ML20134G135
| ML20134G135 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1984 |
| From: | Van Vo C AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132C567 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-85-173 NUDOCS 8508230061 | |
| Download: ML20134G135 (96) | |
Text
h b AFFIDAVIT My name is Chan van Vo. I am also known as van Vo Davis. I am giving this statement to Robert Guild, Attorney-at-Law, of Charleston, South Carolina, who has identified himself to me as a representative of the Government Accountability Projec'. I was employed for almost five years by Carolina Power & Light Company in the construction of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant near Raleigh, North Carolina, most recently in the position of Engineer where I was responsible for ensuring that the installation of pipe and pipe-hangers was in accordance with approved plans, specifications, codes, procedures and schedules. Although I am not opposed to nuclear power, my experience with CP&L causes me to have serious doubts about CP&L's commitment to N nuclear safety and about the as-built quality of construction at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. On many occasions I have brought safety concerns and construction deficiencies to the attention of my supervisors only to face lack of interest and hostility; and in one case only to find my documentation of a serious safety concern discarded in my supervisor's trash can the next day. I have taken these concerns up my chain of command to senior management at CP&L on several occasions only to be told that 'this is not Vietnam, here at CP&L you are only a
- soldier who must follow orders.' This lack of interest in my safety concerns wt s followed by a pattern of harassment, intimidation, pressure to resign, and ultimately my termination. I have filed a
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hG(. L t
PDR l
complaint against CP&L with the U.S. Department of Labor for violation of the Employee Protection Provisions of The Energy Reorganization Act because of the Company's discrimination against me for raising safety concerns. I was only trying to do my job to the best of my ability according to my pro-fessional engineering training. I believed that the Quality Assurance' regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and the Company's wri? ten policies and procedures meant what they said. However', I have" learned that CP&L has very little interest in seeing that the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant is built "by the book." Workers at the site are expected'to "look the other way" when they see safety violations or risk losing their jobs. I hope that my concerns will be fully investigated and that effective action will be taken to ensure that the public health and safety is protected before the Harris plant is allowed to operate.
- 2. I was born in South Vietnam and became a U.S.
citizen after I came to this country in 1975. I hold a degree in Math, Science and Physics from the French College and a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering with a specialty in Fluid Mechanics from Phutho Higher Technical University, Saigon, South Vietnam. In order to supplement my education for engineering certification in this country, I have taken courses in civil and mechanical engineering from Fayetteville Technical Institute and International Correspondence Schools. I am currently an MBA candidate at Campbell University, Buies Creek, North 2
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Carolina', where I am concentrating in Production Management.
I expect to receive my degree in May 1985. I am an Associate member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
- 3. I was first employed by CP&L at the Harris site on April 10, 1979, as an Engineering Aide I, in the Mechanical Department under E.M. "Ed" McLean, where I was responsible for preparing requisitions for site material procurement and for performing inspections of mechanical installations in all parts of the plant. On October 10, 1979, I was promoted to Engineering Technician II where I was assigned responsibil-ities for piping and pipe-hangers. Afte,r I finished the ICS program for equivalence with a 4 year degree in mechanical engineering and based on my " outstanding" performance, I was promoted to Associate Engineer, effective October 4, 1980..
In this position I performed material take-offs, prepared purchase specifications and material purchase orders for piping; and was in charge of field support for radwaste piping in the Waste Processing Building. In April, 1982, I was transferred to work for the Lead Hanger Engineer, A.G.
"Alex" Fuller, where I was responsible for providing technical support to the hanger crafts including the proparation and interpretation of design documents and work procedures, investigation of field problems, preparation of field changes such as Field Change Requests / Permanent Waivers (FCR/PW), and the resolution of nonconformances.
- 4. Alex Fuller and his immediate superior, Resident Mechanical Engineer E.E. "Ed" Willett, particularly demonstrated a lack of commitment to nuclear safety and a general lack of knowledge and competence to perform their important engineering and management responsibilities. The Resident Engineering Unit carries responsibility for all site engineering functions at the Harris Plant, under the direc-tion of a CP&L employee, the Senior Resident Engineer, a position held by A. Lucas until his removal for poor performance in early 1983. Under Lucas were the various engineering disciplines and the Construction Inspection (CI) organizations. Ed Willett took over the' Mechanical Engineering group in 1980. He originally supervised activities in the piping, hangers, equipment and heating-ventilation-air conditioning (HVAC) areas; until equipment installation and HVAC were taken away from him in early 1983, and hanger work was taken away in October, 1983, because of mounting problems and growing recognition of Willett's lack of ability to effectively manage his work. Willett brought in his friend, Alex Fuller, to supervise the hanger program in late 1981, despite Fuller's lack of qualifications for this work. Fuller's training was in civil engineering and his only previous work experience was in dam construction with CP&L. As problems mounted in the hanger area, Al Rager was brought in over Alex Fuller. This did not help at all since Rager lacked any engineering experience. Rager has 4
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since been placed in charge of the Construction Inspection program. This recent move will do nothing to improve the Quality Assurance program at the Harris Plant.
- 5. In mid-August 1982 I was performing my normal duties checking the installation of pipe-hangers in the Turbine Building. While doing so I observed several pipefitters attempting to fit a 24" carbon steel piping line to the discharge nozzle of Steam Generator Feed Water Pump 1A-NNS.
This piping system is of large diameter pipe through which feedwater is pumped back from the turbine condensor to the steam generator which is located inside the Reactor Building containment. The system, including the ' piping and associated valves and pumps, is classified as Secondary System, Safety Category 4, Seismic Category 1. The integrity of reactor temperature and pressure control is dependent upon the effective function of these pumps, valves and piping, which are, therefore, nuc] ear safety significant. The 24" carbon steel pipe in ques'. ion extended on a horizontal run in the direction of the length of the Turbine Building until it reached a position above the discharge nozzle of the pump in question where it dropped vertically toward the pump. Since the pipe-to-pump flange connection was the last remaining fit-up to be made in the pipe run, I was particularly concerned that proper alignment of the pipe to the flange was main-tained in order to assure that no improper stresses were imparted to the pump.
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- 6. ,
To assure proper fit-up, I identified the fitters' Foreman and requested that he ask his General Foreman, Danny McGhee, to request Mi11 wright assistance in fitting this connection. Millwrights are responsible for the installation of mechanical equipment such as this SGFW pump. The Foreman did as I requested, but reported back that McGhee had saic go ahead without the Mi11 wrights. I returned to my office where I called Piping Engineer D.M. Dasburg to whom I related the problem.
- 7. Several days later I encountered the same crew of pipefitters in the Turbine Building in the process of actually fitting up this pipe to the pum'p nozzle. The fitters had rigged a horizontal "come-along" from the pipe to a nearby beam and were " cold pulling" the pipe using extreme force which I would estimate at several thousand pounds in order to force fit the connection. When I. encountered them they had almost completed the entire weld. No Millwright was present, nor did I observe any Quality Control, construction Inspector, or supervisory authority present to witness the
" cold pull" fit-up of this pipe.
- 8. About one week later I observed two Millwrights, a l
Mr. Strickland, Company No. 50-185 and Mr. Bass, Company No.
l 50-105, performing an alignment test on the subject Feedwater Pump. One of them said to me, "Mr. Chan they really screwed up this pump!" The Millwrights were measuring the pump shaf t l alignment using an instrument called a " Dial Indicator" which measures in thousands of an inch. Procedure calls for an alignment tolerance of +/ .'005. The Millwrights reported to 1
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_ . - - : c , .. . ..
me the results of alignment measurements over a three-day period under hot and cold temperature conditions. Their notes reflected a severe misalignment measurement of as much as + .108", - .078" under hot conditions; and + .108",
- .075" under cold conditions!
- 9. On August 25, 1982, I explained this problem to my Supervisor, Alex Fuller. I asked.him how I should document and report this safety deficiency; and whether I should inform Resident Mechanical Engineer Ed Willett. Fuller told me to document the problem on a " Speed Letter" which he said i he would route to Willett. " Speed Letters" are commonly used at the Harris site for not only routine internal communica-tion, but also in place of prescribed Quality Assurance l documentation. Use of " Speed Letters" is not prescribed in any procedures for the documentation of construction deficiencies, nor are " Speed Letters" controlled documents which are normally part of the Nuclear Plant's permanent quality records. I documented the cold pulling misalignment of the Steam Generator Feedwater Pump as I was instructed in such a " Speed Letter" to Alex Fuller, "
Subject:
Loads Imposed on the Steam Generator Feed ' Pump 1A-NNS," which l I
detailed my observations and attached a diagram showing the l Dial Indicator alignment readings and the Millwrights' names and Company numbers. I closed my message: "Please inve s t iga te . " The very next day I happened to find my " Speed i
Letter" with attached diagram discarded in Fuller's trash can!
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- 10. The following day I spoke with R.T. "Roy" Settle, a Daniel Construction employee who serves as Equipment i Installation Supervisor. I told him of the problem and showed him my discarded " Speed Letter". Roy said that he had told,Ed Willett of the problem three times. He quoted 1
Willett as cursing him and adding: "I don't want to hear any more about that problem. If something happens I will fire
-you first!"
- 11. Several months later on October 14, 1982, I observed Millwrights re-checking the alignment of the subject pump.
They gave me a note reflecting the results of their Dial Indicator readings: + .098", - .075". I showed this note to Alex Fuller.- He said nothing. The following day I showed it to Ed Willett. He-said tell Daren Dsaburg the Piping Engineer. I already had. ~I gave a copy of the note to 1
Dasburg.
- 12. Since I'first raised my concern regarding the cold pulling of this pipe and its effect on the feedwater pump, I became aware of increasing pressure from Fuller and Willett.
1 I sought a transfer out from under Fuller and Willett i
thinking that a change in supervision would ease _this retaliation. Willett refused to approve my transfer request.
I _ pursued ny ' concern regarding the mishandling of the pump I deficiency and my request for transfer to avoid the l i
mistreatment. Both Senior Resident Engineer A. Lucas and liarris Project Manager- Parsons showed no interest and offered i no help. They sent me back to Willett.
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13.- In November or December 1982 I went to see CP&L Vice 4
i President, M.A. McDuffie. I told him that I was just trying 1
to serve my Company. I explained to him all about my report l
j of the pump deficiency. I showed him my " Speed Letter" and j' diagram and the Millwrignts' notes; I told him of Roy Settle's comments. He showed no reaction and asked no questions. I told him of the retaliation and pressure from Fuller and Willett. He told me that I was a good man, that the Company needed me. He said he would. help and that I should go back and request a transfer. I did as he told me; but my transfer was refused. Mr. McDuffie did not help me, I ,
i nor did he investigate my safety concerns.
l 14. In March, Alex Fuller increased the level of
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, pressure on ne and threatened me with termination- of my job.
He subjected me to " formal counseling" regarding my' job 4
, performance, including a requirement that I impove my
" understanding and explanation of problems." After I requested Project Manager Parsons' help in allowing me to
. rebut Fuller's allegations, Fuller and Willett backed down i'
and. dropped their charges.
- 15. In April, 1983, I wea to see Vice President f McDuffie again for help. This time he sent me back without any action or help. Mr. McDuffie said, "This is the U.S.
This is CP&L,_not Vietnam. Here Ed Willett is your l Lieutenant and you are only a soldier. You must obey I orders." During the Spring the pressure from Fuller continued to increase. I was assigned more and more work:
hangers in the diesel generator building, the turbine.
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bu ild ing ', the reactor building, the auxiliary building and the waste processing buliding. Much more work than my fair j - share.
- 16. In June, 1983, the NRC began to identify serious problems in the hanger installation program at Harris. In a June 10, 1983, exit meeting with site management, NRC Senior Mechanical / Welding Engineer J.W. York noted problems-in the I hanger inspection area with particular regard to missed deficiencies and material control problems. Several weeks later Alex Fuller assigned me to work with the OA Surveillance Group under the direction of OA Engineer " Buck" Williams. Our task was to begin an evaluation of the adequacy of the existing pipe hanger installation program.
Fuller instructed me to' select, at random, about 50 hanger ,
l packages for review, with particular emphasis on material j aubstitutions, use of surplus materials, and identification of Construction Material Requisitions (CMR's) that did not match the hanger materials actually installed. These areas I
represented significant problems which the NRC had observed
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and which indicated the potential need for costly and time 1
consuming reinspection and rework.
- 17. At Buck Williams' request I pulled 50 hanger 1
packages 'for seismic hangers on safety-related ' systems which were supposed to be Phase II complete: installed, inspected, j and found acceptable for turn over to operations with only i
the-final Phase III stress analysis yet to be performed. Of these, the OA Surveillance Group inspected 12 at random. In 10
the course of this review numerous serious deficiencies were noted which had not been identified, documented or corrected although'these hangers.had all received final approval by CI and CP&L QA/QC.
, 18. By " Speed Letter" of July 18, 198,3, I transmitted to Alex Fuller and Ed Willett' my completed " Hanger Phase II Verification Checklists" for these sample-hanger packages.
Fuller was very angry that such a large number of i deficiencies had been identified, and he blamed me for 1
! documenting all of these problems. In particular he focused f on the problem of material traceability which we had 1~
identified on inany of these hangers. For example on pipe
- hanger A-2-236-1-CC-H-105, a " Speed Letter" of 4/25/80 l
I indicates that a 1" x 10" x 10" plate was obtained-from Purchase Order 21022 and installed as per drawing. PO 21022 1
was cited as the source for material in many of-the hangers i '
we-exanined. I explained to Fuller that I had re. searched l this PO with QA Inspector Jay' Vincent and another man on the Surveillance team. We could find no documentation of-this'PO in the QA records vault. In - the Purchasing Department, i Robert Babb informed us that the Purchasing Log showed that PO 21022 had been voided:and that no materials had ever been received through that. order! We could not determine where i
these hanger materials had come from or document that such a materials were of acceptable _ grality for nuclear safety
' application.
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- 19. Later that afternoon Fuller called me into his
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office. He called me "a liar"~and said that he had found
, documentation'for PO 21022 in the warehcuse. He accused me of not doing my job properly. I asked him to wait for the issuance of the Deficiency and Disposition Report (DDR) by the OA Surveillance Group which would confirm my report of 4
material traceability problems and, in particular, the apparent falsification of documentation involved in the repeated use of void PO 21022 to supply traceability for hanger materials of unknown origin. I returned to my work.
- 20. DDR 1775 was issued by Buck Williams on~ July 26, ,
a 1983, documenting the OA Surveillance findings, as well as my report to Fuller and Willett regarding the void PO. That DDR states that "PO # 21022 was voided and no documentation exists that material was received." It also sta,tes: "A l further investigation of PO # 21022 revealed that material from this PO was used on pipe hanger 1-CC-H-1242, 1-RH-H-183, and numerous other pipe hangers not listed here, although PO
- 21022.was voided . . . DDRs 1776, 1784, 1795 and Nonconformance Report-(NCR) OA-255-also document problems we found in the hanger verification.
- 21. 'In response to my report to Fuller and Willett of QA failures, Willett issued a Memo July 29, 1983, "
Subject:
Shearon Harris Nuclear _ Power Plant - Compliance with Project
-OA Programs and Procedures", which emphasized that compliance with OA procedures is " mandatory" and provided examples of
" DO ' s a nd Do n ' t ' s " .
+
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- 22. On August 1, 1983, Assistant Project General Manager P.F. Foscolo responded to our Phase II hanger surveillance and the NRC concerns by providing for significant changes in the hanger program. A stop work order had been issued on July 29, 1983, halting all work and inspection on seismic hangers. Phases I and II were eliminated; work and OA I procedures were substantially changed, including particularly WP-110, and TP-34, which provided for hanger installation and inspection. In particular, CP&L noted that hanger documentation should be checked to insure "that the surplus hangers number / purchase order' number is legitimate". At that time only about 300 of the 18,000 seismic pipe hangers had successfully passed inspection. I remain concerned about the use of . false documentation on such safety grade materials.
Has any effort been made to investigate the'cause or extent of this problem at the Harris Plant?
- 23. On August 22, 1983, Alex Fuller presented me with a f stemo ' signed by himself and Ed Willett re flecting their decision to place me on probation due to what was described as a decline in my performance "over the past year and one half". Of course, Fuller himself had promoted me to Engineer less than a year earlier! I believe that this action was in retaliation for my expression of safety concerns. I refused to acknowledge Fuller's false charges, and, instead I wrote:
"I do not agree with this statement", on the memo.
Ironically one of the actions required of me over the next 6
, months was: ". ... problems that are detected must be i
reported accurately and timely.". CP&L management 13
demonstr'ated time and time again that they wanted us to look the other way when we encountered deficiencies. " Problems" were the last thing they wanted reported.
