ML20129B982
| ML20129B982 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1985 |
| From: | Lehman T TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8507290313 | |
| Download: ML20129B982 (109) | |
Text
!
1 i
1 BEFORE THE FACT FINDING TASK FORCE r).
(
2 OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 5
Re:
6 Davis-Besse event 4
7 of June 9,
1985 8
i 9
INTERVIEW OF TED LEHMAN t
I-lo 1
11 Interview of TED LEHMAN by the Nuclear j
12 Regulatory Commission Fact Finding Task Force, taken 13 before me, Anne I.
McBrayer, a Notary Public in and
~
14 for the S ta te of Ohio, at the Site Emergency 15 Operations Center, Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant, Oak 16 Harbor, Onio, on Wednesday, June 12, 1985, at 9:08 i
17 o' clock a.m.
18 i
i 19 20 21 22 8507290313 850612 PDR ADOCK 05000346 lj
'24 T
PDR RUNFOLA_& ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
2
'l.
APPEARANCES:
dgs. -
~
2 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4340 East West Highway 3
Bethesda, _ Maryland 20814 By Mr. Steve Burns, 4
On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory' 5
Commission.
6 Members of the Team:
7 Wayne Lanning.
8 Larry Bell J.
T.-Beard 9
Ernie Rossi 10 11 12 13 14 15
-16 17 18 l
19
-20 l
I 21 i
'22 1
23-
{
24 i
l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION I
4
. - -. ~,. - -...
3 1
TED LEHMAN r-D 2
being. called as
- a. witness, was interviewed as 3
follows:
l 4
EXAMINATION 5
BY MR. ROSSI:
i i
6 Q.
Okay.
This is Ted Lehman.
And, Ted, why
+
1 7
don't you tell us what your position in the company 8
is?
l 9
A.
Okay.
I hold the-position of shift I
10 supervisor.
I've held that since July lat of 1981.
I i
11 Before that, I was an assistant shift supervisor i
12 since the beginning of the plant operation.
I was i
j 13 one of the original coal license members.
Been in 14 the program since April'of 1972.
l 15 Q.
Okay.
And you were on duty, I guess, the I
l 16 night of the 9th?
17 A.
9th, yes, I was.
i i
18
-Q.
At the. time that you had the problem with t
i 19 the main feedwater pump?
i 20 A.
Yes.
21 Q.
Maybe the best thing to do is to have him 1
22 describe what occurred and refer to.any. graphs or 23 racords that you.have?
4
-24 BY MR. BEARD:-
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
(
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 1
4 1
Q.
Can I ask you one sort of administrative s
(
\\
%)
2 thing?
3 A.
Go ahead.
4 Q.
You were on that shift.
What time at this 5
plant does that shift start?
6 A.
Twelve midnight.
7
- Q.
It starts at twelve midnight.
In any 8
event, we're talking about it took place at roughly 9
- 1:30 in the morning, so you had been on duty an hour 10 and a half?
11 A.
Hour and a half.
12 Q.
And I presume when you came on duty in 13 your turnover, the shift from the previous shitt to 14 you folks, there were no significant or unusual 15 plant conditions or maybe you could cover that so it 16 would give us a background of where we're coming 17 into this from.
18 BY MR. ROSSI:
19
-Q.
It might be good if you started at the 20 time you came onto the shift and tell us, you know, 21 wha t, if anything, occurred?
22 A.
When we came on shift, the plant was at 90 23 percent power, 800, roughly 820' megawatts electrical.
[' 1 the only significant difference from normal 24
.We RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 5
w w
. ~ _
4
~
1 0
1:
1 operations, we had had problems with the main feed t
! y-l.
2 pump oil systems.
.As a result of that, we were 3
running with t h e = N cL.
1 main feed pump in automatic, i
i l
4 and No. 2 main feed pump was in manual.
5 BY MR. BEARD:
6 Q.
When you.say o'i l ~ s y s t e m, Ted, you're-not j
7 talking about lube oil, are you?
~
8 A.
No, control ~ oil.
i i
9
'Q.
Control. oil.
Okay.
-Just want to maxe I
I; 10 sure tha t's ~ clear.
11.
A.
Yes.
We hadiproblems of when we were 1
I
~ that we'd had, during j-12 coming-up-from the last trip j
13 that trip both main-feed pumps had tripped shortly' 14 after-the reactor tripped.
During the investigation
)
1 15 of that, they discovered an. anomaly in the' oil j
16 system for the No. 1 main feed' pump.
They didn't.
i-l 17.
really have a resolution to.that.
i 18 While they were-down, they instrumented 19 both pumps.
And then we brought the plant 1up, and 20
.they were.just going to wa tch the1 instrumentation.
i
'21 See-if they.could find anything ou t ' about that.
22 LThey wanted one pump to be run-in automatic, one 23
. pump manually.
They didn't'have any preference 24 whic'h one was-which.
We just, you know, we had the f(}
RUNFOLA &-ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
(
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
[
E
.. ~., _ -.... -. - -
6 l
line up we did in the way we started up.
q Q
2 Q.
Was there some rationale as to why one 3
automatic and why one manual?
if something 4
A.
Just in case something 5
- would happen, we'd have one pump that wasn't relying 6
on the control oil system as such.
7 Q.
So the oil system that you were having 8
difficulties with was relating to the automatic 9
control and not related to the manual?
10 A.
That was the theory.
11 Q.
Okay.
12 A.
It had problems before where both pumps 13 would tend to oh, what can I say.
They were we have a,
what they called, rapid 14 thinking that 15 feedwater reduction system on our feedwater pump 16 that is supposed to aid in our feedwater control 17 following a trip, post trip.
One of the functions 18 of that system is to increase the main feed pump 19 speed to keep our f eedwa ter delta P high~ due to the 20 increased steam pressure.
21 One of the theories was that the ra pid 22 increase that the system would give to the feed 23 pumps might be-causing the lube oil system to or
/^)
24 not the lube oil, but the control oil to fail in I
(-
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 1
7 1
some method.
Not necessarily fail, but have a 2
malfunction, some method that would cause the pumps 3
to trip.
4 Because ot that, they wanted us to run 5
with one feed pump in manual such that it would not 6
respond to that rapid feedwater reduction system in 7
the event it would trip.
8 Q.
So the control system that was apparently 9
involved was the rapid reduction part, which as I is that now part of the integrated 10 think is 11 control system?
12 A.
It's tied into the integrated control I
13 system.
I t's not really a fault in a rapid 14 feedwater reduction, but more in response of the 15 feed pump to that.
It would only appear usually 16 during a trip.
17 Q.
Okay.
So it wouldn't 18 A.
A post trip.
19 Q.
It wouldn't be involved with the automatic 20 controls used to maintain the plant at s ta ted power?
21 A.
No.
22 Q.
But only in a post trip situation?
23 A.
Just in post trip is when it showed up
(~T 24 before this.
%J RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
8 1
BY MR. ROSSI:
well, let me go 2
Q.
What sort of problems 3
back one step before that.
Had this control system 4
for the main feedwater pumps, this was something 5
that was newly installed?
[
6 A.
The control systems on the main feed pumps 7
were put in during the last fueling outage.
8 Q.
Which would have been what date about?
9 A.
It was last fall.
10 Q.
That's close enough.
11 A.
Sometime.
I can't remember exact dates on 12-that.
But it was installed during that outage.
l 13 This was a new system from GE that was supposed to 14 be of a considerable improvement over the original 15 systems that came with the pumps.
16 BY MR.
BEARD:
17 Q.
In case I'm confused a bit, maybe you can l
18 help me understand this.
Are you saying the rapid 19 feedwater reduction system was installed during this 20 outage or a new improved version of it was installed?
21 A.
No.
It was tho' actual control system for 22 the feed pump.
The actual control cabinet and l
23 control system for the feed pump itself was changed..
()
24 Q.
Okay.
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l-
1 4
4 9
1 A.-
The rapid feedwater reduction, I couldn't
.,eb L
2
.give you the exact dates when that had been put in.
3 It was sometime before even this.
And that was just i
4 a modification to the ICS to aid in p l'a n t response 5
to a reactor trip.
6 BY-MR. ROSSI:
had you been 7
Q.
Had they-been having 8
having problems with the feedwater control system 9
since last fall or 7
f
-10 A.
No.
]
had these.--
11 Q.
i t
12 A.
Up until this time, it had:been aJ pretty 13 nice system.
)
14 Q.
The new one?
15 A.
Yes.
It ran very smoothly.
Gave us.much 16 better control of.the pumps.
The.old oneLused to well, just cantankerous.
Sometimes we'd have 17 tHe 18 trouble getting the pumps off gear when wegwere 19 bringing the' pumps up.
We'd'have to go down and 4
20 crank on the contro1~1ers.down there to'get the thing 21 to come up and just various problems like that.
i 22 Tnese were much better from that standpoint.
23 Q.
And so the problems started like just
()
24 during'a recent reactor trip or.--
l -
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION.
i
10 1
A.
On, it had been like we had a trip 2
about a week before mine, and it started sometime 3
shortly before that that they started experiencing 4
some of these problems.
~5 Q.
So a couple of weeks is what you're saying?
6 A.
At least.
7 BY MR. BELL:
~
you're talking lixe the 8
Q.
That was my 9
feed pump problem started in May of '85 then?
10 A.
I can't give.you an exact date, but yeah, 11 it was sometime previous to this they experienced z
12 some of these problems.
}
13 BY MR. ROSSI:
14 Q.
But it'was on the order of maybe a month 15 previcus?
16 A.
Yeah.
17 Q.
Not several months previous?
18 A.
Usually on a. post trip condition.
They'd l
19 never given us any problems while we were operating.
20 BY MR. BELL:
21 Q.
And did, as a part of the recovery, did
(
22 anybody other than instrument No.-l feed pump, did l
23 anybody make any changes to the adjustments of the f
(])
24 control oil sys tem or did they just decide to l
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
11 m.
1 instrument the system and not troubleshoot the
%)
2 system?
3 A.
They troubleshot the-system as well as 4
they could with the pump not running.
5 Q.
Okay.
6 A.
And there wasn't a lot they could see.
So the decision was made to not delay the 7
they
~
8 s ta r t-u p any longer, to just go ahead and put the o
9 instrumentation on the pump and start the plant back
~
i i
10 up and observe what would happen.
11 Q.
Was there any, discussion about limiting 12 plant power to the maximum power you can make on 13 only one feed pump while the other feed pump was 14 being troubleshot?
15 A.
No.
16 Q.
So that-you could get some actual there 17 was no discussion like that?
18 A.
That wasn't really considered.
19 Q.
And one final condition.
One final 20 Equestion, and I'll let you continue.
You said
't h e.
21 anomaly appeared in No. 1 main feed pump.
22 A.
That was the one we observed it in first.
- 2. 3 Q.
Okay.
And what sort.of anomaly was that?
(
24 A.
It was something that occurred that they RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES '(614)445-8477
. COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
l 12 4
1 never could really say that it was'related to the 4
m 2
' problems they had experienced with the pumps.
With 3
the pump-on turning gear, when you would initially 4
roll the pump up in'sp'eed, the standby. pump would 5
start.just because of the, you know, as the control 6
' system picked up and the in-surge on the oil-system, 7
the second pump would kick-in momentarily.
8
~ Q.
oSo'just let me ~ interrupt you a minute.
9 When this pump rolls up, then there's a reduction in 10 oil ~
~ that picks up-the standby pump?
pressure -Apparent reduction in: oil pressure?
12
., A.
Yeah, it's just.
There's oil regulators O-'
13 in the system.
The pumps put out something like-250 4
14 pounds of oil.
And tha t's stepped'-down once=for 15 control oil and again for. lube oil.
16 Q.
Okay.
17 A.
And it's just when you initially start
'18 rolling the pumps'up until the pressure' regulators 19 can catch it, sometimes the' pressure will just dip 20 low enough'it_will. catch the standby' pump and bring 21 it on.
Then the, you know,/the it.will all. level
- 22 oackDout,'and you'll turn the standby p u m p 'o f f. -
^
23 AsLit_ occurred, we were starting to' roll
({}.
24-the pump up as such,'and.the standby pump came on.
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)'445-8477 COMPUTER'. ZED' TR ANSCRIPTION
+-.
13 1
And the operator looked down and saw that and he
.,c)
(_)
2 tripped it.
As soon as he tripped the oil pump, the 3
main feed pump tripped.
4 Q.
So he caught'it while pressure was still 5
low?
6 A.
Well, the pressure had apparently 7
stabilized, but it shouldn't have done it under any 8
case.
9 Q.
What tripped the feed pump then?
10 A.
As they subsequently found out, it was, 11 for.some reason, it was the thrust bearing wear 12 detector trips, for whateverireason.
13 Q.
Okay..
Now they couldn't find anything 14 A.
They never 15 that would say why this happened.
It was just 16 something that, you know, if you caught it at just 17 the right time, just when the regulators were just, 18 you know, starting to catch it, if you dump that 19 standby-pump, the main feed pump was tripped, and it 20 was the thrust bearing wear detectors that would 21 trip.
'22 Q.
Okay.
Have you had-any problems with dirt 23 or foreign material.in this control _ oil system tha t
(])
24 would make the system-act erratically?
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
__ +
14 2
1 A.
No.
