ML20206G948
| ML20206G948 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1999 |
| From: | Christian D VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-338-98-05, 50-338-98-5, 50-339-98-05, 50-339-98-5, 98-686A, GL-91-18, NUDOCS 9905100183 | |
| Download: ML20206G948 (10) | |
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VIRGINIA EuCCTHIC AND POWl?R COMi%NY NICIIMOND, VIRGINI A 2326i May 3, 1999 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.
98-686A Attention: Document Control Desk NAPS /JHL R6 Washington, D. C. 20555 Docket Nos.
50-338 50-339 License Nos.
NPF-4 NPF-7 Gentlemen:
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-338/98-05 AND 50-339/98 o" UPDATED INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION ON UNDERSIZED WELDS NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-338/08-05 and 50-339/98-05, dated November 5, 1998, included a Notice of Violation associated with Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System pipe supports not being constructed in accordance with the details shown on design drawings. Specifically, several pipe supports were identified that contained undersized welds. Virginia Electric and Power Company (Virginia Power) responded to the Notice of Violation by letter dated December 21,1998 (Serial No.98-686). The response indicated that an additional inspection of at least fifty-eight (58) accessible safety-related pipe supports would be performed, using the guidance provided in ASME Code Case N-430 and EPRI Report NP-5380, Volumes 1 and 2, to provide assurance that safety-related pipe supports meet design criteria.
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This letter is to inform you that the inspection of 58 accessible safety-related pipe supports has been completed. Based on the inspection results, it can be concluded that:
1)
The as-built condition of safety-related pipe supports meets or exceeds %
des,ign enten,a.
2)
Slightly undersized fillet welds exist on some pipe support structures due to previous welding practices.
3)
The undersized welds are random, and are not specific to any location or type of support. Existing design documentation does not accurately reflect the as-built condition of safety-related pipe supports.
The majority of the weld discrepancies were limited to 1/16" undersize.
9905100103 990503 PDR ADOCK 05000338 G
There were some exceptions where portions of the structural welds were identified to be up to 1/8" undersized. Also, one specific support was identified with guscet plates welded to the baseplate with 5/16" fillets and to the trunnion with 1/4" welds versus 5/8" 7
as identified on the drawing. The 5/8" dimension specified on the drawing is believed to w a typographical error in that 5/16" should have been specified. All of the undersized welds were evaluated and determined to meet design requirements.
Furthermore, based on the inspections to date. discrepancies are typically limited to only portions of the weld and weld discrepancies that are greater than 1/16" undersized with respect to design documentation are the exception.
Our sampling results to date provide us with greater than 95% confidence that more than 95% of the supports meet the design basis strength requirements. Also, as a result of the extent of the observed undersized welds, there is no concern of a cumulative effect on structural integrity for single or multiple pipe supports due to multiple undersized welds. That is, each weld location is evaluated individually and as long as no gross failure occurs which would transfer load to other welds, there is no impact on the other welds. Therefore, identification of any slightly undersized welds in a safety-related pipe support structural connection will not lead to a loss of structural integrity or an operability concern.
In assessing the capability of the observed undersized welds, it is noted that the load resisted by a 1/4" weld is only 1.33 times the load resisted by the same length of 3/16" weld. However, a weld can resist at least two times its normal design load. capacity without a gross failure. Assuming a 1/4" weld was loaded to the maximum normal acceptable value, a 3/16" weld would resist the maximum design load without failure and remain within NRC Generic Letter 91-18, Appendix F allowable stresses. This applies whether one or all of the welds on a support are undersized since each welded connection is evaluated individually and hence, there are no cumulative effects. It should be noted that supports in the sample plan were evaluated usmg the allowable stresses from the plant design basis criteria which are significantly lower than the allowable stresses contained in Generic Letter 91-18 including Apcendix F of ASME Code Section Ill.
Since we have a high confidence that tnere is riot a safety /decign issue with the weld discrepancies, actions to update drawings or perform additional walkdowns purely to reconcile this issue are not considered warranted.
Consistent with our previously identified corrective actions, if our normal work process identifies an uridersized weld, the discrepancy will be entered into the corrective action process. The appropriate corrective action will be taken to resolve the discrepancy. In addition, we plan to perform an assessment of the current welding and welding inspection processes, practices, and procedures for safety-related pipe supports. Corrective action will be taken, as necessary.
