Text

Insp Rept 50-302/88-01 on 871216-880211.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Security,Radiological Controls,Lers & Nonconforming Operations Repts,Facility Mods & Review of Special Repts
	ML20148H126
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	03/10/1988
From:	Crlenjak R, Stetka T, Tedrow J; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20148H101	List: IR 05000302/1988001; ML20148H095; ML20148H107; ML20148H126;
References
	50-302-88-01, 50-302-88-1, NUDOCS 8803290320
	Download: ML20148H126 (17)
	v • d • e

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Q QE0 UNITED STATES

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. WUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

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,# \ o REGION 11

g s. ,j 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.

,( '* ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report No: 50-302/88-01

Licensee: Florida power Corporation i

3201 34th Street, South

St. Petersburg, FL 33733 l

Docket No: 50-302 Licensee No.: OPR-72 i

Facility Name: Crystal River 3 ,

Inspection Conducted: December 16, 1987 - February 11, 1988 !

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Inspectors: N-O ODb- Dk

T.'S4.etka, 3 nior Resident Insg(ctor

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Date' Signed

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J. Ted , Resi ent Inspector

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Oat 4 Signed

Approved by: ,

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R. Crfen@k, Sectf'on Chief WatefSigned 1

Division of Reactor Projects

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SUMMARY ,

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Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the 4

areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event '

Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, facility modifications, review of

special reports, plant startup from refueling, cold weather preparations, and

licensee action on previous inspection items. Numerous facility tours were ,

conducted and facility operations observed. Some of these tours and '

observations were conducted on backshifts.

Results: Two violations were identified. (Failure to implement plant

procedures, paragraphs 3, 5.b(7), and 8; Failure to have seismic monitoring

instrumentation with the required measurement range, paragraph 5.a.(7)) ,

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8803290320 880311

PDR ADOCK 05000302

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REPORT DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

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Licensee Employees

F. Bailey, Superintendent, Projects t

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P. Breedlove, Nuclear Records Management Supervisor

M. Clary, Principal Nuclear Mechanical Engineer

J. Colby, Manager, Nuclear Mechanical / Structural Engineering Services :

"M. Collins, Nuclear Safety & Reliability Superintendent

D. Cook, Nuclear Engineer II :

J. Cooper, Superintendent, Technical Support

M.-Culver, Senior Nuclear Reactor Specialist ,

J. Endsley, Nuclear Engineer II- !

R. Fuller, Senior Nuclear Licensing Engineer '

F. Fusick, Supervisor, Site Nuclear Engineering Services

H. Gelston, Supervisor, Site Nuclear Engineering Services

B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

M. Jacobs, Area Public Information Coordinator

S. Johnson, Manager, Site Nuclear Services

W. Marshall, Nuclear Operations Superintendent

P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

W. Neuman, Supervisor, Inservice Inspection (ISI)

V. Roppel, Manager, Nuclear Plant Technical Support

W. Rossfeld, Manager, Nuclear Compliance

F. Sullivan, Supervisor, Site Nuclear Engineering Services

R. Thompson, Supervisor, Site Nuclear Engineering Services

K. Walters, Nuclear Engineer I

E. Welch, Manager, Nuclear Electrical / Instrumentation & Control l

Engineering Services -l

C. Williams, Nuclear Fire Protection Specialist

M. Williams, Nuclear Compliance Specialist

"K. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing )

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Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, j

engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.

Howard & Associates, Inc. Attendees

H. Howard, Fire Protection

Attended exit interview

2. ExitInterview(30703)

The inspector met with licensee representives (denoted in paragraph 1) at

the conclusion of the inspection on February 11, 1988. During this

meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection

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as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the l

Violations and Inspector Followup Items (IFI). i

The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did l

not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed I

by the inspectors during this inspection. 1

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3. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702 & 1

92701)

(Closed) *Vnresolved Item 302/87-40-04: Investigation into transfer

switch operation. The licensee has completed their investigation

into this matter and has reported this event as LER 87-28 dated

January 4, 1988. On December 5, 1987, an ES actuation occurred

during efforts to power down the "B" Inverter for_ maintenance. The

"B" and "D" vital AC buses were being supplied by alternate AC

sources via manual bypass switches, rather than the normal power

supply from the inverter. The licensee's investigation concluded

that due to improper operation of the transfer switches and bypass

switches, the vital buses were momentarily de-energized which

actuated two channels of the ES system. The licensee determined that

had the appropriate directions provided in procedure OP-703, Plant

Distribution System, been utilized, the inverter would have been

restored to the desired lineup without an ES actuation.