^2 Q.
Plugs, small orifices or that-kind of
-3 thing?
4 A.
No.
5 Q.
Okay.
Thank you, sir, s
6 BY MR. ROSSI:
7 Q.
Have you had these same kind of problems 8
witn-the main feedwater pump also; is that correct?
9 I1 mean, you 10 A.
It wasn't found on the No.
- 2. pump.
11 Q.
This problem'wasn't?
12 A.
N o.'-
13 Q.
The one that was found during 14' troubleshooting.-
But-the tripping of a after--
15 reactor trip had occurred on'it too?
4 16 A.
Yeah,'on the last trip-before this one, 17 both pumps tripped within a matter of seconds of 18 each other, immediately after the trip.
l 19 BY MR. BEARD:
20 Q.
Let:me make sure I understood what you r
/
21-said earlier,:.Ted.
The problem had been observed
'22 with the No. 1 main feed pump.
.And then for the 23 start-up it was decided one in automatic and one in 24 manual.
i' RUNFOLA'&-ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477-
[
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
-15 1
A.
Yes.
2 Q.
I think'you indicated that the guidance 3
that operators had received, it.really didn't make
'4 any difference which one but whatever.
But now when 5
.you did the otart-up or when the start-up was done, 6
which ones did you-have in automatic and which one 7
was in manual, do you remember?
8
,A.
When the plant finally got up on the line, 9
they had 2 in manual and 1 in automatic.
10 Q.
So No. I was in automatic and No. 2 was in 11 manual?
12 A.
Yes.
f%
kl 13 Q.
And 14 A.
We discovered this problem one afternoon 15 when we were on afternoon shitt, and we played 16 around with this.
And, you know, everybody 17 scratched their heads and looked at this.
Then 18 they decided they would go ahead and instrument 19 the pump.
Before they started.up they tried to 20 duplicate this problem again on the day shift, and 21 they couldn't.do it.
22 BY MR. ROSSI:
23-Q '.
This problem being the one where you
(}
24 tripped off the standby pump?
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
_ COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
m -
16 1
A.
They couldn't duplicate the problem.
So 7x L.,.)
maybe they just 2
they-tigured maybe it was just 3
had to exercise the system or whatever.
Tnat was 4
their explanation of it.
5 A decision was made to go ahead and take 6
the plant up with the pumps in that contiguration, 7
-and they didn't care which one we had in manual and 8
wnich one we nad in auto.
It was up to our 9
discretion.
10 BY MR.
BELL:
11 Q.
When the rapid feedwater reduction system 12 sends a signal to increase main teed pump speed, A-13 does that involve an increase in control pressure in 14 that feed pump to position the governor valve?
15 A.
N o.t an increase.
16 Q.
How do we ramp those valves up to a higher 17 position Lnon?
18 A.
Well, they're hydraulic.
Thete's the put more oil to the cylinder, 19 system will put just 20 the operating cylinder, and it hits the valves.
21 Q.
So when it does put more oil to this 22 ope ra ting cylinder in the position, the low pressure then this regulator has to 23 poppetts, then there
(')
24 reposition to hold a constant control oil pressure?
%.)
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
n
=
5 17 1
A.
I would assume that much.
j
-O-
- %s 2
Q.
Okay.:
3 A.
I ca n ' t -- you know, you're getting a 4
little bit past my knowledge of the just how the-5 sys tem - ope ra te s. -
But it's my understanding of it.-
j 6
Q.
All right, sir.
Thank you.
7 BY MR.
BEARD:
8 Q.
In summary then, when.you came on shift at 9
midnight, the only, quote,. unusual thing you had to 10 contend with was this problem on the main feed' pumps..
11
. And everything else ran pretty much as typical?
'i l
12 A.
Yes.
s 13 B Y --M R. ROSSI:
14 Q.
.And then things stayed that way until 1:30, 15 just steady s ta te of operation?
16 A.
Steady state.
17 Q.
Uneventful.
1
'1 8 A.
It was quiet, you know.
Night shift.
19 Nothing_ abnormal was happening.
The-weekend, there 20
.were no extra maintenance personnel-then.
So -there 1,
21 was no testing, no maintenanca of any kind. going on.
22 Just a very quiet Sunday morning..
23 BY MR.
LANNING:
k'"N 24 Q.
Do you recall any problem with the source
)
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
c 18 1-range detectors or anything to do with the source 2
-range?
3 A.
The No. 1 source range was declared 4
unoperable.
5
.BY MR.
BEARD:
6 Q.
Was it really inoperable, Ted, or was it 7
legally inoperable on some technicality?
8 A.
We've had the problem with the No. 1 when it's the 9
source range in that as it's 10 source range during power operation is normally 11 deenergized.
12 Q.
Right.
)
13 A.
For whatever reason a static charge tends 14 to build up on the center probe or-the. center lead 15 of_the cable, and that feeds through the circuit.
-16 And with the thing deenergized, it will sit there, 17 and it will read counts, 30, 40, 50, maybe higher 18 counts on source range.
And, you know, by rights, 19
-it's not right and we declared it inoperable per 20 textbooks.
~
21 BY MR. LANNING:
i 22
-Q.
How long has it been in this condition?
23 A.
Really it's been quite a while.
It will
(}
24 be in a condition like that.
If the instrument and RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
i
{
19 1
control technicians come over and they'll do the ST 2
on it, it will straighten back out and come down and 3
it will read right.
4 Q.
I see.
-5 BY.MR. BEARD:
6 Q.
And then I guess after a period of time, 7
the misbehavior reoccurs?
8 A.
Sometimes it will reoccur and wind up in 9
the same condition again..
10
~Q.
Following up'on that same line, was it 11' inoperable such that in your opinion that on a plant 12-trip you wouldn't be able to. depend-upon its: release 13 or did it~have this misbehavior-that only seemed to 14 occur related to when~you were at power and the 15 detector was turned off so that it's been 16 A.
It only happened.when we were at power and 17 the detector was off.
18 Q.
So you, as a supervisor or as an operator, 19 you -- did you feel that you could have depended 20.
upon 'its reading on'a post trip situation or --
21 A.
I wasn't concerned about it.
22
-Q.
Okay.
23 A.-
As such.
Tha t was no concern.
24 Q.
Okay.
RUNFOLA=&' ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
~
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 1
1
20 1
BY MR. ROSSI:
2
'Q.'
Okay.
Why don't you go on then and 3
describe how you first noted that something was f
,4 happening and tell us'what you observed about the
.5-event.
1 l
'6
-A.
I was,in my office, and-I had just gotten r
'7 up.-
I don't even know where I was going to go now.
'8 But I~ heard something start to wind down.
The shift I
i j
9
' supervisor's. office sits in somewhat of a unique i
l 10 position in that in that one spot, you.can hear a I
11 majority of the larger equipment that runs in the j
12 plant.
And I heard something-just start to wind i
13 down.
4' l-4 I immediately went over to the control 15-room and discovered tha t the No. 1 feed pump had 16 tripped.
The plant was in a runback.
1The RO had l
17 gone.to the No.
2' feed pump controller'and was 18 attempting to raise Lt in manual and attempt to 1 -
19
. bring the f ee: aa ter pressure and the flow up.
He 4
20 wasn' t successf ul in'this.
The. plant tripped on i
21 RCS pressure.
1hm went into our' emergency procedure l
22 for reactor trip.
Started'--
7 23 LBY;MR.' BELL:.
i ({}
24'
'o.
This 1
RUNFOLA 4 ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l-I
~
r f
.. _ ~
,s 4..
....;_,,_.._.4.,
r.__,.
21 1
A.
That one right there.
3 4
2 Q.
This is their emergency trip proceduro EP 3
1202.01.
4 BY MR. BEARD:
5 Q.
This is your -- you use the term emergency 6
procedure, and that's a proper name.
But it's 7
really the procedure that you use on any plant trip; 8
is that correct?
9 A.
Yes.
10 0
Okay.
11 A.
The assistant shift supervisor had opened 12 the procedure up, gone to the immediate actions and 13 read through those.
And then started through the 14 supplementary actions in the procedure which 15 verifies the reactors trip, turbine trip, rods in i
16 the bottom, turbine valves are closed, electrical
{
17 power, station air, instrument air, it goes through 18 a whole-list of parameters to check.
19 Q.
Now, _in tha t area comes up the question 20 about what' indication did you have on your nuclear 21 instrumentation system of the' flux level at that i
22 time?
23' A.
Normal post trip.
It would be in the
, /'l 24 intermediate range.
V RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477-COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION I
i 22 1
Q.
You were still in the intermediate range 1
g ks i
2 at that time?
3 A.
Yes, decaying down immediately after trip.
4 It takes quite a few minutes to get down into the 5
source-range post trip.
We were going through that.
6 At the same time I was obaerving the feedwater 7
system along with the RO that had been trying to 8
bring the feed pump up.
One'of our concerns was too 1
9 that the feedwater system would cut back and come 10 down onto low level limits on the steam generators 11 and hold there.
12 We've had occasions where it would O
13 undershoot, and we would have a SFRCS actuation on 14 low steam generator level.
So I was watching this 15 pretty close as the levels came down.
And levels 16 came down-nicely, came right in.
We watched the 17 valves, the start-up feedwater valves pick up.
The 4
18 levels came in right at low level limits and 19 appeared to be stable.
Was looking real good.
20 During this period of time the safeties had been 21 litting, and then they reseated.
22 Q.
You're talking about steam line safeties?
i 23 A.
Yes, main steam line safeties, which, you
- (]
24 know, as they should have.
And then as we were l
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 f
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
I l
!~
23 1
observing this, all of a sudden the safeties picxed 2
up again, which was unusual.
I looked up to see 3
what was causing this and discovered that the MSIVs 4
had gone. closed for no apparent reason that we could 5
discern.
6 We.immediately checked the enunciators.
7 We had no SFRCS t ri p aus would be indicated'by those.
8 We had no other equipment actuation wnich would 9
indicate an SFRCS trip.
No --
10 Q.
No ESP either?
11 A.
Nothing.
Just had gone closed.
12 Q.
With regard to enunciators, just to give 13 me a feel for it, how many enunciators were on 14 roughly prior to the start of the event?
I mean, 15 are we talking half a dozen, a dozen?
16 A.
Wo.would normally have maybe maybe a 17 dozen.
18 Q.
Okay.
So that prior to the event, there 4
19 was maybe a dozen lit.
Now,_at the time that you i
.20 found out that~the MSIVs were closing, you were 21 looxing around for causes.
And one of the places' i
22 you had looked was the enunciator panels.
About t
23 roughly, if you can remember, how many panels were l
(])
24 lit at that time?
200, 207-RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
i l
24 1
A.
No.
Let me think about this for a minute.
2 A.
I'd have to say maybe 30, 40.
-3 Q.
30 or 40, okay.
4 A.
That is a rough guess.
5 Q.
I was just trying to get a feel for about 6
how many.
7 A.
The enunciator _ panel that I was looking at 8
had none lit on it.
9 Q.
Now, is this a special enunciator panel?
10 A.
The enunciators are divided up into 11 sections around there, and there's one section that 12 has all the SFRCS alarms on it.
13 Q.
Tha t's it'was the SFRCS enunciator panel?
14 A.
And it had nothing lit on'it.
It's got 15 the SFRCS alarms and steam generator level on it.
fir't. place I looked, and it was blank.
16 And it's the s
17 Nothing lit.
18 Q.
Do you have a separate enunciator panel 19 for the ESF actuation systom?
20 A.
Yes, clear over on the other side.
i 21 Q.
Were any of those lit as you remember?
22 A.
For emergency safety features?
23 Q.
Yes.
(}
24 A.
Nothing for that.
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 l
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
L
25 1
Q.
Okay.
,- m Y_]
2 A.
We had enunciators for the RPS system that 3
would be associated with the reactor trip.
host of 4
the enunciators were normal for the reactor trip and 5
for the trip of the main feed pump.
6 Q.
Okay.
7 A.
There was really nothing abnormal in the 8
enunciators that we had for the conditions we had.
9 Q.
So I guess I interrupt you quite a bit, 10 but I think the point you wore at was that you found 11 that the one steam safeties had basically lifted and, 12 I guess you were saying, stayed open.
And in O\\J 13 looking to that, you found the two MSIVs closed, and 14 you looked around and found no obvious reason why 15 they closed, is that about where you were?
16 A.
It wasn't just one satety.
A number of 17 them lifted again.
It's hard to tell.
A loud roar.
18 And when I looxod up to see what the cause of that 19 was, the first thing that caught my eye, we got two 20 big lights over there that are indicators tor the 21 MSIVs, and they are closed.
22 BY MR. BELL:
23 Q.
Ted, it's normal on any reactor lift to
(')
24 lift the safety valves?
\\s RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-P477 COMPUTERIZED T,RANSCRIPTION
E 26 1
A.
Yes.
2 Q.
And when they closed, you thought 3
everything was normal.
And when the steam shot up, 4
that increased steam pressure for the second time, 5
and safeties lifted for the second time, and tha t's 6
the abnormal lift?
7 A.
It was the second lift of the safeties 8
that caught my attontion, yes.
The initial lift of 9
the safeties is normal.
We'll lift all 18 safetien, 10 and they'll blow for a given period of time and t t.e n well, you 11 ressat.
