ML20137Q126

Responds to ASLB Re Generic Safety Problems Involving Emergency Notification of Residents in Plume Zones.Ltr Based Exclusively on Evidentiary Record & Departs from NRC Process.Svc List Encl

ML20137Q126
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	12/02/1985
From:	Baxter T CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO., NORTH CAROLINA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCIES, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:	Asselstine J, Palladino N, Roberts T NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
CON-#485-386 OL, NUDOCS 8512050170
Download: ML20137Q126 (15)

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December 2, 1985 (202) 822-1090 Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 In the Matter of Carolina Power & Light Company and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant)

Docket No. 50-400 OC Ref: Letter to the Commission, November 19, 1985, from Administrative Judges Kelley, Bright and Carpenter

Dear Mr. Chairman and Commissioners:

In a letter to you of November 19, 1985, the three admin-istrative judges who comprise the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in this operating license proceeding wrote to you "to bring to your attention evidence of possible generic safety problems involving nighttime emergency notification of resi-dents in the plume emergency planning zones surrounding nuclear power plants." The letter is based exclusively on the eviden-tiary record compiled in hearings conducted in this proceeding 0

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SHAW, PITTMAN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE A PARTNERSM'8 'NCladO8NO pmOFESSsCNAL CORPORAf TONS Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 2, 1985 Page 2 on November 4 and 5, 1985. Since no party to the case has yet filed with the Licensing Board proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on that record -- which by Board order will be filed over the period December 6 to 30, 1985 -- the letter represents an extraordinary departure from the normal NRC adjudicative process, particularly in the extent to which it assesses and passes judgment upon the evidence in this case.

On behalf of Carolina Power & Light Company and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency, the applicants in this proceeding, we feel compelled by the judges' letter ourselves to step outside of the normal adjudicative process and to re-spond to you directly. We do so because in our view the

< judges' letter does not provide a complete picture of the evi- i dence, which we are firmly convinced does not indicate that a safety problem exists. Since this issue may not come before ,

the Commission in the normal review process for many months --

4 at which time Applicants normally would express their views on the Licensing Board's decision -- it would not be responsible for us to remain silent while the Commission evaluates and potentially considers taking actions on the basis of the judges' letter. In addition, we feel obligated to alert the Commission that, in light of the judges' letter, it should focus attention not on a safety problem which does not exist, but rather upon an apparently erroneous interpretation of the Commission's regulations which, if adopted, would have generic ,

I implications for all nuclear power plants and would create con-flict between the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management r Agency on the requirements for off-site emergency preparedness for nuclear power plants.

The Contention at Shearon Harris The relevant contention (Eddleman Contention 57-C-3) cur-rently being litigated in this proceeding alleges essentially that the off-site emergency response plans for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant do not have adequate provisions for notification of EPZ residents at night (between the hours of 1 and 6 a.m.) in the summer, when most people are normally asleep and might have air conditioners on.

SH Aw, PITTM AN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE A PARTNtRSM4P INCLuOsNG PROFCS$6CNAL CORPORAh0N$

Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 2, 1985 Page 3 The Reculatory Framework 1/

The Commission's emergency planning regulations require that "means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established." 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(5).

In addition, the Commission requires that:

The design objective of the prompt public notification shall be to have the capabili-ty to essentially complete the initial no-tification of the public within the plume exposure pathway within about 15 minutes.

The u.se of this notification capability will: range fr'm o immediate notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time available for the State and local government officials to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public notification system.

S IV.D.3, Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50.

FEMA and the FEF.A-REP-1Rev.1SyRCStaffusephecriteriainNUREG-0654/-

and FEMA-433 to determine whether a prompt public notification system meets these requirements. CP&L, like other facility operators, has considered these documents 1/ For a thorough explanation of the requirements for a prompt public notification system, see also Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-680, 16 N.R.C. 127, 131-35 (1982), and ALAB-717, 17 N.R.C. 346, 369 (1983).

2/ " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." Appendix 3 specifically addresses siren sys-tems.

3/ " Standard Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notifica-tion Systems for Nuclear Power Plants."

