ML20213G764

Forwards Revised Responses to Sqrt & Pvort Audit Issues, Reflecting Info Requested by NRC at 870430 Meeting & 870501 & 05 Telcons.Info Sufficient to Resolve Remaining Concerns in Confirmatory Issues 12 & 13

ML20213G764
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/11/1987
From:	Carey J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
2NRC-7-111, TAC-62895, TAC-62896, NUDOCS 8705180439
Download: ML20213G764 (41)

Text

e

' AFT e LW 2NRC-7-111 (412)393-7546 Beaver Valley No. 2 Unit Project Organaation Telecopy(412) 393 7889 May 11, 1987 5ao[$",8 Shippingport PA 15077 U..ited States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 BVPS-2 Seismic and Dynamic Qualification of Safety-Related Mechani-cal and Electrical Equipment Gentlemen:

Please find enclosed Duquesne Light Company's (DLC) revised responses to Specific Qualification Review Team (SQRT) and Pump and Valve Operability Review Team (PV0RT) Audit issues. These responses reflect the information requested by the NRC during a meeting on April 30, 1987 and subsequent phone call on May 1, and May 5,1987. DLC considers this supplemental information sufficient to resolve all remaining concerns in Confirmatory Issues 12 and 13, with the exception of the replacement and testing of the Main Steam Isolation Valves.

Should you have any questions, please contact K. E. Woessner at (412) 393-7739.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY By .

J PJ. Carey (/

Senior Vice President ETE/ijr NR/ETE/SEIS/DYN Attachment AR/NAR cc: Mr. P. Tam, Project Manager (w/o/a)

Mr. S. Hou, NRC (w/a)

Mr. A. S. Masciantonio, NRC (w/a)

Mr. J. Beall, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. L. Prividy, NRC Resident Inspector Mr. J. N. Singh, EG&G Idaho, Inc. (w/a)

Mr. C. Kido, EG&G Idaho, Inc. (w/a)

INP0 Records Center NRC Document Control Desk 0705180439 870511 0 PDR ADOCK 05000412 E PDR i

o PVORT SER Issue 3.10.2.3 Specific (2)

Issue. The review of-the MSIV (Tag Number 2 MSS-HYV101A) found that oper-ational problems have been identified by the applicant. Also, environmen-tal qualification had not yet been completed. The applicant is consider-ing several options to address operability of this component, including redesign or replacement. The applicant shall notify the staff whcn (a) a suitable modification and repair has been determined, (b) the necessary repairs and modifications have been completed, (c) testing has been completed, and (d) when full qualification including environmental has been established.

Evaluation. In the letter dated October 27, 1986 the applicant indicated that the existing MSIVs will be used. The applicant will notify the staff when all problems associated with the MSIVs have been corrected, and the valves are fully qualified and ready for operation. The staff finds the applicant's comitment to be acceptable, pending confirmaton of qualifica-tion. This issue is confirmatory.

Response: Duquesne Light has completed their review of the qualification documer,tation for the new Atwood & Morrill wye pattern globe Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) and have found these valves to be qualified for BVPS Unit 2. Attached is a copy of the Summary section (Tab 4) of the seismic qualification file which describes the qualification methodology and documentation. Also attached is the Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Review -- Long Form for the MSIV's. These attachments should provide enough information to determine that the MSIV's are qualified.

Additionally, this valve has been utilized on 29 other plants, some of which have been reviewed by the NRC and found to be acceptable.

The installation of these valves is progressing ahead of schedule and should be completely installed by fuel load (May 21,1987). Equipment and system tests are also ahead of schedule and should be completed by fuel load or shortly thereafter. Criticality will not occur until installation and testing have been completed.

Status: Open

SQRT Generic Item 3.10.1.3(2)

Clearance Between Adjacent Cabinets Supplemental Response:

Cabinets mounted as close as is physically possible to each other were determined by the NRC to be seismically acceptable on the BVPS site as long as:

1) The cabinets are " seismically rigid", and

2) Sufficient contact exists along the mating surfaces of adjacent cabi-nets.

DLC has inspected all cabinets on site which are not bolted together to the {

l acceptance criteria described above. From this inspection forty-six (46)

' cabinets deviated from the acceptable criteria and are being bolted. The bolted condition has been evaluated and found to be an improvement in the qualified condition. The qualification file is being updated to reflect the installed condition.

Status: Closed (NRC meeting 4/30/87)

SQRT Generic Item 3.10.1.3(4)

The applicant is to inform the staff of the completion of the seismic and dynamic qualification program. The completion and confirmation must occur before fuel load.

Response

Duquesne Light has completed their review of the qualification documentation for the new Atwood and Morrill wye pattern globe Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) and have found these valves to be qualified for BVPS Unit 2.

Attached is a copy of the Summary section (Tab 4) of the seismic qualifica-tion file which describes the qualification methodology and documentation.

Also attached is the Seismic and Dynamic Qualification Sumary of Equipment

-- Long Form for the MSIV's. These attachments should provide enough infor-mation to determine that the MSIV's are qualified. Additionally this valve has been utilized on 29 other plants, some of which have been reviewed by the NRC and found to be acceptable.

The installation of the valves is progressing ahead of schedule and should be completely installed by fuel load (May 21, 1987). Equipment and system tests are also ahead of schedule and should be completed by fuel load or shortly thereafter. Criticality will not occur until installation and test-ing have been completed.

Status: Open

SQRT Equipment Specific Issue 3.10.1.4(1)

Review of the qualification documentation for the residual heat removal (RHR) system heat exchanger raised the following concerns:

(a) the appropriateness of using Bijlaard analysis for the 24-inch nozzle-shell junction stresses (b) sizing calculations for the support lug welds (c) the use of specified lug dimension in the support lug-shell junction stress analysis The above concerns must be resolved for the RHR heat exchanger to be quali-fled.

Response

a) The Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers at BVPS-2 are classified as ASME Safety Class 3 pressure vessels. They were designed, fabricated, and code stamped in accordance with Section III, Division 1, Subsection ND (1974/ Summer 1974 Addendum) of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

Westinghouse performed a local stress analysis using the Bijlaard tech-nique, at the nozzle /shell connection for the 24" shell outlet nozzle using actual nozzle loads and found the shel1 membrane stress to be 8150 psi. This value is far less than 41060 psi (vendor calculated) listed in the "EG&G" Report EGG-EA-7498 and less than the allowable, 42000 psi.

The differences between the vendor stresses and those calculated by (W_)

can be explained as follows:

1) The vendor (Dynatech Report No.-1318) used all equipment specifica-tion allowables for the input in the "Bijlaard" program. The allowable shear load and bending moment is used in both horizontal directions instead of using 0.707 times the allowable shear and bending moment value in those two directions (Vc & VL should be 8325 lbs instead of 11775 lbs and Mc & ML should be 478283 in-lb instead of 676496 in-lb.). This resulted in very conservative stress values.

