ML20215H616
| ML20215H616 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 04/16/1987 |
| From: | Carey J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215H618 | List: |
| References | |
| 2NRC-7-085, 2NRC-7-85, TAC-62895, NUDOCS 8704200451 | |
| Download: ML20215H616 (80) | |
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M 2NRC-7-085 Bewer Vall o. 2 Unit Project Organization Telecopy ( 2 3 Ext.160 P.O. Box 328 April 16, 1987 Shippingport, PA 15077 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 BVPS-2 Seismic and Dynanic Qualification of Safety-Related Mechanical and Electrical Equipment Gentlemen: Please find enclosed Duquesne Light Company's (DLC) responses to the Seis-mic Qualification Review Tean (SQRT) and Pump and Valve Operability Review Tean (PVORT) Audit Issues. The SQRT generic and specific issues are contained in Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Supplement No. 4 Section 3.10.1.3 and 3.10.1.4, respectively. The PVORT issues were forwarded to DLC by NRC Meeting Notice dated March 18, 1987, and will he included in SER Supplenent No. 5 scheduled to be issued in May 1987, in a meeting with the NRC cn April 1,1987, draf t DLC responses were reviewed and assessed for completeness. At the bottom of each response is the status as discussed at the conclusion of this meeting. The revisions as agreed upon have been incorporated and DLC considers the informa-tion contained in the enclosure sufficient to close Confirmatory Issues 12 and 13, with the exception of replacenent of Main Stean Isolation Valves. In a recent memorandum from the NRC staff to the ACRS, the seismic design of the Decay Heat Removal System with respect to the safety margin of equipment was addressed. The NRC staff's review of the BVPS-2 Seismic Progran is summarized in SER Supplenent 4 Section 3.10. BVPS-2 has satisfied the ACRS concern by applying a 10% margin to this equipnent. This margin is assured and denonstrated by the enveloping of the RRS curves by the TRS curves. DLC consi-ders this issue to be resolved by the issuance of SER Supplement 4. 8704200451 870416 fDR ADOCK 05000412 ko4 , I
l United States Nuclear Regulatory Cannission BVPS-2 Seismic and Dynamic Qualification of Safety-Related Mechanical and Electrical Equipment Page 2 Should you have any questions, please contact E. T. Eilmann at (412) 393-7895. DUQUESNE L T COMPANY By Ls' (Jj/ J. Car 69 ETE/ijr NR/SEIS/DYN Attachment AR/NAR cc: Mr. P. Tam, Project Manager (w/o/a/) Mr. S. Hou, NRC (w/a) Mr. A. S. Masciantonio, NRC (w/a) Mr. J. Beall, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector (w/a) Mr. L. Prividy, NRC Resident Inspector (w/o/a) Mr. J. N. Singh, EG&G Idaho, Inc. (w/a) Mr. C. Kido, EG&G Idaho, Inc. (w/a) INP0 Records Center (w/o/a) \ l
f PVORT SER Issue: 3.10.2.2(1) ; Issue. The environmental qualification of the 80P pump motors is not > specifically mentioned in FSAR 3.98.3.2.1, as compared to the B0P valve operator discussion in FSAR 3.98.3.2.2 Item 5. The applicant shall anend the FSAR as needed to confirm that the operability qualification of each pump motor considered all environmental conditions over .its qualified . life ' (aging, radiation, accident environnent, etc.).. (See FSAR Section 3.98.3.2.1, page 3.9.10a and NL' REG-1057 Section 3.10.2) Evaluation. In a letter dated September 23, 1986, the applicant provided a response to this issue. The response indicated how motor environmental qualificaion was being addressed and that the required information would be included in a future amendment to the FSAR. This issue is confirma-tory. Response: Attached is a copy of the revised FSAR Section 3.98.3.2.1 in response to this issue. This FSAR change was incorporated into Amendment 16 issued April 1, 1987. Status: Closed (April 1, 1987 NRC Meeting)
, BVPS-2-FSAR Safety-related active valves are likewise subjected to a series of stringent tests prior to service to ensure functionability of these valves. These preoperational tests and analyses assure the functional reliability of the pump and valve assemblies for their intended safety system service and performance.
Operability of active pumps and valves is assured by satisfying the requirements of various p rogrt.ms . Safety-related valves are qualified by prototype testing and analysis, and safety-related active pumps by analysis with suitable stress limits and nozzle loads. The content of these programs is detailed as follows. 3.93.3.2.1 Pump Operability Assurance Program Active pumps are qualified for operability by being subjected to rigid tests both p'rior to and after installation in BVPS-2. These tests include: l
- 1. Hydrostatic tests of ASME Section III requirements.
- 2. Performance tests, while the pump is operated with flow, to determine total developed head, minimum and maximum head,
, net positive suction head requirements, and other pump / motor parameters.
- 3. Operability qualification of pump motors for the environmental conditions over the installed life (aging, radiation, accident environmental simulation, etc) according to IEEE Standard 323-1971 or IEEE Standard 382-1972.
Also monitored during these operation tests are bearing temperatures and vibration level 5, which are shown to be below appropriate limits specified to the manufacturer for design of each active pump. After the pump is installed in BVPS-2, it undergoes performance testing and the required periodic in-service inspection and operation as applicable. These tests demonstrate reliability of the pump for the design life of BVPS-2. In addition to these tests, the safety-related active pumps are qualified for operability during an SSE condition by ensuring that:
- 1. The pump is not damaged during the seismic event.
- 2. The pump continues operating when subjected to the SSE loads.
The pump manufacturer is required to show that the pump operates normally when subjected to the maximum applicable amplified seismic (floor) accelerations, attached piping nozzle loads, and dynamic system leads associated with the faulted operating condition. Analysis and/or testing procedures are utilized in accordance with Amendment 16 3.9-10a April.1987
b PV0RT SER Issue 3.10.2.3 Specific (1) Issue. The review of the fuel pool cooling pump (Tag Number 2FNC*P21A) revealed that during pump testing the applicant had identified design flow rate and pump / motor assembly vibration readings as not being within the limits of the acceptance criteria. The vibration problem requires that the pump mounting have additional support added. The applicant shall notify the staff when (a) the installation has been modified and (b) the pump satisfactorily meets the testing of all design parameters and manu-f acturer's criteria. Evaluation. In the letter dated October 27, 1986 the applicant conmitted to notify the staff when the fuel pool cooling pump has been tested and accepted for operation. The applicant has already explained that the testing and modifications will not be completed prior to fuel load. The applicant has determined that the punp is not required until the start of the first refueling outage. The staff finds the applicant's connitment to be acceptable, pending notification by the applicant. This issue is con-firmatory. Response: At the time of the audit. 2FNC*P21A had an open Nonconformance and Disposition Report No.12346 describing the test failure because the pump did not meet acceptance criteria for vibration at the outboard motor bearing in horizontal direction. The fuel pool cooling pump, 2FNC*P21A motor support stand was modified and motor was retested for vibration level and the data was acceptable. N&D 12346 (final disposition copy attached) was closed on 2/25/87 and the pump is now coupletely qualified. The attached figure shows the new test curve and the manufacturer's curve for 2FNC*P21A. As indicated on page 99 of the N&D the pump develops the flow rate and total head required to support safety analyses with a substantial margin (44%). Therefore no further action is required. Status: Closed (Response revised as agreed upon during the April 1,1987 NRC Meeting)
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- 1) 2FNC*P21A did not meet head / flow curve requirements. See attached TDR 2882 and data sheets, RI SUG #1895 is also attached.
- 2) 2FNC*P21A pump did not meet acceptance criteria for vibration in the horizontal direction. See attached TDR-2817, SWR-5037 and data sheets. ,
- 3) 2FNC*P21B pump did not meet head / flow curve requirements. See attached TDR-2883 and data sheets.
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ATTACHMENT 11.6 QCC (( TEST CRITIQUE TITLE RET EST po E t_ pm# cmu MG pose (1FhjC w P2.) AT uoTop CRITIQUE PERFORMER OF TEST FOUND RESULTS SATISFACTORY WITH EXCEPTION OF THE FOLLOW (a) Problem found: && d . (b) Corrective action taken or initiated: h n_ (c) Open ites No.: Mou Written and forwarded to: dlA (d) Tes t summary: 1 B"1 9 e i bamtd Me t h o n h 5 b m$-h'n 0 ONd e4 Let A ucrm - cr.vd hmn2rt ATndi3 h4 cfm - n c t
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Inboard Bearing 0 , 1 85 MIts 0.093 IPS (Unfilterd) 4 0.002. IPS (Filtered) Outboard Bearing O.12 MII,5 O.079 IPS (Unfilterd) A Q.OO3 IPS (Filtered) 8.4.6 Motor Bearing Temperature,: g Inboard Bearing i2- *F 73IY EY Outboard Bearing 72 I __
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l Seever Valley Power Staties Unit 2 g - Startup Manust TEST DEFICIENCLES TEST DEFICIENCT R870tf TDR$d[f'7 DEFICIENCY ID W F1FICAT100 Systes Names F ,l P . ; c . o 1 ,,. Co .seet n.ru No.: wu c.,,P,2 i n l Location: ~73 0 bl bJehb) J Subsystem Pks No.: 90- ) , M Test Procedure No.: _77: F"dc '.2dA '2,03 Af fected Composeate are [ Safety Related Non-gafety Related (Cat. I) Description of Deficiency o ma t) hr3Ned GAron A Orc t nbJra l ace.cnahack
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Director-Startup Froof Test Section/ designee 1 Corrective Action Completed ) System Test Engr /5pecialist Date: 3-16p"E7 Retest Satisfactority Completed , 31 1 Date: 3-//.-E 1 l Syssee Teet Ingr'. 4 Test Procedure Report No.: 6-1220 , l Distributtos: Original to Los l Initiating System Test Speciallet/ Engineer i Revisies 4'
DUQUESNE 1,1GMT COlf ANY - Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 Startup Manual Chapter 5.6 TEST DEFICIENCY REPot? REVISION FORM TDR$ ~JP84~70 - Revised Deficiency Identification
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Revised Solution: l s s ve MLb 03 % B anet mo b n,e AJ th 1 Revised Retest Eq sent: - s.spv erQrm Wu C- 'Ji~- F*oc '20 A - 2.o C Initiated by d Date ~3- ( ~5 -F'7 System Test I inser/ Spec ialis t Reviewed by: . . Sys h supervisor Date: 1 4!87 Approved by: nu# - dN Date 8 # #7 Director-$tartup Proof Test Section/ designee Revision 6
T PV0RT SER Issue 3.10.2.3 Specific (2) Issue. The review of the MSIV (Tag Number 2 MSS-HYV101A) found that oper-ational problems have been identified by the applicant. Also, environmen-tal qualification had not yet been completed. The applicant is consider-ing several options to address operability of this component, including redesign or replacement. The applicant shall notify the staff when (a) a suitable modification and repair has been determined, (b) the necessary repairs and modifications have been completed, (c) testing has been completed, and (d) when full qualification including environmental has been established. Evaluation. In the letter dated October 27, 1986 the applicant indicated that the existing MSIVs will be used. The applicant will notify the staff when all problems associated with the MSIVs have been corrected, and the l valves are fully qualified and ready for operation. The staff finds the applicant's connitment to be acceptable, pending confirmaton of qualifica-tion. This issue is confirmatory. l Response: OLC has decided to replace the three existing MSIVs (2 MSS *HYV-lulA, B, C) manufactured by Crosby. The replacement valves are " Wye" pattern type globe valves with a nominal size of 28" manufactured by Atwood and Morrill . This modification necessitates a revision to the
- scheduled fuel load date from April 30,1987 to May 21,1987. Since the
! reactor plant will not be affected by the valve replacement activity, DLC intends to proceed with fuel load on May 21, 1987. Criticality, however, will not occur until installation and testing has been completed (The present schedule is June 30,1987). The finalization of the qualification documentation in support of BVPS-2's plant specific conditions is sched-uled to be completed by fuel load (May 21,1987). DLC will notify the NRC when the new valves have been qualified, installed and passed pre- opera- , tional tests. This new Atwood & Morrill valve is a proven design in the nuclear industry and has been installed on at least 29 BWR or PWR nuclear renctors in the United states alone. The capability of this valve to meet seismic and environmental qualification requirements has obviously been demonsrtated by the NRC's approval of this valve's application at these ( other plants (see attached list). Therefore, the NRC should not require an extensive review. l Status: Open (Notify NRC when valves have been qualified) l l l
Att achnent.1 Atwood and Morrill Co., Inc. Installation List of Main Steam Isolation Valves Sequoyah 1 & 2 Pilgrim 1 Perry 1 & 2 Enrico Fermi 2 - Hatch 1 River Bend 1 Allens Creek 1 Clinton 1 Oyster Creek 1 Grand Gulf 1 & 2 Nine Mile Point 1 Monticello Susquehanna 1 & 2 Limerick 1 & 2 Peach Bottom 2 & 3 Hope Creek 1 & 2 Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3 Hartsville Al, A2, Phipps Bend 1 & 2
r PV0RT SER Issue: 3.10.2.3 Generic (1) Issue. At the time of the audit, most construction tests had been completed. The hot functional tests are scheduled for late 1986. The applicant shall confirm that all preservice tests for safety-related pumps and valves that are required before fuel load have been completed. The applicant shall also provide a list of all preservice tests to be comple-ted, the schedule for these tests, and the justification for any tests scheduled beyond fuel load. Evaluation. The applicant responded to this issue in a letter dated Octo-ber 27, 1986. The Initial Test Program and Pre-Operations Test Phase are described in FSAR Sectoin 14.2 and 14.2.1.2. The schedule for the Ini-tial Test Program for system operabilty verification, pre-op test phase, and initial start-up test phase is shown FSAR Figure 14.2-3. The applic-ant intends to complete the majority of pre-op tests before fuel load. The applicant has committed to perform sufficient testing prior to fuel loading to provide reasonable assurance that the test performed after fuel load will be successful. The applient has stated that "all appropriate pre-service tests will be completed prior to fuel load". The staff finds the applicant's response and FSAR descrptions to be acceptable, pending confirmation of completion of the pre-service tests needed before fuel load. This issue is confirmatory. Response. In 1986, the Joint Test Group (JTG) approved P0-2.01A.08 which included approx.151 tests required for core load. This list was based on FSAR, Tech. Spec. and Reg. Gd. requirements and also the present Level II Scheduled (6t that time) in anticipation that most testing would be com-pleted as scheduled prior to core load. In January 1987 it was determined what tests are required for core load. Fifty-seven (57) tests may be completed prior to core load, but they aren't necessary based on the following method used to determine what is required.
- 1) A list of Operating Surveillance Test (OST) required for Mode 6 completion and their associated tech. spec. requirements were prepared.
- 2) A list of Beaver Valley Test (BVT) required for Mode 6 completion were prepared.
- 3) A determination was then made as to what tests (Preoperational/ System Operability Verification / Initial Startup Tests) were required to satisfactorily prepare a component or system to be tested by an OST or BVT.
- 4) From this list of tests it was determined what supporting systems or tests are required to be completed or avail able to perform each test.
- 5) It was then determined what tests are required for core load.
