ML20238E153

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Provides Addl Info Re 870803 Request That Emergency Actions Taken in Response to Steam Generator Tube Rupture Event on 870715 Be Accepted as Annual Emergency Plan Exercise for 1987,per 870827 Telcon.Rept & Supporting Info Encl
ML20238E153
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 09/11/1987
From: Stewart W
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
Shared Package
ML20238E156 List:
References
87-472A, NUDOCS 8709140175
Download: ML20238E153 (37)
v • d • e


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VIHo NIA ELuc rHIC AND POWEH COMPANY )

H 1C11 MOND, Y1 HO INI A 2 0 0 61

w. L. srnwrur wru enn.,'am" September 11, 1987 Na ra.etu ca nn4 Trows U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No. 87-472A ,

Attn: Document Control Desk N0/RMK:vlh Washington, D. C. 20555 Docket Nos. 50-338 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4 NPF-7 i Gentlemen:

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUPPORTING THE REQUEST FOR THE JULY 15, 1987 UNIT 1 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE TO BE ACCEPTED AS SATISFYING THE

_1987 ANNUAL EMERGENCI PLAN EXERCISE REQUIREMENTS Our letter dated August 3, 1987, Serial No.87-472, formally requested that the emergency actions taken by the Company in response to the Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) Event at North Anna Unit 1 on July 15, 1987 be accepted as the annual Emergency Plan exercise for 1987. A conference call between members of our respective staffs was held on August 27, 1987 to discuss the matter, and the following additional information was requested to supplement our August 3, 1987 letter.

a) Description / sequence of events, including specific emergency response classifications and actions.

b) Extent of involvement of offsite (ie, state and local) agencies in responding to the event. Also, indication that the State of Virginia is in agreement with and supports the Company's request that the NRC accept the emergency actions taken during the SGTR event as satisfying the annual exercise requirement for 1987.

c) Provide a discussion of the emergency response critique conducted after the event, including lessons learned and corrective actions.

d) Provide a cross-reference between the emergency plan elements carried out during the SGTR event and the appropriate section(s) of NUREG-0654, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological EmergencyResponsePlansandPreparednessinSup{ortofNuclear Power Plant." '

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Enclosure 1, Virginia Electric and Power Company report entitled, " North Anna Power Station - Report of Emergency Preparedness Events Related to Unit 1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture - July 15, 1987," is provided 'for your use in considering our request.- The specific information described above can be found in the following sections of the report:

Item "a" - Section 2 (additional detail is provided in Sections 3, 4, and 5),

Item "b" - Sections 9 (specifically, the letter from Mr. Urquhart, j Chief Radiological Emergency Response Planning Branch, Commonwealth of Virginia, to Mr. Cox, Virginia Power, dated September 8 1987), 10, and 11, Item "c" - Sections 7 and 13 Item "d" - Sections 6 and 12.

Our letter of August 3, 1987 also identified key elements of the Emergency Plan to be demonstrated during the planned August 4, 1987 annual emergency exercise, which were not conducted during the SGTR event or the pre-exercise drill on July 14, 1987. These elements, specifically the fire, medical, and post-accident sample system drills, have now been successfully completed. An j overview of each drill is provided in Enclosure 2. 1 We will be available to discuss this matter with you at your convenience. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. F. M. Cox at (804)771-4188.

Very truly yours, j .'

s W. L. Stewart Enclosure cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323 Mr. J. L. Caldwell NRC Senior Resident Inspector North Anna Power Station

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ENCLOSURE 2

1. OVERVIEW OF JULY 14, 1987 PRE-DRILL.

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2. OVERVIEW 0F FIRE AND MEDICAL EMERGENCY DRILLS CONDUCTED ON AUGUST 13, 1987. I
3. OVERVIEW 0F POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM DRILL CONDUCTED ON AUGUST 14, 1987.
4.

SUMMARY

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. ATTACHMENT 1 VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION PRE-EMEF.GENCY EXERCISE JUI.Y 14, 1987 NOTE:

1) For the purpose of the 1987 pre-exercise, references to June 18, 1986 shall actually be July 14, 1987.
2) All events prior to 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> shall be simulated.
3) The times listed throughout the package shall be advanced by 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> will be 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> real time).
4) The fire and first aid drills will NOT be conducted during the pre-exercise.

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A. OVERALL STATION OBJECTIVES

1. Demonstrate the emergency organization's ability to make proper decisions related to emergency radiation exposure guidelines, and the capability to implement these decisions.

l 2. Demonstrate at all emergency facilities the ability to establish and maintain emergency management comand and control authority, and maintain continuity of authority throughout the exercise.

3. Demonstrate the ability to formulate and make protective action l recommendations to protect station personnel and the general 1

i public based on plant parameters and/or field monitoring information.

4 Demonstrate the ability to classify actual or potential emergencies in accordance with NAPS Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures with respect to:

a. Notification of Unusual Event q
b. Alert )
c. Site Area Emergency ]
d. General Emergency l S. Demonstrate the ability to develop alternative systems or !

equipment alterations in response .to accident affected plant systems or components and to formulate respective procedures to accompany these required modifications, if necessary.

6. Demonstrate the capability to ascertain and to requisition the necessary parts to perform corrective maintenance on damaged equipment, if necessary.
7. Demonstrate the ability to evacuate non-essential personnel from j the site. I

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GAP /jmj/SP4/122

n A. OVERALL STATION OBJECTIVES (continued)

8. Simulate transition into the recovery mode. Requests fo r simulated technical support will be made, as well as transmitting information to the facilities needed for recovery support.
9. Demonstrate the ability to augment the on-shift emergency organization to support emergency operations in a timely and effective manner.
10. Conduct an effective critique in order to disclose significant exercise findings which require corrective action.

B. OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES

1. Demonstrate the ability of the Operations Staff to recognize operational symptoms indicative of degrading plant conditions.
2. Demonstrate proficiency in evaluating parameters, properly categorizing the situation utilizing the station's emergency action level scheme, an.d making the requisite emergency classification.
3. Demonstrate the ability to properly escalate /de-escalate the emergency classification.
4. Demonstrate efficient and effective notification / alerting procedures and methods.
5. Demonstrate effective communications / informational flow from the control room to supporting locations.

I C. SECURITY OBJECTIVES i i

1. Demonstrate the adequacy of access control and security for emergency response facilities.  ;

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C. SECURITY OBJECTIVES (continued)

2. Demonstrate station employee accountability.
3. Demonstrate the ability to implement site evacuation and access procedures.
4. Demonstrate call-out of off-duty station personnel .
5. Demonstrate Security escort capabilities.

i D. HEALTH PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY OBJECTIVES

1. DELETED
2. Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological monitoring activities. and assessments, and to formulate offsite radiological dose projections.
3. DELETED
4. Demonstrate collection and analysis of water, vegetation, soil, and air samples both on-site and off-site, as appropriate.  !

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5. Demonstrate use of communications by the monitoring teams, to j include sending, receiving, and understanding message content.
6. Demonstrate response to and analysis of simulated elevated  ;

airborne and/or liquid activity levels (as appropriate), and of l

' simulated elevated area radiation levels.

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D. HEALTH PHYSIC.S AND CHEMISTRY OBJECT!VES (continued)

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7. Demonstrate initiation and use of appropriate procedures for the collection, analysis, and documentation of Environmental Monitoring samples, and for Radiological Monitoring evaluation.

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8. Demonstrate the ability to assess data obtained 'as a result of d sampling . activities, and the ability to factor results into ne overall assessment process.

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F. EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY OBJECTIVES 1

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Demonstrate the staffing of the following Emergency Response l Facilities: ,

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Control Room (CR)

Technical Support Center (TSC) j Operational Support Center (OSC)

Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF)

Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)

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F. EMERGENCY RESPONSE FAC!LITY OBJECTIVES (continued) -

2.- Demonstrate the communications capabilities of the Control Room, TSC, OSC, LEOF, and CERC, and the ability to maintain these communications with Federal, State, and local governments. This shall include sending, receiving, and understanding the content of messages involved.

3. Demonstrate the proper utilization of the Emergency Response Facilities and that adequate emergency response equipment exists.

G. CORPORATE OBJECTIVES

1. Demonstrate that the LEOF can be adequately staffed and communications properly established.
2. Demonstrate that the CERC can be adequately staffed and made .

functional (e.g., maintain communications , interface with the State Emergency Operations personnel at the CERC, provide engineering assistance, providP logistic support, and establish a Rumor Control group).