Sometimes you'll get one that 12 know, any main steam safety, code safety, is -- can 13 be erratic.
Sometimes when they get hot, they'll 14 simmer and sometimes relitt a littlo bit.
But this 15 was a major blow the second time, and that was what 16 brought my attention up.
And I looked around and j
17 saw the MSIVs were closed.
18 BY MR. BEARD:
19 Q.
So the first abnormality in this post trip 20 situation was the closure of the MSIVs?
i 21 A.
Yes, because up until that time, the 22 f or a post trip, the conditions were looking good.
23 I felt our chances of stablizing out were very good
(( )
24 at the time.
And I was surprised to see those RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION I
~ _ - -
27 1
things going shut especially with no other I ~
2 indications as to what closed them.
3 BY MR. LANNING:
i 4
Q.
What type of signals would normally close 5
the MSIVs?
i 6
A.
The only thing that we've got would really 7
close them would be an SFRCS actuation.
i 8
-BY MR. BEARD:
9 Q.
You mentioned in-answer tc'the question 10 about what signals would operate the MSIVa?
11 A.
Yes.
4 j
12 Q.
That the steam feed rupture control system 13 would cause that?
l 14 A.
Yes.
15 Q.
My question was, would the ESF actuation 16 sys te m also cause it?
17 A.
Yes.
j
{
18 Q.
okay.
Are those basically the only two 19 sources of automatic closure signals to the MSIVs?
1 20 A.
Yes.
4 21 Q.
okay.
22
.A.
Okay.
Having.seen the safeties were i
23 having seen that.the MSIVs were closed, we-know
(])
24 there wasn' t going to be any easy way out of it.
I' RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
J 28 1
You know, it's not something that you can 2
immediately reopen.
They were closed, and they were 3
going to stay that way.
I 4
So in anticipation of an SFRCS actuation, 5
which we knew we would get if we waited long enough, f
6 the steam generator levels would boil down, and we 7
would pick up a low level trip, the reactor operator 8
asked permission to trip SFRCS manually.
a j
9 Q.
I t's anticipatory?
4 l
?
10 A.
Anticipatory.
It's just an anticipatory 11 action, you know.
The quicker we can get ourselves t
i 12 the sooner we catch the steam generator levels, the 13 better off we'd be.
He went over to the back panel 14 and tripped the SFRCS.
4 15 Q.
By back panol 16 A.
Tha vertical panels.
17 Q.
.The vertical panel in the main control 18
. room, not a back panel in the sense of 4
l 19 A.
No, just the vertical panels as opposed to 20 the bench panels in the front.
He went back and i
21 tripped the SPRCS.
Came back around.
And we 5
22 watched _for proper actuation of the auxiliary 23 f eedwa ter system.
The first thing I saw were the
()
24 aux. feedwater segregation valves.
It's AF 69 RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
29 1
through 72.
These are the runs that line up the 2
feedwater flow for whichever steam generator.
i 3
I looked at those, and the valves were l
4 lined up such that I would feed 2 and 2 would feed 1.
j 5
This was abnormal for a low level trip.
They should 6
have lined up so that No. 1 system'would fit in No.
7 1 generator and No. 2 would feed No.
2.
8 The RO looked at that and immediately 9
looked over to the back panel and observed that he 10 had tripped the'SFRCS system ~ on low steam generator i
11 pressure rather than low levels.
12 Q.
So it was at the point that'you realized i
13 the aux. feedwater trains had lined up in a 14 crisscreas pattern rather than a straight-in s
l 15 pattern r
16 A.
Yes.
that you deduced that the actuation had 17 Q.
]
la not been a desirable one?
19 A.
Yes.
I immadiately walked to the back 20 panel myself.
We reset the low-pressure trips and' 21 retripped it on low level.
r j
22 Q.
Okay.
l 23 A.
It was during this same time that the aux.
j {}
24 feed pumps had started, come up in speed.
And the l
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
. COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
r 30 1
RO observed them coasting back down'again and looked 2
up, and we had the overspeed trip alarms in for both.
3 Q.-
On both?
4 A.
For both aux. teed pumps.
5 Q.
What's a normal start-up time on one of 6
your aux.-feed pumps from the' time, for example, if if the operator-had gone over and hit this 7
the 8
manual' actuation, wha t's a typical response time 9
that the pump would be up to proper feed and be able 10 to put out water?
11 A.
It could be 25, 30 seconds.
12 Q.
Okay.
13 BY MR. LANNING:
14 Q.
Did the RO' realize he had pushed the wrong 15 buttons?
16 A.
He was the first one to see it.
He 17 discovered his own mistake.
And we immediately 18 reset it.
19 BY MR. ROSSI:
20 Q.
And you noticed both aux. feed pumps now 21 had tripped?
22 A.
Yes.
At the same time, while this was 23 occurring, the assistant shift supervisor had walked
(])
24 around to the back panel to verify proper actuation RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-0477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
l 31 1
of the steam valves that supply the aux. feed pumps.
j 1
2 It was while he was back there that he observed that 1
3 AF 599 and AF 608, which are the aux. teedwater stop 4
valves, had closed.
He attempted to roset and open i
5 theso valves.
i 6
BY MR. BEARD:
l 7
Q.
Excuse me, was the closure of those valves 8
a proper response or something abnormal?
9 A.
It was a proper response for the low 10 pressure ~ trips that was initially i nserted.
i
}
11 Q.
Yes.
I 12 A.
They should have come back open.
13 Q.
Based on the resetting of.the low pressure 14 actuation, manual input of the low pressure 15 actuation followed by the manual input of low level 16' actuation?
4 17 A.
Yes, sir.
4 18 Q.
Okay.
)
19 BY MR. ROSSI:
20 Q.
Those valve numbers, again, those were 1
21 aux.-feed numbers, and their numbers wore?
22 A.
Okay.
These valves 23 were observed to be closed.
He immediately hit the
()
24 resets and tried to reopen them.
l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
~
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 7
,r..-
r,~
-_,,7-,,,
.,m. ~,,.
32 1
BY.MR. BEARD:
2 Q.'
Now, resets here, you're talking about a l
t 3
local component reset versus a system?
it's a local ll A.
Yes.
It's a local I
i 5
, component reset on each valve.
They've each got a 6
reset button.
And then each valve has two 7
controllers.
Both of those have to be hit to open
~8 them.
j 9
Q.
- Okay, b
10 A.
He tried those.
And the valves did not 11 respond.
He then immediately went'to the cabinet 12 room in the back to the SFRCS cabinets.
I p
13 BY MR. ROSSI:
i 14 Q.
This.is the assistant shift supervisor?
l 15 A.
This is the assistant, yeah, shitt
. 16 supervisor.
And went to what we call initial bypass l
17 and block.
This is a procedure that will clear any 18 trips that are in the system and block them.
Once 19 he released on that, the system would have lined i
. 20 back up by the low' level trips that were locked into i
l 21 them.
j 22 BY MR. BEARD:
i would it block the manual 23
'Q.
But it would 1
i (])
24 input or --
I RUNFOLA &' ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCR3PTION t
,.---,,m-
~. --..r n-e. y-,w
+-
.,m..
,,.-.<i,
3
..v
-,----,.w
__y
,.5.~_
v
r 33 1
A..
No, it would not block the manual input if
. O-2 manual input was locked'into them.
Once you push i
3 those' buttons, they're locked'in.
j.
t
,4 Q.
I guess I'm.getting a'little confused on 5
the word lock and block.
6 A.
The manual trip. buttons that we have in i
7 the control room for the SFRCS system are the type
]
8 that once you depress them, they lock in place.
i j
9 Q.
Physically stay depressed?
1 10 A.
They physically stay depressed.
You have i
f I don't know what it's labeled, but it's 11 to hit a l
12 a little button on the side to release that.
13 Q.
Okay.
4 I
14 A.
Those low level trips were locked into i
15 place.
He went to initial bypass and block which 16 clears all the trips that would be in it and let go 17 of it.
18 Q.
The manual low levels still being locked 19 in.
Okay.
7 20 A.
You know, would have cleared the logic.
j 21 And the system, if there was any problems in the 4
22 logic, should have lined back up.
As it' turns out, 23 the system was lining back up as it should have
(~)
24 anyway.
AF 599 and 608 apparently, when they went
(_
j i
RUNFOLA & ASSOCII. TBS (614)445-8477 l
' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION s
4 u
e-
-r
-e w
--,--g
,v.-. - - - -
c.
.rv
---nv
4 i
34
=
1 closed and tried to. reopen, torqued out.
1 2
BY MR. BELL:
1 i
3 Q.
Let me interrupt your train of. thought one 4
second.
This initial bypass and block then would 5
clear out any trip signals that had been. sensed
)
6
'because of transmitter inputs?
I 7
A.
Yes.
8 Q.
Okay.
But since you had manually 4
1 i
j 9
initiated it, you said you manually ini tia te d low n
10 level.
7 j
11 A.
Yes.
12 Q.
That signal would have remained sealed in l
13 borause it would be i
i 14
.A.
Yes.
i 4
i still present because the buttons are.
15 Q.
i j
16 still depressed?
E i
I' l-17
.A.
Yes.
i 18 Q.
Okay.
i 19 A.
Now i
20 BY MR.~ROSSI:
[-
21
.Q.
Okay.
The two valves are still he's t
l 22 still not able to get the two valves open?
e f
l 23 A.
They're still. closed.
l l ()
24 Q.
Still closed.
RUNFOLA &' ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477.
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
.__._--..,'r.--.
~,.. -
_,._.r. _ _ _ _... _. _.....
1 35 l
A.
Now, when
~~
2 BY MR. LANNING:
3 Q.
Excuse me a second.
Let me ask a question.
4 Are we on procedures now, training to go and perform 5
this or 6
A.
Well, that was not.
That was not.
That 7
is not a procedural step, but it was not a bad stop 8
to do at the time.
9 Q.
Okay.
10 A.
Now, let me back up a little bit here.
11 When the RO observed that the aux. teed pumps had 12 tripped, two Eos were immediately dispatched to the 13 aux. feed room.
14 BY MR.
BEARD:
15 Q.
EO being equipment operators?
16 A.
Equipment operators.
17 Q.
Nonlicensed equipment operators?
18 A.
Nonlicensed equipment operators.
Here 19 immediately dispatened to the aux. teed room.
Let 20 me catch my train of thought here.
After the 21 assistant shift supervisor came back into the 22 control room and observed that the valves woro still 23 closed and the pumps had tripped, he immediately
()
24 left the control room to enable tne start-up feed RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
i i
36 1
pump.
This is something that has to be done out in I O 2
the plant.
It is kept valved out of service and tne 3
breakers racked out.
t 4
Q.
This is the start-up feed pump?
5 A.
Tnis is the start-up feed pump.
This is a l
i 6
motor driven feed pump that takes the suction off 7
the main feedwater and is used just for start-up i
8
. conditions.
He immediately left the control room to a
I 9
go put that pump in service.
At the same time, I 10 went to my office to the locxed valve key locker, 11 took out a locked valve key, gave it to another 12 equipmeat operator, and directed him to go into the 13 aux. ouilding and manually open AF 599 and 608.
trying to get 14 Q.
So at tnis point, if I I
15 the big picture here, you'd lost main feed.
The 16 aux. feeds didn't seem to work right.
And the 17 region was a problem with the pumps on trip and the 1
18 valves?
19 A.
And the valves.
i 20 Q.
And so at this point you seemed to be l.
21 saying the assistant shift supervisor was working on J
22 a new pump which would be activating the start-up 23 feed pump?
. ()
24 A.
Yes.
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
. _ - _, - ~ _ _
37 1
Q.
You were working with an equipment 2
operator on the valve side of tne auxiliary feed 3
pumps?
4 A.
Yes.
5 Q.
And so you had a parallel pass there in 6
order to get feedwater someplace?
7 A.
Yes.
8 BY MR. ROSSI:
i 9
Q.
Now, the RO had observed the sux. feed 2
10 pumps that tripped and sent two EOs to reset the 11 aux, feed pumps.
Where did they have to go, the sos, 12 to do tha t?
'1 13 A.
They h a'd to go down into the aux. feed I
14 pump room.
1 15
-Q.
Okay.-
And these other valves, or the i,
)
16 valvos AF 599 and AF 608, where are they?
17 A.
They are over in the auxiliary building.
i 18 Q.
And he needed keys to manually open the i
19 valves?
20 A.
Yes, those are locked valves, and they are 21 the hand wheels are chained.
They had to be s
22 unlocked so that they could manually operate the 23 valves.
(}
24 BY MR. BEARD:
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 4
n
4 38 1
Q.
What about security of getting through 2
locked doors for vital areas and things of this 3
nature?
To what extent were they involved in either 4
of these two in-plant manipulations?
5 A.
In the aux. building, all the doors were 6
on card readers.
7 Q.
Card readers?
8 A.
Card readers, which their ID badge would 9
open.
There was no problem with that.
The man that 10 went to the aux. feed pump room had to unlock a 11 padlock and slide back a hatch to get down into the 12 room.
13 Q.
Now, the unlocking of the padlock, where 14 do they have to go or how do they get a key to this 15 padlock?
16 A.
They have a key on the key rings that they 17 normally carry.
18 Q.
Okay.
19 A.
That would give them access to that room.