- 24. In the Fall of 1983 I met with CP&L Executive Vice I President E.E. Utley in Raleigh. I carried with me all my i
documentation of safety concerns and deficiencies, including I those described here. I explained these concerns to Mr.
Utley and the responses to them by my supervision. He showed little interest in anything I said or any document I showed him. He did not ask questions regarding my concerns or my treatment. He said I was a " good man" and that I should go back to work. He promised to help. He did not. I performed all work assigned to me over the next 6 months, and have retained documentation of my satisfactory performance under increasing pressure and intimidation by my supervisor, Alex Fuller. All my requests for transfer were refused. At the end of 6 months, I was called before Messers-Foscolo,'Rager, Ferguson and Fuller who told me that if I did not resign I would be terminated. They urged me to make it easier on
.myself by resigning; and said I would have a hard time getting another nuclear industry job if I did not resign. I
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told them I had'done nothing wrong and would not. resign, t
That. afternoon,-February 29, 1984, Fuller. escorted me like a prisoner out the gate-without even a chance to exchange farewells with my colleagues arid friends.
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.25. I have very serious concerns regarding the breakdown of Quality Assurance at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. There is a great deal of pressure on the Construction Inspection (CI) organization which lacks the freedom and independence from cost and scheduling considerations to ef fectively perform their OA duties of identifying ard documenting deficiencies. As an Engineer-I was always aware of the conflict between production and quality. Both CI and Construction Engineering reported to the Senior Resident j Engineer.
- 26. CP&L and its prime contractor Daniel employ a confusing and ineffective array of different documenting systems for controlling nonconformances such as DR's, DDR's, NCR's FCR/PW's and such commonly used uncontrolled paperwork as Memos and " Speed Letters". Few of us were trained in which procedures were to be used when. Mostly we wrote things.down informally. I doubt that the QA vault contains \/
even a fraction of the deficiencies in safety systems which have been identified. In order to ensure that I communicated effectively in my work particularly since English is my second language - I made it a practice to retain full documentation of work in my areas. I have " Speed Letters" reflecting numerous deficiencies which I am sure have been discarded by CP&L.- I also have retained copies of many quality' documents which I believe have not been properly controlled by CP&L.
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I hope that someone will seriously investigate my safety concerns. I know that many other present and forme- Harris employees, including craft and other engineers, share my concerns. However, they are not eager to share.my experience in order to voice those concerns,.since they have overy reason to fear the same kind of retaliation that I have experienced. I hope that this statement of mine will make it easier for the others to speak more freely. i i
I am willing to assist in identifying and correcting quality assurance and workmanship problems in any manner necessary to ensure that the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant does not harm the public.
J' CHAN VAN VO Sworn to and subscribed before me this the [ day of ()cI ________, 1984.
NpfhRY PUBLIC My Commission expires: f// gd 16 E m.__ _ . - - - _. -
, ; , ,, g ,._. ._ . _ . _ . _ __
g-.
l (9 p.
.6 .
l AFFIDAVIT l
My name is Chan Van Ve. I as also known as Van Vo Davis. I am giving this statement to Robert Guild, Attorney-at-Law, of Charleston, south Carolina, who has identified himself to me as a representative of the Government Accountability Project. I was employed for almost five years by Carolina Power & Light Company in the construction of the shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant near Raleigh, North ,
. Carolina, most recently in the position of Engineer where I was responsible for ensuring that P.he installation of pipe and pipe-hangers was in accordance with , approved plans, specifications, codes, procedures and schedules. Although I am not opposed to nuclear power, my experience with CP&L causes me to have serious doubts about CP&L's commitment to nuclear safety and about the as-built quality of construction
- at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. On many occasions I have brought safety concerns and construction deficiencies, to the attention of my supervisors only to face lack of interest and hostilityr and in one case only to find my documentation of a serious safety concern discarded in my
, supervisor's trash can the next day. I have taken these concerns up my chain of command to senior management at CP&L on several occasions only to be told that 'this is not vietnam, here at CP&L you are only a soldier who must follow orders.' This lack of interest in my safety concerns was followed by a pattern of harassment, intimidation, pressure to resign, and ultimately my terminatibn. I have filed a i
e
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complaint against CP&L with the U.S. Department of Labor for violation of the puployee Protection Provisions of The Energy Reorganization Act because of the Company's discrimination ,
against me for raising safety concerns. I was only trying to do my job to the best of my ability according to my pro- i fossional engineering training. I believed that the Quality !
t j
Assurance regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 8, and the Company's written policies and procedures meant what they said. However', I i have learned that CP&L has very little interest in seeing {
that the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant is built'"by the .
s book." Workers at the site are expected'to "look the other .
I way" when they see safety violations or risk losing their ]
jobs. I hope that my concerns will be fully investigated 'and that effective action will be taken to ensure that the public l I health and safety is protected ,before the Harris plant is j allowed to operate.
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- 2. I was born in south Vietnam and became a U.S. j citizen af ter I came to this country in 1975. I hold a degree in Math, Science and Physics from the French College and a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering with a specialty in Fluid Mechanics from Phutho Higher Technical University, Saigon, South Vietnam. In order to supplement my education for engineering certification in this
- i country, I have taken courses in civil and mechanical engineering from Fayetteville Technical Institute and International Correspondence schools. I am currently an MBA candidate at Campbell University, Buies creek, North
l .
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Carolina, where I as concentrating in Production Management.
I expect to receive my degree in Mcy 1985. I am an Associate member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
3.
I was first employed by CP&L at the Harris site on April 10, 1979, as an Engineering Aide I, in the Mechanical Department under E.M. "Ed" McLean, where I was responsible i
for preparing requisitions for site material procurement and 9 for performing inspections of mechanical installations, in all parts of the plant. On October 10, 1979, I was promoted to f
Engineering Technician II where I was assigned responsibil-ities for piping and pipe-hangers. Afte,r I finished the ICS program for equivalence with a 4 year degree in mechanical '
engineering and based on my " outstanding" performance, I was promoted to Associate Engineer, ef fective october 4,1980'. [
In this position I performed material take-offs, prepared j
purchase specifications and material purchase orders for 1 piping; and was in charge of field support for radwaste piping in the Waste Processing Building. In April, 1982, I was transferred to work for the Lead Hanger Engineer, A.G.
"Alex" Fuller, where I was responsible for providing technical support to the hanger crafts including the !
preparation and interpretation of design documents and work I procedures, investigation of field problems, preparation of field changes such as Field Change Requests / Permanent Waivers (FCR/PW), and the resolution of nonconformances.
=
o n i
Alex Fuller and his immediate superior, Resident
- 4. ,
Mechanical Engineer E.E. "Ed" Willett, particularly demonstrated a lack of commitment to nuclear safety and a ge --al lack of knowledge and competence to perform their ir angineering and management responsibilities. The Re s sw. . . :ngineering Unit carries responsibility for all site j i
engineering functions at the Harris Plant, under the direc- l tion of a CP&L employee, the Senior Resident Engineer, a i position held by A. Lucas until his removal for poor performance in early 1983. Under Lucas were the various engineering disciplines and the Construction Inspection (CI) organizations. Ed Willett took over tho' Mechanical Engineering group in 1980. He originally supervised '
activities in the piping, hangers, equipment and heating-ventilation-air cor.ditioning*(HVAC) areas; until equipment installation and HVAC were taken away from him in early 1983, and hanger work was taken away in October,1983, because of
- mounting problems and growing- recognition of willett's lack j f'
of ability to effectively manage his work. Willett brought .
f t
in his friend, Alex, Fuller, to supervise the hanger program
, in late 1981, despite Fuller's lack of qualifications for g 1
this work. Fuller's training was in civil engineering and (
1 his only previous work experience was in dam construction (
with CP&L. As problems mounted in the hanger area, Al Rager was brought in over Alex Fuller. This did not help at all since Rager lacked any engineering experience. Rager has 4
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since been placed in charge of the Construction Inspection program. This recent move will do nothing to improve the Quality Assurance program at the Harris Plant.
- 5. In mid-August 1982 I was performing my normal duties checking the installation of pipe-hangers in the Turbine Building. While doing so I observed several pipefitters attempting to fit a 24" carbon steel piping line to the discharge nozzle of Steam Generator Feed Water Pump 1A-NNS. ;
a This piping system is of large diameter pipe through which feedwater is pumped back from the turbine condensor to the steam generator which is located inside the Reactor B'uilding containment. The system, including the piping and associated .
valves and pumps, is classified as secondary System, Safety j Category 4, seismic Category 1. The integrity of reactor I
4 temperature and pressure control is dependent upon the Gnebes s F Asc. maars g E p ,51f. .:.g e. ... u ... c u.__.._,..
deless g and, pfsaJj
..z.__ .... ,1,t... .. .s dHM g are, therefore, nuclear safety significant. The 24" carbon steel pipe in question extended on a horizontal run in the i direction of the length of the Turbine Ruilding until it reached a position above the discharge nozzle of the pump in !.
i question where it dropped vertically toward the pump. Since L the pipe-to-pump flange connection was the last remaining fit- l up to be made in the pipe run, I was particularly concerned ,
that proper alignment of the pipe to the flange "was main- i tained in order to assure that no improper stresses were imparted to the pump.
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- 6. ,
To assure proper fit-up, I $dentified the fitters' Foreman and requested that he ask. his General Foreman, Danny McGhee, to request Millwright assistance in fitting this connection. Millwrights are responsible for the installation of mechanical equipment such as this SGFW pump. The Foreman did as I requested, but reported back that McGhee had said go l ahead without the Millwrights. I returned to my of fice where f 4
I I called Piping Engineer D.M. Dasburg to whom I related the pecolem.
7 Several days later I encountered the same crew of ,
pipefitters in the Turbine Building in the process of actually fitting up this pipe to the pump nozzle. The l
fitters had rigged a horizontal "come-along" from the pipe to f I
a nearby beam and were " cold pulling" the pipe using extreme l t
force which I would estimate at several thousand pcunds in order to force fit the connectic". When I o Mounte:w: them they had almost completed the e~ri- weld. N: M111 wright was present, nor did I observe any c a_ contr:' 0:nstructi n Inspector, or superviscry authority resent - si: ness the
" cold pull" fit-up of th . s pipe .
- 8. About cm wee k later I obs ved Mi:' right. c Mr. 5:ricklanc ;emy No. 5 .nd 'r. Be :cmpeny 50-105, perfernir; an alignme- test on :2 :M c t Feedw tr Pump. 3 of the- said to e "Mr. Chan :nef really scre-up ,p!" ne s.illwr b , were ating the pump su d t al; ant sing an i n s tru.a.e n t : ed a * ' al Indicator
- which measures ir thousands cf an ine Procedure calls f or a-alignment tc erance of +' .csa. The Millwrighli t -g ud to
{
a ,
, t t . .
me the results of alignment measurenants over a three-day period unc!ar hot and cold temperature conditions. Their notes reflected a severe misalignment measurement of as much
- as + .10 8 " , . 07 8 " under hot conditions; and + .108",
L .075" uncer cold conditions! .
- 9. On August 25, 1982, I explained this problem to my Supervisor, Alex ruller. I asked him how I should document l and report this safety deficiency; and whether I should i inform Resident Mechanical Engineer Ed Willett. Fuller told me to document the problem on a " Speed Letter" which he said l he would route to Willett. " Speed Letters" are com.konly used ,
at the Harris site for not only routine internal communica-tion, but also in place of prescribed Quality Assurance documentation. Use of " Speed Letters" is not prescribed in any procedures for the documentation of construction deficiencies, nor are " Speed Letters" controlled documents which are normally part of the Nuclear Plant's permanent quality records. I documented the cold pulling misalignment of :re Steam Generator Feedwater Pump as I was instructed in such a " Speed Letter" to Alex Fuller, "
Subject:
Loads .
Imposed on the Steam Generator Feed Pump 1A-NNS," which detailed my observations and attached a diagram showing the Dial Indicator alignment readings and the Millwrights' names and Company numrers. I closed r.y message: "Please investigate." The very next day I happened to find my " Speed 1 Letter" with attached diagram discarded in Fuller's trash can! -
l l
7 ;
1... .
- 10. ,
Tho following day I spoko with R.T. "Roy" Sottlo, o Daniel Construction employee who serves as Equipment Installation supervisor. I told him of the problem and showed him my discarded " Speed Letter". Roy said that he had told Ed Willett o'f the problem three times. He quoted Willett as cursing him and adding: "I don't want to hear any more about that problem. If something happens I will fire you first!"
- 11. Several months later on October 14, 1982, I observed Millwrights re-checking the alignment of the subject pump.
They gave me a note reflecting the results of their Cial Indicator readings: + .098", .075". I showed this note to Alex Fuller. He said nothing. The following day I showed it to Ed Willett. He said tell Daren Daaburg the Piping Engineer. I already had. I gave a copy of the note to Dasburg.
- 12. Since I first raised my concern regarding the cold pulling of this pipe and its ef fect on the feedwater pump, I l i
became aware of increasing pressure from Fuller and Willett.
I sought a transfer out f rom under Fuller and Willett thinking that a change in supervision would ease this retaliation. Willett refused to approve my transfer request.
I pursued my concern regarding the mishandling of the pump I deficiency and my request for transfer to avoid the mis tre a tment. Both Senior Resident Engineer A. Lucas and Harris Project Manager Parsons showed no interest and of fered I no help. They sent me back to Willett.
u l
l e :
l
- 13. In November or December 1982 I went to see CP6L Vice President, M. A. McDu f fie . I told him that I was just trying i
to serve my Company. I explained to him all about my report J of the pump deficiency. I showed him my " speed Letter" and I
diagram and the Millwrights' notes; I told him of Roy I Settle's comments. He showed no reaction and asked no questions. I told him of the retaliation and pressure from Fuller and Willett. He told me that I was a good man, that '
,the Company needed me. He said he would help and that I should go back and request a transfer. I did as he told e.e; I I
but my transfer was refused. Mr. McDuf fie did not help me, nor did he investigate my safety concerns.
- 14. In March, Alex Fuller increased the level of pressure on me and threatened me with termination of my job. ,
He subjected me to " formal counseling" regarding my job performance, including a requirement that I impove my
" understanding and explanation of prcblems." After I requested Project Manager Parsons' help in allowing me to rebut Fuller's allegations, Fuller and Willett backed down and dropped their c.harges.
- 15. In April, 1983, I went to see Vice President L,
McDuffie again for help. This time he sent me back without any action or help. Mr. McDuf fie said, "This is the U.S.
This is CP&L, not Vietnam. Here Ed Willett is your Lieutenant and you are only a soldier. You must obey 1
ceders." During the Spring the pressure from Fuller continued to increase. I was assigned more and more works hangers in the diesel generator building, the turbine i-
___ _, J.- ~
building', the reactor building, the auxiliary building and the waste processing buliding. Much more work than my fair share.
- 16. In June, 1983, the NRC began to identify serious problems in the hanger installation program at Harris. In a June 10, 1983, exit meeting with site management, NRC Senior Mechanical / Welding Engineer J.W. York noted problems in the hanger inspection area with particular regard to missed 1 deficiencies and material control problems. Several weeks later Alex Fuller assigned me to work with the QA -
Surveillance Group under the direction of QA Engineer " Buck"
{
Williams. Our task was to begin an evaluation of the i i
adequacy of the existing pipe hanger installation program. l ruller instructed me to select, at random, about 50 hanger l
packages for review, with particular emphasis on material substitutions, use of surplus materials, and identification of Construction Material Requisitions (CMR's) that did not match the hanger materials actually installed. These areas represented significant problems which the NRC had observed and which indicated the potential need for costly and time i
consuming reinspection and rework.
- 17. At Buck Williams' request I pulled 50 hanger packages for seismic hangers on safety-related systems which 2
were supposed to be Phase II completer installed, inspected,
, and found acceptable for turn over to operations with only the final Phase III stress analysis yet to be performed. Of these, the CA Surveillance Group inspected 12 at random. In l
GN
the course of this review numerous serious deficiencies were noted which had not been identified, documented or corrected although these hangers had all received final approval by CI and CP&L QA/QC.
- 18. By " Speed Letter" of July 18, 198,3, I transmitted to Alex Fuller and Ed Willett my completed " Hanger Phase II Verification Checklists" for these sample hanger packages.