3. Demonstrate the activation of the Local Media Center. 1 4 Demonstrate the timely release and distribution of news announcements.
5. Demonstrate coordination of news announcements with off-site emergency response agencies.

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6. Demonstrate the ability to conduct timely and informative media d briefings.
7. Demonstrate the ability to respond to outside news inquiries, if ,

received.

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GAP /jmj/SP4/122 i

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VIRGINIA PCWER NORTH A.VNA POWER STATION j I

l l EMERCENCY EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE JULY 14, 1987 High unidentified leakage of Reactor Coolant (> 1 gpm) eventually requires a plant shutdewn to comply with Tech. Specs.

The shutdown rate is accelerated when RCS unidentified leakage exceeds 50 gpm. The unit is taken of f-line and the reactor is )

shutdown IAW no rmal shutdown procedure. RCS samples are requested requiring use of the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) due to inoperability of the no rmal sample system.

Operations personnel initiate normal plant cooldown and de-pressurization. During this time frame RCS leakage increases requiring start of a second Charging /SI pump to maintain pressurizer level. Pressurizer level is restored and cooldown and de-pressurization continue until RCS leakage increases to the point of manual initiation of SI. EP-0 (Reactor Trip S.I.) is l 1mplemented and event diagnosis leads into EP-1 (LOCA). Initial system response is verified adequate until 1 of 2 available and running Charging /SI pumps fails catastrophically, requiring efforts to be initiated to restore a 3rd Charging /SI pump that was removed for maintenance. RCS leakage now exceeds make up i capacity, resulting in partial core uncovery. Thermocouple (T/c) I temperatures increase rapidly indicating superheated conditions, resulting in fission produce gas release to the Reactor Coolant and subsequently into the Containment atmosphere via the break.

Efforts to restore the 2nd Charging /SI pump are completed and the pump is returned to se rvice. At this time, however, containment pressure is slightly above atmospheric with H, gas ~

present.

NOTE: Control Room personnel are aware that the personnel j i

hatch inner door is not sealed. However, they are not aware that a member of the entry team partially undogged the outer hatch locking ring, but failed to inform the control room.

AH burn occurs in containment, forcing the outer hatch 7

(personnti) door open and allowing a release path to the Auxiliary Building. Auxilia ry Building ventilation systems ,

transport the release to the environment via the 'A' Vent stack. ]

Indications of a major release are the following:

1) Vent Stack Ei Range R/M ,

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2) Containment Pressure Strip chart (spike due to H 2 burn).

Operations personnel attempt to lower containment pressure by starting the only available Quench Spray pump. However, the pump fails to start and Damage Control personnel are instructed to trouble-shoot and repair. (Efforts to start R.S pumps will be acknowledged but blocked by controller).

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Following repair of the Quench Spray pump breaker, the pump is started and containment pressure is brought sub-atmospheric approximately 30 minutes following the pressure spike and release  !

initiation.

l The release is terminated at this point.

The Control Room is notified that the outside door of the personnel hatch was operated and may not be fully locked. Damage Control personnel are j sent to the personnel hatch to close and lock the outside hatch. j NOTE: HP personnel should work closely with these personnel due to high activity in the area. E=ergency Dose limits may be required.

The hatch is then closed and secured. {

Plant cooldown and de-pressurization continue along with maintaining containment sub-atmospheric. The SI is evectually terminated and normal charging established. RER is placed in service IAW procedures. ,

I' Offsite monitoring teams and State agencies continue to track the plume and the Station Emergency Manager will make recommendations for i sheltering and/or evacuation for affected zones and sectors IAW l appropriate Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

RECOVERY  ;

i Eventually, recovery from the incident will be initiated and a l de-escalation of the emergency will follow. The exercise will be terminated af ter recovery actions are complete. A critique of the i exercise will be conducted in the North Anna Training facility following termination of the exercise.

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I VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION JULY 14, 1987 NOTE: TIMES ARE APPROXD'. ATE TIME EVEYr l

l 0300 - Controller-Player briefing conducted AND initial conditions provided.

0330 - Controller positioned for exercise initiation.

0340 - Fire is reported at H Transport Trailer, j 2

0350 - " Notification of Unusual Event", EPIP-1.01 (Tab I) -

DECLARED 0400 -

Reactor Coolant System leak rate PT indicates

, Unidentified leak of : 1.2 gpm. Enter 1-AP-16 (Containment entry is required. Entry team makes preparation to enter Containment).

0430 -

Containment entry team requests permission to enter l Containment.

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Fire is reported OUT.  !

0515 -

Containment entry team exits Containment (only a portion of the containment was searched).

0530 -

Containment entry team re-enters Containment.

iniate maintenance evolution on protection channel instrument failure. Operator takes action to place channel in trip as per 1-AP-3.

0615 -

Containment entry ream exits Containment. A steam leak is reported in the vicinity of C Loop behind the Reactor Coolant Pump.

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Computer leak-rate - Unidentified leak rate still at

1.2 gpm.

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TIVE EVENT 0645 - Another containment entry team enters Containment.

0715 - Containment entry team exits Containment and identifies leak to be between the Tc stop valve and the Reactor.

They are not able to quatify the leak.

0730 - Containment entry team enters Containment

- Leak Rate (Computer unidentified) increases to 1.6 gpm.

0759 - Computer unidentified leakrate increases to 2 gpm.

0800 - Time expires on Action Statement. Therefore, the unit must be shutdown. " Notification of Unusual Event" is declared as per Tab. B. #4, RCS event. or Tab A. #2, system shutdown or assessment system event. Commence unit shutdown at 150 MWE/ hour as per 1-0P-2.2.

0815 -

DELETED 0820 - Efforts to exit Containment via personnel hatch are abandoned and team reports to Control Room that they will exit via the equipment hatch escape lock.

0830 - Containment entry team exits via equipment hatch-1 0905 - RCS leakage is up to 50 spa (by charging / letdown

{ indication). unit shutdown rate is increased to 5% per min.

0910 -

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TIME EVENT 0918 - Main Generator removed from service.

0919 - Reactor shutdown commenced by driving control rods in l manually.

0920 - Commence emergency boration to achieve cold shutdown boron concentration. Efforts are being made to commence RCS cooldown and depressurization as per 1-OP-3.

0930 - Pressurizer level cannot be maintained at >20% level because of increasing RCS leak. Charging line flow indication increases off scale (>150 gpm) and the second charging pump must be started.

- An " ALERT" is declared as per TAB B, #5, RCS Event.

- Pressurizer level (20% and RCS. leak rate >50 gpm.

- After the second pump has been started, pressurizer level drop stops and gradually starts increasing.

0945 - RCS cooldown and depressurization continuss and a heactor Coolant Pump is stopped per cooldown procedure.

1030 - Pressurizer level decreases to <20%. Charging flow increasing rapidly.

1035 - Manual Safety Injection. A " Site Area Emergency" is declared:

Tab B, #6. Loss of Reactor Coolant EP-1, initiated.

Inability to maintain pressurizer level with two Charging /SI pumps operating.

1051 - One of two operational Charging /SI pumps fail (B charging pump).

It will be determined by observation that this pump cannot be i

restarted. Efforts must be initiated to return 'A' charging pump

! to operable status.

- Pressurizer level starts dropping, leakage exceeds makeup.

- Reactor Vessel level begins to decrease.

- Superheated conditions occur as shown by Excore Thermocouple readings. Temperatures ultimately reach 2300 F, clad damage occurs, and fission product gases are released from the fuel to the RCS and ultimately to the Containment.

- It is expected that the Station Emergency Manager may declare a " General Emergency" due to Tab B, #11, Thermocouple

> 1200 , ET-1 in progress, and a potential that containment integrity may be lost (of one of two doors on the personnel hatch is failed).

TIME EVENT 1150 - If not previously performed, the Station Emergency Manager should declare a " General Emergency" Tab B. -#11 EP-1 and. Containment Hi Range Rad Monitor > 10R/hr. In order for the drill to progress, all attempts made by Operations. to depressurize the Containment will be acknowledged by controllers and respectfully blocked.

This will allow for a release of fission gas from the Containment to the environment.

1152 - The Damage Control Team will be notified by the TSC to restore operability of 1-QS-P-1A.

- At approximately this time, high dose. rates are expected to ' cause evacuation of the Operations Support Center and/or Security. For the purpose of this exercise.

Security will undergo a." simulated" evacuation.

1223 - The Damage Control Team has repaired'the breaker for 1-QS-P-1A and the Control Room starts the pump.

1225 - The Containment is returned to subatmospheric and the release is terminated. Ultimate termination of the release is when the outer personnel hatch is _ closed and locked.