PVORT The 151 tests can be broken down into four categories. The first category are those tests required to be completed to support fuel load; the second category are tests that must be performed during the core loading process; the third category are those tests that will be conducted during power ascension testing; and the last category covers tests which are not
' required for any of the above three operating milestones and can be per-formed at some later date. ,All tests required for fuel load will be completed as scheduled. However, for those tests or sections of tests or retests that must be moved to after core load, a 10CFR50.59 safety evalua-tion will be submitted to the NRC for review (prior to core load).
Status: Closed (April 1, 1987 NRC Meeting) i
PVORT SER Issue: 3.10.2.3 Generic Issue (2) Issue. At the time of the audit, approximately 10 to 15 percent of all safety related pumps and valves had not been qualified. The applicant shall confirm that all safety-related pumps and valves are properly quali-fled and installed prior to fuel load. In addition, the applicant shall provide written confirmation that the original loads used in tests or analyses to qualify safety-related pumps and valves are not exceeded by any new loads, such as those imposed by a LOCA (hydrodynamic loads) or y as-built conditions. Evaluation. In the letter dated October 27, 1986 the applicant made a commitment that all safety-related equipment will be qualified and proper-ly installed prior to fuel load. The applicant will notify the staff if any equipment cannot be qualified before fuel load, or if any new loads are imposed that exceed those loads used to originally qualify the equip-ment. The staff finds the applicant's response acceptable pending confir-mation of qualification completion. This issue is confirmatory. Response: The seismic and dynamic qualification program is in the final stages of completion. All pumps and valves have been properly qualified, except for the three Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) (See 3.10.2.3, Specific Issue 2). Installation status is at 99.8% complete with 7 equipment items (including the MSIVs) yet to be verified. Other than the MSIV's no other pumps or valves are part of the 7 equipment items to be verified. BVPS-2 has successfully implemented and completed a stress reconciliation program. The main objective being complete reconcilation ofas-installed piping systems and mechanical equipment. This program which included a review of all interfacing loads on mechanical equipment (i.e, pumps, valves, heat exchangers and strainers) has been completed. All interfac-ing loads on mechanical equipment have been reconciled to ensure the actu-al loads imposed are below the specified design allowable loads. Stat.us: Closed (April 1, 1987 NRC Meeting)
PV0RT SER Issue 3.10.2.3 Generic (3) Issue. There were several instances where the tested component is not the same as the installed component. However, no similarity analysis has been included in the documentation which addresses acceptability. A similarity statement (analysis of form, fit, func-tion, manufacturing methods, materials, etc.) must be provided in all cases where the tested unit is not identical to the installed unit. The effect of these differences on component operability should be addressed. Attention should also be given to test conditions that are not identical to the expected plant conditions. The applicant shall evaluate its document files to assure that all similarity con-cerns have been addressed. Evaluation. In the letter dated October 27, 1986 the applicant made a comitment, which adequately addresses similarity analysis for two components (2 CHS-MOV 8130A and 2 IAC-MOV 130). The applicant has committed to reverify the similarity evaluation in conjunction with the finalization and turnover of these two equipment qualification packages. This is acceptable. The applicant has stated that a complete review of all equipment qualification packages was performed during the package assembly stage of the program prior to the PV0RT audit. However, the above two concerns identified by the staff during the PVORT audit were considered to be of a generic nature. The staff's concern is that the applicant's pre-audit review of the qualification packages may not have been sufficient to address similarity analysis for all safe-ty related pumps and valves. In order to resolve this issue the applicant needs to complete the following actions items prior to fuel load: a) Based upon a representative sampling of NSSS and B0P active safe-ty related pumps and valves, the applicant shall demonstrate that the qualification by similarity can be justified. In each case where the tested unit is not identical to the installed unit, the applicant shall confirm that a similarity statement (analysis of form, fit, function, manufacturing methods, materials, etc.) has been provided. The statement or analysis shall include the basis for assessing similarity, b) Using the same representative sampling in (a), the applicant shall confirm that any differences between the tested and installed units do not adversely affect equipment operability. c) The applicant shall submit for staff review examples of similar-ity analyses for one active safety related pump and one active safety related valve. Until these items are completed this issue remains open.
4 PV0RT Res)on_se: Similarity was evaluated for the initial qualification pac cage preparation and reviewed again during the finalization and turnover of the qualification packages to DLC (which took place after-the audit). For vendor supplied equipment the - initial evaluation covered the implementation of design requirements and verified that acceptable documentation addressing similarity was provided by the - equipment vendor. During this process for procuring equipment, specifications were developed under a quality assurance program ~ which assured complete and consistent content. Each document contained both legal and tech-nical information which included the plant specific qualification requirements necessary to assure complete and traceable qualifica-tion. The vendor had the initial responsibility for assuring complete qual-ification and traceability. The vendor was also responsible .for meeting all technical requirements of the specification as well as complying with their own in-house quality assurance procedures. In developing the necessary qualification, vendors were required to assemble and submit documentation which adequately addressed the plant specific requirements. The qualification sometimes included grouping equipment which could be considered in the same " family of design". This provided for more efficient and timely qualification without compromising acceptability. A complete review of the vendor qualification was performed. When similarity was employed the review included an evaluation of the technical analysis , testing procedures with results and drawings. Specific areas of review included the following parameters: overall and detail dimensional and mass comparisons, similarity in design and function, the consistency in usage of materials and fabrication tech-niques, and the differences between the tested and the installed equipment with respect to operability impacts. The documentation has been independently reviewed and verified. During this review when similarity was employed, SWEC, as well as DLC, verified that the approach employed was acceptable. Confirma-tion of this review is contained on the checklist for Reviewing Seis-mic Test Reports within Tab 5 of each package. This checklist shows that the engineer has reviewed as a minimum, type, size, configura-tion, aging and qualification. The engineer also reviews the vendors justification and test reports for compatability and qualification. This approach has been generically implemented on BVPS-2 and is part of the fundamental basis for assurance of consistent and complete qualification documentation. The finalization effort further assured that when similarity was used as the qualification methodology the appropriate reviews and evaluations were performed.
PV0RT The Quench Spray Pumps (2QSS*P21A&B) and the Feedwater Isolation Valves (2FWS*RV157A, 8, C) are _ discussed below to show how similarity is adequately addressed in the BVPS-2 Seismic Equipment Qualification Packages. The Quench Spray Pump Assemblies were specifically analyzed for application to BVPS-2 plant seismic conditions. The motor, a West-inghouse 350 HP, Frame size 5009-M was~ qualified by similartity to a 600 HP Westinghouse motor. The checklist for Reviewing Seismic Test Reports (Page 3, attached) identifies this qualification by compari-son as being contained in " Equipment Qualification Test Report, Westinghouse, large Pump Motors for use in a High Energy Line Break Environment Outside Containment" WCAP 8687 Supp. 2-A05A Rev. O, November 1985 (page 2) attached. The reviewing engineers responsibilty when assembling the package is to review the applicable documentation and verify that the similarity statements / analysis are acceptable. The Feedwater Isolation Valves contain a relief valve that was quali-fled by comparison. This valve is a Crosby 3/4 X 1 JMB-WR Nozzle Type Relief Valve Model #80288 and was compared to a Crosby 3/4 X 1 JM8-WR Nozzle Type Relief Valve Model #N-59277. The checklist for Reviewing Seismic Reports (Page 3, attached) identifies this qualifi-cation by comparison as being contained in a letter from Crosby to Mr. F. Bulamperti of Stone and Webster dated January 18, 1980 (attached). The conclusions given for acceptance of the valve are summarized as follows:
- 1) A lifting lever and consequent heavier super-structure, indicat-ing a lower natural frequency. Acceptance by similartity is conservative.
- 2) A flange connection, rather than a socket weld connection. ,
Fixity of the inlet joint of the flange connection thus, would lower the natural frequency, ag ain , indicating acceptance of result is conservative.
- 3) The fundamental frequency of the test valve is 170 Hz and there-fore it is not likely that the qualified valve would have a frequency of less than 33 Hz, this is supported by Crosby Analy-sis Report No. EC-558, Rev. 0 Therefore as stated above, the qualification documentation has been reviewed to assure that all similarity qualifications have been incorporated into the BVPS-2 Seismic Er ', ment Qualification Program and that all qualifications based on 'y are acceptable.
Status: Open (Response revised to include NRC concerns)
Checklist for Reviewing Seismic Test Reports Page No. 3 Duquesne - Beaver Valley Two - P.0 2BV- 24 , Component: 2(? $$ MP21 A 6 ('perpp pero /2) 1
' 3. Qualification by Comparison (this page should be filled out only if equipment was qualified by comparison)
Ref. Page
- a. Equipment or equipment family to be qualified:
name: {}uENCic SPD/sv l)orep No rd/2 f, manuf: UJESIM/CNCtKt I model e: ? W tt P ,' fee MS St001-r-r j serial e: size (L x W x H ): W'l X F?n K 4 A c> },f > L weight (1bs): 2 pg f g p drawing no.'s ro Ne / M 3 M M ? ^
- b. Identification of tested equipment to which equipment or equipment family is to be compared:
name: lA AGE Pl!M D 40 70/2- 3 2 manuf: W R r/ W C //00 Sf 3 2. model m: 6004A 3 1 serial n: 75-8v-o7 g g size (L x W x H ): X X
~ . weight (1bs): #A drawing no.'s 1
i c. Enter the reference and page where the comparison of the equipment to be qualified and the tested equipment is made: Ref. Page configuration: 3 2 sub-components: 3 2 Comments
- d. Comparison of qualification test:
, Enter the reference and page where the comparison of ; testing requirements is made for the equipment to be qualified and the tested equipment.
Ref. Page Aging requirements li3 l'3l 32 (KF.l)l 5,'// hEf, 3) RRS and IRS 3 I/ rc 9/ Comments i
- e. Provide a synopsis of the vendor's justification for using the tested equipment qualification for the equipment to be qualified:
Tt/E Ar e tr/> S H A v6 GA Arf TYPC Con)S r~petrr/0Al A A/O IN.$ttl./S 770A) E i 70 rt: .< rrn F conn MO ro p / 5 Wrrr ced ~'s ri g/d or 700in ro I; 00 H P /!/1 Nfe'J~ M M Tf' A7 0 ,
- f. Is this qualification by comparison Judged acceptable acceptable L
, or unacceptable? un a c c e p t a b l e ,,_,_
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WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY CLASS 2 O 2.0 EQUIPMENT TESTED
's; The equipment tested was a 600 HP, 4000 volt motor manufactured by Westinghouse Large Motor Division (WLMD), Buffalo, New York. The motor was manufactured under WLMD Shop Order 76F60179. The serial number was 25-76.
The shop order number and serial number were later changed to 84F44532, and 15-84-07,'respectively, during baseline testing at WLMO. This was only a paperwork change and does represent a change in the test article. The motor , can also be identified by the spin number nameplate which reads SDP-CSAPCH-02. The test motor was a production unit built to the same production, manufacturing, and quality assurance requirements as other motors referencing this test program. The motor .is of weather protected type 1 construction and utilizes Thermalastic cpoxy insulation, which is used for motors in the 200 HP and larger size range. The 600 HP motor tested is representative of motors in i this size range. The bearings utilized in the motor are oil ring lubricated and are babbitted with tin-base babbitt (WPDS-1764080). .
~
The same motor was used throughout the entire test sequence. I l l
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- ms 92160 2
Checklist for Reviewing Seismic Test Peports Page No. 3 Duquesne - Beaver Valley Two - P.O 2BV g Components csosiev Metire vntyr i, ,
===========================================f=============================
- 3. Qualification by Comparison (this page should be filled out only if equipment was qualified by comparison)
Ref. Page
- a. Equipment or equipment family to be qualified:
name: cnose v 3A = I .TMa -wx Nozric rype courr vet.ve B_. a manuf: caoOv vn/.vr <C c4ce consnuv e _.L._, RoasR' model # /3 1 serial # aowe-size (L x W x H ): ~
- X X /S h2 /t weight (lbs): / Bess /3 drawing no.'s os -e - g a 92 R
/3
- b. Identification of tested equipment to which equipment or equipment family is to be compared:
names eno<nv -M 1 zMn -WR No7Et r YYDM pr/ /rf VALVE R _C manut: ckossv vptvs t<:4df CoMPANu R L model # A/ - A 92 7 t' 8 .A _ serial #: Mc9277-oo-coor 8 g size (L x W x H ): X X / S Pz ' , weight (1bs): wor /w worn w drawing no.'s as-c- 5 9p v7 nrVA 3 2
- c. Enter the reference and page where the comparison of the equipment to be qualified and the tested equipment is mader Ref. Page configurations //
sub-components: // - Comments ren w rin v ic s+wne su <~r esq/ /Frrfr onreo /-/8-80 p l II i
- d. Comparison of qualification tests Enter the reference and page where the comparison of testing requirements is made for the equipment i
to be qualified and the tested equipment. Aging requirements h RRS and TRS Comments rNr peovt rrstrn nrr Nor Rf*quinED AvD/str rNrferoft Nor/MPlEMD/Trh /N rNF GUAURCM770u r'rnt PRO 6/Wtf RW r>/M MEL/Ep v4Lvf
- e. Provide a synopsis of the vendor's justification for using the tested equipment ,
qualification for the equipment to be qualified m xn/Mrt wpfe creverner er restrb vntvc ivrwwrn com artw ov e cmwwwu is ensamnc Wxitirvof ruunf ceMarerma oc rr<r vntvs wein b invr/ rd HMnsrA Mrpte wev t0cenria4 l
> Acccrr/wr er Erwt rs is ewsnwrwr - C enrm& D Mioo-
'q# , f. Is this qualification by comparison judged acceptable acceptable Le or unacceptable? unacceptable n /MCFP7Atta /ry /$ Ca,n,0Wirb Gy frF.9 sume orres runr rec aww suar,xprist esou g,.,,,,, , , ,a , , a.,,,o
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- p. 2 p{s CROSOY VALVE & GAGE COMPANY
' w n E N T H A M. MASS O2093 617/384 3121 )
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(-- , C FI O S B Y J T January 18, 1980 Nuclear Va'1ve Division Borg-Warner Corporation r=~ 7500 Tyrone Avenue Van Nuyo, California 91409 r Stone & W439, ' Attention: Mr. Fred Bulamperti h % forper g.s
~
ArreovtoTs'otilNio~ Subj ect s NUCLEAR RELIEF VALVES IN int sticarsiktIONs BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - IRIIT #2 ' C umAcCt'fAstt aprenygg 43 , DUQLTESNE LIGHT COMPANY As offmioin :ng 3pgg, PURCilASE ORDER #83824 stvitwto CROSBY FACTORY ORDER IN-84067 , 33g _lppfg Reft.rence! Seismic Qualification Test Report #3772 **tc. k _2 B us .92 1 NVD Telecopy Dated March 20, 1979 WE M Mord 80
~ nr Apt > ~ -
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)
Mr. Liwei Chin of Borg-Warner has requested (via referenced telecopy message), Crosby coment on Stone & Webster's rejection of Test Report 3772. This report detailed qualification testing already done on a valve similar to that, which will be provided for Borg-Warner with the exception, that the inlet and oulet connections and valve set pressures differ. Comparison of the two (2) valves, revento that the test valve as com-pared with your valve has
- 1) A lif ting lever and consequent heavier super structure, indicating a lower natural frequency. Acceptance by similarity is conservative.
- 2) A flange connection, rather than a socket weld connection. Fixity of the inlet joint of the flange connection thus, would lower the natural f requency, again, indicating acceptance of result is conservative.
