ONS-2018-011, Ufsar/Selected Licensee Commitment Changes

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Ufsar/Selected Licensee Commitment Changes
ML18033A610
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/25/2018
From: Burchfield J
Duke Energy Carolinas
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ONS-2018-011
Download: ML18033A610 (45)
v • d • e


Text

    • .I ef,DUKE

~'ENERGY J. Ed Burchfield, Jr.

Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy ON01VP 17800 Rochester Hwy ONS-2018-011 10 CFR 50.71(e) Seneca, SC 29672 o: 864.873.3478

f. 864.873.4208 Ed.Burchfield@duke-energy.com January 25, 2018 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Numbers 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 Renewed License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 UFSAR/Selected Licensee Commitment Changes Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(e), please find attached the latest revisions to the Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual. The SLC Manual constitutes Chapter 16 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

Any questions regarding this information should be directed to Chris Wasik, Regulatory Affairs Manager, at (864) 873-5789.

I certify that I am a duly authorized officer of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and that the information contained herein accurately represents changes made to Chapter 16 of the UFSAR since the previous submittal. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 25, 2018.

Sincerely, J. Ed Burchfield, Jr.

Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Attachments www.duke-energy.com

ONS-2018-011 January 25, 2018 Page 2 cc: Ms. Catherine Haney Administrator, Region II .

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 Ms. Audrey Klett, Project Manager (ONS)

(by electronic mail only)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 0-08B1A Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Mr. Eddy L. Crowe Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station

ONS-2018-011 January 25, 2018 Attachments Revised Oconee Nuclear Station SLC Manual Pages SLC List of Effective Pages (LOEPs), Rev. 023 LOEP 1-4 SLC Table of Contents, Rev. 006 TOC 1-7 SLC 16.9.3 Keowee CO2 Systems *DELETED* 16.9.3 1- 1 SLC 16.9.6 Fire Detection Instrumentation, Rev. 005 16.9.6 1 - 11 SLC 16.9.9 Additional Protected Service Water (PSW)

System Commitments, Rev. 002 16.9.9 1-5 SLC 16.9.9a PSW Battery Cell Parameters *DELETED* 16.9.9.a NIA SLC 16.9.22 PSW System Unavailability *DELETED* 16.9.22 1- 1 SLC 16.9.23 Alternate Chilled Water (AWC) and Alternate Reactor Building Cooling (RBC) Systems, Rev. 001 16.9.23 1-7 SLC 16.9.25 Spent Fuel Pool Area Isolation, Rev. 001 16.9.25 1-5

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 01 /08/18 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Number Implementation Date 16.0 005 08/16/17 16.1 000 10/15/07 16.2 000 08/25/14 16.3 001 06/29/15 16.4 PENDING 16.5.1 000 11/26/12 16.5.2 000 11/15/12 16.5.3 000 02/21/07 16.5.4 000 11/15/12 16.5.5 Deleted 5/16/09 16.5.6 Deleted 02/10/14 16.5.7 000 12/13/06 16.5.8 000 01/31/07 16.5.8a Deleted 5/19/05 16.5.9 000 11/15/12 16.5.10 000 10/08/03 16.5.11 000 01/31/00 16.5.12 000 03/27/99 16.5.13 000 03/27/99 16.6.1 000 07/23/12 16.6.2 000 01/31/07 16.6.3 000 11/15/12 16.6.4 000 11/15/12 16.6.5 000 12/14/00 16.6.6 000 11/15/12 16.6.7 000 03/27/99 16.6.8 000 03/27/99 16.6.9 000 11/15/12 16.6.10 000 11/15/12 16.6.11 000 11/15/12 16.6.12 000 11/15/12 16.6.13 000 03/31/08 16.6.14 000 04/21/14 16.6.15 000 11/15/12 16.7.1 000 11/15/12 Oconee Nuclear Station LOEP 1 Revision 023

.Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 01/08/18 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Number Implementation Date 16.7.2 000 11/15/12 16.7.3 000 11/15/12 16.7.4 000 07/14/05 16.7.5 000 11/15/12 16.7.6 000 04/08/14 16.7.7 000 11/15/12 16.7.8 000 03/27/99 16.7.9 000 10/23/03 16.7.10 000 11/15/12 16.7.11 000 11/15/12 16.7.12 000 06/30/04 16.7.13 000 12/05/12 16.7.14 000 11/15/12 16.7.15 000 04/08/14 16.7.16 000 10/14/15 16.7.17 000 07/14/16 16.8.1 000 08/09/01 16.8.2 000 02/10/05 16.8.3 001 01/26/16 16.8.4 000 02/10/05 16.8.5 000 05/21/15 16.8.6 000 01/04/07 16.8.7 000 01/31/00 16.8.8 000 01/31/00 16.8.9 000 06/21/05 16.9.1 001 08/16/16 16.9.2 002 08/16/16 16.9.3 Deleted O1/08/18 16.9.4 001 08/16/16 16.9.5 002 08/16/16 16.9.6 005 12/19/17 16.9.7 001 08/16/16 16.9.8 000 02/15/06 16.9.8a 000 02/07/05 16.9.9 002 08/16/17 Oconee Nuclear Station LOEP2 Revision 023

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised O1/08/18 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Number Implementation Date 16.9.10 000 01/12/04 16.9.11 001 06/29/15 16.9.11a 001 06/06/17 16.9.12 001 09/21/15 16.9.13 000 01/31/07 16.9.14 000 10/28/04 16.9.15 000 03/27/99 16.9.16 000 10/15/14 16.9.17 000 05/23/01 16.9.18 000 07/15/14 16.9.19 000 03/31/05 16.9.20 001 12/14/16 16.9.21 000 07/09/09 16.9.22 Deleted 08/16/17 16.9.23 001 08/16/17 16.9.24 003 11/18/16 16.9.25 001 08/16/17 16.10.1 000 11/15/12 16.10.2 000 12/02/03 16.10.3 000 03/27/99 16.10.4 000 11/15/12 16.10.5 Deleted 08/24/04 16.10.6 000 03/27/99 16.10.7 001 09/21/15 16.10.8 000 11/27/06 16.10.9 000 11/25/09 16.11.1 000 03/15/11 16.11.2 000 01/31/00 16.11.3 000 11/20/08 16.11.4 000 06/30/14 16.11.5 000 10/30/02 16.11.6 000 11/08/13 16.11.7 000 01/31/00 16.11.8 000 12/21/09 16.11.9 000 03/22/10 Oconee Nuclear Station LOEP3 Revision 023

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised d1/08/18 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Number Implementation Date 16.11.10 000 05/14/14 16.11.11 000 03/27/99 16.11.12 000 04/10/03 16.11.13 000 03/27/99 16.11.14 000 03/27/99 16.12.1 000 03/27/99 16.12.2 000 05/03/07 16.12.3 000 05/01/03 16.12.4 000 03/27/99 16.12.5 000 03/27/99 16.12.6 000 11/08/07 16.13.1 001 12/22/15 16.13.2 000 12/15/04 16.13.3 000 12/15/04 16.13.4 000 03/27/99 16.13.5 Deleted 11/30/99 16.13.6 000 03/27/99 16.13.7 000 12/15/04 16.13.8 000 03/27/99 16.13.9 000 03/27/99 16.13.10 000 03/27/99 16.13.11 000 03/27/99 16.14.1 000 11/15/12 16.14.2 000 07/23/12 16.14.3 000 03/27/99 16.14.4 Deleted 03/15/11 16.14.4.a 000 03/15/11 16.15.1 000 04/12/06 16.15.2 000 11/15/12 16.15.3 000 11/15/12 Note: With the introduction of Fusion in June 2015, all controlled documents require a three-digit revision number. Thus, the revision numbers were set to "000" in the summer of 2015. As such, the revision dates for Revision 000 are based on the implementation dates for revisions in effect prior to this change.

