IR 05000344/1997002

Insp Repts 50-344/97-02 & 72-0017/97-02 on 970414-17.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Health Physics, Training Program,Spent Fuel Pool,Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation & Fuel Building Crane Tests

ML20148B500
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan  File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	05/06/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148B483	List: IR 05000344/1997002 ML20148B477
References
50-344-97-02, 50-344-97-2, 72-0017-97-02, 72-17-97-2, NUDOCS 9705130119
Download: ML20148B500 (12)

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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

, REGION IV Docket No.: 50-344; 72-17 License No.: NPF-1 Report No.: 50-344/97-02; 72-17/97-02

Licensee: Portland General Electric Company

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l Facility: Trojan Nuclear Plant '

l Location: 121 S. W. Salmon Street, TB-17 l Portland, Oregon 97204 Dates: April 14-17,1997 i inspectors: J. Vincent Everett, Health Physicist Chuck J. Paulk, Reactor inspector Approved By: D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph. D., Chief Nuclear Materials Licensing Branch Attachment: Supplemental information

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9705130119 970506 PDR ADOCK 05000344 O PDR _

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-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Trojan Nuclear Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-344/97-02; 72-17/97-02 The Trojan nuclear facility is currently undergoing decommissioning and dismantlement. A significant amount of dismantlement work had been completed inside the containment and auxiliary building. Structural steel components were being removed from areas where the steam generators and reactor coolant pumps had been located. Contamination controls appeared to be well established and radiological dose rates in most areas were low. The effort in the spent fuel pool to pre-position the spent fuel bundles for eventual loading into the storage casks for placement in the independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (ISFSI) was nearing completion. The fuel building crane load test was conducted to demonstrate the ability of the crane to hold 100 per cent of it's rated load. The crane's rated load was 125 tons. This test was not completed during the inspection due to rigging problems with the 125 ton load, however, the crane did successfully lift and hold the load for several minute e Health physics practices implemented at Trojan continue to be effective in minimizing the spread of contamination. Radiation exposures received by workers for 1996 were similar to levels received in 1995 (Section 1).

• The training program implemented at Trojan includes both initial training and retraining for employees and contractors. Additional specialized training had been developed for certified fuel handlers, safety reviewers, fire watch personnel, and visitors. Training records were computerized and easily verified as complete (Section 2).

e Spent fuel pool water level and temperature were maintained within the required Technical Specification for the period January 1 through April 13,1997 (Section 3).

e The independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation work activities were progressing toward a 1998 fuelloading date. Projected dates were identified for key activities planned for the future (Section 4).

e The preventive maintenance program had been acceptably implemented as required, for the fuel building crane. The condition of the crane was found to be acceptabl The inspectors concluded that the licensee's testing program for the fuel building crane lifting of scent fuel dry storage and transfer casks was acceptable (Section 5),

e Inspection followup was completed for one open item related to the 1996 exercis (Section 6).

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3-Reoort Details Summarv of Plant Status The Trojan nuclear facility is currently undergoing decommissioning and dismantlement. A significant amount of dismantlement work had been completed inside the containmen Structural steel components were being removed from areas where the steam generators and reactor coolant pumps had been located. Tha next major component removal effort from containment will be the reactor vessel. Areas of the auxiliary building were also undergoing active dismantlement. Contamination controls appeared to be well established and radiological dose rates in most areas were low. The effort in the spent fuel pool to preposition the spent fuel bundles for eventual loading into the casks for placement in the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (ISFSI) was nearing completion. The pouring of the concrete for the storage pad in the ISFSI is planned for early June. The fuel building crane load test was conducted to demonstrate the ability of the crane to hold 100 per cent of it's rated load. Tho crane's rated load was 125 tons. This test was not completed during the inspection due to rigging problems with the 125-ton load, however, the crane did successfully lift and hold the load for several minutes. The crane tests were reschedule Health Physics (83100) Insoection Scone Activities associated with the dismantlement and removal of contaminated material from various areas of the containment and auxiliary building were reviewed. This included contamination controls, implementation of Al. ARA, proper use of protective clothing, and health physics coverage of activitie .2 Observations and Findinas The radiological section of the 1996 Annual Report for the Trojan Nuclear Plant was reviewed. This report is required by Technical Specification 5.8.1.1. The report providad a summary of radiological data for site activities. For 1996,59 workers received exposures in excess of 100 mrem. Of these,36 were contractors performing dismantlement activities. The highest exposure received by an individual worker was 1970 mrem. The total manrem dose for the site was approximately 44 manrem, with approximately 38 manrem being accumulated by the contract workers.. This compares to 41.5 manrem exposure for 1995, of which 93 workers exceeded 100 mrem for the yea Plant tours were conducted in a number of areas in the containment and the auxiliary buildings where work was underway. During the tours, plant conditions were found to be acceptable, with little accumulation of radiological waste material or flammable material in any one area. Most areas of the plant continue to have a

