ML20135H739
| ML20135H739 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1985 |
| From: | Baird J, Terc N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135H737 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-85-16, NUDOCS 8509240181 | |
| Download: ML20135H739 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000285/1985016
Text
--
-
.
APPENDIX
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-285/85-16
License: DPR-40
Docket: 50-285
Licensee: Omaha Public Power District
1623 Harney Street
Omaha, Nebraska 68102
Facility Name:
Fort Calhoun Station
Inspection At:
Fort Calhoun, Nebraska
4
Inspection Conducted: July 22-26, 1985
O
I
T- 8 0- #5
Inspector:
Nemerf M. Terc, NRC Team Leader
~Date
Other Inspectors:
W. V. Thomas, PNL
D. H. Schultz, Comex
G. R. Bryan, Comex
E. A. King, PNL
E. C. Watson, PNL
Approved:
h b MM
'///8/F6~
J/ B. Baird, Acting Chief, Emergency Preparedness
Dats
'
and Safeguards Programs Section
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted July 22-26, 1985 (Report 50-285/85-16)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced emergency preparedness exercise
observations, evaluation and inspection. The inspection involved 294
l
inspector-hours by seven NRC and contractor inspectors.
l
Results: Within the emergency response areas inspected no violations or
deviations were identified. Ten deficiencies were identified by NRC and
l
contractor inspectors.
~
f
8509240181 850919
$DR
ADOCR 05000295
l
l
PH
_
_
_
.
.
_ . _ ,
_
-
. .
._
-
.
1
-z.
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Omaha Public Power District
D. Hyde, Maintenance Supervisor
'
M. Kallman, Supervisor, Administrative Services and Security
- G. Roach, Health Physics / Chemistry Supervisor
- G. Gates, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station
- F. Franco, Manager, Radiological Health and Emergency Preparedness
- R. Jaworsky, Manager, Technical Services
- D. Freighert Emergency Planning Coordinator
J. Fisicaro, Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory and Industry Affairs
- R. Andrews, Division Manager, Nuclear Protection
- J. Gasper, Manager, Administrative Services
J. Michael, Shift Superintendent
- E. Pape, Senior Vice President, OPPD
- M. Gautier, Media . Relations & Publications Manager
- K. Morris, Manager, Quality Assurance
- K. Hothaus, Supervisor, Reactor Performance Analysis
W. Jones, Vice President, Nuclear. Operations
R. Mueller, Maintenance Supervisor
J. Tesark,. Instruments and Control Electrical Support Coordinator
R. Mehaffby, Instruments and Control Mechanical Support Coordinator
,
The inspectors also contacted other licensee employees during the course
of the emergency exercise. They included chemistry and health physics
technicians, reactor and auxiliary operators, members of the security
force and maintenance personnel.
- Denoted those present at the exit interview.
~
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) 0 pen Item (285/8423-01): The inspectors determined that offsite
~ monitoring teams were efficient in their.use of-survey instruments,
protective clothing and dosimetry.
This item is closed; however, see
deficiency identified in paragraph 5 of this. report.
.
3.
Exercise Scenario
The exercise scenario was'~ reviewed to determine if provisions had been
.made for.the required level of participation by state and local agencies,
and that all the major elements of emergency response would be exercised
in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50 and the guidance
criteria in NUREG 0654,'Section 11.n.
The review included an~ evaluation
=
.
.
-3-
of the technical adequacy of both, operational and radiological aspects
of the scenario.
In addition, a review of the internal consistency and
thoroughness of information provided to participants, observers,
controllers and evaluaturs, was made.
Results of this review were as
follows:
The scenario did not include a narrative summary of physical
events which occurred in the reactor and associated systems,
nor the rationale behind the same.
Various scenario events were unrealistic. For example, a cue
card suggested a reactor trip to the operator solely for a
medical emergency; a worker burned by radioactive steam was
required by the scenario to make a complete report of conditions
in the location he was injured.
In addition, inadequate timing
of scenario events was found in a message at 9:20 a.m., reporting
an alarm. Suddenly, at 9:21 there was already someone in the
auxiliary building who had been briefed by control room operators
and was ready to report the reason for the alarm.
There were numerous scenario messages which prompted or coached
the players, giving them an anticipated, premature idea of
events and conditions thus diminishing the amount of realism
and freeplay expected during an emergency exercise.
For
example, some messages were given to the wrong organizational
,
members, others clearly hinted to personnel on what action to
take, and final values and physical units were given to field
teams before they performed appropriate calculations. Other
messages conveyed technically incorrect data.
Contingency messages, which are normally given to players only
=
after they have failed to respond adequately in order to
prevent the exercise from reaching an impasse, were inadequate
in number and content.