Oconee Nuclear Station LOEP4 Revision 023

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE NO 16.0 SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS 16.1-1

16.1 INTRODUCTION

16.1-1 16.2 APPLICABILITY 16.2-1 16.3 DEFINITIONS 16.3-1 16.4 COMMITMENTS RELATED TO REACTOR COMPONENTS Pending 16.5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 16.5.1-1 16.5.1 Reactor Coolant System Vents 16.5.1-1 16.5.2 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System 16.5.2.1 16.5.3 Loss of Decay Heat Removal 16.5.3-1 16.5.4 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Boron Sampling 16.5.4-1 16.5.5 [DELETED] 16.5.5-1 16.5.6 [DELETED] 16.5.6-1 16.5.7 Chemistry Requirements 16.5.7-1 16.5.8 Pressurizer 16.5.8-1 16.5.8a [DELETED] 16.5.8a-1 16.5.9 Testing Following Opening of System (Core Barrel Bolt Inspections) 16.5.9.1 16.5.10 Loss of Reactor Coolant 16.5.10-1 16.5.11 Subcriticality 16.5.11-1 16.5.12 RCS Leakage Testing Following Opening of System 16.5.12-1 16.5.13 High Pressure Injection and the Chemical Addition Systems 16.5.13-1 16.6 COMMITMENTS RELATED TO ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 16.6.1-1 (NON-ESF SYSTEMS) 16.6.1 Containment Leakage Tests 16.6.1-1 16.6.2 Reactor Building Post-Tensioning System 16.6.2-1 16.6.3 Containment Heat Removal Verification Frequency 16.6.3-1 16.0-1 Rev.006

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION TITLE NO 16.6.4 Low Pressure Injection System Leakage 16.6.4-1 16.6.5 Core Flood Tank Discharge Valve Breakers 16.6.5-1 16.6.6 Core Flooding System Test 16.6.6-1 16.6. 7 BWST Outlet Valve Control 16.6.7-1 16.6.8 LPI System Valve Test Restrictions 16.6.8-1 16.6.9 Containment Purge Valve Testing 16.6.9-1 16.6.10 Trisodium Phosphate (TSP) 16.6.10-1 16.6.11 Containment Debris Sources 16.6.11-1 16.6.12 Additional High Pressure Injection (HPI) Requirements 16.6.12-1 16.6.13 Additional Requirements to Support Low Pressure Injection (LPI) 16.6.13-1 Operability 16.6.14 Control of HPI and LPI/RBS Pump Room Temperatures 16.6.14-1 16.6.15 High Pressure Injection (HPI) and Liquid Waste Disposal (LWD) 16.6.15-1 Leakage 16.7 INSTRUMENTATION 16.7.1-1 16.7.1 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 16.7.1-1 16.7.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram 16.7.2-1 16.7.3 Emergency Feedwater System 16.7.3-1 16.7.4 Hydrogen Analyzers 16.7.4-1 16.7.5 Steam Generator Overfill Protection 16.7.5-1 16.7.6 Diverse Actuation Systems 16.7.6-1 16.7.7 Position Indicator Channels 16.7.7-1 16.7.8 lncore Instrumentation 16.7.8-1 16.7.9 RCP Monitor 16.7.9-1

16. 7 .10 Core Flood Tank Instrumentation 16.7.10-1
16. 7.11 Display Instrumentation 16.7.11-1 16.0-2 Rev. 006

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.7.12 SSF Diesel Generator (DG) Air Start System Pressure 16.7.12-1 Instrumentation 16.7.13 SSF Instrumentation 16.7.13-1 16.7.14 Rod Withdrawal Alarm Limit 16.7.14-1 16.7.15 Engineered Safeguards Protective System (ESPS) Voter Trouble Alarm 16.7.15-1 16.7.16 Spent Fuel Pool - Wide Range Level Instrumentation 16.7.16-1 16.7.17 Reactor Protective System Instrumentation Setpoints 16.7.17-1 16.8 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS 16.8.1-1 16.8.1 Control of Room Temperatures for Station Blackout 16.8.1-1 16.8.2 Additional Requirements to Support Keowee Hydro Unit (KHU) 16.8.2-1 OPERABILITY 16.8.3 Power Battery Parameters 16.8.3-1 16.8.4 Keowee Operational Restrictions 16.8.4-1 16.8.5 [DELETED] 16.8.5-1 16.8.6 Lee/Central Alternate Power System 16.8.6-1 16.8.7 Auctioneering Diodes 16.8.7-1 16.8.8 External Grid Trouble Protection 16.8.8-1 16.8.9 Keowee Governor Speed Out Of Tolerance (OOT) Alarm 16.8.9-1 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.1-1 16.9.1 Fire Suppression Water System 16.9.1-1 16.9.2 Sprinkler and Spray Systems 16.9.2-1 16.9.3 [DELETED] 16.9.3-1 16.9.4 Fire Hose Stations 16.9.4-1 16.9.5 Fire Barriers 16.9.5-1 16.9.6 Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6-1 16.9.7 Keowee Lake Level 16.9.7-1 16.0-3 Rev. 006 I

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.9.8 Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS) Booster Fans 16.9.8-1 16.9.8a HPSW System Requirements to Support Loss of LPSW 16.9.8a-1 16.9.9 Additional Protected Service Water (PSW) System Commitments 16.9.9-1 16.9.10 Component Cooling and HPI Seal Injection to Reactor 16.9.10-1 Coolant Pumps 16.9.11 Turbine Building Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11-1 16.9.11a Auxiliary Building Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a-1 16.9.12 Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) And 16.9.12-1 Siphon Seal Water (SSW) System Operability Requirements 16.9.13 Spent Fuel Cooling System 16.9.13-1 16.9.14 SSF Diesel Generator (DG) Inspection Requirements 16.9.14-1 16.9.15 Radioactive Material Sources 16.9.15-1 16.9.16 Reactor Building Polar Crane and Auxiliary Hoist 16.9.16-1 (RCS System Open) 16.9.17 Reactor Building Polar Crane (RCS at elevated 16.9.17-1 temperature and pressure) 16.9.18 Snubbers 16.9.18-1 16.9.19 Gravity Induced Reverse Flow to Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) 16.9.19-1 Through a Unit 2 Condensate Cooler 16.9.20 Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors 16.9.20-1 16.9.21 Standby Shutdown Facility External Flood Protection 16.9.21-1 16.9.22 [DELETED] 16.9.22-1 16.9.23 Alternate Chilled Water (AWC) and Alternate Reactor Building Cooling 16.9.23-1 (RSC) Systems 16.9.24 FLEX - Equipment and Connections 16.9.24-1 16.9.25 Spent Fuel Pool Area Isolation 16.9.25-1 16.0-4 Rev. 006 I

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.10 COMMITMENTS RELATED TO STEAM & POWER CONVERSION 16.10.1-1 SYSTEMS 16.10.1 Local Start of Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump 16.10.1-1 16.10.2 Steam Generator Secondary Side Pressure and 16.10.2-1 Temperature (PIT) Limits 16.10.3 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump and Valve Testing 16.10.3-1 16.10.4 Low Presssure Service Water System Testing 16.10.4-1 16.10.5 [DELETED] 16.10.5-1 16.10.6 Emergency Feedwater Controls 16.10.6-1 16.10.7 Alternate Source of Emergency Feedwater (EFW) 16.10.7-1 16.10.8 Upper Surge Tank (UST) Riser Branch Line Automatic Isolation Valves 16.10.8-1 16.10.9 Air Operated Valves (AOVs) Required to Support Standby Shutdown 16.10.9-1 Facility (SSF) During Station Blackout (SBO) 16.11 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS CONTROL 16.11.1-1 16.11.1 Radioactive Liquid effluents 16.11.1-1 16.11.2 Radioactive Gaseous Effluents 16.11.2-1 16.11.3 Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 16.11.3-1 16.11.4 Operational Safety Review 16.11.4-1 16.11.5 Solid Radioactive Waste 16.11.5-1 16.11.6 Radiological Environmental Monitoring 16.11.6-1 16.11.7 Dose calculations 16.11.7-1 16.11.8 Reports 16.11.8-1 16.11.9 Radioactive effluent release report 16.11.9-1 16.11.10 Radiological Environmental Operating Reports 16.11.10-1 16.11.11 Iodine Radiation Monitoring Filters 16.11.11-1 16.0-5 Rev. 006 I

