ML20236M076
| ML20236M076 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1987 |
| From: | Stewart W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 87-472, NUDOCS 8708100463 | |
| Download: ML20236M076 (12) | |
Text
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10 CFR 50.47 VIntGINIA EI.iscritic AND POWI:It CO>tPANY
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Il lC H M O N D, T'1 HO I N I A CH2G1 August 3, 1987 Pl2: 57 I,. STWMT i
YM F, PN r.MIDftMT NrnFAN oPENATIONM United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial Nc.87-472 101 Marietta Street, N.W.
N0/RMK:jmj Suite 2900 Docket Nos.
50-338 Atlanta, GA 30323 50-339 License Nos.
NPF-4 NPF-7 Gentlemen:
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY NORTH AENA POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 REQUEST FOR THE JUi1~15., 1987 NORTH ANNA mIITJ STEAM CENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT TO BE ACCEPTED AS FATISFYING THE 1987 ANNUAL EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE REQUIREMENTS The purpose of this 1ctter is to formally request that emergency response acticn s taken by the Company during the July 15, 1987 North Anna Unit 1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture event be accepted as the annual Emergency Plan exercise for 1987. This request was discussed with the NRC on July 23, 1987.
- Also, during this conversation, agreement was reached whereby the tnnual North Anna Emergency Plan exercise scheduled to be conducted on August 4, 1987, would be postponed while this request is being considered.
In response to the Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) event, the station Emergency Plan was implemented via the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).
A " Notification of Unustal Event" was initially declared and shortly thereafter the event classification was upgraded to an " Alert." All emergency response personnel and facilities were activated (i.e., Company, State, local, and NRC) and appropriate emergency activities were successfully performed in accordance with the EPIPs.
As the plant conditions were stabilized, reentry / recovery actions were planned and then implemented.
Accordingly, we consider that this event exercised and conclusively demcn strated the adequacy of our emergency response capabilities as required by 10 CFR 50.47,
" Emergency Plans," section (b)(14).
Attachments 1 and 2 provide specific information to support this request. We believe that the information contained in these attachments provide sufficient justification to conclude that our response to the SGTR event fulfills the key elements of the annual emergency plan exercise requirement. Specifically, the SCTR event demonstrated the adequacy of our emergency response capabilities in terms of protecting public health and safety. The event also afforded the opportunity to realistically evaluate major portions of our emergency response plan.
8708100463 870B03 PDR ADOCK 05000338 F
pga g
DFAT
. provides a summary of the key elements of the North Anna Power Station Emergency Plan that were demonstrated during the July 15, 1987 event.
This attachment also' specifies those Emergency Plan key elements which were included in the planned August 4, 1987 exercise, but were not required during the SGTR event. These remaining key elements are also discussed below along with a description of how the corresponding emergency response capability has i
been or will be demonstrated.
1.
The ability to formulate and make protective action recommendations to l
protect the general public based on plant parameters and/or field I
monitoring information was not demonstrated during the July 15, 1987 event.
The event was not escalated to a " Site Area Emergency" and therefore no protective action recommendations were made.
A practice drill was conducted on the day before the event (July 14, 1987) in preparation for the scheduled August 4, 1987 exercise.
During this practice exercise, protective action recommes datials were made to the Commonwealth of Virginia when the exercise escalated to a " Site Area Emergen cy" an d then to a " General Emergency." Therefore, we cas sider that this objective has been ercrcised and that adequacy has been demon strat ed.
2.
The initiation and use of procedures for the collection, analysis, and documentation of Post Accident Sampling was not performed during the SGTR event.
A monthly periodic test (PT) of this system is performed, and we will conduct a drill in association with this PT by September 16, 1987.
3.
The transport of an injured, contaminated individual to a medical facility was not carried out during the event because there were no injuries.
A drill involving the transport of an injured, contaminated individual to a medical facility will be performed by December 31, 1987.
4.
Response to a fire, in accordance with the requirements of the station Fire Protection Program, was not demonstrated during the event because there was no fire.
A drill, in accordance with the requirements of the North Anna Power Station Fire Protection Program and the North Anna Power Station Emergency Plan, will be performed by September 16, 1987.
5.
Response by Local Volunteer Rescue Squads or Local Volunteer Fire Department was not demonstrated during the event because no offsite response was required.
Response by Local Volunteer Rescue Squads and Local Volunteer Fire Departments will be performed in association with the above respective drills (Items 3 and 4).
6.
Evacuation of nonessential personnel from the site was not required during the SGTR event.