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SHAW, PITTMAN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE A PARTN(RSM8p ?hCLQQeNg PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 2, 1985 Page 4 to embody definitive Federal guidance for the design of siren systems to meet the prompt public notification. system require-ments. The Background section of NUREG-0654 states in part that the guidance, after being commented upon by interested parties during a formal public comment period, is classified as final guidance, will be used by Federal agencies in their re-view of the preparedness of NRC facility licensees, and is sup-portive of the NRC Final Rule on Emergency Planning.

The public alert and notification system is to conform to the following:

(a) Capability for providing . . . an alert signal . . .

to the population on an area wide basis throughout the 10 mile EPZ, within 15 minutes.

(b) The initial notification system will assure direct coverage of essentially 100% of the population within 5 miles of the site.

(c) Special arrangements will be made to assure 100%'cov-erage within 45 minutes of the population who may not have received the initial notification within the en-tire plume exposure EPZ.

NUREG-0654, at 3-3. However, these criteria are qualified:

The design objective for the system shall be to meet the acceptance criteria of sec-tion B of this Appendix [ quoted immediately above). This design objective does not, however, constitute a guarantee that early i notification can be provided for everyone with 100% assurance or that the system when tested under actual field conditions will meet the design objective in all cases.

Id. at 3-1.

These documents basically present, as a numerical design acceptance criterion, that the target level for the design of anadequatesirensystemsgguldbe10dBaboveaveragedaytime ambient background levels. ' In particular, a siren system 4/ The judges' letter, in Item No. 1 on page 2, incorrectly refers to 10 dBA when discussing this criterion.

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SHAw, PITTMAN, PoTTs & TROWBRioGE A paa?NEAS*** INCLUOsaso peorES5eONAL CCa*CmarioNs Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 2, 1985 Page 5 satisfies the criterion if, for the covered geographic areas, either:- (1) the expected siren sound level generally exceeds 70 dBC wher the population density exceeds 2,000 persons per square mileg/ and 60 dBC in other inhabited areas, or (2) the expected siren sound level generally exceeds the average mea-sured daytime ambient sound levels by 10 dB.

As explained in NUREG-0654, at 3-9, "[t]he 10 dB differen-tial above daytime ambient is meant to provide a distin-guishable signal inside of average residential construction under average conditions." Finally, "the siren system must be enhanced by other alerting methods" only "[w]here the estimated siren sound level does not generally meet the specified level based either on population density or a 10 dB differential be-tween the measured average ambient sound and estimated siren sound level." FEMA-43, at E-8.

The guidance discussed above has been in effect, followed by the industry, and relied upon by NRC and FEMA in approving systems, since 1980. In addition, final FEMA approval of a sirensystemdependsuponaday-timesirentestcogpuctedby FEMA, followed by a telephone survey of residents. According to FEMA testimony, a 70% positive response is considered to be acceptable. Tr. 9940-41, 9953.

Licensina Board Lecal Interpretation In a Memorandum and Order dated February 27, 1985, the Li-censing Board denied Applicants' motion for summary disposi-tion, which was based upon a demonstration that the siren sys-tem for the Shearon Harris EPZ complies with NUREG-0654 and FEMA-43. The' Licensing Board held that those guidelines do not have the force of law, are not binding on the Board, and merely reflect the positions taken by the Staff and FEMA. The Board stated that "the mere fact that the Harris sirens may meet FEMA acceptance criteria does not by itself demor. strate that all legal requirements have been met."

}/ The 70 dBC minimum does not apply in this case because j

there is no area within the Shearon Harris EPZ with a popula-i tion density.of more than 2,000 persons per square mile. .

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6/ See Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Sta-l tion, Units 1 and 2), DD-81-14, 14 N.R.C. 279, 282 (1981). I L

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~ SHAW, PITTM AN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE A PARTggggMap INCLuGENO PROFC$$4QNA4 CORPORATIONS Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 2, 1985' Page 6 The Licensing Board provided the following further direc-tion:-

At.the evidentiary hearing, the Appli-

. cants should address whether the sirens can wake up virtually all the people sleeping in the EPZ between 1 and 6 a.m., particu-larly those with windows closed and air conditioners running. The Applicant should also address whether the presently-planned

means of back-up mobile notification could and sb.ould be augmented to meet the "about" 15-minute standard in Appendix E, if neces-sary.

Applicants disagreed with this ruling in several respects.

