ML20210B647

Affidavit of Ps Miriello Re safety-related Welds That Never Received Preservice Insp

ML20210B647
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	09/13/1986
From:	Miriello P CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20210B560	List: ML20210B556 ML20210B647 ML20210B696
References
OL, NUDOCS 8609180131
Download: ML20210B647 (5)

Text

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,.. 5eptember 13,1936 fv'1

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I:t TH2 I!ATTER OF CAROLINA PO'.l2R & LIGHT 7 DMT A NOT KNCUIIIG I? IT HA3 GIV2'i TH2 3AF2TY L,d%gg 32LAT2D U2LDS IN TH2 5H2ARCN HARRIS NUCL2AR d PLANT A PR252RVICI IN5PICTICN .g h g g M AFFIDAVIT OF PATTY 3. :.:IRI2LLO * -

CFFICL - -

Patty 3. Miriello, being duly sworn according to la iDQfiliod.eg.a}nd"'-

Mays as follows:

1. Iiy name is Patty S. Miriello. I live in Charleston County, 3.0.

I an both a nuclear engineer and a materials en I ras employed by Carolina Power a Light (CP&L)gineer, presently.

from February 1985 through August 1935 as a health physics technician. I was employed contractor, at by theNuclear ShearonEnergy Harris Services, a nondestructive nuclear plant testin[7nspection as an in the preservice engineer from April 1984 through February 1985 As an engin'eer for Services (NES), Carolina Power & Light (CP&L) was billed Nuclear 2nergy$50.00 per hour for ny servicesi whereas, technicians appro::imately and clerks were billed to CP&L for much less. At a cost of about 0$0.00 -

per hour, CPaL paid :i25 about the sane amount of noney for Archie Doud

( 3.3. Nuclear 2ngineer) as they did for ne (3.A. 3.3. 2ngineer/M.S.

in completion). I designed, implemented, and supervised the preservice data control system at the Shearon Harris nuclear plant. I vrote almost 100 nonconformance reports on the Shearon Harris safety related piping.

I ~as reponsible for interfacing as an engineer with Daniel engineering to see that the repairs dictated by the nonconformance were completed and I verfied that they uere and and informed ITIS personnel 2: hen they could reinspect welds. I interfaced with the construction crews doing the repairs, CP&L quality assurance, and I answered to plant management and interfaced vith plant management in this matter at meetings. Any statenent by Tom Brombach, my former CP&L supervisor (no degree) in inservice inspection, that I was not an engineer; but a technician is an attengt to cover up. (See the CP&L 3rombach affidavit of August 6, 1936 to the Director of~ the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission)

oreover, Thomas 3ronbach Tas pleased with my work as an engineer as plainly shown in Attachment 1. Does Thomas 3ronbach and CP&L lie to the U3NRC? '

2. The purpose of this affidavit is to once again point out the following: That there are nany. safety relat9d celds at the Shearon Harric nuclear nlant that recuire a rreservice insnection accordinz to U.S. Code nuclear reculationse that ~ere never civen a nreservice insnection. I inforned former CPaL sunervision of this natter chile I vas ennloved as an encineer by NES in the inservice insnection nro-cran.

3 In July or August o: 1934, I told both Tom 3rombach and Stanely Pruitt that I found bet ea110 and 20 safety related piping welds that had never had an .a preservice inspection. Both N23 and CP&L thought the welds had been given a preservice inspection; but in actuality the velds had been cut out or reworked)and had never been given a second preservice inspection. The documentation at that time in the CP&L assurance construction vault such as the complete veld data

' quality report (UDR) plainly ahowed the rework and dates of rework. However, the interface between the CP&L construction people and the CP&l. operations s-

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.1 personnel was so poor that one didn't always know what the other was doing. Thomas Brombach (the inservice inspection ' engineer' for CP&L) and Stanely Pruitt (No degree, formerly from TMI, and the inservice inspection specialist for CFah) did not know the extent of the problem.