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.11.12 Radioactive Material in Outside Temporary 16.11.12-1 Tanks Exceeding Limit 16.11.13 Radioactive Material in Waste Gas Holdup 16.11.13-1 Tank Exceeding Limit 16.11.14 Explosive Gas Mixture 16.11.14-1 16.12 REFUELING OPERATIONS 16.12.1-1 16.12.1 Decay Time for Movement of Irradiated Fuel 16.12.1-1 16.12.2 Area Radiation Monitoring for Fuel Loading and Refueling 16.12.2-1 16.12.3 Communication Between Control Room and Refueling Personnel 16.12.3-1 16.12.4 Handling of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies 16.12.4-1 16.12.5 Loads Suspended over Spent Fuel in Spent Fuel Pool 16.12.5-1 16.12.6 Fuel Damage During Fuel Handling Operations in Containment 16.12.6-1 16.13 CONDUCT OF OPERATION 16.13.1-1 16.13.1 Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.13.1-1 16.13.2 [DELETED] 16.13.2-1 16.13.3 [DELETED] 16.13.3-1 16.13.4 Reactivity Anomaly 16.13.4-1 16.13.5 Deleted 16.13.5-1 16.13.6 Retraining and Replacement of Station Personnel 16.13.6-1 16.13.7 Procedures for Control of Ph in Recirculated 16.13.7-1 Coolant after Loss-of-coolant Accident & Long-term Emergency Core Cooling Systems 16.13.8 Respiratory Protective Program 16.13.8-1 16.13.9 Startup Report 16.13.9-1 16.13.10 Core Operating Limits Reports 16.13.10-1 16.13.11 Procedure for Station Survey Following an Earthquake 16.13.11-1 16.0-6 Rev. 006 I

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.14 CONTROL RODS AND POWER DISTRIBUTION 16.14.1-1 16.14.1 APSR Movement 16.14.1-1 16.14.2 Control Rod Program Verification 16.14.2-1 16.14.3 Power Mapping 16.14.3-1 16.14.4 [DELETED] 16.14.4-1 16.14.4.a Engineering Work Station 16.14.4.a-1 16.15 VENTILATION FILTER TESTING PROGRAM 16.15.1-1 16.15.1 [DELETED] 16.15.1-1 16.15.2 Control Room Pressurization and Filtering System 16.15.2-1 16.15.3 Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System 16.15.3-1 16.0-7 Rev. 006 I

[DELETED]

16.9.3 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.3 [DELETED]

16.9.3-1 Rev. 001 I

Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.6 Fire Detection Instrumentation COMMITMENT The provided Fire Detection Instrumentation for each equipment/location shall be FUNCTIONAL as listed in Table 16.9.6-1.

NOTE---------------------------------------------------

Fire Detection Instrumentation located within containment is not required to be FUNCTIONAL during the performance of Type A Containment Leakage Rate Tests.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

16.9.6-1 Rev.005 I

Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 ACTIONS

NOTE:----------------------------------------------------------

FUNCTIONALITY of fire detection instrumentation for adequate equipment/location coverage may also be determined by the Site Fire Protection E:ngineer or designee, based on performance based assessment risk.

CONDITION RE:QUIRE:D ACTION COMPLE:TION TIME:

A. All fire detection A.1 --------------NOTE:-------------

instruments in all fire An hourly firewatch is not zones nonfunctional required for inaccessible due to fire detection equipment/locations such system failure. as the Reactor Building at power operation. Periodic inspections using a TV camera (if available) are permitted, or, the inaccessible equipment condition may be monitored by remote indications which would ------------NOTE:-----------

provide early warning of a The provisions of SLC fire. 16.2. 7 do not apply.

!::stablish hourly fire watch once within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> patrol in all affected fire zones. AND hourly +25% thereafter 16.9.6-2 Rev.005 I

Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 ACTIONS ( continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more Fire B.1 --------------NOTE-------------

Detection An hourly firewatch is not lnstrument(s) in any required for inaccessible fire zone equipment/locations such nonfunctional. as the Reactor Building at power operation. Periodic inspections using a TV camera (if available) are permitted, or, the inaccessible equipment condition may be monitored by remote indications which would ------------NOTE-----------

provide early warning of a The provisions of SLC fire. 16.2. 7 do not apply.

Establish hourly fire watch once within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> patrol for the affected fire detection instruments or AND zones.

hourly +25% thereafter B.2 Complete an evaluation as Prior to terminating permitted by RIS 2005-07 Required Action B.1 and implement alternative compensatory measures as required.

16.9.6-3 Rev. 005 I

Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.9.6.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of 31 days Oconee Fire Detection Instruments using Fire Detection Instrumentation Control Board Panel Test Switch.

SR 16.9.6.2. Visually inspect Oconee Fire Detection 184 days Instruments accessible during power operation.

SR 16.9.6.3 Test each Oconee fire detector for sensitivity. 12 months SR 16.9.6.4 Visually inspect Oconee Fire Detection 24 months Instruments not accessible during power operation.

SR 16.9.6.5 Test each Oconee fire detector not accessible 24 months during power operation for sensitivity.

16.9.6-4 Rev. 005 I

Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 TABLE 16.9.6-1 Fire Detection Instrumentation OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Fire Fire Detectors Area Zone Location Description Details Provided AB Auxiliary Building El. 758- Col.

AB 48 S-T/45-47 Unit 3 LPI & RB Spray Pumps LPI/HPI areas 2 El. 758- Col.

AB 49 S-T/42-44 Unit 3 LPI & RB Spray Pumps LPI/HPI areas 2 El. 758- Col.

AB 50 R-S/42-44 Unit 3 HPI Pump Area LPI/HPI areas 1 El. 758- Col. Unit 3 HPI Pump. Spent Resin Xfr Pump Waste AB 50A R-S/45-47 Tank, Waste & CT Om Pumps LPI/HPI areas 1 El. 758- Col. Unit 2 LPI Pumps & Valve Room (Inside Room AB 52 S-T/29-31 63) LPI/HPI areas 2 El. 758- Col.

AB 53 S-T/26-29 Units 1 & 2 LPI & RB Spray Pumps LPI/HPI areas 2 El. 758- Col. Unit 1 LPI Pumps & Valve Room (Inside Room AB 54 S-T/24-26 61) LPI/HPI areas 2 El. 758- Col. Unit 1 RB Sump & Cinp Om Pump, HPI Pump, AB 55 R-S/24-26 Spent resin Xfer Pump LP 1/H PI areas 1 El. 758- Col.

AB 55A R-S/26-27 Unit 1 & 2 HPI Pump Area LPI/HPI areas 1 El. 758- Col. Unit 2 Spent Resin Xfer Pump, HPI Pump, RB AB 56 R-S/28-30 Sump & Comp Brn Pump, Wt LPI/HPI areas 1 Unit 3 BA Mix, Spt Res Storage, RC Bid HUT, AB ,58 Rms. 100, 261 CBAST, Misc WHUT 1st floor hallway 7 AB 60 Rm. 159 Unit 3 LPI Room Hatch Area LPI hatch 3 AB 61 Rm. 158 Unit 3 HPI Room Hatch Area all 3 AB 62 Rm. 157 Unit 3 Operators Panel/Chem Sample Hood Waste Control 1 ASW SWGR area/

AB 64 Rm. 128 Unit 2 Emerg Aux Service Water Pump PSW pump area 2 Unit 2 MWHT, Misc Wst Exp, CBAST, RC Bid AB 65 Rms. 100, 124 Xfer Pmp, RC Bid HT 1st floor hallway 9 AB 67 Rm. 119 Unit 2 LPI Room Hatch Area LPI hatch 3 AB 68 Rm. 118 Unit 2 HPI Pump Hatch Area HPI hatch 2 AB 69 Rm. 117 Unit 2 Operators Panel/Chem Sample Hood Waste Control 1 AB 70 Rm. 119 Unit 1 LPI Room Hatch Area LPI hatch 1 AB 72 Rm. 118 Unit 1 HPI Pump Hatch Area HPI hatch 3 Unit 1 RC HU Tnks, CBAST, RC Bid Xfr Pmp, AB 76 Rm. 100 Wst Oma, Fltr Room SRST 1st floor hallway 6 AB 77 Rms. 200, 264 Unit 3 Storage, Chemistry Storage all 14 AB 79 Rm. 252 Unit 3 RB Component Coolers Component Coolers 1 Rms. 200, 220, Unit 2 l&E Hot shop, Misc Evap Fd Tk, Chem AB 81 224 Storage, Laund, RC EFT 2nd floor hallway 15 AB 83 Rm. 216 Unit 1 & 2 RB Component Coolers Component Coolers 1 AB 85 Rms. 200, 204 Unit 1 Chemistry Storage, High Level Storage 2nd floor hallway 10 16.9.6-5 Rev. 005 I

Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 TABLE 16.9.6-1 Fire Detection Instrumentation Fire Fire Detectors Area Zone Location Description Details Provided AB Auxiliary Building (cont'd)