1230 - The TSC is given information by the containment entry team operator that, in his haste to exit the containment he left the outer personnel hatch unlocked. Damage Control Team members make preparations to enter the Auxiliary Building to-close the Personnel Hatch.

1310 - Efforts are successful in closing and sealing the outer personnel hatch. For the remainder of the exercise, operations will continue to cooldown and depressurize the plant, ultimately placing the Residual Heat Removal System in service per the POST-LOCA cooldown procedure.

1330 - Exercise Terminated. Recovery, followed by critiques, initiated.

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AT.T A C191 E NT 2 1

1 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION FIRE / MEDICAL DRILL AUGUST 13, 1987 OBJECTIVES The objectives of this drill are to. demonstrate the emergency response capability of North Anna Power Station as detailed below. At no time will the drill events be permitted to interfere with the routine safe operation of the.

' plant. The station management may at its discretion suspend the drill to ensure this goal.

The following list represents the objectives of this drill:

1. Conduct a fire drill in accordance with the requirements of the NAPS Fire Protection Program.
2. Demonstrate response to a simulated contaminated, injured individual.
3. Tracsport a simulated contaminated, injured individual to an offsite medical facility.
4. Involve participation of a local tescue squad.
5. Involve participation by an offsite medical facility.

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VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION ,

FIRE DRILL SCENARIO AUGUST 13, 1987 1800 - Ultrasonic sink control panel 1-EL-CP-172C experiences a phase to ground short. The associate circutt breaker (#5) in protection panel 1-EP-CB-107 fails to open, passing protection function to BUS Supply Breaker MCC-1B1-1B-B3R. The resulting are is sufficient to blow open a door on 1-EL-CP-172C and ignite a two-gallon flammable storage can. The can is filled with alcohol and is positioned directly in front of'the control panel.

The fire immediately spreads to adjacent trash as well as other flammable liquid containers, blocking direct access to the primary exit.

In his haste to evacuate the area, the Decon Technician transferring RCP oil knocks over the green drum. Approximately 15 gallons of oil spills directly into the rapidly developing fire. Oil being pumped from the yellow drum is now flowing to the floor of the Decon Bay area.

1801 - In an unsuccessful attempt to reach the only portable fire extinguisher in the area, the Virginia Power H.P. Technician falls over material stored on the floor and sustains the following injuries:

1. A compound fracture of the right lower leg.
2. A deep laceration on the left-hand (palm).

- One of the contract technicians attempts to open the roll-up door, but abandons the effort when the door jams within the first two inches of travel. He then begins to clear a path of the normally unused (and blocked) walk-out door.

1801 (con't) The other contract technician assists the injured Virginia Power technician by dragging him out of the .immediate area of the growing fire and extinguishing (with his gloved hands) flames on the left leg of the victim.

1802 - The fire grows in intensity and the area fills with smoke. The two uninjured individuals exit the area via the walk-out door, carrying the injured technician with them. All suffer from smoke inhalation.

- Exhausted, they seek shelter around the southeast corner of the building.

Having smelled smoke, the fire is discovered and reported via.

Cai-Tronics by the HP Technician in the local HP office. He fails to mention that three personnel were working in the engaged area.

1803 - Efforts to control the fire with a portable extinguisher f ail.

The HP technician closes the previously blocked open door between the Decon Bay and urea formaldehyde tank room. The fire grows in size and intensity as bagged trash and waste in the immediate vicinity ignite. Fumes venting from other flammable liquid cans feed the fire. Oil from the green drum begins to ignite.

1803 - Fire continues to grow in size and intensity. Spilled to 1807 oil becomes fully engaged. Bagged trash and material near the ]

roll-up door ignite.

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4 1807 - First responding person (s) arriving on scene notices to 1810 Decon Techs in PC's. This person responds to the first aid situation, reporting same, and rendering aid commensurate with knowledge and skills. Contaminated injury portion of drill begins at this point. Offsite assistance (fire and medical) is requested.

i 1815 - Efforts to suppress the fire are unsuccessful. The fire grows in l

l heat and intensity. Oil pumping to the floor of the inner bay area ignites. (NOTE: 011 will continue to siphon to the floor even after failure or isolation of electrical power to the pump).

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Visibility in the Decon Bay area is near zero. The roll-up door buckles from the heat.

1820 - Trash and LSA material against mid-wall ignite. The large pile l of LSA waste and trash near the back of the inner bay begins to l

burn. Oil on the floor of the inner bay becomes fully engaged.

Efforts to employ foam suppression are unsuccessful due to equipment problems.

- Fumes venting from flammable liquid cans and drums fuel the fire.

Intense heat prevents effective attack from the urea formaldehyde tank room.

1825 - Fire grows with intense heat and smoke. The large pile of LSA waste near the back of the inner bay, and the large pool of oil on the floor are fully engaged.

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1830 -

Offsite assistance arrives. Fire in the inner bay area is ;

intense. Efforts to use Virginia Power foam applicator are sti?1 blocked. Fire in the outer bay area begins to die down due to hose streams and lack of fuel.

1835 -

Additional manpower and equipment functional at the fire scene.

Effective hose streams are reaching the inner bay area.

1835 -

Fire is brought under control.

to 1845 1845 -

Main fire.is knocked down. Several hot spots remain in the back of the. inner bay area.

1850 -

(Fireisextinguished. Clean-up and HP contamination control I. ,

operations begin,s t

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1910 m ' HP contamination coarvol operations continue until all personnel

,,, are released.

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YIRGINIA POWER ,

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION. )

1 MEDICAL EMERGENCY DRILL' SCENARIO AUGUST 13, 1987 .

l NOTE: The Medical Emergency Drill will be conducted in conjunction with the' Fire Drill.

i Approximate Time: 1802 l EVENT: "As Decon technicians were conducting work in the Decon Bay, a fire erupted at the control panel for the ultrasonic sink.

Waste and combustibles in the vicinity ignited.

'The three Decon technicians immediately attempted to exit the area; however, the primary exit through the Decon' office area was blocked by flames. One of the individuals, in a panic to escape, fell over materials storea in the building.

He suffered the following injuries:

1) A compound fracture of the left tibia / fibula.
2) An open wound to the left palm.
3) Burns to the right leg.

'The other technicians remove him from the building through the west door (beside the roll-up door) and up the ramp to the trailer parked beside the building.

  • All three technicians suffer from smoke inhalation.

"No report of their injuries has been made to the Control Room.

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Approximate Time: 1802 - 1810

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EVENT: ' A fire brigade member responding to the fire arrives on l

scene.

'Three technicians are found beside the trailer positioned l catside the Decon Bay area. All three are in full PC's.

' Conditions of the injured persennel are as follows:

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1) Tech #1 RESP: Labored / shallow, @ 24 PULSE: 120, rapid and thready 1 BP: Unable to determine

'STIN: Pale, shocky PUPILS: Dilated CONTIEINATION LEVELS: Unable to determine )

PHYSICAL INJURIES: Compound fracture of the left i Tibia / Fibula, open wound to the left palm, and several burns on the right leg. Victim is semi-conscious and has sustained smoke inhalation, j J

2) Tech #2 and #3 RESP: Depressed, @ 20; coughing PULSE: 100 BP: Unable to determine SNN: Pale, sweating PUPILS: Equal / reactive CONTAMINATION LEVELS: Unable to determine PHYSICAL INJURIES: Smoke inhalation EXPECTED RESPONSE: Notify Control Room after rendering initial first ,

(depending on skills of the first responder). I aid.

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-Approximate Time: 1810 - 1815

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EVENT: 'Upon arrival of the First Aid Team, it is' determined that the injured technician (#1) will receive 'first priority.

' Tech #1 is unconscious. It is evident that he has lost a larfe- quantity of blood. His PC's are burned along the right leg - he is having difficulty breathing.. Body temperature is @ 100*

RESP _: Labored / shallow, @ 24 j P11LSE: 120, rapid and thready .

l BP: Palpitated, 80 SKIN: Pale,'shocky PUPILS: Dilated C0NTAMINATION 0 LEVELS: See Attached Survey

  • The other tur technicians suffer from mild smoke inhalation.

Vital signs are normal for both., see attached survey 'l for contamination levels prior to and following deconning.

REEPONSE ACTION _S_: The first aid team should notify the Centrol Room of the individuals condition 'and that offsite assistance, is necessary. The team should check all vital signs and oxygen should be administered as soon as possible. The individual should be treated for shock and an airway maintained. Due to the r.ature of the injuries. and -the body temperature,. the PC's. should be removed. It is ,

likely that little decon work will be accomplished  !

on the victim. Burne should be cooled and treated, and attempts should be made to control the bleeding.

