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.

" 10CFR50.47(b)5 - Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency personnel by all organizations; the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations and the public has been established; and means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.

• 10CFR50.47(b)6 - Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.

" 10CFR50.47(b)8 - Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained.

• 10CFR50.47(b)16 - Responsibilities for plan development and review and for distribution of emergency plans are established, and planners are properly trained.

o ONS E Plan Section D - Reg Guide 1.101, Rev. 3, August, 1992, approved the guidance provided by NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, as an Alternative Methodology for the Development of Emergency Action Levels. Oconee Nuclear Site used the NUMARC guidance for the development of initiating conditions and emergency action levels. The emergency action levels provided in this section have been modified to implement the guidance provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, NEI guidance as endorsed in Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-12 and to support the implementation of NET 03-12.

o ONS E Plan Section F - Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations, emergency personnel, and to the public.

o ONS E Plan Section H - Emergency Facilities And Equipment.

o ONS E Plan Appendix 3 - The Alert and Notification System for Oconee Nuclear Site will include an acoustic alerting signal and notification of the public by commercial broadcast (EAS). The system is designed to meet the acceptance criteria of Section B of Appendix 3, NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.

Compliance Evaluation and

Conclusion:

BLOCK 4 Evaluation:

The proposal changing selective signaling to DEMNET serve to ensure the ONS E Plan remains accurate and up to date with correct communications means/methods as required by 10CFR50.47(b) Primary and backup means of communication between the Site, local government agencies, and State response organizations have been established. Compliance is continued with the replacement of Selective Signaling with DEMNET. DEMNET is the new system that will be used to replace selective signaling which is being replaced as a result of support from the vendor being discontinued 12/31/2015. The 50.54q effectiveness review completed for the DEMINET System describes how the change in notification methods at ONS resulted ineno reduction in effectiveness of the emergency plan. Previous backup systems specified have not been replaced and continue as before. Calls to the state and local agencies will be made via DEMNET instead of selective signaling. Therefore continued compliance with 10CFR50.47(b) is assured.

Conclusion:

The proposed activity Z does / E] does not continue to comply with the requirements.

I I Reduction in Effectiveness (RIE) Evaluation and

Conclusion:

BLOCK5

1. Evaluation:

The evaluation uses the comparison matrix to identify each change numerically, the reason the change was made, and the resultant impact on effectiveness of the E Plan.

1. ONS E Plan Section D, Editorial Change: replacing a reference for Selective Signaling with DEMNET and a title change correction; Operations Shift Manager to Shift Manager. Therefore continued compliance is assured.

2. ONS E Plan Section F, Editorial Change: replacing a reference for Selective Signaling with DEMNET, title change correction; Operations Shift Manager to Shift Manager, and replacing SH/0/B/2005/002 with AD-EP-ALL-0203.

Therefore continued compliance is assured.

3. ONS E Plan Section H-11, COUNT ROOM EQUIPMENT (ONSITE). The vendor equipment/instrument names are being removed based on recent instrumentation upgrades. Although the equipment remains the same functionality the vendor names are removed to reduce E-Plan revision burden. Therefore continued compliance with 10CFR50.47(b)8 and 10CFR50 Appendix E.IV.G is assured.

4. ONS E Plan App 3, Editorial Change: replacing a reference for Selective Signaling with DEMNET. Therefore continued compliance is assured.

5. ONS E Plan Table of Contents, Editorial Change: replacing SH/O/B/2005/003 with AD-EP-ALL-0204. Therefore continued compliance is assured.

There is no reduction in effectiveness as a result of these changes.

The functional criteria specified in Reg Guide 1.219 for the identified license bases includes:

10CFR50.47b.4, has One emergency planning function has been defined for this planning standard:

(1) A standard scheme of emergency classification and action levels is in use.

10CFR50.47b.5, has Three emergency planning functions have been defined for this planning standard:

(1) Procedures for notification of State and local governmental agencies are capable of alerting them of the declared emergency within 15 minutes after declaration of an emergency and providing follow-up notifications.

(2) Administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway.

(3) The public ANS meets the design requirements of FEMA-REP-10, "Guide for Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants" (Ref. 12), or is compliant with the licensee's FEMA-approved ANS design report and supporting FEMA approval letter.

10CFR50.47b.6, has two emergency planning functions defined for this planning standard:

(1) Systems are established for prompt communication among principal emergency response organizations.

(2) Systems are established for prompt communication to emergency response personnel.

10CFR50.47b.8, has two emergency planning functions defined for this planning standard:

(1) Adequate facilities are maintained to support emergency response.

(2) Adequate equipment is maintained to support emergency response.

10CFR50.47b.16, has two emergency planning function defined for this planning standard:

(1) Responsibility for emergency plan development and review is established.

(2) Planners responsible for emergency plan development and maintenance are properly trained.

The proposed changes as detailed above do not alter or impact these functions. As can be seen in the detail above and use of the comparison matrix.

Effectiveness Evaluation Results BLOCK6

[ The activity does continue to comply with the requirements of §50.47(b) and §50 Appendix E and the activity does not constitute a reduction in effectiveness. Therefore, the activity can be implemented without prior approval.

Dj The activity does not continue to comply with the requirements of §50.47(b) and §50 Appendix E or the activity does constitute a reduction in effectiveness. Therefore, the activity cannot be implemented without prior approval.

Preparer Name: Prep rer Signatur Natalie Harness4/81 Reviewer Name: Reviewer SignaturDate:

Don Growl .2g - f <

Approver Name: pro_________________________ Date: i Pat Street 51k Revision 12

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual 3.10 IOCFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.2

§50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form Activity Description and

References:

AD-EP-ALL-0204, Distribution of Potassium rInI Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release, Revision 0 This is a new fleet Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure that will supersede procedure SHIO/BI20051003, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release. See attached step by step comparison of SHIOIB/20051003 and AD-EP-ALL-0204.