The scenario lacked technical consistency with actual practices
and as a consequence restrained control room operators from
following actions expected during actual emergencies.
For
. example, after the shift supervisor had adequately classified
an event as an Alert in accordance with procedures, he was
forced by the scenario to de-escalate to a Notification of
Unusual Event (NOVE) contradicting his training and approved
emergency procedures. Other examples included the prevention
of alteration of the ventilation path following the fuel
handling accident scenario.
The format and content of data given to players was in many
cases inadequate or lacking.
For example, data for the injured
victim and offsite radiation monitoring data originating from
the radioactive plume were not flexible, but limited to fixed
.
-
.
-4-
locations and without distinguishing iodine from noble gas
components.
In addition, data for containment radiation
monitors was lacking.
Based on the above, the following item is considered to be emergency
preparedness deficiency:
Internal j.nconsistencies and lack of completeness in the scenario data
and instructions for players and controllers resulted in various
instances of unnecessary simulation, coaching and lack of realism. As a
consequence some exercise objectives were not adequately demonstrated
(285/8516-01).
'
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Deficiencies Identified by NRC Inspectors
The following deficiencies, grouped by location or activity, were
identified by NRC inspectors:
a.
Control Room
Initial conditions were provided to the control room staff assigned
to respond to the simulated emergency at 6:45 a.m.
Among significant
. initial conditions were the following:
1.
The reactor was operating at full power.
2.
A high pressure injection pump was out of service for
maintenance.
3.
Inspection reactor fuel elements from a previous fuel cycle
was in progress.
-
The exercise was started at 6:45 a.m., with a leak of chlorine gas due
to the failure of a safety valve on a cylinder stored on the loading
dock next to the cafeteria. This event prompted the shift supervisor
to declare an Alert classification at 7:07 a.m. (this emergency class was
changed by the controller to a' Notification-of Unusual Event). At
7:50 a.m., a radiation alarm in the spent fuel pool area indicated
abnormal levels of direct radiation and airborne radioactive contamin-
ation, and at 7:56 a.m., personnel in the fuel area were evacuated. A
high level alarm from the stack radiation monitor indicating a
release _of radioactivity offsite was investigated and confirmed. The
shift supervisor declared an Alert emergency class, and sounded the
site evacuation alarm. 'A sequence of system failures resulted in a
' loss of coolant accident which eventually led to the uncovering of
the fuel elements within-the reactor vessel and consequently to a
release of a substantial amount:of fission products to the environment
and a declaration of a General Emergency condition.
.
.
.
i'
.
.
-5-
The NRC inspectors in the control room observed the appropriate use
of emergency implementing and operating procedures in responding to
the various aspects of the emergency as the scenario unfolded.
Accident' mitigation schemes were thoughtful and innovative, and
references to plant and instrumentation diagrams contributed to early-
diagnosis and corrective action plans.
The NRC inspectors, however, observed the following deficiencies:
'
Initial notification with appropriate descriptive contents, including
whether a release was taking place, potentially affected population
and areas, and whether protective measures may be necessary (see
example, 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section 4.0.3 and NUREG 0654,
Sections 11.E.3 and II.E.4), which must be performed within.15
,
'
minutes after declaring an emergency, were delayed up to 50 minutes
or not made at all as in the case of Harrison County Emergency
Operations Center (E0C), and Iowa State Forward Operating Location at
Logan, Iowa (285/8516-02).
The transmission by telefax of technical data during the notification
process included protective action recommendations (PARS) which had
been automatically generated by the computer but had not been approved
by the emergency coordinator (Recovery Manager).
In' addition, these
PARS did not take plant conditions into consideration (285/8516-03).
Written notification procedures were found to be organized in a
manner which did not' lend themselves to providing technical informa-
tion content to offsite authorities.
Furthermore, written procedures
did not reflect the licensee staff actual notification practices
during the exercise (285/8516-04).
The licensee failed to respond to release rate calculations'in the
control room indicating extremely hazardous radiological conditions
that would have required a general emergency classification. Technicians
performing the calculations, yielding 8.22 E13 C1/sec, failed to
recognize this as a physically impossible release rate for commercial-
nuclear power plants.
In addition, the individual failed to communi-
cate these results promptly to the shift supervisor, who at that time
was acting as the emergency coordinator. He in turn failed to recog-
nize the unlikely nature of the data, and it was not until 33 minutes
after the initial results were at hand that an assistant reactor
operator requested verification of this calculation (285/8516-05).
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The NRC inspectors observed that the reorganization which shifted
the-site director from the shift supervisor's office to the TSC
improved the performance of the emergency response over that' observed
during the previous exercise,' and was a . key factor in eliminating
past deficiencies in TSC' direction, control and briefings. The NRC
inspectors also observed that notifications and updates to the NRC
- -
-
-
-
-
-
.