- 3) A cross section more substantial than that of your valvo, indicating acceptance is non-conservative.
It in difficult to predict which of these considerations will govern. The test in question was continued beyond 50 liertz for informational purposes, and the test valve was found to have a lower resonant frequency of 17011ertz. It is difficult to conclude that the third factor above would have enough influnnce to drop the natural frequency to below 33 lie rtz . It is Crosby's opinion however, that the subject 3/4xl J!!B Valve j will have a natural frequency in excess of 33112.
\.
I , PVORT SER !ssue
- l. 3.10.2.3 Generic (4)
Issue. The audit revealed that errors were made in retrieving the l appropriate qualification documents. Although the reports were even-tually made available for the audit, the method of retrieval is comp. licated and lacks consistency. The applicant shall evaluate their document control system to (a) determine its effectivenss, (b) reduce the potential for human error, and (c) ensure that all personnel who use the document retrieval system are adequately trained. Evaluation. In the letter dated October 27, 1986 the applicant made a connitment to evaluate the equipment qualification documentation l packages to improve the documentation retrieval system in conjunction l with the finalization and turnover of the packages to Duquesne Light Company. Any improvements will be incorporated into the Final Equip-ment Documentation Package and will be completed prior to fuel load. The staff finds the applicant's response to be acceptable, pending confirmation of completion of the turnover of packages. This issue is confirmatory. Response: The equipment qualification documentation retrieval system has been reviewed and all equipment qualification packages have been reorganized to increase the effectiveness of the retrieval of quali-fication information, and to reduce the potential for human error, The following is a basic description of how a typical package is i l assembled. Tab ! 1 Index ! 2 DLC approval- provides assurance that the package has been reviewed I (detail or cursory) 3 Revision status - provides traceability to changes that have been made to the package 4 Summary and Approval - provides a synopsis of how the equipment was qualified, and the location of pertinent information within the pack-l age 5 Review checklist - provides references to page numbers within the I qualification documents where qualification information can be loca-ted and also provides similarity information in the cases where the tested unit is not identical to the installed unit. ! 6 Documentation checklist - list of qualification documents, calcula-tions and drawings contained in the package 7 Database - provides a direct link between the equipment mark no, and model number, location of equipment within the plant, test proced-ures, test reports and drawings. 8 Purchase specification 1
PVORT 9 Correspondence - various letters, etc., between Stone and Webster and the vendor and any related interoffice correspondence. 10 Drawings - Manuf acturers, structural, mechanical and electrical draw-ings associated with the installation of the equipment. 11 Nozzle Loads - latest reconciled nozzle loads 12 Embedment loads - latest reconciled enbedment loads 13 RRS/TRS Curves - curves or values associated with elevation at which the equipnent is installed. ! 14 Qualification Plans 15 Qualification Reports 16 Miscellaneous - SQRT/PV0RT forms, information for Database, and closed open itens. OLC believes that, with the reorganization of the Qualification packages, the rewriting of the Summary and Approvals and the incorporation of the vendor model number into the Database the documentation retrieval system has been substantially improved. Status: Closed ( April 1,1987 NRC Meeting) t i I
PV0RT SER Issue 3.10.2.3 Generic (5) Issue, in a letter dated September 23, 1986 the applicant connitted to evaluate any recommendations that may result from an INP0 workshop held in October 1986 on check valve operability. The applicant needs to (a) describe the extent of its participation in the workshop and (b) indicate any actions (mandatory or voluntary) that will be taken by Beaver Valley to assure check valve operability. Evaluation. The letter dated October 27, 1986 did not include a response to this issue. This issue remains open. Response. As stated in the September 23, 1986 letter DLC is continually reviewing check valve reports, INP0 Significant Operation Experience Reports (50ER), USNRC IE Information Notices, Bulletins and NUREGS for applicability to BVPS-2. In addition to thase reviews DLC personnel also participate in numerous industry sponsored workshops, and owner groups. The INP0 workshop on check valve operability which was held in Octooer ' 1986 was attend by both DLC and SWEC (8VPS-2's Architect Engineer). The reconnendedations from this Workshop as well as those contained in INP0 SOER 86-3 " Check Valve Failure or Degradation" issued on October 15, 1986 are being reviewed. BVPS-1 has developed responses (attached) to the two (2) reconnendations contained in this 50ER. BVPS-2 is presently in the process of developing its position and it is anticipated that the BVPS-2 position will closly follow the BVPS-1 responses, it should also be noted that an Application Guide is developed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) . presently b With comple. tion scheduled for May 1987. This guide will then be used by INP0 in conducting their audits of nuclear power plants. If any actions are iden-tified by BVPS-2 as a result of the Application Guide as being required , these actions will be incorporated into the appropriate plant procedures at that time. Status: Closed (April 1, 1987 NRC Meeting)
DUQUESNE LIGHT CostFANY Power station 8eaverM Valleh5 -\ SVPS Technical Support 50ER Application 50ER 84-3 Aecommendation Date November 11, 1986 Check valve Failures or Degradation 30ER 88-3 reporte several incidents of check velve failures throughout the nuclear power industry. INFO notes that check valve failures may not be apparent immediately. Such undetected failures increase the probability of multiple failures in a single event. i RECG4MENDATION 1: Es tablish preventive maintenance procedures (i.e., a test and inspection prograe) that identifies emitting and incipient failures of check valves in appropriate systems. Based on industry experience, the following systems should be included in the prograe
-. main stese
-- nuclear servtce water t
-- auxiliary feedwater (PWR only)
-- diesel air. start
-- suppression pool support (swa only) i -- chemical and values control (PWR only) l
-- esin feedwater l
i 1 -- residual heat removal and low-pressure injection Other systems should be added to the program based on in-house expe rience. The program should include a combination of the following elemente to ensure ded valve reliability
-- Periodic testing to desens trate that check valves wt11 operate, i.e., open and close--If it is necessary that the check valves prevent beckleakage, this should also be tested.
i
SCER 46-3 November 11, 1984 Page 2 surveillance monitoring (i.e., acoustic and vibration
.analysee) problems.~
to identify seat leakage and other developing Disassembly and inspection on a samp1 Lag basis to ensure check valve internals are intact and are not experiencing abnormal wear. RESPONSE 1: Seave r valley's IST program currently includes inspection and testing of check valves in the above systems and in additional systees. Check valves are exercised to the position required to fulfill their function every three (3) months, unless such operation is not practical during plant operation. In such cases the valves are part stroke exercised at power. and full stroked during cold shutdown. Applicable check valves are tested for backleakage either with tests designed to measure valve leaktate (if any) or by observing other sys tem parameters such as reverse rotation of shutdown pumps, etc. Beaver Valley does use acoustic monitoring tests of certain check valves (BYT 1.4-1.30.2). Additionally, acoustic monitoring has also O been employed in special tests Check Valve Test during SR). However, as INFO notes in this SOER, effectiveness of acoustic monitoring is dependent on piping system (e.g., Safety Injection Accumulator the background noise and other parameters. Based on these considerations, Beaver Valley normally relies on more positive testing techniques whenever possible. Beaver Valley's current program does include disassembly and inspection of certain check valves on a periodic basis (CMP 1.75.300). RECOMMNDATION 2: Fo r those check valves included in the program discussed in Recommendation 1, perfore a design review of the check valve ins tallations. This review should determine the following: Are check velves sized properly for anticipated operating modos? Are the proper types of check valves installed for the required services? Are check valves properly oriented and located a suitable distance from upstream components that cause turbulent flow? Based on this review, initiate design changes or perform additional O preventive esintenance and testing for check valves determined to be misapplied.
30ER 86-3 November 11, 1984 Page 3 O V RESPONSB 2a Beaver valley has performed check valve design reviews for several applications tha t have been shown by industry experience to be particularly susceptible to failure / degradation due to generic causes. Sese reviews have included any of the above concerne considered applicable based upon the identified failure enchanisme in each. case. i Further review is not necessary at this time based upon the operating history of Beaver Valley. Se check valves at Beaver Valley have demonstrated proper operation under a wide variety of conditions (e.g., i s teady state, transient, power operation and shutdown conditions) over. an extended period of ties. His operating history provides a high confidence factor for proper operation of check valves currently I installed at Beaver Valley, barring generic cause failures. The OAG is holding .both items of this 50ER open pending issuance of forthcoming WOG guidelines. 1
REFERENCES:
- 1) BVPS response to INFO SOERs, SERs and 04MRs referenced by this document.
O 2) 3) 4) Conversation with TAPP personnel-BVPS IST Program SVPs OM Chapter 55A 0 J l 1 IO i I l i
PV0RT SER Issue 3.10.2.3 Generic (6) Issue. There were two instances where the Nonconformance and Disposition ThTffT tags were not accurate, indicating that the tracking system is not as effective as it should be. The applicant shall provide evidence that N&D 16001 and 32817 have been completed and accepted prior to fuel load. In addition, the applicant shall provide written confirmation that the N&D tags and rejection tags for all safety-related pumps and valves have been satisfactorily resolved prior to fuel load. Evaluation. The letter dated October 27, 1986 did not include a response to this issue. This issue remains open. Response: ,a) Provide written confirmation that N&D Tags 16001 and 32817 have been completed and accepted prior to fuel load. N&D 32817 reported improper storage for MSIV actuators, Mark Numbers 2 MSS *HYV101A, 2 MSS *HYV1018 and 2 MSS *HYV101C. These items were tagged by the Inspector initiating the N&D with Tag Nos. 46211, 46212 and 46213. The hand-written copy of this N&D, prepared by the Inspector on 7/9/86, was reviewed by the SQC Engineer and approved for typing. Due to a cleri-cal error, this report was placed in an information file and not formally issued within the normal time frame. On 9/29/86. QC identified concerns with the referenced tags and N&D 32817. QC review uncovered the error which had occurred and a typed report was issued on 9/30/86. During the time frame between identification of the unsatisfactory conditions and formal issue of the N&D report, the reject tags, applied by the Inspector, remained affixed to the components. This is entirely in accordance with Procedure SQC-4.4, "Nonconformance and Dispositon Reports", as these tags are only to be removed by SQC personnel following either a decision by the SQC Engineer that a nonconformance does not exist or upon closure of the N&D. N&D 32817 was closed on 11/10/86 and all reject tags assigned by this document were verified as being removed. N&D 16001 reported a variety of possible deficiencies for limitiorque operators relating to problems identified in NRC I.E. Notices. A total of 27 components were listed on this N&D with 27 reject tags (#29195 to
#29221) being assigned to identify these items.
6 . t The report indicates that a tag (incorrectly identified as Tag #16001) for valve 2SWE*M0V1168 had not been removed although work had been completed. The QC inspection for this mark piece number was completed on 2/7/86. The (attached) Reject Tag Log which tracked tags assigned by N&D 16001 indi-cates that Reject Tag #29206, assigned to this component, was returned to the QC office for destruction on 2/13/86. Additionally, the tag log indi- i cates that two tags were reported missing and that all other tags, with-the exception' of one (Tag #29221 for valve 2CCP*M0V1288) were removed ~ prior to the audit. Tag #29221' was verified as being returned to the office for destruction on 10/10/86. As the tag found during the ' audit was not properly identified, a question
- remains as to which of the_27 tags identified on the N&D it coulo have been. A plausible explanation is that one of the tags which was reported missing could have been found and attached, in error, to valve 2SWE*MV01168 by an unknown party.
N&D 16001 was closed on 3/13/87. b) Provide written confirmation that the N&D Tags and Rejection Tags for all safety-related pumps and valves have been satisfactorily resolved prior to fuel load. N&D Reject Tags will be removed by QC personnel as unsatisfactory i deficiencies are resolved and N&D's are closed. In addition to the inter-nal tracking of N&D's and tags performed by QC in accordance with SQC-4.4, "Nonconformance and Disposition Reports", all N&D's (along with other types of deficiency reports) are automatically entered into the Engineer-4. ing Work Tracking System (EWT). This program enables all levels of project management to review and assess open items with respect to system
- and area completion status. All items on EWT, which include N&D's, are l prioritized in accordance with their iraportance to support fuel load. All
! N&D's required to support fuel load will be completed, d- QC completion walkdowns of systems and areas performed in accordance with SQC-6.1, " System / Subsystem Release", provide additional control in this
- area as one of the main goals of these walkdowns is to perform a detailed review of tags in place in order to assure that no discrepancies exist with either QC records or the EWT system. In addition, NRC site inspec-l tors continuously monitor and review the resolution and disposition of
- N&D's to assure conformance with plant commitments, procedures and regula-j tions.
We are confident that these programs provide our project with the effective means to accurately track, status and complete all work items i required prior to fuel load. i l Status: Closed (April 1, 1987 NRC Meeting) 1 l l 1 - - - _ _ _ _ - - . - _ - -
\ '* m
* , %'.IY$ic 0LC. SOC
,.. . S ' * 8 BVPS UNIT 11 Page 1 of ll N0. 16001 miara s . u..
14 m NCl)COMPORMANCE O DISPOSITION REPORT T N/A
; n- -w.. t San Balnw s, a n.. L.v.. spesem variaa./r. >
ca.uen me r_4-4eaven. on.cacara c.- antaw cener . i
. nm. natow Various-See Be1== L..e or w.e m. I"a"*' N/A O saw m'* v.a**'
u/A C Vander Im 10 N*- nn. rive n t.. a.1av e - m.1 a., saa n.1 a., t am _ car at ca ca mis /a. cit s a.. f n s.t. A.sm t. o ci c2 as 29195 to 29221 O.i , Jgf ! ADerev.G AJ.he.E hegr. Q t. a A conesinen o.imes, Aviva sum.m nts sa es,it r ir.e. wien tais n a o no. w . 5 ' MOV DEFICIENCIES E-438 This N&D initiated per site 2BVM-3719 (3-18-85).
; possible deficiencies related to NRC notices Tha listed limitorque operators have 84004). IPR-51148 (ROAP 84002) and as revealed by sample program per .
MARK # P.O. # 4 SYS .
$dJA VENDOR LOCATION REJECT SR # CODE PRIORITY TAG #
2SVS*MOV106A 2BV-76 ' 2SWS*MOV1068 H. Pratt 725' VP 2SR-30-lJ SWS 2BV-76 H. Pratt 19 2SWS*MOV107D 725' VP 2SR-30-lJ SWS 19 ~= 2BV-76A 321d Posi-Seal 718' AB 107A J W ") 2SR-30-lJ SWS 19 *- = 1078 718' AB 19 MS u,e 2vW 718' AB 107C 19 29195
.. .fW 99 ,,
718' AB
. 2SWF*MOV562 ,,
2BV-91 10M01 VP 2SR-30-lJ i, 19 2920f f . 563
- SWM 19 29201~
564 VP 19 29206~ s 565 VP 19 29208~ 2SWE*MOVil6A VP 19 2BV-76 H. Pratt 728' VP 2S20C L 1168 .L 2SR-30-1A SWE 20 2E( i~
,L 728' VP 2CCP*MOV150-1 2BV-76 1 1 20 25( h H. Pratt 718' PT 2SR-15A-1B 150-2 CCP 21 lM( i 151-1 713' RC 21 . ardf0 151-2 718' PT 21 l Elf 5 E, 156-1 <
713' RC 21 .,
;R U 156-2 718' PT 21 232. I 157-1 713' RC 21 imi: 2 157-2 718' PT 21 252:3 175-1 713' RC 21 23214 ~
175-2 718' AB 21 25215 176-1 118' AB 21 29216~ 176-2 718' AB 21 23217 ~ 173 718' AB 21 29238 ~ 128A 718' AB 21 252rg s 1288 ,f 718' AB 21 25220'
,, 718' AB ., ,, 21 4 msg a.m.....