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l very low background levels. Contamination controls, including signs and rope were appropriately established. Protective clothing and contaminated waste receptacles ,

were available. Radiation detectors were easily accessible and were found to be in !

calibration. Several high radiation areas in the auxiliary building were encountered and were all found to be properly posted and locked. High radiation areas in the auxiliary building included the residual heat exchanger room and the spent resin )

storage tank. High radiation areas remaining in containment included the refueling-cavity under the reactor vessel and the regenerative heat exchangers. Workers performing dismantling activities in the auxiliary building and the containment were observed to be working safely. Health physics technicians were interviewed at two work areas. The health physics technicians were positioned to be able to observe work activities from outside the work area and were familiar with the work underway and the potential for contamination and exposure problems. Several j individuals exiting from containment were observed to properly remove their i protective clothing as they stepped out of the contaminated area. Health physics l practices continued to demonstrate successful control of radiation exposure and !

contamination in work areas of the facilit ) Conclusion Health physics practices implemented at Trojan continue to be effective in minimizing the spread of contamination. Radiation exposures received by workers for 1996 were similar to levels received in 1995, 2 Training Program (83723)

I Insoection Scoce I

l Trojan is required to maintain a training program for radiation workers. This l inspection reviewed the current training program and selected personnel records to l verify that site personnel were receiving required trainin ]

I Observations and Findinas A review was completed of the overall training program. New employees attended a general employee training class. This training was divided into two categories based on the work location of the individual. Workers who would not be entering the protected ared and radiation controlled area and would only be working in the industrial area received category 1 training. This consisted of training in the areas of Trojan site orientation, safety, quality assurance, emergency planning, security, and an abbreviated radiation protection fundamentals presentation. Category 1 training was approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> in lengt Personnel working in the protected area and radiation controlled areas received a more comprehensive training referred to as category 11 training. This training

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included the topics presented in category I with additional detail added to selected areas plus training on fitness for duty, use of protective clothing, and considerably more information on radiation protection fundamentals and site specific requirements. Category 2 training took approximately 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> Annually, all employees were required to complete retraining. This training was typically provided each October. Topics included problems that had occurred during !

the past year, industry events, and new commitments made to the NRC, State, or l other agencies. For category I employees, an overview of the original training was I also provided. For category 11 employees, an overview of the category 11 training was provided with special emphasis on topics that had typically been hard for workers to remember. Employees had the option to complete a review of the required material and take a challenge test consisting of nonradiological and radiological questions. A score of 80 per cent was required to pas Workers assigned duties for fire watch completed fire watch training. Both an initial and an annual retraining were required. During initial training, the students extinguished an actual fire. Topics covered in the training included types of fire I extinguishers, hot work permits, use of fire equipment, and fire watch rule I l

Visitors to the Trojan site were provided training based on their experience, training, )

and knowledge of the nuclear industry. Training could be as little as a short l

orientation to several hours of briefing on specific issues. Training was commensurate with the potential hazard that could be encountered during the visi The Trojan training specialist determined the extent of training required after interviewing the visitor. Visitors were always accompanied by an escort while in the radiologically controlled are !

Respirator training was provided to all workers required to wear respirators due to either radiological concerns or industrial hygiene concerns. This group typically consisted of security, radiation protection technicians, maintenance, contractors performing dismantlement activities, and operations. Self-contained breathing apparatus training was provided to selected groups including operations, security, and radiation protection, as well as selected individuals from other group Training on the requirements for conducting safety reviews required by 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 was provided to selected individuals. This training covered the regulatory basis for conducting safety reviews and was developed using NSA 125 Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations. Retraining is offered on an 18-month cycl Personnel assigned to move fuel in the spent fuel pool were required to be trained under the certified fuel handler training program. This training was taught by a qualified shift manager from the Operations Department. There were currently 12 certified fuel handlers, all of which were former control room operators. The initial