Activity Scope: a g t ey El The activity ko a change to the emergency plan I(0 The activity is not a change to the emnergency plait This is a new fleet Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure. The following emergency plan sections were reviewed. This new procedure does not require a change to the following emergency plan content:

• Catawba Emergency Plan Revision 14-5, Section J.6

• McGuire Emergency Plan Revision 14-5, Secdon J.6

• Oconee Emergency Plan Revision 2015-02, Sections J.5 & J.6 This new procedure will require editorial changes to the DEC station emergency plans to change procedure references. These changes are being screened on separate forms:

• Catawba Emergency Plan Revision 14-5, Section 1.6, Figure P-2 a McGuire Emergency Plan Revision 14-5, Section J.6, Figure P-2

• Oconee Emergency Plan Revision 2015-02, Figure P I This new procedure will require content changes to the Oconee station emergency plan. This change is being screened and evaluated separately:

, Oconee Emergency Plan Revision 2015- 2. Section K.1 Change Type: ~ ~ '~~ Change Type:

El The change is editorial or typographical i- The change d conform to an activity that has El The change is not" editorial or typographical prior approval (I-'The change does not conform to an activity that has Not Applicable per'Step 3.10.4.1.3.3 pro approval Not Applicable per Step 3.10.4.1.3-3 Planning Standard Impact Determination:

0 §50,47A()1) - Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control) - Approval authority for administration of KI El §50.47(bX2) - Onsite Emergency Organization

§*50.47(bx3) - Emergency Response Support and Resources O §50,47(b)(4) - Emergency Classification System*

O §5O.47(b)(5) - Notification Methods and Procedures-0§50.47(b)(6) - Emergency Commiruncations E] §50.47(b)(7) - Public Education and Information O §50.47(bX8) - Emergency Facility and Equipment

§50.47(b)(9) - Accident Assessment*

§l S §50.47(b)(10) - Protective Response* - Protective Actions for Emergency Workers, Authorization and use of KI

§§50.47(b)(1 1) - Radiological Exposure Control - Resources for controlling radiological exposures for Revision 12

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.2 emergency workers El §50.47(b)(12) - Medical and Public Health Support El §50.47(b)(13)- Recovery Planning and Post-accident Operations

[E §50.47(b)(14) - Drills and Exercises El §50.47(b)( 15)- Emergency Responder Training F] §50.47(b)(16) - Emergency Plan Maintenance

• Risk Significant Planning Standards El The proposed activity does NOT impact a Planning Standard Commitment Impact Determination: ' "

El The activity does involve a site specific EP commitment Record the commitment or commitment reference:

El The activity does not involve a site specific EP commitment Not required per Step 3.10.4.1.6-3 if a Planning Standard is impacted.

Screening Evaluation Results: 7 El The activity can be implemented without performing a §50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation 10 The activity cannot be implemented without performing a §50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation Preparer Name: Pre arer Signature Date:

Ernestine M. Kuhr , April 8, 2015 Reviewer Name: i Revi, Date:

-L A- k C*g 11 4r -ý 5 I

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual 3.10 10CFR 50 .54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.3

§50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation Form Activity Description and

References:

AD-EP-ALL-0204, Distribution of Potassium BLOCK I Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release, Revision 0 -

This is a new fleet Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure that will supersede procedure SH0/IB/2005/003, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release. See attached step by step comparison of SH/0!B/2005/003 and AD-EP-ALL-0204.

Activity Type: BLOC(2 E] The activity is a change to the ernergenqyplan

[ The activity affects implementation of the emergency plan, but is not a change to the emergency plan This is a new fleet Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure. The following emergency plan sections were reviewed. This new procedure does not require a change to the following emergency plan content:

a Catawba Emergency Plan Revision 14-5, Section J.6 McGuire Emergency Plan Revision 14-5, Section J.6 a Oconee Emergency Plan Revision 2015-02, Sections J.5 & J.6 This new procedure will require editorial changes to the DEC station emergency plans to change procedure references, These changes are being screened on separate forms:

" Catawba Emergency Plan Revision 14-5, Section J.6, Figure P-2

" McGuire Emergency Plan Revision 14-5, Section J.6, Figure P-2

" Oconee Emergency Plan Revision 2015-02, Figure P1 This new procedure will require content changes to the Oconee station emergency plan. This change is being screened and evaluated separately:

Oconee Emergency Plan Revision 2015-02, Section K.1 Impact and Licensing Basis Determination; B(C2 I. [list offrnctions, elements and/orconmmitments impacted by the activity (organizedby planningstandard as applicable)]

EP Function - A range of protective actions is available for plan emergency workers during emergencies, including those for hostile action events. Authorization and use of KI. [I OCFR 50.47(bX)10)]

EP Function - The resources for controlling radiological exposures for emergency workers are established.

Authorization and use of Emergency Exposure Limits. [I OCFR 50.47(b)(l 1))

Licensing Basis:

Catawba Emergency Plan Revision 14-5 Section J.6. Protective Measures - Breathing Apparatus, Protective Clothing. KI

• Individual Thyroid Protection - Protective measures will be utilized to minimize the ingestion and/or inhalation of radioactive iodine. However, if an unplanned incident involves the accidental or potential ingestion or inhalation of radioactive iodine, Potassium Iodide Tablets (KI) are available for distribution by SIFO/B/2005/003 (Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release).

Section P. FigZ.u~re P-2?

Revision 12

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual

3. 10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.3 Figure P-2 lists SH/O/B/2005/003, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release, as a procedure that implements Section J.6.

McGuire Emergency Plan Revision 14-5 Section J.6 Protective I Eouinment I - Breathing*1Apparatus, I I II I Protective Clothes,I K!