Failure to implement the requirements of procedure OP-703 is contrary

to the requirements of TS 6.8.1.a and is considered to be a

violation. Although this matter is licensee identified, it is being

cited as a violation due to the self disclosing nature of the event.

Violation (302/88-01-01): Failure to implement the requirements of

plant procedures as required by TS 6.8.1. For record purposes this i

Unresolved Item will be closed and further action tracked by the i

Violation. j

(0 pen) Violation 302/87-34-02: Failure to adhere to the requirements l

- of procedure MP-109 for setting of relief valve ring settings and

failure to implement the requirements of procedure CP-118 for fire

watch conditions. The inspector verified that the actions delineated i

in the licensee's response to this violation dated December 1, 1987, j

were completed for the violation involving procedure CP-118. With

1, respect to the violation involving procedure MP-109, the NRC has

accepted the licensee's denial of this example of a violation.

However, in their response to the example, the licensee committed to

revise procedure MP-109 to provide a positive means of ring setting

verification and to have maintenance personnel review the procedure

changes. The licensee expects to have this revision completed by

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June 1988. This item remains open pending completion of revisions to

procedure MP-109.

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(Closed) Violation 302/87-17-01: Failure to adhere to the

requirements of plant procedures as required by TS 6.8.1. The

inspector reviewed and verified the implementation of the corrective

actions stated in the Florida Power Corporation (FPC) letter of

October 8, 1987.

(Closed) Violation 302/87-17-02: Failure to demonstrate the

operability of the transformer supplying power to Vital . Bus

Distribution Panel (VBDP)-3 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as required by TS 4.8.2.1.2. The inspector reviewed and verified the implementation of

the corrective actions stated in the FPC letter of October 8, 1987.

(0 pen) Violation 302/87-17-06: Failure to review and approve the ISI

program and changes to this program as required by TS 6.8.2.b. The

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inspector reviewed and verified the implementation of the corrective ~

actions stated in the FPC letter of October 8, 1987. One of the

corrective actions discussed in this letter was that procedure

AI-701, Conduct of Inservice Inspection; would be revised to better

define the ISI program. This procedure revision is expected to be

issued by March 18, 1988. This item remains open pending

implementation of the revised procedure AI-701.

(Closed) Violation 302/87-17-05: Fa'11ure to conduct the Inservice

Testing (IST) of pumps and valves as required by TS 4.Q.5.b. The f

inspector reviewed and verified the implementation of the corrective

actions stated in the FPC letter of November 9, 1987.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 302/87-12-04: Implement procedures that s.

, will provide positive control over fossil plant activities which

affect CR-3. The inspector reviewed administrative instruction

AI-1300, Crystal River Coal Plants Interface with Crystal River Unit

3, and Fossil Engineering Administrative Procedures FEAP 18,

Interface Procedure for the Coexisting Systems at the CR Complex, and

FEAP 30, Interface Procedure for Control of Crystal River Fossil

Plant Design Changes Affecting CR-3. These procedures require a

review of fossil plant modifications by nuclear engineering for

identified systems which have an interface with the licensing basis

of the nuclear unit. These procedures, if properly implemented,

should provide adequate control of modifications and maintenance

performed by fossil plant personnel.

(Closed) Violation 302/87-28-05: Failure to recertify the Qualified

Reviewers on a periodic basis as required by TS 6.8.2.c. The

inspector reviewed and verified the implementation of the corrective

actions stated in the FPC letter of October 23, 1987.

(Closed) IFI 302/87 34-06: Review investigation into the missing

part from valve MSV-56. The licensee has completed their inspection

of strainers in the downstream steam piping to the steam driven

emergency feedwater pump to verify that these lines were not

obstructed or damaged. No material or damage was identified.