20 Q.
So tney didn't have to go any special 21 place or call the guard or anything to go in there?
22 A.
No.
i 23 Q.
They just whip it out from the side of f ( )'
24 their hip?
I RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
39 1
A.
That's right.
They had the keys on them.
gy
'\\_)
2 The only key that had to be obtained was the locked 3
valva key that I gave to the primary equipment 4
operator to unlock the valves.
5 Q.
Okay.
6 BY MR. ROSSI:
7 Q.
Let me ask you another question about the 8
card readers that allow the people to go through the 9
doors to get to the auxiliary building.
They're 10 controlled by a computer?
11 A.
Yes, sir.
12 Q.
If that computer is out of service, what OkJ 13 happens to the doors?
14 A.
The doors will not respond to a card.
15 Then they have to go -- resort to keys.
16 Q.
And did they have the keys with them to do 17 that had the doors not respondad to the card readers?
18 A.
I don't know.
The equipment operators on 19 the primary site don't normally carry a key ring.
20 They have no need for it.
I would say that ha 21 probably did not have any keys on him as such.
22 BY MR. BEARD:
23 Q.
Well, in the event that should occur, what
(';
24 would be the normal thing that you would expect your v
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
40 1
people to do when they get down thero and find the y
2 card readers misbehaving?
Would it be to call 3
security to get a guard over so they could open it 4
for them or what would you typically expect?
5 A.
It would probably be quicker for the man 6
to come back to my ottice and take a set of master i
7 keys.
B Q.
I see.
Okay.
9 BY MR. BELL:
10 Q.
He wouldn't have to suit out or suit in to 11 go into this part of the auxiliary room?
12 A.
No.
That was not required for any.of the 13 operations that had to be done'in this instant.
j 14 Q.
Okay.
So now you've got gentlemen going the assistant shift supervisor.'s going 15 down to 16 down to line the start-up feed pump.
And one :of '
17 your equipment ope ra tors is going to line up the 18 auxiliary feed pump turbines, reset those?-
19 A.
Two men.
20 Q._
Two men.
And the fourth man 11s going to 21
.open AF 599 and 608.
22 A.
And 608.
-23 Q.
Would you-tell me how close valves FW 106'
_(
24 and-FW-89:are physically?
I've got-a print here.
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION T
~
~
41 1
Q.
Okay.
2
'A.
106 and 85.
3 Q.
Those are the two possible auction sources 4
to the start?
5 A.
Yeah, he jumped on 106.
How close.
6 Q.
He opens 106, right?
7 A.
Um-hmm.
8 Q..
And if he opens 85, we put the DFT right 9
to the suction'of'the off-speed pumps; is that right?
10 A.
Yes.
Let me see your print.
11
-Q.
This was given to us yesterday.
12-MR. BURNS:
Why don't you identify what 13 you're showing him?
14
.Q.
This is trair ing print figure 1.that came 15 from P&IDM 006 B.
Here is 106.
Tnis is.the normal 16 suction valve, right?
17-A.
Wait a minute.
That's the discharge.
18 Q.
Yes, excuse me, discharge.
He nas to 19 open --
'20 A.
He1got 85.
21
.Q.
He opens 857-or ~does he open 32?
22 A..
No,-wait a minute.
This is 32.
It would 23 be 32.
And then-106 would~be the discharge.
(}.
24.
Q.
And 32 then;11nes.up the. start-up feed RUNFOLA'& ASSOCIATES-(614)445-8477
-COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
v
Y 42 1
pump from the DFT?
f-2 A.
Yes.
?
3 Q.
And 106 lines up the-discharge of the 4
start-up pump-up through to the normal feed header?
5 A.
Yes.
6 Q.
Okay.
Are 85 and 32 very close together 7
physically?
This valve and this valve?
8 A.
They're not that far apart.
They're in 9
close proximity.
10 Q.
Okay.
Thank you, -sir.
'll BY.MR. BEARD:
12 Q.
I hope you understand, Ted, that the 13
. barrage of questions that we're giving you are s
14 intended only to get a detailed knowledge of what i
15 happened and what did not happen.
We are not 16 criticizing your actions whatsoever?
tha t's the impression I get.
'17 A.
No, I'm not 18 Q.
We're just trying to understand.
I mean, P
19 after all,'you know this plant'a-lot better than we 20 do.
i i
' 21 BY-MR. ROSSI:
2 21 Q.
Okay.
-So the two EOs have-gone'off to
- 2. 3 roset the aux. feedipump controls.
The assistant
. (7 24 shift-supervisor has left'the control room to_put RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES-(614)445-8477-
-COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
l
~
43 1
the start-up feedwater pump in service.
And the 2
third EO has gone to open AF 599 and AF 608.
3 A.
Yes, sir.
4 Q.
I think that's vnere we were with that 5
story?
6 A.
Yeah.
- 7 Q.
Okay.
Why don't you continue?
8 BY MR. BEARD:
just to get it in perspective, 9
Q.
Can I 10 when all these things were going on, what was your I
11 feel for the overall plant condition ~in terms of did 12 you have on your hand -- obviously, some of these 13 are absurd answers, but let me give you a couple 14 a routine reactor trip, an accident that could 15 possibly lead to core mald, a slightly complicated 16 reactor trip or a near miss to an accident or, you-17 know, what overall feel did you have for the plant 18 condition you were trying to cope with?
19 A.
We realized that we were in a total loss
-20 of feedwater.
We also realized that'this was the 121 condition that started off TMI-2.
By this time, 22
. things were getting a little shaky.-
I had been on 23 the telephone probably since the time we discovered
(")
24 that the MSIVs had gone closed.
I'd gotten Bill ss
-RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
1 l
l 44
)
1
.O'Connor, the operations engineer, on the telephone 3
w) 2 and I talked with him.
It's probably s o m e w h ?,r e in
.3 the period we're in right now.
He hung up so he 4
could-make other phone calls to other people.
5 Q.
Were these phone calls for notification or 6
technical advice?
7 A.
No for notification.
He wanted to get 8
ahold of the plant manager and the operations 9
supervisor.
During this period of time I attempted 10 one more time to open AF-599 and 608.
It was while 11 I was a t temp ting to do this I noticed that one or t
12 them came open.
A couple of minutes later the
-O 13
-second one came open.
J 14 We had the steam valves were already open, 15 and the valves on the feodwater side of the system 16 were now open.
So we had a flow path, steam too and 4
water ' feed pumps.
We were~
17 feedwater from the aux.
18 now relying on, for that system, on the EOs tha t-19 were in.the room.to get.the pumps started.
20 EY MR. ROSSI:
' 21 Q.
The opening of AF 599 and AF 608, was 22 that -- or maybe you don't know the answer to this.
23' Was that because of the EO that ~ had gone to'open
()
24
'them?
I RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
[
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
r
45 1
1 A.
Yes.
,s (v) 2 Q.
Or -- not your attempt?
3 A.
That was his efforts.
4 Q.
His efforts.
Okay.
5 A.
Because they opened while I I wasn't 6
pushing anything.
7 Q.
Okay.
8 A.
By this time, I just notice that the one 9
came~ open, and then a couple minutes la te r the 10 second one came open.
That was his efforts that 11 opened those valves.
'12 BY MR.
BEARD:
Od 13 Q.
I'm really trying to get a fael, Ted, for 14 the gravity of the overall situation as it was 15 perceived, not the way the equipment'is responding 16 at the minute.
Just to take a snapshot, you know, 17 how big or how bad did you see it?
18 A.
Okay.
By this time, each time I looxed we've got a big T ave meter on the back panel.
19 up 20 Each time I looked up, tne temperature was higher 21 and higher.
We realized this.
It had'been 22 mentioned once.from Bill O'Connor, as I was talking 23 to him, you know.
He says we have1to consider the-
/~'.
24 possibility of HPI'PORV cooling.
V)
RUNFOLA'& ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED-TRANSCRIPTION p
i
46 r
~
l As the RO and I woro waiting for the 2
equipment operator to get the aux. feed pumps 3
running, it was mentioned again.
And we realized 4
the gravity of the situation.
As the temperature 5
got higher, we were approaching a point where we 6
were going to have to do it if something didn't 7
occur quickly.
8 By this time, Bill O'Connor had called me 9
back, and we were talking.
And he mentioned it 10 again, that if.we didn't get it bacx shortly, we-11 would have to go to make up HPI PORV cooling.
It 12 was just at this time, 'cause I mean, by now it was h)
~/
13 getting right to the fine. edge.
It was right at 14 this time that the s ta r.t-u p feed pump came available.
15 Q.
The start-up was the first one available?
16 A.
The start-up was the first one to come 17 bacK.
The RO immediately started the pump.
Opened 18 the start-up f e e dwa te r valve for the No. 1 steam 19 generator.
Those have SFRCS closures to them.
20 During this period.of time, the second RO had gone 21 to the back of the cabinet room and reset those.
So 22-we were set that way.
23 He immediately s ta r te d the pump and opened
(]).
24 the valve and got f eedwa ter flow into the No. 1 l
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
t
47 1
That immediately turned our 7mb 2
temperature rise and started decreasing RCS pressure.
3 Tnis gave us a little bit of relief, mental relief.
s 4
Q.
Yes.
What was the emotional state of your 5
people in.the control room, the operators that 6
worked for you, in the sense of how were they 7
handling themselves?
This obviously was a tense 8
situation I would presuma?
9 A.
They handled themselves quite well.
10 Q.
Well, I didn't mean it that way, Ted, I'm well, let me just let you answer.
11
'sorry.
I meant 12 I'm sorry.-
rm k~
13 A.
The operator that was handling the primary 14 side was -- was doing it quite well.-
I did not get 15 the impression from him that he was having any 16 problems.
He;didn't convey to me that he had any 17 problems on his side.
I left him do his job.
e
.18 The reactor operator who was.on the 19 feedwater side realized just how close we were 20 getting, and he wanted a feed pump of some kind.back 21 in the worst _way.
I don't know what more I could 22 say.
23.
Q.
Okay.
The last --
()
24 A.
You know, itEwas a tough si tua tion.
You RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
B 48 k-~.
1 know, the adrenaline was flowing.
3 2
Q.
The last question I had in mind in this 3
line is with regard to the HPI and PORY cooling mode, 4
which is sometimes referred to as feed and bleed, 5
did~your training or your procedures have some 6
predecided threshold at which you would enter that 7
mode of operation or was it a judgment call?
8 A.
Okay.
It's right in the procedure that if 9
both generators go dry, as defined by levels less 10 than eight inches or pressures less than 960 and 11 decreasing, you're there.
12 Q.
OKay.
13 A.
We never observed levels in the generators 14 less than 10.
And I personally never.saw pressures 15 any less than in the rango of 950 to 975, and they 16 held fairly stable.
Generators were bottled up 17 fairly tight.
They were holding steam pressure.
So 18
_ we were,'you know, still clear on that standpoint of 19 it.
It'was an option, but it was one that was 20 coming very close.
21 Q.
I guess I was thinking of earlier you l
22 mentioned that the.T ave indications were continuing l
i 23 to rise.
f l
l (])
24 A.
Yes.
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
[
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
49 1
Q.
And I got the impression that msybe that
+
73
%A 2
was a key indicator to you that it was getting close 3
to time to do something?
'4 A.
Well, it was one that I could see the 5
clearest.
6 Q.
Okay.
7 A.
We realized that, that you know, that 8
temperature rise was coming becauso, you know, we l
9 were getting insufficient cooling.
.The highest I 10 saw it go was 590 degrees.
11 BY MR. ROSSI::
12 Q..
Steam generators being empty by having Akl
.13 levels less than 8 ' inches or pressuros less than 14 960, is that in'itself the' trigger point for going
~
16 A.
Tha t's as it's' stated in the emergency 17 procedure.
18 BY MR. BEARD:
19 Q.
Okay.
Was there anything'done or did you l
20 direct anything to do to~line up the systems in:
21
. anticipation or in preparation-for going into that 22
. feed and blood mode of-cooling?
23 A.
Not a t: tha t time.
,( }
24 Q.
Not'at that' time?
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES _(614)445-8477
. COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
50 i
It's a procedure tnat.is quick.
It 1
A.
2 wouldn't tako very much at all for us to do it.
3 Q.
I'm not criticizing you tor that.
4 A.
No, I know.
But it would just
'e a matter 5
of starting tne pump and opening the va.ves.
And 6
then the primary operator would open up the PORV and 7
lock it open.
8 Q.
What about the area of piggybacking the r.
i 10 A.
That could be done if needed.
11 Q.
All right.
Do you know whether or not 4
12 such a configurationfwas, in fact, establianed?
13 A.
Not at that-time.
i 14 Q..
Okay.
15' A.
We had the start-up. feed pump-back, and.we 16
'were putting wa ter in the No.
- 1. generator.
Shortly 17 after.this, the number two aux. feedwater pump 18 started up.
The EOs.in-the room had~ considerable 19
. trouble.getting the pumps 20
.BY MR. ROSSI:
21 Q.-
I'm sorry, which.one started?.
22 A.
The No.'2.
23 Q.
The No. 2 aux. feed.
Okay.
. (}
24 A.
The Eos in the room had-considerable l
l RUNFOLA'& ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
[
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION I
,... ~ -,
,_.~.2
51
'l trouble getting the pumps latched.