Therefore, I was told to s ueld documentation (UDR's) to pend a week either in theorconstruction confirm vault deny what the NESreviewing tech-cians were reporting to CF&L: that cons;ruction crews (Daniel) were going behind the NES inspection crews ani cutting out and reworking welds. In addition, the NES crews were . stating that they were not being told to reinspect these welds by Stanely Pruitt or Thomas 3 rom-bach. I was being given no indication by Stanely Fruitt or Thomas Brom-bach that any welds needed to be reinspected or to adjust the data control or nonconformance systems to reflect that. It was the responsibility of CP&L to inform NES what the construction status of the welds requiring inspection ras. In plain terms, the system wasn'.t working at Harris.

After one week of review in the vault. I cited between 10 to ?O walds -

which CP&L and NES thoucht had a valid nreservice insvection which in fact were not nreservice insnected. No one in inservice inspection knew that the welds had been reworked or that in some cases the original weld was completely gone and a new weld was present. I copied the WDR's as evidence, attached the invalid preservice inspections, and attached any related documentation rhich I had such as nonconformance reports and gave all of this to Thomas 3rombach. He said that he would take care of the problem. He did take up the matter with Stanely Pruitt.

At thin noint in tina about 1000 safety related welds had a nreservice insnection connleted and neither CP&L or NES were sure which insnections were valid. As I analyzed the situation and the UDR's it became clear that in some cases, construction crers due to the amount of work were simply slow in making weld repairs. Cften the paper vork took time.

Therefore, it was not unusual for construction work to continue on the piping after CF&L operations -thought it had ceased. At this point in time there was no uritten statement or documentation from CFOL construc-tion to CFaL operations - inservice inspection that a piping ~ eld could be turned over to be inspected. This ras poor engineering and management of the inservice inspection program. A critical noint was overlooked in the rush for construction connletion.

The 10Nwelds (approximate) included the following systems: reactor coolant, main steam, safety injection, and other systems. I was told not to concern myself anymore tith this matter and that it would be taken care of. From this point in time to Febnxury 25,1935 I never saw any effort to go back and review the documentation on the welds pre-viously given the preservice inspection which now were suspect of having false reports as official plant documentation. In my opinion the ichcle matter should have been written up in a nonconformance report.as a reportable matter to the USSRC. It never Jas. Because a number of NES personnel knew of the problem; the system was changed so that there was a documented turn over of piping systems between CF&L plant construction j

and the inservice inspection personnel. However, Thomas 3rombach and

! Stanely Pruitt did not go back and check the supposedly completed welds.

They probably hoped the matter would never become exposed.

i

Page 3 Consequently, what safety relate,d welds in the 3hearon Harris nuclear plant have really been inspected? 'lhat other communication The

, problems inservice between CP&L organizations resulted in similiar problems?

inspection and preservice inspection is required Moreover, by the U3NRC the integrity and thetoengineer-help insure that the plant is safe.

ing ability to operate the Shearon Harris nuclear plant is in question in this matter.

In order for Thomas Brombach and Stanely Pruitt to change the system and the interface between CP&L construction and operations personnel in this matter; plant management had to become invcived. This included 2d Steudel, the manager of Technical Support of plant operations and Jim 'ilillis the plant manager. Also the construction management of both CP&L and Daniel construction would be aware of the problem so that a new system of documented turn over of welds could work effectively.

Quality assurance mangement would in'a similiar manner be aware of the problem and changes. Are all of these people aware that there are approximately 1000 welds out there that slid by? -

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' Pat'ty i. Miri'ello Sworn and subscribednto before me

, 1986.

thic /Bd day of 2 .oh

[yotary Publicc,Y7W4 -

My Commission expires [ .

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Attachment 1

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CP&L Carohna Power & Light Company my 8,1985 To whcm it may concern:

During the period of April 9,1985 through February 25,1985; I had the opportunity to supervise and direct the activities of Patty S. Miriello.

I can candidly state that Patty was the type of erployee most supervisors enjoy to have on their staff. She was self motivated needing little direc-tion nor supervision. Assigned tasks were W ormed diligently and re p r- '

ting requirements satisfied in a manner beneficial to 'the ccrupany. She showed interest in all phases of her work continuing to pursue and become knowledgable in all areas not restricting herself to her own specific func-tion. At no time did I have any reason to question her stability, reliabil-ity, or trustworthiness. Patty ccmes highly rewmerded to fill any position for which she is qualified.

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5" ProjectEnghr

Shcaron Harris Jabatage

1. Deisel generator building fire.was set as alleged.

2. Reactor coolant piping was cut as alleged.

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