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(Closed) IFI 302/86-31-03: Separate safety related electrical cables

for EFIC cabinets from non-safety cables. The licensee initiated and ,

performed work request (WR) #84330 to separate the non-safety related {

cables from the safety related cables. This work was completed

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October 20, 1987.

(Closed) IFI 302/86-12-03: Revise procedure CP-115, In - Plant

Equipment Clearance and Switching Orders, to include the safety

related portions of the emergency diesel generator lube oil (DL),

domestic water (00), main steam (MS), feedwater (FV), and auxiliary

steam (AS) systems as systems which require independent valve lineup

verification when returned to service from a maintenance condition.

The licensee has revised procedure CP-115, Revision 61 dated

January 9, 1988, to include these systems for independent i

verification. l

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(Closed) IFI 302/86-35-08: Review procedure for draining the l

separator tank ori the waste gas compressors and provide caution note l

foraakeup tank (MUT) venting. The licensee has added a caution note- :

to procedure OP-402, Makeup and Purification System, to ensure that l

no other draining or venting operations are in progress while venting ;

the MUT. The licensee has further revised procedure OP-412A, Waste '

Gas Disposal System, to provide instructions for draining the

separator tank. !

(0 pen) IFI 302/80-42-06: The Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling

Pump (SWP-1C) check valve (SWV-10) was replaced this past refuel

outage under modification (MAR) 83-02-01. This valve was of a

different design which was supposed to cure the valve slamming

problem. Following system startup, it was determined that the valve j

slamming is still a problem. The licensee is presently evaluating j

additional actions that could be taken including an evaluation of the '

effect of the slamming upon system integrity. This iteru remains open

pending NRC review of this evaluation.

(Closed) IFI 302/87-10-03: Review calibration procedure for reactor 1

coolant pump vibration detectors. The licensee has implemented

procedure PM-296, Calibration of Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration i

Monitors (LP-010-SI 1A, LP-010-SI 18, LP-010-SI IC, LP-010-SI 10), i

dated December 16, 1987, to provide the necessary instructions to i

calibrate these detectors.

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(Closed) IFI 302/87-40-07: Review efforts to resolve the discrepancy ;

between the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and normal operation i

of the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCOT). Further engineering

analysis by the licensee has determined that the 561 cubic feet tank

capacity specified in the FSAR, Table 11-5, is equivalent to a tank ;

level of 8 feet 3,25 inches. The licensee is maintaining the tank j

level between 6 feet 8.5 inches and 9 feet and has determined that

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this level should be adequate to ensure the tank can perform its

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function of quenching steam,

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(Closed) IFI 302/84-09-10: Review correctiva actions associated with !

the February 28, 1984 reactor trip. The licensee has completed I

modification MAR 80-09-13-01 to provide overcurrent and directional l

power relays for the emergency diesel generators.

(Closed) IFI 302/87-10-06: The licensee has completed their

evaluation of the feedwater isolation matrix and determined that the

present time delay relays would be removed and interposing relays

installed that would allow testing of the matrix without causing '

valve movement. A modification to install the new relays is being

developed (MAR 87-04-13-01) and it is expected that this modification l

will be installed during the next refueling outage. l

Unresolved items are a matter about which more information is i

required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve

violations or deviations. 1

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1 4. Review of Plant Operations (71707) l

The plant began this inspection period in the cold shutdown (Mode 5)

condition. A plant heatup was conducted and the hot standby (Mode 3)

condition reached at 10:47 PM on January 3, 1988. At 8:43 PM on January

8, a reactor startup was performed and criticality achieved. Power

operation (Mode 1) was commenced at 4:30 AM on January 10. The plant

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remained in power operation for the remainder of this inspection period. i

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a. Shift Logs and Facility Records (71707) )

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The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with

operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical

Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.

The following records were reviewed: l

Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Eo.uipment

l Out-0f-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building

Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveillance

Log; Work Request Log; Short Term Instructions (STI); and Selected

Chemistry / Radiation Protection Lngs.