This N&D gives Construction Management's requirements for priority. For the other Limitorques affected See N&D's 16002, 16003, 16004, 16005, 16006, 1600715995, IS996, 15997, 15998, 15999, 16000,
. DISPOSITION OTHER 8108
\
4fo O SOCf*4f8(8833fM
- e. . .
DLC SOC L~ hC
, SVPS HITil y:4,. <
Reject ist le8 fit 888888P888888 DATE 595880 (884T100 Of T444E0 54Titl4L DATE 888 M VED 8H88888 Various - Inspection of y 29208 Limitorque Operators 3/25/85 16001 MWb 29209 4/29/86 29210 5/28/86 29211 4/29/86 29212 5/28/86 g;gl7,,29213 4/29/00 g.pik 29214 5/28/86 29215 4/29/86 29216 4/29/86 29217 4/29/86 28,9cause _29218 WWuda 29219 , 4/29/86 29220 4/29/86 I 29221 10/10/86 Various / Inspection of 29222 t.initorque Ope'rators 3/25/85 16002 4/29/86 29223
~
4/29/86 29224 4/29/86 (.. ' 29225 4/29/86 29226 . 5/23/86 29227 5/13/86
G g,, 4:stesmn OLc sec
,- f' - BVPS INiill
. .,5 Reject Tag leg i
Tas L0t4 Tite SF TA04tB udittlal toaststessist a DATE 04Tt M W D'4888E8 Various - Inspection of 29188 Limitorque Operators 3/25/85 16000
,jgjy 29189 5/10/85 1
29190 l 29191 ! g
. I 29192 #
l l
.. 29193
~
N' l 29194 l l Various / Inspection 01 29195 Limitorque Operators 3/25/85 16001 2/13/86 [1 ht 2/13/86 29197 T 1/21/86 29198 29199 v. 29200 (. ca 29201 4/2/86 29202 4/2/86 29203 4/2/86 29204 4/2/86 (.29205 _ 2/13/86 29206 l,M64,,45WE, 9 MOVille $ ) 2/13/86 29207 ' 4/29/86
PVORT SER issue: 3.10.2.3 Generic (7) Issue. The FSAR figures do not identify check valves by label (mark number). Since these valves are active, safety-related components, the applicant shall confirm that all check valves are correctly iden-tified in the FSAR figures prior to fuel load. Evaluation. In the letter dated October 27, 1986 the applicant stated that the check valves are identified on the Beaver Valley 2 design and operation drawings as required. The applicant considers the FSAR to be licensing document, which does not require all equip-ment items to be listed. The staff does not find this response acceptable. The staff is not aware of any other plant which has failed to identify check valves in the FSAR text, tables , and figures. The FSAR description should be representative of the plant configuration, including the identification of safety-related equip-ment. The applicant has already connitted in the response to Generic Issue 8 to anend the FSAR tables to list all active safety related pumps and valves, including check valves. In order for the content of the Beaver Valley 2 FSAR to be consistent, the applicant shall confirm that all active safety related check valves are correctly identified in the FSAR figures prior to fuel load. This issue is open. Respons_e_: The piping and instrumentation diagrams in the BVPS-2 FSAR show the check valves in the various plant system but do not include specific " mark numbers" or identification numbers for such valves. This information has not been included because it is considered to be a level of detail which adds nothing to the understanding of the functioning of the syatems in question. We note the request to add this information to the 174 BVPS-2 piping and instrumentation diagrams in the FSAR has no basis in either the NRC's regulations or in any of the Connission's guidance documents. In fact, Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 3 the " Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants" states that "the appIlcant should strive for clear, concise presentation of the information provided in the SAR." It should be noted that the correlation between the design drawings which identify the check valve 10 numbers and the FSAR figures are documented on the FSAR figures under the notes column. For exanple, the design drawing from which FSAR Figure 9.2.3 was generated was Drawing 10080-RM-71E as denoted in Noto #3 on the FSAR figure. It is further noted that the BVPS.2 FSAR has been under review by the NRC staff for a period in excess of four years without there being a single documented instance where the absence of a " mark number" or serial number for the check valves on the P&lD's has detracted from the ability of the staff to understand the functioning of the BVPS 2 system. If this information is required or desired for any reason, it is readily accessible in project design documents as mentioned above. Status: Closed (Response revised as agreed upon during the April 1,1987 NRC Meeting)
PV0RT SER !ssue 3.10.2.3 Generic (8) Issue: At the conclusion of the PV0RT audit, it was apparent that a complete list of safety-related pumps and valves had not been provided in the FSAR. The applicant shall confirm that all safety-related NSSS and B0P pumps and valves including check valves are correctly identified in the FSAR prior to fuel load. Evaluation. In the letter dated October 27, 1986 the applicant committed to list all balance-of-plant (BOP) active pumas and valves in the FSAR for Amendment 13 scheduled for January 1987. Thi s response is acceptable for B0P equipment. The applicant needs to confirm that the FSAR list of Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) active safety related pumps and valves is correct. In addition, the applicant needs to confirm that all active safety related NSSS and 00P check valves are correctly identified in the FSAR tables. This issue is open. Response: A complete list of active pumps and valves including check valves has been incorporated by Mendment 13 (January 1907) into the BVPS-2 FSAR (see attached FSAR Tables). Both the NSSS and 00P tables were reviewed in preparation for Amendment 13 to assure the accuracy and i completeness of these lists. The list includes both identification num-bers and/or mark numbers as applicable. The usage and document tracing methodology is discussed in responso to Generic item 3.10.1.3(1). The Containment Purge and Vent Valves 211VR*M0023A & D and 211VR*M0025 A & B (Ilsted on page 6 of 15 of Table 3.9819) were previously charactertred as non active in DI.C's letter dated October 21, 1986. The Containment Purge and Vent Valves are considered " active" valves only during cold shutdown and refueling operations. During normal operation these valves are locked closed per DVPS 2 Technical Specification requirements. FSAR Table 3.90-j 19 will be revised in Mendment 17 to clarify this descrepancy. (Sco attached revision to Table 3.90-19) The DVPS 2 containment isolation system (CIS) mouts the intent of NUREG-0731, Action Iten !!.E.4.2 with regard to containment isolation depend-ability (FSAR Section 6.2.4). Prior to initial unit operation and during each major refueling period, as specified in 10CfR50, Appendix J, tests are conducted to ascertain the leaktightness and operability of the CIS.
- FSAR Section 6.2.6 provides a description of the Type 0 and Type C test programs. The containment purge and vent valves are leak tested in accor-dance with 10CfR50, Appendix J. Type C test program during refueling out-ages Mr test BVT 2.1 1.47.5 and fully stroked and Lined por Operations Surveillance Test 2.1.10.
Status: Closed (Response has been revised as agreel upon during April 1, 1981 NRC Meeting) i
l l l BWFS-2 FSAR TASIE 3.98-18 l ACTIVE F M (30F) Post- Safety krk h. Type Morant leCA Fametien Class Fameties made Mode Code 8 2CCP*F2IA Centrifagal 3 e ,-- = Coeling en Off/0m 5 hter ~ l l W F21R Centriiagal 3 e ,-- M Coeling On Off/cm 5 hter
. W F21C Centrifugal 3 e- .- = Coeling On Off/0m 5 l hter
! 2E E*F21A Vertical 3 Stamey Generater l Off en/Off 1, 3 Feel Oil 2EE*F213 %ertical 3 Stae6y Generater Off Om/Off 1, 3 Feel Oil 2EE*F21C Vertical 3 Sr W Generater Off Om/Off 1, 3 Feel Oil 2E E*F21D Vertical 3 Staeay Generator Off On/Off 1, 3 Feel Oil 2fMC*F21A Centrifugal 3 Ciremlate Berated On Off/0m 6 hter 2fMC*F21R Centrifagal 3 Ciremlate Berated On Off/0m 6 hter 2D E*F22 centrifugal 3 Ass. Feedwater to Off On 1. 5 Sta. Gen. 2f E*F23A Centrifugal 3 Ass. Feeduater to Off On 1, 5 Sta. Gen. Ammwr 33 3 .g 3 J ,y gggy
- - . - _ _ - ~ . . . . - . . ~ _ - - _ - - . - - . .__- ..- - . - - . _ _ , - . . - . . . - . - - .
l WWFS-2 754R TABLE 3.99-18 (Cent) Post- Safety mark Mo. Type Normal 18CA Femeties Class Feectice _Mede Nede Cedel 2SMS*P21C Beep Braft Vert. 3 Service Mater to On r, On I i 2SMS*F25A Centrifemal l 3 Centrol Been De Befrig. r h e Oe/Off I Recirculaties 2SMS*P254 Centrifagel 3 Centrol Been ce Oe/Off 1 Refrig. Ceedesser Becircolaties NOTES:
- 1) Safety Functies Codes for Active Pumps
- 1. Emergency Beacter Shetdeum
- 2. Caetaissent Isolaties
- 3. Core Coeling -
- 4. Caeta=-t Erat hval
- 5. Core Besienal Beat h al 6.
Preweet Belease of Radienctive Noterials
- 7. Safety /Beasafety Isolaties h%t 13
- Jammary 1947 l
_ _ _ _ _ - . . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ -. _ _,- . .. . _ - - . . . - , _ - . _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ . ~ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - . _ . . . _ - . -
BVPS-2 FSAR TABI.E 3.9B-19 ACTIVE VALVES (BOP)3 Actuated Normal Mark No. Size Type Class By Function Position 1 2BDC*ADVIGOA1 3 Globe 2 Air Steam Gen. Blowdown Isolation 0 2BDC*AOV10051 3 Globe 2 Air Steam Gen. Blowdown Isolation 0 2BDG*ADV100C1 3 Globe 2 Air Steam Gen. Blowdown Isolation 0 2BDG*ADV101A1 3 Globe 2 Air Steam Gen. Blowdown Isolation 0 2BDG*A0V101A2 3 Globe 2 Air Steam Gen. Blowdown Isolation 2BDG*AOV10181 3 0 Globe 2 Air Steam Gen. Blowdown Isolation 0 2BDC*A0v101B2 3 Globe 2 Air Steam Gen. Blowdown Isol ion 0 2BDG*AOV101C1 3 Globe 2 Air Steam Gen. Blowdown Isolation 0 2BDG*ADV101C2 3 Globe 2 Air Steam Gen. Blowdown Isolation 2BDG*A0V102A1 2 0 Globe 2 Air Sample Line Isolation 0 2BDG*A0V102A2 2 Globe 2 Air Sample Line Isolation 0 2BDG*A0V102B1 2 Globe 2 Air Sample Line Isolation 0 2BDG*ADV102B2 2 Globe 2 Air Sample Line Isolation 2BDG*A0V102C1 2 0 Globe 2 Air Sample Line Isolation 0 2BDG*ADV102C2 2 Globe 2 Air Sample Line Isolation 0 2CCP*ADV107A 2 Globe 3 Air Thermal Barrier Rupture Isolation 0 2CCP*ADV107B 2 Globe 3 Air Thermal Barrier Rupture Isolation 2CCP*A0V107C 0 2 Globe 3 Air Thermal Barrier Rupture Isolation 2CCP*A0V171 0 3 Globe 3 Air SC-3/MNS Isolation 0 2CCP*ADV172 3 Globe 3 Air SC-3/MNS Isolation 0 2CCP*ACV173 3 Globe 3 Air SC-3/ IBIS Isolation 0 2CCP*AOV174 3 Globe 3 Air SC-3/ IBIS Isolation 0 2CCP*DCV100-1 8 Globe 3 E/R CCP Pump Min. Flow M 2CCP*DCV100-2 8 Globe 3 E/R CCP Pump Min. Flow 2CCP*DCV101A 16 M Butterfly 3 Air CCP Heat Er Sanger Supply M 2CCP*DCV101B 16 Sutterfly 3 Air CCP Meat EA 'ager Supply 2CCP*DCV101C M 16 Butterfly 3 Air CCP Beat Exchanger Supply M 2CCP*MOV112A 18 Butterfly 3 Motor RHS Supply 2CCP*MOV112B C 18 Butterfly 3 Motor RMS Supply C 2CCP*MOV118 2 Ball 3 Motor SC-3/MNS Break O 2CCP*MOV119 2 Ball 3 Motor SC-3/NNS Break O 2CCP*MOV120 2 Ba11 3 Motoe SC-3,MNS Break O Amendment 16 1 of 15 April 1987
BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.98-19 (Cont) Mark No. Size Type Actuated Class By -Function Normal 4 Position 3 2CCP*MOV150-1 18 Butterfly 2 2CCP*MOV150-2 Motor Containment Isolation 18 Butterfly 2 Motor 0 2CCP*MOVI51-1 18 Butterfly 2 Containment Isolation 0 2CCP*MOV151-2 18 Motor containment Isolation Butterfly 2 Motor 0 2CCP*MOV156-1 18 Butterfly 2 Containment Isolation 0 2CCP*MOV156-2 18 Motor Containment Isolation Butterfly 2 Motor 0 2CCP*MOV157-1 18 Butterfly 2 Containment Isolation 0 ) 2CCP*MOV157-2 Motor Containment Isolation 18 Butterfly 2 Motor 0 l! 2CCP*MOV175-1 10 Butterfly 3 Containment Isolation 0 2CCP*MOV175-2 10 Motor SC-3/MS Isolation Butterfly 3 Motor 0 2CCP*MOVI76-1 10 Butterfly 3 SC-3/MS Isolation 0 2CCP*MOVI76-2 10 Motor SC-3/MS Isolation Butterfly 3 Motor 0 2CCPMOV177-1 10 Butterfly 3 SC-3/NNS Isolation 0 ) 2CCP*MOV177-2 10 Motor SC-3/MS Isolation Butterfly 3 Motor 0 2CCP*MOV178-1 10 Butterfly 3 SC-3/MS Isolation 0 2CCP*MOV178-2 10 Motor SC-3/MS Isolation Butterfly 3 Motor 0 2CCP*RVIO2 1 Relief 2 SC-3/WS Isolation 0 2CCP*RV103 Self Containment Isolation 1 Relief 2 Self C 2CCP*RV104 1 Relief 2 Containment Isolation C 2CCP*RVIOS Self Containment Isolation 1 Relief 2 Self C j 2CCP*VI 20 Containment Isolation Butterfly 3 Manual C 2CCP*V2 20 Train Separation 0 2CCP*V6 Butterfly 3 Manual Train Separation 20 Check 3 0 2CCP*V7 Self Pump Discharge Check Valve 20 Check 3 - 2CCP*V8 Self Pump Discharge Check Valve 20 Check 3 - 1 2CCP*V18 Self Pump Discharge Check Valve 20 Butterfly 3 - 2CCP*V19 20 h aual Train Separation Butterfly 3 Manual 0 2CCP*V50 20 Butterfly Train Separation 0 3 Manual Train Separation 2CCP*V51 20 Butterfly 0 3 Manual Train Separation 2CCP*V96 2 Cate 0 3 Manual Train Separation 2CCP*V97 2 Gate 0 3 Manual Train Separation 2CCP*V160 2 Check 0 3 Self 2CCP*V182 2 Check 3 Thermal Barrier Rupture Isolation -