Individual Thyroid Protection - All efforts should be made to utilize respiratory protective equipment to minimize ingestion and/or inhalation of radionuclides and to maintain internal exposure below the limits specified in 10CFR20, Appendix B. However, if an unplanned incident involves the accidental or potential ingestion or inhalation of radioactive iodine, Potassium Iodide Tablets (le1) are available to distribution by SI-FO/B/2005/003, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release.

Section P, Figmre P-2 Figure P-2 lists SHIO/B/2005/003, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release, as a procedure that implements Section J.6.

Oconee Emergency Plan Revision 2015-02 Seeions J.5 R,. ~i~ - .qt Evaeutistin Pro edures-PersonneI Acrcountability Sections J 5 & 16 - Site Evacuation Procedures-Personnel Accountabilitv After all non-essential personnel have been evacuated from the site, logsheets will be kept by Radiation Protection personnel in the Operational Support Center of all persons onsite together with their Radiation Protection records to include the following:

a. Individual respiratory protection

b. Protective clothing

c. Use of Radioprotective drugs Section K. Radiolonical Exposure Control To assure that means for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency are established for emergency workers and the affected population.

K. I Onsite exposure guidelines have been established for the following categories:

MAXIMUM EXPOSURE LIMITS IN REM CATEGORIES TOTAL LENS OF SKIN EXTREMITIES COMMITTED EFFECTIVE THE EYE DOSE DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT* (ORGAN)**

All 5 rem 15 rem 50 rem 50 rem 50 rem Protecting 10 rem 30 rem 100 rem 100 rem 100 rem Valuable Property Lifesaving or 25 rem 75 rem 250 rem 250 rem 250 rem Protection of Large Population . ........ . ......

VOLUNTEER >25 rem >75 rem >250 rem >250 rem >250 rem BASIS:

Lifesavinn or

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual

3. 10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.3 Protection of Large Population

• Note TEDE to non-pregnant adults from exposure during an emergency situation. Special precautions should be taken to limit dose to eye lens, and other organs, tissues, or extremities. With regard to maximum limit, EPA concluded that it was not possible to prejudge the acceptable risk for saving a life. Doses may be authorized to the limits established in this chart.

• • Note: Administration of stable iodine will be recommended for emergency workers if a dose of 5 rem CDE is projected to the thyroid from radioiodine. This action will require approval of the Radiation Protection Manager in the OSC or the Emergency Coordinator.

Section P, Figzure PI Figure P 1 lists SH/OiB/2005/003, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release, as a procedure that implements Sections J5/J6 and KIa - g of the Emeýgency Plan.

Compliance Evaluation and

Conclusion:

BL I. PS 10 Evaluation

§50.47(b)(10) - A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. Evacuation time estimates have been developed by applicants and licensees. Licensees shall update the evacuation time estimates on a periodic basis. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.

This is firther explained in NUREG-0654, Criterion J.6:

J.6 Each licensee shall, for individuals remaining or arriving onsite during the emergency, make provisions for:

a. Individual respiratory protection;

b. Use of protective clothing; and

c. Use of radioprotective drugs (e.g., individual thyroid protection).

Discussion SH/ii0//2005/003, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release, provided information necessary to distribute Active Potassium Iodide (KI) tablets to Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel in the event of a release of radioiodine resulting from emergency conditions. AD-EP-ALL-0204, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release, will provide information for distribution of Active Potassium Iodide (KI) tablets to Duke Energy and contractor personnel in the event of a release of radioiodine resulting from emergency conditions. The scope of the procedure has been expanded to include all Duke Energy and contractor personnel in the event of Hostile Action Scenario during radioiodine release.

Therefore, AD-EP-ALL-0204 continues to comply with PS 10.

3. PS II Evaluation

§50.47(b)(I 1) - Means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established for emergency workers. The means for controlling radiological exposures shall include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides.

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.3 This is further explained in NUREG-0654, Criterion K.1 K. I Each licensee shall establish onsite exposure guidelines consistent with EA Emergency Worker and lifesaving Activity Protective Actions Guides (EPA 520/1-75/001)...

Discussion EPA 520/1-75/001 has been superseded by EPA 400-R-92-00 1, Manual of Protective Action Guides And Protective Actions For Nuclear Incidents (October 199 1). EPA-400-R-92-001 specified a threshold of 25 rem Committed dose equivalent to the thyroid from radioiodine as the threshold for administration of stable iodine. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), Guidance Potassium Iodide as a Thyroid Blocking Agent in Radiation Emergencies (December 1991) provided additional guidance on the threshold for administration of stable iodine. Based on a review of the latter, Duke Energy adopted a threshold for administration of stable iodine of 5 rem CDE projected to the thyroid from radioiodine.

Therefore, AD-EP-ALL-0204 continues to comply with PS 11.

Conclusion:

The proposed activity El does / El does not continue to comply with the requirements.

Reduction in Effectiveness (RIE) Evaluation and

Conclusion:

B

1. Evaluation:

Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee will continue to have a procedure for distribution of potassium iodide tablets in the event of a radioiodine release. AD-EP-ALL-0204 continues to use a threshold for administration of stable iodine of 5 rem CDE projected to the thyroid from radioiodine for distribution of Active Potassium Iodide (KI). Log sheets will continue to be kept by Radiation Protection personnel of all persons to document the use of radioprotective drugs. The scope has been expanded to include all Duke Energy and contractor personnel in the event of Hostile Action Scenario during radioiodine release. This is considered an enhancement.

The change in approval authority issuing KI at Oconee has been evaluated separately and determined not to be an RIE. The change in approval authority aligns the approval authority with that in the currently approved procedure, SH/O/B/2005/003, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the event of a Radioiodine Release.

Conclusion:

The proposed activity [I does / [D ý*Ld dgo t constitute a RIE.

Effectiveness Evaluation Results L4 ' ....

[ The activity does continue to comply with the requirements of §50.47(b) and §50 Appendix E and the activity does not constitute a reduction in effectiveness. Therefore, the activity can be implemented without prior approval.