In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently

verified clearance order tagouts.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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b. Facility Tours and Observations (71707)

Throughout the inspection period,- facility tours were conducted to

observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. Some

operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted

during backshif ts. Also, during this inspection period, licensee

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meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and

management activities.

The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:

security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator

room; auxiliary building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and,

electrical switchgear rooms.

During these tours, the following observations were made

(1) Monitoring Instrumentation -

The following instrumentation

and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated

parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current

operational mode:

Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid

. oiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating

parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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(2) Safety Systems Walkdown (71710) - The inspector conducted a

walkdown of the Containment Hydrogen Monitoring (WSV) system to

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verify that the lineup was in accordance with license

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requirements for system operability and that the system drawing

and procedure correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(3) Shift Staffing (71707) - The inspector verified that operating

shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that

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control room operations were be?ng conducted in an orderly and

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professional manner. In addition, the inspector cbserved shif t

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turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant

status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant

information during these turnovers.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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(4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions (71707) - Storage of material and

components, and cleanliness conditions of various areas

throughout the facility were observed to determine whether

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safety and/or fire hazards existed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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(5) Radiological Protection Program (71709) - Radiation protection

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control activities were observed to verify that these activities I

were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures l

and in compliance with regulatory requirements. These

observations included:

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Selected licensee conducted surveys; .

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Entry and exit from contaminated areas including step-off !

pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;

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Area postings and controls;

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Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and

contaminated areas; <

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Radiation Control Area (RCA) existing practices; and, ,

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Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment, i

i protective clothing, and respiratory equipment. l

Area postings were independently verified for accuracy by the

inspectors. The inspectors also reviewed selected Radiation :

Work Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that ;

the controls were adequate. ,

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The implementation of the licensee's As Low As Reasonably

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Achievable (ALARA) program was reviewed to determine personnel !

involvement in the objectives and goals of the program. ;

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No violations or deviations were identified. !

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(6) Security Control (71881) - In the course of the monthly

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activities, the Resident Inspectors included a review of the

, licensee's physical security program. The composition of the

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security organization was checked +a insure that the minimum

number of guards were available and that security activities

were conducted with proper supervision. The performance of i

various shifts of the security force were observed in the

conduct of daily activities to include;_ protected and vital area

1 access controls, searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles, l

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badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols, ,

and compensatory posts. In addition, the Resident Inspectors i

observed the operational status of Closed Circuit Television i

(CCTV) monitors, the Intrusion Detection system in the central

and secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected

and vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization

interface with operations and maintenance.

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(7) Fire Protection (71707) - Fire protection activities, staffing

i and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing

was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,

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actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency

equipment, and fire barriers were operable,

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During a review of the Nuclear Operators (NO) logs on !

January 22, the inspector verified fire brigade team member l

qualifications utilizing the licensee's computerized

qualification list. The inspector noted that two individuals ;

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listed in the N0 logs as fire brigade team members during

January 19 through January 22, were not listed on the

computerized cualification list. This finding was discussed 1

with the licensee's training personnel who confirmed that the

two individuals had been removed f rom . the list since tN ,

beginning of the year due to expired qualifications.

Administrative procedure AI-2205, Administration of CR-3 Fire l

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Brigade Organization, Sections 4.2 and 4.4, require that the

fire brigade team be composed of qualified fire brigade team

members. Failure to have qualified team members on the plant's

fire brigade is contrary to the requirements of procedure

AI-2205 and is considered to be a violation of TS 6.8.1.f. This

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violation is considered to be another example of the violation

discussed in paragraph 3 of this report (88-01-01).

(8) Surveillance (61726) -

Surveillance tests were observed to

verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified

personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to

verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized;

and TS requirements were followed.

j The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:

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SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance;

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SP-321, Power Distribution Breaker Alignment and

Power Availability Verification;

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SP-323, Evacuation and Fire Alarm Demonstration; j

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SP-3498, Emergency Feedwater Pump (EFP-2) Monthly

Operability Demonstration; l

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SP-354A, Monthly Functional Test of the Emergency s

Diesel Generator EGDG-1A;.