2) The vendor also used higher stress concentration factors values (Kn=

1.5 & Kb=3.0) instead of 1.0 for both. The WRC Bulletin 107 under Paragraph 2.0 on Page No. 2 states to use these higher factors if, (a) the vessel is constructed of brittle material and (b) if fatigue evalation is to be undertaken. None of these conditions exist, and 1.0 for "Kn" & "Kb" should have been used (was used in Westinghouse analysis). This added to the conservative results.

SQRT Evaluating the above situation, the actual " membrane stress" is much lower than the value shown in the vendor report based on extreme conser-vatism. Even though some " discontinuity stresses" exist, there still is a big margin between the actual stress using actual nozzle loads and the allowable. Based on (W) current analysis, using actual nozzle loads, there is no concern'"with failures at the junction.

The use of the Bijlaard technique to determine stresses at the nozzle /shell junction has been industry accepted and is appropriate for the following reasons:

1) This analysis discounted reinforcement around the nozzle /shell junction, thus the high stresses calculated by the Bijlaard analysis are conservative

2) Each heat exchanger is supported vertically by two lugs located toward the lower end of the vessel; lateral support is provided at the head of the pressure vessel. The Bijlaard analysis c.,sumes that the nozzle is isolated. Although the nozzle in question is located near the vessel head to shell junction, this and condition produces a stiffening effect on the nozzle which results in reduced binding stresses determined by a Bijlaard analysi s . ( Although bending stresses decrease, snear stresses increase but have little effect).

3) Article ND-3000, subparagraph NO-3112.4, " Design Allowable Stress Values" states:

"It is recognized that highly localized and secondary bending stresses may exist in components designed and fabricated in accordance with these rules. Insofar as practical, design rules for details have been written to hold such stresses at a safe level consistent with experience."

We believe this statement directly applies to this concern.

The Bijlaard technique was utilized to calculate the primary stresses in the RHR Heat Exchangers. The secondary stresses, although addressed by the Bijlaard techniques are self-limiting in nature and are included within the design allowable stress values, b) The filler material used for welding gussets to the support is AISI type 399 as per the vendor procedure. The minimum tensile strength per AMSE Code Section II, Part C, Section SFA-5.4 for shielded metal arc welding method is 80.0 ksi. The minimum tensile strength for base material (SA 240 TP 304) is 75.0 ksi . This shows that the strength of filler mater-ial is higher than the base material and also, as stated in our previous letter (October 27, 1986) the throat of the weld exceeds the plate it joins. In addition, the welds were made using qualified weld procedure per ASME Code. Thei efore, we believe that the weld is adequate and stronger than the base metal.

SQRT c) Westinghouse utilized the " finite element" method (using the stick model modified for new gusset arrangement) to evaluate the stresses in the shell at the gusset connection in addition to the "Bijlaard" technique used in the vendor design report. The results indicate that the stresses due to the " finite element" method are lower compared to the "Bijlaard" technique, thus indicating that the "Bijlaard" technique is conservative to use in this case. Please note that the major contribu-tion in the stress is due to internal pressure.

The reconciliation program recently complete on BVPS-2 identified a concern with the stresses in the lower support lug. Westinghouse, in turn, modified the support gusset arrangement by adding two more gussets between the existing gussets which are 30" apart. The new design has inner gussets 16" apart and outer gussets 30" apart. This change has been implemented in the field. The new gusset configuration has been evaluated utilizing the "Bijlaard" technique and the stresses were found' to be 13.2 ksi, significantly lower than the design allowable load of 38.88 ksi.

Status: Open Part C - Open (Parts A and B - Closed, April 30, 1987 NRC Meeting)

SQRT Equipment Specific Issue 3.10.1.4(2)

The field observation and the review of qualification documents indicated the following issues with respect to the alternate shutdown panel:

(1) Finite element model used for the analysis was not authenticated.

(ii) There was neither a list nor qualification of internal class IE instruments.

(iii) There was no permanent auditable link between the field item and the documentation.

The qualification of this item is pending and requires resolution of the above issues of concern.

Response

The qualification package for the Alternate Shutdown Panel has been complet-ed and includes the results of the in-situ testing. This package demon-strates the Alternate Shutdown Panel is qualified for BVPS-2 plant condi-tions.

(i) The vendor's finite element model has been authenticated by in-situ impedance testing, as described in SWEC report 12241-650-AV3 dated 12/86. The measured minimum gross fundamental frequency was identical to the 20 Hz frequency predicted by the vendor's analysis.

(ii) The alternate shutdown panel (ASP) was designed and installed to satisfy the requirements for safe shutdown in the event of a fire (A seismic event is not postulated during a fire) in any of five specific fire areas of the plant (CB-1, CB-2, CB-3, CB-6, and CT-1). There-fore, the ASP is normally deenergized. Transfer of control to the ASP must occur manually by utilizing transfer pushbuttons mounted on the ASP panel. These transfer pushbuttons are seismically qualified.

Alternate shutdown panel instrumentation is non-1E, and are located in a separate section of the panel. These instruments have their own sensing elements and black power source. Also due to its potential interaction with the adjacent cabinet which contains normally deener-gized class 1E circuits and equipment, the panel itself was seismical-ly qualified.

(iii) The permanent auditable link between the alternate shutdown panel and the documentation is established by permanently affixing to this equipment its Mark Number. This is one of the customized panels not identified by a Vendor serial /model number (see response to Generic item 3.10.1.3(1)). The Mark Number is the BVPS-2 permanent equipment identification number and provides the required auditable link between the equipment and its documentation.

't Status: Closed (change made as agreed upon in May 5,1987 telephone conver-sation with NRC)

SQRT DLC Letter - December 24, 1985 Issue #42 Provide the method for considering low-cycle fatigue effects resulting from seismic excitation on electrical and instrumentation equipment and their related supporting structures.

Discussion:

This was identified by the NRC as an "old issue" in the meeting of 4/1/87 in

.Bethesda. The NRC's request for this information was made with reference to DLC's response to item 42 identified in DLC's letter 2NRC-5-157 dated 12/24/85 which was written in response to the BVPS-2 SER (NUREG-1057) dated 10/85.

Response

Low-cycle fatigue effects, which require a significant strain range typical-ly involving plastic deformation and malfunction in approximately 1000 cycles or less, have been considered in seismic qualification testing and analysis.