El The activity does not continue to comply with the requirements of §50.47(b) and §50 Appendix E or the activity does constitute a reduction in effectiveness. Therefore, the activity cannot be implemented without prior approval.

SH/O/B/2005/003 Old Step Wording AD-EP-ALL-0204 New Step Wording PS/Function Impact?

Step Step

1. Purpose 1.0 Purpose 1.1 This procedure provides information 1.1 This procedure provides information for Expanded to include all necessary to distribute Active Potassium distribution of Active Potassium Iodide personnel in the event of Iodide (KI) tablets to Emergency Response (KI) tablets to Duke Energy and Hostile Action Scenario Organization (ERO) personnel in the event of contractor personnel in the event of a during radioiodine a release of radioiodine resulting from release of radioiodine resulting from release.

emerg ency conditions. emergency conditions.

1.2 This procedure provides information for Attachments 1, 2 & This information is included in See below management and the administered personnel 3 Attachments 1, 2 & 3.

on effectiveness, dosage, and potential side effects.

1.3 This procedure is an Emergency Plan N/A Deleted Fleet Regulatory Affairs Implementing Procedure (EPIP) for MNS, now distributes EP CNS, and ONS. This procedure must be procedures to NRC once forwarded to the Emergency Planning Group approved.

at each site within 7 working days of approval by the responsible group (PIP 0 New procedure process 0701). does not annotate individual site PIPs/CRs unless they are CAPRs.

2.0 Scone 2.0.1 This procedure applies to the Duke New Administrative

"*7 ,- * .*,..- ......

-7, ..... . . . .

Ene e 9peratin.*.

, nuclear fleet ,*:F.* yw Procedure Format Procedure* , Fo:Z-Z * .r.mat 3.0 Definitions_

3.1 Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE): New Administrative The dose equivalent to a specific organ Procedure Format or tissue integrated over a 50 year period due to radionuclides in the body.

3.2 Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE): The New Administrative sum of the products of the dose Procedure Format equivalent to each organ and a weighing factor related to the risk of delayed health effects in the respective organ.

Units are in Rem.

3.3 Thyroid Blocking Agent: A non- New Administrative prescription (i.e., over the counter) drug Procedure Format I

SH10/B/2005/003 Old Step Wording AD-EP-ALL-0204 New Step Wording PS/Function Impact?

Step Step that is effective in reducing the accumulation of radioiodine ,which has entered the body through inhalation or ingestion, by the thyroid gland.

3.4 Total Effective Dose Equivalent New Administrative (TEDE): The sum of the Deep Dose Procedure Format Equivalent and the Committed Effective Dose Equivalent.

4.0 Responsibilities New Administrative Procedure Format 4.1 ICNS, MNS, ONSI Radiation New Administrative

_ __._ _ _ _Protection Manager (RPM) Procedure Format 4.1.1 Determines the need for and approves New Administrative the administration of KI for: Procedure Format

a. Site Duke Energy and contractor personnel.

b. Off-site Duke energy and contractor personnel until the Emergency

_Operations Facility (EOF) is operational.

4.2 ICNS, MNS, ONS] Radiological New Administrative Assessment Manager (RAM) Procedure Format 4.2.1 Determines the need for and approves New Administrative the administration of KI for off-site Procedure Format Duke Energy and contractor personnel and EOF personnel.

4.3 IBNP, HNP, RNPI Radiation Control New Administrative Director (RCD) Procedure Format 4.3.1 Determines the need for and approves New Administrative the administration of KI for the Procedure Format following:

a. Site Duke Energy and contractor personnel.

b. Off-site Duke Energy and contractor personnel until the EOF is operational.

4.4 [BNP, HNP, RNPJ Radiological New Administrative Control Manager (RCM) Procedure Format 4.4.1 Determines the need for and approves New Administrative

SHIO/B/2005/003 Old Step Wording AD-EP-ALL-0204 New Step Wording PS/Function Impact?

Step Step the administration of KI for off-site Procedure Fornat Duke Energy and contractor personnel and EOF personnel.

4.5 Radiation Protection (RP) New Administrative Procedure Format 4.5.1 Maintains KI inventory as part of the New Administrative

'___emergency kit inventory. Procedure Format 4.5.2 Distribute KI as directed by the RPM, New Administrative

.... _ RAM, RCD, or RCM. Procedure Format 4.6 Security New Administrative Procedure Format

"__ 4.6.1 4.6.1 Obtains and distributes KI to security New Administrative

_-_" pTresnnel on ist under RP direction. Procedure Format

2. References 7.0 References 2.1 Radiation Protection Standard Procedure 7.2.1 AD-RP-ALL-4010, Internal Dose No change. AD-RP-ALL-SH/0/B/200 1/001, Internal Dose Assessment Assessment 4010 superseded SH/0/B/2001/001 2.2 PIP 0-93-701, Distribution of Emergency N/A Deleted New procedure process Plan Procedures does not annotate individual site PIPs/CRs unless they are CAPRs.

7.3.1 IOCFR2O, Standards for Protection New Reference Against Radiation 2.3 EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective 7.3.2 EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of No Change Action Guides And Protective Actions For Protective Action Guides And Protective Nuclear Incidents Actions For Nuclear Incidents 7.3.3 Federal Register, Consideration of New Reference Potassium Iodide in Emergency Plans, January 19, 2001 7.3.4 National Council on Radiation New Reference Protection, Report 161, parts I and I, Management of Persons Contaminated with Radionuclides, Scientific and I Technical Bases (2008)

_---.. 7.3.5 OE 17970, KI Sensitivity Impacts ERO New Reference 3

SI/0/B/2005/003 Old Step Wording AD-EP-ALL-0204 New Step Wording PS/Function Impact?

Step Step 5.0 Instructions

3. Limits and Precautions 5.1 General Instructions Warning KI shall NOT be taken by persons allergic to 5.1. 1 Warnings are discouraged by the new Difference iodine, procedure writers guide. This information is covered in step 5.1.1 3.1 K1 shall NOT be taken for more than 10 5.1.3 Do not take KI for more than ten days Difference days. without doctor approval.