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i Approximate Time: 1815 - 1820 l i

1 EVENT: 'The left foot of the injured technician is cyanotic with no  ;

distal movement or pulse. Body temperature is 100* and he  !

is unconscious. The victim has gone into shock. j

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RESP: Depressed, 12 i PULSE: 120, rapid and thready I BP: 90/50 i SKIr.: Pale PUP 5LS: Dilated, slight response f CONTAMINATION READINGS: See Attached Survey i

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i RESPONSE ACTIONS: Straighten and splint leg to improve circulation. j Dress wounds, check for distal pulse. Maintain {

oxygen and monitoring body temperature. Elevate feet and treat burns with sterile (dry) dressings and cool. j 1

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Approximate Time: Arrival of Ambulance

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EVENT: " Arrival of ambulance onsite (escorted by Security).

' Ambulance EMT's are provided information on the victim's condition (repeat previous message).  ;

RESPONSE ACTIONS: Ambulance staff checks vital signs, initiates treatment, and prepares to transport victim.

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Approximate Time: During Transport EVENT:

  • Transport to Medical College of Virginia.

' Individual is unconscious, injured leg is cyanotic. Body temperature is 99.8* and slowly falling. Bleeding has been stopped.

RESP: Depressed, 8 PULSE: 88, weak BP: 108/68 SKIN: Mottled, splotchy PUFILS: Equal, responsive CONTAMINATION LEVELS: See Attached Survey RESPONSE ACTIONS: Continue treatment for shock. Assist ventilation mechanically. Continue to monitor vital signs.

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Approximate Tima: Arrival at MCV .l ;

EVENT: '/unbulance ' arrives a't MCV. . The victim is taken to the designated treatment area.. Vital signs are relayed by.the f attending EMT's to the waiting hospital staff. j

'The hospital. staff examines the. victim and finds compound i fracture of the left' tibia / fibula an open wound.to the left palm, and several small 3rd degree b' urns on the right leg, -1 j

Body temperature is 99.6*.

RESP: 12 3 PULSE: 88, weak { '

BP: 110/80 WIN: Mottled PUPILS: Equal, responsive CONTAMINATION' LEVELS: See Attached Survey RESPONSE ACTIONS: Attending EMT's should relay vital signs to the hospital staff and assist as necessary, i

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1 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION FIRE / MEDICAL DRILL CHRONOLOGY ADGUST 13, 1987  ;

TIME EVENT 1801 Fire reported in Decon Bay area; station alarm sounded.

Entered AP-50.

1803 Scene Leader arrives.

Emergency do.simetry requested at scene.

1805 Injury reported; station alarm sounded.

1807 First Aid Team on scene.

Shif t Supervisor (operator-in-charge) briefs Control Room. I HP on scene.

1810 Offsite rescue squad assistance requested.

Station ambulance requested.

CR requests HP to initiate EPIPs 4.01 and 4.20. <

l 1814 Mineral rescue squad in transit; station ambulance on scene.

CR Shif t Supervisor conducts briefing with HP Shift Supervisor on severity / type of event. j I

1815 Simulated placing Decon Building exhaust through charcoal )

filters.

"NOUE" initiated.

1818 Offsite fire department assistance requested. l 1822 Miceral Fire Department in transit. )

1825 Entry for primary search initiated.

Accountability initiated by Control Room. Blocked by drill controller.

1828 Priority / evacuation (Pegasus) requested. Blocked by drill controller.

1831 Mineral Fire Department arrives.

Control Room initiates escalation to " alert" based on SEH judgement / worsening conditions. Blocked by drill controller.

1835 Victim being transported offsite is transferred from Mineral unit to Station ambulance in order to release Mineral unit from drill.

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4 TIME EVENT

'1841 Ambulance departs site; is en route to MCV.

1850 Fire extinguished.

Control Room contacts MCV.

1851 Search of fire area is conducted.

1904 Secured'from Fire / Medical Drill.

.004 Ambulance arrives at MCV.

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NORTH ANNA POWER STATION FIRE / MEDICAL DRILL AUGUST 13, 1987 LIST / LOCATION OF CONTROLLERS AND OBSERVERS j Controllers Location S. Harrison Control Room ,

l L. S11 man Fire Scene R. Fleshman First aid Scene

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Observers _

E. Cheely First Aid Scene, MCV H. Hay HP R. Hutsell Fire Scene G. Mocarski Fire /First Aid Scene H. Ostergren MCV List of Players B. Morrison K. Tucker M. Robertson J. Lencalis Jeff Johnson G. Henie T. Crawford D. Gill L. Bogess M. Cox C. Dix T. Snoddy B. Spencer D. Bostain W. Towsey (Mineral Fire)

S. Lynch C. Verling K. Walton (Mineral Fire)

R. Chitwood T. Park H. Wilson (Mineral Fire)

T. Perrin B. Beverage T. West (Mineral Fire)

J. Caldwell (NRC) J. Garland D. Anderson (Mineral Rescue)

B. Thompson L. Wilson T. Baker (Mineral Rescue)

T. Shashaty N. O' Shields L. Wash (Mineral Rescue)

J. Englehart E. Reynolds (Mineral Rescue)

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i T j NORTH ANNA POWER STATION. 1 CRITIQUE ROSTER FIRE / MEDICAL DRILL AUGUST 13, 1987 I S. Harrison J' T. Perrin W. Willaford J. Lencalis T. Snoddy 3 R. Hutsell L. Silman .

K. Tucker l G. Mocarski I

T. Park J J. Garland C. Verling q G. Henie L. Bogess M. 'Robertson )

D. Bostain l E. Cheely i H. Ostergren - 1 f

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ATTACHMENT 3 BORTH AIGEA POWER STATION ]

l PASS DRILL j AUGUST 14, 1987 ' a OBJECTIVES I

i The objectives of this drill are to demonstrate the emergency response '

capability of North Anna Power Station as detailed below. At no time will the drill events be permitted to interfere with the routine safe operation of the '

plant. The station management may at its discretion suspend the drill to ensure this goal. -

1 The following list represents the objectives of this drill:

1. Demonstrate the capability of Chemistry personnel in taking liquid samples with actual elevated radioactive levels using the-post-accident sampling system. j
2. Demonstrate the ability to analyze samples taken- from the l post-accident sampling system.

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3. Demonstrate the use of appropriate procedures for collecting and analyzing the sample and for recording results.
4. Demonstrate the capability of emergency response personnel to use emergency communications systems within the station.

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s NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

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' j PASS DRILL AUGUST 14, 1987 SCENARIO NARRATIVE k

The Post-Accident Sampling System Drill will require taking an actual sample from the HRSS sampling system in order to demonstrate the capability of emergency response personnel to gather and analyze liquid samples without access to the Primary Sampling System.

Simulations of some events by personnel will occur where it is considered )

impractical or it is unnecessary to perform actions carefully documented by 1 periodic testing. At no time will the drill be allowed.to interfere with the usual, safe operation of the plant.

The plant is experiencing a simulated failed-fuel event that has led to a classification of a " Site Area Emergency". geHighRangeLetdownRadiation Monitor has recorded readings higher than 1 x 10 cpm and the core differential l temperature reading is rapidly diverging. f A simulated conference of the Station Emergency Manager (SEM) with the Emergency Directors has resulted in the Emergency Technical Director (ETD) i requesting an isotopic analysis of core radioactivity. This request is I directed to the Supervisor Chemistry who selects a team to take a Primary I Sample.

The Chemistry Team returns to the Chemistry Lab with the simulated information that the Primary Sampling System is not usable because of elevated readings at ,

the sampling point (s). They request Health Physics (HP) support and assemble the necessary equipment and procedures to access the HRSS post-accident sampling system.

The sample will then be taken and later returned to the HP Count Room for analysis.

Finally, a simulated reply will be made to the EMT's request for isotopic analysis of core radioactivity and the exercise will be terminated.

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N0ltTH ANNA POWER STATION PASS Derti AUGUST 14, 1987 CHRONOLOGY Initial Time: 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> T=0 Inform Management of drill events.

T+90 min Request for isotopic analysis.

T+95 min Chemistry Team dispatched for Primary Sample.

T+105 min Chemistry Team returns to Hot Lab for equipment and prscedures necessary for PASS sampling.

T+135 min Chemistry Team takes HRSS sample.

