IR 05000522/2006005

Enhanced Team Insp Rept 50-528/85-12 on 850522-0605 & 0716. No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operating Crews & Operational Support Activities During Initial Startup & Low Power Testing

ML20137A530
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde, Skagit
Issue date:	08/06/1985
From:	Bosted C, Bryan S, Crews J, Eckhardt J, Fiorelli G, Huey R, Miller L, Pate R, Polich T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137A500	List: IR 05000522/2006005 IR 05000523/2006005 ML20137A569 ML20137A592 ML20137A617 ML20137A641 ML20137A669
References
50-528-85-12, NUDOCS 8508210420
Download: ML20137A530 (8)

Text

.

-

..

.

f'

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

.

Report No. 50-528/85-12

,

Docket No. 50-528 License No. NPF-34 l

Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 Inspection at: Palo Verde Site

//

Inspection conducted: a 2 - June 5,1985 and July 16, 1985 Inspectors: 8 6 83 J ~. 'Ddte(Signed

'

L 'or Reactor Engineer and Tm ~pd % .~t At/V

, Yctin Chief FA/A Dats Signed

'

ffe y c L{fl(Miller,Chipf/

EM W Datfe Sign (d Re rojects 54ction 2

~ ]V/ Yl b il $ f h hk

-

sn A3tiig f Director Da(e Signed ec ecj thp 6vement Proj . , NRR

, . /fll W [ kW , . Eckh[irdt', Senior Res,ident Inspector Date Signed Ra cb i 8/' N0/s <, f hf Dat( Signed 9[t"Hiiiiy, Seny6r Resident Inspector 2h 'J.'(P611'ch, R(sident Inspector lab ' d jon on s-Date 6igned MST $

G F4 1~1, Resfdent Inspector, Palo Verde D4te/Slgned

!

LV/' W0dK- / h $_

C a.pma, nesi/ lent Inspector, Palo Verde Da[e/igned S

850821042085000h28

$DR ADOCK 05000 PDR

- - - - - .

.

..

,,

.

.

-

2--

Other Accompanying Personnel:

L. R. Peterson, Consultant, Lawrence Livermore National La B. F. Gore, Consultant, Pacific Northwest Laboratories J.-W. Upton, Jr., Consultant, Pacific Northwest Laboratories A. J. Boegel, Consultant, Pacific Northwest Laboratories Approved By: [ [ v// 87 A. E. ChafTee, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch

~

Date Signed Summary:

,

Inspection on May 22 - June 5, 1985 (Report No. 50-528/85-12)

Areas Inspected: Enhanced Team Inspection of the operating crews and operational support activities during initial startup and low power testin This inspection involved 447 inspection hours by nine NRC personnel and 210 inspection hours by four NRC consultant Findings: No violations of NRC requirements resulted from ths inspectio Observations by the Special Inspection Team were discussed with licensee management for their consideration, and actions were taken, and are expected to continue, to improve operational activities. These observations are discussed throughout the report; and relate principally to needed improvements

'in the control room environment (e.g., reduction in noise levels, operator alertness, and communications), retrieval of information for post-event evaluation, and reactor engineering support for operation .

.

DETAILS Persons Contacted

• E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., ANPP Executive Vice President

• • G. Haynes, Vice President Nuclear Production (Announced as Vice President on May 30, 1985)

• D. B. Karner, ANPP Assistant Vice President Nuclear. Production

• J. R. Bynum, ANPP Plant Manager

• E. Ide, ANPP Director, Corporate QA/QC J. E. Allen, ANPP Operations Manager

• L.A. Souza, ANPP Assistant Director Corporate QA/QC

• 0. J. Zeringue,'ANPP Technical Support Manager

• R. C. Younger, ANPP Unit I Operations Superintendent

• D. F. Hoppes, ANPP Reactor Engineering Supervisor

• W. W. Montefour, ANPP Quality Assurance Engineer F. Philpott, CE Lead Engineer L. Briner, Shift Advisor (Southern California Edison Company)

R. Gouge, Day Shift Supervisor C. N. Russo, Manager QA Audit and Surveillance Discussions were also held with numerous other personnel, including shift supervisors, reactor operators, QA/QC engineers and inspection / surveillance personnel, during the inspectio *Present at Site Exit Interview on June 5,198 **Present at Corporate Office Exit Interview on July 16, 198 . Enhanced Inspection Team Composition and Pattern of Inspection The inspection.was carried out be senior members of the Region V and NRC headquarters staffs, Senior Resident and Resident-Inspectors assigned to operating power reactors iii Region V, and four NRC consultants from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories (PNL). The latter consultants (three individuals)

from PNL currently provide contract assistance to the NRC staff in the conduct of operator license examinations.for PWR (Combustion Engineering supplied) power reactor-facilities. The consultant from LLNL is an experienced reactor physicist, and has previously served as a consultan to the NRC staff in the area of human factors evaluation of control room layout and design as well as inspections of the type of the curren inspectio To evaluate the performance of the operating crews, members of the Enhanced Inspection Team were assigned to around-the-clock coverage of

, shift operations commencing on May 22, 1985, when plant heatup in

[ preparation for initial criticality.was started. This around-the-clock i coverage continued through initial criticality (on May 25, 1985) and

!

until June 5, 1985.