3.2 KI shall be stored in sealed containers, 5.1.2 Store KI in sealed containers, protected Difference protected from light, and temperature from light and temperature variances in variances per manufacturer's limitations, accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

3.2 Personnel with pre-existing thyroid 5.1.1 Do not issue Active Potassium Iodide Difference conditions shall NOT be issued KI. (KI) to personnel with the following conditions:

0 Pre-existino thyroid conditions

4. Procedure First Note before The effectiveness of potassium iodide as a Attachment 3 The effectiveness of Potassium Iodide is No change Step 4.1 thyroid blocking agent decreases as a as follows:

function of time. The effectiveness of a. 90% effective if taken immediately potassium iodide is as follows: prior to or concurrent with exposure to

• 90% effective if taken immediately prior radioactive iodine.

to or concurrent with exposure to b. 50% effective if taken within 3 to 4 radioactive iodine. hours following exposure.

& 50% effective if taken within 3 to 4 c. Less effective if taken more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following exposure. hours following exposure but still a Less effective if taken more than 24 significant enough to warrant hours following exposure but still administration.

significant enough to warrant administration.

Second Note The RPM or RAM can designate other 4.5.2 Distribute KI as directed by the RPM, No change before Step 4.1 Radiation Protection personnel to perform RAM, RCD, or RCM.

this procedure.

4.1 Evaluate conditions for issue of KI in 5.2.1 Evaluate conditions for issue of KI in No Change consultation with the Radiation Protection consultation with the following:

Manager (RPM) Q.R Radiological [{CNS, MNS, ONS] Radiation Assessment Manager (RAM). Protection Manager (RPM) or 4

SHIOIB/2005/003 Old Step Wording AD-EP-ALL-0204 New Step Wording PS/Function Impact?

Step Step Radiological Assessment Manager (RAM)

[BNP, HNP, RNP] Radiological Control Director (RCD) or Radiological Control Manager (RCM) 4.1.1 IF any of the following conditions exist, 5.2.2 If actual or expected uptake of Bullet one - difference establish KI distribution for designated radioiodine is equal to or greater than 5 Justification for deletion emergency workers: rein CDE thyroid (200 DAC-hrs 1-131 of bullets two and three -

" Actual OR expected uptake of equivalent), then establish KI Even though the side-radioiodine is equal to or greater distribution for designated Duke Energy effects of KI are generally than 5 rem CDE-thyroid (200 DAC- and contractor personnel, minimal, it is still a drug hrs 1-131 equivalent), and should only be taken

" Actual OR potential loss of three if there is credible fission product barriers information that the EPA-

• Actual OR potential fuel damage 400 PAGs will be resulting from spent fuel movement exceeded.

in containment OR spent fuel pool.

4.1.2 IF determination is made to distribute KI 5.2.3 If determination is made to distribute KI Difference tablets, notify the Emergency Coordinator tablets, then notify the following:

AND EOF Director of decision. 0 [CNS, MNS, ONS] Emergency Coordinator (EC) and Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) Director

• [BNP, HNP, RNP] Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) and Emergency Response Manager (ERM) 4.1.3 Notify Count Room personnel to include I- 5.2.4 The RPM or RCD ensures air samples Difference 131 equivalent AND DAC-hrs for subsequent related to the radioiodine release are air samples related to the radioiodine release, analyzed to include 1-131 equivalent and DAC-hrs..

Note before Step Where applicable, Technical Specification See 5.2.5 Notes are discouraged by the new None. Not an action step 4.1.4 testing for unfiltered in-leakage into the procedure writers guide. Action is in Control Room has the potential to result in a Step 5.2.5 below.

declared "degraded" condition. In this case, ingestion of KI by Control Room Operators is required should the need for distribution be determined.

5

SH110/1/2005/003 Old Step Wording AD-EP-ALL-0204 New Step Wording PS/Function Impact?

Step Step 4.1A4 IF Control Room in-leakage is declared 5.2.5.a If Control Room in-leakage is declared No change "degraded" include Control Room Operators degraded, then include Control Room in the distribution process. Operators in the distribution process.

4.1.5 Distribute one (1) blister package containing 5.2.5.b Distribute one package containing Difference; Expanded to fourteen (14) KI tablets to each designated fourteen KI tablets to each designated include additional emer*gency worker. Duke Energy and contractor personnel. personnel on site Note Designated emergency workers shall be 5.2.5 Distribute KI to Duke Energy and Difference identified by site management. contractor personnel, including workers returning from the field, as designated by site management 4.1.6 Instruct designated emergency worker to read 5.2.5.c Instruct designated Duke Energy and Difference; Expanded to and follow package instructions, contractor personnel to read and follow include additional package instructions personnel on site 4.1.7 Request designated emergency workers read 5.2.5.d Request designated Duke Energy and Difference; Expanded to AND sign Enclosure 5.1. contractor personnel read and sign include additional Attachment 1, Potassium Iodide (KI) personnel on site Distribution and Ingestion Information.

4.2 If required evaluate designated emergency 5.3.1 Perform whole body counts on personnel Bullet three - difference.

worker internal dose following a significant who are suspected of, or who have been Justification for deleting uptake to radioiodine based on the following exposed to radioiodine other bullets: The first methods: two bullets drive you into 0 Portal or contamination monitor alarm BBA, which is internal

• Actual DAC-hr exposure equal to or dose assessment. Passive greater than 4 DAC-hrs (10 mRem CDE- monitoring is the portal or thyroid) contamination monitor.

0 Passive monitoring indication So essentially the last two

• Body Burden Analysis (BBA) are duplicates of the first bullet.