Unit 3 Hatch Area Chemistry Labs & Change AB 86 Rms. 356, 368 Room 3rd floor hallway 32 Rms. 354, all; including cable AB 89 354A Unit 3 Equipment Room shaft 20 Unit 2 Hallway, Change Room, Laundry Room, Rms, 312, 328, RP Lab, Chemistry Lab, Medical Room, Decon AB 90 333,334 Room and Offices 3rd floor hallway 36 all; including cable AB 92 Rm. 311 Unit 2 Equipment Room shaft 13 Unit 1 Hallway, Hatch Area, Change Room, AB 94 Rms. 300, 304 Tool Storage, and Drumming Area all 28 all; including cable AB 95 Rm. 310 Unit 1 Equipment Room shaft 12 AB 99 Rm. 452 Unit 3 East Penetration Room all 20 AB 100 Rms. 455, 458 Unit 3 Control Battery Room all 4 Rms. 450, 4508, Cable all; including cable AB 101 Shaft Unit 3 Cable Room shaft 29 AB 103 Rm. 407 Unit 2 East Penetration Room all 25 AB 104 Rm. 408 Unit 2 Control Batterv Room all 5 all; including cable AB 105 Rm. 404 Unit 2 Cable Room shaft 21 all; including cable AB 106 Rm. 403 Unit 1 Cable Room shaft 21 AB 108 Rm. 402 Unit 1 East Penetration Room all 22 AB 109 Rm.400 Unit 1 Control Battery Room all 5 Rms. 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512,513,515, AB 110 516,516A Unit 1 & 2 Control Room all 38 Rms. 552, 553, AB 112 554,556,557 Unit 3 Control Room all 29 AB 114 Rm. 669 Unit 3 Purge Inlet Equipment Room all 5 AB 115 Rm. 666 Unit 3 Purae Exhaust Equipment Room all 10 Rms. 650, 651, AB 116 653,657 Unit 3 AHU Room all 6 AB 118 Rm. 618 Unit 2 Purge Exhaust Equipment Room all 10 AB 119 Rm. 603 Unit 1 & 2 AHU Room all 8 AB 121 Rm. 600 Unit 1 Purge Exhaust Equipment Room all 11 16.9.6-6 Rev. 005 I

Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 TABLE 16.9.6-1 Fire Detection Instrumentation Fire Fire Detectors Area Zone Location Description Details Provided BH Blockhouse Unit 1 & 2 BH12 45 Block House Unit 1 & 2 Block House all 6 Unit 3 Block BH3 47 House Unit 3 Block House all 3 CT-4 Block Ionization smoke CT4 46 House CT-4 Block House detection 2 PSW PSWBuilding photoelectric smoke PSW PS101 Cable Vault detectors only 2 photoelectric smoke PSW PS102 PSW Main Floor (transformer space) detectors only 6 photoelectric smoke PSW PS103 Batterv Room 2 detectors only 2 photoelectric smoke PSW PS104 Batterv Room 1 detectors only 2 photoelectric smoke PSW PS105 Mezzanine Area detectors only 4 RB Reactor Building EL. 796+6 and Unit 1 Reactor Building - Basement thru 4th all (both ionization RB1 122 797+6 Floor and heat) 22 EL. 796+6 and Unit 2 Reactor Building - Basement thru 4th all (both ionization RB2 123 797+6 Floor and heat) 22 EL. 796+6 and Unit 3 Reactor Building - Basement thru 4th all (both ionization RB3 124 797+6 Floor and heat) 22 SSF Standby Shutdown Facility all (Honeywell panel SSF SSF SF104 Standby Shutdown Facility detection) 74 TB Turbine Building Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 1 B-E/52-56 Unit 3 Lube Oil Purifier Area all 2 Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 2 E-F/54-55 Unit 3 EHC Area all 3 Ele. 775 - Col. all (both ionization TB 3 H-N/48-56 Unit 3 Heater Drain Pumps 301 & 302 and beam) 15 Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 4 E-F/54-55 Unit 3 Turbine Driven EFDW Pump Area all 2 Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 6 B-E/42-46 Unit 3 Main Feedwater Pump Area all 4 Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 7 E-F/43-44 Unit 3 Motor Driven EDFW Pump Area all 1 Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 8 F-G/43-44 Unit 3 Hotwell Pump & TB Sump Area 1 all 1 Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 9 J-M/43-44 Unit 3 Powdex/LPSW Pump Area all 2 16.9.6-7 Rev.005

Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 TABLE 16.9.6-1 Fire Detection Instrumentation Fire Fire Detectors Area Zone Location Description Details Provided TB Turbine Building (cont'd)

Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 10 B-C/38-39 Unit 2 Lube Oil Purifier Area Ionization 2 Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 11 E-F/40-41 Unit 2 EHC Area all 3 Ele. 775 - Col. Unit 2 Heater Drain Pumps 2D1, 2D2, 2E1, & All (both ionization TB 12 H-N/34-42 2E2 and beam) 15 Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 13 B-D/32-38 Unit 2 Turbine Driven EFDW Pump Area all 4 Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 15 B-E/27-32 Unit 2 Main Feedwater Pump Area, MCC 2XC all 6 Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 17 F-J/28-29 Unit 2 HW Pump, LPSW Pump - B Area all 3 Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 18 L-M/30-31 Unit 2 Powex, Backup IA Compressors all 1 Ele. 775 - Unit 1 Main Feedwater Pump Area, MCC 1XC TB 19 Col.E-F/21-27 Switchgear all 5 Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 21 F-J/27-28 Unit 1 HW Pump, LPSW Pump - A Area all 3 Ele. 775 - Col.

TB 22 L-M/22-23 Unit 1 Powdex Area all 1 Ele. 775 - Col. Unit 1 TDEFDW Pump, EHC, Oil Purifier, TB 24 B-F/13-21 Auxiliary Boiler all 4 Ele. 775 - Col all (both ionization TB 25 F-M/13-20 Heater Drain Pumps 1E1 & 1E2 and beam) 15 Ele. 796 - Col.

TB 27 E-G/53-55 Unit 3 MT Oil Tank, MS & Control Valves all 6 Ele. 796 - Col.

TB 28 L-M/52-53 Unit 3 Heater Bav Area, MSRH A1 & A2 all 3 Ele. 796 - Col.

TB 29 J-M/43-46 Unit 3 4160 Volt Switchqear all 37 Ele. 796 - Col.

TB 31 D-G/39-41 Unit 2 MT Oil Tank, MS & Control Valves all 4 Ele. 796 +6 - Unit 2 Heater Bay Area, MSRH A1 & A2, 3XS6, TB 32 Col. G-N/32-42 3X10, MCC 2XGB, SSF Transfer cables all 14 Ele. 796 +6- Unit 2 6900/4160 Volt Switchgear, SSF Transfer TB 33 Col. B-N/28-32 cables all 31 Ele. 796 +6-TB 33A Col.B-N/28-30 Unit 2 Power Battery Room all 1 Ele. 796+6-Col. B-N/23-28 (not including Unit 1 6900/4160 Volt Switchgear, SSF Transfer TB 34 FZ 34A) cables all 30 Ele. 796 +6-TB 34A Col. L-M/25-26 Unit 1 Power Batteries all 2 Ele. 796 - Col. Unit 1 Heater Bay Area, MSRH A1 & A2, MCC TB 35 G-N/14-23 1XGB Switchgear all 4 Ele. 796 - Col.

TB 36 F-G/14-15 Unit 1 MT Oil Tank, MS & Control Valves all 3 Ele. 796 +6-TB 37 Col.N-R/86-87 Unit 2 SSF Transfer Cables all 4 Ele. 822 - Col.

TB 38 D-G/45-54 Unit 3 Main Turbine, Turbine Fir, Offices all 7 16.9.6-8 Rev. 005 I

Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 TABLE 16.9.6-1 Fire Detection Instrumentation Fire Fire Detectors Area Zone Location Description Details Provided TB Turbine Building (cont'd)

Ele. 822 - Col.

TB 39 J-N/43~56 Unit 3 Auxiliarv Shutdown Panel all 1 Ele. 822 - Col.

TB 39A L-M/45-47 Unit 3 Power Battery Room all 2 Ele. 822 - Col.

TB 40 D-G/28-40 Unit 2 Main Turbine, Turbine Fir, Offices all 7 Ele. 822 - Col TB 41 J-N/27-42 Unit 1 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel all 1 Ele. 822 - Col.