1 Fuller was very angry that such a large number of Il deficiencies had been identified, and he blamed me for d documenting all of these problems. In particular he focused i on the problem of material traceability which we had identified on many of these hangers. For example on pipe f j hanger A-2-236-1-CC-H-105, a " Speed Letter" of 4/25/80 indicates that a 1" x 10" x 10" plate was obtained from Purchase Order 21022 and installed as per drawing. PO 21022 i '
was cited as the source for material in nany of the hangers i; we examined. T had re eman m.*r a on
" a d--
uito rv wicn vA I explained inspector to Fuller Jay vincentthat.d an another the y 1
Surveillance team. We could find no documentation of this PO in the QA records vault. In the Purchasing Department, 4 1
Robert Babb informed us that the Purchasing Log showed that Po 21022 had been voided and that no materials had ever been
- received through that order! We could not determine where these hanger materials had come from or document that such materials were of acceptable quality for nuclear safety application, f
9
. . _ . _ - . _ _ _ .- _ - _ _ _ _ $ _ -83. --- - - - - - - -
, o
- 19. Later that af ternoon Fuller called me into his office. He called me "a liar" and said that he had found documentation for PO 21022 in the warehouse. He accused me of not doing my job properly. I asked him to wait for the !
issuance of the Deficiency and Disposition Report (DDR) by the OA surveillance Group which would confirm my report of material traceability problems and, in particular, the apparent falsification of documentation involved in the repeated use of void PO 21022 to supply tracer.bility for hanger materials of unknown origin. I returned to my work.
, 20. DDR 1775 was issued by Buck Williams on July 26, 1983, documenting the QA Surveillance findings, as well as my report to Fuller and Willett regarding the void PO. That DDR states that "PO 4 21022 was voided and no documentation exists that material was received." It also states: "A further investigation of PO 4 31022 revealed that material !
from this PO was used on pipe hanger 1-CC-H-1242, 1-RM-H-183, t
j and numerous other pipe hangers not listed here, although PO ,
- 21022 was voided . . .
DDRs 1776, 1784, 1795 and Nonconformance Report (NCR) QA-255 also document problems we found in the hanger verification.
- 21. In response to my report to ruller and willett of QA failures, Willett issued a Memo July 29, 1983, " Subject Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant - Compliance. with Project QA Programs and Procedures", which emphasized that compliance with QA procedures is " mandatory" and provided examples of i " DO ' s a nd Don ' t 's " .
12
. - _ _ - _ - - _ - - - - - _ - - - - . . . - - - , - - - - - - . - - - - - +.---------l
.e
- 22. ,
on August 1, 1983, Assistant Project General Manager P.F. Foscolo responded to our Phase II hanger surveillance and the NRC concerns by providing for significant changes in )
l the hanger program. A stop work order had been issued on July 29, 1983, halting all work and inspection on seismic J
, hangers. Phases I and II were eliminated; work and QA :
1 r procedures were substantially changed, incl ~uding particularly I WP-110, and TP-34, which provided for hanger installation and inspection. In particular, CP&L noted that hanger i documentation should be checked to insure "that the surplus 1 hangers number / purchase order number is legitimate". At that I l
> time only about 300 of the 18,000 seismic pipe hangers had d ti successfully passed inspection. I remain concerned about the
?
i use of false documentation on such safety grade materials. i 1
I' Has any effort been made to investigate the cause or extent of this problem at the Harris Plant?
- 23. On August 22, 1983, Alex ruller presented me with a i j Memo signed by himself and Ed Willett reflecting their decision to place me on probation due to what was described ,
l as a decline in my performance "over the past year and one half". Of course, Fuller himself had promoted me to Engineer i
less than a year earliert I believe that this action was in i
, retaliation for my expression of safety concerns. I refused to acknowledge Fuller's false charges, and, ins,tead I wrote:
"I do not agree with this statement", on the memo.
. Ironically one of the actions required of me over the next 6 months was: ". . . problems that are detected must be reported accurately and timely.". CPsL management i- !
1 GD <
l demonstrated time and time again that they wanted us to look the other way when we encountered deficiencies. " Problems" were the last thing they wanted reported.
- 24. In the Fall of 1983 I met with CP&L Executive Vice President E.E. Utley in Raleigh. I carried with me all my o i
documentation of safety concerns and deficiencies, including
{
those described here. I explained these concerns to Mr. :
Utley and the responses to them by my supervision. He abowed little interest in anything I said or any document I showed him. He did not ask questions regarding my concerns.or my treatment.
He said I was a " good man" a.nd that I should go back to work. He promised to help. He did not. I performod 2((:m. i all work assigned to me over the next 6 months, and have ,I]!
3 .
, i retained documentation of my. satisfactory performance under increasing pressure and intimidation by my supervisor, Alex Fuller. All my requests for transfer were refused.
At the end of 6 months, I was called before Messers Foscolo, Rager, Ferguson and Fuller who told me that if I did not resign I ,
would be terminated. They urged me to make it easier on I 1
myself by resigning; and said I would have a hard time l getting another nuclear industry job 18 I did not resign. I e i
told them I had done nothing wrong and'would not resign. l That afternoon, February 29, 1984; Fuller escorted me like a '
prisoner out the gate without even a chance to exchange t farewells with my colleagues and friends.
o
. _ _ . , . . , . , . , - -a r - = ' * " ' ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~# "
O g
. e
- 25. , I have very serious concerns regarding the breakdown of Quality Assurance at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. There is a great deal of pressure on the Construction '
Inspection (CI) organization which lacks the freedom and ;
independence from cost and scheduling considerations to [
effectively perform their Ch duties of identifying and l
documenting deficiencies. As an Engineer I was always aware l i
of the conflict between preauction and quality. Both CI and ;
i construction Engineering reported to the Senior Resident j i
Engineer. l
- 26. CP&L and its prime contractor Daniel employ'a -
confusing and inef fective array of dif ferent documenting j i
systems for controlling nonconformances such as DR's, DDR's, ;
NCR's FCR/PW's and such commonly used uncontrolled paperwork f as Memos and " Speed Letters". Few of us were trained in l which procedures were to be used when. Mostly we wrote things down informally. I doubt that the QA vault contains
, even a fraction of the deficiencies in safety systems which have been identified. In order to ensure that I communicated ef fectively in my work - particularly since English is my second language - I made it a practice to retain full documentation of work in my areas. I have " Speed Letters" reflecting numerous deficiencies which I am saro have been ;
discarded by CP&L. I also have retained copies of many ;
quality documents which I believe have not been properly !
con. trolled by CP&L.
G
I hopo that someone will seriously investigate my safety concerns. I know that many other present and former Harris employees, including craft and other engineers, share my concerns.
However, they are not eager to share my experience in order to voice those concerns,-
since they have every 1
1 reason to fear the same kind of retaliation that I have expe rienced.
I hope that this statement of mine will make it easier for the others to speak more freely.
I am willing to assist in identifying and correcting quality assurance and workmanship problems in any manner necessary to ensure that the Shearon Harris Nuclear ' Power plant does not harm the public. '
1 CHAN VAT VO '
i r
Sworn to and subscribed before me !
i this the I day of de,Y , 1984.
i NO h PVBLIC My Commission expires: f (d _
i I
l 1
16
r s,
AFFIDAVIT My name is Chan Van Vo. I am also known as Van Vo Davis. I am giving this statement to Robert Guild, Attorney-at-Law, of Charleston, South Carolina, who has identified a
himself to me as a representative of the Government Accountability Project. I was employed for almost five years by Carolina Power & Light Company in the construction of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant near Raleigh, North Carolina, most recently in the position of Engineer where I was responsible for ensuring that the installation of pipe and pipe-hangers was in accordance with approved plans, specifications, codes, procedures and schedules. Although I am not opposed to nuclear power, my experience with CP&L causes me to have serious doubts about CP&L's commitment to ,
nuclear safety and about the as-built quality of construction at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. On many occasions
[ I have brought safety concerns and construction deficiencies !
y; J to the attention of my supervisors only to face lack of l
interest and hostility; and in one case only to find my documentation of a serious safety concern discarded in my !
y ,
supervisor's trash can the next day. I have taken these concerns up my chain of command to senior management at CP&L 1
on several occasions only to be told that 'this is not
{
Vietnam, here at CP&L you are only a soldier who must follow orders.' This lack of interest in my safety concerns was I followed by a pattern of harassment, intimidation, pressure
} to resign, and ultimately my termination. I have filed a i
l A
EXHtBiT g e _ J___of (/) /8 P ESS
.g, ,.. 1 complaint against CP&L with the U.S. Department of Labor for violation of the Employee Protection Provisions of The Energy Reorganization Act because of the Company's discrimination against me for raising safety concerns. I was only trying tc do my job to the best of my ability according to my pro-fessional engineering training. I believed that the Ouality Assurance regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and the Company's written policies and procedures meant what they said. Howe ver', I have learned that CPEL has very little interest in seeiny that the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant is built "by the book." Workers at the site are expected' to "look the other way" when they see safety violations or riTk losing their jobs. I hope that my concerns will be fully investigated and that effective action will be taken to ensure that the public health and safety is protected before the Harris plant is allowed to operate.
- 2. I was born in South Vietnam and became a U.S.
citizen after I came to this country in 1975. I hold a degree in Math, Science and Physics from the French College and a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering with a specialty in Fluid Mechanics from Phutho Higher Technical University, Saigon, South Vietnam. In order to supplement my education for engineering certification in this country, I have taken courses in civil and mechanical l
engineering from Fayetteville Technical Institute and International Correspondence Schools. I am currently an MBA candidate at Campbell Univer'sity, Buies Creek, North EXHIBri (/) -
i Page A d E l
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( Carolina, where I am concentrating in Production Management. )
1 I expect to receive my degree in May 1985. I am an Associate member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. .
- 3. I was first employed by CP&L at the Harris site on i i
April 10, 1979, as an Engineering Aide I, in the Mechanical -i ,
Department under E.M. - "Ed" McLean, where I was responsible
- for preparing requisitions for site material procurement and for perform'ing inspections of mechanical installations in all l
parts of the plant. On October 10, 1979, I was promoted to !
Engineering Technician II where I was assigned responsibil-ities for piping and pipe-hangers. Afte,r I finished the ICS {
program for equivalence with a 4 year degree in mechanical f
engineering and based on my " outstanding" performance, I was !
promoted to Associate Engineer, effective October 4, 1980. 5 In this position I performed material take-offs, prepared f r
purchase specifications and material purchase orders for piping; and was in charge of field support for radwaste piping in the Waste Processing Building. In April, 1982, I was transferred to work for the Lead Hanger Engineer, A.G. [
"Alex" Fuller, where I was responsible for providing '
technical support to the hanger crafts inc.1.uding the ;
preparation and interpretation of design documents and work I procedures, investigation of field problems, preparation of l field changes such as Field Change Requests / Permanent Waivers !
(FCR/PW), and the resolution of nonconformances. I l
- 1 1
l i
EXHtB!I W '
3 page U $ W
i
. 4. Alex Fuller and his immediate superior, Resident
\m Mechanical Engineer E.E. "Ed' Willett, particularly demonstrated a lack of commitment to nuclear safety and a general lack of knowledge and competence to perform their important engineering and management responsibilities. The Resident Engineering Unit carries responsibility for all site engineering functions at the llarris Plant, under the direc-tion of a CP&L employee, the Senior Resident Engineer, a position held by A. Lucas until h'is removal for poor
- performance in early 1983. Under Lucas were the various engineering disciplines and the Construction Inspection (CI) organizations. Ed Willett took over the' Mechanical Engineering group in 1980. He originally supervised activities in the piping, hangers, equipment and heating-ventilation-air conditioning (HVAC) areas; until equipment installation and HVAC were taken away from him in early 1983, and hanger work was taken away in October,1983, because of mounting problems and growing recognition of Willett's lack of ability to effectively manage his work. Willett brought in his friend, Alex Fuller, to supervise the hanger program in lat+, 1981, despite Fuller's lack of qualifications for this work. Fuller's training was in civil engineerir.g and his only previous work experience was in dam constructicn with CP&L. As problems mounted in the hanger area, Al Rager was brought in over Alex Fuller. This did not help at all since Rager lacked any engineering experience. Rager has I
EXH!BI "/ 6 p,ges Page -
4
.~. . --
since been placed in charge of the Construction Inspection
\
program. This recent move will do nothing to improve the Ouality Assurance program at the Harris Plant. !
- 5. In mid-August 1982 I was performing my normal duties checking the installation of pipe-hangers in the Turbine !
Building. While doing so I observed several pipefitters attempting to fit a 24" carboh steel piping line to the discharge nozzle of Steam Generator Feed Water Pump 1A-NNS.
This piping system is of large diame'tsr pipe through shich .
feedwater is pumped back from the turbine condensor to the !
steam generator which is located inside the Reactor Building containment. The system, including the ' piping and associated valves and pumps, is classified as Secondary System, safety C'tegory a 4, Seismic Category 1. The integrity of reactor temperature and pressure control is dependent upon the effective function of these pumps, valves and piping, which f are, therefore, nuclear safety significant. The 24 " carbor.
steel pipe in question extended on a horizontal run in the ,
direction of the length of the Turbine Building until it a reached a position above the discharge nozzle of the pump in t
question where it dropped vertically toward the pump. Since the pipe-to pump flange connection was the last remaining fit-up to be made in the pipe run, I was particularly concerned I that proper alignment of the pipe to the flange was mr.in- ,
tained in order to assure that no improper stresses were imparted to the pump.
e
- /-1 5
T**~~~~d3lT 7
(/) />b Prima
~
. . . . .. i
. i l
1
- 6. ,
To assure proper fit-up, I identified the fitters' t .
Foreman and requested that he ask his General Foreman, Danny McGhee, to request Mi11 wright assistance in fitting this connection. Mi11 wrights are responsible for the installation of mechanical equipment such as this SGFW pump. The Foreman did as I requested, but reported back that McGhee had said go ahead without the Mi11 wrights. I returned to my office where I called Piping Engineer D.M. Dasburg to whom I related the problem.
- 7. Several days la ter I encountered the same crew of pipefitters in the Turbine Building in the process of actually fitting up this pipe to the pum'p nozzle. The fitters had rigged a horizontal "come-along" from the pipe to a nearby beam and were " cold pulling" the pipe using extreme force which I would estimate at several thousand pounds in order to force fit the connection. When I encountered them they had almost completed the entire weld. No Mi11 wright was present, nor did I observe any Quality Control, Construction
- Inspector, or supervisory authority present to witness the
, " cold pull" fit-up of this pipe.
- 8. About one week later I observed two M111 wrights, a Mr. Strickland, Company No. 50-185 and Mr. Bass, Company No.
50-105, performing an alignment test on the subject Feedwater Pump. One of them said to me, "Mr. Chan they really screwed up this pump!" The Mi11 wrights were measuring the pump shaf t alignment using an instrument called a " Dial Indicator" which measures in thousands of an inch. Procedure calls for an
~
alignment tolerance of +/ .005. The Mi11 wrights reported to EXHIBIT,(/)
6 Page 8 3 i
me the results of alignment measurements over a three-day period under hot and cold temperature conditions. Their notes reflected a severe misalignment measurement of as much as + .108", .078 " under hot conditions; and + .108",
.075" under cold conditions! -
- 9. On August 25, 1982, I explained this problem to my Supervisor, Alex Fuller. I asked him how I should document and report this safety deficiency; and whether I should inform Resident Mechanical Engineer Ed Willett. Fuller told me to document the problem on a " Speed Letter" which he said he would route to Willett. " Speed Letters" are commonly used at the Harris site for not only routine internal ccmmunica-tion, but also in place of prescribed Quality Assurance documentation. Use of " Speed Letters" is not prescribed in any procedures for the documentation of construction .
deficiencies, nor are " Speed Letters" controlled documents which are normally part of the Nuclear Plant's permanent quality records. I documented the cold pulling misalignment of the Steam Generator Feedwater Pump as I was instructed in such a " Speed Letter" to Alex Fuller, "
Subject:
Loads Imposed on the S team Genera tor . Feed Pump 1A-NNS," which detailed my observations and attached a diagram showing the Dial Indicator alignnent readings and the Millwrights' names and Company numbers. I closed my message: "Please inves tiga te . " The very next day I happened to find my " Speed ,
Letter" with attached diagram discarded in Fuller's trash can!
EXHIBIT (/)
7 Page A d
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- 10.
- The following day I spoke with R.T. "Roy" Settle, a Daniel Construction employee who serves as Equipment !
t Installation Supervisor. I told him of the problem and showed him my discarded " Speed Letter". Roy said that he had .
told Ed Willett of the problem three times. He quoted
.i Willett as cursing him and adding: "I don't want to hear any '
more about that problem. If something happens I will fire t
you first!"
e
- 11. Several months later'on October 14, 1982, I observed l
t Millwrights re-checking the alignment of the subject pump. '
They gave me a note reflecting the results of their Dial i t
Indicator readings: + .098", .075". I showed this note to I,
Alex Fuller. He said nothing. The following day I showed it '
to Ed Willett. He said tell Daren Dsaburg the Piping Engineer. I already had. I gave a copy of the note to Dasburg. ,
- 12. Since I first raised my concern regarding the cold :
t pulling of this pipe and its effect on the feedwater pump, I i becane aware of increasing pressure from Fuller and Willett.