4.3 IF required evaluate any potential uptakes per 5.3.2 Evaluate any potential uptakes per AD- No change - AD-RP-Reference 2.1. RP-ALL-4010, Internal Dose ALL-40 10 superseded Assessment Reference 2.1 Potassium Iodide (KI) Distribution and Enhancement Ingestion Information This attachment has had the following 6

SI/11/B/2005/003 Old Step Wording AD-EP-ALL-0204 New Step Wording PS/Function Impact?

Step Step added as enhancements:

• RP Badge H

• KI Lot #

" KI Expiration Date

• Note 1: Enter Declined if KI is refused.

" Additional bullets:

o I understand the use of KI is voluntary

" I have no known pre-existing thyroid conditions such as Grave's disease, thyroid nodules or Hashimoto's thyroiditis, Dermatitis herpetiformis, Hypocomplementric vasculitis, Nodular thyroid disease with heart disease 2 Security Potassium Iodide (KI) This is a new attachment Distribution and Ingestion Information that establishes a process for Security officers in the field to receive KI in the event of a radioiodine release, it contains the same information as attachment I 3 Potassium Iodide (KI) Effectiveness Difference This enclosure contains the same information as the Note in SHIO/B/2005/003 at the beginning of NEW STEPS NOT YET ADDRESSED 5.1 Do not issue Active Potassium Iodide Enhancement. Addresses (KI) to personnel with the following additional medical conditions: conditions that need to

_____.___avoid KI.

7

SHO/0BJ2005t003 Old Step Wording AD-EP-ALL-0204 New Step Wording PS/Function Impact?

Step Step

• Pre-existing thyroid conditions

" Grave's disease

. Thyroid nodules

. Hashimoto's thyroiditis

. Dermatitis herpetiformis

• Hypocomplementric vasculitis

. Nodular thyroid disease with heart disease

. Who have known allergies to iodide

.... ____"__substances such as shellfish 5.1.3 Store KI, this procedure, Attachment 1, Enhancement Potassium Iodide (RI) Distribution and Ingestion Information, and Attachment 2, Security Potassium Iodide (KI)

Distribution and Ingestion Information, per site emergency kit inventory

__.___"__procedures.

5.1.4 Do not take KI for more than ten days Enhancement without doctor approval.

5.1.5 Recommend nursing mothers who Enhancement receive KI tablets use nutrient substitutes (e.g., milk or a formula) for children for the duration of the ten-day tablet use

______.__ .__. __._"" period.

5.1.6 Use Attachment 3, Potassium Iodide Enhancement

. .... f ... (KI) Effectiveness, to review the value of KI ingestion over time.

5.2.6 Distribute KI to Security personnel as Enhancement.

follows:

a. Issue the following to the Security New section that officer assigned to obtain KI for establishes a process for specified number of Security personnel Security officers in the on post field to receive KI in the (1) One pack containing fourteen event of a radioiodine.

KI tablets. Resolves a weakness (2) Attaclment 2, Security identified during an ERO

_______"_"____.____,_.._,.____.. ___._ _________Potassium Iodide (KI) Distribution HAB drill 8

SII/0/B/2005/003 Old Step Wording AD-EP-ALL-0204 New Step Wording PS/Function Impact?

Step Step and Ingestion Information.

b. Instruct Security officer assigned distribution of K] to:

(1) Ensure Security personnel on post to read and follow package instructions.

(2) Ensure Security personnel on post read and sign Attachment 2, Security Potassium Iodide (KI)

Distribution and Ingestion Information.

-. -:-. Records 6.0 New Administrative Procedure format 6.1 Attachment 1, Potassium Iodide (KI) New Administrative Distribution and Ingestion Procedure fonnat Information 6.2 2. Attachment 2, Security Potassium New Administrative Iodide (KI) Distribution and Procedure format Ingestion Information 9

Form 703-2. Procedure Change Process Record (Ro8-1o)

Duke Energy PROCEDURE CHANGE PROCESS RECORD (1) ID No. ONS E-Plan Revision No. 2015-004 Change No.

Permanent/Restricted to (2) Station: OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION (3) Procedure

Title:

Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan (4) Section(s) of Procedure Affected: Record of Changes, E-Plan Sections: App 3, D, F, H, K, & P, and the E-Plan Table of Contents (5) Requires NSD 228 Applicability Determination?

[P Yes (Procedure change with major changes) - Attach NSD 228 documentation.

F1 No (Procedure change with minor changes)

(6) Description of Change: (Attach additionalpages, ifnecessary.)

See attached change matrix for a list of specific changes to each section.

(7) Reason for Change:

Changes as a result of a changefrom selective signalingto DEMNET, OSM to SM andprocedure reference updates; SH/O/B/2005/002 to AD-EP-ALL-0203 & SH/O/B/2005/003 to AD-EP-ALL-0204.

Selective Signaling System has been replaced with DEMNET in support of a Duke Energy fleetwide initiative and is an overall enhancement for offsite notifications during an emergency. This change continues to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b) planning standards and NRC requirements, as described in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

(8) Prepared By* Natalie Harness (Signature) ate 04/28/2015 (9) Reviewed By* (QR)(KI) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR)(KI) NA _ Date .5-97 -75 Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* (QR) NA W Date e- /57 Mgmt. Involvement Review By* (Ops. Supt.) NA L Date _nZ-,, I-r (10) Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date (11) Approved By* ?e:jy.ý_4 Date

• PrintedName and Signature

Rev. 2015-004 E-Plan Changes to Sections Appendix 3, D, F, H, K, P & Table of Contents (Record of Changes) Change Matrix

1. Section -TCurrent wording Proposed wording Reason for change 1 Section D In the opinion of the In the opinion of the Shift removed Operations (Shift Page D-16 Operations Shift Manager, the loss of the Manager is termed SM not Enclosure 4.2 Manager, the loss of the annunciators or indicators OSM) annunciators or requires additional indicators requires personnel (beyond normal additional personnel shift compliment) to safely (beyond normal shift operate the unit.

compliment) to safely operate the unit.