Irroming nonessential personnel were restricted from access to the site, and a number of vendor and craft persennel were released, but not dispatched to the Remote Assembly Area because
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l it was determined to be unnecessary.
The ability to evacuate i
I nonessential personnel from the site was accomplished during the practice drill on July 14, 1987 when nonessential personnel were I
evacuated to the Remote Assembly Area and monitored by Fealth Physics personnel.
Therefore, we consider that this objective has been exercised and that adequacy has been demonstrated.
7.
Conducting a critique of the event on July 15, 1987 was not accomplished in a traditional manner; however, an effective critique was conducted through interviews with emergency response personnel.
Additionally, a traditional critique was performed after the practice exercise on July 14, 1987.
Please note that wf.th the exception of item No. 7, the above items were supplemental elements that were included in the planned August 4, 1987 exercise but were not opscifically requirti to be conducted at that time. The fire, riedical, and post-accident sampling atills were incorporated into the exercise for convenience.
An acceptable alternative would have been to conduct these drills at another time during the year (within 12 + 3 months of the previous l
year's drill), independent of an annual exercise.
In addition, the content of exercises may be varied from year to year such that all major elements of the Emergency Plan are tested over a five year period. A site evacuation, one of the major elements, was not specifically required to have been demonstrated this year, since it had been demonstrated during previous exercises.
Furthermore, protective action decision-making must only be demonstrated during years in which a full-scale exercise is conducted (i.e.,
an exercise in which at least a " Site Area Emergency" classification is declared).
l is an overview of emergency reoponse activities conducted during the SGTR event. This overview shows that the major elements of our Emergency j
Plan vere exercised during the SGTR event, and that emergency response l
capabilities required by 10 CFR 50.47 were adequately demonstrated.
If you have any questions, please contact us.
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I Very truly yours, n d m.&CY.
l Ptg L
W. L. Stewart i
l Attachments i
ec:
U. S. Nucient Regt.latory Commission Attention: Document Control Dask Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. J. L. Caldwell NRC Senior Resident Inspector l
North Anna Power Station j
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l ATfACHMENT 1 1
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l KEY ELEMENTS OF NORTH ANNA POWER STATION EMERCENCY PLAN DEMONSTRATED DURING SCTR EVENT l
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l ATTACHMENT 1 l
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KEY ELEMENTS OF NORTH ANNA POWER STATION EMERGENCY PLAN DEMONSTRATED DURING SGTR EVENT During the July 15, 1987, "C" Steam Generator tube rupture event, most of the j
key elements of the NAPS Emergency Plan were satisfactorily demonstrated.
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Verification of these events having been demonstrated was achieved by reviewing logs and procedures maintained throughout the event, and by conducting interviews with emergency response personnel.
The key elements that were achieved are provided below:
A.
OVERALL STATION ELEMENTS 1.
The cmergency organization's ability to make proper decisions related to emergency radiation exposure guidelines, and the capability to implement these decisions.
2.
The ability to establish and maintain emergency management command and control authority, and maintain continuity of authority throughout the event.
3.
The ability to classify actual or potential emergencies in accordance with NAPS Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
4.
The ability to develop alternative systems or equipment alterations in response to accident affected plant systems or components and to formulate respective procedures to accompany these required modifications (i.e. walkdown of affected areas, formulation of revised shutdown margin procedure, etc.).
5.
The capability to ascertain and requisition parts to perform corrective maintenance on damaged equipment, as necessary, by establishing the Damage Control and Maintenance Suppor: Teams.
6.
The ability to transition into the recovery mode and formulate a long-term recovery and reentry plan.
7.
The ability to augment the on-shift emerdency organization to support emergency operations in a timely and effective manner.
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Effective use of Safety Parameter Display System.
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9.
Requesting offsite technical support.
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Documentation and record keeping of key events.
11.
Conducting mobilization of key elements of Federal, State and local
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I B.
OPERATIONS ELEMENTS 1.
The ability of the Operations Staff to recognize operational symptoms indicative of degrading plant conditions.
2.
Proficiency in evaluating parameters, properly categorizing the situation utilizing the station's emergency action level scheme, and making the requisite emergency classification.
3.
The ability to properly escalate the emergency classification.
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The ability to efficiently and effectively use notification / alerting l
procedures and methods.
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The ability to provide effective communications / informational flow-I from the control room to supporting locations.
C.
SECURITY ELEMENTS 1.
The adequacy of access control and security for emergency response facilities.
2.