First, we believe that the history of administering the Commis-sion's regulations through the Staff and FEMA acceptance criteria, and the expertise which that implementation reflects ,

are entitled to greater deference. Second, the Licensing Board's view that " virtually all" of the EPZ population must be alerted by the siren system in 15 minutes is not a reasonable interpretation of the Commission's regulations. Drafted with what reflects a deliberate desire for flexibility, the Commis-sion requires not a demonstration that virtually all will be alerted, but rather a system with a " design objective" to have "the capability" to " essentially complete" initial notification in "about 15 minutes." (Emphasis supplied.)

Bec rulings,99se of the bar

' however, to interlocutory Applicants had no choice, reviewinofthe such hearings i which followed the summary disposition ruling, but to proceed with the effort to make the demonstration requested by the Li-

censing Board. The discussion of the evidence, reflected in the judges' letter, continues this erroneous interpretation of the regulations.

2/ Interlocutory appellate review is not available for a 11-censing board order granting or denying a motion for summary disposition. Egg, e.g., Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-734, 18 N.R.C. 11 (1983); Pennsylvania Power & Licht Company 1

(Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-641, 13 N.R.C. 550 (1981).

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O SHAW, PITTMAN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE A PANTNEN5**89 INCLUDNG PROFES5sONAL CompomatioNs Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 2, 1985 Page 7 The Record We understand that, in their letter, the judges were not attempting to summarize the entire evidentiary record. While we will not undertake to do so either, some elements of the

record -- not discussed in the judges' letter -- are important to any assessment of whether safety problems exist. In addi-tion, there are some errors in the judges' description of the record.

Before turning to the night-time notification issue, some background information is appropriate. There are approximately 7,000 households in the Shearon Harris EPZ. The siren system consists of 69 Federal Signal Thunderbolt Model 1000 rotating sirensratedat125dBC(at100gpet),plus10 sirens sited around Harris Lake.-

fixed-direction While the system has not yet been tested by FEMA, FEMA testified that the system conser-vatively meets the design acceptance criteria. Indeed, ac-cording to the FEMA reviewer, the Shearon Harris siren system is capable of providing, under average conditions, a sound cov-erage of greater than 80 dBC -- which is 10 times the sound pressure level considered by FEMA and NRC to be adequate -- to almost 60% of the residences in the EPZ. Carter Testimony, ff.

Tr. 9690. The State and local emergency response plans will provideforthesirenstobesoundgpforfourthree-minutepe-riods during the first 15 minutes.-

FEMA also presented testimony explaining why the summer

. day-time conditions specified in FEMA-43 are prudent and proper for siren system design conditions. In brief, ambient back-ground noise levels are higher in summer than in other seasons, and are higher during the day-time than at night. Further, me-teorological conditions reduce sound propagation for summer daytime conditions. Lee Testimony, ff. Tr. 9690, at 19-22.

Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA presented the results of extensive efforts to estimate the alert effectiveness of the 8/ The ten sirens around the lake are not considered in ana-lyzing the contention here.

9/ Applicants' analysis of the effectiveness of the system considered only 10 minutes of siren activation, instead of the planned 12. This is conservative, because siren system effec-tiveness increases with the length of time it is operated.

SHAw, PITTMAN, PoTTs & TROWBRioGE A PARTNgggestP INCLbOgNg PROFES$10NAL CQRpOmanONS Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 2, 1985 .

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-Shearon Harris siren system under night-time conditions. Both modeled the sound propagation from the sirens and utilized a map of actual housing locations to identify sound levels at the outside of homes. The sound loss or attenuation through the structure was then considered, and Applicants employed demographic and air conditioner data to distribute among the housing stock the variety of attenuation situations and back-ground noise levels in the bedroom. The number of persons in a household and their ages were evaluated, and based on studies of arousal capability, the probability of arousal was calculat-ed.

Applicants predicted that 72% of the households would be alerted directly by the siren system. Based upon actual expe-rience in emergencies, a prominent disaster sociologist then evaluated the additional alerting which would occur from infor-mal notification initiated by those already alerted. He con-servatively estimated that 88% would be alerted in 15 minutes, and 95% in 30 minutes. The Staff and FEMA, assuming a siren activation pattern of 3 minutes on and 3 minutes off, predicted that 87.8% of the people in the EPZ would be aroused and

-alerted in 15 minutes.