2. Section D Loss of all offsite Loss of all offsite Removed "Selective Page D- 18 communications communications capability signaling" and added 4.B capability (Selective (DEMNET, ETS lines, DEMNET Enclosure 4.2 Signaling, ETS lines, offsite radio system, offsite radio system, commercial phone system) commercial phone affecting the ability to system) affecting the communicate with offsite ability to communicate authorities.

with offsite authorities.

3. Section D In the opinion of the In the opinion of the Shift removed Operations (Shift Page D-20 Operations Shift Manager, the loss of the Manager is termed SM not Enclosure 4.2 Manager, the loss of the annunciators or indicators OSM) annunciators or requires additional indicators requires personnel (beyond normal additional personnel shift compliment) to safely (beyond normal shift operate the unit.

compliment) to safely operate the unit.

4. Section F Calls to activate Calls to activate Added "by" at the end of F. l.a State/County agency's State/County agency's the sentence and removed emergency function are emergency function are the Operations (Shift Manager the responsibility of the responsibility of the Shift is termed SM not OSM)

Operations Shift Manager/Emergency Manager/Emergency Coordinator. These calls are Coordinator. These calls made by:

are made:

5. Section F 1. By selective signaling 1. Duke Emergency Removed "By selective F. l.a. 1 phone system (where Management Network signaling phone system applicable). (DEMNET). (where applicable)" and added DEMNET under bullet 1

Rev. 2015-004 E-Plan Changes to Sections Appendix 3, D, F, H, K, P & Table of Contents (Record of Changes) Change Matrix

1. Section Current wording Proposed wording Reason for change

6. Section F On a monthly basis, a On a monthly basis, a Removed selective F. 1.b communication check is communication check is signaling phone system made to state and local made to state and local and changed to DEMNET government warning government warning points points within the within the Emergency Emergency Planning Planning Zone.

Zone. Communications Communications during an during an emergency emergency situation would situation would be by be by DEMNET, site selective signaling telephone phone system, site system/commercial phone telephone service, or by radio (where system/commercial appropriate).

phone service, or by radio (where appropriate).

7. Section F The EOF organization The EOF organization has corrected spelling of F. 1.c has the responsibility to the responsibility to ask for telecommunication ask for federal response. federal response. However, However, communication with the communication with the Nuclear Regulatory Nuclear Regulatory Commission from the Commission from the emergency response emergency response facilities, would be by use facilities, would be by of the Emergency use of the Emergency Telecommunication System Telecommuication (ETS) located in the Control System (ETS) located in Room areas, Technical the Control Room areas, Support Center, or the Technical Support Emergency Operations Center, or the Facility.

Emergency Operations Facility.

Rev. 2015-004 E-Plan Changes to Sections Appendix 3, D, F, H, K, P & Table of Contents (Record of Changes) Change Matrix

1. ESection Current wording Proposed wording Reason for change

8. Section F Selective Signaling Duke Emergency Replaced "Selective F.l.d.3 (Generator backed at the Management Network Signaling (Generator microwave tower) (DEMNET) backed at the microwave tower)" with Duke The Selective Signaling DEMNET is the primary Emergency Management System is the primary means of communication Network (DEMNET).

means of with the offsite agencies. Also replaced "The communication with the DEMNET uses digital voice Selective Signaling is on offsite agencies. The manager technology and IP the Duke fiber optic Selective Signaling is on connectivity through either system tied to short leased the Duke fiber optic the internet or a dedicated lines from the local system tied to short satellite connection, telephone company. This leased lines from the resulting in redundant paths circuit" with "DEMNET local telephone to ensure operability. uses digital voice manager company. This circuit DEMNET allows technology and IP allows intercommunication among connectivity through intercommunication the EOF, TSC, control either the internet or a among the EOF, TSC, room, counties, and states. dedicated satellite control room, counties, connection, resulting in and states. redundant paths to ensure operability."

Rev. 2015-004 E-Plan Changes to Sections Appendix 3, D, F, H, K, P & Table of Contents (Record of Changes) Change Matrix

1. Section Current wording Proposed wording T Reason for change

9. Section F The emergency The emergency Replaced "Selective F.9 communications communications systems at Signaling" with systems at the Charlotte the Charlotte EOF are DEMNET.

EOF are designed to designed to ensure the ensure the reliable, reliable, timely flow of timely flow of information between all information between all parties having an emergency parties having an response role. DEMNET is emergency response the primary means of role. The Selective communicating changes in Signaling System is the event classification and primary means of protective action communicating changes recommendations to the in event classification state and counties. The and protective action Decision Line provides the recommendations to the state and counties with a state and counties. The dedicated line to discuss and Decision Line provides coordinate protective action the state and counties recommendations. Existing with a dedicated line to commercial telephone discuss and coordinate service will serve as the protective action designated backup means recommendations. for communications in the Existing commercial event of a DEMNET/

telephone service will Decision Line failure.

serve as the designated backup means for communications in the event of a Selective Signaling System or Decision Line failure.

10. Section F Selective Signaling DEMNET (for state/county Replaced "Selective F.9 System (for state/county notifications) Signaling" with listing notifications) DEMNET.

11. Section F Should an emergency Should an emergency occur Removed Operations F. 1.e occur that will require that will require activation (Shift Manager is termed activation of the of the Emergency Response SM not OSM)

Emergency Response Organization, the Organization, the Shift Operations Shift Manger Manger will require the will require the following following actions to actions to occur:

occur:

Rev. 2015-004 E-Plan Changes to Sections Appendix 3, D, F, H, K, P & Table of Contents (Record of Changes) Change Matrix

1. ISection Current wording Proposed wording Reason for change

12. Section F 3. Selective 3. DEMNET to Oconee Replaced "Selective F.2 Signaling phone to County who then would Signaling" with bullet 3 Oconee County who contact the Oconee Medical DEMNET.

then would contact the Center. (Operations only)

Oconee Medical Center.