It's got a,
what 7.
%/
2 they call, a trip throttle valve that has to be 3
latched up and then opened.
And they had 4
considerable trouble getting these valves latened.
15 They finally got the No. 2 pump started.
6 It came up to speed and gave us a-lot of feedwater the RO had trouble 7
quickly.
He had trouble 8
~ getting control of this pump to start with.
And we J
9 really filled the generator higher than he would 10 have santed to at the time.
11 The SFRCS system only brouqht the level up 12 to 46 inches.
We took it in excess of tnat, close O.
13 to'a hundred.
I-know it was in excess of 75 inches.
14 This caused a rather rapid shrink on the RCS and 15 pressure.
Pressure fell rapidly.
It-got down to 16 1700 pounds.
Primary side RO requested permission 17 to put on HPI to help. recover his pressure in the 18-sys tem.
19 BY MR.' BEARD:
20 Q.
May I interrupt at this' point.
Do you-21 believe that the depressurization on the primary 22 side.was-largely caused by the higher than desirable 23 level on the steam generator?
l
()
24 A.
Yes.
I have no doubt.
l' RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION r
P 52 1
Q.
Okay.
,y N-)
we put-a lot of cold water in 2~
A.
That was 3
the generator quickly.
And there was no doubt that 4
that's what caused it to shrink.
He asked 5
permission to put on HPI.
We told him to piggyback 6
And ha did such.
That was on for a 7
period of maybe five minutes.
8 We never observed any flow from the HPI 9
system during tnis time.
We were told later by the 10 tech section that their printouts indicated that we 11 had put some wa ter in.
It was just of such a
~
12 magnitude that we couldn't see it.
By this time, 13 the. secondary side RO had gotten his other aux. feed 14 pump started.
And it was blind water also.
15 He had level control problems with this 16 pump to the extent that he never did get control of 17 it in the control room.
Tnat pump was controlled f
18 using that trip throttle valve as a throttle valve
,j' 19 by one of the equipment operators in-the aux. feed l
20 pump room being directed.over the-Gai-Tronics system.
21 Q.
You're saying I think on the-No. 2 feed 22 LN o. l?'
- 23 A.
No.'l.
()
24 Q.
No.
1, the automatic controls in the RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED ~ TRANSCRIPTION f
g
a.
f 53 i
'l control room.apparently weren't functioning properly?
g i
2 A.
They did not function properly.
3 Q.
And the manual controls in the control 4
room, the-operator could have used, apparently 5
weren't functioning properly also.
So wnat.you J
6 ended up with was-local manual, if you-will?
i i
7 A.
Yes.
i 8
Q.
Via communications on it?
9 A..
Yes.
And he did subsequently got manual i
10 control-of the'No. 2 aux. feed. pump on his. panel.
11' So we at thisEtime had-three pumps giving us 1
)
12 feedwater.:
The configuration we' wound up in was the 4
13 No. 1 steam. generator was being fed by the start-up 4.
1
.No.
2 steam generator-was being fed 14 feed pump.
.The I
i 15 by tne No.
- 2. steam. aux. feed jump..
The No. 1 aux, i
16.
feed pump was left rolling.j us t,-wi th the pressure
'17
. backed ~off'just enough'that it wasn't feeding just
~ of the control. problems he?was having:with 18 because 19 that.
1.
l-
-20
'Q.
Oxay.
Does that pump have a miniflow i
i 21-recirc-line it was using there?
l i-
.22
-A.
'Yes.
r 23 Q.
- 2 that gets you in pretty good shape,11 l
{}.
'24 wou'ld -imagine, now tha t you've got'tnree feed pumps?
RUNFOLA'& ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION L'
.~.....-m-
54 1
A.
By this time everybody was a little more 3
% J^
2 relaxed.
We had a chance to step back and look at 3
our plant conditions.
4 Q.
Yes.
5 A.
The RO was establishing levels of 50 --
6 roughly 50 inches in each steam generator.
The 7-primary side RO was getting good control of.the RCS 8
.back.
His pressure was coming back up.
He was 9
getting control of his pressurizer level.
He was 10 getting stable on that side.
.11 Q.
One area that you haven't talked about, 12 let's go back to the primary side et the plant.
Let 13' me see.
I think you indicated that because.of the 14 high level, the overfeed, if you-Will, on.one of the 15 steam generators, the primary' side experienced some 16 shrink, the pressure started coming down with that 17 as a primary driving force, and I think you 18 indicated you may have gotten as low as say 1700 19 pounds?
20 A..
Yes.
21 Q.
Okay.
What about earlier in-the event, 22 before the aux. feed pumps were brought on on the 23 primary side, did you have any experience with
.( }
24 regard to relief valves?
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477' l
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
l l
55 1
A.
The PORV lifted.
Os 2
Q.
PORY is P.O.R.V.?
i 3
A.
Power operated-relief valve lifted at 4
least once that I Knew of,
'cause I heard him say it.
it was 5
But it popped and reseated, which was 6
doing.the function it was designed for.
i 7
Q.
Right.
8 A.
He never indicated he was having any' 9
problems =with it.
As it. turned out later, it' lifted on the decrease in 10 three timas.
And on the 11 pressure, he isolated the valve as the pressure fell.
12 BY MR.
BELL:
13 Q.
Was that just a gut reaction?
14 A.
That was a gut reaction on his part.
He
{
15 just he didn ' t -like the way the pressure was 16 falling.
He wanted to get control of it quickly.
17 And as the history of power operated release, his 18 pressure was low enough he felt confident.
He i
'19 isolated it for a periodoof time.
'20 BY MR. ROSSI:
-21 Q.
That was an RO that did that?
22 A.
Yes.
23 BY MR. BELL:
'(
).
24 Q.
Was there'any time during I'm asking i
l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
l
, ~ - -,
1 56 1
you to read the other gentleman's mi'nd, but was j
that it was thought that 2
there any time that PORY 1
3 the PORV had failed open?
no, conditions 4
A.
At the= time there was wa 5
could really point a t.
As it-turned out later, his 6-gut reaction was probably right because the printout 7
showed that on that last decrease, the PORV had not 4
8 gone closed yet.
9 Q.
Okay.
And --
10' A.
And did not close until after he shut the 11 block.
r 12 Q.
Okay.
And this decrease in pressure that i
13 caused the operator to shut the PORY block valve was i
14 caused by the introduction of-feedwater into the 15 steam generator?
16 A.
Yes.
17
'Q.
And'it'was the' PORY blowing you down?
i 18 A.
It could have been both.
We never did a
19
' blow the. rupture disk ~on the: quench tank,- so : i t '
20 couldn't have been excessive.
21 Q.
'If it.was-leaking, it.was small?
22 A.
That valve can't stay open.long and
?
~
23 maintain'the integrity of the tank.
It will blow
( )-
24 the rupture disk out.
l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l..
57 1
BY MR.
BEARD:
7-)
(~/
2 Q.
If I remember right from some of the i-3 design constructions, on tne design basis, the 4
quench tanx is sized for about 15 to du seconds, 5
somewhere on that?
In other words, you could have a 6
PORV open s ta r ting from full power and full pressure 7
for something like 15 to 30-seconds before the 8
rupture disk-would go.
Do you have any rough feel 9
for how much of a pressure falloff that would amount 10 to or -- I'm trying to understand, Ted, what's the 11 significance of the point you didn't get to where 12 ene rupture disk would blow?
13 A.
Well, you're asking me a question'I don't 14 know if I can answer.
15 Q.
That's all r i g h t.-
'T h a t ' s all right.
No 16 problem.
17 A.
Tne initial openings of the valve were 18 very quick.
They were just pops.
It popped and 19 blew the pressure down,'and it-pops back up a second 20 time and then a third time.
I can't give you a good 21' feel for what our pressure would be when the 22 ruptured disk would blow.
l 23 If conditions were stable and you opened O
24 the PORV, tha t's one thing.
But'we had -- we had a l
ks f
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 l
COMPUTERIZED' TRANSCRIPTION i
58 1-high level on the pressurizer because of the 2
overheating of the RCS.
Plus we had'been chucking 3
excess water into it in response to the trip in an 4
effort to, you-know, maintain pressurizer level f
5 which was then subsequently heated,.and that 6
contributed.
So the high pressurizer level would i
7 contribute to the overpressure.
And I j ust can't 8
give you a good feel for what kind of-pressure-we 9
might be talking about on.that.
10 Q.
I guess the bottom l'ine of what I think 11 you're trying to convey to us, and correct me if I'm a primary contributor to-the 12 wrong, is that the 13.
decrease in pressure on the primary side was the 14 high level and ' steam generator.
And it's possible 15 that the :PORY was blowing down and contributing to a,
16 let's say, a faster reduction in pressure?
i 17 A.
Yes.
i i
18 Q.
And maybe it.was the rate of. pressure I ',l l -
19 reduction that the operator. reacted to and was, 20 say, suspicious of the PORV and chose to r block it.
i
~ And then subsequently you'found out, in fact, that, 21 i
22 yes, the PORY was open.ond did not reclose until 23 after the~biccx valve'had..baen' closed?
[
24 A.
Yes.
l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES-(614)445-8477-l COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
r
~
-w e+
,e v
.e v
+,,,
59 1
Q.
Is that the flavor you're trying
.3U 2
A.
That's, yeah, the majority of it.
The 3
major contributor to the pressure decrease was the 4
overfeed of the steam generator.
5 Q.
Okay.
the amount of water we 6
A.
It would have 7
put in there at the rate we put it in probably would 8
have masked the pressure decrease that.he might have 9
seen from the PORV being open.
But just as a 10 precaution on the pressure decrease, when the 11 pressure was down to a point that ne telt 12 comfortable with, he isolated the_ thing.
13 Q.
I see.
But I gathered that you felt --
14 A.
And a couple three minutes later ha opened 15 it back up.
uneasy about.it' 16 Q.
I gather you felt he was 17 or decided that would be a prudent thing to do?
.18 A.
Yes, that was just a decision on-his part.
19 Q.
Were there any.other systems, either 20 primary or secondary side, that could have come into 21 play that you happen'to. remember that would 22 contribute to the pressure reduc tion?'
For example, 23 the pressurizer sprays or.anything of this nature?
{}
24 Maybe the heaters cut.off or any other. contributors RUNFOLA &-ASSOCIATES-(614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED' TRANSCRIPTION
60 1
tha t you happen to remember?
gm 2
A.
Nothing that I heard of at the time.
3 Anything that I know of now came after the incident 4
was over tnat I learned of it.
There was nothing at 5
the time to indicate to ~ me.
It was just the initial 6
pressure fall from the --_from the overtill of the 7
generator was the biggest thing, which we all 8
anticipated.
He, to keep from a possible safety 9
features actuation, requested and received
~10 permission to put in.HPI f or a short period of time, 11 which might have helped.
Other than that 12 Q.
So getting back to where we are then, I C
-\\
13 guess you've got a lot of feed available to you so 14 the' plant's oretty much back in good shape.
. Things 15 are beginning to stabilize out.
16 A.
Yes.
17 Q.
And so now you're basically in a recovery 18 mode of some sort, I guess?
l 1
19 A.
Yes.
Now our primary concern was just 20 stabilizing the plant at a point.
We wound up with 21 RCS temperature at 546, about 50 inches in each 22 steam generator..
RCS pressure'came back up' to about 23
_2100 pounds.
The pressurizer level was high because 1
(]
24 of the amount of water that we put into-the system i
l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES-(614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i-i-
61 1
during this time.
That was of no problem or concern k
2 as sucn.
And we just tried to hold it at that point.
3 Q.
Where were you at this time in regard to 4
your nuclear instrumentation?
I ca n t give you an 5
A.
It was somewhere 6
exact time.
Somewhere in here we came onto the 7
source ranges.
The high voltage comes on 8
automatically, and we discovered that neither one of 9
them really worked.
One was giving us what we felt 10 to be an erroneous reading.
Tne other one was off 11 scale.
12 Q.
Was it off scale hign or low?
13 A.
I want to say it was high.
I can't really 14 verify that.
I looked at it quick,.and it wasn't on 15 scale ona way or the other.
16
-Q.
Okay.
17 A.
We went to our abnormal-procedure for loss-t la of. neutron indication.
Per that-procedure, we went 19 to an emargency boration condition.
20 Q.
Before you get into1that part, Ted, you 21 said that both of them basically ware-misbehaving.
1 22 You said one was off scale, and the other one was i
23 acting in a'way.to give you a reading that you-24 didn't-believe?
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES ('614)445-847.7 l
i COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
m
- i. -.
62 2
1 A.
Yes.
2 Q.
Could you give me some feel as to what 1
3 kind of reading you saw, what kind of reading you I
4 would have expected?-
Like was it reading grossly i
5 abnormally low or grossly abnormally high.or what?
6 A.
No, really it was like mid scale.
7 Q.
Mid scale.
it was mid scale when the high 8
A.
But it
.9 voltage came onto it.
l 10 Q.
I see._
And it should have been high?
i 11' A.
It should have been high at that time and 12 then decayed off, and it didn't.
It just stayed
)
13 where-it was and just sat there.
the abnormality was it was 14 Q.
So it.was a 15 lower than it should have been, and it was 16 relatively constant rather-than falling as you would 17 expect neutronics before to ~ behave?
f 18 A.