TB 42 E-G/15-27 Unit 1 Main Turbine, Turbine Fir, Offices all 7 Ele. 796 - Col.

TB 44 C-F/12-14 Unit 1 MCC 1XA & 1XA-A all 2 WP1 Unit 1 West Penetration Room WP1 97 Rm. 348 Unit 1 Cask Decon Tank Room all 4 WP1 107 Rm. 409 Unit 1 West Penetration Room all 7 WP1 120 Rm. 620 Unit 1 Purge Inlet Equipment Room all 6 WP2 Unit 2 West Penetration Room WP2 91 Rm. 349 Unit 2 Cask Decon Tank Room all 4 WP2 102 Rm. 410 Unit 2 West Penetration Room all 7 WP2 117 Rm. 621 Unit 2 Purge Inlet Equipment Room all 6 WP3 Unit 3 West Penetration Room WP3 87 Rm. 376 Unit 3 Cask Decon Tank Room all 4 WP3 98 Rm. 455 Unit 3 West Penetration Room all 7 YARD Yard YARD- U3RCP YARD EAST SWGR Yard Area - East U3 RCP SWGR 2 16.9.6-9 Rev.005 I

Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 BASES On June 16, 2004, the NRC revised its regulation Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Section 50.48 to include a new paragraph 50.48(c) that incorporates by reference National Fire Protection Association 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants 2001 Edition," hereafter referred to as NFPA 805. On December 29, 2010, the NRC issued Oconee's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) approving adoption of a performance-based (PB) fire protection program (FPP) as an alternative to the existing, deterministic fire protection regulations. Specifically, NFPA 805 allows the use of PB methods, such as fire modeling, and risk-informed (RI) methods, such as fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), to demonstrate compliance with the nuclear safety performance criteria. As a result of transitioning to the NFPA 805 Licensing Basis, certain Fire Protection Systems and Features are "required" to satisfy either the NFPA 805 Chapter 3 fundamental fire protection program safety goals or the NFPA 805 Chapter 4 performance based/risk informed safety goals. These "required" Fire Protection Systems and Features are placed into SLCs since they comprise the safety basis of the new fire protection program.

Allowed out of service times and action statements along with some surveillance requirements are consistent with the NFPA 805 licensing basis and safety goals. The documentation of these "required" fire protection systems and features is provided in the SER Attachments A and D.

The equipment contained in this SLC is considered part of the NFPA 805 Power Block. Power Block structures, systems, and components (SSCs) include all safety-related and balance-of-plant systems and components required for operation, including radioactive waste processing and storage, the 230 kV switchyard, and Keowee Dam and associated structures. Power Block SSCs are required for the safe and reliable operation of the plant. Calculation OSC-10650, Oconee NFPA 805 Power Block, defines the Power Block for Oconee. Not all fire detection within the Power Block is required by this SLC. Only the Power Block detection listed in Table 16.9.6-1 herein is within the scope of this SLC.

DPC-1435.00-00-0002, Technical Basis for Roving Continuous Fire Watches, justifies the allowances for continuous and hourly fire watches. This Selected Licensee Commitment is part of the Oconee Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provisions of Oconee Facility Operating License Conditions.

ACTIONS FUNCTIONALITY of the NRC committed Fire Detection Instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires in areas containing safety related and important to safety equipment at Oconee Facilities. Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program. The regulatory requirement is to have NFPA 805 required Fire Detection Instrumentation FUNCTIONAL at all times.

16.9.6-10 Rev. 005 I

Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 A.1 and B.1 In the event that a portion of the Fire Detection Instrumentation is nonfunctional, the establishment of compensatory actions in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the nonfunctional instrumentation is restored to FUNCTIONALITY.

RA B.2 provides an option for times when fire watches may not be the most effective compensatory measure for degraded or inoperable fire protection features. To implement a different compensatory measure or combination of measures, perform a documented evaluation of the impact of the proposed alternate compensatory measure. The evaluation must demonstrate that the alternate compensatory measure would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Additionally, the evaluation of the alternate compensatory measure should incorporate risk insights regarding the location, quantity, and type of combustible material in the fire area; the presence of ignition sources and their likelihood of occurrence; the automatic fire suppression and fire detection capability in the fire area; the manual fire suppression capability in the fire area; and the human error probability where applicable. Retain all such evaluations in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(a). Refer to RIS 2005-07 for additional information.

REFERENCES:

1. Oconee UFSAR, Chapter 9.5-1 and UFSAR, Chapter 18, Table 18-1 (Portions of this SLC are credited in the Fire Protection Program for License Renewal).
2. Oconee License Renewal Commitments, OSS-0274.00-00-0016.
3. Oconee Fire Protection Safety Evaluation dated December 29, 2010.
4. Oconee License Amendment Request dated April 14, 2010.
5. Oconee Fire Protection Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection Program, (currently contained in the Fire Protection DBD), as revised.
6. Oconee Plant Design Basis Specification for Fire Detection, as revised.
7. Drawing Series 0-0310-K, Fire Protection Plans.
8. Drawing Series 0-0310-L, Fire Protection Plans.
9. OSC-10650, Oconee NFPA 805 Power Block.
10. DPC-1435.00-00-0002, Technical Basis for Roving Continuous Fire Watches.
11. 0-0756-J, Location Diagram Fire Detection System (FD) Standby Shutdown Facility Detector Locations.

16.9.6-11 Rev. 005 I

Additional PSW System Commitments 16.9.9 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.9 Additional Protected Service Water (PSW) System Commitments COMMITMENT: a) Trapped Inventory (CCW) shall be FUNCTIONAL.

b) Power for an independent backup source of electrical power to support required SSF System loads shall be available.

c) Channel A of the Manual Keowee Emergency Start Function shall be FUNCTIONAL.

d) Control Battery Room HVAC Power Transfer Switches shall be available.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2 ACTIONS

NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------

The provisions of SLC 16.2.4 are not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Commitment a or c not A.1 Declare PSW inoperable. Immediately met.

AND A.2 Enter applicable TS Immediately condition.

B.. Commitment b or d not B.1 Log unavailability. NA met.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.9.9.1 Perform Manual Keowee Emergency Start 12 months CHANNEL A FUNCTIONAL TEST.

SR 16.9.9.2 Perform functional test of required power 24 months transfer switches used for control battery room HVAC.

16.9.9-1 Rev. 002 I

Additional PSW System Commitments 16.9.9 BASES The PSW system is designed as a standby system for use under emergency conditions. The PSW system provides added "defense-in-depth" protection by serving as a backup to existing safety systems and as such, the system is not required to comply with single failure criteria.

The PSW system is provided as an alternate means to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for one, two, or three units following postulated scenarios that damage essential systems and components normally used for safe shutdown.

The PSW system is designed as an alternate means to mitigate the consequences of a fire, tornado, or a loss of Lake Keowee event by providing emergency cooling water to one or more of the three Oconee Units Steam Generators and High Pressure Injection (HPI) pump motor coolers.

The PSW pumping system utilizes the inventory of lake water contained in the Unit 2 Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) piping. The PSW primary and booster pumps are located in the Auxiliary Building (AB) at elevation 771' and take suction from the Unit 2 CCW piping and discharge into the steam generators of each unit via the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system headers. The raw water is vaporized in the steam generators (SGs), removing residual heat, and is dumped to atmosphere via the Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) or Atmospheric Dump

  • Valves (ADVs). For extended operation, the PSW portable pump with a flow path capable of taking suction from the intake canal and discharging into the Unit 2 CCW piping is designed to provide a backup supply of water to the PSW system in the event of loss of CCW and subsequent loss of CCW siphon flow. The PSW portable pump is stored onsite.

The PSW system is designed to support cool down of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The PSW system is designed to maintain SG water levels to promote natural circulation Decay Heat Removal (DHR) using the SGs for an extended period of time during which time other plant systems required to cool the RCS to MODE 5 conditions will be restored and brought into service. In addition, the PSW system, in combination with the HPI system, provides borated water for Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal cooling, RCS makeup, and reactivity management.

This SLC addresses commitments associated with the PSW System that are not explicitly addressed by Technical Specifications 3. 7.10 or 3. 7 .1 Oa.