T+165 min Sample taken for analysis to HP Count Room.

T+210 min Analysis complete. SEM informed of isotopic analysis.

Exercise Terminated.

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- - - - - - - - . - - _ - - _ _ _ - - . - - - - - _ - _ _ ---_________a_-____ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , , _ _ _ _

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NORTH ANNA POWER STATION PASS DRILL AUGUST 14, 1987 Controllers S. Harrison L. Storms l

Observers

. R. Sharp List of Players J. Reynolds M. Thompson R. Robinson L. Lee D. Piemen.

B. Land ,

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l Critique Attendees l l

L. Lee S. Harrison L. Storms R.' Sharp L. Miller B. Land J. Reynolds i

t AT_TACHMENT 4

SUMMARY

Critiques were conducted immediately following termination of the drills referenced in this enclosure. Controllers, obse rvers , and key players assembled to discuss effectiveness of the response to these drills, and to identify weaknesses which were observed. In addition, these individuals were encouraged to recommend enhancements which would ultimately strengthen North Anna's emergency response capability.

Thrcugh the critique process, objectives of these drills were determined to have been satisfactorily achieved. Identified improvement items have been developed into an action plan and placed on the Commitment Tracking System for resolution. Appropriate corrective actions will be taken, as necessary, to address and resolve concerns identified as a result of the outcome of these  !

drills.

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ENCLOSURE 2 ,

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1. OVERVIEW OF JULY 14, 1987 PRE-DRILL.
2. OVERVIEW 0F FIRE AND MEDICAL EMERGENCY DRILLS CONDUCTED ON AUGUST 13, 1987.
3. OVERVIEW OF POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM DRILL CONDUCTED ON AUGUST 14, .

1987.

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4.

SUMMARY

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_ ATTACHMENT 1 l

l VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION PRE-EMERGENCY EXERCISE JULY 14, 1987 I

i NOTE:

1) For the purpose of the 1987 pre-exercise, references to June 18, 1986 shall actually be July 14, 1987. j i

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2) All events prior to 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> shall be similated.
3) The times listed throughout the package shall be advanced by 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> will be 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> real time).
4) The fire and first aid drills will NOT be conducted during the pre-exercise.

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A. OVEP.ALL STATION'0BJECTIVES l

1. Demonstrate the emergency organization's ability to make proper decisions related to emergency radiation exposure guidelines, and the capability to implement these decisions.

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2. Demonstrate at all emergency facilities the ability to establish and maintain emergency management comand and control authority.

and maintain continuity of authority throughout the exercise.

3. Demonstrate the ability to fomulate and make protective action recommendations to protect station personnel and the general l public based on plant partmeters and/or field monitoring  !

information. )

4 Demonstrate the abili ty to classify actual or potential j emergencies in accordance with NAPS Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures with respect to:

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a. Notification of Unusual Event j
b. Alert l
c. Site Area Emergency

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d. General Emergency ]
5. Demonstrate the ability to develop alternative systems or equipment alterations in response to accident affected plant systems or components and to fomulate respective procedures to accompany these required modifications, if necessary.
6. Demonstrate the capability to ascertain and to requisition the necessary parts to perform corrective maintenance on damaged  ;

equipment, if necessary.

7. Demonstrate the ability to evacuate non-essential personnel from the site.

GAP /jmj/SP4/122

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A. OVERALL STATION OBJECTIVES (continued)

8. Simulate transition into the recovery mode. Requests for simulated technical support will be made, as well as. transmitting information to the facilities needed for recovery support.
9. Demonstrate the ability to augment the on-shift emergency organization to support emergency operations in a timely and effective manner, 1

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10. Conduct an effective critique in order to disclose significant exercise findings which require corrective action.

B. OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES

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1. Demonstrate the ability of the Operations Staff to recognize operational symptoms indicative of degrading plant conditions.
2. Demonstrate proficiency in evaluating parameters, properly, categorizing the situation utili:ing the station's emergency action level scheme, and making the requisite emergency classification.
3. Demonstrate the ability to properly escalate /de-escalate the emergency classification. l i
4. Demonstrate efficient and effective notification / alerting l procedures and methods.

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5. Demonstrate effective communications / informational flow from the i control room to supporting locations.

C. SECURITY OBJECTIVES  !

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1. Demonstrate the adequacy of access control and security for emergency response facilities.

i GAP /jmj/SP4/122 I l

r C. SECURITY OBJECTIVES (continued)

2. Demonstrate station employee accountability.
3. Demonstrate the ability to implement site evacuation and access procedures.
4. Demonstrate call-out of off-duty station personnel.

i S. Demonstrate Security escort capabilities.

D. HEALTH PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY OBJECTIVES

1. DELETED
2. Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological monitoring activities and assessments, and to formulate offsite radiological' I dose projections.

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4. Demonstrate collection and analysis .of water, vegetation, soil, and air samples both on-site and off-site, as appropriate.

i i 5. Demonstrate use of communications by the monitoring teams, to include sending, receiving, and understanding message content. l

6. Demonstrate response to and analysis of simulated elevated airborne and/or liquid activity levels (as appropriate), and of

' simulated elevated area radiation levels.

GAP /jmj/SP4/122 1

d D. HEALTH PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY OBJECT!VES (continued)

7. Demonstrate initiation and use of appropriate procedures for the collection, analysis, and documentation- of Environmental Monitoring samples, and for Radiological Monitoring evaluation.
8. Demonstrate the ability to assess data obtained as a result of sampling . activities, and the ability to factor results .into tne overall assessment process.

E. DELETED F. EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY OBJECTIVES 1.

Demonstrate the staffing of the following Emergency Response Facilities: l j

Control Room (CR)

Technical' Support Center (TSC)

Operational Support Center (OSC)

Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF)

Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)

GAP /jmj/SP4/122 7

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i F. EMERGENCY RESPONSE FAC!LITY OBJECTIVES (continued) -

2. Demonstrate the communications capabilities of the Control Room, l TSC, OSC, LEOF, and CERC, and the ability to maintain these  !

communications with Federal, State, and local governtrents. This j shall include sending, receiving, and understanding the content of I messages involved.

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3. Demonstrate. the proper utilization of the Emergency Response l

Facilities and that adequate emergency response equipment exists. .

1 G. CORPORATE OBJECTIVES _

1. Demonstrate that the LEOF can be- adequately staffed and communications properly establ.ished.
2. Demonstrate that the CERC can be adequately staffed and made functional (e.g., maintain communications , interface with the State Emergency Operations personnel at the CERC, provide l engineering assistance, provide logistic support, and establish a Rumor Control group).

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3. Demonstrate the activation of the Local Media Center.

4 Demonstrate the timely release and distribution of news announcements.

5. Demonstrate coordination of news announcements with off-site )

emergency response agencies.  !

6. Demonstrate the abi'.ity to conduct timely and informative media l briefings.
7. Demonstrate the ability to respond to cutside news inquiries, if received.

GAP /jmj/SP4/122 l

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1 URRGINTA POUER

  • NORTH ANNA POWER STATION ]

EMERGENCY EXIRCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE JULY 14, 1987 l High unidentified leakage of Reactor Coolant (> 1 gpm) ,

eventually requires a plant shutdown to comply with Tech. Specs.

The shutdevn rate is accelerated when RCS unidentified leakage j exceeds 50 gpm. The unit is taken of f-line and the reactor is shutdown IAW normal shutdown procedure. RCS samples are requested requiring use of the Post Accident Sampling System I (PASS) due to inoperability of the normal sample system.  !

Operations personnel initiate normal plant cooldown and de-pressurization. During this time frame RCS leakage increases requiring start of a second Charging /SI pump to maintain pressurizer level. Pressurizer level is restored and cooldown l and de-pressurization continue until RCS leakage increases to the l l point of manual initiation of SI. EP-0 (Reactor Trip S.I.) is i l implemented and event diagnosis leads into EP-1 (1,0CA) . Initial l

system response is verified adequate until 1 of 2 available and running Charging /SI pumps fails catastrophically, requiring efforts to be initiated to restore a 3rd Charging /SI pump that was removed for maintenance. RCS leakage now exceeds make up capacity, resulting in partial core uncovery. Thermocouple (T/c) temperatures increase rapidly indicating superheated conditions, resulting in fission product gas release to the Reactor Coolant and subsequently into the Containment atmosphere via the break.

Efforts to restore the 2nd Charging /SI pump are completed l and the pump is returned to service. At this time, however, containment pressure is slightly above atmospheric with H2 gas present.

l NOTE: Control Room personnel are aware that the personnel I hatch inner door is n_o,t_ sealed. However, they are not aware that a member of the entry team partially undogged the outer hatch locking ring, but failed to inform the control room.