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-6-training program used a qualification card concept which identified the required training to be completed including training modules, practical demonstration of knowledge of system's operation and function, completion of standing watch, and demonstration of various activities that would be required of a certified fuel handle Retraining was conducted on a quarterly schedule and consisted of various topics such as facility changes, procedure changes, industry events, operational problem areas, emergency planning classification scenarios, system reviews, and selected discussions on licensing basis documents. The annual retraining is a combination of self study, walkthroughc, and classroom. At the end of each year an oral and written exam was administered. The quality assurance department conducted an audit of the program every 2 years. An annualinternal evaluation was completed by the operations department. The most recent evaluation was completed on February 20,1997. The evaluation covered corrective action reports, problem areas, events, and feedback from student exams and training evaluation forms. No program deficiencies were identifie In addition to the standard training program, special training and briefings were provided as needed. These may be combined with periodic safety meetings or may be the result of a special request by a group prior to performing a special work tas Training records were reviewed for selected individuals. The training record system was computerized and provided for immediate access to individual records. The system provided records from 1993 to the current date. Original records were sent to the quality assurance files. The records examined during this inspection indicated that the employees were completing the required training. The training record, in some cases was very extensive and included a comprehensive list of training and meetings. One individual had over 160 training entries listed for the past 4 year .3 Conclusion The training program implemented at Trojan includes both initial training and retraining for employees and contractors. Additional specialized training had been developed for certified fuel handlers, safety reviewers, fire watch personnel, and visitors. Training records were computerized and easily verified as complet Spent Fuel Pool (86700)

3.1 Insoection Scoce l

Technical Specification 3.1 established the requirements for the spent fuel pool I water level and temperature. This inspection included a review of the spent fuel pool's water level and temperature records for the first quarter of 1997, l j

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-7-3.2 Observations and Findinas Technical Specification 3.1.1 required the water level of the spent fuel pool to be maintained 2 23 feet over the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies. Technical Specification 3.1.3 required the pool to be maintained at a temperature of s 140 The records from January 1 through April 13,1997, were reviewed. The water level was maintained in excess of 24 feet throughout this period. The spent fuel pool temperature was typically maintained between 50* F and 70* F. The maximum temperature reached during this period was 85* .3 Conclusion

Spent fuel pool water level and temperature were maintained within the required i Technical Specification for the period for January 1 through April 13,199 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (60854)

4.1 Insoection Scooe The status of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) was reviewed to determine the extent of work underway and the schedule of activities planned for the near futur .2 Observations and Findinas The location within the industrial fenced area that had been designated as the pad site for the ISFSI was fenced and posted to prevent entry of potentially contaminated material being removed from the Trojan plant facility. The ISFSI pad site had been cleared with some site preparation work completed. Additional field work was on hold until after the pad design changes were finalized. No concrete or concoce forms had been place .

The status of activities associated with the ISFSI were reviewed with representatives from licensing and scheduling. Because of a number of issues a related to the pad design and the VSC-24 cask design, scheduled work had slipped for the ISFSt. The NRC inspector identified a number of key activities related to the i ISFSI schedule which Trojan committed to keep the NRC informed of schedule changes. These activities are listed in the following table with the scheduled dates j from the February 3,1997 schedule, as modified by a recent update of selected i activitie l j

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-8-J ACTIVITY DATE 1) Fuel Inspection Complete 2) Crane Test (Initial load test) April 21,1997 3) Pad Construction (Rebar in place & ready to pour pad) June 10,1997 4) Fuel Debris Project (System operational & tested) June 12,1997 5) Storage Cask (Rebar in place & ready to pour concrete) Sept. 9,1997 6) Security System (Start of final operational testing) Sept. 2,1997 i

7) Transfer Cask (Start of Fabrication) July 8,1997 1

• I 8) Basket (Start of fabrication) Oct. 3,1997 l l

9) Cask Welding Dry Run (Demonstrate welding of lids) Sept,17,1997 '

10) Dry Run (Pre-operational test using prototype basket) Sept,17,1997 )

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11) Loading of First Cask 1998 I l

l The dates for the activities listed above are estimates and will be updated as j supporting tasks are complete l

4.3 Conclusion The Independent Spent Fuel Storage installation work activities were progressing j toward a 1998 fuel loading date. Projected dates were identified for key activities l planned for the futur I 5 Fuel Building Crane Tests (60854)

5.1 Insoection Scooe in preparation for the movement of spent fuel to dry cask storage at the independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, the licensee initiated a verification program for the spent fuel building crane to ensure that the crane was qualified to perform the necessary heavy lift .2 Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed Maintenance Request 12460 and Crane Manufacturing &

Service Corporation Testing and Inspection Procedures for Trojan Power Plant Crane L-202 for performing the load test on the main hoist of the fuel building crane to

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determine the adequacy of the testing. The inspectors also reviewed Maintenance i Procedure MP-120, " Cranes, Hoists, and Winches," Revision 15, and the maintenance history for the fuel building crane to determine the condition of the crane prior to the testing. The team observed the load testing and subsequent licensee actions.