!

,

l

- -

-

.

,

The above pattern of inspection permitted members of the inspection team to observe the performance of each of the six operating crews as well as the conduct of portions of all of the zero power physics test . Assessment of Operating Crew Performance Operating crew performance was assessed based upon the inspection team's observation of~(1) the conduct of scheduled plant evolutions during initial critica.ity and zero power physics tests, (2) crew response to unplanned events, aad (3) through discussions with individual operating crew member Part(cula* emphasis was given to the extent to which Shift Advisors (individuals under contract to the licensee to provide on-shift experience in the operation of similar licensed power reactor facilities)

were integrated into the shift operation The overall performance of the operating crews was judged by the Special Inspection Team to be average to above average in plant knowledge and in the conduct of operating duties (including the use of and adherence to operating procedures) when compared to operators of power reactor facilities of similar type during the initial plant startup and early operating perio Early in the inspection period, on May 23, 1985, the inspection team observed that an annunciator, CEA Deviation - Tech Spec Violation, was activated during a period following manipulation of the control element assemblies (control rods). At the time a licensed operator was in attendance at the CEA controls adjacent to the panel where the annunciator was located. Also present was-an operator trainee, who on occasion manipulated the annunciator acknowledge button to silence audible annunciators as they were activated. After a period of several minutes, the inspection team leader questioned the two operators present as to their knowledge of the conditions causing this annunciator to be activated. Neither had an immediate explanation. Af ter some prompting by the NRC inspector, the operators referred to the annunciator response procedures manual located on the front of the control panel nearb Still there was not an explanation by either operator for a period of several minutes, after which a third individuel (an STA) was asked of his knowledge of the conditions accounting for the annunciator's activatio It was only af tcr a period of more than 30 minutes that sufficient attention and actions were taken by the operating crew to satisfactorily understand and explain the reasons and significance of the annunciator's being activate It was determined that one or more CEA's were out of position in two different rod groups sufficiently to cause the deviation alarm condition. The deviation was not, however, sufficiently great to constitute a violation of the technical specification This observation by the inspection team was discussed the following morning with senior site and corporate management, and characterized as unacceptable attentiveness and alertness on the part of the control room operators involved. Steps were taken by licensee management to assure the alertness of control room operators such that this circumstance was not repeated during the balance of the inspection period. There were numerous occasions during the inspection when control room operators were asked about actuated annunciators and other system.and component status.

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

"

a

'

.

.

On these occasions, except for the instance discussed above, the operators demonstrated an exceptionally good level of knowledge of plant instrumentation and equipment statu The. inspection team observed shift turnover practices on frequent occasion. The shift turnover of plant and equipment status, particularly within the control room - including thorough'" walk down!' of instrument and control room panels was judged to be of exceptional qualit There were instances where the inspection team. observed circumstances within the control room warranting attenbion by licensee management and/or supervision, particularly.with regard to reducing noise levels or potential distraction of control room operating personnel. An example where licensee corrective action was prompt in correcting the condition

,

involved ' shift briefings by the test director at the beginning of each shif Initially these briefing were conducted adjacent to the

" horseshoe" area' of the control room. The numbers of people involved plus discussion among those involved in the briefing created potential-distractions to the operators. When this observation was brought to the attention of supervision steps were taken to relocate such briefings in the computer room immediately adjacent to the control roo Two other observations by the inspection team regarding the control room environment were (1) the location of telephones for calls from outside-the plant and -(2) the background noise level resulting from the control room normal air conditioning system. In the first instance, it was observed on numerous. occasions that calls received in the horseshoe area, generally answered by the reactor plant operator, were for individuals in the opposite end of the control room. This necessitated rather. loud verbal paging, without the aid of an intercom or buzzer system, to transfer the call to the individual. for whom it was intende Regarding the control room air conditioning noise level, apparently generated by the high velocity air exiting the ceiling vents, the inspection team, particularly on the non-day shift periods, observed substantial annoyance due to this condition over a period of an eight hour shif Licensee management committed to give further attention to these conditions. In the case of the conirol room air conditioning, the condition had been previously idcatified for further evaluation by the license The relatively low numbers of control room annunciators actuated (or lit)

during plant operations was a particularly positive observation by the inspection team. This circumstance had resulted from a comprehensive and effective effort by the licensee to reduce substantially the number of unnecessary and nuisance alarm condition Not withstanding the need for licensee management to give continuing attention to those areas discussed above to enhance the control room environment and the alertness of plant operators, the inspection team found the performance of the operating personnel to be good. Their overall attitude was observed to be very positive toward "doing the job