A detailed summary of the methodology used for selecting pipe supports to inspect, the inspection results, and overall conclusions are provided in the attachments.
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If you have any further questions, please contact us.
V ry truly yours, u
C D. A. Christian Vice President-Nuclear Operations Attachmer.ts Commitments made by this letter:
1.
We plan to perform an assessment of the current welding and welding inspection processes, practices, and procedures for safety-related pipe supports. Corrective action will be taken, as necessary, a
cc:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. M. J. Morgan NRC Senior Resident inspector North Anna Power Station h
C 1
i ATTACHMENT 1 UPDATED INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION ON UNDFRSIZED WELDS lNSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-338/98-05 AND 50-339/98-05 l
l lNTRODUCTION i
NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-338/98-05 and 50-339/98-05, dated November 5, 1998, included a Notice of Violation associated with Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System j
pipe supports not being constructed in accordance with the wails shown on design i
drawings. Specifically, several pipe supports were identified that contained undersized welds. Virginia Electric and Power Company (Virginia Pov:er) responded to the Notice of Violation by letter dated December 21,1998 (Serial No.98-686). The response indicated that an additional inspection of at least fifty-eight (58) accessible safety-related pipe supports would be performed, using the guidance provided in ASME Code Case N-430 and EPRI Report NP-5380, Volumes 1 and 2, to provide assurance that safety-related pipe supports meet design criteria.
The inspection of 58 accessible safety-related pipe supports has now been completed.
The methodology for selecting pipe supports to inspect, the inspection results, and overall conclusions are provided below.
METHODOLOGY Volume 2 of EPRI Report NP-5380, Sampling Plan for Visual Reinspection of Welds, was used to provide guidance in determining the sample size and methodology for selecting pipe supports for inspection. A single sampling plan was chosen for which 58 individual pipe supports would be randomly selected. In order to randomly select accessible pipe supports, candidates for inspection (without difference to observed condition) were chosen during walkdowns conducted by a team of four engineers. Pipe supports were selected from any locations where safety-related piping and supports are found with the exception of Unit 1 and 2 containments and the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump house and tunnel and the Unit 2 AFW tunnel. Supports inside containment were excluded because they are essentially inaccessible during full power operations. AFW supports were excluded because of the extensive inspections that were performed during the AFW Safety System Engineering Inspection.
Support sample selectica was performed using the following criteria:
Not located in containment Not located in the Unit 1 AFW pump house or AFW tunnel Not located in the Unit 2 AFW tunnel Not located in high radiation or contaminated areas Does not require F
'Iding erected in order to visually inspect Page 1 of 4 r
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Visual inspection of the supports is not impeded by interference (e.g., other piping, I
conduits, equipment)
Supports selected from at least three different lines per area (where possible)
-- e
- No two adjacent supports on the same line
'e Ganged supports count as more than one support (based on the actual number of e
pipes supported)'
Only safety-related supports The above rules were implemented by entering an area and randomly selecting candidates without reference to drawings or calculations.
In. order to ensure that the extent of the undersized weld concern was adequately assessed, 98-supports throughout the plant were initially selected for sample consideration. This number o: supports exceeded the targeted sample size. The list was then further refined to 58 supports by randomly choosing supports by area. This was done without reference to drawings or calculations. However, the support type was considered to ensure that a representative sample of spring hangers, snubbers, anchors, lateral restraints, and struts were chosen. Final selections from each area j
were as follows:
Area Number of Supports Fuel Building 2
Auxiliar/ Building 16 Ervice Water Pump House / Valve House 4
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump House (Unit 2 only) 5 Safeguards Unit 1 4
Safeguards Unit 2 4
Quench Spray Pump House Unit 1 5
Quench Spray Pump House Unit 2 7
Main Steam Valve House Unit 1 3
Main St am Valve House Unit 2 3
J Casing Cooling Pump House Unit 1 2
Casing Cooling pump House Unit 2 3
Total =
58 Once the pipe supports were selected, design drawingc were obtained and inspections were conducted.-
EPRI Repod NP-5380, Visual Weld Acceptance Criteria, provided inspection criteria to be used for the weld size visual inspections. This guidance has been endorsed by ASME in Code Case N-430.
The focus of the visual inspections was to verify that the weld sizes and configurations identified in the design documentation matched what was installed in the field. Welds were verified by using fillet weld gages at each location where this was possible. A few l
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welds required size verification using a ruler or by visual inspection because of interference when attempting to use the weld gage. Each weld discrepancy was noted.