The ability to perform station employee accountability.
3.
The ability to perform call-out of station personnel.
4.
The ability to perform Security escort capabilities.
D.
HEALTH PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY ELEMENTS 1.
The capability to perform radiological monitoring activities and assessments, and to formulate off-site radiological dose projections.
2.
The co11cetion and analysis of water, vegetation, soil, and air samples both on-site and off-site.
3.
The use of communications by the monitoring teams, to include sending, receiving, and understanding message content.
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4.
The response to and analysis of elevated airborne and/or liquid
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activity levels and of elevated area radiation Icvels.
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5.
The initiation and use of appropriate procedures for the collection, analysis, and documentation of Environmental Monitoring samples, and for Radiological Monitoring evaluation.
6.
The ability to assess data obtained as a result of sampling activities, and the ability to factor-results into the overall assessment process.
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a E.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY ELEMENTS 1.
The ability to staff the following Emergency Response Facilities:
i Control Room (CR)
Technical Support Center (TSC)
Local Emergency' Operations Facility (LEOF)
Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC) 2.
Demonstrating the communications capabilities of the Control Room,.
- TSC, OSC, LEOF, and CERC, and the ability to maintain these communications with Federal, State, and local governments.
This includes sending, receiving, and understanding the content of messages involved.
3.
The proper utilization of the emergency response facilities and that l
adequate emergency response equipment exists.
j F.
CORPORATE ELEMENTS 1.
Demonstrating the LEOF to be adequately staffed and communications properly established.
2.
Demonstrating that the CERC can be adequately staffed and made functional (e.g.,
maintain communications, interface with the State Emergency Operations personnel at the CERC, provide engineering assistance, provide logistic support, and establish a Rumor Control group).
3.
Performing the activation of the Local Media Center.
4.
Performing the timely release and distribution of news announcements.
5.
Coordinating news announcements with off-site emergency response agencies.
6.
Conducting timely and informative media briefings.
7.
Responding to outside news inquires.
8.
Establishing an effective rumor control network.
The key elements of the NAPS Emergency Plan that were not fully achieved during the Steam Generator Tube Rupture event are provided below.
1.
The ability to formulate and make protective action recommendations to protect the general public based on plant parameters and/or field-monitoring information was not performed on July 15, 1987. The event was not escalated to a Site Area Emergency and therefore no protective action recommendations were made. During the practice exercise on July 14,
- 1987, protective action recommendations were made to the Commonwealth of Virginia when the exercise escalated to a Site Area Emergency and a General Emergency.
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- 2. 'The initiation and use of appropriate procedures for the collection, analysis, and documentation of Post Accident Sampling was not performed.
3.
The transport of an injured, contaminated individual to a medical facility was not accomplished because there were no injuries associated with the July 15, 1987 event.
4 Response to a fire, in accordance with the requirements of the NAPS Fire Protection Program, was not accomplished because there was no fire associated with the July 15, 1987 event.
5.
Response to Local Volunteer Rescue Squads or Local Volunteer Fire Departments was not accomplished because there was no injury or fire occurring during the July 15, 1987 event; therefore, no offsite response was requested.
6.
Evacuation of nonessential persennel from the site was not performed on July 15, 1987. Incoming nonessential personnel were restricted from access to the site, and a number of vendor and craft personnel were released, but not dispatched to the remote assembly area because it was determined to be unnecessary.
The ability to evacuate nonessential personnel from the site was accomplished during the practice exercise on July 14, 1987, when nonessential personnel were evacuated to the remote assembly area and monitored by Health Physics.
7.
Conducting a critique of the event on July 15, 1987 was not accomplished in a traditional manner; however, an effective critique was conducted through interviews with emergency response personnel. Additionally, a traditional critique was performed after the practice exercise on July 14, 1987.
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ATTACHMENT 2 l
l OVERVIEW OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIVITIES I
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ATTACHMENT 2 i
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1 OVERVIEW OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIVITIES i
Staffing and Responsibility}'
Specific assignments to the emergency organization were made in accordance with the Station Emergency Plan and were adequate to respond tc the event.
Timely activation, staffing, and operation of Emergency Response Facilities was accomplished.
Emergency Response Support and Resources
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Support resources (i.e. Westinghouse, OMNI, MODCOMP, etc) were requested l
and effectively used during the event.
State resources that participated at I
the LEOF were adequately accommodated.
In general response agencies demonstrated their ability to augment the Station response.
Emergency Classification The emergency classification and action level scheme, as provided in the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures, was adequate for the classification l
of the event.