All Class 1E electrical and instrumentation equipment have been qualified by test. In seismic testing, the number of tests associated with the 5 08E events and the 1 SSE event and their duration and amplitude, along with any natural frequency scan testing, when utilized, adequately addressed low-cycle fatigue affects. Each seismic test was 30 seconds (not 15 seconds as actually anticipated) in duration. An approximate minimum duration of 3 minutes was associated with low-level sine sweep testing in each axis when natural frequency scan testing was employed.

In most cases the electrical and instrumentation equipment support struc-tures were also included in the seismic testing. When the qualification of these low carbon steel supporting structures was by analysis, material stress allowables of 70% of minimum yield strength for the OBE design condi-tion and the lesser of 100% of minimum yield or 70% of ultimate strength for the SSE design condition were utilized. Fatigue design data such as the conservative design curves of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, dem-onstrate these stress allowables are sufficient to prevent low-cycle fatigue. Also the design of the cabinets and their supporting structures generally required the first natural frequency to be above the amplified region of the specific amplified response spectra (ARS). This typically resulted in stresses much lower than the above allowables. Therefore they may be considered as " seismically rigid" structures.

Status: (Response modified as agreed upon in May 1,1987 telephone conver-sation with NRC) Closed

i BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - UNIT NO. 2 EQUIPMENT SEISMIC QUALIFICATION REVIEW PROGRAM AND PUMP AND VALVE OPERABILITY REVIEW PROGRAM SQRT/PV0RT REVISION / ISSUE NUMBER: O DESCRIPTION: Mid 6h 1 % t.A cT h> J \ ALhES MARK NO. 2M54 AOV 1014,B<'C SPEC NO. 2BVS- 26 ) P.O. NO. 28V- M /

VENDOR:

AT~uodb' ) ObeALL do IL)C.

r f Summary of Oualification approach, methods and conclusions:

See Attached Dates of outstanding open item reports reouiring resolution: (if none, indicate none).

The cualification documents for the above equipment have been reviewed and evaluated. Pending the satisfactory resolution of the open items Itsted above, these qualification documents have been found to provide adeauate demonstration of the capability of the above described components to meet seismic and opera-bility reoutrements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Qualification Review Team (SORT) and/or Pump and Valve Operability Review Team (PVORT).

Signed 4( A k h 8batM te 41 29-B9

(&S / /w/f paring Engineer)

/

Supervisor Initials Date

( unna APR 2 9 mR7 U.2Wervisor)

I

l Page 1 of 5 ATTACHMENT 2BVS-261 Summary of Qualification acoroach. methods and conclusions:

The Main Steam Isolation Valves are designated as ASME III, Class 2 valves and are located in the Main Steam lines carrying saturated steam from three steam generators to the turbine of the BVPS-2 Nuclear Power Station. The three main steam lines each contain a wye pattern globe type main steam isolation valve and are located in the Main Steam Valve Building immediately outside the Reactor Containment. If a pipe ruptures upstream or downstream of the valve, a signal such as that developed by excess flow, causes the valve to close. This valve closure prevents steam flow out of- the system in either the forward or reverse flow direction depending on the location of the pipe rupture.

DLC purchased three Category I Main Steam Line Isolation Valves from Atwood and Morrill Co., Inc. (A&M) located in Salem, MA. A&M was one of the industry's first valve manufacturers (in the late 1960's/early 1970's) to take special interests in the specifications for main steam isolation valves. These specifications are low pressure drop, tight seating, the ability to open against a differential pressure, closing time adjustable between 3 to 10 seconds, means for testing through partial stroke and return, and simplicity and reliability of operation. A&M has fabricated and installed main steam isolation valves at facilities in Tarapur, India, Nine Mile Point Station of Niagra Mohawk Power Co., and the Oyster Creek Station of Northern States Power Co. Consequently, the A&M wye type of main steam isolation valve which has had more experimental testing than any other design, and its dependable operating experience with a history of successful installations, provides the highest inval of confidence in its use. -

The information contained in this package adequately reflects the requirements of Specification 2BVS-261, " Main Steam Line Isolation Valves" (Tab 8).

The following mark numbers are qualified by documentation contained in this packages' Main Steam Isolation Valves 2 MSS *AOV101A Main Steam Isolation Valver 2 MSS *AOV101B Main Steam Isolation Valves 2 MSS *AOV101C l

I l

+

Page 2 of 5 The following documents were used in the qualification of the main steam isolation valves:

SWEC File No. Tab No. Document Descriotion 8 2BVS-261 Purchase Specification 2606.510-261-018A ,

14A 503-13824 MSIV Control Panel Test Plan 2706.510-261-002A 15A 13824 MSIV Control Panel Test Report 2606.510-261-017A 14B 511-13952 Valve Actuator Test Procedure 2706.510-261-003A 158 201-39500 Valve Actuator Test .

Report 2706.510-261-004A 15C 44 MSIV Bend Test Report 1 2706.510-261-005A 15D 302-15579 MSIV Design Report

-00 12241-NP(N)-X2H,R.6 11 Main Steam Pipe Stress Calculation 2006.510-261-048C 10A 15579-03 28" 'Y' Type MSIV w/

Sh. 1 Seal & Poppet 2006.510-261-049C 10A 15579-03 28" *Y' Type MSIV w/

Sh. 2 Seal & Poppet 2006.510-261-050C 10A 15579-03 28" 'Y' Type MSIV w/

Sh. 3 Seal & Poppet The roadmap to the information used to qualify the equipment can be found in the Database (Tab 7). The Database will allow cross-referencing of Mark No. to Vendor I.D. No.

The seismic test plans for the control panel (Tab 14A) and valve actuator (Tab 14B) were prepared by Atwood and Morrill Co., Inc. for AVCO Environmental Testing Services and American Environments Company, respectively.

QufLificalion Summarv - Seismic Testinn/ Analysis:

Qualification of the Main Steam Isolation Valves was accomplished by seismic testing and analysis.

The qualification test procedure for the 32" MSIV control panel (Tab 14A) was prepared by Atwood and Morrill Co'.,

Inc. The procedure was reviewed and approved in accordance with 2BVS-261 (Tab 8). The control panel tested is identical to that purchased for use at BVPS-2 (per the telephone memorandum of April 14, 1987 located in Tab 9D).

The qualification test report for the MSIV control panel (Tab 15A) was prepared for Atwood and Morrill Co., Inc. by the Environmental Testing Laboratory of Avco Systems Division. Aging was not performed prior to seismic testing since no Class 1E safety related components are located on the panel. The panel was subjected to resonance search testing and single axis continuous sinusoidal vibration.

Page 3 of 5 Single axis testing was allowed, in accordance with IEEE-344-1975, since no cross-coupling was indicated during the resonance search. Single frequency testing was also justified since ~ ru) resonances occurred below 50 Hz. The report was reviewed and approved in accordance with 2BVS-261 (Tab 8) and the test procedure (Tab 14A).