Additionally, any obvious configuration differences other than welds were noted.
Drawing change requests were initiated to correct applicable configuration differences.
The inspection criteria described in EPRI Report NP-5380 were used to determine whether a detailed support stress evaluation was required. If a support had undersized welds, but the welds still met the requirements of the EPRI Report (and ASME Code Case N-430), then no detailed evaluation was deemed necessary, otherwise detailed stress evaluations were performed.
INSPECTION RESULTS Fifty-eight pipe support structures were inspected to verify weld size.
Of the 58 supports inspected, 26 (45%) were identified as having undersized weld materia' over some portion of the weld. Sixteen of these 26 supports (28% of total sample) were identified as having undersized weld material over a portion of the weld that did not meet the EPRI acceptance criteria. A station deviation report was submitted for any support that exceeded the EPRI inspection criteria. These station deviation reports initiated appropriate corrective actions, such as structural evaluations and drawing changes. A summary of the inspection results can be found in Attachment 2.
In addition, any support discrepancy identified in the future will be dispositioned via the station deviation report (corrective action) system.
Pipe supports with welds that did not meet the EPRI inspection criteria were evaluated conservatively assuming the smaller weld sizes were applied for the entire length of the weld regardless of the length of the undersized weld. Analysis indicates that the existing pipe supports are acceptable as-is and meet the design requirements.
INSPECTION CONCLUSIONS Fifty-eight supports were inspected. Each support met the design requirements based upon either meeting the detailed inspection criteria or by detailed structural evaluation of weld strength (see Attachment 3). Based on Volume 2 of EPRI Report NP-5380, Sampling Plan for Visual Reinspection of Welds, the results provide a 95% confidence level that 95% of the safety-related supports will meet the design basis strength requirements. Based on these inspection results, we do riot plan to perform additional simpling and inspection of safety-related pipe supports. However, we plan to perform an assessment of the current welding and welding inspection processes, practices, and procedures for safety-related pipe supports.
Corrective action will be taken, as necessary.
Besides these 58 supports, approximately 100 supports have previously been inspected. It has been established with a 95% confidence level that 99% of tne supports meet the design basis strength requirements. This is based on the statistical f
frcmework provided in ANSI /ASQC Z1.4-1993, Sampling Procedures and Tables for Page 3 of 4 t
Inspection by Attributes.
Therefore, the result of these additional inspections re-confirms the conclusion provided in the Reply to Notice c.: Violation from NRC inspection Report Nos. 50-338,339 98-05 dated December 21,1998 that the as-built
-. condition of safety-related pipe supports adequately meet or exceed design criteria.
Based 'on the results of the statistically significant sample plan of 58 support inspections, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1)
The as-built condition of safety-related pipe supports meets or exceeds design criteria.
2)
Slightly undersized fillet welds exist on some pipe support structures due to previous welding pactices.
3)
The undersized welds are random, and are not specific to any location or type of support. Existing design documentation does not accurately reflect the as-built condition of safety-related pipe supports.
DETERMINISTIC CONCLUSIONS BASED ON STRENGTH OF WELD The majority of the welds with an undersized portion of weld material were mainly limited to 1/16" undersize. This apparently results from not using a fillet weld gage to verify weld size.
Taking a deterministic approach, the load resisted by a 1/4" weld is only 1.33 times tha load resisted by the same length of 3/16" weld. However, a weld can resist at least two
- times its normal design Iced capacity without a gross failure. Assuming a 1/4" weld was loaded to the maximum normal acceptable value, a 3/16" weld at that location of the joint would resist the maximum design load without failure and remain withir. NRC Generic Letter 91-18, Appendix F allowable stresses. From this, we conclude that there is no operability concern associated with the individual supports based on the experience of the sampled supports. It should be noted that supports in the sample plan were evaluated using the allowable stresses from the plant design basis criteria which are significantly lower than the allowable stresses contained in Generic Letter 91-18 including Appendix F of ASME Code Section 111.
F Jrther, there is no concern of a cumulative effect on structural integrity for single or multiple pipe supports due to multiple undersized welds. That is, each weld location is evaluated individually and as long as no gross failure occurs which would transfer load to other welds, there is no impact on the other welds. Therefore, identification of slightly undersized welds in a pipe support structural connection will not lead to a loss of structural integrity or an operability concern.