! Self Thermal Barrier Rupture Isolation -
l Amendment 16 1 2 of 15 April 1987
] ,l BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.98-19 (Cont) ) ) Actuated i Mark No. Size Ty Class Normal By Function ! Positioat ) 2CCP*V213 2 Check 3 j 2CCP*V301 2 Check Self Thermal Barrier Rupture Isolation - 3 Self 1 2CCP*V537 2 Gate 3 SC-3/MIIS Break Check Valve - i 2CCP*V538 2 Manual Train Separation 0 Gate 3 Manual Train Separation ! 2CHS*RV160 1 Relief 2 0 2CHS*RV260A 1 Self Penetration Overpressure C Relief 2 Self Penetration Overpressure 2CHS*RV2608 1 Relief 2 C < Self Penetration Overpressure 2 CMS *RV260C 1 C ' Relief 2 Self Penetration Overpressure 2CHS*SOV206 1 Globe 2 C
- 2CHS*V107 Solenoid A.M. Emerg. Boration C 25 Check 2 ideight 2CES*V108 25 Check 2 Containment Isolation -
t l 2 CMS *V109 ideight Containment Isolation 25 Check 2 ileight 1 2 CMS *V110 25 Check 2 Containment Isolation - 2CES* Vill ideight Containment Isolation - 25 Check 2 ideight j 2 CMS *VII2 3 Check Containment Isolation - 2 ideight Containment Isolation l 2CHS*FCV113A 2 Globe 3 Air Boration Flow Control ] 2CHS*FCV113B 2 Globe 2 0 j Air Hermal Boration 2CES*V218 2 Check 2 0 } 2CVS*SOV102 ideight Alt. Emers. Boration - 1 Globe 2 j 2CVS*SOV151A 2 Globe 2 Solenoid Cont. Rad. Monitor Discharge 0 ; 4 2CVS*SOV151B 2 Globe 2 Solenoid Cont. Vacuum Section 0 ! 2CVS*SOV152A 2 Globe Solenoid Cont. Vacuum Section 0 2 Solenoid Coat. Vacuum Section i 2CVS*SOV1528 2 Globe 2 0 ! l 2CVS*SOV153A 1 Globe Solenoid Cont. Vscuum Section 0 2 j 2CVS*SOV1538 1 Globe Solenoid Cont. Vacuum Section 0 2 2CVS*V84 1 Check Solenoid Coat. Vacuum Section 0 2 Self 2DAS*A0V100A 2 Globe 2 Cont. Atm. Rad. Monitor Discharge 0 Air Cont. Sump Pump Discharge 4 2DAS*A0V1008 2 Globe 2 0 j Air Cont. Sump Pump Discharge 2DGS*A0V108A 2 Globe 2 0 Air Prim. Drains Transfer Pump Discharge 0 2DGS*A0V108B 2 Globe 2 Air Prim. Drains Transfer Pump Discharge 0 , 2DAS*RV110 24 Relief 2 Self Containment Isol. Thermal Relief j 2DGS*RV115 2 2 C 2EGA*V1002 Relief Self Containment Isol. Thermal Relief j 3/4 Check 3 C Self D.G. Air Tank Inlet - Amendment 16 3 of 15 April 1987 l
BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.9B-19 (Cont)
!! ark No. Actuated Normal Size Type Class By Function Position 1 2EGA*V1012 3/4 Check 3 Self D.G. Air Tank Inlet l 2EGA*VIIS2 1/2 Check 3 l 2EGA*V1192 1/2 Check Excess Flow SC-3/NNS Isolation Flow 0 3
! 2ECA*71302 3/4 Check Excess Flow SC-3/NNS Isolation Flow 0 3 Self } 2EGA*V1312 3/4 Check D.G. Air. Tank Inlet - 3 Self D.G. Air Tank Inlet { 2YCa*T1552 3/4 Check 3
- 2EGr*T1562 3/4 Check Excess Flow SC-3/NNS Isolation Flow 0-3 4
21 3*T74 3 Check Excess Flow SC-3/NNS Isolation Flow 0 2 Self 20.7'T75 3 Check 2 DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Discharge - Self DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Discharge 2fLG 3~C5 3 Check 2 Self DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Discharge
.dJ'CF 3 Check 2 Self I
JVXars! 6 Check DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Discharge - 3 Self
; 2 Extra'+ 6 Check Fuel Pool Coolant Pump Discharge -
- 3 Self Fuel Pool Coolant Pump Discharge 22 MEW 2W 2 Globe 2 Air Fire Protect /Contain. Isolation t 2fNECJK 4 Globe 2 Air C
i 2fNEC% 6 Gle.be 2 Fire Protect /Contain. Isolation C Air Fire Protect /Contain. Isolation l 2fM EC211 2 Globe 2 Air C 2fMTI3 2% Check 2 Fire Protect /Contain. Isolation C i 2FMTD Weight Fire Protect /Contain. Isolation rs Check 2 Weight Fire Protect /Contain. Isolation I 2F W TII3 4. Check 4 I Weight Fire Protect /Contain. Isolation 2Fi%"-T134 & Qeck 4 Weight Fire Protect /Contain. Isolation 2F1E*FCT122 i MC 3 Flow Aux. Feedwater Flow Control , 2DE*FCVm.a e UC 3 Flow O 2DE*FCV1233 & UC Aux. Feedwater Flow Control 0 3 Flow Aux. Feedwater Flow control 2DE*HCY10CA 3 4 ine 2 0 2DE*HCV1008 E/H Aux. Feedwater Flow Control 0 3 4 sn* 2 l 2FWE*HCV100C E/M Aux. Feedwater Flow Control 0 3 4 ine 2 E/M ) 2BE*HCV100D 3 Q up- 2 Aux. Feedwater Flow Control 0 2DE*HCV100E E/R Aux. Feedwater Flow Control 0 3 C2de 2 E/M 2FWE*HCV100F 3 Clde 2 Aux. Feedwater Flow Control 0 2FWE*RV101 E/E Aux. Feedwater Flow Control 0 3 Relief i Self 2FWE*SOV100A 2 Clehe Aux. Feedwater Relief C i h iemoid Pria.PN.Demin.Wtr.Stor. Tank Isol. 0 2FVE*SOV100B 2 Ciche 1 L1msid Pria.PN.Demin.Wtr.Stor. Tank Isol. O { Amendment 16 i si 15 i April 1987
9 BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.9B-19 (Cont) Mark No. Actuated Size Type Class By Normal Function Position 1 2FWE*V39 4 Butterfly 3 2FWE*V40 Manual P.P.D.W.S.T. Switchover to S.W. 6 Butterfly 3 C 2FWE*V41 Manual P.P.D.W.S.T. Switchover to S.W. 6 Butterfly 3 0 2FWE*V42 Manual P.P.D.W.S.T. Switchover to S.W.
- 8 Butterfly 3 C 2FWE*V212 Manual P.P.D.W.S.T. Switchover to S.W.
6 Butterfly 3 O Manual P.P.D.W.S.T. Switchover to S.W. 2FWE*V213 4 Butterfly 3 0 Manual P.P.D.W.S.T. Switchover to S.W. 2FWE*V233 4 Check 2 C Self Aux. Feedwater 2FWE*V234 4 Check 2 Self Aux. Feedwater 2FWE*V235 4 Check 2 Self Aux. Feedwater
- 2FWE*V236 4 Check 2
! Self Aux. Feedwater 2FWE*V237 4 Check 2 ! Self Aux. Feedwater 2FWE*Vi38 4 Check 2 Self Aux. Feedwater 2FWE*V254 4 Check 2 Self Aux. Feedwater 2FWE*V255 4 Check 2 Self Aux. Feedwater , 2FWE*V256 4 Check 2 Self Aux. Feedwater l 2FWS*FCV478 16 Globe 3 Air Feedwater Control / Isolation ! 2FWS*FCV479 6 Globe 3 0 Air Feedwater Control / Isolation 2FWS*FCV488 16 Globe 3 C Air Feedwater Control / Isolation 1 2FWS*FCV489 6 Globe 3 0 Air Feedwater Control / Isolation j 2FWS*FCV498 16 Globe 3 C Air Feedwater Control / Isolation 2FWS*FCV499 6 Globe 3 0 Air Feedwater Control / Isolation 2FWS*HYV157A 16 Gate 2 C 2FWS*HYV157B E/H Feedwater Isolation 0 16 Gate 2 2FWS*HYV157C E/H Feedwater Isolation 0 16 Gate 2 I 2FWS*V305 E/H Feedwater Isolation 0 16 Check 2 Self 2FWS*V306 16 Check 2 Self Feedwater 13edwatioA) - 2WS*V307 Feedwater T spbariod 16 Check 2 2GNS*SOV853A Self Feedwater ;%4*L.4T8'M - 1 Globe 2 i 2GNS*SOV853B 1 Globe Solenoid Accumulator Vent C 2 2GNS*SOV853C 1 Globe Solenoid Accumulator Vent C 2 2GNS*SOV853D 1 Globe Solenoid Accumulator Vent ~ C '" 2 2GNS*SOV853E 1 Globe Solenoid Accumulator Vent ~~ C
- 2 2GNS*SOV853F 1 Solenoid Accumulator Vent C '
Glob; 2 - Solenoid Accumulator Vent C
^
Amendment h q 5 of 15 '
'y 1987 i my
BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.9B-19.(Cont) " Mark No. Size Type Actuated Class By Function Norinal 2GNS*SOV854A Position 1 1 Globe 2 j 2GNS*SOV854B 1 Globe 2 Solenoid Accumulator Vent C 2HCS*MOV112A 2 Ball 2 Solenoid Accumulator Vent C 2HCS*MOV112B 2 Motor RBNR Inlet Isolation Ball 2 C 2HCS*MOV116 2 Motor RBNR Inlet Isolation Ball 2 C 2HCS*MOV117 2 Motor Containment Isolation Ball 2 Motor C 2HCS*MOV120A 2 Plug Containment Isolation 2 Motor C 2HCS*MOV120B 2 Plug RBNR Outlet Isolation 2 Motor C 2HCS*SOV114A 2 Globe RBNR Outlet Isolation 2 C 2HCS*SOV114B 2 Globe 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation C 2HCS*SOV115A 2 Globe 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation C 2HCS*SOV115B 2 Globe 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation C 2HCS*SOV133A 3/8 Globe 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation C 2HCS*S0V133B 3/8 Globe 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation C 2HCS*SOV134A 3/8 Globe 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation C 2HCS*S0V134B 3/8 Globe 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation C 2HCS*SOV135A 3/8 Globe 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation C 2HCS*SOV135B 3/8 Globe 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation C 2HCS*SOV136A 3/8 Globe 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation C 2HCS*SOV136B 3/8 Globe 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation C 2HVC* MOD 201A 36 Butterfly 3 Solenoid Containment Isolation C Motor 2HVC* MOD 201B 36 Butterfly 3 Isolation-Outdoor Air Norm. Supply 0 2HVC* MOD 201C 36 Motor Isolation-Outdoor Air Norm. Supply Butterfly 3 Motor 0 2HVC* MOD 201D 36 Butterfly 3 Motor Isolation-Exhaust to Outdoor C 2HVC* MOD 204A 6 Butterfly 3 Motor Isolation-Exhaust to Outdoor C 2HVC* MOD 204B 6 Butterfly 3 Isolation-Outdoor Emerg. Supply C 2HVC*SOV201A 2 Motor Isolation-Outdoor Emerg. Supply Globe 3 C Solenoid Modulate Refrig. Supply to DX M 2HVC*SOV201B 2 Globe Coils 2HVC*ACU201A,B 3 4 Solenoid Modulate Refrig. Supply to DX M 2HVR* HOD 23A 42 Butterfly 2 Nils 2HVC*ACU201A.R 2HVR* MOD 238 " Motor 42 Butterfly 2 Motor Isolation-Containment Purge Supply 6 Isolation Containment Purge Supply C Amendment (6); t'1 6 of 15 la 1987 "U
'"i J'
M0 BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.9B-29 (Cont) S CL ** .h ::+ s Mark No. Size Actuated Tyge Class 4 By Function NorNal 2NVR* MOD 25A 42 Position 1 alMt*HQD25B, Butterfly 2 notor 47 Butterfly 2 Isolation-Containment Purge Exhaust C 2IAC*MOV130 3 '9 to r 2IAC*MOV133 Plug 2 .scor Isolation-Containacpt Purre Erh - t C l 4 Plug containment Isolation 2IAC*MOV134 2 Motor 0 4 Plug Containment Isolation 2IAC*V734 2 Motor 0 3 Check Containment Isolation 2LMS*SOV950 2 Weight 0 3/8 Globe 2 Containment Isolation 2LMS*SOV951 3/8 Globe Solenoid - 2LMS*SOV952 3/8 Globe 2 Solenoid Cont.Atm. Pressure to Indicator 0 2LMS*SOV953 3/8 Globe 2 Solenoid Cont.Atm. Pressure to Indicator O 2HSS*A0V102A 2 Globe 2 Solenoid Cont.Atm. Pressure to Indicator 0 l 2 MSS *AOV102B 2 Air Cont.Atm. Pressure to Indicator 0 2 Globe Main Steam Warmup 2 MSS *a0V102C 2 Air C 2 Globe Main Steam Warmup 2 MSS *HYV101A 2 Air C 32 Ball Main Steam Warmup 2 MSS *HYV101B 2 C 32 Ball Solenoid Main Steam Isolation 2 MSS *HYV101C 2 0 32 Ball Solenoid Main Steam Isolation 2 MSS *SOV105A 2 0 3 Globe Solenoid Main Steam Isolation 2 0 2 MSS *SOV105B 3 Globe 2 Solenoid Steam to Terry Turbine C 2 MSS *SOV105C 3 Globe 2 Solenoid Steam to Terry Turbine C 2 MSS *SOV105D 3 Globe 2 Solenoid Steam'to Terry Turbine C 2 MSS *SOV105E 3 Globe 2 Solenoid Steam to Terry Turbine C 2 MSS *SOV105F 3 Globe 2 Solenoid Steam to Terry Turbine C 2 MSS *SOV120 3/8 Globe 2 Solenoid Steam to Terry Turbine C Solenoid Main Steam Radiation Monitor 0 2 MSS *SV101A 6 Relief 2 Isolation 2 MSS *SV101B 6 Self Main Steam Safety 2 MSS *SV101C Relief 2 Self C 6 Relief Main Steam Safety 2 MSS *SV102A 2 Self C 6 Relief 2 Main Steam Safety C 2 MSS *SV102B 6 Self Main Steam Safety 2 MSS *SV102C Relief 2 Self C 6 Relief 2 Main Steam Safety 2 MSS *SV103A 6 Relief Self Main Steam Safety C 2 MSS *SV103B 2 Self C 6 Relief 2 Main Steam Safety 2 MSS *SV103C 6 Relief Self Main Steam Safety C 2 Self C Main Steam Safety C Amendment h / 7 of 15 Apri 1987
~ - - ,
BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.9B-19 (Cont) Mark No. Actuated Size Tyge Class By Normal ! Function Position 1 i 2 MSS *SV104A 6 Relief } 2 MSS *SV104B 6 2 Self Main Steam Safety Relief 2 C j Self Main Steam Safety 2 MSS *SV104C 6 Relief C 2 Self j 2 MSS *SV105A 6 Relief Main Steam Safety C 2 Self Main Steam Safety 2 MSS *SV105B 6 Relief C
; 2 Self Main Steam Safety 2 MSS *SV105C 6 Relief C 2 Self
{ 2 MSS *V81 3 Check Main Steam Safety C 2 Self 1 2 MSS *V82 3 Check Steam Supply to Terry Turbine - 2 Self
! 2 MSS *V97 3 Check Steam Supply to Terry Turbine -
3 Self l 2 MSS *V105 6 Check 2 Steam Supply to Terry Turbine - 2 MSS *V106 Self Steam Supply to RHR Valve } 6 Check 2 Self C j 2 MSS *V107 6 Check Steam Supply to RHR Valve C j 2 Self Steam Supply to RHR Valve 2 MSS *V213 3 Check C 3 Self
; 2 MSS *V214 3 Check 3 Steam Supply to Terry Turbine -