The test report ddmonstrates the control panel's ability to withstand the prescribed seismic events without any structural degradation or compromise to functional capability with the following anomalies.

The slight peak-notch response indicated at 26-34 cps, in both X and Y axes during resonance search testing, was attributed to low-level input plus some rotation excitation by the shaker / fixture suspension and was not associated with the test panel structure. Deviation from unity response, whether peak or notch, during the seismic vibration test, was assessed and attributed to CG location, fixture suspension, shaker stiffness, and/or noise. The deviations, being low in level (12.0 db) and occurring above 36 cps, did not affect the reliability of the seismic level tests.

The qualification test procedure for the pneumatically operated safety-related valve actuator and accessories (Tab 14B) was prepared by Atwood and Morrill'Co., Inc. The procedure was reviewed and approved in accordance with 2BVS-261 (Tab 8).

The qualification test report for the valve actuator (Tab iSB) was prepared by Atwood and Morrill Co., Inc. The qualification of the 28" MSIV actuator assembly is based on the generic test program of a 28" DWR MSIV actuator assembly. The prototype unit was seismically tested at American Environments Co., Inc. The report was reviewed and approved in accordance with 2BVS-261. The test methodology employed is in accordance with IEEE-323-1974, 344-1975, 382-1972 and the qualification test procedure.

A smaller and lighter (6000 lb) BWR actuator assembly consisting of a production cover, attached yoke rods, springs, spring plates, pneumatic cyclinder, hydraulic speed control system, special stem, packing gland follower, limit switches and air control assemblies was seismically tested in three stages. The first stage was a low amplitude resonant frequency search of the actuator assembly. The second stage was a biaxial dynamic seismic simulation test of the limit switch assemblies and air mantfold assembly components. The third stage was a static bend test of the actuator assembly. Design verification details for the DVPS-2 purchased actuator assembiv are provided in the Design Report (Tab 15D).

Page 4 of 5 The test report demonstrates the actuator's ability to withstand the prescribed seismic events without any structural degradation, switch continuity / discontinuity, or compromise to Class 1E safety function with the following anomalies.

During the resonant frequency search, resonant frequencies below 33 Hz were noted in the limit switch-junction box assemblies. These assemblies were considered as non-rigid structures and subjected to the second stage of testing described above. The results of the dynamic shake table test were satisfactory, thus resolving the anomaly. At the completion of the static seismic test, air leakage in excess of the specified maximum allowable rate was noted.

This leakage was traced to the 1/8" NPT connection between the 90 degree elbow tube and the solenoid stack adaptor.

Examination of the connection revealed cross-threading.

Both the elbow fitting and the adaptor were replaced and the connection was sealed with hydraulic sealant. Air leakage was again measured and found to be within acceptable limits. This anomaly was attributed to a manufacturing error and appropriate corrective action was taken by the manufacturer.

The purpose of the MSIV bend test (Tab 15C) was to show that while applying various pipe end loads to the valve no:zles and an equivalent seismic pull load to the operator assembly, the valve would perform its function as an active valve and close. The end loads applied were to simulate those expected to occur during a guillotine break in the Main Steam piping while the seismic pull load is the equivalent of a typical design basis earthquake for a MSIV.

The bend test report (Tab 15C) concludes that the ASME III, Class 2 MSIV has been operated successfully through several cycles of motion under full pipe and seismic load conditions. The closure times under fully loaded conditions and no-load conditions were measured and found to be below the five second closure limit imposed by Specification 2DVS-261 (Tab 0). Stresses in the valve body were recorded during maximum load conditions, and found to be below maximum allowable values defined in the ASME code. (See Appendix II of Report in Tab 15C.) The stresses in the valve actuator are determined in Tab 15D and are shown to be below allowable limits for all applicable load conditions.

The MSIV design and seismic report (Tab 15D) provides the basis for ASME Section III Code acceptance for three 2G"

, Class 600 "Y" type Main Steam Isolation Valves for the DV-2 Power Station.

ALM has performed this analysis in accordance with the reautrements of Design Specification 2DVS-261, Revision 1 (Tab 8) and criteria defined in the appitcable ASME Doller

fk kii I~O Page 5 of 5 and Pressure Vessel Code. This analysis provides the necessary evaluations and calculations to assure acceptance to the design requirements stated in Specification 2BVS-261, Revision 1.

The Namco EA-740 limit switches are generically quahlified for seismic and environmental conditions in Namco Reports OTR 111, Revision 1, QTR 112, Revision 1 and QTR 127, Revision 1. These reports are available under SDDF 2707.660-651-001D.

No::le End Loads and Bv oass Pinind Loads The MSIV's are installed in-line with 32" diameter main steam piping. The end loads developed on the MSIV's are considered acceptable due to the maximum stress levels in the process piping being less than code allowables. The 2" by pass piping loads developed on the valve body are also considered acceptable based on maximum stress levels in the by pass piping being less than code allowables. The above end loads are contained in Tab 11. In addition, the nozzles located on the air intake manifold of the control panel utilize flexible pipe connections. Therefore, the attachment piping to the manifold will not transmit end loads to the no::le.

GILnghtsig2s.J.

Based on the above information, SWEC verification of test input, design analysis, resolution of anomalies, and nozzle end load review, it has been determined that, with the exception of any outstanding open items, the MSIV's are seismically qualified for use at DVPS-2.

PUMP AND VALVE OPERABILITY ASSURANCE RIVREW I. PLANT INFORMATION

1. Name ,, Beaver Valley Unit Two Docket No.t_50-412

3. Utility .,_Duquesne Light company

4. NSSS: Westinghouse '

{X}PWR { } BWR

5. A/E Stone and Webster Engineering Corp.

6. C.P. Docket Date 10-20-72 C.P. SER Dates 11-9-73 (Notes Ref. numbers refer to numbers assigned in the documentation checklist)

II. GENERAL COMPONENT

• INFORMATION

1. Suppliera { } NSSS {X} BOP

2. Locations a. Building / Room Ma{ Steam Valve House

b. Elevation 789'

c. System Main Steam

3. Component I.D. No. on PEID dwgt 2 MSS *AOVIDIA. B. C

4. If' component is a ( ) Pump complete II.S.

If component is a {x) Valve complete II.6.

5. General Pump Data N/A

a. Pump b. Prime-mover Name Name Mfg. Mfg.

Model Model S/N S/K Type Type The component, whether pump or valve, is considered to be an assembly composed of the body, internals, prime-mover (or actuator) and functional accessories.

.i.