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9 ATTACHMENT 2 - PlPE SUPPORT INSPECTION RESULTS Line Number Support PSSK Findings Deviation DCR Number Report Fuel Building 10"-FC-2 152-Q3 1 FC-A-18 117B.01 Baseplate has gussets that aren't shown on N-99-263 99-055 PSSK, but are on MFSK. Some gusset to baseplate welds are 3/16" vs.1/4".
Does NOT meet EPRI inspection criteria.
12"-CC 133-151-Q3 1-CC-R-87 1218.11 Some structural welds are 3/16" vs.1/4".
N-99-262 99-059 Does NOT meet EPRI inspection criteria.
Auxihary Building 8"-CC-232-151-03 1-CC-R 157 -
118V.04
~1 1/2" of 3/16" of structural weld vs.1/4".99-070 Meets EPR1 inspection criteria.
12*-CC-31 151-03 1-CC-R-187A 118R.05 No weld discrepancies noted.
18".CC-615-151 03 2-CC-R-175A 118J.04 No weld discrepancies noted.
8"-CH-604-153A-Q2 2-CH-A-92 111 AG.15 No weld discrepancies noted.
3* CH-6671502-Q2 2-CH-A-208 111F.05 Trunnion to pipe (pressure boundary) weld has N-99-265 99-057 short arc (-25') at 3/16" vs.1/4".
4" WS-C50-151-03 1 WS-R 38 105S.32 No weld discrepances noted.
4"-WS-C51-151-Q3 1-WS-R 54 105S.32 No weld discrepancies noted.
4"-WS-C50-151-Q3 1-WS-R 36 105S.30 No weld descrepancies noted.
4"-WS-C51 151-Q3 1-WS-R 52 105S.30 No weld discrepances noted.
4"-WS-C53-151-03 1-WS-R 19 105S.19 No weld discrepancies noted.
4"-WS-C51 151-03 1-WS-R-50 105S.19 No weld discrepancies noted.
4"-WS-C50-151-03 1-WS-R 34 105S.19 No weld discrepancies noted.
4"-WS-C52-151-Q3 1-WS-R-65 105S.19 No weld discrepancies noted.
8"-CH-204-153A-Q2 1-CH-A-42A 111C.15 Gusset plates are welded to baseplate with 5/16" N-99-265 99-056 '
filleu. and to trunnion with 1/4* welds vs. 5/8" shown. Appears to be typo,5/16" should have been specified.
Does NOT meet EPRI inspection criteria.
8"-SI-49-153-Q3 1-St-R-43 111C.17 Some structural welds are 3/16" vs.1/4". One N-99-264 99-058 short run on gusset plate with no weld.
Does NOT meet EPRI inspection critoria.
24" WS-101 151-Q3 1 WS-R-9 105A.11 Some 1/4" vs. 5/16" fillet on one column. Meets99-071 EPRIinspection criteria Service Water Pump House / Valve House 6"-WSSW-401-151-03 2-WSSW-R-160 10508.01 Several 3/16" vs.1/4" structural welds. No N-99158 99-038 I
specific details shown for some welds (2 of these 99-065 are 1/8"). Minor support configuration 99-066 differences.
99 067 Does NOT meet EPRI inspection criteria.99-068 6"-WSSW-401 151-Q3 2-WSSW-R-161 10508.01 Several 3/16" vs.1/4" structural welds. No N-99-158 99-038 specific details shown for some welds (2 of these 99-065 are 1/8"). Minor support configuration 99 066 differences.99-067 Does NOT meet EPRI inspection criteria.99-068 6"-WSSW-1 151-Q3 1-WSSW-R-162 10508.04 Several 3/16" vs.1/4" structural welds. No N-99-158 99-069 specific details shown for some welds (2 of these are 1/8"). Minor support configuration drfferences.
Does NOT meet EPRI inspection criteria.
6"-WSSW-1-151-Q3 1 WSGW-R-163 10508.04 Several 3/16" vs.1/4" structural welds. No N-99-158 99-069 specific details shown for some welds (2 of these are 1/8"). Mirer support configuration differences.
Does NOT meet EPRI inspection criteria.
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Line Number Support Number PSSK
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Findings Devstion DCR Report AFW Pump House (Unit 2) 4"-WAPD-439-601-Q3 2-WAPD-A-618 ZFSK Drawing to be revised to clanfy weld sizes.09-072 2880A/B Meets EPRI inspection criteria 6"-WAPD 401-60103 2-WAPD-R-20A 102F.16 One undersized structural weld. One joint's weld 99-073 size not clearly indicated. Meets EPRI inspectior, criteria.