3 The inspectors noted that the procedures were written only to test the lifting

] capabilities of the fuel building crane. The inspectors observed, however, that the j licensee had contracted support from the company that supplied the control system

[ for the crane. A vendor representative was onsite to monitor the saturation currents l 1 of the saturable reactors during the testing. -The inspectors found this monitoring to i be adequate to demonstrate the crane's capability to lift the full loa I

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i During the initial lift test on April 16,1997, an unbalanced condition of the load

, occurred and one end of the load dropped back to the floor. In response to the load !

! shift, the licenses stabilized and secured the load and stopped the test. The

! licensee initiated Corrective Action Request 97-0007 to document the unexpected j load shift during the test, to request an evaluation of the event, and to develop

- corrective actions to correct the cause of the event. The inspectors found that the

licensee personnel responded appropriately to this even While the licensee had not definitively determined the cause of the load shift by the end of the inspection, licensee engineers speculated that the combination of a mispositioned pin bushing in the spreader bar and the geometric configuration of the lifting tackle contributed significantly, if not totally, to the load shift. The engineers were in the process of redesigning the lifting rig to provide for better stability for performing the load tests. The inspectors found these actions to be reasonable and appropriate to address the suspected cause of the load shif The inspectors did not identify any concerns during review of maintenance history on the fuel building crane. The inspectors found that the preventive maintenance had been performed on the crane as recommended by the vendor and in accordance with the licensee's maintenance program. An interview with the crane vendor *

indicated no additional concerns related to the crane's capability to handle the ,

expected heavy load l Conclusions  !

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The preventive maintenance program had been acceptably implemented as required, for the fuel building crane. The condition of the crane was found to be acceptabl The inspectors concluded that the licensee's testing program for the fuel building crane lifting of spent fuel dry storage and transfer casks was acceptabl . ,

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6.1 Insoection Scoce inspection followup included one open item from 1996 concerning emergency plannin .2 Observations and Findinas (Closed) Follovvuo item 50-344/96008-01: 1996 Annual Exercise-~ Action item The 1996 annual exercise critique included a number of improvement recommendations made by players and evaluators. These issues included self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) training, operator response to radiation alarms, public address system announcements inside the plant, and communications  !

with the Coast Guard and Rainer Fire Department. The emergency preparedness .

engineer followed up on each problem. A number of the problems were corrected [

through small meetings with the effected groups to discuss the problem and ensure i that existing site programs would be used to fix the problems. For the public i address system, a weekly test was conducted. Problems were reported to I maintenance for corrective action. For the SCBA training, the training specialist '

reviewed training records to ensure required training qualifications were being .

maintained. The communication problems with the coast guard were determined to l be due to the simulations in the drill. The actions taken by the emergency preparedness engineer appeared to be adequate to address the problem .3 Conclusion l

inspectiore followup was completed for one open item related to the 1996 exercis I

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ATTACHMENI i a

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

a f Licensee l A. Bowman, Radiation Protection Supervisor  !

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C. Brown, Training Specialist

] H. Cabellero, Safety and Hazardous Materials Coordinator

! J. Camp, Scheduler

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J. Cooper, Emergency Preparedness Engineer K. Cox, ISFSI Manager

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T. Meek, Radiation Protection Manager J. Mihelich, Engineering Manager

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K. Oberloh, Operations

H. Youngblood, Shift Manager

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Consultant

L. Walker, Rio Technical Services State of Oreaon l

A. Bless, Oregon Department of Energy Resident inspector b

l lNSPECTION PROCEDURES USED I l l j 60854 Preoperational Testing of an ISFSI l 83100 Occupational Exposure During SAFSTOR and DECON J r 83723 Training and Qualifications

! 86700 Spent Fuel Pool Activities j 92701 Followup on Open items j 92702 Followup on corrective Actions for Violations IIfMS_QP_ENEA_CLOSfA_AMELQlECilSS.EQ Closed i

50-344/96008-01 IFl 1996 Annual Exercise Action items i

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2-LIST OF ACRONYMS ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable CFR Code of Federal Regulations ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation mrem millirem NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus VSC Ventilated Storage Cask t