I sought a transfer out from under Fuller and Willett thinking that a change in supervision would ease this retaliation. Willett refused to approve my transfer request. ,
I pursued my concern regarding the mishandling of the pump I deficiency and my request for transfer to avoid the [
mistreatment. Both Senior Resident Engineer A. Lucas and i
Harris Project Manager Parsons showed no interest and offered ne help. They sent me back to Willett.
o [ PaSE
13.
In November or December 1982 I went to see CP&L Vice
'( President, M.A. McDuffie.
I told him that I was just trying i
to serve my Company. I explained to him all about my report of the pump deficiency. I showed him my " Speed Letter" and diagram and the Millwrights' notes I told him of Roy Settle's comments. He showed no reaction and asked no questions.
I told him of the retaliation and pressure from Fuller and Willett. He told me that I was a good man, that the Company needed.me. He said he would help and that I should go back and-request a transfer. I did as he told me; but my transfer was refused. Mr. McDuffie did not help me, nor did be investigate my safety concerns.
- 14. In March, Alex Fuller increased the level of .
pressure on me and threatened me with termination of my job.
He subjected me to " formal counseling" regarding my job c -
performance, including a requirement that I imp,ove my
" understanding and explanation of problems." After I requested Project Manager Parsons' help in allowing me to l
rebut Fuller's allegations, Fuller and Willett backed down and dropped their charges.
15.
In April, 1983, I went to see Vice President McDuffie again for help.
This time he sent me back without any action or help. Mr. McDuffie said, "This is the U.S.
This is CP&L, not Vietnam. Here Ed Willett is your Lieutenant and you are only a soldier. You must obey orders."
During the Spring the pressure from Fuller centinued to increase. I was assigned more and more work:
hangers in the diesel generator building, the turbine
_ D8MI M-- *g Pasti 9 page
.- I I
building, the reactor building, the auxiliary building and the waste processing bulidinO. Much more work than my fair share.
I
- 16. In June, 1983, the NRC began to identify serious problems in the hanger installation program at Harris. In a .
June 10, 1983, exit meeting with site management, NRC Senior 1 l
l Mechanical / Welding Engineer J.W. York noted problems in the hanger inspection area with particular regard to missed deficiencies and material control problems. Several weeks later Alex Fuller assigned me to work with the OA Surveillance Group under the direction of OA Engineer " Buck" Williams. Our task was to begin an evaluation of the adequacy of the existing pipe hanger installation program.
Fuller instructed me to select, at random, about 50 hanger packages for review, with particular emphasis on material substitutions, use of surplus materials, and identification of Construction Material Requisitions (CMR's) that did not match the hanger materials actually installed. These areas represented significant problems which the NRC had observed and which indicated the potential need for costly and time consuming reinspection and rework.
17 At Buck Williams' request I pulled 50 hanger packages for seismic hangers on safety-related systens which t
were supposed to be Phase II complete: installed, inspected, and found acceptable for turn over to operations with only j the final Phase III stress analysis yet to be performed. Of these, the OA surveillance Group inspected 12 at random. In EXHIBIT (D 10 Page S OI
_________m..__.__
the course of this review numerous serious deficiencies were s
noted which had not been identified, documented or corrected although these hangers had all received final approval by CI and CP&L OA/0C.
- 18. By " Speed Letter" of July 18, 198,3, I transmitted to Alex Fuller and Ed Willett my completed " Hanger Phase II Verification Checklists" for these sample hanger packages.
Fuller was very angry that such a large number of deficiencies had been identified, and he blamed me for documenting all of these problems. In particular he focused on the problem of material traceability which we had identified on many of these hangers. For example on pipe hanger A-2-236-1-CC-H-105, a " Speed Letter" of 4/25/80 indicates that a 1" x 10" x 10" plate was obtained from Purchase Order 21022 and installed as per drawing. PO 21022 was cited as the source for material in nany of the h$ngers we examined. I explained to Fuller that I had researched this PO with OA Inspector Jay Vincent and another man on the Surveillance team. We could find no documentation of this PO in the OA records vault. In the Purchasing Depa r tme n t ,
Robert Babb informed us that the Purchasing Log showed that PO 21022 had been voided and that no materials had ever been received through that order! We could not determine where these hanger materials had come from or document that such materials were of acceptable quality for nuclear safety application.
i l
d EXHST U) fj: ,
Page S C 11
l f
- 19. Later that afternoon Fuller called me into his office. He called me "a liar" and said that he had found documentation for PO 21022 in the warehouse. He accused me of not doing my job properly. I asked him to wait for the issuance of the Deficiency and Disposition Report (DDR) by
\ the OA Surveillance Group which would confirm my report of h
9 4g d'I material traceability problems and, in particular, the
\
gA apparent falsification of documentation involved in the b 4 .
repeated use of void PO 21022 to supply traceability for I hanger materials of unknown origin. I returned to my work.
- 20. DDR 1775 was issued by Buck Williams on July 26, 1983, documenting the OA Surveillance findings, as well as my report to Fuller and Willett regarding~the void PO. That DDR states that "PO # 21022 was voided and no documentation exists that material was received." It also states: "A !
further investigation of PO 4 21022 revealed that material from this PO was used on pipe hanger 1-CC-H-1242, 1-RH -H-18 3, and numerous other pipe hangers not listed here, although PO
- 21022 was voided . . . DDRs 1776, 1784, 1795 and Nonconformance Report (NCR) OA-255 also document problems we found in the hanger verification.
- 21. In response to my report to Fuller and Willett of QA failures, Willett issued a Memo July 29, 1983, "
Subject:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant - Compliance with Project OA Programs and Procedures", which emphasized that compliance with OA procedures is " mandatory" and provided examples of "DO's and Don't's".
EXHIBIT (A
- Page /.--- 0I-12 t
t
- 22. On August 1, 1983, Assistant Project General Manager P.F. Foscolo responded to our Phase II hanger surveillance !
and ,
the NRC concerns by providing for significant changes in the hanger program. A stop work order had been issued on July 29, 1983, halting all work and inspection on seismic hangers. Phases I and II were eliminated; work and OA procedures were substantially changed, including particularly WP-110, and TP-34, which provided for hanger installation and
. inspection. In particular, CP&L noted that hanger l
documentation should be checked to insure "that the surplus hangers number / purchase order number is legitimate". At that I i
time only about 300 of the 18,000 seismic pipe hangers had !
successfully passed inspection. I remain concerned about the Use of false documentation on such safety grade materials.
Has any effort been made to investigate the cause or extent of this problem at the Harris Plant? .
- 23. On August 22, 1983, Alex Fuller presented me with a Memo signed by himself and Ed Willett reflecting their c i l
i decision to place me on probation due to what was described i
as a decline in my performance "over the past year and one i half".
Of course, Fuller himself had promoted me to Engineer I less than a year earlier!
I believe that this action was in retaliation for my expression of safety concerns. I refused i to acknowledge Fuller's false charges, and, instead I wrote: i' "I do not agree with this statement", on the meno. l' Ironically one of the actions required of me over the next 6 i
\
menths was: ". . . problems that are detected must be reported accurately and timely.". CP&L management c,_w.tBiT (A 13 Pcge ICI
r' demonstrated time and time again that they wanted us to look -
the other way when we encountered deficiencies. " Problems" were the last thing they wanted reported. .
t
- 24. !
In the Fall of 1983 I met with CP&L Executive Vice .
t President E.E. Utley in Raleigh. .
I carried with me all my - !i documentation of safety concerns and deficiencies, including !
those described here. I explained these concerns to Mr. t I
Utley and the responses to them by my s'upervision. He showed little interest in anything I said or any document I showed !
{
him.
He did not ask questions regarding my concerns or my t
treatment.
He said I was a " good man" and that I should go back to work. He promised to help. He did not.
I performed I all work assigned to me over the next 6 months, and have I l
retained documentation of my satisfactory performance under i j
increasing pressure and intimidation by my supervisor, Alex Fuller. All my requests for transfer were refused. '
At the end of 6 months, I was called before Messers Foscolo, Rager, i Ferguson and Fuller who told me that if I did not resign I would be terminated. They urged me to make it easier on ,
myself by resigning; and said I would have a hard time I getting another nuclear industry job if I did not resign. I I
j told then I had done nothing wrong and would not resign. !
That afternoon, February 29, 1984, Fuller escorted me like a i prisoner out the gate without even a chance to exchange farewells with my colleagues and friends.
. 1 Mm
- 25. I have very serious concerns regarding the breakdown of Quality Assurance at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. There is a great deal of pressure on the Construction
?
Inspection (CI) organization which lacks the freedom and independence from cost and scheduling considerations to ef fectively perform their OA duties of identifying and .
documenting deficiencies. As an Engineer I was always aware of the conflict between production and quality. Both CI and Construction Engineering reported to the Senior Resident
- Engineer.
- 26. CP&L and its prime contractor Daniel employ a confusing and ineffective array of different documenting systems for controlling nonconformances such as DR's, DDR's, NCR's FOR/PW's and such commonly used uncontrolled paperwork as Menos and " Speed Letters".
Few of us were trained in which procedures were to be used when. Mostly we wrote things down informally. I doubt that the OA vault contains even a fraction of the deficiencies in safety systems which +
have been identified. In order to ensure that I communicated ef fectively in my work particularly since English is my 3
{
second language - I made it a practice to retain full i documentation of work in my areas. I have " Speed Letters" reflecting numerous deficiencies which I am sure have been f
discarded by CP&L. I also have retained copies of many l
quality documents which I believe have not been properly controlled by CP&L. .
7 o* b W
i
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I hope that i someone will seriously investigate my cafety
{
concerns.
I know that many other present and former Harris employees, including craft and other engineers, share my concerns.
However, they are not eager to share my experience in order to voice those concerns, since they have every
~ .
reason to fear the same kind of retaliation that I have experienced. I hope that this statement of mine will make it easier for the others to speak more freely.
I am willing to assist in identifying and correcting quality assurance and workmanship problems in any manner necessary to ensure that the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant does not ha rm the public. '
GW CHAN VAT VO
- Sworn to and subscribed before me I I
this the [ day of (2c/ , 1984.
$/ ~
N}p(ARYPUBLIC f
My Commission expires: f//p/Af I
t I
i O
16
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- 1 2
AFFIDAVIT My name is Chan Van Vo. I am also known as Van Vo Davis. I am giving this statement to Robert Guild, Attorney-at-Law, of Charleston, South Carolina,.who has identified himself to me as a representative of the Government Accountability Project. I was employed for almost five years by Carolina Power & Light Company in the construction of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant near Raleigh, North Carolina, most recently in the position of Engineer where I was responsible for ensuring that the installation of pipe and pipe-hangers was in accordance with approve,d plans, specifications, codes, procedures and schedules. Although I am not opposed to nuclear power, my experience with CP&L causes me to have serious doubts about CP&L's commitment to nuclear safety and about the'as-built quality of construction at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. On many occasions I have brought safety concerns and construction deficiencies e
to the attention of my supervisors only to face lack of interest and hostility; and in one case only to find my documentation of a serious safety concern discarded in my supervisor's trash can the next day. I have taken these concerns up my chain of command to senior management at CP&L on several occasions only to be told ~that 'this is not Vietnam, here at CP&L you are only a soldier who must follow orders.' This lack of interest in my safety concerns was followed by a pattern of harassment, intimidation, pressure to resign, and ultimately my termination. I have filed a A14-
. I
[J -
6 *
. s complaint against CP&L with the U.S. Department of Labor for
. violation of the Employee Protection Provisions of The Energy Reorganization Act because of the Company's discrimination against me for raising safety concerns. I was only trying to do my job to the best of my ability according to my pro-fessional engineering training. I believed that the Ouality Assurance regulations of tLe Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and the Company's written policies and procedures meant what they said. However, I have learned that CP&L has very little interest in seeing that the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant is built "by the book." Workers at the site are expected to "look the other way" when they see safety violations or risk losing their jobs. I hope that my concerns will be fully investigated and that effective action will be taken to ensure that the public health and safety is protected before the Harris plant is allowed to operate.
- 2. I was born in South Vietnam and became a U.S.
citizen after I came to this country in 1975. I hold a degree in Math, Science and Physics from the French College and a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering with a specialty in Fluid Mechanics from Phutho Higher Technical University, Saigon, South Vietnam. In order to supplement my education for engineering certification in this country, I have taken courses in civil and mechanical engineering from Fayetteville Technical Institute and International Correspondence Schools. I am currently an MBA candidate at Campbell University, Buies Creek, North 2
f.
- a. ..
Carolina, where I am concentrating in Production Management.
I expect to receive my degree in May 1985. I am an Associate member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
- 3. I was first employed by CP&L at the Harris site on April 10, 1979, as an Engineering Aide 1, in the Mechanical Department under E.M. "Ed" McLean, where I was responsible for preparing requisitions for site material procurement and for performing inspections of mechanical installations in all parts of the plant. On October 10, 1979, I was promoted to Engineering Technician II where I was assigned responsibil-ities for piping and pipe-hangers. After I finished the ICS program for equivalence with a 4 year degree in mechanical engineering and based on my " outstanding" performance, I was promoted to Associate Engineer, effective October 4, 1980.
In this position I performed material take-offs, prepared purchase specifications and material purchase orders for piping; and was in charge of field support for radwaste piping in the Waste Processing Building. In April, 1982, I was transferred to work for the Lead Hanger Engineer, A.G.
"Alex" Fuller, where I was responsible for providing technical support to the hanger crafts including the preparation and interpretation of design documents and work procedures, investigation of field problems, prepara' tion of field changes such as Field Change Requests / Permanent Waivers (FCR/PW), and the resolu lon of nonconformances.
3
A, ,
- 4. Alex Fuller and his immediate superior, Resident Mechanical Engineer E.E. "Ed" Willett, particularly demonstrated a lack of commitment to nuclear safety and a general lack of knowledge and competence to perform their important engineering and management responsibilities. The Resident Engineering Unit carries responsibility for all site engineering functions at the Harris Plant, under the direc-tion of a CP&L employee, the Senior Resident Engineer, a position held by A. Lucas until his removal for poor performance in early 1983. Under Lucas were the various engineering disciplines and the Construction Inspection (CI) organizations. Ed Wil?ctt took over the Mechanical Engineering group in 1980. He originally supervised activities in the piping, hangers, equipment and heating-ventilation-air conditioning (HVAC) areas; until equipment installation and HVAC were taken away from him in early 1983, and hanger work was taken away in October, 1983, because of mounting problems and growing recognition of Willett's lack of ability to effectively manage his work. Willett brought in his friend, Alex Fuller, to supervise the hanger program in late 1981, despite Fuller's lack of qualifications for this work. Fuller's training was in civil engineering and his only previous work experience was in dam construction ;
with CP&L. As problems mounted in the hanger area, Al Rager was brought in over Alex Fuller. T h i t, did not help at all since Rager lacked any engineering experience. Rager has !
4
j aI -
- I since been placed in charge of the Construction Inspection program. This recent move will do nothing to inprove the Quality Assurance program at the Harris Plant.
- 5. In mid-August' 1982 I was performing my normal duties checking the installation of pipe-hangers in the Turbine Building. While doing so I observed several pipefitters j attempting to fit a 24" carbon steel piping line to the
- discharge. nozzle of Steam Generator Feed Water Pump 1A-t;NS.
1
- This piping system is of large diameter pipe through which 1
1' feedwater is pumped back from the turbine condensor to the steam generator which is located inside the Reactor Huilding j containment. The system, including the piping and associated i
valves and pumps, is classified as Secondary System, Safety I
Category 4, Seismic Category 1. The integrity of reactor i temperature and pressure control is dependent upon the I
l! effective function of these pumps, valves and piping, which i
j a re , therefore, nuclear safety significant. The 24" carbon i
- steel pipe in question extended on a horizontal run in the i
] direction of the-length of the Turbino 11uilding until it i
reached a position above the discharge nozzle of the . pump in
! question where it dropped vertically toward the pump. Since i
the pipe-to pump flange connection was the last remaining fit-
~
]
l' up to be made in the pipe run, I was particularly concerned i
j that proper alignment of the pipe to the flange was main-r j tained in order to assure that no in;> roper stresses were imparted to the punp.
l i
4
! 5
- 6. To assure proper fit-up, I identified the fitters' Foreman and requested that he ask his General Foreman, Danny McGhee, to request Millwright assistance in fitting this connection. Millwrights are responsible for the installation
- of mechanical equipment such as this SGFW pump. The Foreman j did as I requested, but reported back that McGhee had said go ahead without the Millwrights. I returned to my office where I called Piping Engineer D.M. Dasburg to whom I related the problem.