6"-WAPD-402-601-Q3 2-WAPD-R-208 102F.10 One undersized structural weld. One joint's weld 99-073 size not clearty indicated. Meets EPRI inspection criteria.
3" WAPD-412-601-03 2-WAPD-R-13 102F.12 No weld discrepancies noted.
3"-WAPD 414-60103 2-WAPD-R 29 102F.12 No weld discrepancies noted.
Safeguards (Unit 1) 10"-SI-213-153A-03 1 St-SH-33G 104K.07 Drawing does not specify size for most welds.99-074 8"-RS-E16-155A-02 1-RS-A-612 104E.12 No weld discrepancies noted.
10*-RS s 53A-02 1-RH-R-630 104D.03 No weld discrepancies noted.
10"-SI-18 1502-02 1-SI-HSS 105 104A.11 No weld discrepancies noted.
Safeguards (Unit 2) 12"-SI-414-153A-O2 2-SI-R 4 104C.07 3/16" structural weld vs.1/4". 1/2" long void N-99-171 99-042 where could not weld. Two places where weld gage could not be used. Estimated between 1/8" and 3/16" vs.1/4".
Does NOT meet EPRI inspection criteria.
10"-SI-628153A-03 2-SI-R-51 104C.09 Some 3/16"(low spots) welds vs.1/4".
N-99-172 99-041 Does NOT meet EPRI Inspection criteria.
10"-RS-409-153A-02 2-RS-R 620 104E.01 No weld discrepancies noted.
10"-SI-464-153A-Q2 2-SI-SH-601 1048.04 Short run of 3/16" fillet weld on stdfener plate vs.99-075 1/4". Meets EPRIinspection criteria.
Quench Spray Purnp House (Unit 1) 8"-OS-4-15103 1-OS-R-718 107C.06 No weld discrepancies noted.
3"-CC-Y96-151-Q3 1 CC-R-710 105KA.07 Several 3/16" structural welds vs.1/4". One N-99-219 99-047 weld on 1 gusset 3/16" vs 3/8". Stiffener plate 99-051 welded on one side vs. both sides.
Does NOT meet EPRI Inspection critoria.
3"-CC-D15-151-Q3 1-CC-R-711 105KA.07 Several 3/16" structural welds vs.1/4". One N-99-219 99-047 weld on 1 gusset 3/16" vs. 3/8". Stiffener plate 99-051 welded on one side vs. both sides.
Does NOT meet EPRI Inspection criteria.
3"-CC-D16-151-Q3 1-CC-R-712 105KA.07 Several 3/16" structural welds vs.1/4". One N-99-219 99-047 weld on 1 gusset 3/16" vs. 3/8". Stiffener plate 99-051 welded on one side vs. ooth sides.
Does NOT meet EPRI Inspection criterla.
3"-CC-Y97-151-Q3 1-CC-R-713 105KA.07 Several 3/16" structural welds vs.1/4". One N-99-219 99-047 weld on 1 gusset 3/16" vs. 3/8". Stiffener plate 99-051 welded on one side vs. both sides.
Does NOT meet EPRI Inspection criteria.
Quenen Spray Purnp House (Unit 2) 3*-OS-409-152-Q3 2-OS-A-250 107D.7 Some 3/16" structural weld vs.1/4".
N-99-220 99-049 Meets EPRI inspection criteria.
16"-WS-438-151-03 1-WS-R-40 105B.12 No weld discrepancies noted.
3"-CC-Z21-151-Q3 2-CC-A-611 105GB.12 Short run of 3/16" structural wekt vs.1/4".99-048 Meets EPRI inspection criteria.
3"-CC-204-151-Q3 2-CC-A-612 105GB.12 Slightly undersized stiffener plate weld.99-048 Meets EPRI inspection criteria.
3"-CC-ZO2-151-03 2-CC-A-613 105GB.12 No welo discrepancies noted.
3"-CC-Z20-151-Q3 2-CC-A-614 105GB M One 3/16" structural weld vs.1/4".
N-99-222
.S-048 Does NOT meet EPRI inspection criteria.
16"-WS-432-151-03 2-WS-R-12 105A.09 Short run of 3/16" fdlet weld vs.1/4".