Not knowing what the Licensing Board meant by " virtually all," Applicants consider this evidence to demonstrate compli-ance with Commission regulations, even as interpreted by the Licensing Board. Yet, the judges' letter concentrates on the admitted percentage of the population for which the probability of arousal is lower -- reflecting again a view that all must be 1 alerted.

The judges discuss (Item No. 3) the low probability of arousal from sleep for a house with windows closed (central air conditioning) and an outdoor siren sound level of 60 dB -- the day-time minimum set by FEMA. Applicants' projections of sound propagation at nicht, however, show fewer than 1% of the EPZ houses covered by less than 70 dB, while FEMA estimates that only 3.9% of the houses are in the 60 to 70 dB range. In addi-tion, some 36% of the houses have no air conditioning and pre-sumably have windows open.

In Item No. 4, the judges again discuss a worst case, and indicate the outdoor sound level needed for a 50% probability of arousal of an individual. The record shows, however, that only 18.5% of the households have just one person. Where two  ;

are present (29.5% of the households), the probability of j I

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SHAw, PITTMAN, PoTTs & TROWBRioGE A PARTNERSH3P INCLUD8NG PACFESSCNAL CCRPORArcNS Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 2, 1985 Page 9 arousing one rises to 75% at the same sound level, and to 87.5%

for the households (19.6% of the total) with three persons. In the Shearon Harris EPZ, 32.4% of the households have 4 or more persons.

In their letter (Item No. 6), the-judges make the unassailable observation that if the overall arousal percentage for an EPZ is 70% under these conditions, for some households the probability of arousal will be less than 50%. In assessing the significance of this situation, however, the judges discuss the probability of arousal only for households with one or two persons -- ignoring the 52% of EPZ households which have three or more persons.

More unfortunate in this discussion, however, is the judges' selection of the area around Siren 70 in the EPZ to 11-lustrate the number of houses with a low probability of arousal. Applicants' witness testified that his analysis con-c sidered only 68 of the 69 relevant sirens because one had not I yet been precisely placed by CPEL. Keast Testimony, ff. Tr.

9375, at 8. He further testified that the siren would be added in the southeast corner of the EPZ. Tr. 9422-23, 9575 (Region U on Applicants' Ex. 47). This is the area near Siren 70. In short, the judges have focused on the one area in the EPZ where

a siren will be added. (It should also be noted that it was the FEMA review, conducted under the published acceptance criteria, which had already identified the need for this siren.)

Finally, on page 3 of their letter, the judges express the

view that the informal notification process known to occur dur-ing actual emergencies should not be viewed as a substitute for planned notification because the phenomenon cannot be con-trolled and its likely effects are difficult to quantify.

Applicants, the NRC Staff and FEMA are not advancing a substi-tute for planned notification. Rather, we are asking the Li-censing Board to give credit, in evaluating the alert effec-tiveness of sirens, for a phenomenon which is known to occur.

This agency makes many predictive findings, often on the basis of engineering analysis, for phenomena not strictly con-trollable (g2gt, accidents). That disaster sociologists quan-tify the effects of informal notification on the basis of actu-al experience, makes their estimates more, not less reliable.

In addition, the informal notification process has been recog-nized and considered by other NRC boards. See, e.a., Duke Power Company (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2),

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SHAw, PITTMAN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE A PARTNER $mp INCLQ@NG page ES$6CNAg CORpOmanggg Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 2, 1985 Page 10 LBP-84-37, 20 N.R.C. 933, 973 (1984) (Finding 10); Southern  !

California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Sta-tion, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-46, 15 N.R.C. 1531, 1534-35 (1982). ,

Significance of the  ;

Licensina Board's Assessment  ;

The judges' letter, both in its tone and the timing of its preparation, reflects a possible view that the evidence at Shearon. Harris revealed something we did not already know --

that not everyone in an EPZ will be alerted by a siren system under all-conditions. In fact, the guidance (quoted above) acknowledges this fact. The. Commission itself, in promulgating its Final Rule on Emergency Planning, stated as follows on pub-lic notification systems: "The commission recognizes that not every individual would necessarily be reached by the actual operation of such a system snder all conditions of system use."