AB burn occurs in containment, forcing the outer hatch (personn$1) door open and allowing a release path to the l Auxiliary Building. Auxiliary Building ventilation systems transport the release to the environment via the 'A' Vent stack.

Indications of a major release are the following:

1) Vent Stack Hi Range R/M i
2) Containment Pressure Strip chart (spike due to H 2 burn).

Operations personnel attempt to lower containment pressure by starting the only available Quench Spray pump. However, the pump fails to start and Damage Control personnel are instructed to trouble-shoot and repair. (Efforts to start R.S pumps will be acknowledged but blocked by contro11cr).

4 Following repair of the Quench Spray pump breaker, the pump is started and containment pressure is brought sub-atmospheric approximately 30 minutes following the pressure spike and release initiation.

The release is terminated at this point.

The Control Room is notified that the outside door of the personnel hatch was operated and may not be fully locked. Damage Control personnel .are sent to the personnel hatch to close and lock the outside hatch. 1 NOTE: HP personnel should work closely with these personnel due to high activity in the area. Emergency Dose limits may be required.

The hatch is then closed and secured. l Plant cooldown and de-pressurization continue along with maintaining containment sub-atmospheric. The SI is eventally terminated and normal charging established. RER is placed in se:vice IAW procedures. ,

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l Offsite monitoring teams and State agencies 6 continue to track the y plume and the Station Emergency Manager will make recot:mendations for {

sheltering and/or evacuation for af fected . zones < and

sectors IAW ,

appropriate Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. l r j, ,-

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RECOVERY

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Eventually, recovery from the incident will be initiated and a de-escalation of the emergency will follow. ,The exercise will be q terminated af ter recovery actions are complete. A critique of the exercise will be conducted in the North Anna Training facility following termination of the exercise. ,

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VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION JULY 14, 1987 l

NOTE: TIMES ARE APPROXI'd. ATE TIME EVENT l l

0300 - Controller-Player briefing conducted AND initial conditions provided.

) i l 0330 - Controller positioned for exercise initiation. j l

0340 -

Fire is reported at H Transport Trailer. l 2

0350 - " Notification of Unusual Event", EPIP-1.01 (Tab I) -

I DECLARED 0400 - Reactor Coolant System leak rate PT indicates

, Unidentified leak of : 1.2 gpm. Enter 1-AP-16 (Containment entry is required. Entry team makes l preparation to enter Containment).

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,- 0430 - Containment entry team requests permission to enter j Containment.

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Fire is reported OUT.

' 39$15

- Containment entry team exits containment (only a portion

-' J t of the containment was searched).  !

0530 , -r Containment entry team re-enters Containment.

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- iniste maintenance evolution on protection channel instrument failure. Operator takes action to place ,

' channel in trip as per 1-AP-3.

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,, 0615

- Containment entry ream exits Containment. A steam leak

. is reported in the vicinity of C Loop behind the Reactor Coolant Pump.

0616 - Computer leak-rate - Unidentified leak rate still at

1.2 gpm.

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EVENT 0645 - Another containment entry team enters Containment.

0715 - Containment entry team exits Containment and identifies leak to be between the Tc stop valve and the Reactor.

They are not able to quatify the leak.

0730 - Containment entry team enters containment

- I.eak Rate (Computer unidentified) increases to 1.6 gpm.  ;

0759 - Computer unidentified leakrate increases to 2 spa. i 0800 - Time expires on Action Statement. Therefore, the unit must be shutdown. " Notification of Unusual Event" is q declared as per Tab. B, #4, RCS event, or Tab A, #2, system shutdown or assessment system event. Commence unit shutdown at 150 MWE/ hour as per 1-OP-2.2.

0815 -

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I 0820 -

Ef forts to exit Containment via personnel hatch are abandoned and team reports to Control Room that they will exit via the equipment hatch escape lock. ]

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0830 -

Containment entry team exits via equipment hatch  :

0905 - RCS leakage is up to 50 gpm (by charging / letdown indication), unit shutdown rate is increased to 5% per I

min.

0910 - DELETED i i

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I t g 0918 -

Yain Generator removed from service.

'N by rods 1 mio Neactor . 4hutd$ws- commenced driving control in manually.

c m t qy' 0920 ' - Co mence emergere"b7 oration to achieve cold shutdown boron con 0entration. If.kords are being made to commence RCS

_ cooldown and depros m ritation as per 1-0P-3.

N 30, '- Pressurizer lev 51 upart be maintained at >20% livel because of 5, -3' increasing; RCS letk.' charging line flow indicatien thereases off

" scale (>150 F;pm) ari che second charging pump must be st(rt =s .

- An " ALERT" is declared as per TAB B, #5, RCS Event. '

- Pressurizer level (20% and RCS leak rate >50 gpn.

. After the schond Uump jies been started, pressn izer level drop stops and gradualty' starts ir. censing.

0945 e RCS cooldown and depressukfzation continues and a Reactor Cool. ant Pump isistopped per coeldown procedure.

1030~ -

PressurizetJ 1 h 1 det.reases to <20%. Charging flow increasing rapidly.

1035 - Manual Saf ety' Injection. A " Site Area Emergency" is declared:

Tab B, #6. Loss- of Reactor Coolant EP-1 ini; dated.

Inability to U. mint.tf a jiicssatizer icvel with two : Charging /SI pumps operating. ,

F - 4 1051 - One of rwo operational Charsing/SI pumps fail (B charging pump). l

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It vill be determin.d by. ebs ervation that thir , pump cannot be l

'A' chbrging pu ep restarted. Efforts must be 4.tntiated to return  !

to operable status. c'  !

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- Pressurizer level starts dr'opi ag, d leakage exceds makeup. , j Reactor Vessel icvel hins to decrease. 4

- Superheated conditioes occur as shown by Execre Thewucouple readings.

  • ! Temport:tur m ultimately reach 2300 F, clac damage occurs, and fissign product gases are released from the fuel

, ta the RCS and ulta.ately to the Containment.

- It .!s expected th at.' the Station Emergency Manager may dec1.are a " General Emergency" due. to Tab B, #11, Thermocouple

} 1200", EP-1 in p t ogrestf, 6,nd a potential that containment '

-irftgrity may be lost (of orv of two doors on the personnel hatch e

.is failad). -

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1 TIME EVENT 1150 - If not previously performed, the Station Emergency Manager should declare a " General Lnergency", Tab B, //11 EP-1 and Containment Hi Range Rad Monitor > 10R/hr. In order for the drill to progress, all attempts made by Operations to 'depressurize the Containment will be acknowledged by controllers and respectfully blocked.

This will allow for a release of fissica gas from the Containment to the environment.

1152 - The Damage Control Team will be notified by the TSC to restore operability of 1-QS-P-1A.

- At approximately this time, high dose rates are expected to cause evacuation of the Operations Support Center and/or Security. For the purpose of this exercise, Security will undergo a." simulated" evacuation.

1223 - The Damage control Team has repaired the breaker for 1-QS-?-1A sad the Control Room starts the pump.

1225 - The Containment is returned to subatmospheric and the I release is terminated. Ultimate termination of the l release is when the outer personnel hatch is closed and locked.

1230 - The TSC is given infomation by the containment entry tes.m operator that, in his haste to exit the containment, he left the outer -!

personnel hatch unlocked. Damage Control Team members l make preparations to enter the Auxiliary Building to 2 close the Personnel Ratch.

1310 - Efforts are successful in closing and sealing the outer personnel hatch. For the remainder of the exercise, operations will continue to cooldown and depressurize the plant, ultimately placing the Residual Heat Removal <

System in service per the POST-1.0CA cooldown procedure.

1330 - Exercise Teminated. Recovery, followed by critiques, initiated.

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  • ATTACEMENT 2 NORTH ANIRA PORK STATION FIRE / MEDICAL DRILL AUGUST 13, 1987 OBJECTIVES }

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The obj ectives of this drill are to demonstrate the emergency-response capability of North Anna Power Station as detailed below. At'no time'will the drill events be permitted to interfere with the routine safe operation of the j

j plant. The station management may at ite discretion suspend the drill .to ensure this goal. l The following list represents the objectives of this ' drill:

1. Conduct a fire drill in accordance with the requirements of the NAPS Fire Protection Program. l
2. Demonstrate response to a simulated contaminated, injured individual.-
3. Transport a simulated contaminated.. injured individual to an offsite medical facility.  !
4. Involve participation of a local rescue squad.
5. Involve participation by an offsite medical facility.