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SP-417, Refueling Interval Integrated Plant Response

to Engineered Safeguards Actuation;

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SP-421, Reactivity Balance Calculations;

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SP-422, RC System Heatup and Cooldown Surveillance;

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SP-430, Containment Air Locks Seal Leakage Test;

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SP-455, Functional Test of Vital Bus Redundant

Transformers and Static Transfer Switches;

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SP-650, ASME Code Safety Valve Test;

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SP-715, Containment Building Spray Semiannual

Surveillance Program;

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SP-744, Waste Gas Decay Tank (3A, 3B, & 3C)

Nonscheduled Surveillance Program;

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PT-136, Decay Heat and Nuclear Services Closed Cycle

Cooling (DC & SW) System Flow Measurements

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and EGDG-1A KW Loading-Due to ES Pumps;

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PT-312, Nuclear Services Pump 2A and Decay Heat

Seawater Pump 3A (RWP-2A & RWP-3A) Power

Inflow Measurement for EGOG-1A KW Loading-

Verification.

During the performance of SP-417, the "C" -Inverter (VBIT-1C)

failed which caused the "C" Vital AC Bus to receive AC power

from the alternate _(transformer) power supply. The licensee has

declared VBIT-1C inoperable and is presently operating with this

inverter bypassed. The licensee is developing two modifications

(MAR 86-03-04-06, FCN#2 to add an in-line resistor to the

inverter control power circuit, and MAR T8C-03-04-07, to install

a shunt trip in the 480v AC input to the inverter) to return the

inverter to operable status.

Inspector Followup Item (302/88-01-02): Review the installation

of plant modifications to return VBIT-1C to operable status.

(9) Maintenance Activities (62703) -

The inspector observed

maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment -

clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention

work permits, as required, were issued and being followed;.

quality control personnel were available for inspection.

activities as required; and, TS requirements were being

followed.

Melnten.nce was observed and work packages were reviewed for the

following maintenance activities:

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Troubleshooting of the "in limit" indication for control

rod group number 4 in accordance_ with procedure MP-531,

Troubleshooting Plant Equipment;

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Troubleshooting and repair of startup feedwater control

valve FWV-39 in accordance with procedure MP-531;

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Replacement of seismic monitors SI-004-MEI and SI-005-MEI

j and post maintenance testing in accordance with procedure

SP-155, Channel Check of the Triaxial Peak Accelographs;

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Troubleshooting of the "C" Inverter (VBIT-1C) failure in

accordance with procedure MP-531;

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Troubleshooting the Engineered Safeguards (ES) test light ]

for valve CFV-16 in accordance with procedures MP-531 and

SP-356, Operations ES Refueling Manual Actuation Channel ,

Functional Test for Reactor Building (RB) Isolation and ;

Cooling; !

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Testing of the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control 1

(EFIC) relays in accordance with procedure PM-167, EFIC '

j Time Delay Relay Testing;

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Troubleshooting the absolute position indication for i

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control rods 1-1 and 3-7 in accordance with procedure j

MP-531; and, i

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Troubleshooting of emergency containment cooling fan AHF-1A .

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in accordance with procedure MP-531.

No violations or deviations were identified. '

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(10) Radioactive Waste Controls (71707) - Solid waste compacting and

selected liquid and gaseous releases were observed to verify

that approved procedures were utilized,:that appropriate release .

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approvals were obtained, and that required surveys were taken.

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No-violations or deviations were identified.

(11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints (71707) - Several pipe

hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related

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systems were observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate

rnd no leakage was evident, that restraint settings were

appropriate, and that anchoring points were not binding.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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5. Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700) and Nonconforming Operations

Reports (71707)

a. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic

impact, to dete:t trends, and to determine whether corrective actions ;

appeared appropriate. Events, which were reported immediately, were

reviewed as they ec. curred to determine if the TS were satisfied.