(Operations only)

13. Section F Selective Signaling DEMNET Replaced "Selective Figure F-1 System Signaling" with DEMNET in table heading.

14. Section F Operating instructions Operating instructions are changed SH/0/B/2005/002 Figure F-2 are shown in the shown in the Emergency to AD-EP-ALL-0203 A. 48.5 MHZ Emergency Telephone Telephone Directory and Directory and AD-EP-ALL-0203 SH/0/B/2005/002 (Protocol for the Field (Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency During Emergency Conditions)

Conditions)

15. Section F Operating instructions Operating instructions are changed SH/0/B/2005/002 Figure F-2 are shown in the shown in the Emergency to AD-EP-ALL-0203 B. 800 MHZ Emergency Telephone Telephone Directory and Directory and AD-EP-ALL-0203 SH/0/B/2005/002 (Protocol for the Field (Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency During Emergency Conditions)

Conditions)

16. Section H IP/0/B/1601/003 gives IP/0/B/1601/003 added the procedure title Figure H-4 range, accuracy and (Meteorological Equipment location. Checks) gives range, accuracy and location.

Rev. 2015-004 E-Plan Changes to Sections Appendix 3, D, F, H, K, P & Table of Contents (Record of Changes) Change Matrix

1. Section Current wording Proposed wording Reason for change

17. Section H Canberra 9900 Gamma Gamma Spectroscopy removed specific Figure H-11 Spectroscopy System System instrument vendor names Canberra 9900/ Body Burden Analyzer and WBC6000 Body Burden NcleCar Data p-u 1110uV r Analyzer and Nuclear Sitonc-uF TFcf\ k 'go /r:X%3Z~ r Data people mover -AP-&Automatic Smear Counter Tennelec APC Automatic Smear Liquid Scintillator Counter Alpha Scintillator Packard Liquid Scintillator Tennelee Alpha Scintillator

18. Section H Tennelee Series V XLB delete due to upgrades to count Figure H-i l Proportional Smear room equipment Counter An automatic smear counter using a gas flow proportional detector.

This instrument )

performs alpha and beta analyses.,_ __ L,..Q c~k~AeQ -vd ~m

Rev. 2015-004 E-Plan Changes to Sections Appendix 3, D, F, H, K, P & Table of Contents (Record of Changes) Change Matrix

1. Section Current wording Proposed wording Reason for change

19. Section K Administration of stable Administration of stable Added additional

• • Note iodine will be iodine will be recommended statement regarding the Page K-1 recommended for for emergency workers if a change per AD-EP-ALL-emergency workers if a dose of 5 rem CDE is 0204, "for site Duke dose of 5 rem CDE is projected to the thyroid Energy and contractor projected to the thyroid from radioiodine. This personnel and offsite from radioiodine. This action will require approval Duke Energy and action will require of the Radiation Protection contractor personnel until approval of the Manager in the OSC for site the EOF is operational.

Radiation Protection Duke Energy and contractor Once the EOF is Manager in the OSC or personnel and offsite Duke operational, the the Emergency Energy and contractor Radiological Assessment Coordinator. personnel until the EOF is Manager in the EOF operational. Once the EOF approves the is operational, the administration of stable Radiological Assessment iodine for offsite Duke Manager in the EOF Energy and contract approves the administration personnel."

of stable iodine for offsite Duke Energy and contract personnel.

20. Section K The Operations Shift The Shift Manager in the Removed Operations Page K-2 Manager in the Control Control Room, the (Shift Manager is termed K.2 Room, the Emergency Emergency Coordinator in SM not OSM)

Coordinator in the TSC, the TSC, or the Radiation or the Radiation Protection Manager in the Protection Manager in OSC is responsible for the OSC is responsible authorizing emergency for authorizing workers to receive doses in emergency workers to excess of 10 CFR 20 receive doses in excess limits....

of 10 CFR 20 limits....

21. Section P SH/0/B/2005/003 AD-EP-ALL-0204 changed procedure Figure P 1 Distribution of Distribution of Potassium reference from J5/J6 Potassium Iodide Iodide Tablets in the Event SH/0/B/2005/003 Tablets in the Event of a of a Radioiodine Release to AD-EP-ALL-0204 Radioiodine Release

22. Section P SH/0/B/2005/003 AD-EP-ALL-0204 changed procedure Figure P1 Distribution of Distribution of Potassium reference from K1 a-g Potassium Iodide Iodide Tablets in the Event SH/0/B/2005/003 Tablets in the Event of a of a Radioiodine Release to AD-EP-ALL-0204 Radioiodine Release

Rev. 2015-004 E-Plan Changes to Sections Appendix 3, D, F, H, K, P & Table of Contents (Record of Changes) Change Matrix

1. I Section Current wording Proposed wording Reason for change

23. App 3 The activation of this The activation of this alert Replaced "Selective C. 1 alert and notification and notification system Signaling" with DEMNET system requires requires procedures and in table heading.

procedures and relationships between both relationships between Duke Energy Company and both Duke Energy the off-site agencies that Company and the support Duke and Oconee off-site agencies that Nuclear Site. When an support Duke and incident is determined to Oconee Nuclear Site. have reached the level When an incident is requiring public protective determined to have actions, Duke contacts the reached the level cognizant off-site agency requiring public via the "DEMNET" or other protective actions, Duke phone system and provides contacts the cognizant its recommendations. This off-site agency via the system is available for use "Selective Signaling" or 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day and links other phone system and the control room, TSC, provides its EOF, SC (EOC), the county recommendations. This warning points, and the system is available for county EOC's.

use 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day and links the control room, TSC, EOF, SC (EOC),

the county warning points, and the county EOC's.

24. TOC Procedure ID SH/O/B/2005/002 AD-EP-ALL-0203 changed procedure reference from SH/O/B/2005/002 to AD-EP-ALL-0203