45 Fed. Reg. 50705 (1980).

.This fact has been recognized on numerous occasions by the NRC's adjudicatory boards. The Appeal Board recently held:

The FEMA. criteria do not require that the sirens reach every person in the plume EPZ -- a practical impossibility. (Simi- . ,

larly, and for the very same reason, there~

is no NRC requirement along that line.)

x Duke Power Company (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2),

ALAB-813, 22 N.R.C. 59,'77 (1985) (footnotes omitted). Egg A112 Pacific Gas and Electric' Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-70,'16 N.R.C. 756,'774 (1982) (" Joint Intervenors are in error'in their assertion that 100 percent notifi_ cation is re LBP-84-37, 20 N.R.C. 933, 973" quired"); (1984) Catawba, suora,("There may be situation where the ambient noise inside a building may exceed the siren volume; however, these do not-make the siren system inadequate.

The requirements of FEMA-43 andiNUREG-0654 were not intended as a guarantee that 100% of the population will actually hear the sirens in an emergency but rather were meant to establish a de-j

. sign ob ecti ve for the si ren system . . . . We find Catawba sirens meet this objective and are in compliance with the acceptance criteria."). In San onofre, suora, LBP-82-46, 15 N.R.C. 1531, 1534 (1982) (Judge Kelley, Chairman), the licens-ing board quoted the disclaimer *in NUR2G-0654 that 1004 s

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SH Aw, PITTM AN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE , ,

i Nuclear Regula' tory Commission December 2, 1985 Page 11 notification is not guaranteed under the design objective, and

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further stated:

It is important to recognize that no warn-ing system can be expected to reach 100 percent of the target population . . . .

The best of siren systems presumably will ,

fail to reach some people for a variety of reasons, including, for example, unusually high ambient noise levels in some places, >

individual hearing defects, beina asleep, etc. .But.we think it reasonable to assume that a carefully engineered siren system will be heard by the areat maiority of the people in.the EPZ and that virtually all those who do not-hear the sirens will be warned soon thereafter.

(Emphasis supplied.)

If the Licensing Board in Shearon Harris discounts the NRC Staff and FEMA acceptance criteria as inadequate, and requires a fixed notification system that will awaken " virtually all" EPZ residents in 15 minutes under all conditions, then there will be a generic issue of significance to the NRC's regulatory program. (Given the informal notification process and the ad-ditional alerting which occurs after 15 minutes, we reject.the notion that a safety problem is involved.) We are not aware that any other nuclear power plant licensee or applicant has been. required to undertake an analysis of predicted alerting under a variety of conditions. Rather,.the NRC has routinely licensed plants based on demonstrations that their prompt noti-fication systems meet NUREG-0654 and FEMA-43.

Commission Action In their letter, the judges recommend that the Commission consider testing siren systems around nuclear power plants be-tween the hours of midnight and six a.m. The witnesses at the Shearon Harris hearing testified that such tests would be seri-ously disruptive ar.d annoying to the residents, and that Office of Management and Budget approval has not been obtained for-such a test and survey. Moreover, the judges' recommendation t

appears to be a test of a requirement which they read into the regulations, and which we believe the Commission did not intend.

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SH Aw, PITTM AN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDdE A PARTNERSnip thCWO*NG pmOFESSaQhah COR#CAAT60NS

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 2, 1985 Page 12 Applicants suggest other actions the Commission might take 7'.

in response to the judges' letter. The Commission has the in-herent authority to step into a proceeding before any of its i boards to provide guidance on important issues of law and poli-cy. Noting that the members of the Commission are responsible

, . for the actions and policy of this agency, the Commission has j i done so, in matters pending before licensing boards, where im-  !

portant issues are raised concerning the NRC's relationship to i 4 other federal agencies and their work product, and where such ]

action will prevent fragmented and uncoordinated government  ;

decision-making, and will promote a more rational approach to l the regulatory process. Public Service Commission of New  ;

Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-77-8, 5 N.R.C. '

503, 516-17 (1977), aff'd, New Enoland Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1978); United States Enerov Research and Development Administration (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-76-13, 4 N.R.C. 67, 75-76 (1976).

See also Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-82-27, 16 N.R.C. 883 (1982) (Commission initiative where interpretation of an emer-i gency planning regulation involved significant issues of policy for the Commission).