Yes.
So we initiated' emergency boration 19 for that.
We weren't overly concerned.
We' knew 20 that ~
had been feeding water from the_ borate water we 21 storage tank into the> system for a while.
We knew we,would_have. increasing 23 xes.sn_from the. post trip conditions which aida in
(
2'4 our shutdownimargin.
And then we did start pumping I
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 l
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
~
a -,
-....... ~..
t 63 1
-1 in concentrated boric acid.
So the from the
,c V
2 conditions that had gone before, this.was something
- i 3
that had to be watched but was not a major concern 4
at the. time.
5 Q.
What about the condition of the or the
,i 6
position of the control rods?
7 A.
They were all on the bottom.
That had 8
been verified early in the trip.
Just part of the 9
post trip operator response, that the conditions 10 we'd'have to check.
Those had been, immediately 11 after the trip, had been verified a l l' on the bottom.
12 Q.
So would it be a proper summary to say-13 that your feeling was that,were the: rods on the f
14 bottom and this that and the other,'the core was
'15 not criticality in danger, but you only had an i'
16 instrumentation problem?
r 17 A.
Yes.
I had no concerns about,. you know, 18 any-inadvertent criticalityfat the time.
19 BY MR. BELL:
20 Q.
I have about three quick q..s s ti on s.
L 21 A.
Yes, sir.
22 Q.
When, on
- a. normal trip,-when that high-l 23 voltage is reenergized--to a source range, and we're i.
l
}
24 talking source range channel 2 tha t's not on. scale RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
r y-
.,,o.a y
v
.,-r---
--*-e
-***Mt-t
-v--
+'
- mt 3 w
- v9 r--
'+i+--w v+ e-v y-w-
)
\\
~
1 64 l'
now?
' ~
2 A.
Yes.
3 Q.
You already told us source range channel 1 4
was not in service?
5 A.
NI 2,
yes.
Well, you're going to have 1
6 to -- NI 2 is channel 1 if you want to talk channels.
7 You want to talk NI numbers?
8 Q.
Okay.
You tell'me wnich one was out of a
9 service.
What. do you call it?
10 A.
NI 2.
11 Q.
NI 2 was out of servico?
12 A.
Yes, it was off-scale.
now, I'm talking about
'13 Q..
Now.
NI 1 14 before the trip,.NI 2 was the one you declared 15 inoperable?
16 A.
No, NI 1 was the one declared inoperable 17
'before the trip.
18 Q.
.NI ;2, when 'the interchange turns it on, 19 you should get a high start-up ra te. alarm.com a s on,
20 right,.because it spikes -- sees a rapid change in 21 neutron level, did tha t enunciator.come on?
22 A.
I can't tell you.
23 Q.
Did you have high voltage on the
()
24 enunciator?
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 6
l
.~
(
65 l
A.
Yes, that was verified.
The primary side dg~.
2 RO went to the back cabinet.
3 Q.
To the RPS?
i 4
A.
To the RPS.
Opened the cabinet to see'the
(~
5 indication-that was in there.-
It was also failed, 6
but he did observe approximately 2,000 volts, high 7
voltage, through the detectors.
'8 Q.
All right.
9 MR.
ROSSI:
Well, see, I had a question go ahead, finish.
10 there.
Was a
11 MR.
BELL:
I've got two'more, and I'll I
12 shut up.
f" 13 BY MR. BELL:-
we were' told-in the 14 Q.
Also you haven't 15 earlier interview that SP6A-failed.
16 MR. BEARD:
7A.
17 A.
7A.
18 Q.
Excuse me, 7A failed during this transient 19 also.
20 A.
Yes.
21 Q.
Did that give'you any concern?
t-22 A.
When we put the start-up feed pump on, the' 22 reactor operator grabbed for - the. control that was
. ()
24 closest to him.
That was 7B'for the No. 1 generator.
i RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
~..
66 1
And'he got feedwater established to that.
2 Q.
Okay.
3 A.
He subsequent to that tried to get flow to J
4 the other steam genera tor through SP7A and got no 5
satisfactory response from'the valve that he could I
6 observe.
Then, like the same time', he got the No. 2 7
aux. feed pump available.
So he fed the No. 2 8
generator with the No. 2 aux. feed pump.
9 Q.
Okay.
Finally, during this trip.that 10 occurred in, I think you said, June the 2nd or so, 11 the trip before this trip.
J 12 A.
Yes.
13 Q.
What caused those feed pumps to trip-on you have no idea?
14 that occasion?
What 15 A.
Can't tell you.
16
-Q.
Okay.
I'm'through.
17 MR. ROSSI:
You asked the-question-that I 18 wanted to ask, was about the SP7A, so you covered
-19 that.-
That's it.
20 BY MR. BEARD:
21
-Q.
I had a-couple that were along the same 22 line.
This is, I think, a little further into the 23 recovery' stage or s tabiliza tion phase, Ted.
. ().
24
_Do you remember any problems with regard RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZUD TRANSCRIPTION l
=-
l 67 1
to the sourco of water for the No. 1 aux. feedwater i
~
2 pump?'
3 A.
Yes.
That happened.
When they were 4
trying:to bring the No. 1 aux. feodwater pump up, it
^
5 tripped a second time.
And at tho same time it 6
tripped, I don't know which came first, the auction 7
to the pump swapped over to service water.
8 Q.
That was unexpected o r --
I don't know.
'9 A.
That w a's unexpected.
I 10 I still don't know wha t caused it.
There's a I
11 saw the enunciator for high DP come-in or 1
12 there's a suction strainer for those pumps-and it 13 has'a.DP alarm across it.
The enunciator came in.
14 Same time the pump tripped, and.the'RO observed that 15 the suctions had swapped.
16 Q.
Okay.
~
the ^ EOs tha t' we re down in the aux.
17 A.
We 18
. feed pump'immediately started to relatch the pump.
19 At the same time the RO opened the suction from the t
20 condensate atorage tanks to the pump, and then I 21 closed the service water valve, which lineo up.
22 normal suction to the pump.
Was after'-- thun after
-23 this was accomplished, they brought.that pump up and.
{ (')
24 in speed, and we kept ~i t on.-
1 RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION.
l i
68 if that spurious c
1 Q.
Okay.
So there were 2
actionJ-- it was a spurious action.
It basically 3
occurred once and didn't reoccur.
In otner-words
-4 when you refigure back to the original configuration, 5
it held in there?
6 A.
Yes, that only happened that one time.
I 7
have no explanation for why that happened.
8 Q.
Did you have any problems with turbine-9 bypass valves?
10 A.
Much later into the recovery.
The SFRCS well, with the MSIVs closed, 11 actuation, when it 12 the turbine bypass valves served no purpose.
(
11 3
-There's no steam.
Control goes to the atmospheric l
14 vent valves.
We were using those for pressure 15 control on the steam generators.
or the 16 When they finally got the atmos 17 MSIVs open, we swapped control to the turbine bypass 18 valves.
When they did this, on the -- let's see.
19
~It's SP13A.
Would-be on the-No.
2' steam ~line.
When 20
~they opened the MSIV.for the No. 2 steam line, I was 21 sitting in my office at the time.
22 I heard a rather loud'- : it almost sounded 23 like a-rattic, but it was a-water hammer.
And
-[~).
2 4' sometime snortly after this, one of the equipment
-w/
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES'(614)445-8477 (s
' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION lL l
69 one of the 1
operators called up and said that the 2
turbine bypass valves on that line was rather 3
severely damaged.
Broke it.
-4 BY MR. BELL:
5 Q.
Do you think that's a result of the 6
opening the MSIV on that side?
7 A.
They figured it got a slug of water in the 8
line.
9 BY MR. BEARD:
10 Q.
Is that typical, that you can get a water 11 slug when you reopen the MSIVs or --
12 A.
Here's what, in conjecture, happened is
. /3 k~)
13 the main steam to aux. steam reducer, this is a 14 valve that takes main steam, reduces it down 235 15 pounds for the auxiliary steam system of the plant.
16 There is a desuperheating valve associated with 17 that.
So when the pressure on-the steam is dropped,-
18 it doesn't super' heat.
19 That valve malfunctions.
We have a hard
.20 time with it because that comes 'off of main 21 feedwater,.and it will wind up with like 1100 pounds 22 of pressureLon one side of it, and it has a hard 23
' time coatrolling.-
The valve, as1 1t turns ~out, the
[j 24 controller to this valve was out of. service for n
RUNFOLA &' ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477.
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION V
y
,-a w,-
4 70 1
whatever reason.
2 INC was working on it.
And the manual 3
bypass was cracked open.to provide desuperheating
~
4 water.for this thing.
They figure while the MSIVs
!4 5
were closed, this desuperheating water just filled 6
up the steam line, backed up the aux. steam system 7-and put a slug of water in the main steam line.
8 When the MSIV was subsequently opened and turbine 9
bypass valves opened, that slug of water went right 10 down the line and hit the turbine bypass valves.
11 BY.MR. ROSSI:
12 Q.
What did it do to the valve when you say.
(s%)-
13 it was severely damaged?
Was it then leaking or 14 A.
It broxe it.
It broke the yoke right in that's a rather substantial yoxe on 15 half, and 16 those things.
It's quite heavy.
-Snapped it right 17 in half.
And broke the. actuator.
These things work 18
~ on an air piston, and it just cracked it~ all the way i
19 around.
20 BY MR. BELL:
21
-Q.
.You're talking both sides'of.-the' yoke?
22 A.
Both sides of-the yoke.
The actuator'wea 23' sitting there going up and down'as the valve wanted
[}
24-to move..
So with the. valve. moving,' the actuator x,
RUNFOLI. &-ASSOCIATES -(614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION.
R 71 1-went up and down, it broke o f f' the valves and 2
snapped the position feedback.
3' BY MR. BEARD:
4.
Q.
So a'rather severe water. hammer, 'wouldn't 5
_you say?
6 A.
-I t was probably rather nasty a t' the time.
7 Q.
Well, i n t h e process.of reopaning'the 8-MSIVs, help me understand this one,H doe s.' one
.9 normally-open, say,.aEsmaller' valve around the:-MSIVs
_ -first?
11' A.'
_Yes,.we open-up the' bypass valve and 12 pressurize the steam:line.
We have toiget the' delta x
13 P reduced down to --
14 Q.
So you-opened-theimain one?
15 A~.
As low as wetcan get it.
~16 Q.
Does that serve the: ~pu rpos e of warmingithe
. 17 line' downstream also?
18
'A.
It will warm the-line a3 such..
- 19
'Q.
Okay.
you know s-pressurizes.
~ 20-A.
And it'a pressure
~ downs tream -dido' 21.
the
. 22 Q.
And was,tha t' :done during'this?
~
23 A '.
Yes..
24
~Q..
So. tha t the ' opening lof the MSIV.was done l[
RUNFOLAT&~ ASSOCIATES-(614)445-8477-COMPUTERIZED" TRANSCRIPTION.
i -
[
72 1
in the normal sort of way.
And the reason you had fS
\\v' 2
damage apparently was because an unusual source of 3
water would fill up the lines is what did you?
we normally don't 4
A.
Yes.
Yes, _tha t's not 5
have tnat kind of a problem.
6 BY MR. LANNING:
7 Q.
I'd like to go back and' discuss what 8
alternative methods that you might have,used if you 9_
had not been successful in getting this start-up 10 feedwater pump operating.
Did you give any thought 1 1-to restoring the main feedwater pumps to operation?
12 A.
That was completely out of the question.
13 Q.
And why is that?
14 A.
There was no steam available.
15 Q.
Because the t
16 A.
MSIVs were closed.
17 Q.
And it must take a long period.of time'--
18 A.
It takes a period of time,;maybe'20, 30 19 minutes just to repressurize the line.
Once you get 20 the condition, you can do that.
2 1' Q.
N o w,- if the MSIVs had not closod, cauld 22
'you.have possibly used_those pumps?
23.
A.
If the MSIVs had not closed, we would not
~24
.have been in this condition a t' a ll. -
RUNFOLA.& ASSOCIATSS (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 1.__
~..._
_ _ _ _ -~
.m.
A w
73 l=
Q.
I~ don't understand.
the No. 2 feed pump 2
A.
Ne would not have 3
would ha ve: supplied us.all the feedwater we needed.
1 4
The steam generators had come onto low level limits 5
nicely.
We would have gone outLinto a normal post i
-6 trip configuration.
We1would have wound up right in f
7
-a. post trip window and we would have been in pretty 8
d e c e n t.. s h a p e.
9 Q.
When w o u l d. y o'u have decided =~to use the-t l
10 feed #and bleed method of. removing heat from the 11-reactor vesso17 12 A.
When the start-up feed pump became l
- 13 available'to us, at that period of time I was to' 14 the. point where if_it.didn't happen within the-15
.next few seconds, I would have gone to the HPI.PORV.
i had
. 16 of cooling.-
And :it was just you know, we t'ime.was-s ta r ting to stretch.out, and we 17 gone s
118
. were to appear'there-in the ?. con trol' room. where 19
'nothing was happening.
20 You1know, we wera just standing t h e r e'.
~
- 21
-The guys were out~ working, and nothing was. happening, 4
-22 and the plant was heating'up.