- 7. Several days later I encountered the same crew of pipefitters in the Turbine Building in the process of actually fitting up this pipe to the pump nozzle. The fitters had rigged a horizontal "come-along" from the pipe to a nearby beam and were " cold pulling" the pipe using extreme force which I would estimate at several thousand pounds in order to force fit the connection. When I encountered them 1
they had almost completed the entire weld. No Millwright was present, nor did I observe any Ouality Control, Construction 4 Inspector, or supervisory authority present to witness the j " cold pull" fit-up of this pipe.
- 8. About one week later I observed two Millwrights, a ,
j Mr. Strickland , Company No. 50-185 and Mr. Bass, Company No.
50-105, performing an alignment test on the subject Feedwater Pump.. One of them said to me, "Mr. Chan they really screwed up this pump!" The Millwrights were measuring the pump shaft alignment using an instrument called a " Dial Indicator" which measures in thousands of an inch. Procedure calls for an alignment tolerance of +/ .'005. The Millwrights reported to 6
l me the results of alignment measurements over a three-day l period under hot and cold temperature conditions. Their notes reflected a severe misalignment measurenent of as much a s + .10 8 " , . 07 8 " under hot conditions; and + .108",
.075" under cold conditions!
i ,
- 9. On August 25, 1982, I explained this problem to my l Supervisor, Alex Fuller. I asked him how I should document i
{ and report this safety deficiency; and whether I should a
j inform Resident Mechanical Engineer Ed Willett. Fuller told i
l 4
me to document the problem on a " Speed Letter" which he said t 1
) he would route to Willett. " Speed Letters" are commonly used at the Harris site for not only' routine internal communica-
- tion, but also in place of prescribed Ouality Assurance ;
i I
documentation. Use of " Speed Letters" is not prescribed in 4 any procedures for the docunentation of construction deficiencies, nor are " Speed Lotters" controlled documents [
1 which are normally part~of the Nuclear Plant's permanent -
1l I l quality records. I documented the cold pulling misalignment 1
l of the Steam Generator Feedwater Pump as I was instructed in j such a " Speed Letter" to Alex Fuller, " Subject Loads ;
I t Imposed on the steam Generator Feed Pump 1A-NNS," which 1
l detailed my observations and attached a diajram showing the 1
Dial Indicator alignnent readings and the Millwrights' names ;
j and Company numbers. I closed my message: "Please l 4
) i nve s t iga te . " The very next day I happoned to find my " Speed !
l !
! Letter" with attached diagran discarded in Fuller's trash i
i can!
l 3 7
.. . - - - - ~ - - - . .- . . - . _ . - .. - - - . - - . - ... ~ _ . .
1 i . 'l
- 10. .
The following day I spoke with R.T. "Roy" Settle, a 3
] Daniel Construction employee who serves as Equipment !
Installation Supervisor. I told him of the problem and !
- .showed him my discarded " Speed Letter". Roy said that he had f told Ed Willett of the problem three times. He quoted j 4
Willett as cursing him and adding: "I don't want to hear any more about that problem. If something happens I will fire j you first!"
1 11. Several months later on October 14, 1982, I observed I .
j Millwrights re-checking the alignment of the subject pump.
1 They gave me a note reflecting the results of their Dial !
Indicator readings: + .098", .075". I showed this note to j Alex Fuller. He said nothing. The following day I showed it '
i j to Ed Willett. He said tell Daren Dsaburg the Piping i
l Engineer. I already had. I gave a copy of the note to l Dasburg.
! 12. Since I first raised ny concern regarding the cold i
- pulling of this pipe and its effect on the feedwater pump, I I became aware of increasing pressure from Fuller and Willett. t i
j I sought a transfer,out from under Fuller and Willett I
( thinking that a chan.je in supervision would ease this .
s .
j retaliation. Willett refused to approve my transfer request.
j I pursued my concern regarding the mishandling of the pump j deficiency and my roquost for transfer to avoid the j mistreatment. Roth Senior Resident Enginenr A. Lucas and l liarris Project Manager Parsons showed no interest and offered i
j no help. They sent me back to Willett.
i l >
i 1
1
, 8
,. . _ . - - .- -. ~ . = _ . . . . . - - . - . - - - - _ - - . . - - - -
! . i
- 13. In November or December 1982 I went to see CP&L Vice President, M.A. McDu f f ie . I told him-that I was just trying, to serve my Company. I explained to hin all about my report
- of the pump deficiency. I showed him my " Speed Letter" and I
diagram and the Millwrights' notes: I told him of Roy Settle's comments. He showed no reaction and asked no j
\
questions. I told him of the retaliation and pressure from Fuller and Willett. He told me that I was a good nan, that ;
j the Company needed ne. He said he would help and that I i
i should go back and request a transfer. I did as he told ne;
- but my transfer was refused. Mr. McDuf fie did not help me, j
i nor did he investigate my safety concerns.
I
- 14. In March, Alex Fuller increased the level of ,
i j pressure on me and threatened me with termination of my job. -
l He subjected me to " formal counseling" regarding my job {
j '
j perfornance, including a requironent that I impove my ;
" understanding and explanation of problens." After I i requested Project Manager Parsons' help in allowing me to j reDut Fuller's allegations, Fuller and Willett backed down !
j and dropped their charges.
j 15. In April, 1983, I went to see Vice President McDuffie again for help. This tine he sent no back without
] any action or help. Mr. McDuffin said, "This is the U.S.
! This is CP&L, not Vietnam. Here Ed Willett is your 4 !
! -Lieutenant and you are only a soldier. You munt obey l
- orders." During the Spring the pressure fron Fuller i
- continued to increune. I was assijned nor and noro work l i
j hangers in the diesel generator building, tho turbine !
i .
l 9 .
- l building, the reactor building, the auxiliary building and the waste processing buliding. Much more work than my fair share.
- 16. In June, 1983, the NRC began to identiff serious problems in the hanger installation progran at Harris. In a June 13, 1983, exit meeting with site managenent, NRC Senior Mechanical / Welding Engineer J.W. York noted problems in the hanger inspection area with particular regard to missed deficiencies and material control problems. Several weeks later Alex Fuller assigned me to work with the OA Surveillance Group under the direction of OA Engineer " Buck" Willians. Our task was to begin an evaluation of the adequacy of the existing pipe hanger installation program.
Fullor instructed me to select, at randon, about 50 hanger packages for review, with particular emphasis on material substitutions, use of surplus materials, and identification of Construction Material Requisitions (CMR's) that did not match the hanger materials actually installed. These areas represented significant problems which the NRC had observed and which indicated the potential need for costly and time consuming reinspection and rework.
- 17. At Buck Williams' request I pulled 50 hanger packages for seismic hangers on safety-related systens which were supposed to be Phane II comple to r installed, inspected, and found acceptable for turn over to operations with only the final Phase III stress analysis yet to bn perforned. Of these, the OA Surveillance Group inspected 12 at randon. In 10
. - - - .. -_- - . ~ . -_ _ ___ -..-. .- - - - - _ .
l =
the course of this review numerous serious deficiencies were noted which had not been identified, documented or corrected
- although these hangers had all received final approval by CI l and CP&L OA/OC.
- 18. By " Speed Letter" of July 18, 198,3, I transmitted to
- Alex Fuller and Ed Willett my completed " Hanger Phase II i
j Verification Checklists" for these sample hanger packages.
i Fuller was very angry that such a large number of i deficiencies had been identified, and he blamed me for documenting all of these problems. In particular he focused i on the problem of naterial traceability which we had identified on many of these hangers. For example on pipe 4
- hanger A-2-236-1-CC-H-105, a " Speed Letter" of 4/25/80 indicates that a 1" x 10" x 10" plate was obtained fron Purchase Order 21022 and installed as per drawing. PO 21022 1
i t
was cited as the source for material in nany of the hangers i
j we exanined. I explained to Fuller that I had researched I this PO with OA Inspector Jay Vincent and another non on the l l
j Surveillance team. We could find no documentation of this PO in the OA records vault. In the Purchasing Department, ,
l ~
{ Robert Babb informed us that the Purchasing Log showed that 4
Po 21022 had been voided and that no materials had ever been l
l received through that order! We could not determine where ,
.i I these hanger materials had come from or document that such i
materials were of acceptable quality for nutloar safety l 1 application.
1 I i l
I i
i s
11
\
- 19. Later that afternoon Fuller called me into his office. He called me "a liar" and said that he had.found i documentation for PO 21022 in the warehouse. He accused me of not doing my job properly. I asked him to wait for the issuance of the Deficiency and Disposition Report (DDR) by the OA Surveillance Group which would confirm my report of material traceability problems and, in particular, the apparent falsification of documentation involved in the repeated use of void PO 21022 to supply traceability for hanger materials ot unknown origin. I returned to my work.
- 20. DDR 1775 was issued by Ruck Williams on July 26, 1983, documenting the OA Surveillance findings, as well as my report to Fuller and Willett regarding the void PO. That DDR states that "PO # 21022 was voided and no documentation exists that material was received." It also states: "A further investigation of PO p 21022 revealed that natorial
. from this PO was used on pipe hanger 1-CC-H-1242, 1-RH-H-183, and nunerous other pipe hangers not listed here, although PO e 21022 was voided . . . DCRs 1776, 1784, 1795 and Nonconformance Report (NCR) OA-255 also document problems we found in the hanger verificatica.
- 21. In responso to my report to Fuller and Willett of OA failures, Willett issued a Memo July 29, 19H3, " Subject Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant - Compliance with Project OA Programs and Procedures", which emphasized that compliance with OA procedures is " mandatory" and provided examples of "D0's and Don't's".
12
2 2.- On August 1, 1983, Assistant Project General Manager P.F. Foscolo responded to our Phase II hanger surveillance and the NRC concerns by providing for significant changes in the hanger program. A stop work order had been issued on July 29, 1983, halting all work and inspection on seismic hangers. Phases I and II were eliminated; work and OA procedures were substantially changed, including particularly WP-110, and TP-34, which provided for hanger installation and inspection. In particular, CP&L noted,that hanger documentation should be checked to insure "that the surplus hangers number / purchase order number is legitimate". At that tire only about 300 of the 18,000 seismic pipe hangers had successfully passed inspection. I remain concerned about the use of false docunentation on such safety grade materials.
Has any effort been made to investigate the cause or extent of this problem at the Harris Plant?
- 23. On August 22, 1983, Alex Fuller presented ne with a Mer.o signed by himself and Ed Willett reflecting their decision to place me on probation due to what was described as a decline in my performance "over the past year and one half". Of course, Fuller himself had promoted me to Engineer less than a year earlier! I believe that this action was in retaliation for my expression of safety concerns. I refused to acknowledge Fuller's f also charges, and, instead I wrote:
"I do not agree with thin statement", on the meno.
Ironically one of the actions required of me over the next 6 months was: ". . . problems that are detected must be reported accurately and timely.". CP&L nanagement 13
- _ _ _ . - . _. . . _ _ - . _ - _ ~ _ _ _ _ __ _ _
demonstrated time and time again that they wanted us to look the other way when we encountered deficiencies. " Problems"
. were the last thing they wanted reported.
- 24. In the Fall of 1983 I met with CP&L Executive Vice
. President E.E. Utley in Raleigh. I carried with me all my documentation of safety concerns and deficiencies, including
- j those described here. I explained these concerns to Mr.
! Utley and the responses to then by my supervision. He showed
) little interest in anything I said or any docunent I showed him. He did not ask questions regarding my concerns or my
] treatment. He said I was a " good man" and that I should go i ;
back to work. He promised to help. He did not. I performed !
l all work assigned to me over the next 6 months, and have
! i j retained documentation of ny satisfactory performance under l
) increasing pressure and intimidation by my supervisor, Alex i
Fuller. All my requests for transfer were refused. At the i 1 .
end of 6 nonths, I was called before Messers Foscolo, Rager, 1 Ferguson and Fuller who told me that if I did not resign I 1
1 would be terminated. They urged me to make it easier on .
i myself by resigning and said I would have a hard time getting another nuclear industry job if I did not resign. I told then I had done nothing wrong and would not resign.
(
i That afternoon, February ~29, 1984, Fuller escorted me like a i prisoner out the gate without even a chance to exchange )
farewells with my colleagues and friends.
i I
i j
i i
1 l
14 l
i * .
- 25. I have very serious concerns regarding the breakdown of Quality Assurance at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. There is a great deal of pressure on the Construction
} Inspection (CI) organization which lacks the freedom and independence from cost and scheduling considerations to effectively perform their OA duties of identifying and i documenting deficiencies. As an Engineer I was always aware of the conflict between production and quality. Both CI and
)
1 Construction Engineering reported to the Senior Resident
- Engineer.
- 26. CP&L and its prime contractor Daniel employ a i
confusing and ineffective array of different documenting 4
systems for controlling nonconformances such as DR's, DDR's, NCR's FCR/PW's and such commonly used uncontrolled paperwnrk ,
i i
as Memos and "S peed Le t te r s " . Few of us were trained in 1
~
which procedures were to be used when. Mostly we wrote things down informally. I doubt that the OA vault contains I
even a fraction of the deficiencies in safety systems which In order to ensure that I communicated have been identified.
effectively in my work - particularly since English is ny second language - I made it a practice to retain full documentation of work in my areas. I have " Speed Letters" l reflecting numerous deficiencies which I am sure have been discarded by CP&L. I also have retained copion of many quality' documents which I believe have not been properly controlled by CP&L.
4 4
i
r I hope'that someone will seriously investigate my safety
. concerns. I know that many other present and former Harris employees, including craft.and other engineers, share my concerns. However, they are not eager to share my experience in order to voice those concerns, since they have every reason to fear the same kind of retaliation that I have experienced. I hope that this statement of mine wi11 make it easier for the others to speak more freely.
I am willing to assist in identifying and correcting quality assurance and workmanship problems in any manner necessary to ensure that the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant does not harm the public.
qy qg----.--....--_--
Sworn to and subscribed before ne this the 1 day of dc,f,,,,,,,_,,__,1934, NOT .t
.4.d.
PUBLIC Y---_-
My Comnission expires: 9 // { ,,
I (
16
L
, h6 Federe1 Register / Val . Ns. 5 / Tu;sd y. Janu:ry 8.1980 / R
/ E-- cnd R:::ulati:ns t* a DEP.ARTt4ENT OF LABOR PART 24-PROCEDURES FOR THE (2Liestified or le shut to tantify in (Mflee of the Secretary HANDLING OF DISCRIMINATION any such proceeding. or (
COMPLAINTS UNDER FEDERAL (3) add or p icipated, or la about l t
25 CFR Part 24 EMPLOYEE PROTECTION STATUTES to assist or participate any manner in I i
' s"- auch a proceedmg or in any other action Procedures for the Handling of M.t Purpose and scope- to carry out the purposes of such Discrimination Complaints Under M2 Obliganons and prohbted acts. Federal statute.
Federal Employee Protection Statutes " C* P * '"
m l g,],[,,h. I 24.3 m-AtassCY: Department of Labor. MS Heannes. (a) Who mayfile. An employee who 24 8 Decisions and orders. believes that he or she hWWin'~'
AC7soet Final rule. 34 7 ludicial review.
24 s Enforcement proceedmas.
discriminated against by an employer in sussasany: His rule establishes 24 s Exception. violation of any of the statutes hsted in j
proced.tres for the handhng of ernployee I 24.1(a) may Ale, orhave another Authorier 42 U.S C 300r-9(>1. 33 U S C. person file on his or her behalf. e '
complaints of discrimination under the 13st.15 U.S C 26:2. 42 U.S C 8871. 42 U.S C emptryee protectico provisions of the 7s .:. 42 U S C sast. complaint alleging such discrimination.
(b) Teme offding Any complaint shall folhwirs Federal statutes: Safe Drinking i 24.1 Purpose and scope.
Water Act. Water Pollution Control Act. be nled within 30 da s aDatthe (a) This part implements the several "C"'"'
- latim For TIx.ic Substances Control Act.Sohd Federal employee protection rovisions de Purpose oh.mining !'P.4 ' timeiness of Wisty Disposal Act. Clean Air Act, for which the Secretary of Labor has Ahng. a com laint n!cd by mail shall be En;rgy Reorganization Apt,of1974. es been given responsibihty pursuant to thg de ihng.
anacTivs para: January 8.1980. folkwir.g statutes. Safe Drinking Water Poe runTwan suponMAnow cowtAct Act. 42 U S C. 300j-9(i). Water Po!!ution f m of'comptainTTs required eacep
.P
- i Ceorge kl. IJily. Counse!. Errploy ce Control Act. 33 U.S C.1367; Toxic Gat a complaint musI be in w ruqtr!d Substancea Control Act,15 U.S C. 2622. shou!) include, gatemen!cfjhe.