.
.
-6-
were timely, that the site director made efficient use of
procedures, and that briefings were timely and concise.
In
addition, the TSC staff was supportive of the control room staff in
technical and other matters; this was demonstrated by the timely
.
deployment of a fire brigade team when the control room staff was
unable to do so.
The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiencies:
E
Information flow within the TSC was not sufficiently prompt to allow
the efficient handling of accident conditions.
For example, the
average of a sample of six observations, showed that it took
21 minutes from the time data.were received from the control room to
the time the status board was updated (285/8516-06).
The analysis of events by the technical staff of the TSC was not
always adequate.
For example, at one time the status board
indicated an increasing pressurizer level although the leak rate was
greater than the charging rate; this inconsistency was not
questioned.
In another case, the TSC staff failed to utilize
isometric drawings at hand _in attempting to determine the correct
valve line-up needed to isolate the loss of coolant. 'This caused a
delay of 30-45 minutes, and resulted in an improper valve line-up
recommendation being forwarded to the control room (285/8516-07).
The base radio used to communicate with.offsite teams was found to be
inadequate.
As a consequence, directives and information flow
between offsite teams and personnel in the TSC was disrupted,
depending on location.
Similar problems were observed when
attempting to communicate with their supervisor in the security
building (285/8516-08).
c.
Search and Rescue, and Health Physics Training
'
The NRC inspe'ctor noted that the' medical scenario indicated a lack
of training ~of site personnel in tasks re. quiring a combined
expertise of health physics; first aid-and rescue operations.
For
example, the rescue team did not take radiation detection
instruments, nor a first-aid kit when entering an area with high
levels of radiation and contamination.
In addition, they failed to
take a breathing mask for.the injured man.
The stretcher used for
transporting the victim was, inadequate in that it had no means for
securing the injured person to prevent his' falling down the stairs
and breathing was' difficult inside the closed container through a
small filter media.
In addition, a health physics technician in charge of TSC habit-
ability surveys,~had no knowledge of the operation of the Particulate-
Iodine-Noble Gas (PING) Monitor, and two clerks in charge of deter-
mining the amount of radioactivity in smears taken onsite did not
have'a working knowledge of radiation protection techniques.
,
-
.
.
-7-
Observations in these areas indicate a deficiency in training and
qualification for health physics and first aid personnel, and
inadequate first aid equipment.
(285/8516-09)
.
d.
Environmental Monitoring Team
The NRC inspectors observed that offsite team actions were greatly
improved from previous performances. However, they failed to
properly label each sample with location, date, time, and name of
the person conducting the survey.
The environmental monitoring
teams consistently placed filter cartridges and filter paper in
individual plastic bags without identifying each of them. Samples
were then placed in a larger bag and this bag was carefully labeled.
Failure to identify each individual sample bag could result in the
lo~ss of sample identity upon removal and separation prior to
analysing them.
(285/8516-10)
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Exercise Critique
The NRC inspectors attended the post-exercise critique conducted by the
licensee staff on July 25, 1985, to evaluate the licensee's
identification of deficiencies and weaknesses as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b) (14) and Appendix E of Part 50. paragraph IV.F.5.
The
licensee staff identified the deficiencies listed below and stated that
responsibilities for followup and corrective actions would be assigned
,
after a final review of their findings.
Corrective actions for these.
deficiencies will be examined during a future NRC inspection.
The description in written procedures of the Operations Support
Manager duties, responsibilities and place within the
organizational structure, were not consistent with observed
practices nor with the responsibilities of the shift
supervisor.
The technical ~ support center staff was not aggressive in
-
attempting to evaluate core damage. This was partially the
result of- not having adequate means for estimating core damage
in' lieu of taking a post accident sample.
Accountability was not demonstrated to be prompt. . Establishing
the~ whereabouts of 132 persons onsite took 48 minutes. This is
contrary to the guidance of NUREG 0654,.II.J., which states
that accountability should be accomplished within.30 minutes.
No violations. or deviations were identified.
.
.
.
.- .
.
-8-
7.
Exit Interview
-
The.NRC team met with licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1
above. .The NRC team-leader summarized.the deficiencies observed during
the exercise.
The NRC team leader stated that although a number of
deficiencies had been identified during the exercise, within the scope
and ifmitations of the exercise scenario, the licensee actions were found
to be adequate to protect the health and safety of the public, and that
, .
such actions were consistent with their Emergency Plan and implementing
procedures. The licensee stated that upon review of exercise findings
~
.
they will. take corrective actions in order to improve their emergency '
-
,
program"... No violations or deviations were reported.
. ,
,
\\
<
.I
v
M
i.
4
1
I
L
v
4
,
-
3.
,
.
,
-r--