Pump and V21va Operability Review Duqu:sn3 - Beaver Valley Two - P.O 2BV- 26I Component 2 MSS *A0V10lA, B, C

a. Pump (continued) b.

overall Prime-mover (continued)

Overall Dimensions Dimensions Weight Weight Mounting Mounting Method **

Method Required B.H.P. H.P.

Prime-mover requirements Component System System (including normal, inanimum Parameters M D

M Accident and minimus)

Press Motor (volt.nge)

Temp Flow Head Turbine (pressure)

Media

• Required NPSH at maximum flow If M list t Avaliable NP5H Duty cycle operating speed Stall current critical Speed Class of insulation List functional accesssoriest*

Functional accessories are those additional sub-components that are required to make the pump assembly operational, (e.g., coupling, lubricating oil system, speed control system, feedback, etc.) Include manufacturer

'and model number.

. Pump and Valve operability Review Duqu:sno - Beaver Valley Two - P.O 2BV-261 Component: 2 MSS *A0V101A, B, C

6. General Valve Data

a. Valve b. Actuator (if not an integral unit)

Name Main Steam Isolation Valve Name _Not Applicable Mfg. Atwood and Morrill Co., Inc. Mfg.

2 MSS *A0V101A 1-15579-03 5/N 2 MSS *A0V10lB 2-15579-03 S/N 2 MSS *A0V101C: 3-15579-03 Type Wye Pattern Globe Tvoe Type Size 28" - Class 600 Size -

Weight 26.000 lbs. Weight Mounting Mounting Method Butt welded Method Required Maximum operating Delivered Torque Not Applicable Torque Power requirements: -

Component System System (including normal,' maximum and '

Parameters: Desien g N Accident and minimum)

Press + 10% VDC 1085 osig 790 onig 1100 onig Electrical 125 - 15% VDC Temp #

560 F. 517 F. 558 F.

Flow 1125.6 lb./Sec. _4425 lb./Sec.

Media Steam Pneumatic / Hydraulic Instru-Max delta P across valve 4.5 psi ment air rated at a nominal Closing time e max P 3 to 5 Sec.80-100 osi.

Opening time 9 max P 5 to 120 Sec.

List functional accessories

• Namco EA 740-50120 Limit Switches w/EC-210 Connector.

• Pump and VOlva Operability Review Duqu:sn3 - Beaver Valley Two - P.O 2BV- 26I III. PtlWCTION Componentt 2 MSS *A0V101A, B, C 1.

Describe components normal and safety functions (include accident initiating signals, 12 applicable):

Normalt Valve Ooen Safety Valve closure stops sudden and larne release of enerav in the form of malnateam either in the forward or reverse flow direction. Also. Drevents the blowdown of more than 2.

one steam nenerator after MSLB.

The components normal state 1st

{} Operating (3 Standby

3. Safety functions

a. () anergency reactor b.

shutdown {} Containment heat removal

c. N Containment isolation *

{} Reactor heat removal

e. {} Reactor core cooling f. {} Prevent significant

• release of radioactive material to environment g.

{} ofDoes one orthemorecomponent of the following function events? Mto mitigate Yes { No the conseq}

If "Yess, identity.

M LOCA () HELS () M$t.B

{} Other

• Functional accessories are those additional sub-components that are required to make the valve assembly operational, (e.g., limit switches, solenoid valves, accumulators, etc.) Include manufacturer and model number.

4 Se

Fump and V01va Operability Review

• Duqu:sn3 - Beaver Valley Two - F.0 23V-261 Component: 2 MSS *A0V10lA, B, C

. 4. Safety requiraments:

{} Intermittent operation {} During postulated event i

{} Continuous Operation Q Following postulated event' 's, i-If component operation is required following an event, give approniante length of time component must remain operational.

! 15 Minutes (e.g., hours, days, etc.)

t

5. For VALVES: ,4 Does the component {} Fail open

,$ Fall closed {} Fail as is i

Is this the fail safe position? @ Yes {} No 1s the valve used for throttling purposes? {} Yes N No 4

What is the maalaus acceptable internal and enternal leaktate?

Forward: 10cc/hr/in of seat diameter i Ravarset lec/hr/in of stem diameter Nitrogen equivalent of 2000 lb/hr of saturated steam.

IV. QUAI,IFICATI0li -

i

1.

Reference, by specific number, the design codes and standards used i

i as a guide to qualify the components i

IEEE-344-71, - 70 trrr - 19 % to7A _ rrrr - in9-1072.

i ASME Code Section III. NCA-3250. dated 1977. olus all addenda thereto includina Su==ar 1979.

1 2.

Have acceptance criteria been established and documented in the '

!. test plan (s) for the component? N Yes {} No 3.

Are the margins

• identified in the qualification documentation?

{ M Yes {} No 4.

Was the component that was qualified a model, or an actual assembly? actual annemhtv _. If an actual assembly, was it j

qualified as an assembly or by sub-assemblies? (i.e., valve, actuator, pump, driver)?, Actuator and control ann.1 unes r..r.a

) as sub-assemblies.

i Entire valve assembiv was quellffed by static bend tests,

)

j

• Margin is the differarce between design basis parameters and the test parameters used for equipment qualification. '

i 5- .

l i

l l

l

Pump and Valva Operability Review

, Duqu:sn3 - Beaver Valley Two - P.O 2BV-261 Component:

5. 2 MSS *A0V10lA B, C

.l0 List all component 3 performed or to be pe,rformed

's that demonstrate qualification Static Seismic Bend Test Ref.

IAi_

Seismic Test of 32" MSIV Control Panel 1.

_ Valve Actuator Oualification Test

_1.

Namco EA-740 Limit Switch Oualification

_3 Hydrostatic Shell Test Backseat Leakage

_f Test. Packing Leakane Test. Hydrostatic Discard Main Seat Leakane Test. Performance Test.

4 Operational Time Test -

Performance Testing -

of a 26" MSIV Durine Simulated 7

Guillotine Break Conditions

6. __

List all ccaponent analyses performed that demonstrate qualification:

Deslan'and Seismic Report L.

~

l 7.