COMMITMENT Additional PSW system commitments include the following:

a) Trapped Inventory, which includes the following, shall be FUNCTIONAL:

  • The Unit 2 CCW Inlet pipe is full (not unwatered and not partially unwatered}.
  • CCW Cross-Connect valves shall be FUNCTIONAL to ensure inventory to satisfy the Unit(s) decay heat removal requirements to mitigate a Loss of Lake Keowee event.

b) Power for an independent backup source of electrical power to support required SSF System loads shall be available.

c) Channel A of the Manual Keowee Emergency Start Function shall be FUNCTIONAL.

d) Control Battery Room HVAC Power Transfer Switches shall be available.

16.9.9-2 Rev. 002 I

Additional PSW System Commitments 16.9.9 Trapped Inventory The PSW system is capable of using the water inventory trapped in the CCW piping for decay heat removal. An external source of makeup water is not immediately required due to the large quantities of water stored underground in the intake and discharge CCW piping. The combined stored volume of water in the CCW intake and discharge lines below elevation 791ft would provide sufficient cooling water for all three units for at least 30 days after trip of the three reactors (Ref. 1).

Access to the combined stored volume of water in the CCW Intake and discharge piping rely upon specific combinations of the applicable Units' CCW Intake and Discharge Unwatering and CCW Cross-Connect valves to provide water to the Unit 2 CCW Intake piping which provides suction to the PSW pumps. These valve combinations are defined as follows:

Unit 1 (applicable when Unit 1 is in MODES 1 and 2) 1CCW-30, -31, -32, -40 and 2CCW-41 must be opened to transfer water from the Unit 1 CCW Inlet and Discharge piping to the Unit 2 CCW Inlet pipe.

Unit 2 (applicable when Unit 2 is in MODES 1 and 2)

Normally, 1CCW-30, -40 and 2CCW-31, -32, -41 must be opened to transfer water from the Unit 2 CCW Discharge to the Unit 2 CCW Inlet pipe using the Unit 1 CCW Inlet pipe. When Unit 1 CCW Inlet pipe is unwatered, 2CCW-31, -32, -75, -78, -79, -86, -87 must be opened to transfer water from the Unit 2 CCW Discharge pipe to the Unit 2 CCW Inlet pipe.

Unit 3 (applicable when Unit 3 is in MODES 1 and 2)

There are two pathways available for transferring water from Unit 3 CCW Inlet and Discharge piping to Unit 2 CCW Inlet. Either or both pathways may be used, but only one is required. One pathway relies on opening 3CCW-30, -31, -32, -33 and 2CCW-30. Another pathway relies on opening 3CCW-30, -31, -32, -33, -42, -94 and 2CCW-41.

Provide Power for Independent Backup Source of Electrical Power to Support Required SSF System Loads Provide power from a PSW power supply to support essential SSF system loads (includes CT-7 Transformer, breaker B7T-2 (B7T 4160V Feeder), breaker B7T-4 (SSF Bus Alt Feed), and breaker OTS1-0 (SSF Alternate Power Supply Bkr). No other 4160V loads on B7T switchgear are required. If power path through CT-7 Transformer with breaker B7T-2 (B7T 4160V Feeder) is unavailable then B7T-01 (B6T-B7T Tie) can be racked in and closed to supply both PSW switchgears to meet this commitment. If SLC 16.9.19, "Gravity Induced Reversed Flow to Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) through a Unit 2 Condensate Cooler" is not met, power must be available to PSW switchgears from Fant Black line to meet this commitment.

Channel A of the Manual Keowee Emergency Start Function Channel A is required since its cable is not routed through the Turbine Building (TB) and is not affected by a TB fire (Ref. 3). A surveillance requirement was added to verify the functionality of the manual emergency start capability of the KHUs from the Unit 1&2 and the Unit 3 Main Control Rooms (MCRs). The PSW system requires manual activation. Normal power is provided 16.9.9-3 Rev.002

Additional PSW System Commitments 16.9.9 from the Central Tie Switchyard via a 100 kV transmission line. An alternate power source is provided from the KHUs via a tornado protected underground path. The KHUs can be emergency started either automatically or manually. Capability is provided to manually initiate an emergency start from the Unit 1&2 MCR and the Unit 3 MCR.

Control Battery Room HVAC Power Transfer Switches The PSW system can also provide backup power to the station Control Battery Room HVAC system. When backup power to the Control Battery Room HVAC system is required, manual transfer switches are aligned from the normal power source to the PSW power source.

APPLICABILITY These additional PSW commitments are required to be met in MODES 1 and 2. Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis was performed assuming full power initial conditions as described in the Bases above and in the Oconee Fire Protection Program Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment. The plant configuration examined in the Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis is representative of risk significant operating conditions and provides reasonable assurance that an event mitigated by PSW during these MODES will not prevent the plant from achieving and maintaining the fuel in a safe and stable condition.

ACTIONS The exception for SLC 16.2.4 provided in the NOTE of the Actions, permits entry into MODES 1 or 2 when PSW system commitments are not met. This is acceptable because the PSW system is not required to support normal operation of the station or to mitigate a design basis event.

A.1 and A.2 When COMMITMENT a or c is not met, the PSW System shall be declared inoperable and the applicable TS condition entered immediately.

When COMMITMENT b or dis not met, the respective required action is to log unavailability of the function.

16.9.9-4 Rev. 002 I

Additional PSW System Commitments 16.9.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 16.9.9.1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the required Manual Keowee Emergency Start Channel A switches to ensure that Keowee will manually start from each Control Room to provide power to the PSW System. The Surveillance Frequency of 12 months is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.

SR 16.9.9.2 This SR verifies that Control Battery Room HVAC normal and alternate power transfer switches (shown in table below) are FUNCTIONAL every 24 months for the required equipment.

Component 1EL-SX-TRN001 (U1 Cntrl Batt Rm HVAC Norm/Alt Pwr Xfer Sw) 2EL-SX-TRN001 (U2 Cntrl Batt Rm HVAC Norm/Alt Pwr Xfer Sw) 3EL-SX-TRN001 (U3 Cntrl Batt Rm HVAC Norm/Alt Pwr Xfer Sw)

REFERENCES

1. Calculation OSC-11194, CCW Heatup During PSW and/or SSF-ASW Operation.
2. Amendment 386, 388, and 387, Issuance of Amendments Regarding Implementation of the Protected Service Water System, dated August 13, 2014.
3. AR 01842071, Manual Keowee Emergency Start Function.

16.9.9-5 Rev. 002 I

SLC Change 2016-04 deleted 16.9.9a, PSW Battery Cell Parameters. on August 16, 2017 Remove pages 16.9.9a - 1 through 16.9.9a - 9 from manual

- -~~- ~

[DELETED]

16.9.22 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.22 [DELETED]

16.9.22-1 Rev. 001

AWC and Alternate RBC Systems 16.9.23 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.23 Alternate Chilled Water (AWC) and Alternate Reactor Building Cooling (RBC)

Systems COMMITMENT: The following cooling systems shall be FUNCTIONAL:

  • AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling System or comparable measures may be used to provide AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling.
  • AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling System or comparable measures may be used to provide AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling.
  • Alternate RBC System.

APPLICABILITY: When Protected Service Water (PSW) is required to be OPERABLE ACTIONS

NOTES---------------------------------------------------------

The provisions of SLC 16.2.4 are not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. AWC Supplied Control A.1 Declare PSW inoperable. Immediately Complex Cooling is non-functional. AND A.2 Enter applicable TS Immediately Condition(s).

8. AWC Supplied 8.1 Log unavailability in Immediately Auxiliary Building Operations Log.

Cooling is non-functional. AND 8.2 Initiate actions to restore the NA AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling System to a FUNCTIONAL status.

(continued) 16.9.23-1 Rev. 001 I

AWC and Alternate RBC Systems 16.9.23 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Alternate RBC system C.1 Log unavailability in Immediately is non-functional. Operations Log.

C.2 Initiate actions to restore the NA Alternate RBC system to a FUNCTIONAL status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.9.23.1 Operate each Chiller System. 92 days SR 16.9.23.2 Start each Cable Room AHU (1-52, 1-53, 2-52, 92 days and 2-53).

SR 16.9.23.3 Verify that 4160V Switchgear AWC1, 600V 24 months MCCs AWC2 and AWC3, and 208V MCCs AWC4 and AWC5 can be energized.