LERs 84-23, 85-26, 86-20, 87-06, 87-11, 87-21, 87-23, 87-25, 87-28,

87-29, 87-30, 87-31, 88-01 and 88-02 were reviewed in accordance with

the current NRC Enforcement policy. LERs 84-23, 85-26, 86-20, 87-06,

87-21, 87-23, 87-25, 87-29, 87-30 and 87-31 are closed.

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(1) (Closed) LER 84-23: This LER reported a deviation from the

administrative controls for Low Temperature Overpressure

Protection (LTOP) . The licensee has installed modification

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1 (MAR) 86-10-09-01 to add computer alarms to alert operators when

, the low pressure setpoint for the Power Operated Relief Valve

, (PORV) has not been selected and when power has not been removed

j from the high pressure injection valves. The inspector reviewed

the installation and associated testing documentation for this

modification and verified inclusion of the appropriate alarms in

the plant computer.

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(2) (Closed) LER 85-26: This LER reported a plant trip caused by

problems with the plant's feedwater system. The liccesee ha-

completed the following corrective actions:

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recommendations have been provided to operators for optimal

j methods to be utilized for transfer of feedwater control

between feedwater control valves;

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additional operator training has been conducted _ regarding i

the operation of the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and

Control (EFIC) system; and, '

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a detailed study of the PORV relay failure have been l

) conducted. This study ultimately resulted in the. replace- j

J ment of the failed relay with a higher current relay-which j

will utilize two contacts in the opening circuit. This

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action should prevent this type of failure in the future.

(3) (Cleed) LER 86-20: This LER reported the failure to meet the

req :f red time interval for three consecutive .18 month

surveillance tests. The licensee is develeping a computer

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prograni to track accomplishment of surveillance procedures, '

however this system is not yet fully functional and reliable..

' In the interim the licensee is manually tracking the 3.25 time

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interval allowed for the performance of three consecutive

a surveillance tests to ensure that this interval is not exceeded.

The inspector verified that the five surveillance procedures of

. concern were adequately tracked by the manual system and

scheduled for accomplishment within required due dates.

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(4) (Closed) LER 87-06: This LER reported that the "B" channel of

the Toxic Gas Monitoring system had been inadvertently lef t in l

the "test" pcsition. The licensee has revised procedures ;

CP-123, Key Control (Revision 21 dated August 11, 1987), '

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SP-326A, Toxic Gas Detection System (Weekly) (Revision 8 dated i

January 1, 1988) and SP-326B, Toxic Gas Detection System ;

, (Semiannual) (Revision 3 dated January 6, 1988) to provide

formal control over the test keys.

]

(5) (Closed) LER 87-21: This LER reported that an Engineered

3 Safeguards (ES) actvation occurred as a result of personnel

error while deenergizing the 4160v ES Bus 3A. A brief summary

. of this event has been included in the Operator's Study Book

3

which is required reading for all plant operators.

(6) (Closed) LER 87-23: This LER reported the failure to have

, audible neutron flux indication during refueling operations. The

licensee has revised procedures SP-406, Refueling Operations -)

l Daily Data Requirements (revision 12 dated November 20, 1987), l

l and SP-441, Unit Shutdown Surveillance Plan (Revision 32 dated l

1 November 27, 1987) to ensure that this requirement is

4

implemented before refueling operations are commenced.

(7) (Closed) LER 87-31: This LER reported that an inadequate !

j procedure change safety evaluation review resulted in the use of ;

j seismic monitoring instrumentation with a measurement range not i

! in compliance with the TS. The triaxial peak accelographs of i

! the seismic monitoring system are required by TS 3.3.3.3 and l

j Table 3.3-7 to have a measurement range of + 2.0 G. During a l

review of instrumentation channel check and vendor calibration

i ;

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12

data, the licensee discovered that the installed triaxial peak

acceiographs had the measurement range of + 1.0 G. The licensee

has determined that this condition has existed since

approximately June 1979 when the calibration procedure for the

three triaxial peak accelographs was changed to require a

measurement range of + 1.0 G.

Although this matter was' identified by the licensee, this matter

is considered to be a violation of TS 3.3.3.3 due to the

. extensive period of time which elapsed before this problem was

detected and the. opportunities which were available via the

periodic procedure review process to provide early

identification.