As a result of any of the tests (or analyses),

deviations from design requirements identified?were any

~~~

S Yes {} No If "Yes", briefly describe any changes or to the component to correct the deviation.

made in tests (or analyses)

In Ref. 3. resonant frequencies below 33 Hz were noted on the limit switch-lunction box ansemblica. Thone n=anmblica vorn anbiner en further testing and results showed no evidence of physical d amace.

switch continuity / discontinuity or malfunction.

e

Pump and Valva Operability Review Duqu sn3 - Beaver Valley Two - P.O 2BV- 26i Component: 2 MSS *A0V101A, B, C

8. Was the tested component precisely identical (as to model, size, etc.) to the in-plant component? {} Yes S No If 'No", is installed component O oversized or {} undersized?

Actuator Assembly tested is smaller.

9.

Is component orientation sensitive? @ Yes {} No {} Unknown If "Yes",

does installed orientation coincide with test / analysis orientation?

{$ Yes {}No .

10. List all plant loading conditions considered during tests or analysis; (e.g., normal, upset, emergency, faulted):

Normal, upset emergency and faulted considered during analysis,

11. What is the fundamental frequency of the component?

Ref. Page Front to Back = > 33 cps 1 IV-27

.Gide to Side = > 33 cps Vertical 1 IV-27

= > 33 cps 1 IV-27

12. Does the component have a unique design or utilize. unique material in its construction? (F.xamples are special gaskets or packing, one of a kind components, limitations on nonferrous materials, special coatings or surfaces, etc.)

{} Yes N No If "Yes" identify:

13. What is the design (qualified) life of the component, exclusive of normal maintenance items such as packing, bearings, seals, diaphrages, gaskets, and other elastomers? 40 years

14. Which of the components normal maintenance items requires the most frequent replacement / repair? Packing What is the normal time interval between replacements / repairs?

As recuired.

15. List the harshest environmental conditions that the component could be exposed to during or following an accident, { e.g., temp.,

pressure, humidity, subnergence, radiation (type and dose), etc.,} :

2.25 psid, 535 P. 100% humidity.

1x 100rads, steam spray.

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QUAL IF : C.4 7 [C;l p;p,3;.RY OF ype 2 # ' U * ' ' M ' C-

• To be completed to stand on its own (do not refer to any document)

• All questions are to be answered (if not applicable; mark "fl/A")

1. _P l an t flame:

DEAVER VALLEY P0uER STATIOli - UllII 2

1. Uti1ity:

• DUQUEStiE LIGilT CollPA!IY 2.

Location: SIII PPIllCPORT. PElitiSYLVAllIA

3. Type: fur 4. Capacity (MWe flet):

857

5. Containment Type: un. HIF RREltlF/C0!! CRETE

6. Cooling Source: OHIO RIVER

7. IIRC Docket lio.: 50-412 8. CP Docket Date:

9. 10/20/72 1155S Vendor: WESTIttCiloUSE 10.

A/E: ST0llE.Allu WEDSTER EllGR cc II. Component flame:

Main Steam Isolation Valve

1. Scope: [ ] f(SSS [x] 00P 2.

Vendor: Atwood & Morrill Co.. In 3. Vendor Model fio. :

4. 15579-03 Manufacturer:

Atwood.&MorrillCo.h. Manufacturer Model llo.: 15579-03

6. Purchase Spec. flo.: 261 Inc.

7. Total flo. In Safety Systems:

8. 3 Location (Choose the worst one with respect to seismic)

Main Steam

a. Building: Valve House b. Elevation and Area:

c. Environment: [x ] liarsh 789'

[ ] Mild

9. Field Mounting:

a. [ ] Floor [

] Wall [ x ] Pipe [ ] Panel

[ ] Other (describe) b* [ ] Dolted; description: ,

[ x ] Welded; description:

[ ] Other; description: 3/8".Olu. s 1 zGI'lldE- EEc. l 035

. Continuous, ER70S_2; 7/8' tsize

_ Valves conne,cted on unstream side to Nomiaal ID Pipe of SA-106 Gr. C Material and downstream 29.687" Nominal ID Pipe of A-155, Gr. KC-70, Class 1

c. .

Mounting restriction from the manufacturer,-if any: (horizontal Vertical, etc.) 22-1/8 in, required maintenance access

10. ,

Functional Description of the Equipment:

a. System in which located:

Main Steam

b. Type:

(for item 8 in 11, above)

[ x ] Active [ ] Passive

c. Equipment required for: [ ] Ilot standby

[ ] Cold shutdown

[ ] Both [ x ] fleither

d. Intended safety function:

releaseflow reverse of energy direction.in the form of main steam, either in thValve clos e forward or Also prevents the blowdown of more than one steam generator aft er a MSLB.

1

e.

Direct consequences of its failure (brief description of :he effect on the system):

_ Rapid cooling of the reactor coolant system.

f. Redundancies, if any: None.

Each MSIV receives both Train A and B Signals.

III. Equipment Qual.ification Methodi ~

[ ] Test [ ] Analysis

,[x] Combination of test & analysis

[ ] Other (describe)

IV. Loads and Load Combinations:

1. Loads: -

a. [ x] Seismic b. [ ] Hydrodynamic

c. [ ]Flowinducedvib, d. [ ] Normal operation vib.

e. [ ]Otherdynamicloads: (specify)

2. Combination technique: Not Anoticable

3. Required acceleration in each direction:

a. [ x] ZPA [ ]Other;specify: -

b. 08E: s/s 3.02  ; f/b: 3.02  ; v: 3.og SSE: s/s 3.og  ; f/b: 3.og  ; v: 3.og V.

Qualification test: by Test (complete this section for each report including parti

1. Test report:

(Company) Environmental Test Laboratory. AVCO Systems Div.

a.

Title:

seimmir ouniiriention Teat nonore. 32 in. MsIV Control Panel for Atwood & Morrill Co. . Inc.

no.: 13824  ; revision: o  ; date: July 5, 1977

b. Reviewed by: Atwood & Morrill Co. . Inc.

2. Qualification report:

(Company) Environmental Test Lab.. AVC0 Systems Div.

l a.

Title:

Seismic Oualification Test Report. 32 in. MSIV Control l

Panel for Atwood & Morrill Co. . Inc.

no.: nm  ; revision; o  ; date: July 5. 1977 b.

Reviewed by: Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation

3. Laboratory mounting:

a.