- An'd it was just?ati
~
23 the point where if it didn't happen 'now,-we were
. (}
. going to'have to go the other way.
.AndEright at-24'
'RUNFOLA^& ASSOCI ATES -( 614 ) 445-8 47 7-COMPUTERIZED-TRANSCRIPTION C
s 2
r f
.c.
m_...
L.
74
~
'l that time the start-up feed pump became available-to 2
us.
And i t was just a closo decision right there.
3 Q.
Do you have a lot of confidence in that i
4 method?
v 5
A.
. I have, you know, we've had training'on 6
that from B&W.
We've observed it on tne
-7 similarities.
We have gone through the c a s u a l t'i e s,
8 that they've given us similar to this whero you have 9
a total loss of feedwater.and you'go to that'
{-
10 situation, and we have followed it'all the way=down-1 11 to-cold shutdown.
12 And -it = appea rs to work well, if you want 13 to say that.
. I mean, it's a method that-works.-
It, 14 you.know, it makes a mess out of your plant,- but it 15 works.
But, you knowi you got to realize'what your
{.
16 primary concern is, core integrity..
You can't 17 you know, it'it comes to that, it comes to that.
18 Q."
Were1the subco'oling meters of.use during-19-this transient?
20 A.-
Yes.
i
- 21
'.Q.
How did-'you use them?
22 A;
I mean, you know, they'reright-there.
l.
23
'And we observedithose things closely at various-(
24 times, kee ping -:tra ck of our. subcooling margin.
And RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477'
' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION c
k-4 y
4,e
+r-n w-
,..-r-,
g,
,ns rse+en p
75 1
we never observed a subcooling margin of any less 2
than 47 degrees is the lowest we ever got.
So we 3
always 4
BY.MR.
BEARD:
5 Q.
What time during the event, do you 6
remember the minimum subcooling occurring roughly?
7 I don't mean clock time.
I mean, what was going on?
8 A.
Let me think.
9 Q.
Was this before the aux. feed and start 10 feeds got running, for example?
11 A.
Yes, it would have been.
12 Q.
Oxay.
13 A.
That was the lowest we saw.
Once we'got 14 the feedwater in there and it ' cooled off, the margin 15 became greater.
16 Q.
Okay.
47 degrees was the lowest we saw at 17 A.
47 18 any one timo.
'1 9 BY MR. LANNING:'
20 Q.
From an operating standpoint, wuuld you 21 have preferred to have the start-up feedwater-pump 22 not locked'out, not valved out?.
23 A.'
Sure.
()
24 Q.
Now, has'it always been valved out?
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614')445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
i u.
76 1
A.
No.
I can't give you the dates that this 2
came about, but it was discovered that the lines for 3
the start-up feed pump.had not been properly 4
analyzed by Bechtel Engineering when-the place was and there was the danger of a high
{
5 constructed,.
6 energy line break from either the feedwater lines to 7
the start-up feed pump or the cooling water lines 8
which could'endt.nger the aux. feed pump that sits in 9
the same room.
As'a result of this, they made us 10
-when the pump was not in service, it has to be 11 valved out.
who is they?
12 Q.
They is 13 A.
The NRC.
14 Q.
Okay.
15 BY MR. BEARD:
16 Q '.
Along the same line, when you say there is 17 a danger of a high energy line break, are you just a failure 18 referring to the c a's e where a 19 occurs or are you referring to the ~ situation where 20 there's some external phenomena such as seismic.
21 event which might cause such~
failure?
a 22 A..
Whatever condition would cause it.
It 23 could be anything.
'That if you,. you Know, if the
]
24 feedwater line would rupture, the concern was the~
, -, - (,../.
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
~ COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
77 1
damage it would cause to the aux. feed pump in the 7.
V 2
same room.
When we have the pump in service, we 3
are required to keep a man in the room that is 4
knowledgeable in the actions that have to be taken 5
to isolate the pump in case of a break.
6 Q.
So the concern then is that the 7
pipe related to the start-up feed pump may not 8
be adequately designed or analyzed such that 9
its failure potentially could affect the 10 safety-related aux. feed pump that is in the room?
11 A.
Yes, sir.
12 Q.
Okay.
(3
(. J 13 MR. LANNING:
Is there 14 BY MR. ROSSI:
15 Q.
You started to say something about how 16 long ago you were required to do that.
Do you 17 roughly remember about when?
I mean 18 A.
At least last year sometime.
19 Q.
So it's about a year ago?
I just don't have a 20 A.
At least.
I don't 21 good feel for that n u;a b e r.
22 BY MR. LANNING:
23 Q.
If you were going to factor this event and
{})
24 experience you gained from this event into a RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
78 1
training program for the operators, is tnere
,.k) 2 which parts would you emphasize most and is there 3
areas which you felt that you could have benefited 4
by either additional experience, additional training 5
or whatever?
6 A.
I feel that the-training that we have 7
received since the Three Mile Island 2 event dealing 8
with ove rhe a ting conditions in the RCS have been 9
adequate for the conditions I observed during this 10 incident.
We knew what had to be done.
We knew 11 what the results would be.
I don't think there's 12 anything that we could emphasize that hasn't.already O
13 been done in a case like this.
14 Q.
Or anything you would have done 15 differently during this e v e n t?
16 A.
I might have ordered the start-up feed I
17 pump put in service sooner.
It could have been by a 18 matter of two, three, four minutes.
'But, you know, 19 it would have helped.
That's about the only thing I 20 can see.
21 BY MR.-BELL:
22 Q.
Was the ATOG, A.T.O.G.,
display in service 23
.during this transient?
f; 24
'A.
No.
m-
'RUNFOLA &-ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
.y.
.. ~... _.
a e
a
).
.79 l'
. Q.
.Why not?
2 A.
.I t ' j us t ~ wa sn ' t tunctioning.
'3
' Q.
JYou don't.--
would it-be normal for t h a t.
t
{
4 system to function?
Would'it not normally.be done I
5 if the system were operational?
6 A.
Its reliability has been marginal for 7
having.it available to the operators.
8 Q.
Would you nave l'i k e d t h a t' display to be~in i
9 operation during that t ra n s i e n t ?.
J'
.Yes,EI would.
2'
'10 A.-
have..
We all would have.
4
-11 We'va gotten used to seeing'those displays in our i
fl2
. planning at.B&W and they'aro quite-nelpful, l
13' especially its the event ot this Kind..
14 BY MR.
BEARD:
15 Q.
Point of. clarification, ATOG_dispiny, is i
j 1 6~
that the same as a safety parameter display system 17 display or-is tnat different?
-18 A.
Yes.
Tha t 's your SPDS?
1 i
19 Q.
Yes.
4 20 A.
~Yes.
1 21 Q.,
That's the.same. interval?
1
-!22 A.
Same critter.
(
23 Q..
I have a question with regard to -- it's I
! (').
24
- 11ong.the-line of T sat meters.
To ~what extent were RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 i
" COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
+
4-d 80 i
J l
the acoustic monitors on the PORV used or of benefit 2
or not of~ benefit during the event as you remember 1
1
'3 it?
4.
A.
I didn't personally observe them at all.
i 5
Tne primary operator, I believe, looked at tnose in 6
relation to his operations on the PORV.
Those 7
displays are available right to nis rignt as ne 8_
or to_his left as he.vas standing in tront of-his i
I 9
panel.
i i
10 Q.
Do you think-this had or do you 1
11 remember whether or not what he observed on the 12 acoustic monitors for the PORY is to have,-that may 13 have inputted to nis decision to use the PORY block o
14 valve?
1 T.i 15 A.
I couldn't tell-you.
i 16 BY MR. LANNING:
17 Q.
When management arrived-in the control l
18 room after the event, can you sort'of give us somt i
19 insight as'to what their reactions were or comments 1
4 20 or. interactions with'the operators?
21 BY MR. ROSSI:
I 22 Q.
You mig h t 's ta r t by telling us at what f
23 point did otners.arrivo?
24 A.
O'K a y.
Let me catch up to wheru I had'left I
'RUNPOLA"& ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
.-..,.w-,
l f
81 1
off and will continue.
2 We were.to the point where the plant was f
3
' fairly s.able.
We had good control of most I. -
i 4
everything.
I stood back and took a look at the 5
I realized that during this r.
i 6
transient, we were deep.into the emergency plan, but 7
there was no way that I could take time at the time j
8 to declare any Kind of an event.
I 9
By the time I could stand back and look at L
10 it, we were notLin any emergency action level.-
The 11 one that would have been called would have been a i,
12 site area emergency, which is a rather severe 3
i p l
v 13 emergency action level.
j i
'14 Q.-
What would have triggered the site area i
15 emergency?
[
1-16 A..
A loss of all feedwater.
j.
17 BY MR. BEARD:
1 18 Q.
In terms of the events, you.have,-I guess, i
l 19 an unusual' event is the lowest and then you have an l
20
' alert.
21 A.
Alert.
1
)
22 Q.
And then sido emergency and then~a general 23 emargency?
]}
24 A.
General.
t l
RUNFOLA & AJSOCIATES (614)445-8477 l
COMPUTEdIZED TRANSCRIPTION I
3
.a n,
,n
,.,n-,.c.
~,,,.. + - - -
-,.,. ~.,,
82 1.
Q.
So you would have been at the No. 3 out or
~
'.\\J 2
47 3
A.
Yes.
Realizing that I was in that 4
condition for a while, I felt tnat some-declaration 5
of some Kind was warranted.
Between myself and the 6
assistant shift supervisor and the'shitt technical 7
a ss i s ta n t, the STA, we debated back and forth for a 8
minute.
9 I decided that I would declare an unusual 10 event just as a notification process.
My feeling 11 was more just to wake psopin up such that if-12 conditions would get worse for me, people would be
(
13 aware of what had already occurred.
14 Just as I was sitting.down -- I was going
~
13 to sit down and write up the. message that would be 16 put onto the tape for the-automatic pager --' it was 17 right at this time when Louie Simon, the operations
'18 supervisor, arrived..
His major. concern was, you 19 know,~what is tha plant condition and, you know,'how 20 do we stand.
And, you know, he started looxing at i
21 that, bringing himself up to da te on the conditions.
l the 22 I sat down and wrote out a message' tor i
23 emergency plan notification.
I gave that to the e
s
! ()
24 admin assistant, and she. proceeded to put the l
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTSRIZED-TRANSCRIPTION
- -, ~.. -, - _. - -
,83 1
message on the tape.
It was shortly after this that 2
Steve Quonnoz, the plant manager, arrived, and then 3
Bill O'Connor, the operations engineer, arrived.
4 And we s ta r ted ' looking at just plant s ta bliza tion,
'5
- what we'would have to do to put the plant in a hot 6
standby. condition.
7 We were a secondary site system.
We had.
8 no vacuum.
That had b,
a broken because we lost all 9
steam.
For'that period of time that the MSIVs were 10 c l o s e d, an) lost seals to the turbine.
We lost' steam 5
11.
to the. air ejectors, and we broke-vacuum just to I
l 12 prevent any -- it's just not good to draw-cold air
)
l 13 along the hot turbine shaft, so we broke vacuum.
I 14 because of that, so we had no vacuum.
15 When the turbine coasted to a stop, the s
i 16 turning gear would not engage.
This had happened.on 17-the last trip.
That gave me-en indication of where 18 to look.
We had one electrician there,:and I l
19 instructed'him on the circuits-to' investigate.
They
.20 had found ' blown' fuses before in5a' sensing circuit i
21 that enabled the turning gear.
I directed him to 22 look at that.
{'
23 BY MR. BELL:
!. ]
24 Q.
'Zero speed circuit 7 x
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES -(614)445-8477 l'
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION I
t 5 -_
t 84 1
A.
No, it was lift pressure.
I t's a circuit 2
that observes lift pressure to the turbine bearings.
3 And if that's available, then theLturning gear will 4
start and engage.
So we were in a ' condition where 5
we-had~
vacuum.
'The turbine was off gear.
There no 6
wasn?t much I could do at'that time until I could --
7 I had to get the turning gear -- or the turbine on 8
gear before I could put seals on.
9 I had to have seals before I could put 10 vacuum.
I had to have vacuum back before I could 11 get the MSIVs back open.
It was that kind of chain 12 reaction,oso we were stuck right where we were at.
13 Between Bill O'Connor and Steve Quennoz, they.
14' started looking at what support we would.nood for 15 the problems that we had.
16 They-called in people from the tech 1l7 section to delog the computers that would have all 18 the transient data on it.
We gotnextra i nstrument a
- well, 19
'and control people in here to look at the 1
20 like we had' problems with the'NIs, problems.with 4
starting the feedwater valve. control'. circuit.
21; tha 22 They called in maintenance people from the 4
i 23.
maintenance shop to.look at problems ~like controls l
' (])
24 for the aux. feedwater pumps.
Well, you' fkn ow, the RUNFOLA,& ASSOCIATES-(614)445-8477-COMPUTERIZED' TRANSCRIPTION m
f I
85 1.
governor control problems we had that way.
They got EO well, let's see.
Tney 2
some engineers in there i
3 called in the maintenance ongineer.
j 4
Ha got.other maintenance engineers in 5
there to~ aid in writing work requests for the work 6
that had to be done.
It pretty well geared up the 7
whole plant staff that way.