N-99-221 99-050 Meets EPRI inspection criteria.
Main Steam Valve House (Unit 1) 16*-WFPD-17-601-S 1-WFPD-HSS-102D.35 No weld discrepancies noted.
224 4*-SDHV 4-601-Q2 1-SDHV-HSS-101H.11 No weld discrepancies noted.
233A Page 2 of 3 1
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Line Number Support Number PSSK Findings Deviaten DCR Report 4*-SDHV-4-601-Q2 1 SDHV-R 233 101H.10 Wold between trunnion and clevis plate (one leg)
N-99-156 99-039 is 3/16" vs.1/4*.
Does NOT meet EPRIinspection criteria.
Ma6n Steam Valve House (Unit 2) 16"-WFPD-413-601-S 2-WFPD-HSS-1020.37 Drawing requires clanfication of weld sizes.99-076 223 99-077 99-078 3*-SHP-562-601-Q2 2 SHP-HS-562.4 101KB.04 No weld discrepancies noted.
3"-SHP-547-601-Q2 2-SHP-HSS-101KA.09 No weld discrepancies noted.
547.1 Casing Cooling Purnp House (Unit 1) 6"-RS-E23-153A-Q3 1 RS-SH-10 107J.4 No weld discrepance noted.
6"-RS-E15-153A-Q3 1-RS-A-3 107L.4 PSSK shows 4 gussets on baseplate, only 2 N-99-137 99-033 installed. DCP 7847 added 2 gussets but was not implemented.
Cad.ig Cooling Pump House (Unit 2) 4*-RS-459-153A-Q3 2-RS-R-605 107F.03 No weld discrepancies noted.
6"-RS-459-153A-Q3 2 RS-R-627 107G.07 No weld discrepancies noted.
6"-RS-459-153A-Q3 2-RS-H-620 107G.02 1/32" to 1/16" cap between bottom of pipe and restraint. Plate that pipe was dry (empty) during inspection.
PSSK Pipe Support Sketch DCR. Drawing Change Request j
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ATTACHMENT 3 SUPPORT EVALUATION DOCUMENTATION
SUMMARY
Line Number l
Support Number l
PSSK l
Calculation Fuel Building 10"-FC-2-152-03 1-FC-A-18 1178.01 13075-SEO "'S, Addendum 00A 12"-CC-133-15103 1-CC-R 87 121B.11 13075-SEO-1811, Addendum 00A Auxiliary Building 8"-SI-204-153A-02 1-CH-A-42A 111C.15 13075-SEO-2527, Addendum 02A 8"-St-49-153-03 1-SI-R 43 111C.17 13075-SEO-2847, Addendum 02A Service Water Pump House 6"-WSSW-401-151-03 2-WSSW-R-160 10508.01 CE-1451, Revision 0 6"-WSSW-401-151-03 2-WSSW-R 161 10508.01 CE-1451, Revision 0 6"-WSSW-1 15103 1 WSSW-R-162 1050B.04 CE-1451, Revision 0 6"-WSS'N-1 151-03 1 WSSW-R-163 1050B.04 CE-1451, Revision 0 Safeguards (Unit ?)
12"-SI-414153A-O2 2-St-R-4 104C.07 12050-Z607, Addendum 02A 10"-St-628-153A-03 2-St-R-51 104C.09 12050-Z 2036, Addendum 02A Quench Spray Pump House (Unit 1) 3"-CC-Y96-15103 1 CC-R-710 105KA.07 CE-0787, Rev. O Subcalc M Addendum 00A 3"-CC-D15-151-03 1.CC-R-711 105KA.07 CE-0787, Rev. O Subcalc M Addendurn 00A 3"-CC-016-151-03 1-CC-A-712 105KA.07 CE-0787, Rev. O Subcalc M Addendum 00A 3"-CC-Y97 151-03 1-CC-R-713 105KA.07 CE-0787, Rev. O Subcalc M Addendum 00A Quench Spray Pump House (Unit 2) 3"-CC-Z20-151 03 l 2 CC-A-614 1 105GB.12 l 14938.71-NZ(B)-001-ZB, Addendum 008 Main Steam Vahre House (Unit 1}
4"-SDHV-4-601-02 l 1.EDHV-R-233 l 101H.10 l CE-0421, Addendum 01A f
PSSK - Pipe Support Sketc'i i
i l
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