! 2 MSS *V215 Self Steam Supply to Terry Turbine 3 Check 2 Self Steam Supply to Terry Turbine 2 PAS *SOV103 3/8 Globe 2 2 PAS *SOV105A1 3/8 Globe 2 Solenoid SC-2/NNS Isolation C 1 2 PAS *SOV105A2 3/8 Globe 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation C } 2 PAS *SOV106 3/4 Globe 3 Solenoid Containment Isolation C l 2 PAS *SOV107 3/8 Globe 2 Solenoid Gas Return Isolation C 2 PAS *SOV108 3/8 Globe Solenoid 2RSS*P21A Sample Isolation C 2 Solenoid 2RSS*P21B Sample Isolation 2 PAS *SOV113 1 Globe C 3 ! 2 PAS *SOV114 1 Globe Solenoid SWS/ PAS Isolation C 3 !' 2QSS*A0V120A 6 Globe Solenoid SWS/ PAS Isolation C 2 Air 2QSS*A0V120B 6 Globe Refuel Wtr Clg Pump Suct. Isolation 0 2 Air 2QSS*MOV100A 12 Gate Refuel Wtr Clg Pump Suct. Isolation 0 2 Motor QSS Pump Suction 2QSS*MOV100B 12 Gate 2 0 Motor QSS Pump Suction 2QSS*MOV101A 10 Gate 2 0 Motor QSS Pump Discharge 2QSS*MOV101B 10 Gate 2 0 2QSS*MOV102A Motor QSS Pump Discharge 6 Gate 2 0 2QSS*MOV1028 Motor Chem. Addition Tank Discharge 6 Gate 2 C 2QSS*RV101A Motor Chem. Addition Tank Discharge 1 Relief 2 C
! Self Relief for 2QSS*MOV1014 2QSS*RV101B 1 Relief 2 C Self Relief for 2QSS*MOV101B C Amendment 16 8 of 15 i
April 1987 I
i h BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.9B-19 (Cont) l Actuated Normal Mark No. Size Tgge Class By Function Position 1 2QSS*SOV100A 2 Globe 2 2QSS*SOV1008 2 Solenoid QSS Chem. Inj. Cont. Isolation C Globe 2 Solenoid QSS Chem. Inj . Cont. Isolation i 2QSS*SOV101A 2 Globe C 2 Solenoid QSS Chem. Inj. Header Isolation
- 2QSS*SOV101B 2 Globe C 2 Solenoid QSS Chem. Inj. Header Isolation #
4 2QSS*SOV102A 2 Globe C 2 Solenoid QSS Chem. Inj. Header Isolation 2QSS*SOV102B 2 Globe C 2 Solenoid QSS Chem. Inj. Header Isolation 2QSS*VI 10 Check C 2 Weight 2QSS*V2 10 Check Containment Isolation - 1 2 Weight Containment Isolation - 2QSS*V94 2 Check 2 Self ! 2QSS*V95 2 Chen Inj. Pump Discharge - Check 2 Self ( Chen Inj. Pump Discharge 2\ 2QSS*V150 Check 2 Weight l 2QSS*V200 2 Check Containment Isolation - 2 Self Chem. Inj. Pump Discharge - 2QSS*V201 2 Check 2 2RCS*RV100 1 Self Chem. Inj. Pump Discharge - Relief 2 Self PRT Relief , 2RCS*V55 2\ Check C 2 Weight PRT Na Supply - 2RCS*V56 3 Check 2 Weight PRT Water Supply -
- 2RHS*FCV605A 8 Globe 2 Air 2RHS*FCV605B 8 RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass M Globe 2 Air RER Heat Exchanger Bypass 4
2RHS*HCV758A 10 M Butterfly 2 Air RHB Heat Exchanger Isolation 2RHS*HCV758B 10 0 Butterfly 2 Air RHB Heat Exchanger Isolation 2RHS*RV721A 4 0 Relief 2 Self RMS Pump Suction Relief 2RHS*RV721B 4 M Relief 2 Self RHS Pump Suction Relief 2RHS*RV100 M 1 Relief 2 Self 2RSS*MOV154C 6 Gate Cont.Penet.X-24 Thermal Relief C 2 Motor RSS Pump Mini Flow Recire. J 2RSS*MOV154D 6 Gate C i 2 Motor RSS Pump Mini Flow Recire. C 2RSS*MOV155A 12 Butterfly 2 Motor 2RSS*MOV155B RSS Pump Suction 0 12 Butterfly 2 Motor RSS Pump Suction 0 2RSS*MOV155C 12 Butterfly 2 Motor RSS Pump Suction O
! 2RSS*MOV155D 12 Butterfly 2 l
Motor RSS Pump Suction 0 2RSS*MOV156A 12 Gate 2 Motor RSS Pump Discharge 0 { 2RSS*MOV156B 12 Gate 2 Motor RSS Pump Discharge O ' } 2RSS*MOV156C 12 Gate 2 Motor RSS Pump Discharge 0 l 1 Amendment 16 1 9 of 15 April 1987 i
BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.9B-19 (Cont) Mark No. Actuated Normal Size mT Class By Function Position 1 2RSS*MOV156D 12 Gate 2 Motor RSS Pump Discharge 0 2RSS*RV156A 1/2 Relief 2 Self 2kSS*RV156B 1/2 Relief 2 Thermal Relief for 2RSS*HOV156A C Self Thermal Relief for 2RSS*MOV156B-l 2RSS*RV156C 1/2 Relief 2 C Self Thermal Relief for 2RSS*MOV156C 2RSS*RV156D 1/2 Relief 2 C Self Thermal Relief for 2RSS*HOV156D 2RSS*VI 12 Check 2 C Weight Containment Isolation 2RSS*V2 12 Check 2 Weight Containment Isolation 2RSS*V3 12 Check 2 Weight Containment Isolation l 2RSS*V4 12 Check 2 Weight Containment Isolation 2SDS*A0V111A1 1\ Globe 2 Air 2SDS*A0V111A2 1 Globe 2 Air Containment Isolation (Steam Drains) 0 2SDS*A0V111B1 1\ Globe 2 Air Containment Isolation (Steam Drains) 0 2SDS*A0V111B2 1\ Globe 2 Air Containment Isolation (Steam Drains) 0 2SDS*A0V111C1 1\ Globe 2 Air Containment Isolation (Steam Drains) 0 2SDS*A0V111C2 1\ Globe 2 Air Containment Isolation (Steam Drains) 0 2SDS*A0V129A 1 Globe 2 Air Containment Isolation (Steam Drains) 0 2SDS*A0V129B 1 Globe 2 Air containment Isolation (RHR Drain) 0 2 SIS *RV130 3/4 Relief 2 Self Containment Isolation (RHR Drain) 0 2 SIS *RV175 3/4 Containment Isolation C Relief 2 Self Safety Accumulator Test Relief ! 2 SIS *Vll3 10 Check 2 Weight C 2 SIS *V114 10 Check Containment Isolation - 2 Weight 2 SIS *V115 10 Check Containment Isolation - 2 Weight 2 SIS *V116 3 Check Containment Isolation - ' 2 Weight Containment Isolation 2 SIS *Vll7 3 Check 2 Weight 2 SIS *V118 3 Check Containment Isolation - 2 Weight 2 SIS *V119 3 Check Containment Isolation - 2 Weight 2 SIS *V120 2\ Check Containment Isolation - 2 Self SIS Fill Containment - Isolation 2 SIS *V145 4 Check 2 Self SIS Pump Discharge { 2 SIS *V146 4 Check 2 l Self SIS Pump Discharge - 2SSR*A0V100A1 3/4 Globe 2 Air 2SSR*A0V100A2 3/4 Globe Containment Isolation 0 2 Air Containment Isolation O Amendment 16 10 of 15 April 1987
4 BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.9B-19 (Cont) 1 Mark No. Actuated Normal Size Tyge Class By Function Position!
- 2SSR*AOV102Al 3/4 Globe 2 Air l 2SSR*AOV102A2 3/4 Globe Containment Isolation 0 2 Air Containment Isolation t
2SSR*A0V109Al 3/4 Globe 2 0 Air Containment Isolation , 2SSR*A0V109A2 3/4 Globe 2 0 ' Air Containment Isolation 2SSR*A0V112A1 3/4 Globe 2 O. Air Containment Isolation 2SSR*A0V112A2 3/4 Globe 2 0 Air Containment Isolation 2SSR*A0V117A 3/4 Globe 0 2 Air 2SSR*A0V1178 3/4 Globe Steam Generator Isolation 0 2 Air 2SSR*AOVil7C 3/4 Globe Steam Generator Isolation 0 2 Air 2SSR*A0V116A 3/4 Globe Steam Generator Isolation 0 2 Air 2SSR*A0V116B 3/4 Charging Pump Discharge Sample 0/C Globe 2 Air 2SSR*A0V116C 3/4 Charging Pump Discharge Sample 0/C Globe 2 Air ! 2SSR*A0V118A 3/4 Charging Pump Discharge Sample 0/C Globe 2 Air Letdown Flow Sample Valve i 2SSR*A0V118B 3/4 Globe 2 Air 0/C Volume Control Tank Gas Space 0/C { Sample j 2SSR*A0V118C 3/4 Globe 2 Air Volume Control Tank Liquid Sample i 2SSR*A0Vll8D 3/4 Globe 2 Air 0/C Reactor Coolant Filter Influent 0/C Sample 2SSR*RV117 1 Relief 2 Self Containment Penetration Relief 2SSR*RV118 C 1 Relief 2 Self Containment Penetration Relief C 2SSR*RV119 1 Relief 2 Self Containment Penetration Relief C
- 2SSR*RV120 1 Relief 2 i
Self Containment Penetration Relief C 2SSR*RV121 1 Relief 2 Self Containment Penetration Relief C I 2SSR*RV122 1 Relief 2 Self 2SSR*SOV128A1 3/8 Globe Containment Penetration Relief C 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation 2SSR*SOV128A2 3/8 Globe 0 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation 2SSR*SOV129Al 3/8 Globe 2 0
; 2SSR*SOV129A2 3/8 Globe Solenoid Containment Isolation 0 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation 2SSR*SOV129B 3/8 Globe 0 2 Solenoid Sample Pump Isolation j 2SSR*SOV130A1 3/8 Globe C 2 Solenoid Containment Isolation i 2SSR*SOV130A2 3/8 Globe 0 2 Solenoid Containment Isclation 2SVS*HCV104 10 Globe 0 2 E/H Residual Heat Removal C Amendment 16 11 of 15 April 1987
BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.9B-19 (Cont) Mark No. Actuated Size h Class By Normal Function Position 1 2SVS*PCV101A 10 Globe 2 2SVS*PCV101B E/11 Atmosphere Dump 10 Globe 2 C 2SVS*PCV101C E/H Atmosphere Dump 10 Globe 2 C 2SVS*V105 E/H ' sphere Dump > 6 Check 2 C v 2SVS*V106 6 Check 2 Self Self Main Steam Drain Isolatio PAS e oJM -HM b Rb #' 2SVS*V107 6 Check 2 Main Steam Drain Isolatio Self 2SWE*MOV116A 30 Butterfly 3 Motor Main Steam Drain Iso 1atio] S N A M M ^"
@> alm Ba'rge Accident bC-3/NNS Isolation M
2SWE*MOV116B 30 Butterfly C 3 Motor 2SWM*MOV562 3 Plug Barge Accident SC-3/NNS Isolation C 3 Motor 2SWH*MOV563 3 Plug 3 Chlorination SC-3/NNS Isolation O 2SWM*MOV564 Motor Chlorination SC-3/NNS Isolation O 3 Plug 3 Motor 2SWM*MOV565 3 Plug 3 Chlorination SC-3/NNS Isolation 0 2SWS*n3V114 Motor Chlorination SC-3/NNS Isolation 0 10 Butterfly 3 Air SC-3/NNS Isolation 2SWS*A0V118A 2 Globe 3 0 Air 2SWS*A0V118B 2 Globe 3 Air Unit 1 Seal Wtr.SC-3/NNS Isolation 0 2SWS*MOV102A 30 Butterfly 3 Unit 1 Seal Wtr.SC-3/NNS Isolation 0 2SWS*MOV102B Motor SWS Pump Discharge Isolation 0 30 Butterfly 3 2SWS*MOV102Cl Motor SWS Pump Discharge Isolation 0 30 Butterfly 3 Motor SWS Pump Discharge Isolation 2SWS*MOV102C2 30 Butterfly 3 Motor C 2SWS*MOV103A 24 SWS Pump Discharge Isolation C Butterfly 3 Motor 2SWS*MOV103B 24 RSS Supply C Butterfly 3 Motor RSS Supply 2SWS*MOV104A 16 Gate 3 C 2SWS*MOV104B Motor RSS Supply O 16 Gate 3 2SWS*MOV104C Motor RSS Supply 0 16 Gate 3 2SWS*MOV104D Motor RSS Supply O 16 Gate 3 Motor RSS Supply O 2SWS*MOV105A 16 Gate 3 Motor RSS Supply O 2SWS*MOV105B 16 Gate 3 Motor RSS Supply 0 2SWS*MOV105C 16 Gate 3 2SWS*MOV105D Motor RSS Supply 0 16 Gate 3 Motor RSS Supply 0 2SWS*MOV106A 30 Butterfly 3 Motor CCP/CCS-Contat Cooling coil Supply 0 2SWS*MOV1068 30 Butterfly 3 Motor CCP/CCS-Contat Cooling Coil Supply 0 2SWS*MOV107A 24 Butterfly 3 Motor CCP SC-3/NNS Isolation 0 2SWS*MOV107B 24 Butterfly 3 Motor CCP SC-3/NNS Isolation O Amendment 12 of 15 Apri 1987 N
BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.9B-19 (Cont) Mark No. Actuated Normal Size Type Class By Function Position 1 1 2SWS*MOV107C 24 Butterfly 3 Motor CCP SC-3/NNS Isolation 0 2SWS*MOV107D 24 Butterfly 3 Motor CCP SC-3/NNS Isolation 0 l 2SWS*MOV113A 6 Gate 3 Motor Diesel Supply C { 2SWS*MOV113B 6 Gate - 3 Motor Diesel Supply 2SWS*MOV113C 6 Gate C. 3 Motor Diesel Supply C 2SWS*MOV113D 6 Gate 3 Motor Diesel Supply C 2SWS*MOV148A 4 Butterfly i 3 Motor Rod Control AC Supply C 2SWS*MOV148B 4 Butterfly 3 Motor Rod Control AC Supply C 2SWS*MOV152-1 8 Butterfly 2 Motor containment Isolation 0 2SWS*MOV152-2 8 Butterfly 2 Motor Containment Isolation 0 2SWS*MOV153-1 8 Butterfly 2 Motor Containment Isolation 0 2SWS*MOV153-2 8 Butterfly 2 Motor Containment Isolation 0 2SWS*MOV154-1 8 Butterfly 2 Motor Containment Isolation 0 2SWS*MOV154-2 8 Butterfly 2 Motor Containment Isolation 0 2SWS*MOV155-1 8 Butterfly 2 Motor Containment Isolation 0 2SWS*MOV155-2 8 Butterfly 2 Motor Containment Isolation 0 2SWS*MOV162 8 Butterfly 3 Motor SC-3/NNS Isolation 0 2SWS*MOV163 8 Butterfly 3 Motor 2SWS*MOV164 8 SC-3/NNS Isolation 0 Butterfly 3 Motor SC-3/NNS Isolation 2SWS*MOV165 8 0 Butterfly 3 Motor SC-3/NNS Isolation 2SWS*PCV117A 3 Globe 0 3 Solenoid Unit 2 Seal Wtr Supply 2SWS*PCV117B 3 Globe C 3 Solenoid Unit 2 Seal Wtr Supply 2SWS*RV152 1 Relief C 2 Self Containment Isolation 2SWS*RV153 1 C Relief 2 2SWS*RV154 Self Containment Isolation C 1 Relief 2 Self Containment Isolation 2SWS*RV155 1 Relief C 2 Self Containment Isolation ] 2SWS*SOV130A 2 Globe C ' 2 Solenoid Unit 2 Seal Wtr Supply 2SWS*SOV130B 2 Globe C 2 Solenoid Unit 2 Seal Wtr Supply 2SWS*TCV101A 2 Y pattern C
' 3 Solenoid Control Room Cooling 2SWS*TCV101B 2 Y-pattern M 3 Solenoid Control Room Cooling 2SWS*V192 30 Check M 3 Self SWS Pump Discharge Check 1
2SWS*Vl94 30 Check C 3 Self SWS Pump Discharge Check I 2SWS*V196 30 Check 3 Self SWS Pump Discharge Check - Amendment 16 13 of 15 April 1987 i
BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.9B-19 (Cont) Mark No. Actuated Normal Size mT Class By Function Position 1 2SWS*V243 2 Check 3 Self 2SWS*V244 2 Check 3 Unit 1 Seal Wtr SC-3/NNS Isolation - Self 2SWS*V260 2 Gate 3 Unit 1 Seal Wtr SC-3/NNS Isolation
~ -
Manual [ Unit 2sealWtrSupply 'c " 2SWS*V261 2SWS*V264 2 6 Gate Check 3 3 Manual (At 2 Seal Wtr Sunply Self
'c" % Q Q E '/ '^g M J
I S 2SWS*V265 6 Check 3 Self Diesel Check Valve Diesel Check Valve y - 2SWS*V266 6 Check 3 Self Diesel Check Valve 2SWS*V267 6 Check 3 Self Diesel Check Valve 2SWS*V269 3 Check 3 Self SWS Pump Vacuum Breaker 2SWS*V270 3 Check 3 Self SWS Pump Vacuum Breaker 2SWS*V271 3 Check 3 2SWS*V355 Self SWS Pump Vacuum Breaker - 30 Butterfly 3 Manual 2SWS*V356 30 SC-3/NNS Isolation 0 Butterfly 3 Manual 2SWS*V410 24 SC-3/NNS Isolation 0 Butterfly 3 Manual RSS Heat Exchangers 2SWS*V438 30 Check C 3 Self 2SWS*V439 30 Check Header Check (Barge Acc Loop Cycle) 0 3 Self 2SWS*V451 6 Gate Header Check (Barge Acc Loop Cycle) 0 3 M:nual Fuel Pool Backup 2SWS*V452 6 Gate C 3 Manual Fuel Pool Backup 2SWS*V551 10 Check C 3 Self SC-3/NNS Isolation 2SWS*V803 2 Check 3 2SWS*V809 2 Self Control Room Cooling - Check 3 2VRS*A0V109Al Self Contr'lo Room Cooling - 1\ Globe 2 Air Hydrogenated Gas Vent 2VRS*A0V109A2 1\ Globe O 2 Air Hydrogenated Gas Vent O Amendment 14 of 15 1987
BVPS-2 FSAR , TABLE 3.9B-19 (Cont) '. 3