Ben: fits Divisien. Office of the Solicitor.
U.S. Dep rtment of Labor. Suite N2718, NDOL Building. 200 Constitution Sohd Waste Disposal Act. 42 U.S C.
6971: Clean Air Act. 42 U.S C. 7622; M' *".d C ' i8'I dates, wiu are hesed to constitute 8
- CD' '
P
)
Avenue. N.W Washington, D.C. 20210 Energy Reorganization Act of1974. 42 D** ~~
(a02) 357-0437. U.S C 5611 tdThe offiling A complaint may be -
75TFocedures are established by this filed la Person or by mall ith the Office
- suppi.aMENTARYIwFoRMAnoet Re:ent Part Pursuant to the federal statutory of the'Adagnistrator of th Wege and Congressional _cqncern for the protection provisions listed above for the flour Division. Employme t Standards eI wh,i,stle}!ower employees from expeditious hand!mg of complaints by .A fministration. U.S Department of (
i discriminatory actions by their emplo>ees. or pmons acting on their Labor.ne address of the emplI)ers has led to the enactment of behalf.of ascrimineory action by Administrator's office is Room S3502, special employee protection provisiona employers. 200 Constitution Avenue NW.,
in s:v:ral federal statutes. 1 24.2 Obh9ations and prohibited acts, Washington. D C. 20210 A complaint R:sponsibility for the handlina of these may also be Eled at any local ofLee of
- prot
- ctions has been lodged wl'h the (a) h several statutory employee the Wege and flour Disision. The protection provisions listed in i 24.1, address of such local offices may be l
Secretzry of Lobor. The Secretary of abose. provide that no employer subject found in local telephone directories.
Labor has determined that uniform to the provisions of the Federal statute procedures are required for the orderly of which these protective provisions are I 'd * '""'4'"***
resolution of the complaints now being a part may d2scharge any employee or fihd with the Secretary pursuant to (a) Upon receipt of a complaint under otherwise discriminate against any this part, the Administrator shall notify th:se several statutory provisions.
employee with respect to the employee's the person named in the complaint, and 7h2 Department o/l.oborhos compensation terms conditions, or the appropriate ofnce of the Federal determined that this document is not a prisileges of employment because the asency charged with the administration cignificant rule anddoes not require o emplo}ee. or any person acting pursuant of the affected program of sts Ahng.
/egulatory analysis under frecutste to the emplo)ee's request. engaged in Order 120H andDepartment ofL.obor * "Y *' 'h ' * *I'i' * *P'*EII'd I*
(b) W MrMalitralouh31L on a j P"*'U) b,*
- L*' hI* * *0 ^ET'hU , '
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Cuidelines (# T/l 3370). This document subsection (b) below. date concernmg such case. and as part (b) Any person is deemed to have l
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p te un r e pe i
violated the particular federallow and cMhe investigation ma enter and ins ect such places a records (and Division offirployee Benefe.ts. these regulations if such person ntimid tes, thzarigns, restrains, ma e copies thereof). may question Accordingly, since this rule relates persons being proceeded against and coerc . bla ckhsts, dischines. or other employees of the charged only 12 proced J rabpalter,s required by st:txte for which no proposed oF' annerTsenminatee again~- o employer, and may require the !
ruhmaking is required. Subtitle A of rr-lo ee ho bas production of any documentary or other 4.ormences! or caused to be evidence deerned necessary to Tith 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations is hereby amended by the to menc'ed.it causa4ala comroencedis eVoil.lo com'm'ence or determine whether a vlotation a proceeding of the la additi:n of the following new Part 24. involved has been committed.
which provides as *o!!ows: under one of the Federal statutes listed
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ist be(co) nducted in a manner whichc Investigsf f
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{ requ. Laera proceedm~g~Idr administration or enforcement of any irement imposed under such protects theThe confidentiality of any Federal statute; person othat ifistrtKTTomplainant who provides Information on a conndential w <
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.il Federal R:gister / u. 45. N:. 5 / TuIsday. I:nuary 8,1980 , Ruhe cnd R:gulations 1337 I*
basis,in acceedance with Part 70 of this hearing. However, because of the time by the administrative law judge and
( tide. constrainta imposed upon the Seentary shall be due within the time prescribed 1 (d)(1) Within 30 days of the receipt of by the above statutes. rto requests fo_r by the administrative law judae. '
a complaint, the Administrator shall pastponement shall be granted,e_scep~t (4) Dismissolfor Cause. (i)the complete the invesGgation, determine Iq'r compelling nesong7~ administrative law judge may, at the I whethat the atteged violation has ' (b) ConsT>lidatedNearings. When two request of any party, or on his or her accurred, and give iiolicFofibiiP or more hearings are to be held, and the own motion, dismiss a claim l determination which1haTi5aTaia e same or substantially similar evidence is (A)Upon the failure of the afalement of re'asons'fE the findings relevant and material to the matters at complainant or his or her representak sid' conclusions therein. Notice of the issue at each such hearing. the Chief to auand rheartng without good cause; /
determination shall be given by certified Administrative Law Judge may.upon (B)IJpon the failure of the ./
mail to the complainant, the respondent, motion by any party or on his own or complainant to comply with__a lawful Q and in their representatives. At the same her own motion, order that a seder of the administrativelaw judait.
time the Administrator shallfile with consolidated hearing be conducted. li)In any case where a dismissal of a the Chief Administrative Law judge. Where consolidated hearings are held, a c! alms, defense. or party is sought. the LI.S. Department of labor. the original single record of the proceedmas shall be administrative law judge shau issue an complaint and a copy of the notice of made and the evidence introduced in order to show cause why the dismissal determination. one case may be considered as should not be granted and afford all (2)(i)If on the basis of the introduced in the others, and a separate parties a reasonable tirne to respond to in estigalion the Administrator or joint decision shall be made, as such order. After the time for response determines that the complaint is without appropriate. has expired, the administrative law merit, the notice of deter =Instion shau (c) Moce ofHearing He hearing judge sha!! take such action as is include, or be accompanied by notice to shall, where possible, be held at a place appropriate to ru'e on the dismissal, the complainant that the notice of within 75gof the complainant's which may include an order dismissing determination shan become the final residence. the claim, defense or party, order of the Secretary denying the (d) Right to Counsel. In all cornplaint unless within fl.vg33I ndar proceedmgs under this part, the parties t 24.s pecNona_ and orders.
d yaof its receipt the compTainant files shall have the right to be represented by- (a) flecommendeo uccesion. ne with the Chief Administrative law judge counsel.
- "~
administrative law judge shall issue a a request by telegram for a hearing on Tel Procedures, evidence andrecord. omm'nded d'c the complaint.The notice shan give the (1) Evidence. Fgrmal rules of evidsnce ya jeMe_t.EnE. gnhion withio.and.ye-of the.Stostading.
address of the Chief Administrative Law shallnot apply, but rules or prin~ciples 41w'hich.3vidence was,submjtted, b Judge' designed to assure production of the recommended decision she'!IlE6ntsIn f (ii) Copies of any request for a hearing most probative evidence available shall appropriate findings, conclusions and a
( shall be sent by the comp!ainant to the (be applied.The administrative law recommended order and be fonvarded.
(pespondent (employer) and to the Judge may exclude evidence which is together with the record, to the Administrator. j isasted.al. Irrelevant. or undialy j Scfrary of labor fonfinal prdt,r.%e (3)(i)If on the basis of the repe_tif _gns.
t recommende3 decision shall be assued investigation the AdmircittElor "(2) RecordofNearing. 41 hearings A upon all parties to the proceedmg.
determines that the alleged vio!stion has shaHbe therublic en s au 5eu *
(b1 MnoiOrder. (t) Withm 90 days occurred, the notice of determination sqechani or stenograph3! ally , after receipt of a complaint. the shau include an appropriate order to irporti d. evidence upon which the Secs *8+eref tutRrr thatt iesve,e final abate the violation, and notice to the admimstrative law judge relies for order, based on the record and the respondent that the 6rderliha!! become derf tion sha!! be contained in the recommended decision of the thg, final order of the Secretary uniras
~
tr.pnf.,cr.i;t of testimony, either directly or adinDnsirma la siudge, which shall be within five calendar days of its receiptr. by appropriate reference. All e@ibits sened upon all of the parties.
the respondent files with the Chief , and other pertinent documents or (2)lf the Secretary concludes that the Administrative I.aw Judge a request by records, either in whole or in material party charged has violated the law, the telegram for a hearina An order issued part, introduced as evidence, shall be final order shall order the party charFed pursuant to this subsection shaU be in marked for identification and to take app r_o1riate affirmative action to accordance with the relevant provisions incorporated into the record. abale the vroTa I6 Elf 23uama
. of the statute violated.%e notice shall (3) Ocplorrument; briefs. Any party, rt,!asut,tment of the complatrrent tg1 hat.
give the address of the Chief upon requesw mey im =11 owed a penon'alormer or substantiaIly Administrative Law Judge, reasonsble time for presentation of pral equivalt.nl peeltion, ifadged. togethrt (ii) Copies of any request for a hearing .arament and to file a prehengrin brteT] with the comeenaatioTn mcludms bar.L shall be sent by the respondent or other written statemerT6TTact or latv. naf)'. terms3 cort dtt fons, and privileges
~
of (employer) to the complainant and to the A copy of any such prehearing brief or that empfb ment. N Secretary may.
Admimstrator. other written statement shall be filed whTie dWm'id appTopriate, order the with the Chief Administrative Law judge party charge J to provide campentatory NJ l 24.5 Hurings. or the administrative law judge assigned damanes to thelo lainant.
(a) Notice e/ Nearing he to the case before or during the ()}T5sts. If such a me orderis administrative law judge to whom the proceeding at which evidence is issued.the Secretary, at the request of case is assigned shall within og(en submitted to the admlnistrative law the complainant, shall assess against the '
calendar days f.o!!ow[ng receipt et the judge and shall be served upon each ondent a sum'"#hual to the aggregate request for hearing. not4fy the parties by other party. Post. hearing briefs will not h am:oun of gli costs and expenses ~
N '
certified mall, directed to the last known be pszmitted.cIsipl althe'tequest of the- (includig ~ attorney gd, expert witness address of the parties,of a day, time and administr awJudgE %bn faeafrisioriibly ingcurr IITy thF plJc.glor hearing. All parties shall be perm ste , any sucE brief shall be complainant, as deFcrmined by the I given at least fivje_ dis 2 s police of such limited to the lasue or issues specified Segry, for, or in conne'etion with. the l l
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183_3 Federal Eestleter / V ~ 15. N2 5 / Tuesday. I:nu:ry 8,1960 / r se cnd Regulati:na l p' brirgin of the completat upon which $24.9 Essapean.
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the fine order was leeued. This part shallhave no application to (
(4)Dismissols.If the Secretary any employee alleging activity determines that the party charged has prohibited by this part who, acting mot violated the law, en oeder shall be without direction from his or her laaued denying the complaint. employ'er (or the employer *a agent),
deliberately causes a violation of any 9 24.7 W W. requirement of a Federal statute listed in #' %'
(:) Within 80 days after the laavance i 24.1, above. ,7si- -.
of 0 final order under l 24.8. above rson adversely affected or aggriev1 Seyied this 2nd day of lanuary. iano, at Washington. D.C. G'y \
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sucn pruer mEI) f res ew of the order,ite m the1f!M3apetttfon Ray W States fof . y s' ^"*
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c15U3pf 5pp~eals for the eticuit In%hicT
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- the vioIaf.'5n with respe~ct io wlilch'the ~ F' 8" ' * 'd'#~" "****3 ' ' ~ f* ,,'.i
- order was issued allegedly occurred. suma coas esie.st.as Qg* .- ,
,e The commencement of proceedings -., 4 ;<,
under this subsection shall n_gt.un!ges orderwd by the court, operate as a stay j/
'oflhe.Se.cretqy's. order. ~ ' '
Q.2. 'j'
) An order of the Secretary with ,
respect to wldch review could have be:n obtained under subsection (a) shall not be subject to judicial review in any inal or other civil proceeding.
(c) Certification of RecordforJudicial Review.The record of a case, including the reco.d -
of proceedings before the A. d g h g'o administrative law judge, shall be Censmitted by the Secretary to the Cf#
, cfc'['rt.
( h 'l 7 5 24.8 Enforoement proceedings. p S- f (
(a) Whenever a person has failed to ,
comply with a final order issued by the ()/ t.
Secretary of Labor under i 24.6. above, the Strplary ni4y file a civil setion in -
ti13'UnitEl States t!Isirict court for the district in which the violatnin'was Toed
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to, occur to enforceJuch order. In actions- .j o [
broidt iiriae'r this sectier[the ddMet-courts shall have juris6ction t#F" ant To
.allsppropriate rehefincludmg but n5C
]' gN,,,
limited to,injunctIve relief.
'forr.pensatory and exemp!ary damages.
(b)(1) Any person on whose behalf a final order was issued by the Secretary of Labor under i 24.6. above, may commence a Qvil action against.she pe:10.p tp wh.p.u EiTer wae isaund b
Ltrequire comphance with such oMer.
Th> appropriate UrdlStates cfistnct court,,shall have junediction, without M) regard to the amount in controversy or C.a citizenship of the parties. to enforce auch order.
(2) The court.in lasuing any final order under this section may award costs oflitigation (includi!T7essonable cttorney and expert witness fees)g y pagrt whenevetlhegourt determines l N apch mbpropiiate.
l (c) Any nondiscretionary duty imposed by this section sha!! be l' l enforceable in a mandamus proceeding brought under sectin 1361 of Title 28 of the United States Code.
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- r AFFIDAVIT My name is Chan Van Yb. I am also known as Van Vo Davis. I am giving this statement to Robert Guild, Attorney-at-Law, of Charleston, South Carolina, who has identified himself to me as a representative of the Government Accountability Project. I was employed for almost five years by Carolina Power & Light Company in the construction of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant near Raleigh, North Carolina, most recently in the position of Engineer where I was res onsible for ensuring that the installation of pipe and pipe-hangers was in accordance with , approved plans, specifications, codes, procedures and schedules. Although I am not opposed to nuclear power, my experience with CP&L causes me to have serious doubts about CP&L's commitment to nuclear safety and about the as-built quality of construction at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. On many occasions I have brought safety concerns and construction deficiencies fh to the attention of my supervisors only to face lack of f interest and hostility; and in one case only to find my documentation of a serious safety concern discarded in my gf , supervisor's trash can the next day. I have taken these concerns up my chain of command to senior management at CP&L on several occasions only to be told that 'this is not Vietnam, here at CP&L you are only a soldier who must follow orders.' This lack of interest in my safety concerns was followed by a pattern of harassment, intimidation, pressure a
to resign, and ultimately my termination. I have filed a i
W
9 complaint against CP&L with the U.S. Department of Labor for violation of the Employee Protection Provisions of The Energy Reorganization Act because of the Company's discrimination against me for raising safety concerns. I was only trying to do my job to the best of my ability according to my pro-fessional engineering training. I' believed that the Ouality Assurance regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and the Company's written policies and procedures meant what they said. However', I have learned that CP&L has very little interest in seeing that the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant is built "by the book." Workers at the site are expected'to "look the other way" when they see safety violations or risk losing their 1
jobs. I hope that my concerns will be fully investigated and l l
that effective action will be taken to ensure that the public health and safety is protected before the Harris plant is l allowed to operate.
- 2. I was born in South Vietnam and became a U.S.
citizen after I came to this country in 1975. I hold a degree in Math, Science and Physics from the French College and a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering with a specialty in Fluid Mechanics from Phutho Higher Technical University, Saigon, South Vietnam. In order to supplement my education for engineering certification in this country, I have taken courses in civil and mechanical engineering from Fayetteville Technical Institute and International Correspondence Schools. I am currently an MBA candidate at Campbell University, Buies Creek, North 2
Carolina *, where I am concentrating in Production Management.
I expect to receive my degree in May 1985. I am an Associate member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
- 3. I was first employed by CP&L at the Harris site on April 10, 1979, as an Engineering Aide I, in the Mechanical Department under E.M. "Ed" McLean, where I was responsible 1
for preparing requisitions for site material procurement and l 1
l for performing inspections of mechanical installations in all parts of the plant. On October 10, 1979, I was promoted to Engineering Technician II where I was assigned responsibil-it-ies for piping and pipe-hangers. After I finished the ICS program for equivalence with a 4 year degree in mechanical engineering and based on my " outstanding" performance, I was promoted to Associate Engineer, effective October 4, 1980.
1 In this position I performed material take-offs, prepared purchase specifications and material purchase orders for piping; and was in charge of field support for radwaste piping in the Waste Processing Building. In April, 1982, I was transferred to work for the Lead Hanger Engineer, A.G.