-

. 4 right the first time". Few personnel errors were observed; this being in large part the' result of substantial utilization of the plant specific simulator to train operators in the testing procedures and operations involve Attachments 1 through 4 provide additional observations and comments by consultant members of the special inspection team regarding the performance of the operating crew . Initial Criticality and Zero Power' Testing Members of the Enhanced Inspection Team witnessed initial criticality and portions of all low power tests. -Details regarding the conduct and

.results of.these tests are discussed in Attachment . Engineering Direction and Support of Operations and Testing The technical direction and of initial criticality and low power testing activities was provided by individuals within the Reactor Engineering Section of the licensee's onsite Technical Support staff. This staff is composed currently of approximately 12 engineers, half of whom are employees under contract from the NSSS (Combustion Engineering - CE)

contracto Approximately an equal number of contract CE technical personnel are also available to the Reactor Engineering staff, when neede The licensee's staff within Reactor Engineering is relatively inexperienced with regard to the startup and operation of commercial nuclear plants - thus the need for the presence of contract personnel in this part of the organizatio The Inspection Team observed that the licensee's Reactor Engineering

. personnel were noticeably dependent upon the advice of the more experienced CE representatives during the initial approach to criticality and low power physics tests. The licensee's current plans are to retain CE representatives through completion of the power ascension testing on Unit The lack of experience within the Reactor Engineering staff was also evident during a period of uncertainty regarding the absolute reactor power level below five percent power. A period of several hours was necessary before a satisfactory level of confidence was established in the actual reactor thermal power verses that indicated by the nuclear instrumentatio At the time of the Management Interviews, this subject was discussed with licensee management in the context of a need to reexamine continued CE presence beyond the completion of Unit I startu . Quality Assurance / Quality Control Involvement The extent of Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC) involvement in early operational activities was exceptionally noteworthy during the current inspection. Their presence and substantive involvement in such . 5

activities as low power physics testing, inspection and surveillance of maintenance and troubleshooting (diesel generator apparent malfunction, etc.), health physics activities and housekeeping was readily evident during the inspection. Discussion with QA/QC management revealed plans for greater involvement of the QA/QC staff in operational activities such as independent verification of valving and electrical system lineu . Post-Event Information Retrieval Systems The inspection team observed rather substantial difficulties in the retrieval and evaluation of information necessary to reconstruct the sequence of events during early operation during the current inspection as compared to similar facilities in Region This was particularly the case during the period, discussed in paragraph 5., above, when uncertainty existed on the actual power leve In response to the inspection team's observation, licensee management indicated that steps, including a reassessment of the amount and type of parameters to be programmed for retrieval by the plant process computer (s), were being taken to improve the utilization of post-trip / event information system . Management lnvolvement During the course of the current inspection particular attention was given by the inspection team to the presence and involvement of site and corporate management in the day-to-day operational activitie Corporate office management, including the Executive Vice President, Corporate QA/QC Manager, and Assistant Vice President, were observed at the plant on frequent occa:iion. All were present at the time of initial criticality on May 25, 198 The Plant Manager and key managers and supervisors of his staff -

including in particular the Reactor Engineering Supervisor, Unit 1

~

Operations Superintendent, Assistant Operations Superintendent and Technical Support Manager - were observed to be involved extensively in operational activities. Examples of such involvement included unusual efforts to assure operability of the hydrogen monitora and resolution of diesel generator fuel oil discrepancie Overall management involvement was observed to be substantive and effective. The prevailing attitude which seemed to permeate the entire staf f associated eith operations and operational support activities was one of unusual caution and thoroughness during the approach to initial plant operation and the conduct of each plant evolutio . Management Meetings The results of the current inspection were discussed with those licensee representatives indicated in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on June 5, 1985 (onsite) and at the corporate offices on

. July 16, 1985.

I

_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _

._

.. . . . .

. . - _

>

,

l

. .

6 i

'

l

,

!

Licensee representatives indicated that particular continuing attention j4 would-be given-to-the following observations of the inspection team, Utilization of post-event information systems (Paragraph 7).

i.'

. Retention of supplemental (contractor) Reactor Engineering staff

-

(Paragraph 5).

I

' Enhancement of control room environment and operator alertriess (Paragraph-3).

-

,.

>

P t

I-

!

!

!

r

5 I

I

)

1. * ,

l 4 <

,

s

'

!

t-I l-

. , - + - - . . . . _ _ . - - . - - . . - . _ . - - - . - . - - . - . . . - . . . - . . - .. ., . -, - - - , _ . , -.~,- . . - - . -