~
l
. 't e
NOTES: 1) Normal Positions 0 - Open C - Closed M - Modulating 2) These mark numbers are not on flow diagram 12241-RM-72A, but are on VOND 12241-0M-236-11 . 3) This valve listing is for design applicability of " Active" components. se'e LVPS-2 Inservice Test For test requirements, Program for Inservice Testing Plan for Pumps and Valves (ASME Section XI). 4} ?_ eve.4 m 0 13 8.o',Z SA) h %w% W M wa m a - pm +A. M geAd QA h j Amendment 6) 15 of 15 April 1987 m 1
SVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.94-9 ACTIVE PUMPS ANS Post-Item Safety Pump No. Normal LOCA System Class Mode Mode Function Centrifugal APCH CVCS 2 charging ON/0FF ON High head pumps #1, #2 safety or #3 injection, also boration for safe shutdown Boric acid APBA CVCS 3 transfer ON/0FF OFF Boration pumps #1 or for safe
#2 shutdown Low head APLH SIS 2 safety 0FF* ON Low head injection safety pumps #1 injection or #2 NOTE:
*from Lowthehead RWST. pumps operate during refueling to fill the reactor cavity Amendment 13 1 of 1 January 1987
BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.9N-10 (Cont) Mark Mom Actuated Type / Normal Location System By h Safety Class Position Function 2CHS*MOV381 8100 CVCS Motor 3 Cate/2 0 Containment isolation-seal return 2CHS*MOV350 8104 CVCS Motor 2 GIobe/2 C BATP discha rge isoIation 2CHS*MOV373 8106 CVCS Motor 3 Gate /2 0 CCP siniflow isolation 2CHS*MOV289 8107 CVCS Motor 3 Cate/2 0 Containment isolation 2CHS*MOV275A-C 8109A/8/C CVCS Motor 2 Globe /2 O CCP siniflow isolation 2CHS*MOV380A/8 8110A/S CVCS Motor 2 Globe /2- C CCP alternate minirlow ECHS*MOV383A/8 8111A/8 CVCS Motor 2 Globe /2 0 CCP alternate minirlow 2CHS*MOV378 8112 CVCS Motor 3 Cate/2 0 Containment isolation-seat return 2CHS*MOV30dA-C 8113A/8/C CVCS Motor 2 Globe /2 0 Containment isolation-seat injection 2CHS*MOV8130A/8 8130A/S CVCS Motor 8 Cate/2 0 CCP suction isolation 2CHS*MOV8131A/8 8131A/8 CVCS Motor 8 Gate /2 0 CCP suction isolation 2CHS*MOV8132A/8 8132A/8 CVCS Motor 4 Cate/2 0 CCP discharge isolation 2CHS*MOV8133A/8 8133A/S CVCS Motor 4 Gate /2 0 CCP discharge isolation 3CHS*MOV310 8146 CVCS Motor 3 Cate/2 0 Cha rg ing isolation 2CHS*A0V200A/C 8149A/C CVCS Air 2 Globe /2 C Letdown / containment isolation 2CHS*A0V2008 81498 CVCS Air 2 Globe /2 O Letdown / containment isolation 2CHS*A0V204 8152 CVCS Air 2 Globe /2 0 Containment isolation 2CHS*MOV201 8153 CVCS Moto r 2 Globe /1 C RCPS -None- 8314A/B CVCS AP 2 Check /3 - SATP d i scha rge Amendment 13 2 of 6 January 1987
_ _ - - - - _. .. --- - - - - - - . - . - - - - . - . ~ -.. - - i l, BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.9N-10 (Cont) Ma rk No. Actuated Type / Normal Location System Sv fjlg Safety Class Position Function 2RHS*MOV701A,8 8701A/B RHRS Motor 12 Cate/1 C 2RHS*MOV702A,8 RHR suction isolation 8702A/8 RHRS Motor 12 Cate/1 C RHR suction isolation j 2RHS*MOV720A,8 8703A/8 RHRS Motor 10 Cate/1 C-74 C RHR discharge isoIation j 8704A/S RHRS AP 10 Check /2 - RHR pump discharge l 1 4 l l 2 } 1 ) I I I i j l Amendment 11 4.of 6 January 1986
O BVPS-2 FSAR TABLE 3.9N-10 (Cont) i Ma rk No. Actuated Type / No rma l Location System By Size Safety Class Position function 2 SIS *MOV8890A/8 8890A/8 SIS Motor 4 Cate/2 C LHS1 miniflow 2 SIS *MOV841 8892 SIS Motor 3 Cate/2 0- ECCS injection flowpath
-None- 8926 SIS AP 8 Chech/2 -
RWST to CCP pumps suction
-None- 8948A/8/C SIS AP 12 Check /1 -
RCP8, accumulator injection
-None- 8956A/8/C SIS AP 12 Check /1 -
RCP8, accumulator injection 2 SIS *AOV889 8961 SIS Air i 3/4 Globe /2 C Containment isolation i -None- 8973A/8/C SIS AP 6 Check /1 - RCP8
-None- 8976A/B SIS AP 10 Check /2 I LHSI pump discharge
- -None- 8988A/8 SIS AP 6 1
Check /1 - RCP8
-None- 8990A/8/C SIS AP 2 Check /1 -
RCPS
-None- 8992A/8/C SIS AP 2 Check /1 -
RCPS
-None- 8993A/8/C SIS AP 6 Check /1 -
RCP8
-None- 8995A/8/C SIS AP 2 Check /1 -
RCPS '
-None- 8997A/8/C SIS AP 2 Check /1 -
RCPS
, -None- 8998A/8/C SIS AP ! 6 Check /1 -
RCPB j 2 SIS *HCV868A/B NCV-937A/8 SIS Solenoid 1 Globe /2 O
! Eme rgency bora t ion, safe shutdown ! l i
j Amendment 13 6 of 6 Janua ry 1987 1
SQRT Generic Item 3.10.1.3(1) During the field observation, the Staff found that several of the equipment items did not have a model number or a serial number for identification. These items, instead had a " number" put on by the utility. This made it very difficult to establish a permanent audible link between the field equipment and the qualification documentation. On inquiry, the applicant indicated that, in the documentation , the utility has the linkage estab-lished between the " mark numbers" and the model or serial numbers. This, however, puts an extra layer of paperwork between the field item and the qualification documentation and has the potential of loosing the direct traceability. Therefore, the utility should resolve the issue of installing the model or serial numbers (as the case may be) provided by the supplier on the equip-ment in the field for positive identification and traceability. This is to be confirmed.
Response
BVPS-2's system for monitorng equipment is similar to systems successfully implemented on other plants such as BVPS-1, Millstone and Shoreham, and pro-vides complete traceability to vendor supplied documentation and installa-tion requirements. The system provides a consistent and timely approach to control, monitor and assess status on all safety-related equipment. During the site auait both general and specific presentations were made to identify how the mark number system is applied including how the traceabil-ity of the vendor's documentation is maintained and how engineering reviews the appropriate calculations, test reports and installation requirements for acceptance. The presentation provided, by example, the link between the vendor's identification and the BVPS-2 identification by mark number. Generally speaking, the items found during the site audit are all part of the SQRT/PV0RT package for customized cabinets. All of which are of a specific design and easily traced. Secondly, the vendor has not provided with their cabinet a serial /model number tag (This would have to be request-ed of the vendor.) It has been the experience on BVPS-2 that all safety related equipment is traceable to appropriate vendor documentation and requirements necessary to ensure correct and complete installation. The marking system employed has been utilized (as stated above) on other plants and provides a completely traceable link to all applicable vendor and site specific drawings and
- design documents to ensure complete qualification.
Status: Closed (April 1, 1987 NRC Meeting) I l
- r. ,
SQRT Generic Item 3.10.1.3(2) During the field observation of the loop stop valve protection cabinet (NSSS-15), it appeared that the clearance between this unit and the adjacent cabinets was not adequate. On inquiry, the Staff learned that this problem may exist with other cabinets. Therefore, this problem of adequate clear-ance between adjacent cabinets should be addressed on a generic basis. The response should include examples of resolution for typical cases.
Response
A walkdown program, involving Engineering and Q.C., of all safety-rel ated components / systems located within Category I safety areas was completed in November,1986 to identify all cases where a 2" minimum clearance require-ment was not met. Panels mounted as close as is physically possible to each other were not included in this survey, since such continuous contact along their sides precludes sufficient relative motion from seismic excitation for serious impact loading to occur (See Attachment A for further discussion). Typical breaches were between a panel and terminal boxes, conduit or the supporting structure for cable trays, ducts, piping, etc. Of the 13 prob-lems identified during this survey, 8 were accepted as-is based on frequency (the required clearance is much less for panels of frequency of 10 Hz or greater) and 5 were accepted after rework was completed. Examples of the resolution are provided below: Rework MCC*2-E05 (NSS-4 & B0P-1) A zero clearance existed between the motor control center and adjacent cable tray and supporting structure. The cable tray and supporting structure were relocated to provide a clearance of 1/2". This 1/2" clearance was found acceptable per calculation 12241-NM(B)704. Accept as-is PNL*DL2-15 One inch clearance exists between a seismically rigid panel and adj acent rigid conduit support. Due to the inherent stiffness of the two structures, the equipment mounting has been accepted based on Calculation 12241-NM(B)704. Audit concern: RK*2RC-PRT-A (NSSS-15) This cabinet meets the 2" criteria identified in calculation 12241-NM(B)-580 and is therefore acceptable. Status: Open
9 0 SQRT ATTACHMENT A Generic Item 3.10.1.3.(2) The technical rational for accepting electrical and instrumentation equip-nent (cabinets) in close proximity with adjacent cabinets, that is, having continuous contact along the mating sides, is described below. The two concerns addressed are the effects of seismic interaction on structural adequacy and the related effects on the operability of sensitive electri-cal, control and instrumentation components. In considering the basic scenario of a single degree of freedom oscillator (a simple spring-mass damped system), the natural frequency of the oscil-1ator is developed only by allowing displacement of the mass. If rigid displ acement-limiting boundaries are added to the simple oscillator system, the response will become coupled and limited to the amount of displacement available. Also the effective natural frequency will shift. The displacement-limiting boundaries that exist in the actual installation are the adjacent cabinets. The continuous contact that exists between them provides a limiting boundary condition as well as enhanced damping. Since resonant response only develops over many cycles of loading, it is impossible for the fundamental response of the system to include out-of-phase motion because the close contact assures the motion will build up in unison. The displacement and impact energy that could be present due to slight spaces between adjacemt cabinets is not deemed to be sufficient to structurally degrade the cabinets. The above argument is enhanced since the design of the cabinets typically precludes a significant mode within the amplified region of the BVPS-2 amplified response spectra (ARS). (It should be noted that the BVPS-2 site is a seismically quiet site in that the design response spectra is not of a severe amplitude.) This assures " seismically rigid response". To develop, by design, seismically rigid structures requires the incorpor-ation of internal bracing such that the overall stiffness of the cabinet is significant. With the existence of such bracing, the structural integ-rity of the cabinet is also enhanced. Any minimal seismic interaction is also not anticipated to degrade the functional operability of the electrical or instrumentation components mounted within the cabinet. This conclusion is based on the fact that Class 1E electrical and instrumentation components for BVPS-2 were seis-mically tested. During seismic testing the test facility is required, as a minimum, to envelop the required response spectra (RRS). In meeting this requirement the testing facility controls accurately tne input to the seismic test table in the amplified region of the RRS. However, due to non-linearities associated with seismic test tables, especially impact due to clearances at bearings and pi ns , a significant over test normally occurs at frequencies above 33 hertz. This inherently goes unnoticed since it is outside the normal frequency range of interest and is not controllable by the test equipment. However it provides evidence that
c-the test components are capable of withstanding significant and long (from a seismic standpoint) duration testing of relatively high frequency, high acceleration content. The evaluation presented above provides justification for the mounting of adjacent cabinets on BVPS-2 and assures that the integrity and functional capability of the equipment and components has been properly and complete-ly documented.