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t VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION ,

FIRE DRILL-SCENARIO AUGUST 13, 1987 1800 - Ultrasonic sink control panel 1-EL-CP-172C experiences a phase to ground short. The associate circuit breaker (#5) in protection panel 1-EP-CB-107 fails to open, passing' protection function to BUS Supply Breaker MCC-1B1-1B-B3R. The resulting arc is sufficient to blow open a door on 1-EL-CP-172C and ignite a two-gallon flammable storage can. The can is filled with alcohol and is positioned directly in front of the control panel.

- The fire immediately spreads to adjacent trash as well as other flammable liquid containers, blocking direct access to the primary exit,

- In his haste to evacuate the area, the Decon Technician transferring RCP oil knocks over the green drum. Approximately l

l 15 gallons of oil spills directly into the rapidly developing l

1 fire. Oil being pumped from the yellow drum is now flowing to 1

the floor of the Decon Bay area.

1801 - In an unsuccessful attempt to reach the' only portable fire extinguisher in the area, the Virginia Power H.P. Technician falls over material stored on the floor and sustains the following injuries:

1. A compound fracture of the right lower leg.
2. A deep laceration on the left-hand (palm).

- One of the contract technicians attempts to open the roll-up door, but abandons the effort when the door jams within the first two inches of travel. He then begins to clear a path of the normally unused (and blocked) walk-out door.

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1801 (con't) The other contract technician assists the injured Virginia Power i'

technician by dragging him out of the immediate area of the growing fire and extinguishing (with his gloved hands) flames on the left leg of the victim.

1802 - The fire grows in intensity and the area fills with smoke. The two uninjured individuals exit the area via the walk-out door, carrying the injured technician with them. All suffer from smoke inhalation.

- Exhausted, they seek shelter around the southeast corner of the building.

- Having smelled smoke, the fire ir discovered and reported via Gai-Tronics by the HP Technician in the local HP office. He fails to mention that three personnel were working in the engaged area.

1803 - Efforts to control the fire with a portable extinguisher f ail.

The HP technician closes the previously blocked open door between the Decon Bay and urea formaldehyde tank room. The fire grows in size and intensity as bagged trash and waste in the immediate vicinity ignite. Fumes venting from other flammable liquid cans feed the fire. Oil from the green drum begins to ignite.

1803 - Fire continues to grow in size and intensity. Spilled to 1807 oil becomes fully engaged. Bagged trash and material near the roll-up door ignite.

1807 - First responding person (s) arriving on scene notices to 1810 Decon Techs in FC's. This person responds to the first aid situation, reporting same, and rendering aid commensurate with knowledge and skills. Contaminated injury portion of drill begins at this point. Offsite assistance (fire and medical) is requested.

1815 - Efforts to suppress the fire are unsuccessful. The fire grows in heat and intensity. Oil pumping to the floor of the inner bay area ignites. (NOTE: Oil will continue to siphon to the floor even after failur' or isolation of electrical power to the pump).

Visibility in the Decon Bay area is near zero. The roll-up door buckles from the heat.

1820 - Trash and LSA material against mid-wall ignite. The .large pile of LSA waste and trash near the back of the inner bay begins to bu rn. Oil on the floor of the inner bay becomes fully engaged.

Efforts to employ foam suppression are unsuccessful due to i

equipment problems. 1 Fumes venting from flammable liquid cans and drums fuel the fire.

Intense heat prevents effective attack from the urea formaldehyde I i

tank room. j

.i 1825 - Fire grows with intense heat and smoke. The large pile of LSA i vaste near the back of the inner bay, and the large pool of oil on the floor are fully engaged.

i 1830 -

Offsite assistance arrives. Fire in .the inner bay area is intense. Efforts to use Virginia Power foam applicator,are still blocked. Fire in the outer bay area begins to die down due to .

j hose streams and lack of fuel, l j

1835 -

Additional manpower and equipment functional at the fire scene. i j

Effective hose streams are reaching the inner bay area. i j

1835 i Fire is brought under control.

to 1845 1845 Main fire is knocked down.

Several hot spots remain-in the back of the inner bay area. i 1

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Fire is extinguished. Clean-up- and HP contamination control operations begin.

1910 -

HP contamination control operations continue unt11'all personnel  :

are released. ^!

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4 VIRGINIA POFER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION MEDICAL EMERGENCY DRILL SCENARIO AUGUST 13, 1987 NOTE: The Medical Emergency Drill will be conducted in conjunction with the Fire Drill.

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l Approximate Time: 1802 EVENT: *As Decon technicians were conducting work in the Decon Bay, a fire erupted at the control panel for the ultrasonic sink.

Waste and combustibles in the vicinity ignited.

'The three Decon technicians'immediately attempted to. exit the area; however, the primary exit through the Decon office area was blocked by flames. One of the individuals, in a panic to escape, fell over materials stored in the building.

He suffered the following injuries:

1) A compound fracture of the left tibia / fibula.
2) An open wound to the left palm.
3) Burns to the right leg.

I l *The other technicians remove him from the building through the west door (beside the roll-up door) and up the ramp to the trailer parked beside the building.

'All three technicians suffer from smoke inhalation.

  • No report of their injuries has been made to the Control Room.

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i Approximate Time: 1802 - 1810 EVENT: 'A fire brigade member responding to the fire arrives on scene. j

  • Three technicians are found beside the trailer positioned outside the Decon Bay area. All three are in full PC's.  ;

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' Conditions of the injured personnel are as follows:

1) Tech #1 RESP: Labored / shallow, @ 24 '

PULSE: 120, rapid and thready BP: Unable to determine )

SKIN: Pale, shocky i PUPILS: Dilated CONTAMINATION LEVELS: Unable to determine .

PHYSICAL INJURIES: Compound fracture of the left Tibia / Fibula, open wound to the left palm, and j j several burns on the right leg. Victim is {

semi-conscious and has sustained smoke inhalation.

2) Tech #2 and #3 j l

RESP: Depressed, @ 20; coughing PULSE: 100 BP: Unable to determine SKIN: Pale, sweating PUPILS: Equal / reactive CONTAMINATION LEVELS: Unable to determine PHYSICAL INJURIES: Smoke inhalation EXPECTED RESPONSE: Notify Control Room after rendering initial first aid. (depending on skills of the first responder).

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Approximate Time: 1810 - 1815 j

. i EVENT: 'Upon arrival of the First Aid Team, it is determined that 1 the injured technician (#1) will receive first priority. j l

' Tech #1 is unconscious. It is evident that he has  !

lost a large quantity of blood. His PC's are burned along the right leg. He is having difficulty breathing. Body temperature is @ 100* 1 RESP: Labored / shallow, @ 24 i PULSE: 120, rapid and thready g: Palpitated, 80 SKIN: Pale, shocky l PUPILS: Dilated l CONTAMINATION LEVELS: See Attached Survey 1 l

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"The other two technicians suffer from mild smoke inhalation. {

Vital signs are normal for both, see attached survey {

for contamination levels prior to and following deconning.

RESPONSE ACTIONS: The first aid team should notify the Control Room j of the individuals condition and that offsite assistance, is necessary. The team should check all vital signs and oxygen should be administered as soon as possible. The individual should be treated for shock and an airway maintained. Due to the nature of the injuries and the body temperature, the PC's should be removed. It is likely that little decon work will be accomplished on the victim. Burns should be cooled and treated, j control and attempts should be made to the bleeding.

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Approximate Time: 1815 - 1820 I 1

EVENT: 'The left foot of the injured technician is cyanotic with no distal movement or pulse. Body temperature is 100' and he is unconscious. The victim has gone into shock.

l RESP: Depressed, 12 j PULSE: 120, rapid and thready }

BP: 90/50 i SKIN: Pale l PUPILS: Dilated, slight response  !

CONTAMINATION READINGS: See Attached Survey l

l RESPONSE ACTIONS: Straighten and splint leg to improve circulation. 1 Dress wounds, check for distal pulse. Maintain {

oxygen and monitoring body temperature. Elevate J feet and treat burns with sterile (dry) dressings

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and cool.

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c-Approximate Time: Arrival of Ambulance EVENT:

  • Arrival of ambulance'onsite (escorted by Security).
  • Ambulance EMT's are provided information on the victim's condition (repeat previous message).

RESPONSE ACTIONS: Ambulance staff checks vital signs, initiates treatment, and prepares to transport victim.