Emergency Plan Implementating Procedures adequately provided for l
initial and continuing assessment and response actions during the emergency.
Notification Methods and Procedures Procedures established for' notification of Federal, State and local response organizations and emergency personnel were promptly and effectively implemented. Content of initial and followup messages was adequate and consistent with the requirements of the Emergency Plan.
Furthermore, provisions in place to alert Virginia Power's augmented emergency response organization were executed and found to be effective.
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Notification of NRC was initiated at 0702 hours0.00813 days <br />0.195 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.67111e-4 months <br /> and continuously maintained to termination of the event.
State / local notifications were accomplished as follows:
MESSAGE #
TIME 1
0651 2
0702 3
0718 4
0745 5
0805 6
0828 7
0846 8
0913 9
0935 10 1009 11 1043
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12 1115 13 1143 14 1220 15 1252 16 1326 17 1343 o
Station call-out was initiated at 0655 hours0.00758 days <br />0.182 hours <br />0.00108 weeks <br />2.492275e-4 months <br />.
Corporate call-out was initiated at 0710 hours0.00822 days <br />0.197 hours <br />0.00117 weeks <br />2.70155e-4 months <br />.
Station accountability was initiated at 0655 hours0.00758 days <br />0.182 hours <br />0.00108 weeks <br />2.492275e-4 months <br /> and completed at 0728 hours0.00843 days <br />0.202 hours <br />0.0012 weeks <br />2.77004e-4 months <br />.
Emergency Communications l
Communications between emergency facilities, principal response organizations and emergency personnel were promptly established and l
continuously maintained throughout the event.
Necessary equipment and procedures were in place in order to provide adequate communications.
No significant equipment malfunctions occurred.
However, there were some problems with the audioconferencing and speaker systems at the Local Media Center.
This was not prohibitive during the event, and corrective action has been initiated.
Media and Public Information l
Information concerning the emergency was made available to the media for j
dissemination to the public.
Four press releases were issued during the event (at 0800, 0900, 1100, and 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> respectively).
In addition, press briefings were conducted at the Corporate Public News Center (CPNC) and Local Media Center (LMC) throughout the day. The above facilities were activated at 0830 and 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br />, respectively.
Following termination of the event, the media was brought from the LMC to the station for an indepth briefing and plant tour.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment Emergency facilities were activated and promptly staffed during the event, and the facilities were adequately equipped to support the response effort.
The activation times for the Emergency Response facilities are provided below.
1 Technical Support Center - 0757 hours0.00876 days <br />0.21 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.880385e-4 months <br /> q
Operational Support Center - 0753 hours0.00872 days <br />0.209 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.865165e-4 months <br /> i
Local Emergency Operations Facility - 0915 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.481575e-4 months <br /> Corporate Emergency Response Center - 0820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br /> Corporate Public News Center - 0830 hours0.00961 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15815e-4 months <br /> Local Media Center - 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> It should be noted that the Technical Support Center (TSC) was fully manned prior to 0757 hours0.00876 days <br />0.21 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.880385e-4 months <br />.
However, the Station Emergency Manager did not relocate from the Control Room to the TSC until 0757 hours0.00876 days <br />0.21 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.880385e-4 months <br />, and therefore, the TSC was not " officially" activated until that time.
Accident Assessment Methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual onsite consequences of the event were adequate. Assessment and response activities included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards.
Inplant, onsite and offsite monitoring teans were i
promptly dispatched and effectively used throughout the event.
Recovery Planning Prior to termination of the event, a Recovery Organization was formulated.
This team was tasked with developing specific plans and procedures for recovery. The Recovery Organization was established under the direction of the Vice President - Nuclear Operations Department.
The organization created a
" command center" in the LEOF, established a long-term interface arrangement with the NRC and State, and formulated the following support structure:
1.
Maintenance and Repair Team 2.
Technical Evaluation Team 3.
Nuclear Safety and Licensing Team 4.
Industry interface Team 5.
Health Physics Team The recovery organization was implemented upon termination of the event.
Summary The July 15, 1987 SGTR event demonstrated that emergency response personnel within the Virginia Power organization are capable of satisfactorily responding to an emergency of this nature.
Furthermore, the NRC and emergency organizations within the State of Virginia demonstrated the capability to respond to requests for assistance during such an emergency.
In conclusion, the North Anna Power Station and those emergency response agencies that support it effectively mitigated the transient event and adequately protected the health and safety of the public.
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