"Alex" Fuller, where I was responsible for providing technical support to the hanger crafts including the l preparation and interpretation of design documents and work l procedures, investigation of field problems, preparation of field changes such as Field Change Requests / Permanent Waivers (FCR/PW), and the resolution of nonconformances.
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- 4. Alex Fuller and his immediate superior, Resident Mechanical Engineer E.E. "Ed" Willett, particularly demonstrated a lack of commitment to nuclear safety and a general lack of knowledge and competence to perform their important engineering and management responsibilities. The Resident Engineering Unit carries responsibility for all site engineering functions at the Harris Plant, under the direc-tion of a CP&L employee, the Senior Resident Engineer, a position held by A. Lucas until his removal for poor performance in early 1983. Under Lucas were the various engineering disciplines and the Construction Inspection (CI) organizations. Ed Willett took over the' Mechanical Engineering group in 1980. He originally supervised activities in the piping, hangern, equipment and heating-ventilation-air conditioning (HVAC) areas; until equipment installation and HVAC were taken away from him in early 1983, and hanger work was taken away in October, 1983, because of mounting problems and growing recognition of Willett's lack of ability to effectively manage his work. Willett brought in his friend, Alex Fuller, to supervise the hanger program in late 1981, despite Fuller's lack of qualifications for this work. Fuller's training was in civil engineering and his only previous work experience was in dam construction with CP&L. As problems mounted in the hanger area, Al Rager was brought in over Alex Fuller. This did not help at all since Rager lacked any engineering experience. Rager has 4
since been placed in charge of the Construction Inspection program. This recent move will do nothing to improve the Ouality Assurance program at the Harris Plant.
- 5. In mid-August 1982 I was performing my normal duties checking the installation of pipe-hangers in the Turbine Building. While doing so I observed several pipefitters attempting to fit a 24" carbon steel piping line to the discharge nozzle of Steam Generator Feed Water Pump 1A-NNS.
This piping system is of large diameter pipe through which feedwater is pumped back from the turbine condensor to the steam generator which is located inside the Reactor Building containment. The system, including the " piping and associated valves and pumps, is classified as Secondary System, Safety
, Category 4, Seismic Category 1. The integrity of reactor temperature and pressure control is dependent upon the effective function of these pumps, valves and piping, which are, therefore, nuclear safety significant. The 24" carbon steel pipe in question extended on a horizontal run in the direction of the length of the Turbine Building until it reached a position above the discharge nozzle of the pump in I
question where it dropped vertically toward the pump. Since the pipe-to-pump flange connection was the last remaining fit-up to be made in the pipe run, I was particularly concerned that proper alignment of the pipe to the flange was main-tained in order to assure that no improper stresses were imparted to the pump.
5
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- 6. To assure proper fit-up, I identified the fitters' Foreman and requested that he ask his General Foreman, Danny McGhee, to request Millwright assistance in fitting this connection. Millwrights are responsible for the installation of mechanical equipment such as this SGFW pump. The Foreman did as I requested, but reported back that McGhee had said go ahead without the Millwrights. I returned to my office where I called Piping Engineer D.M. Dasburg to whom I related the problem.
- 7. Several days later I encountered the same crew of pipefitters in the Turbine Building in the process of actually fitting up this pipe to the pum'p nozzle. The fitters had rigged a horizontal "come-along" from the pipe to a nearby beam and were " cold pulling" the pipe using extreme force which I would estimate at several thousand pounds in order to force fit the connection. When I encountered them they had almost completed the entire weld. No Millwright was present, nor did I observe any Cuality Control, Construction Inspector, or supervisory authority present to witness the
" cold pull" fit-up of this pipe.
- 8. About one week later I observed two Millwrights, a Mr. Strickland, Company No. 50-185 and Mr. Bass, Company No.
50-105, performing an alignment test on the subject Feedwater Pump. One of them said to me, "Mr. Chan they really screwed up this pump!" The Millwrights were measuring the pump shaf t l
alignment using an instrument called a " Dial Indicator" which i measures in thousands of an inch. Procedure calls for an alignment tolerance of +/ .'005. The Millwrights reported to 6
l me the results of alignment measurements over a three-day l 4
period under hot and cold temperature conditions. Their notes reflected a severe misalignment measurement of as much as + .108", - .078 " under hot conditions; and + .108",
.075" under cold conditions!
- 9. On August 25, 1982, I explained this problem to my Supervisor, Alex Fuller. I asked him how I should document and report this safety deficiency; and whether I should inform Resident Mechanical Engineer Ed Willett. Fuller told me to document the problem on a " Speed Letter" which he said he would route to Willett. " Speed Letters" are commonly used at the Harris site for not only routine internal communica-tion, but also in place of prescribed Quality Assurance documentation. Use of " Speed Le tters" is not prescribed in any procedures for'the documentation of construction .
deficiencies, nor are " Speed Letters" controlled documents which are normally part of the Nuclear Plant's permanent quality records. I documented the cold pulling misalignment
, of the Steam Generator Feedwater Purup as I was instructed in such a " Speed Letter" to Alex Fuller, "
Subject:
Loads Imposed on the S team Generator Feed Pump 1A-NNS," which detailed my observations and attached a diagram showing the Dial Indicator alignment readings and the Millwrights' names and Company numbers. I closed my message: "Please 1
i nve s t iga te . " The very next day I happened to find my " Speed Letter" with attached diagram discarded in Fuller's trash can!
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- 10. The following day I spoke with R.T. "Roy" Settle, a Daniel Construction employee who serves as Equipment Installation Supervisor. I told him of the problem and showed him my discarded " Speed Letter". Roy said that he had told Ed Willett of the problem three times. He quoted Willett as cursing him and adding: "I don't want to hear any more about that problem. If something happens I will fire you first!"
- 11. Several months later on October 14, 1982, I observed Millwrights re-checking the alignment of the subject pump.
They gave me a note reflecting the results of their Dial Indicator readings: + .098", - .075". I showed this note to Alex Fuller. He said nothing. The following day I showed it
'o t Ed Willett. He said tell Daren Dsaburg the Piping Engineer. I already had. I gave a copy of the note to Dasburg.
- 12. Since I first raised my concern regarding the cold pulling of this pipe and its effect on the feedwater pump, I became aware of increasing pressure from Fuller and Willett.
I sought a transfer out from under Fuller and Willett thinking that a change in supervision would ease this retaliation. Willett refused to approve my transfer request.
I pursued my concern regarding the mishandling of the pump deficiency and my request for transfer to avoid the mistreatment. Both Senior Resident Engineer A. Lucas and Harris Project Manager Parsons showed no interest and offered no help. They sent me back to Willett.
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- 13. In November or December 1982 I went to see CP&L Vice President, M.A. McDuffie. I told him that I was just trying to serve my Company. I explained to him all about my report of the pump deficiency. I showed him my " Speed Letter" and diagram and the Millwrights' notes; I told him of Roy Settle's comments. He showed no reaction and asked no questions. I told him of the retaliation and pressure from Fuller and Willett. He told me that I was a good man, that the Company needed me. He said he would help and that I should go back and request a transfer. I did as he told me; but my transfer was refused. Mr. McDuf fie did not help me, nor did he investigate my safety concerns.
- 14. In March, Alex Fuller increased the level of pressure on me and threatened me with termination of my job.
He subjected me to " formal counseling" regarding my job c -
performance, including a requirement that I imp,ove my
" understanding and explanation of problems." After I requested Project Manager Parsons' help in allowing me to rebut Fuller's allegations, Fuller and Willett backed down and dropped their charges.
- 15. In April, 1983, I went to see Vice President McDuffie again for help. This time he sent me back without any action or help. Mr. McDuffie said,- "This is the U.S.
This is CP&L, not Vietnam. Here Ed Willett is your Lieutenant and you are only a soldier. You must obey orders." During the Spring the pressure from Fuller continued to increase. I was assigned more and more work:
hangers in the diesel generator building, the turbine 9
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bu ild i ng ~, the reactor building, the auxiliary building and the waste processing buliding. Much more work than my fair share.
- 16. In June, 1983, the NRC began to identify serious problems in the hanger installation program at Harris. In a June 10, 1983, exit meeting with site management, NRC Senior Mechanical / Welding Engineer J.W. York noted problems in the hanger inspection area with particular regard to missed deficiencies and material control problems. Several weeks later Alex Fuller assigned me to work with the OA Surveillance Group under the direction of OA Engineer " Buck" Williams. Our task was to begin an evaluation of the 1
adequacy of the existing pipe hanger installation program.
Fuller ir.structed me to select, at random, about 50 hanger packages for review, with particular emphasis on material substitutions, use of surplus materials, and identification of Construction Material Requisitions (CMR's) that did not match the hanger materials actually installed. These areas represented significant problems which the NRC had observed and which indicated the potential need for costly and time consuming reinspection and rework.
- 17. At Buck Williams' request I pulled 50 hanger packages for seismic hangers on safety-related systems which were supposed to be Phase II complete: installed, inspected, and found acceptable for turn over to operations with only the final Phase III stress analysis yet to be performed. Of these, the OA Surveillance Group inspected 12 at random. In 10
4 the course of this review numerous serious deficiencies were noted which had not been identified, documented or corrected although these hangers had all received final approval by CI and CP&L OA/QC.
- 18. By " Speed Letter" of July 18, 1983, I transmitted to Alex Fuller and Ed Willett my completed " Hanger Phase II Verification Checklists" for these sample hanger packages.
Fuller was very angry that such a large number of deficiencies had been identified, and he blamed me for documenting all of these problems. In particular he focused on the problem of material traceability which we had identified on many of these hangers. For example on pipe hanger A-2-236-1-CC-H-105, a " Speed Letter" of 4/25/80 indicates that a 1" x 10" x 10" plate was obtained from Purchase Order 21022 and installed as per drawing. PO 21022 was cited as the source for material in many of the hangers we examined. I explained to Fuller that I had researched this PO with OA Inspector Jay Vincent and another man on the Surveillance team. We could find no documentation of this PO in the OA records vault. In the Purchasing Department, Robert Babb informed us that the Purchasing Log showed that PO 21022 had been voided and that no materials had ever been received through that order! We could not determine where i these hanger materials had come from or document that such
- materials were of acceptable quality for nuclear safety application.
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- 19. Later that afternoon Fuller called me into his office. He called me "a liar" and said that he had found documentation for PO 21022 in the warehouse. He accused me of not doing my job properly. I asked him to wait for the issuance of the Deficiency and Disposition Report (DDR) by
\ the OA Surveillance Group which would confirm my report of Nf material traceability problems and, in particular, the hh gp ,
apparent falsification of documentation involved in the
" h 4 repeated use of void PO 21022 to supply traceability for J
l hanger materials of unknown origin. I returned to my work.
- 20. DDR 1775 was issued by Buck Williams on July 26, 1983, documenting the OA Surveillance findings, as well as my report to Fuller and Willett regarding the void PO. That DDR states that "PO # 21022 was voided and no documentation exists that material was received." It also states: "A further investigation of PO f 21022 revealed that material from this PO was used on pipe hanger 1-CC-H-1242, 1-RH-H - 18 3,
- and numerous other pipe hangers not listed here, although PO
- 21022 was voided . . . DDRs 1776, 1784, 1795 and Nonconfermance Report (NCR) OA-255 also document problems we found in the hanger verification.
- 21. In response to my report to Fuller and Willett of QA failures, Willett issued a Memo July 29, 1983, "
Subject:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant - Compliance with Project OA Programs and Procedures", which emphasized that compliance with OA procedures is " mandatory" and provided examples of
" DO ' s a nd Do n ' t ' s " .
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- ._,J. - .- -. - , , . .-
1 .
- 22. On August 1, 1983, Assistant Project General Manager 4 P.F. Foscolo responded to our Phase II hanger surveillance and the NRC concerns by providing for significant changes in the hanger program. A stop work order had been issued on July 29, 1983, halting all work and inspection on seismic hangers. Phases I and II were eliminated; work and OA procedures were substantially changed, including particularly WP-110, and TP-34, which provided for hanger installation and inspection. In particular, CP&L noted that hanger documentation should be checked to insure "that the surplus hangers number / purchase order number is legitimate". At that time only about 300 of the 18,000 seismic pipe hangers had successfully passed inspection. I remain concerned about the Ose of false documentation on such safety grade materials.
Has any effort been made to investigate the cause or extent of this problem at the Harris Plant?
- 23. On August 22, 1983, Alex Fuller presented me with a 4
Memo signed by himself and Ed Willett reflecting their decision to place me on probation due to what was described 1
- as a decline in my performance "over the past year and one half". Of course, Fuller himself had promoted me to Engineer less than a year earlier! I believe that this action was in i retaliation for my expression of safety concerns. I refused to acknowledge Fuller's false charges, and, instead I wrote
"I do not agree with this statement", on the memo.
Ironically one of the actions required of me over_the next 6 months was: ". . . problems that are detected must be reported accurately and timely.". CP&L management I
l 13 l
- 6:
1.,
demonstrated time and time again that they wanted us to lock the other way when we encountered deficiencies. " Problems" were the last thing they wanted reported.
- 24. In the Fall of 1983 I met with CP&L Executive Vice I
President E.E. Utley in Raleigh. I carried with me all my documentation of safety concerns and deficiencies, including those described here. I explained these concerns to Mr.
Utley and the responses to them by my supervision. He showed little interest in anything I said or any document I showed him. He did not ask questions regarding my concerns or my treatment. He said I was a " good man" and that I should go back to work. He promised to help. He did not. I performed all work assigned to me over the next 6 months, and have retained documentation of my satisfactory performance under increasing pressure and intimidation by my supervisor,'Alex Fuller. All my requests for transfer were refused. At the end of 6 months, I was called before Messers Foscolo, Rager, Ferguson and Fuller who told me that if I did not resign I would be terminated. They urged me to make it easier on
] myself by resigning; and said I would have a hard time i
Getting another nuclear industry job if I did not resign. I j told them I had done nothing wrong and would not resign.
That afternoon, February 29, 1984, Fuller escorted me like a i
prisoner out the gate without even a chance to exchange farewells with my colleagues and friends.
14
9
- 25. I have very serious concerns regarding the breakdown of Quality Assurance at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. There is a great deal of pressure on the Construction Inspection (CI) organization which lacks the freedom and independence from cost and scheduling considerations to effectively perform their OA duties of identifying and documenting deficieccics. As an Engineer I was always aware of the conflict between production and quality. Both CI and Construction Engineering reported to the Senior Resident Engineer.
- 26. CP&L and its prime contractor Daniel employ a confusing and ineffective array of different documenting systems for controlling nonconformances such as DR's, DDR's, NCR's FCR/PW's and such commonly used uncontrolled paperwork as Memos and " Speed Le t ters" . Few of us were trained in which procedures were to be used when. Mostly we wrote things down informally. I doubt that the OA vault contains even a fraction of the deficiencies in safety systems which have been identified. In order to ensure that I communicated ef fectively in my work - particularly since English is my second language - I made it a practice to retain full documentation of work in my areas. I have " Speed Letters" l reflecting numerous deficiencies which I am sure have been discarded by CP&L. I also have retained copies of many quality documents which I believe have not been properly controlled by CP&L.
15
4 3
I hope that someone will seriously investigate my safety concerns. I know that many other present and former Harris employees, including craft and other engineers, share my concerns. However, they are not eager to share my experience in order to voice those concerns, since they have every reason to fear the same kind of retaliation that I have experienced. I hope that this statement of mine will make it
- easier for the others to speak more freely.
I am willing to assist in identifying and correcting quality assurance and workmanship problems in any manner necessary to ensure that the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power 4
Plant does not harm the public.
I A
i CHAN VA5~VO 4 Sworn to and subscribed before me this the [ day of d2 c'[ , 1984.