Violation (302/88-01-03): Failure to have seismic monitoring

instrumentation with measurement ranges as required by

TS 3.3.3.3.

LERs 87-11, 87-28, 88-01 and 88-02 will remain open for the

following reasons: )

(8) (0 pen) LER 87-11: This LER reported a reactor trip which

occurred as a result of a fatlure with a reactor coolant' pump

power monitor. During this event, a lockout relay failed and

prevented an automatic turbine trip when the reactor tripped.

As the result of this failure, the licensee has revised-

procedure AP-580, Reactor Protection System Actuation, to

requira operators to depress the turbine trip button following a

reactor trip. The inspectors noted that this lockout relay is

currently tested by the licensee on a refueling interval basis. ,

Following sdditional discussions with the inspectors, the l

licensee will evaluate testing these relays more frequently than i

i

the present refueling interval test. This LER will remain open j

pending completion of this evaluation.

(9) (0 pen) LER 87-28: This LER reported an ES system actuation

which occurred during the operation of a vital bus transfer

switch and inverter manual bypass switch. This event is

discussed further in section 3 of this report. The licensee's

corrective actions concerning this event will include the

following:

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enharced operator training will be given to all licensed

operators; and, !

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a schematic diagram of the vital bus power supplies and

switch Mg arrangements will be provided as operator aids in

each o the inverter rooms.

This LER will remain open 'pending completion of the

licensee's corrective actions.

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(10).(0 pen) LER 88-01: This LER reported two actuations of the

Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system on. January 7 and January 9,

1988, due to a low level condition in the "B" : steam generator.

The-following corrective' actions-remain to-be accomplished:

-

develooment of ' preventive maintenance procedures for the

Integrated Control Lystem (ICS);

-

an Operational Study Book entry to remind operators 'of the-

increased monitoring required --as ' .a result o f, having

multiple control sta61ons in manual; and,

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a revision to procedure SP-102, . Control ? Drop Time

Tests, to require the turbine bypas: valves be placed in

manual, and a caution note added for operators to closely

monitor steam header pressure with these valves in manual.

The inspectors had further discussions regarding .the events

reported in LER 88-01 in a meeting with senior.' licensee manage-

ment personnel. The-inspectors expressed their concern over the

apparent lack of extensive maintenance troubleshooting tech-

t niques employed by the licensee to determine and correct contrib-

uting causes for the first EFW actuation on January 7 which

.

could have prevented the second actuation..on January 9. During

this meeting the licensee stated that in addition to the actions

already mentioned above, the main feedwater control valves would

be included in the plant's non-safety related equipment

reliability improvement policy. This policy directs that

improvements be made in operation, maintenance and failure

analysis measures thereby increasing the reliability of this

equipment. This LER will remain open pending completion of the

licensee's corrective actions.

(11) (0 pen) LER 88-02: This LER reported an EFW actuation and

overspeed trip of the steam driven emergency feedwater pump.

This LER will remain .open pending a . supplemental report-

regarding an engineering. review of feedwater. pump governor

drawings to determine if the feedwater pump should have tripped

when the control power was removed from the governor.

b. The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to

verify the following: compliance with the TS, corrective actions as

identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been

accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are

identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are

reported as requiced by TS.

All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC

Enforcement Policy.

(1) NCOR 88-06 reported the potential for inadequate flow from the

"A" Nuclear Services Seawater Pump (RWP-2A). After performing a

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flow measurement test on this system,'the licensee throttlem the

discharge valve for RWP-2A in an effort to reduce this system's

flow to the design- system flow. Subsequent flow measurements,

at various tide levels, have produced system flow rates lower

than those initially measured with .the discharge. valve

throttled. The licensee had their architect engineer analyze

the flow and tide data. This analysis confirmed that adequate

cooling water flow is available with the discharge valve

throttled to remove the designed system heat loads during the

worst case maximum ht.ricane blowout tide level.

Since the discharge valve for this pump will be subsequently

throttled using a "turns open" technique, and without installed

system flowmeters, the licensee intands to perform a test by

installing flowmeters and verifying that the throttling method

being used will repeatedly provide the required system flow.