16.9.23-2 Rev. 001 I

AWC and Alternate RBC Systems 16.9.23 BASES The AWC System and the Alternate RBC System provide an alternate means to recover from the potential loss of normal ventilation to ensure extended operation of the PSW system. For Auxiliary Building cooling, the AWC System uses portable chillers and permanently installed piping to selected air handling units to provide cooling to the Control Complex, the Penetration Rooms, and other areas of the Auxiliary Building. These areas AHUs are provided with an alternate power source from the PSW electrical distribution system. For Reactor Building Cooling, the Alternate RBC system uses a diesel driven pump to take suction from Lake Keowee and feed lake water through a connection to the Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) supply lines to the 'A' Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU) on each unit. The 'A' RBCU fans are provided with an alternate power source from the PSW electrical distribution system.

There are two separate main chilled water headers - one which feeds Air Handling Units (AHUs) normally supplied by chilled water and one which feeds AHUs normally supplied by LPSW.

The AWC System and the Alternate RBC System equipment is powered by a 4160/600/208V distribution system. Power to the Auxiliary Building and Reactor Building is provided through a new electrical power distribution system referred to as the AWC Electrical Distribution System.

This distribution*system is powered from PSW power through PSW switchgear B6T, breaker 8.

The 4160V Switchgear, AWC1 provides power to the 2 chilled water systems through separate 4160/480V Transformers (AWC6 and AWC7). Transformer AWC6 supplies 480V power to the Chiller 1 System. Transformer AWC7 supplies 480V power to the Chiller 2 System.

The 4160V Switchgear AWC1 also provides power to 2 separate 600V Motor Control Centers (MCCs) (AWC2 and AWC3) through 2 separate 4160/600V Transformers (AWC2 and AWC3).

These 600V MCCs provide power to 2 separate 208V MCCs (AWC4 and AWC5) through 2 separate 600/208V Transformers (AWC4 and AWC5). The 600V and 208V MCCs provide power to selected AH Us, Exhaust Fans (EF), and RBCUs. The 600V MCC (AWC2) and 208V MCC (AWC 4) provides power to the Unit 1 and 2 loads. The 600V MCC (AWC3) and 208V MCC (AWC5) provides power to the Unit 3 loads.

The individual loads to the AHUs are fed from the new distribution system through manual transfer equipment that separates normal plant power from the new distribution system.

COMMITMENT The AWC and Alternate RBC Systems shall be FUNCTIONAL when PSW is required to be OPERABLE as follows:

  • AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling or comparable measures may be used to provide AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling,
  • AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling or comparable measures may be used to provide AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling, and

16.9.23-3 Rev.001 I

AWC and Alternate RBC Systems 16.9.23 AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling and AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling Systems The AWC System supplies chilled water to selected AH Us that supply air to the Control Complex (Control Room, Cable Room, and Equipment Room), the Penetration Rooms, and portions of the Auxiliary Building. These loads are divided into two Chiller systems. Chiller System 1 feeds the Control Complex and Penetration Rooms while Chiller System 2 feeds the remainder of the Auxiliary Building.

Chillers 1 and 2 are considered equivalent systems for heat removal capability and are powered from the same 4160V switchgear (AWC1 ). If Chiller 1 is non-functional, Chiller 2 may be aligned to supply Chiller System 1 loads provided the normal loads on Chiller System 2 are isolated.

Comparable measure(s) to meet the cooling functions may include, but are not limited to the following:

  • Providing a temporary cooler.
  • Engineering analysis to show NFPA 805 requirements can be met without cooling system.

Each Chiller System includes the following:

  • one 500 ton air cooled chiller, piping, valves, pumps, duplex strainer, power and associated skid mounted components, auxiliaries, and make-up system.
  • associated AH Us, boundary valves, supply and return valves, portable hoses (if applicable), power supply, AHU dampers, ventilation boundary dampers, duct work, fans, and power supply transfer switches.

Chiller System 1 Tables 16.9.23-1 and 16.9.23-2 provide the AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling AHUs and Ventilation Boundary Control Dampers that are supplied from Chiller System 1.

TABLE 16.9.23-1 AHU s supp I"1ed f ram Ch"II 1 er S ysem t 1 AHU AHU LOCATION SERVICE AREA AHU 1-11 Unit 1/2, 6th Floor, El. 838+0, Col. 72-Q U-1/2 Control Room AHU 1-22 Unit 1, 3rd Floor, El. 796+6, Col. 71-Qa U-1 Equipment Room AHU 1-52 Unit 1, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 72-S U-1 Cable Room AHU 1-53 Unit 1, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 71-N U-1 Cable Room AHU 2-23 Unit 2, 3rd Floor, El. 796+6, Col. 75-Qa U-2 Equipment Room AHU 2-52 Unit 2, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 74-S U-2 Cable Room AHU 2-53 Unit 2, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 75-N U-2 Cable Room AHU 3-11 Unit 3, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 89-Qa U-3 Cable Room AHU 3-13 Unit 3, 6th Floor, El. 838+0, Col. 88-P U-3 Control Room AHU 3-15 Unit 3, 3rd Floor, El. 796+6, Col. 87-N U-3 Equipment Room 16.9.23-4 Rev. 001 I

AWC and Alternate RBC Systems 16.9.23 Table 16.9.23-2 Con tro ICompex Vt"lt" en I a 10n B oun d arv D ampers 1VS DACD13 Control Dam per 1VS DACD14 Control Dam per 2VS DACD13 Control Dam per 2VS DACD14 Control Damper 1VS DACD02 Control Damper 1VS DACD03 Control Damper 3VS DACD09 Control Damper 3VS DACD12A Control Damper Table 16.9.23-3 is the AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling AHUs supplied from Chiller System 1.

TABLE 16.9.23-3 AHU s supp I"1ed f ram Ch"II 1 er S;ysem t 1 AHU AHU LOCATION SERVICE AREA AHU 1-19 Unit 1, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 71-V U-1 West Pen. Room AHU 1-32* Unit 1, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 65-Q U-1 East Pen. Room AHU 1-33* Unit 1, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 66-Q U-1 East Pen. Room AHU 2-19 Unit 2, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 75-V U-2 West Pen. Room AHU 2-32* Unit 2, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 79-Q U-2 East Pen. Room AHU 2-33* Unit 2, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 80-Q U-2 East Pen. Room AHU 3-32* Unit 3, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 94-Q U-3 East Pen. Room AHU 3-33* Unit 3, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 95-Q U-3 East Pen. Room AHU 3-6 Unit 3, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 90-V U-3 West Pen. Room

  • Either AHU-32 or 33 is required to provide functionality for each Unit.

Chiller System 2 Table 16.9.23-4 is the AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling AHUs supplied from Chiller System 2.

TABLE 16.9.23-4 AHUs supplied from Chiller 2 AHU AHU LOCATION SERVICE AREA AHU 1-10 Unit 1/2, 6th Floor, El. 838+0, Col. 74-P U-1/2 Aux. Bldg. 6th Fir.

AHU 1-15 Unit 1, 5th Floor, El. 822+0, Col. 66-N U-1 A.B. Basement-5th Fir.

AHU 2-16* Unit 2, 5th Floor, El. 822+0, Col. 80-P U-2 A.B. Basement-5th Fir.

AHU 3-7 Unit 3, 5th Floor, El. 822+0, Col. 94-P U-3 A.B. Basement-5th Fir.

AHU 3-8 Unit 3, 5th Floor, El. 822+0, Col. 95-P U-3 A.B. Basement-5th Fir.

AHU 3-9 Unit 3, 6th Floor, El. 838+0, Col. 88-Qa U-3 Aux. Bldg. 6th Fir.

  • System remains functional with AHU removed from service.

16.9.23-5 Rev. 001 I

AWC and Alternate RBC Systems 16.9.23 For AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling, exhaust fans along with associated dampers, nitrogen supplies, and power supplies are also required to support FUNCTIONALITY. Table 16.9.23-5 provides the Exhaust Fans that are required.

TABLE 16.9.23-5 Auxiliary Building Cooling Exhaust Fans EXHAUST FANS EF-15 EF-16 EF-17 EF-18 EF-19 EF-20 EF-21 F3-1*

F3-2*

F3-3*

F3-4**

F3-5**

F3-6**

  • PSW events require all 3 exhaust fans to remain available.
    • System remains functional with 1 of 3 exhaust fans removed from service.