SQRT Generic Item 3.10.1.3(3) The completion of the progran of verification of as-built loads for pumps and valves is to be confirmed.
Response
BVPS-2 has successfully implemented and completed a stress reconcilation program. The main objective being complete reconcilation of as-installed piping systems and mechanical equipment. This program which included a review of all interfacing loads on mechanical equipment (i.e. pumps, valves, heat exchangers and strainers) has now been completed. All interfacing loads on mechanical equipment have been reconciled to ensure the actual loads imposed are below the specified design allowable loads. J Status: Closed (April 1, 1987 NRC Meeting) I
L 1
, SQRT Generic Item 3.10.1.3(4) i ! The applicant is to inform the staff of the completion of. the seismic and '
dynamic qualification program. The completion and confirmation must occur j before fuel load. j Response: ! l 4 The seismic and dynamic qualification program is in the final stages of completion. All equipment has been qualified, except for the three (3) Main j Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). Installation status is at 99.8% complete . with 7 items (including the MSIVs) yet to be verified. DLC had three MSIVs made by Crosby (2 MSS *HYV101A, B, and C), which experi-enced numerous design and operation problems (similar valves existed on Nine Mile Unit 2 plant). DLC has decided to replace these valves with Atwood & Morrill wye pattern globe valves. This decision necessitates a revision to the scheduled fuel load date from April 30,1987 to May 21, 1987. Since the reactor plant will not be affected by the valve replacement activity, scheduled to be completed by June 30, 1987, DLC intends to proceed with fuel load on May 21, 1987. Criticality, however, will not occur until I installation 'and testing have been completed. A letter confirming this I phase of completion will be sent at that time. The finalization of the MSIV qualification documentation in support of BVPS-2's plant specific conditions !
- is scheduled to be completed by fuel load (May 21,1987). This new Atwood &
Morrill valve is a proven design in the nuclear industry and has been installed on at least 29 BWR or PNR Nuclear Reactors in the United States i alone. The capability of this valve to meet seismic and environmental qual-ification requirements has obviously been demonstrated by the NRC's approval ! i of its application at these other plants (see attached list). Therefore, L the NRC should not require an extensive review to approve. Status: Open (Letter to NRC required upon completion of qualification) l i i t i i 4 i 4
3.10.1.3(4) Attachment 1 l r Atwood and Morrill Co., Inc. , r Installation List of ' Main Steam Isolation Valves Sequoyah 1 & 2 l Pilgrim 1 l Perry 1 & 2 Enrico Fermi 2 Hatch 1 River Bend 1 ! Allens Creek 1 , Clinton 1 Oyster Creek 1 ,. Grand Gulf 1 & 2 Nine Mile Point 1 Monticello Susquehanna 1 & 2 Limerick 1 & 2 Peach Bottom 2 & 3 i Hope Creek 1 & 2 Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3 - Hartsville A1, A2, ' Phipps Bend 1 & 2 F [ i i F t L 1 I r
.,.-,,--..,.n., _ ,w.,,- _ , , , , , , , , , - . . - _ . _ - , , _ , , ,,n,n,.n. , , .. , , .,.,
4 SQRT Equipment Specific Issue 3.10.1.4(1) Review of the qualification documentation for the residual heat removal (RHR) system heat exchanger raised the following concerns: (a) the appropriateness of using Bijlaard analysis for the 24-inch nozzle-shell junction stresses (b) sizing calculatons for the support lug welds (c) the use of specified lug dimension in the support lug-shell junction stress analysis The above concerns must be resolved for the RHR heat exchanger to quali-fled.
Response
a) The Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers at BVPS-2 are classified as ASME Safety Class 3 pressure vessels. They were designed, fabricated, and code stamped in accordance with Section III, Division 1, Subsection ND (1974/ Summer 1974 Addendum) of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Westinghouse performed a local stress analysis using the Bijlaard tech-nique, at the nozzle /shell connection for the 24" shell outlet nozzle using actual nozzle loads and found the shell membrane stress to be 8150 psi. This value is far less than 41060 psi (vendor calculated) listed in the "EG&G" Report EGG-EA-7498 and less than the allowable 42000 psi. The differences between the vendor stresses and those calculated by (W) can be explained as follows:
- 1) The vendor (Dynatech Report No.-1318) used all equipment specifica-tion allowables for the input in the "Bijlaard" program. The allowable shear load and bending moment is used in both horizontal directions instead of using 0.707 times the allowable shear and bending moment value in those two directions (Vc & VL should be 8325 lbs instead of 11775 lbs and Mc & ML should be 478283 in-lb instead of 676496 in-lb.). This resulted in very conservative stress values.
- 2) The vendor also used higher stress concentration factors values (Kn=
1.5 & Kb=3.0) instead of 1.0 for both. The WRC Bulletin 107 under Paragraph 2.0 on Page No. 2 states to use these higher factors if, (a) the vessel is constructed of brittle material and (b) if fatigue evalation is to be undertaken. None of these conditions exist, and 1.0 for "Kn" & "Kb" should have been used (was used in Westinghouse analysis) . This added to the conservative results.
SQRT Evaluating the above situation, the actual " membrane stress" is much lower than the value shown in the vendor report based on extreme conser-vatism. Even though some " discontinuity stresses" exist, there still is a big margin between the actual stress using actual nozzle loads and the allowable. Based on (W) current analysis, using actual nozzle loads, there is no concern with failures at the junction. The use of the Bijlaard technique to determine stresses at the nozzle /shell junction has been industry accepted and is appropriate for the following reasons:
- 1) This analysis discounted reinforcement around the nozzle /shell junction, thus the high stresses calculated by the Bijlaard analysis are conservative
- 2) Each heat exchanger is supported vertically by two lugs located toward the lower end of the vessel; lateral support is provided at the head of the pressure vessel . The Bijlaard analysis assumes that the nozzle is isolated. Although the nozzle in question is located near the vessel head to shell junction, this end condition produces a stiffening effect on the nozzle which results in reduced binding stresses determined by a Bijlaard analysis. (Although bending stresses decrease, shear stresses increase but have little effect).
- 3) Article ND-3000, subparagraph ND-3112.4, " Design Allowable Stress Values" states:
"It is recognized that highly localized and secondary bending stresses may exist in components designed and fabricated in accordance with these rules. Insofar as practical, design rules for details have been written to hold such stresses at e safe level consistent with experience."
We believe this statement directly appiles to to this concern. The Bijlaard technique was utilized to calculate the primary stresses in the RHR Heat Exchangers. The secondary stresses, although addressed by the Bijlaard techniques are self-limiting in nature and are included within the design allowable stress values, b) The filler material taed for welding gussets to the support is AISI type 399 as per the vendor procedure. The minimum tensile strength per AMSE Code Section II, Part C, Section SFA-5.4 for shielded metal arc weloing method is 80.0 ksi. The minimum tensile strength for base material (SA 240 TP 304) is 75.0 ksi. This shows that the strength of filler mater-ial is higher than the base material and also, as stated in our previous letter (October 27, 1986) the throat of the weld exceeds the plate it joins. In addition, the welds were made using qualified weld procedure per ASME Code. Therefore, we believe that the weld is adequate and stronger than the base metal.
_y .. . . _ ,_. . _. _ ._-_ _.. __. SQRT 4 c)~ Westinghouse utilized the " finite element" method to evaluate the stresses in the shell at the gusset connection in addition to the "Bijlaard" technique used in the vendor design report. The results indicate that the stresses due to the " finite element" method are lower compared to the "Bijlaard" technique, thus indicating that the "Bijlaard" technique is conservative to use in this case. Please note that the major contribution in the stress is due to internal pressure. The reconciliation program recently complete on BVPS-2 indentified a concern with the stresses in the lower support lug. Westinghouse was notified of this concern and was requested to resolve.
- Westinghouse modified the support gusset arrangement by adding two more gussets between the existing gussets which are 30" apart at two loca-i tions. The new design has inner gussets 16" apart and outer gussets 30" apart. This change has been implemented in the field. The new gusset configuration has been evaluated utilizing the "Bijlaard" technique and
, were found to be within the design allowable loads and low enough to j prevent buckling. ] j Status: Open 9 i t l
SQRT Equipment-Specific Issues: 3.10.1.4(3) The review of qualification documentation for the motor-operated damper indicated that there were a substantial number (too many to list here) of anomalies detected. In some cases the acceptance criteria were changed. The applicant made an initial response to the anomalies at the time of the audit. However, most of these responses do not explain the reason for acceptability. The list of anomalies in Wyle Laboratories Report No. 58784 should be resolved and the reason for the acceptability should be discussed in each case. Also, the change of acceptance criteria, if any should be justified.
Response
Wyle Laboratories Report No. 58784 lists 18 anomalies in Section 7 pages 7-1 thorugh 7-19. ITT comments on each anomaly discussed in Report 730-1-140 are provided in Appendix E of that report. The reason for acceptance of the anomalies are further discussed in Sections 3.2-8 to 3.2-13. Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) and DLC have reviewed these anomalies and have determined that resolutions presented in the above Test Report, and changes in acceptance criteria are justifiable. In addition to the ITT General Controls resolution of the ider.tified anomalies SWEC has further reviewed the anomalies to BVPS-2 plant specific requirements and find all anomalies to be justified. Examples of this review is as follows:
- 1) During vibration aging for Test Unit #2, the manual override handle was removed to facilitate normalization and calibration of the Test Table. (Wyle Anomaly No. 6).
BVPS-2 does not have a manual override handle, thus no problem exists.
- 2) Evaluate the acceptability of the condition affecting anomaly no.14,
" Capacitors broke loose".
ITT's response is acceptable, however BVPS-2 has purchased the Maxwell capacitor and mounting bracket (which did not break loose) and has retrofitted the BVPS-2 actuators.
- 3) An auxiliary limit switch broke during the first axis of vibration aging (anomaly no. 9).
This auxiliary limit switch does not exist on any of the BVPS-2 actua-tors, therefore there is no concern for anomaly no. 9. Therefore based on ITT General Controls testing of NH90 Series Actuators at Wylie Laboratoreis, SWEC and DLC review of the subject test reports and satisfactory disposition of all anomalies, the NH90 series actuators are qualified for use at BVPS-2. Status: Closed (April 1, 1987 NRC Meeting)
SQRT DLC Letter - December 24, 1985 Issue #42 Provide the method for considering low-cycle fatigue effects resulting from seismic excitation on electrical and instrumentation equipment and their related supporting structures. Discussion: This was identified by the NRC as an "old issue" in the meeting of 4/1/07 in Bethesda. The NRC's request for this information was made with refereaee to DLC's response to item 42 identified in DLC's letter ONRC 6-167 dated 12/24/85 which was written in response to the BVPS-2 SER (N!'REfi-!H7) dated 10/85.
Response
Low-cycle fatigue effects, which require a signtficMt strain range typical-ly involving plastic deformation and mal funct too in approximately 1000 cycles or less, has been considered in sot <mic qualification testing and analysis. In seismic testing, the number of te$t t a<sociated with the 5 03E events and the 1 SSE event and their duration Aid splitude, along with any natural frequency scan testing, when uttit:ed, adequately addressed low-cycle fatigue affects. Each seismic tett wat JO seconds (not 15 seconds as actu-ally anticipated) in duratico. An approximate minimum duration of 3 minutes was associated with icw-Imel tine sweep testing in each axis when natural frequency scan testing wat .weleyed, When the qualificat100 of the nuppor'.ing structure was by analysis, material stress allowables of v of minimtrn yield strength for the OBE design condi-tion and 100% of miniman yield, or 70f, of ultimate strength for the SSE design condt t ten wre utilized. Fatigue design data such as the conserva-tive design cun es of the ASME Boller and Pressure Vessel Code demonstrate that t he 4.* < tress allowtales are sufficient to prevent low-cycle fatigue. Also the we ton of the cabinets and their supporting structure generally requir',1 the first natural frequency to be above the amplified region of the spectric Mellfied responso spectra (ARS). Therefore they may be considered at N Kutcally rigid" structures. [t3tg: (Response as agreed upon in April 1,1987 NRC Meeting l l l l
SQRT Equipment Specific Issue 3.10.1.4(2) The field observation and the review of qualification documents indicated the following issues with respect to the . alternate shutdown panel: (i) Finite element model used for the analysis was not authenticated. (ii) There was neither a list nor qualification of internal class IE instruments. (iii) There was no permanent auditable link between the field item and the documentation. The qualification of this item is pending and requires resolution of the above issues of concern.
Response
The qualification package for the Alternate Shutdown Panel has been comple-ted and ~ includes the results of the in-situ testing. This package demon-strates the Alternate Shutdown Panel is qualified for BVPS-2 plant condi-tions. (1) The vendor's finite element model has been authenticated by in-situ impedence testing, as described in SWEC report 12241-65D-AV3 dated 12/86. The measured minimum gross fundamental frequency was identical to the 20 Hz frequency predicted by the vendor's analysis. (ii) The list of internal Class 1E devices, contained in SWEC drawing 12241-RE- 25GA (attached) were seismicaly qualified by test at NTS/Acton, as described in test report: Seismic Test of Control and Relay Components, 20047-84N-2. All Class 1E equipment internal to the alternate shi.tdown panel have been qualified and all anomalies have been resolved. The seismic -qualification package is considered final-ized. Both 03cuments were contained within the SQRT documentation package for 28VS-731 at the time of the audit. (iii) The permanent aJditable link between the alternate shutdown panel and the documentation is established by permanently affixing to this equipment its Mark Number. This is one of the customized panels not identified by a Vendor serial /model number (see response to Generic item 3.10.1.3(1)). The Mark Number is the BVPS-2 permanent equipment identification number and provides the required auditable link between the equipment and its documentation. Status: Closed (change made as agreed upon in April 1,1987 NRC Meeting)
n OVERSIZE DOCUMENT PAGE PULLED - l SEE APERTURE CARDS l NUMBER OFOVERSIZE PAGES FILMED ON APERTURE CARDS APERTURE CARD /HnRD COPY AVAILABLE FROM RECORD SERVICES BRANCH,TIDC FTS 492-3989
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