ML20205D238
| ML20205D238 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1986 |
| From: | Tam P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-62895, TAC-62896, NUDOCS 8608150310 | |
| Download: ML20205D238 (12) | |
Text
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August 5, 1986 Docket No. 50-412 APPLICANT:
Duquesne Light Company, et al FACILITY:
Beaver Valley Unit 2
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING ON JULY 23, 1986 - PREPARATION FOR ONSITE SQRT AND PVORT REVIEW In the October 1985 Safety Evaluation Report, the staff indicated that two onsite reviews will be done by the seismic qualification review team (SQRT) and the pump and valve operability review team (PVORT). These two actions are identified as confirmatory issues 12 and 13, respectively, in the SER.
By letter dated June 4, 1986, the applicant submitted a document entitled
" Seismic and Dynamic Qualification Program for Safety-Related Equipment for Beaver Valley Unit 2," and requested a meeting with the staff prior to the onsite reviews. The requested meeting was held on July 23, 1986, in Bethesda. Enclosure 1 is the agenda and Enclosure 2 is the attendee list of the meeting.
The staff and its consultants provided a number of comments and requests for information in the form of two hand-outs (Enclosures 3 and 4). The staff explained each of these comments / requests to the attendees and requested that the applicant provide answers by August 20, 1986.
Applicant personnel agreed to provide to the staff on August 6, 1986 their latest revision of the equipment master list. The staff, in turn, agreed to provide on August 18, 1986 a list of items selected for review by the SQRT and PVORT.
t All agreed that onsite review will take place during September 20 to October 3, 1986.
/s/
Peter S. Tam, Project Manager Project Directorate #2 Division of PWR Licensing-A
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
See next page
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Mr. J. J. Carey Duquesne Light Company Beaver Valley 2 Power Station cc:
Gerald Charnoff, Esq.
Mr. R. E. Martin, Manager Jay E. Silberg, Esq.
Regulatory Affairs Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Duquesne Light Company 1800 M Street, N.W.
Beaver Valley Two Project Washington, DC 20036 P. O. Box 328 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Mr. C. W. Ewing, Quality Assurance Zori Ferkin Manager Assistant Counsel Quality Assurance Department Governor Energy Council Duquesne Light Company 1625 N. Front Street P. O. Box 186 Harrisburg, PA 15105 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Director, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Room B-151 Transportation & Safety Building Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Mr. T. J. Lex Mr. Thomas Gerusky Westinghouse Electric Corporation Bureau of Radiation Protection Power Systems PA Department of Environmental P. O. Box 355 Resources Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 P. O. Box 2063 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Mr. P. RayStrcar Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation BVPS-2 Records Management Supervisor P. O. Box 2325 Duquesne Light Company Boston, Massachusetts 02107 Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Mr. W. Troskoski O. S. NRC John A. Lee, Esq.
P. O. 181 Duquesne Light Company Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 1 0xford Centre 301 Grant Street Mr. Thomas E. Murley, Regional Admin.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15279 U. S. NRC, Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 15229 l
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BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2 Meeting July 23,1986 Seisr$1c and Dynamic Qualification Program o Opening State;nents
- NRC
- Duquesne Light Co.
1 o Technical Discussion
- Duquesne Light Co.'s Seismic and Dynamic Qualification Program for Safety-Related Equipnent
- NRC staff / consultant's comments
- How site review will be performed
- Dates for site review o Caucus (if needed) o Concluding Remarks by NRC staff t
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COMMENTS ON BEAVER VALLEY-2 FSAR SECTIONS 3.7, 3.9, AND 3.10 1.
On page 3.7-7 it states that " floors are treated as rigid diaphragms".
This may be nonconservative if equipment or piping supports are attached away from vertical supports such as walls or columns on what is really a flexible diaphragm which can amplify vertical seismic accelerations.
2.
In Paragraph 3.78.2.15.1 indications are that structural damping used in analyses was based on formulas from Biggs and Roesset et al. and that values up to 10% may have been used.
The regulatory guide position (R.G. 1.61) is that test data is necessary to justify values greater than those specified in R.G. 1.61.
3.
Paragraph 3.78.3.1.1.3 states that "For equipment exhibiting multiple response modes, single frequency input may be used, providing the input has sufficient intensity to envelop the floor response spectra of the individual modes of the equipment." This is not an acceptable alternative to multi-frequency testing.
4.
On page 3.7-21 it is implied that "significant dynamic modes" in an analysis are sometimes defined as the first 50 modes regardless of the upper limit of these first fifty. This will not necessarily include all significant modes and cases where the "first 50" criteria controlled should be reviewed.
5.
Note 7 for Table 3.9B-14 and note 6 for Table 3.9B-15 specify a 1/3 increase in allowables for dynamic type loads.
What is the justifica-tion for this?
6.
On page 3.10-3 in the last paragraph a report is referenced as " Westing-house (1975)". A WCAP report number should be supplied with this reference.
BEAVER VALLEY 2 - pVORT AUDIT Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2FWE-P22) 1.
NUREG-1154 reported a partial loss of feedwater while the plant was operating at 90% power. A contributing factor was excessive moisture content in the driving steam to the AFW pump turbine, as well as the difficulty of reestablishing steam flow following the turbine overspeed trip. The applicant should provide the following information, describing the plant specific features and preventative measures in place at Beaver Valley 2.
a.
Describe how the moisture content in the driving steam to the turbine will be controlled to prevent an overspeed trip.
b.
Confirm that the maintenance procedures for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump will satisfy the equipment nanufacturer's recommendation.
Provide assurance that all bolts for the pump and turbine assemblies will be regularly checked for their proper torque settings.
c.