N ARY PU'BLIC My Commission expires: 7/ gg 1
16
F ,
AFFIDAVIT My name is Chan Van vo. I am also known as van Vo Davis. I am giving this statement to Robert Guild, Attorney-at-Law, of Charleston, South Carolina, who has identified himself to me as a representative of the Government Accountability Project. I was employed for almost five years by Carolina Power & Light Company in the construction of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant near Raleigh, North Carolina, most recently in the position of Engineer where I i was responsible for ensuring that the installation of pipe and pipe-hangers was in accordance with approved plans, specifications, codes, procedures and schedules. Although I .
l am not opposed to nuclear power, my experience with CP&L causes ne to have serious doubts about CP&L's commitment to nuclear safety and about the as-built quality of construction at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. dd^many occasions I have brought safety concerns and construction deficiencies to the attention of my supervisors only to face lack of interest and hostility; and in one case only to find my l documentation of a serious safety concern discarded in my i supervisor's trash can the next day. I have taken these <
i concerns up my chain of command to senior nanagement at CP&L i
on several occasions only to be told that 'this is not ,
(
vietnam, here at CP&L you are only a soldier who must follow orders.' This lack of interest in my safety concerns was followed by a pattern of harassment, intinidation, pressure to resign, and ultimately my termination. I have filed a lD
- 4. Alex Fuller and his immediate superior, Resident __
Mechanical Engineer E.E. "Ed" Willett, particularly demonstrated a lack of commitment to nuclear safety and a general lack of knowledge and competence to perform their important engineering and management responsibilities. The Resident Engineering Unit carries responsibility for all site engineering functions at the Harris Plant, under the direc-4 tion of a CP&L employee, the Senior Resident Engineer, a l position held by % A. _Lucas until his removal for poor per formance in early 1983. Under Lucas were the various engineering disciplines and the Construction Inspection (CI) organizations. Ed Willett took over the Mechanical Engineering group in 1980. He originally supervised activities in the piping, hangers, equipment and heating-ventilation-air conditioning (HVAC) areas; until equipment installation and HVAC were taken away from him in early 1983, f and hanger work was taken away in October, 1983, because of
, mounting problems and growing recognition of Willett's lack of ability to ef fectively manage his work. Willett brought in his friend, Alex Fuller, to supervise the hanger program t
in late 1981, despite Fuller's lack of qualifications for this work. Fuller's training was in civil engineering and his only previous work experience was in dam construction ;
I with CP&L. As problems mounted in the hanger area, Al Rager l was brought in over Alex Fuller. This did not help at all since Rager lacked any engineering experience. Rager has .
4 __ _ _ __ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___
l
1 4
- 6. To assure proper fit-up, I identified the fitters' Foreman and requested that he ask his General Foreman, Danny ,
McGhee, to request Millwright assistance in fitting this connection. Millwrights are responsible for the installation of mechanical equipment such as this SGFW pump. The Foreman did as I requested, but reported back that McGhee had said go ahead without the Millwrights. I returned to my office where I called Piping Engineer D.M. Dasburg to whom I related the gy
_- -- - - ~ - ,
problem. -
- 7. Several days later I encountered the same crew of pipefitters in the Turbine Building in the process of actually fitting up this pipe to the pump nozzle. The fitters had rigged a horizontal "come-along" from the pipe to ;
a nearby beam and were " cold pulling" the pipe using extreme force which I would estimate at several thousand pounds in order to force fit the connection. When I encountered them they had almost completed the entire weld. No Millwright was present, nor did I observe any Ouality Control, Construction Inspector, or supervisory authority present to witness the
" cold pull" fit-up of this pipe.
3
- 8. About one week later I observed two Millwrights, a Mr. Strickland, Company No. 50-185 and Mr. Bass, Company No.
50-105, performing an alignment test on the subject Feedwater i Pump. One of them said to me, "Mr. Chan they really screwed up this pump!" The Millwrights were measuring the pump shaf t alignment using an instrument called a " Dial Indicator" which ,
measures in thousands of an inch. Procedure calls for an alignment tolerance of +/ .005. The Millwrights reported to 3
6 <
__2 _ .,.# 4 e- _ _ - -a 2 m _ , , . . . .
me the results of alignment neasurenants over a three-day period under hot and cold temperature conditions. Their notes reflected a severe nisalignment neasurenent of as noch as + .108", .078" under bot conditions; and + .108",
.075" under cold conditions!
- 9. On August 25, 1982, I explained this problem to my Supervisor, Alex Fuller. I asked him how I should document and report this safety deficiency; and whether I should infor.n Resident Mechanical Engineer Ed Willett. Fuller told me to document t'ic problen on a " Speed Letter" which he said he would route to Willett. " Speed Letters" are connonly used s
at the Harris site for not only routine internal communica- -
tion, but also in place of prescribed r)uality Assurance f __
documentation. _
Use of " Speed Letters" is not prescribed in any procedures for the documentation of construction deficiencies, nor are " Speed Le t te rs" contr >lled documents shich are nornally part of the Nuclear Plant's permanent quality records. I documented the cold pulling nisalignment of the Stean Generator Feedwater Pump as I was instructed in such a " Speed Letter" to Alex Fuller, "Sunject: Loads Imposed on tne Steam Generatur Feed Punp 1A-NNs," which detailed my observations and attached a diagran showing the Dial Indicator ali.j9nent readings and the Millwrights' names and Company nunbers. I closed ny nessaJe: "Please i nve s t ig a te . " The very next day I happaned to find my " Speed i w i
i Letter" with attached diagram discarded in Fuller's trash can!
7 _ __ ~_ . . _ ,
- 10. The following day I spoke with R.r. "Roy" Settle, a Daniel Construction employee who serves as Equipment Installation Supervisor. I told him of the problen and showed him-ny discarded "Spoed Letter". Roy said that he had told Ed Willett af t> problen three tines. He quoted Willett as cursing hin. and adding: "I don't want to hear any more about that problea. If something happens I will fire you first!"
- 11. Several months later on October 14, 1982, I observed Millwrights re-checking the alignment of the subject pum p.
They gave ne a note reflecting the results of their Dial Ir.dicator readings: + .098", -
.075". I showed this note to Tiox Fuller. He said nothing. The following day T showed it to Ed Willett. He caid tell Daren D9aburg the Piping ? W h6 E F n ,; i ne e r . I air,*ady had. I gave a copy of the note to Dasburg.
- 12. Since I ftrst raised ny concern r+ garding the cold pulling of this pipe c.nd its effe:t on the feedwater pump, I be:a u- awa:; of increasing pressure frm Fuller and Willett.
- + >ug h t a transter out frnn under F ller ind Willett l
thinking that a change in supervisinn would ease this retaliation. Willett refused to approve my transfer request.
i I pursued ny concern regarding the nishandling of the pump '
deficiency and my roquest for transfer to avoid the ,
nistreatment. Both Senior Resident Engineer A. Lucas and ;
it :. r r i s Projoet Manaier Parsons showod no interest and offered -
n' help. They sent ne back to Willett.
8
- 13. In November or December 1982 I went to see CP&L Vice President, M.A. McDuffie. I told him that I was just trying to serve my Company. I expl.iined to hin all about ny report of the pump deficiency. I showed hin ny " Speed Letter" and diagram and the Millwrights' notes; I told hin of Roy Settle's comnents. !!e showod no reaction and isked no questions. I told hin of the retali1rion an7 pressure fran Fuller and Willett. He told me that I was a good man, that the Company needed ne. He said he would help and that I should go back and rei;nost a transfer. I did as he told me; but ny transfer wa:5 refused. Mr. McDuffie did not help me, /
nor did he investij1te ny saf ety concerns.
- 14. In March, Alex Fuller increased the level of pressure on ne and threatened ne with terninition of my job.
He subjected me to "fornal counseling" regarting ny job pe r f c>rnance , includinj a requirement that I impove ny "understancing and explana tion or problems." After I requested Project Manager Parsons' help in allowing ne to reDut Fulle r 's alle:ja t ions , Fuller and Willett backed down and iropped their charges.
- 15. In April, 19 tT 3 , I went ta s e e '.' i c e President icDatfie again for "-1;;. This time ne mnt e b4ck without any action or hel:. *i r . Meifu t f to sai1, "Th , is tho II . S .
This is CP&L, not . . ' r v1 'M re Ed Willet? '7 tour Lieutenant and yo. cly a uldier. You muur they orders." During t:.' Spr in i the pressure from Fullsr ,,
continued to incro3:w. [ was assigned more and more work:
I hangers in the diesel jonerator buildin.), the turbine 9
1 I
building, the. reactor building, the auxiliary building and "a
the waste processing buliding. Much more work than my fair ,
1 i share.
! 16. In June, 1983, the NRC began to identify serious ,
f problems in the hanger installation program at Harris. In a i
June 10, 1983, exit meeting with site management, NRC Senior ,
Mechanical / Welding Engineer J.W. York noted problems in the
- hanger inspection area with particular regard to missed deficiencies and material control problems. Several weeks ,
a
' later Alex Fuller assigned me to work with the OA 7 t
Surveillance Group under the direction of OA Engineer " Buck" ,
]
i Willians. Our task was to begin an evaluation of the ,
adequacy of the existing pipe hanger installation progran. ;
Fuller instructed ne to select, at randon, about 50 hanger !
I i packages for review, with particular emphasis on E t_erial substitutions, use of surplus ma.terials, and identification of Construction *13terial Requisitions (CMR's) that did not L
c +
< natch the hanger naterials actually installed. These areas l represented significant problems which the NRC had observed i i
i and which indicated the potential need for costly and time
! I
- i. consuning reinspection and rework.
l d' CT ?
) 17. At Buck (Williams' request &I pulled 50 hanger ;
packages for seismic hangers on safety-related systens which
! were supposed to be Phase II complete: installed, inspected, i
and found acceptable for turn over to operations with only I
1 i
j the final Phase til stress analysis yet to te performed.- Of i
- these, the OA surveillance Group inspected 12 at randon. In -
) i 4 i L
10 __ _ . , _ _ _ _ _ . _
4 the course of this review numerous serious deficiencies were noted which had not been identified, documented or corrected f although these_ hangers had all received final approval by CI i
and CP&L OA/0C.
- 18. By " Speed Letter" of July 18, 1983, I transmitted to j
Alex Fuller and Ed Willett my ca7pleted " Hanger Phase II l
Verification Checklists" for these sample hanger packages. O I)
Fuller was very angry that such a large number of a
deficiencies had been identified, and he blamed ne for
! documenting all of these problems. In particular he focused 1
on the proDlem of material traceability which we had identified on many of these hangers. For example on pipe i
I hanger A-2-236-1-CC-li-105, a " Speed Letter" of 4/25/80 indicatesthat a 1" x 10" x 10" plate was obtained from i Purchase Orcer 21022 and installed as per drawing. PO 21022 4(
i was cited as the source for material in nany of the hangers f i
! e exanined. I explained to Fuller that I had researched this PO with OA Inspector Jay Vincent and another man on the Surveillance team. We could find no documentation of this PO in the 0; records vault. In the Purchasing Department, R3bert Babb inforned us that the Purchasing Log showed that PO 21022 had been voided and that no naterials had ever been i
I received through that order! We could not determine where t 'ione ha yer materials had cone from or document that such naterials were of acceptable quality for nuclear safety j application. -
i I
11
?
i
- 19. Later that afternoon Fuller called me into his office. He called me "a liar" and said that he had found
', documentation for PO 21022 in the warehouse. He accused me of not doin.] my job properly. I asked him to wait for the I
issuance of the Deficiency and Disposition Report (DDR) by l
the OA Surveillance Group which would confirm my report of I material traceability problems and, in particular, the j _ apparent falsification of documentation involved in the repeated use of void PO--21022 to supply traceability for ;
hanger materials of unknown origin._, I returned to my work.
DDR 1775 was issued by Buck Williams on July 26, 1 20.
1983, documenting the QA Surveillance findings, as well as my '
l report to Fuller and Willett regarding the void PO. That DDR l
4 states that "PO 21022 was voided and no documentation 1
1 exists that material was received." It also states: "A further investigation of PO # 21022 revea led that material >
i from this PO was used on pipe hanger 1-CC-H-1242, 1-RH-H-183, and numerous other pipe hangers not listed-here, although PD 1
- 21022 was voided
" DDRs 1776, 1784, 1793 and i
Nonconformance Report (NCR) OA-255 also docunent problems we f
' found in the hanger verification.
In response to my report to Fuller and Willett of OA I
21.
failures, Willett issued a Memo July 29, 1983, "
Subject:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant - Cenpliance with Project l OA Projrams and Procedures", which emphasized that compliance i
is " mandatory" and provided examples of j with OA procedures ,.
i i " DO ' s a nd Do n ' t ' s " .
)
l 12 !
22'. On August 1, 1983, Assistant Project General Manager P.F. Foscolo responded to our Phase II hanger surveillance and the'NRC concerns by providing for significant changes in the hanger program. A stop work order had been issued on July 29, 1983, halting all work and inspection on seismic hangers. Phases I and II were eliminated; work and OA procedures were substantially changed, including particularly WP-110, and TP-34, which provided for hanger installation and inspection. In particular, CP&L noted that hanger documentation should be checked to insure "that the surplus hangers nunber/ purchase order nunber is legitimate". At that tire only about 300 of the 18,000 seismic pipe hangers had successfully passet inspection. I remain concerned about the ~
use of false documentation on such safety grade materials. -
,2 --
Has any oftort been made to investigate the cause or extent of this problem at the Harris Plant?
- 23. On August 22, 1983, Alex Fuller presented me with a Meno signed by himself and Ed Willett reflecting their decision to place me on probation due to what was described as a decline in ny performance "over the past year and one half". Of course, Fuller himself had promoted me to Engineer less than a year earlier! I believe that this action was in retaliation for my expression of safety enncerns. I refused to acknowledge Fa l le r's false charges, and, instead I wrote:
"I do not agree with this statement", on the meno.
Ironically one of the actions required of me over the next 6 ,
months was: . . . problems that are detected must be reported accurately and timely.". CP&L nanagement I
13-
. - . - . . .. . . ~. - . .~ ----. . - - - . . - - - - . - . . .
I 1
I iT -
1 demonstrated time and time again that they wanted us to look i
tne other way when we encountered deficiencies. " Problems" i
i were the last thing they wanted reported, i
- 24. In the Fall of 1983 I met with CP&L Executive Vice President E.E. Utley in Raleigh. I carried with ne all my .
4 documentation of safety concerns and deficiencies, including
! those described here. I explained these concerns to Mr.
i Utley and the responses to then by my supervision. He showed l
little interest in anything I said or any docunent I showed i
j him. 'He did not ask questions regarding my concerns or my 1
{ treatment. He said I was a " good nan" and that I should go i
! back to work. He premised to help. He did not. I performed -
, all work assigned to me over the next 6 months, and have l .
l j retained documentation of ny satisf actory performance under i '
- increasing pressure and intimidation by my supervisor, Alex i
! Fuller. All my requests for transfer were refused. '
At the -
- l l end of 6 nonths, I was called before .'4essors Foscolo, Rager, [
i 1
i _Ferguson art:j , Puller who told me that if I did not resign I
[
would be t e rm i n a te ?. . They urged ne to nake it easier on l ,
myself by resigning; ano said I would have a hard time jetting another nuclear industry job if I c.id not resign. I I t
told the7 I had dane nothing wrong ana woald not resign.
i i That afternoon, February 29, 1984, Fuller escorted me like a l prisoner out the gn'a ai*hout even a chance to exchange i
j farewells with my collo,Jues and frionds. ,
t i
I l . - . _ . _ _ , . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _
I4 _ , _ _ . __ _____j
q l
i f'
- 25. I have very serious concerns regarding the breakdown of Ouality Assurance at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power 1 i
Plant. There is a great deal of pressure on the Construction- 4 Inspection (CI) organization which lacks the freedom and j
independence from cost an_d sch_edulinJ_ considerations to _
{ j f
f ef fectively perform their OA duties of identifying and documenting deficiencie.s. As an Engineer I was always aware of the conflict between production and quality. Both CI and',
l Construction Engineering reported to_the Se,nior Resident , ,
Engineer. ,
- 26. CP&L and its prime contractor Daniel employ a
! confusing and inef fective array of dif ferent documenting systems for controlling nonconformances such as DR's, DDR's, NCR's FCR/PW's and such commonly used uncontrolled paperwork f as Menos and " Speed Letters". -
Few of us were, trained in 4
which procedures.were to be used when. Mostly we wrote l
things down informally.-I doubt that the OA vault contains even a fraction of the deficiencies in safety systems which ,
ave Deen identified. In order to ensare that I-communicated ,
i effectively in ny Vork - particularly since English is my f second language - I made it a practice to retain full {
f documentation of work in my areas. _ I have " Speed Letters" 4 reflecting numerous deficiencies which I an sure have~ .teen - ....
{iscardedbyCP&L. I also have retained copies of nany quality documents which I believe have not been properly -
t
.:ontrolled by CP&L. ,,
i J
[
I hope that someone will seriously investigate my safety concerns. I know that many other present and former Harris __
employees, including craft and other engineers, share my
, concerns._ However, they are not eager to share my experience in order to voice those concerns, since they have every reason to fear the same kind of retaliation that I have experienced. I hope that this statement of mine will make it easier for the others to speak more freely.
I am willing to assist in identifying and correcting quality assurance and workmanship problems in any manner j l
necessary to ensure that the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant does not harm the public.
i I
M w?SVM44 CHAN VAN VO Sworn to and subscribed before me
)
this the [ day of d)c,I ____,,___
, 1984.
L.--
N. - -.ARY PUBLIC l v.y Commission expires: R// /"d (
l I
16 __________