Alternate Reactor Building Cooling System The alternate RBC System consists of one Alternate Reactor Building Cooling Pump (OLPSPU0005 or OLPSPU0006), portable water hose, portable flowmeters, RBCUs 1A, 2A, and 3A (including associated LPSW valves), and the AWC alternate power source. During a PSW event, the associated RBCU runs in low speed.

ACTIONS The exception for SLC 16.2.4 provided in the NOTE of the Actions, permits entry into MODES 1 or 2 with AWC and Alternate RBC systems not FUNCTIONAL. This is acceptable because these cooling systems are not required to support normal operation of the facility or to mitigate a design basis event.

A.1 and A.2 When the AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling System is non-functional, Required Action A.1 specifies the PSW system to be declared inoperable and the applicable TS (Ref. 2) be entered immediately. Actions shall be taken to restore the AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling System to a FUNCTIONAL status.

16.9.23-6 Rev. 001 I

AWC and Alternate RBC Systems 16.9.23 B.1 and B.2 When the AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling System is non-functional, unavailability shall be logged in the Operations log immediately and actions shall be initiated to restore the AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling system to a FUNCTIONAL status.

C.1 and C.2 When the Alternate RBC System is non-functional, unavailability shall be logged in the Operations log immediately and actions shall be initiated to restore the Alternate RBC system to a FUNCTIONAL status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 16.9.23.1 Standby systems shall be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Testing each Chiller's Skid mounted components adequately checks this system. The Chiller Skids shall be operated and tested every 92 days. The 92 day Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.

Note that if the Chiller Skid is placed in continuous operation, those periods can be credited in lieu of testing.

  • SR 16.9.23.2 Standby systems shall be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Starting and running the fans of each Cable Room AHU adequately checks this system. The 92 day Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.

SR 16.9.23.3 Verify that power paths from 4160V Switchgear AWC1 through 4160/600V Transformers AWC2 and AWC3 to MCCs AWC2 and AWC3 are energized, respectively. Verify that power paths from 600V MCCs AWC2 and AWC3 through 600/208V Transformers AWC4 and AWC5 to 208V MCCs AWC4 and AWC5 are energized, respectively. Verification of the energized power paths shall be performed every 24 months. The 24 month Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.

REFERENCES

1. Amendment 386, 388, and 387, Issuance of Amendments Regarding Implementation of the Protected Service Water System, dated August 13, 2014.
2. Technical Specification 3. 7.10, Protected Service Water System.

16.9.23-7 Rev. 001 I

SFP Area Isolation 16.9.25 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.25 Spent Fuel Pool Area Isolation COMMITMENT: Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Area shall be capable of being isolated per the following:

a. Dampers automatically close on SFP environment high temperature of 135°F:
a. 1,3VSDAID05
b. 1,3VSDAID06
b. Roll-up doors R-19 (Unit 1 and 2) and R-22(U3) are capable of being manually opened.
c. Sand bags and tarps are staged locally and capable of providing drain isolation.

APPLICABILITY: When Protected Service Water (PSW) is required to be OPERABLE ACTIONS

NOTES---------------------------------------------------------

The provisions of SLC 16.2.4 are not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Commitment(s) a, b, or A.1 Perform a risk assessment Immediately c not met. using the Electronic Risk Assessment Tool.

A.2 Initiate actions to restore Immediately SFP Area Isolation capability.

16.9.25-1 Rev. 001 I

SFP Area Isolation 16.9.25 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.9.25.1 Inspect roll-up doors R-19 and R-22 to ensure 61 days they are free of obstructions and damage that would prevent them from being accessed and opened manually.

SR 16.9.25.2 Inspect sandbags and tarps to ensure they are 61 days free of damage, degradation and are staged near SFP drains such that they can be deployed in a timely manner.

SR 16.9.25.3 Manually open roll-up doors R-19 and R-22 to 12 months ensure doors are free of obstructions and damage that would prevent them from being accessed and opened.

SR 16.9.25.4 Perform a functional test for dampers 12 months 1,3VSDAID05 and 1,3VSDAID06.

16.9.25-2 Rev.001 I

SFP Area Isolation 16.9.25 BASES The SFP Ventilation System is designed to maintain a suitable environment in the SFP area for the proper operation, maintenance and testing of equipment as well as for personnel access.

The system is designed to maintain the SFP area between 60°F and 113°F. The system has two potential operating modes. In the unfiltered or normal mode of operation, air is exhausted directly to the unit vent. In the filtered mode of operation, exhaust air is directed through the Reactor Building Purge Filter Train before being discharged to the unit vent. In both modes of operation the path of ventilating air in the SFP area is from areas of low activity toward areas of progressively higher activity for discharge to the unit vent. This system is not nuclear safety related. In the event of loss of power, the system is not operational.

The Alternate Chilled Water (AWC) System and the Alternate RBC System (Ref. 1) provide an alternate means to recover from the potential loss of normal ventilation to ensure extended operation of the Protected Service Water (PSW) system. For Auxiliary Building cooling, the AWC System uses portable chillers and permanently installed piping to selected air handling units (AHUs) to provide cooling to the Control Complex, the Penetration Rooms, and other areas of the Auxiliary Building. These areas AH Us are provided with an alternate power source from the PSW electrical distribution system. A select group of Auxiliary Building exhaust fans are also provided with an alternate power source from the PSW electrical distribution system to support cooling of the Auxiliary Building.

During a PSW event, cooling is lost to the SFP; thereby, inducing the SFP inventory to boil. As the SFP boils, a steam layer will form and could enter the Auxiliary Building through the ventilation system ducts and SFP drainage system. When conditions cool and steam condenses, the water can potentially pool and cause an adverse effect by draining to the Control Rooms and LPI pump rooms. In addition, the steam release to the Auxiliary Building can result in elevated temperatures in areas containing the AHUs and exhaust fans utilized by the AWC system. The elevated temperatures can exceed the design limits for the electrical equipment associated with the AWC system.

COMMITMENT SFP Area shall be capable of being isolated per the following:

a. Dampers automatically close on SFP environment high temperature of 135 °F:

1,3VSDAID05 1,3VSDAID06 The SFP Area Isolation circuitry includes the instrument air supply, spring loaded actuator, dampers, and temperature detector. *

b. Roll-up doors R-19 (Unit 1 and 2) and R-22 (U3) are capable of being manually opened.
c. Sand bags and tarps are maintained and staged in SFP area near drains and capable of providing drain isolation.

16.9.25-3 Rev. 001 I

SFP Area Isolation 16.9.25 ACTIONS The exception for SLC 16.2.4 provided in the NOTE of the Actions, permits entry into MODES 1 or 2 with SFP Area not capable of being isolated. This is acceptable because these commitments are not required to support normal operation of the facility or to mitigate a design basis event.

A.1 and A.2 When the SFP Area Isolation commitments a, b, or c is not met, a risk assessment shall be performed immediately by Required Action A.1. Required Action A.1 is required in conjunction with A.2 to initiate actions to restore the SFP area isolation capability immediately.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 16.9.25.1 Standby systems shall be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Inspecting and verifying that roll-up doors R-19 (Unit 1 and 2) and R-22 (U3) are not obstructed, damaged or otherwise prohibited from being manually rolled up adequately checks this commitment. The 61 day Surveillance Frequency is adequate based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.

SR 16.9.25.2 Standby systems shall be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Inspecting and verifying that the sand bags, tarps, and staging area are not degraded, damaged or obstructed to prevent SFP drains from being blocked adequately checks this commitment. The 61 day Surveillance Frequency is adequate based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.

SR 16.9.25.3 Standby systems shall be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Manually opening roll-up doors R-19 and R-22 ensures doors, chain falls, etc. are free of obstructions and damage that would prevent them from being accessed and opened. The 12 month Surveillance Frequency is adequate based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.

Analysis assumes the roll-up doors are at least 75% open after a PSW event and before initiation of SFP boiling. The 12 month Surveillance Frequency is adequate based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.

SR 16.9.25.4 Standby systems shall be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Since the Damper Isolation circuitry pilot temperature detector cannot be tested, a test valve is provided to allow for simulation of opening the pilot temperature detector on a high temperature. The simulation will close the isolation dampers to provide an adequate check of the system. The Damper Isolation circuitry shall be operated and tested every 12 months. The 12 month 16.9.25-4 Rev. 001 I

SFP Area Isolation 16.9.25 Surveillance Frequency is adequate based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.

REFERENCES

1. SLC 16.9.23, AWC and Alternate RBC Systems.

16.9.25-5 Rev. 001 I

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