Just such a situation exists in the Shearon Harris pro-ceeding, where the Licensing Board gives every appearance of ja adopting a new interpretation of the Commission's regulations

.s which wouldibe in direct conflict with FEMA's longstanding im-plementation of them. The Commission gives great weight to FEMA's views on the need for and adequacy of specific offsite protective planning measures. Emergency Planning, Final Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. 55402, 55406 (1980). NUREG-0654 was specifically consideredJin the rulemaking proceeding in which the current z

, emergency planning regulations were developed, and the language of the regulations restates standards set forth in NUREG-0654.

Further, with respect to the specific requirement at issue here, the Commission has stated its specific desire to be flex-ible in meeting the general objective of prompt notification within 15 minutes, and stated that:

In its implementation of this part of the rule, the NRC intends to be guided by FEMA's judgement as to what times and sys-tems are feasible.

Final Rule on Emeroency Plannino, CLI-80-40, 12 N.R.C. 636, 638 (1980). See also id. at n.3 (Commission recognition of the 60 dB minimum requirement).

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d SHAW, PITTMAN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE ,

a saat=sasma mcLuo.=o enorsss o=*6 coaromario=s  !

Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 2, 1985 Page 13 Guidance from the Commission -- that the acceptance criteria of FEMA-43 and Appendix 3 to NUREG-0654 are adequate to implement the relevant language of Appendix E to Part 50, which does not require that " virtually all" of the EPZ popula-tion be alerted by the fixed notification system alone in 15 minutes under all conditions -- would avoid potential delays in this proceeding, uncertainty in FEMA's reviews of other plant sites, and doubt about regulatory compliance at operating reac-tors.

In the alternative, if the Commission wishes to re-examine the language of.its. regulations and/or the adequacy of the NRC Staff and FEMA implementation of them, it Ohould do so gener-ically by rulemaking. Ege Fire Protection for Operatina Nuclear Power Plants (10 CFR 50.48), CLI-81-ll, 13 N.R.C. 778, 801-02 (1981). In the interim, licensing and appeal boards should be instructed to continue to approve prompt public noti-fication systems which meet the published acceptance criteria issued by the NRC and FEMA.

Sincerely,

%A.W Thomas A. Baxter Counsel for Applicants Carolina Power & Light Company and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency cc: H. Plaine, General Cpdnsel S. Chilk, Secretary Shearon Harris Service List 9

9

-o -w- -, -e e -

e - . - - ,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of )

)

CAROLINA PONER & LIGRT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-400 OL and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN )

MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )

, )

(Shearon Barris Nuclear Power )

Plant) )

1 SERVICE LIST Thomas S. Moore, Esquire Charles A. Barth, Esquire i Chairman Janice E. Moore, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of Executive Legal Director Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulator'y Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Communission Washington, D.C. 20555 ,+

Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing and Service Section Dr. Reginald L. Gotchy Office of the Secretary Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appeal Board Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Daniel F. Road, President CHANGE Mr. Howard A. Wilber l P.O. Box 2151 Atomic Safety and Licensing {

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Appeal Board -

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,

Washington, D.C. 20555 John D. Runkle, Esquire l Conservation Council of l James L. Kelley, Esquire "

r o Road I am afety and Licensing Board Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission M. Travis Payne, Esquire Washington, D.C. 20555 Edelstein and Payne

Mr. Glenn O. Bright P.O. Box 12607 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Raleigh, North Carolina 27605 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Richard D. Wilson 729 Hunter Street Dr. James R. Carpenter Apex, North Carolina 27502 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,

Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. Wells Eddleman 806 Parker Street Durham, NC 27701 Richard E. Jones, Esquire Vice President and Senior Counsel Carolina Power & Light Company P.O. Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Dr. Linda W. Little Governor's Waste Management Board 513 Albemarle Building 325 North Salisbury Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27611 Bradley W. Jones, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marrietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff - NCUC P.O. Box 991 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 H. A. Cole, Jr., Esquire Special Deputy Attorney General 200 New Bern Avenue Raleigh, North Carolina 27601 Joseph Flynn, Esquire FEMA 500 C Street, S.W., suite 480 Washington, D.C. 20740 Steven Rochlis, Esquire Regional Counsel FEMA 1371 Peachtree Street, N.E.

Atlanta, Georgia 30309

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