Describe (from shaker table to the equipment; include orientation, bolt (size, no , gr., etc.), weld (type, size, length, electrode type,etc.)]:

Control panel was bolted to an intermediate adapter at a 45 incline.

Panel and adapter assembly were suspended on two (2) l shakers. Test setup shown in Figures 1-3.

b.

If different from field mounting include equivalency justific nion:

Not Applicable

4. Resonance search: [x]yes [ ]no 4.

Technique: Sine sweep in each principal axis.

b.

Excitation magnitude & frequency interval (or sweep rate):

0.3g peak at 1 Octave / min. from 3 to 50 cps.

. c. Resonances found: (up to: 50 cos.

)

s/s: > 50 cps.  ; f/b: > 50 cps. ; v: > 50 cps.

5. Test

Description:

a. Input:

(a) [x ] single axis; [,] biaxial; [ ] pseudo biaxial;

[ ]tri-axial [ ] random; [ ] sine beat;

[x]other: continuous sine dwell

[ ] phase coherent; [ ] phase incoherent (b) Frequency range: 5 - 36 cos.

(c) Input level (g-level & frequency)

OBE: s/s: 3.oe  ; f/b: *

• 3.0,  ; v: 3.0, SSE: s/s: 3.og  ; f/b: 3.0g* *

v

3.og (d) Number of tests performed: OBE: 5 ; SSE: i ; other:

(e)

Sequential test, including fatigue & vibration aging conducted: [ ]yes [x]no Justification, if not perform'ed: Not Required

b. Output:

(a) TRS generated: [ ]yes [ x] no (b) Percent damping in TRS generation: Not Applicable (c) Percent damping used in RRS: Not Applicable (d) Margin' included in RRS: Not Available

[ ] by test lab. [x ] by others: (specify) TVA (e) i Attach sets of TRS and RRS comparison plots (if not provided, explain): RRS plots were not provided with the test olan or l

report, but are available in TVA Document Sped WB-OC-40-31.2.

l Rev. l.,

l Test Results are shown on Figures 22-29 and Table II (Pages 3A-3I).

At all frequencies above 9 Hz; below 9 Hz, 0-7 inch displacement amplitude.

1 .

3

ATWOOD AND MORRILL CO. , INC.

M.S. I.V. AIR CONTROL PANEL TEST RESULTS i s

TABLE II

. DATA

SUMMARY

p FOS ITION Al A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 '

A9 A10 All A12 C1 h:

DIRECTION Z-X Y 2-X Z-X Y Z-X Z-X Y Z-X Z-X Z-X Z-X X ! ,

T' l-X AXIS X AXIS l' RUN 5 .3g NIL .3 .2 NIL NIL .3 NIL .4g .2 .2 .2 .3g RUN 6 5 CPS 1.0 NIL 1. 0 1.0 NIL 1.0 1.0 NIL 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 8 CPS 2.2 NIL 2.2 2.5 NIL 2.0 2.0 NIL 2.2 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.6 13 CPS 2.5 NIL 3.0 2.9 NIL 2.2 2.2 NIL 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.4 3.0 16 CPS

• 3.4 NIL 2.8 3.0 NIL 2.0 2.8 NIL 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.8 3.0

..- 20 CPS 2.6 .5 2.4 2.6 NIL 2.0 2.6 .5 2.6 2.0 2.2 2.2 3.0 24 CPS 3.3 NIL 2.8 2.6 NIL 2.1 2.4 NIL 2.9 2.1 2.1 2.2 3.0 30 CPS 3.5 NIL 2.5 3.2 NIL 2.3 3.0 NIL 3.1 2.4 2.4 2.2 3.0 36 CPS 3.5 NIL 2.6 3.6 NIL 2.3 3.6 NIL 3.5 2.5 2.4 2.2 3.0 Y-Y AXIS Y AXIS RUN 8 NIL .30 NIL NIL .30 NIL NIL .3g NIL NIL NIL NIL .3g RUN 9 5 CPS NIL 1.0 NIL NIL 1.0 NIL NIL 1.0 NIL NIL NIL NIL 1.0 8 CPS NIL 2.8 NIL .6 2.8 NIL NIL 2.6 NIL NIL .6 NIL 2.6 13 CPS .5 3.0 NIL NIL 2.9 NIL NIL 2.9 NIL NIL NIL NIL 3.0 I s) 16 CPS

• 1.0 3.1 .8 .8 3.1 .6 .6 3.0 .6 .6 .6 .8 3.0

\~ / 20 CPS 1.0 3.1 .8 NIL 3.0 NIL .5 3.2 1.0 NIL NIL NIL 3.0 24 CPS .6 3.0 NIL NIL 2.9 NIL NIL 3.0 NIL NIL NIL NIL 3.0 30 CPS .9 3.6 .5 NIL 2.6 NIL .9 3.8 NIL .8 .6 NIL 3.0 36 CPS 1.5 5.8 1.1 NIL 3.6 NIL 1.0 4.8 1.5 1.1 1.0 NIL 3.0 Z-Z AXIS Z AXIS RUN 12 .5 NIL .35 .3 NIL .3 .35 NIL .20 . 25 .25 .33 .30 RUN 13 5 CPS 1.0 NIL .80 1.0 NIL .6 .5 NIL 1.0 .75 .84 .9 1.0 8 CPS 2.6 NIL 2.0 2.6 NIL 1.8 1.9 NIL 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.6 13 CPS 2.5 -NIL 2.0 2.4 NIL 1.8 2.0 NIL 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.0 3.0 l 16 CPS ** 3.2 NIL 3.0 3.8 NIL 2.9 3.0 NIL 2.3 3.0 3.2 3.0 3.0 20 CPS ** 3.0 NIL 3.0 3.6 NIL 2.6 3.5 NIL 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 24 CPS 2.2 NIL 2.4 2.8 NIL 2.2 2.4 NIL 2.2 2.6 2.4 2.4 3.0 30 CPS 3.0 NIL 2.8 3.0 NIL 2.2 1.9 NIL 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.8 3.0 36 CPS 3.0 NIL 3.0 5.0 NIL 4.0 4.2 NIL 4.0 4.8 4.8 5.0 3.0 NOTES

• Time sequence data shown in Figures 30, 31, and 32.

l

• • Chatter noise riding on control waveform was filtered out during retest. (See bar graph Figures 26 through 29 to verify both readings. )

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AIR CONTROL PANEL '

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. FIGURE 29

1 cc Results:

(a) Basis of qualification:

[x ] structural integrity verified; [x] operability verified (b) Failures detected during qualification tests: {

None __ !

i-(c) Anomalies (With disposition) if any: During seismic level tests. deviations from unit resoonse were attributed to C G ..

l location. fixture susoension.

(d) shaker stiffness and/or noise. _

Modifications mada (in the equipment or mounting) during the qualification phase; describe, if any:

None (e) How (modifications) implemented in the field:

Not Applicable

{ d.

dthertestsperformed(suchasfragifftytest;includeresults)

None

~

VI. <

! Qualification 1.

by Analysis (complete this section for each report )

Analysis' eport: (Company) .

/

a.

Title:

N /

no.: \; revision: /

_; da  :

2.

b. Reviewed by: \ '

Qualification Report: (C any) /

a.

Title:

/

no.:

Y 3.

revis n

\  ; date:

Failure modes:

\

/ \

4 Method of Analy s:

[ ] static [ ] static coefficient

[ ]ti history

[ dynamic

[ ] response spectrum

5. Nat il frequencies (up to cut off frequency of:

,sd:  ; f/b: -

):

_; v:

. - . - _ - _ _ . = _ __-___ - _ . - - _ _ _ - _ - _

e.

Direct consequences of its failure (brief description,of the ef on the system):

/

f. . Re Ndancies, if any:

/

/ -

III. Equipment Quali.fic ion Method! .

[ ] Test [ ] Ana is

[ ] Combination of test analysis

[ ther (describe)

IV.

Loads and Load Combinations:

1. Loads:

a. [_ ] Seismic .

b. [ Hydrodynamic

c. [ ] Flow induced v . d.- [ ] rmal operation vib.

e. [ ] Other dynam loads: (specify)

2. Combination techn ue:

3. Required accel \

ation in each direction:

a. [ ] ZP [ ] Other;specify: -

b. OBE: .s/s  ; f/b: ,

v

SSE: s/s  ; f/b:

v

1 V.

Qualification test: by Test (complete this section for each report includ

i. _

t.

1. Test report: (Company)

American Environments Co., Inc.

l a.

Title:

Nuclear Qualification Test Report on MSIV Air Spring Actuator for Atwood & Morrill Co.. Inc.

no.: STR-060578-1 ; revision: 0

b.  ; date: 10/23/78 Reviewed by: Atwood & Morrill Co.. Inc.

2.

Qualification report: (Company) Atwood & Morrill Co., Inc.

a.

Title:

Valve Actuator Qualification Test Report no.: 201-39.500 ; revision; b.

O  ; date: 05/01/79 Reviewed by:

Stone & Webster Engineering Co.. I'c._

n

3. Laboratory mounting: _

a.

Describe [from shaker table to the equipment; include orientation ,

bolt (size, no , gr., etc.), weld (type, size, length, electrode type,etc.)]: Actuator assembly mounted on test

~

o ho i n!b fixture with (18) l Specimen 8 capscrews.and fixture mounted to shaker table with (32) 1/2" grade f -

b. . If different from field mounting include equivalency justification:

Not Applicable

4. Resonance search: [x ] yes [ ] no 4.

Technique: Sine Sweep in each orthononal direction, b.

Excitation magnitude 5 frequency interval (or sweep rate):

0.3g at approximately 1 octave / minute

. c. Resonances found: (up to: 50 cps.

)

s/s: 12 cos.  ; f/b: 9 ens.  ; v: 20 cos.

5. Test

Description:

a. Input:

(a) [ ] single axis; [X] biaxial; [ ] pseudo biaxial;

[ ]tri-axial [ ] random; [ ] sine beat;

[ x] other: Sine dwell: Static seismic loading.

[ ]phasecoherent; [ ] phase incoherent (b) Frequency range: i en as en..

(c) Input level (g-level & frequency) 08E: s/s: 14.4 g  ; f/b: 14.4 g  ; v: 14.4g SSE: s/s: 14.4 g  ; f/b: 14.4g  ; v: 14.4g (d) Number of tests performed: 08E:_1_; SSE: i ; other:

(e)

Sequential test, including fatigue & vibration aging conducted: [ ] yes [x ] no Just'ification, if not performed: Testine conducted in i

accordance with IEEE-382-1972 requirements.

b. Output:

l (a) TRS generated: [ ] yes [ x ] no (b) Percent damping in TRS generation: Not Applicable (c) Percent damping used in RRS:

Not Acolicable (d) Margin' included in RRS:

Input as shown on Figure 3 (Page 6A)

[ x] by test lab. [ ]byothers: (specify) l (e)

Attach sets of TRS and RRS comparison plots (if.not provided, explain): Inout and output data is orovided in tabular form for each accelecometer.

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c. Results:

(a) Basis of qualification:

! [X ] structural integrity verified; [ X] operabfif ty verified (b) Failures detected during qualification tests:

None (c) Anomalies (With disposition) if any: At static seismic allnunhia. The test, ethnu airfi leakage erino exceeded the Atwood & Morrillthe co attributed to a manufacturina error. leakage was again Anomaly is me (d)

Modifications made'(in the equipment or mounting) during the qualification phase; describe, if any:

None (e) How (modifications) implemented in the field:

Not Applicable d.

Other tests performed (such as fragility test; include results)

None i

l VI.

Qualification by Analysis (complete this section for each report )

1.

Analysis Report: (Company) Atwood & Morrill Co., Inc.

a.

Title:

Design and Seismic Report for 28" Class. 600 Main Steam Isolation Valve.

no.:302-15579-00 ; revision: 0  ; date: 04/23/87

b. Reviewed by:

Stone & Webster Engineeri'ne Corporation 2.

Qual'rication Report: (Company) Atwood & Morrill Co. Inc.

a.

Title:

Design and Seismic Report for 28" Class, 600 Main Steam Isolation Valve. '

no. : 302-15579-00 ; revision:

3.

0  ; date: 04/23/87 Failure modes:

Structural integrity and operability were verified 4

through analysis and static load testina.

Method of Analysis:

[x] static [ ] static coefficient [ ] dynamic

[ ] time history [ ]responsespectrum 5.

Natuni frequencies (up to cut off frequency of: 33 Hz s/s: ) 33 Hz  ; f/b: I 33 Hz

):

V

> 33 Hz l

i

- - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - , - , - , - = ~ " " ~ ' ' ' " ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

7 ,

1

}

, 6. Model Jype:

[ ]10; [ ]20; [x]30

[]finiteelement: (kinds of elements used)

[x]other: (specify) Hand calculations by referenced engineering texts.

7. Support & Boundary conditions in the model:

All pressure retaining par'ts up to and including the weld ends , and including the globe di_sc.

Support is provided by connecting oipe.

8. Comput'er codes used: Not Applicable Method of verification:

9. Damping: 08E: N/A  ; SSE: N/A  ; Basis: FSAR, Sect. 3.9B.3.2.2

10. Fatigue & aging consideration: [ ]yes

.11. Responses:

( x] no

a. Method of combination: [ ]A8S; ( x] SRSS; l

[ ]al,gebraic, [-]other,specify:

i t

b. For critical elements:

3

! Total Source

( Identification calculated Allowable Location Loads stresses of

! stresses allowables Operating Pressure Body Seismic Stress Seismic and Dead Weight 1,759 psi 2,675 psi ASME III No-3522 Stem Proper Operating and Seismic 21.983 nai 69.600 nmi O.75 Sv - FSAR Poppet Disc Design Pressure 11,066 psi. 17,500 psi 0.75 Sy - FSAR Identification Location Allow. Source of allow.

loads Total defl. defl. defl.

valve Superstructure Seismic 0.0505 in. N/A N/A l

VII. Surveillance and Maintenance Program:

l 1. Qualified life: 40 Years (based on weakest link or appendage in the equip.)

2. Basis: EQ Package 261 3.

Procedure of assuring operability of the equipment under seismic and dynamic condition throughout the plant life: An Oceration Surveillance Procedure /.^urrently being developed).

t l 9