This test will also verify pump performance at various tide

levels.

Inspector Followup Item (302/88-01-04): Review the licensee's

flow measurement test for RWP-2A to verify discharge valve

throttling method and pump performance at different tide levels.

(2) NCOR 88-16 reported errors in the test load profile for the

service test of the "A" station battery. During an engineering

review of the load profile on the station battery following a

loss of offsite power event, the licensee determined that a

turbine bearing oil pump would start sooner .than previously

calculated. Subsequent engineering calculations have determined

that this change in the load profile would have a negligible

effect on the results of the previous service tests' since the

tatal amp-hours discharged from the battery remained unchanged.

The licensee is presently revising procedure SP-523, Station

Battery Service Test, to more accurately reflect the load

profile on the battery for future service tests.

Inspector Followup Item (302/88-01-05): Re/iew the licensee's l

revision to procedure SP-523 to reflect tb actual load profile

on the battery.

6. Design, Design Changes and Modifications (37700)

Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the

changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that I

the changes were performed in accordance with technically adepte and l

approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met '

acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner,

and that apptcpriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as

necessary. This review included selected observations of modifications

and/or testing in progress. l

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The following modification approval records (MARS) were reviewed and/or

associated testing observed:

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MAR T88-01-07-01, Control Rod Number 4-5 "In-Limit" Svitch

Modification;

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MAR 87-11-19-01, Replace Containment Hydrogen Monitoring Vaives

WSV-659, WSV-660, WSV-661, and WSV-662; _

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MAR 86-04-24-02, Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Pump (SWP)

Vent and Recirculation;

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MAR 85-09-05-01, Nuclear Services and Decay Heat Seawater Pump (RWP)

Flush Water; and,

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Functional Testing of MAR 86-05-25-01, Emergency Feedwater (EFW)

Control and Interlock, in accordance with test procedure TP#2.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Review of Special Reports (90713)

The licensee submitted a special report dated January 20, 1988 regarding

the performance of steam generator eddy current testing and results of ,

this testing. The inspectors reviewed this report to determine compliance l

with the TS.

No violations c- deviations were identified.

8. Plant Startup From Refueling (71711)

The inspector observed plant activities during unit startup following

refueling to verify that plant systems were properly returned to service

and that the startup was conducted in accordance with approved procedures

and in compliance with the TS. These observations were conducted ,

following review of the following procedures:

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OP-210, Reactor Startup;

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PM-118, AC and DC Breakers - Control Rod Drive System;

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PT-100, Controlling Procedure for Precritical Testing;

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PT-110, Controlling Procedure for Zero Power Physics Testing;

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SP-102, Control Rod Drop Time Tests;

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SP-224, Reactor Coolant (RC) Flow Measurement Determination; and, !

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SP-401, Control Rod Programming Verification.

The plant began deboration to criticality on January 8 and entered the

startup mode (Mode 2) at 7:53 PM. Initial criticality was achieved at

8:43 PM on January 8. The inspector observed the approach to criticality

and verified that criticality occurred within the limits calculated by the

liceasee and independently :alculated by the inspector.

1

While observing the approach to criticality, at approximately 7:45 PM, the )

inspector noted that the Integrated Control System (ICS) control stations 1

for the low load feedwater valves were in the manual mode. Step 8.1.04 of

procedure PT-110 requires these valves to be in the automatic mode.

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Following discussion of this observation with licensee representatives,

the valves were placed in the automatic mode. Subsequent discussions with

licensee ~ representatives resulted in a reverification ~ that plant

' conditions were in accordance with-approved procedures.

Failure to adhere to the requirements of. procedure PT-110 is contrary to

the requirements of TS 6.8.1.c and'is considered to be a violation. This

violation is considered to be another example-of the violation identified

in paragraph 3 of this report (88-01-01).

9. Cold Weather Preparations (71714)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's preparations and ' administrstive

controls established to protect plant equipment during cold weather. .The

licensee has established an Adverse Weather Conditions Checklist which is

implemented when freezing weather conditions are imminent. The inspector

also observed the implementation of this checklist.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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ML20148H126

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