Confirm that the trip and throttle valve can be operated easily when a maximum AP exists across the valve, such as a turbine overspeed condition.
(1) Describe the physical location of the valve, height above the floor, valve stem orientation, and the proximity of adjacent equipment or structures that could interfere with l
the manual operation of the valve.
i (2) Describe the procedures for manually operating the valve during an emergency condition.
Identify the responsible personnel who will be involved.
Identify the use of any auxiliary equipment (such as a wheel wrench) to operate the valve.
(3) Verify that the responsible personnel for maintaining or l
operating the valve are properly trained, including hands-on experience prior to fuel load.
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L Check Valve Operabilit*
2.
IE Notice 86-O' dated January 6, 1985 reported an event caused by the failure of fi s main feedwater (MFW) check valves. These check valve failures resulted in the loss of MFW system integrity and significant water-hammer damage.
The applicant should provide the following information to demonstrate check valve operability.
a.
Describe the methodology used to size and install check valves, considering proximity to flow disruption devices.
b.
Describe tests, if any, used to demonstrate that the valve is not damaged and can still perform its safety function.
c.
Describe what measures are considered to prevent valve chatter, blockage, or failure of the disk assembly.
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Containment Recirculation Spray (RSS) Pumps (2RSS-P21A through -P210)
Bingham-Willamette 10X12X18BE-VCR Service Water (SWS) Pumps (2SWS-P21A through -P21C)
Byron-Jackson 36RXM 3.
IE Bulletin 79-15 dated July 11, 1979 reported industry-wide problems associated with the long term operation of deep draft pumps.
The applicant's letter dated September 13, 1979 dr.d referenced by NUREG/CR-3049 described the appropriate pumps, but stated that operating experience had not yet been achieved. The applicant should provide the following information to demonstrate deep draft pump operability.
Compare the Beaver Valley 2 program for long term operability of a.
deep draft pumps with the Licensing Review Group II (LRG-II) guidelines (Revision 1 September 19,1983).
b.
Identify deviations, if any, from the LRG II guidelines.
Provide justification for any deviations from the LRG II c.
guidelines.
d.
Describe actual operating experience of deep draft pumps, including longest continuous run.
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FSAR Ouestions The following comments are the result of reviewing the Beaver Valley 2 FSAR (Amendment 11, January 1986).
1.
The BOP active pumps and valves are listed in the PVORT master list, but are not identified in the FSAR. The applicant shall list the B0P pumps and valves in the FSAR in a manner similar to Tables 3.SN-9 and -10 for NSSS equipment.
(See FSAR Section 3.9.8.3.2, page 3.9-10) 2.
Valves with operators having significant extended structures are qualified using static equivalent seismic loads.
Valves without significant extended structure are qualified by the seismic analysis of the piping. The applicant shall describe the basis for assessing "significant extended structure". Provide examples of each method of qualification.
(See FSAR Section 3.9.B.3.2.2, page 3.9-12.) p sec.nen 3.98.5 2.2 [
\\ pay.s.9.-rs, A"Waad lo, 3.
The FSAR indicates that the qualification of non-ASME and ASME Class 2/3 equipment is sumarized in Tables 3.98-4 and -12.
(See J
- J etes ;
Section 3.9B.2.2. page 3.9 6, Amendment 7, July 1984 fHowever, both tables have been deleted by Amendment 11, January 1986.
The applicant shall amend the appropriate FSAR sections to address this discrepancy.
4.
Many of the preoperational tests in FSAR Table 3.98-1 are to be monitored visually rather than by calibrated instrumentation.
Visual monitoring alone may not be adequate to detect subtle system responses that may differ from the responses predicted by qualification analyses. The applicant shall provide justification that the preoperational test results will validate the qualification of the systems, components, and supports.
(See FSAR Section 3.98.2 Table 3.9.B-1 and NUREG-1057 Section 3.10.2) f 5.
The environmental qualification of the 80P pump motors is not j
specifically mentioned in FSAR 3.98.3.2.1, as compared to the BOP valve operator discussion in FSAR 3.98.3.2.2 item 5.
The applicant shall amend the FSAR as needed to confirm that the operability qualification of each pump motor considered all environmental conditions over its qualified life (aging, radiation, accident environment, etc.).
(See FSAR Section 3.98.3.2.1, page 3.9-10a and NUREG-1057 Section 3.10.2) i l
L Master List Ouestions_
The following questions are the result of reviewing the Beaver Valley Master Equipment List.
(Letter from Duquesne Light Company to P. Tam, Project Manager, Division of PWR Licensing-A, NRR, USNRC, letter number 2 NRC-6-057, June 4, 1986.)
The status of the Master list is only 31% verified. The applicant 1.
shall submit a revised Master List which verifies that at least 85% of the equipment have been completely qualified and installed.
The format of the Master List does not identify active versus 2.
nonactive equipment nor the sizes and types (butterfly, globe, gate, etc.) of safety-related valves. The applicant shall provide this information to enable the staff to select equipment for the audit.
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L Goerability of Containment Purae and Vent Valves The applicant has not provided the information to demonstrate operability of the containment purge and vent valves per NUREG-0737 TMI Item II.E.4.2(6).
The applicant shall submit the appropriate documentation for review prior to fuel load. The evaluation of this issue will be done in the NRC staff's office, not during the plant' audit.
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MEETING
SUMMARY
DISTRIBUTION l
L POR NSIC PRC System PWRf2 Reading File Piam DMiller Attorney, OELD J. Partlow E. Jordan B. Grimes ACRS(10) bec: Licensee 8 Service List I
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