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b' Approximate Time: During Transport EVENT: ' Transport to Medical College of Virginia..

' Individual is unconscious, injured leg is cyanotic. Body temperature is 99.8* and slowly falling. Bleeding has- been-stopped.

RESP:fDepressed, 8 PULSE: 88, weak BP: 108/68' ~

SKIN: Mottled.-splotchy PUPILS: Equal, responsive CONTAMINATION LEVELS: See Attached Survey RESPONSE ACTIONS: Continue treatment for shock. Assist ventilation mechanically. ' Continue to monitor vital signs..

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Approximate Time: Arrival at MCV EVENT: ' Ambulance arrives s't MCV. The victim is taken to the designated treatment area. Vital signs are relayed by '

the {

-l attending EMT's to the waiting hospital staff.

'The hospital staff examines the victim and finds compound fracture of the left tibia / fibula, an open wound to the left palm, and several small 3rd degree burns on'the right leg.

Body temperature is 99.6*.

RESP: 12 PULSE: 88, weak )

BP: 110/80 5 KIN: Mottled PUPILS: Equal, responsive CONTAMINATION LEVELS: See Attached Survey.

RESPONSE ACTIONS: Attending EMT's.should relay vical signs to the hospital staff and assist as necessary.

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I NORTE ANNA POWER STATIN .

FIRE / MEDICAL DEILL CHRONOLOGY AUGUST 13, 1987-l TIME EVENT l 1801 Fire reported in Decon Bay area; station alarm sounded. )

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Entered AP-50.

1803 Scene Leader arrives.

Emergency dosimetry requested at scene.

1805 Injury reported; station alarm sounded.

1807 First Aid Team on scene. l Shif t Supervisor (operator-in-charge) briefs Control Room. j HP on scene. )

i 1810 Offsite rescue squad assistance requested.

Station ambulance requested.

CR requests HP to initiate EPIPs 4.01 and 4.20.

1814 Mineral rescue squad in transit; station ambulance on scene.

CR Shif t Supervisor conducts briefing with HP Shift Supervisor en severity / type of event.

l 1815 Simulated placing Decon Building exhaust through charcoal I filters.

"NOUE" initiated.

1818 Offsite fire department assistance requested.

1822 Mineral Fire Department in transit.

1825 Entry for primary search initiated.

Accountability initiated by Control Room. Blocked by drill controller.

1828 Priority / evacuation (Pegasus) requested. Blocked by drill controller.

1831 Mineral Fire Department arrives.

Control Room initiates escalation to " alert" based on SEM judgement / worsening conditions. Blocked by drill controller.

1835 Victim being transported offsite is transferred from Mineral unit to Station ambulance in order to release Mineral onit from drill.

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/ 'N TIME EVENT 1841 Ambulance departs site; is en route to MCV.

-1850 Fire extinguished.

Control Room contacts MCV.

1851 Search of fire area is conducted.

1904 Secured from Fire / Medical Drill.

2004 Ambulance arrives at MCV.

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5 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION FIRE / MEDICAL DRILL AUGUST 13, 1987

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LIST / LOCATION 0F CONTROLLERS AND OBSERVERS Controllers Location S. Harrison Control Room L. Silman Fire Scene R. Flashman First aid Scene Observers E. Cheely First Aid Scene, MCV H. Hay HP ,

l R. Hutsell Fire Scene i I

G. Mocarski Fire /First Aid Scene H. Ostergren MCV List of Players B. Morrison K. Tucker M. Robertson I l J. Lencalis Jeff Johnson G. Henie l T. Crawford D. Gill L. Bogess M. Cox C. Dix T. Snoddy B. Spencer D. Bostain W. Towsey (Mineral Fire)

S. Lynch C. Verling K. Walton (Mineral Fire)

R. Chitwood T. Park H. Wilson (Mineral Fire)

T. Perrin B. Beverage T. West (Mineral Fire)

J. Caldwell (NRC) J. Garland D. Anderson (Mineral Rescue)

B. Thompson L. Wilson T. Baker (Mineral Rescue)

T. Shashaty N. O' Shields L. Wash (Mineral Rescue)

J. Englehart E. Reynolds (Mineral Rescue)

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NORTH ANNA POWER STATION CRITIQUE ROSTER-FIRE / MEDICAL DRII.L $

AUGUST 13, 1987 1 l

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S. Harrison i T. Perrin I W. W111aford

' J. Lencalis T. Snoddy R. Hutsell j L. Silman K. Tucker G. Mocarski T. Park J. Garland C. Verling j G. Henie L. Bogess M. Robertson D. Bostain E. Cheely H. Ostergren -

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e ATTACHMENT 3 NORTH A10lA POWER STATION

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PASS DRILL AUGUST 14, 1987 1

l OBJECTIVES

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l The objectives of this drill are to demonstrate the emergency response capability of North Anna Power Station as' detailed below. At no time will the drill events be permitted to interfere with the-routine safe operation of the plant. The station management may at its discretion suspend the drill to ensure this goal.

l The following list represents the objectives'of this drill:

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1. Demonstrate the capability of Chemistry personnel in taking liquid samples with actual elevated radioactive levels using the post-accident sampling system.
2. Demonstrate the ability to analyze samples taken from the-post-accident sampling system.
3. Demonstrate the use of appropriate procedures for collecting and analyzing the sample and for recording results.
4. Demonstrate the capability of emergency response personnel to use emergency communications systems within the station.

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. 1 MORTH ANNA POWER STATION

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PASS DRILL AUGUST 14, 1987 SCENARIO NARRATIVE 1

l The Post-Accident Sampling System Drill will require taking an actual sample I from the HRSS sampling system in order to deme,nstrate the capability of emergency response personnel to gather and analyze liquid samples without access to the Primary Sampling System.

Simulations of some events by personnel will occur where it is considered j impractical or it is unnecessary to perform actions carefully documented by 1 periodic testing. At no time will the drill be allowed.to interfere with the usual, safe operation of the plant.

The plant is experiencing a simulated failed-fuel event that hst led to a classification of a " Site Area Emergency". TgeHighRangeLetdownRaoiation l

' Monitor has recorded readings higher than 1 x 10 cpm and the core differential temperature reading is rapidly diverging.

A simulated conference of the Station Emergency Manager (SEM) with the Emergency Directors has resulted in the Emergency Technical Director (ETD) requesting an isotopic analysis of core radioactivity. This request is directed to the Supervisor Chemistry who selects a team to take a Primary j

~l Sample.

The Chemistry Team returns to the Chemistry Lab with the simulated information that the Primary Sampling System is not usable because of elevated readings at j the sampling point (s). They request Health Physics (HP) support and assemble i l

l the necessary equipment and procedures to access the HRSS post-accident sampling system.

l The sample' dill then be taken and later returned to'the'HP Count Room for l I

analysis.

Finally, a simulated reply will be made to the EMT's request for isotopic analysis of core radioactivity and the exercise will be terminated.

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.1 NORTH ANNA POIER STATION PASS DETTY- i AUGUST 14, 1987 CHRONOLOGY

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'il Initial Time: 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> l l

T=0 Inform Management of drill events. I T+90 min Request for Isotopic analysis. '

1 T+95 min Chemistry Team dispatched for Primary Sample.

T+105 min Chemis;ry Team returns to Hot Lab for equipment and procedures necessary for PASS sampling.

j T+135 min Chemistry Team takes HRSS sample.

T+165 min Sample taken for analysis to HP Count Room. i T+210 min Analysis complete. SEM informed of isotopic analysis. '

Exercise Terminated.

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NORTH ANNA POWER STATION PASS DRILL AUGUST 14, 1987 Controllers S. Harrison L. Storms ,

observers l 1 R. Sharp .

List of Players J. Reynolds M. Thompson I R. Robinson L, Lee D. Plemen B. Land ,

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Critique Attendees L. Lee S. Harrison L. Storms ,

R. Sharp l L. Miller l B. Land  !

J. Reynolds I

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.A_T T_A C H M E N T 4

SUMMARY

Critiques were conducted immediately following termination of the drills referenced in this enclosure. Controllers, observers, and key players assembled to discuss effectiveness of the response to these drills, and to  ;

identify weaknesses which were observed. In addition, these individuals were encouraged to recommend enhancements which would ultimately strengthen North Anna's emergency response capability.

Through the critique process, objectives of these drills were determined to )

have been satisfactorily achieved. Identified improvement items have been developed into an action plan and placed on the Commitment Tracking System for resolution. Appropriate corrective actions will be taken, as necessary, to address and resolve concerns identified as a result of the outcome of these drills.

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