Extra operations people i
j 8
.were called in...They called in the day shift of 4
you know, I've only 9
operators to aid because. the i
,10 got five-equipment operators on the shift, and we
[
11 were protty well strapped by what we had, so they
~
i
)
12 called in the day shift' to aid in what would have to
'13 be dona just-to bring the plant to a - hot s tandby 14 condition.
j 15 BY MR. BEARD:
i 4
l l'6 Q.
Hot standby?
Terminology question?
17 A.
Mode 3.
)
18 Q..
Mode 3.
You were in mode 2 I guess?
i 19 A..
Yes.
20
-- Q.
So you were1wanting-to go --
I i
21 A.
Well, we were really in mode 3 at the time, 22 but w'e'were sitting at 546.
we had.to cool down-532.
23
.Thore was a lot that had to be done'on the secondary 1
()_
24
. side'of<tholplant in the way of the turbine seals i
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
.COMPUTBRIZED TRANSCRIPTION.
6 1
s
.. - ! 2
h 86' 1
and the vacuum and just that kind of thing tha t-i:
2 would take people.
I i
3 Q.
Going back to Wayne's question about the i
4 management people, I got the flavor from what you're i
h 5
saying that the Kinds of things th t they did appear I
6 to be very supportive 7
A.
Yes.
of your. running the show.and getting 8
Q.
9
.you. help?
I 10
.A.
Yes..
i.
11 Q.
.Did management people give you any -- or
{
l 12 did you-perceive any reaction trom the management 13 types of their percaption of the gravity ot the r
i 14 situa+
l
.A.
They know it was serious.
The feeling I i
15 j
16 got was that they were surprised we could get it 4
17 back as quick a s nwe did.
That was s ta ted more than i
18 once.
We w e r's only for a period of 19 BY MR. ROSSI:
20 Q '.
That'you could get it back as quick as you 21 could?
22 A..
Yes, wa were only in that condition for a i
j 23 periodoof. twelve minutes.
~For having everything l
24 dead and in the water like that, the-entiro. shift
(}
RUNFOLA &: ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
l i-i
,. J.,.
87 1
did an excellent job.
It was good efforts made by 7-(-)
2 everybody.
3 BY MR. LANNING:
4 Q.
So the move was to do wha t?
Get ready to 5
come back up to power or 6
.A.
No, they know that was a long way oft.
It 7
was just to got us down into a normal plant 8
configuration.
We were at an in-between spot.
Our 9
normal conditions for post trip would be to come 10 down to 532 low level limits on the steam generators.
11 Q.
Which is hot standby?
12 A.
Which it hot standby.
We weren't there as k
13 such.
14 BY MR.
BEARD:
15 Q.
I don't know whether I'd be interrupting 16 Wayne's train of thought or not, but along tha t sama 17 line I'd be curious as to the shift technical 18 advisor.
l 19 A.
Yes.
20 Q.
Who was he, what did he do.
Did he 21 provido you good assistance?
Was he involved in 22 doing things for you?
How did that seem to work out 23 there during this event?
(~l 24 A.
The fellow's name is Tod Lang.
That's
\\._/
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-d477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION t
t 88 I
1 L-a-n-g.
He's one of our newer STAS.
As it turned 2
out, this was his first trip as an STA.
He did 3
provide some assistance in going through the i
4
- emergency procedure, helping me sort out tho emergency plan.
He made'the initial red phone call 5
j i
6 to-the NRC.
Provided more administrative assistance.
7 But he-was of some help.
8 Q.
Did you feel like that the overall 9
diagnosis'of'what the overall plant condition was i
1 10 from a global.perspectivo, in this particular event 11 did you do the majority of that or was it you and i
12 the assistant supervisor or how did tnat how 13 would you describe that?
s 14 A.
I think;everybody tha t was in the control 15 room the way of licensed operators and the STA was 16 aware of what the c o n'di tio n s were.
They really l
17 didn't have to be pointed out by somebody.-- by'one
.18
.porson to anybody else.
We all were aware of the 19 situation and the gravity'of11t.
20 Q.
Okay.
21 A.
Wasn't something that.really had to be 4
L22 pointed out as such..
23 Q.
So I guess I get the flavor that'your
_( )
24 training, especially-the post TMI part of various l
RUNPOLA.& ASSOCIATES (61'4)445-8477 LCOMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 4
+
1
~-r-'E r
w
-r-v-
~p
--.v,.m.
9
- * + =
r-m ar w - se -- e 7
r
I s
89 1
. scenarios, wall enveloped the situation.
It was
~'
2 recognized.
.3 A..
Yes, indeed.
4 Q.
There weren't any unusual developments 5
that maybe the shift technical advisor was 6
originally envisioned to help you diagnose.?
7 A.
Tha t's - true.
I don't think anybody that 8
was in there had any trouble recognizing the 9
conditions that we were in or what it would 10 eventually lead to.
11 Q.
Okay.
And all the actions-were within, I 12 guess, the envelope of.your. procedures and' training?
13 A..
Yes.
14 BY MR. BELL:
15 Q.
So the 16 A.
The effort'was all in one. direction.
17 Q.
If I may summarize ~both-his question and 18 your answer then, the.STA really wasn't required'for l
c19 this event?
I' 20 A.
Not for the original-purpose that~the'STA 21;
.was envisioned tor.
22' MR. BEARD:
Excuse me.
Did I interrupt j
23-your train of. thought there,. wayne?
24 BY MR.~'LANNING:
l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
9
b
^
i:
90 1
Q.:
I wanted to get back to the management 2
question.
And are-they generally supportive of the
-3 operations personnol?
I guess I'm talking about
-4 managemont a t the corporate level now.
Like, is relationship ther'e'that 5
there a warrants some sort 4
6 of discussion or you feel has some strong feelings j
f 7
about it one way or the other?
4.
8 A.
Nothing one way or the other.
They've 4
f 9
always been supportive.
Dick Crouse, the vice j
-10 president of nuclear, did come in also.
I can't 11 tell you exactly what ~ time ha showed up,-but he was 12 there.
Ho realized that he was.of no real help of a 13 technical nature,.but he'said he would he was 1
5 l
14 there to give any help in obtaining resources that t
15 we might need as such.
No, we had no - Eno problems 4
i i
16 with support.
Everybody'was very supportive.
l i
17 Q.
Suppose this had been a more routine
~18 reactor trip?
19 A.
It-wouldn't have been nearly as involved.
20 Q.
And management's attitudo would have been 21
.what?
22:
A.
If it had been a routine tripa,when we had 23 finally stabilized out-I would have called the i
(f 24 opera tions ' engineers ' required.-
'And we'Would have
{,
RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 i
-COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
=
91 1
discussed, you know, any problems that we might have g3'w) 2 nad, you know.
If it had been a normal trip, there 3
wouldn't have really been any.
We would have 4
stabilized ourselves out at standby and probably 5
stayed-there until morning.
People probably would 6
have come in on day shift.
I don't know if anyone 7
would have come in in the middle of night.
8 BY MR. BELL:
9 Q.
Why would you have not restarted the plant?
10 A.
They probably would not have just because 11 of the problems with the main feed pump.
Wa had 12 problems with it before, and some people were uneasy f)')
(
13 about going up with them in the condition they were 14 in.
But we did anyway.
And to have it trip again 15 just out of the blue, they would have had to, you 16 know, do some kind of troubleshooting.
17 BY MR. LANNING:
la Q.
Now, who is some people?
Did you feel 19 personally that --
20 A.
We would they would have had to get 21 it would have been between like the plant manager 22 and upper management, you know.
They're the ones 23 that will say, you know, push for getting plant on
,( )
24 the line, make money.
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
~. -.. -.
i 92 1
1 Q.
This is corporates you'ro talking about
^
2 now?
3 A.
Yes.
It would have been from that i
4 standpoint.
And, you Know, decision would have had
+
5 to have been made~to bring in factory 4
6 representativos from GE to, you Know, troubleshoot-7 this situation some.more.
i 8
BY MR. ROSSI:
}
9' Q.
Had tha t been done-before?
Had GE people 10 come in to look.at the --
f 11 A.
Yes.
j 12 Q.
They had been here before?
13 A.
They wore.the ones that had como in and i
14 instrumented the pumps before'tnis last' start-up.
[
15 BY MR. BELL:
i 16 Q.
Does it-irk you that you put in trouble l
17 reports on the nuclear in s t rume n ta tion system and it i
I
-18
'doesn't seom to get fixed, and'you also'put in I
19 assume you ~put in trouble reports on this ATOG l
does that. get l-20 display, and 'it doesn' t. ge t fixed, 21 under your skin?
l 22 A.
A'little bit.
It does.
I mean, it's an I-
~
I've boon told l
23 ongoing' situation.
And there's
()
24
,that there's.somo kind of a fixfbeing-drawn up that-j l
RUNFOLA &L ASSOCIATES.(614)445-8477 l
COMPUTERIZED. TRANSCRIPTION l
J
_, =..-
93 1
will correct this problem, but, you know, it's not (2) 2 there yet.
3 Q.
You know, these are problems that 4
evidently have been going on for several months.
5 And do you feel like that paople aren't responsive 6
to the trouble reports that the oporators submit?
7 A.
Sometimes.
I can't say that all the time.
8 But, you know, this occurs again and again.
we'll declare the thing inoperable, and 9
They'll 10 then it we trip and the seal comes oft and they'll 11 do ST on it and it comes back and it's good and it 12 comes back up, then it's inoperable again.
Same
)
(J
\\
13 conditions.
14 BY MR.
BEARD:
15 Q.
You're referring to the NI?
16 A.
To the NI in this case.
17 Q.
Do you feel like that tho raason you're 18 not getting things tixed either in a' timely or in a 19 good way relates to more of management providing 20 resources or that maybe when the technicians do gat 21 around to looking at a piece of equipment like an NI, 22 they basically go through and do a survoillance test 23 on it.
And if it passos, they write it off versus
}
24 doing really investigative troubling shooting?
I'm RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
94-f
[1( )
1 trying to understand wnero you would like to see the 2
more improvemonts?
4 3
A.
Well, improvements would probably have to 4-l 4
come from the top down.
You Know, it's-a problem 5
tnat it takes an engineering fix to correct.
You G
can't really throw it onto the technician.
I mean, 1
they'll get sometimes just as frustrated as 7
he f
8 anybody else because.they'll go in, thay know wnat 9
the problem is, and t'hoy can look at it.
'And it 10 winds up the same way.
I' 11 Q.
So the problem is not one t h a t. they're notL I
- 12 doing _enough. investigative troubleshooting-for you.
4 13 It's just that the~
i 14 A.
A lot of times the conditions are-known.
J l
15 They're just not fixed.
16 Q.
Oxay.
Because it's beyond a' repair effort
{
17 that a technician would do?
3 18 A.
Yes.
It takes.some Kind of_ engineering i
19 fix to do it, and somotimes they're a.long time!
20
-coming.
h i
21
'BY MR. BELL:
22 Q.-
But if this were
~ these problemo-were of f
23 a technical spacification nature, that rcquired them 24 to1 be repaired.before you could restart the unit or'
()
RU tJ FOL A & ASSOCIATES (614)445-6477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION g
, ~
95
^
1-
'i f they weren't repaired, you'd have to shut the O
l,
'2
. unit down, do you get prompt'responsa?
~3 A.
Yes, it's no choice.
It costs monay when i
4 the unit is down.
It costs them a lot of. bucks a 5
. day.
And, you Know, they don't like-that either.
6 So if it comes down to it, if there's-something in 7
the road tha t can't be bypassed that has to be fixed, I
8 tnen,'you.know, a good. effort will be made to fix it.
'9
!Q.
'So if we have to fix-(t to make it run.
10
.I f we can get.along without it, it's something 11 that's nice to'have-in order to run, we just sort of i
12
-let that'allp?
13 A.
I won't say.theyllet'it slip, but it might 14 not have the prompt :a ttention ' and ' response that 15 ~ 'something else might get.
f~
16 BY.MR. BEARD:
J-thejguick"fix' issue for 17
,Q.
While we're on la your plant,-with one start-up source? range' nuclear i
1i 19
' ins trumen ta tion inoperable, I; guess 1that leaves you 20 with a second one, are you' allowed to start.up in 21
.that condition?
i 22 A.-
No, not start up.
Once you're up', 'they t
23 can-go out of service and they're,not; required.
p i {).
24 Q.
One or both of them?
~
RUNFOLA'& ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
1 i-
96 1
A.
I'd have to read it to be sure, but at g3V 2
least one.
I thinx both of them.
You don't need 3
source range when you're at power.
Once you trip 4
Q.
Then you need it?
5 A.
Then you need them.
6 BY MR. ROSSI:
I 7
Q.
But you can't start up without both being 8
in service?
9 A.
You can't start up witn one of them being 10 broke.
11 BY MR.
BEARD:
12 Q.
I guess the last time you restarted the Ik-13 plant prior to this event, I get the clavor this 14 source range channel that was on-again, ott-again 15 operability s ta tus and it happened to be operable at 16 the time you wanted to start up, so you went up.
17 And then apparently it died, if I can use that term, 18 after you got out of the source range?
19 A.
Um-hmm.
20 Q.
Oxay.
21 BY MR. LANNING:
~22 Q.
Had you had an opportunity to moet Mr.
23 Crouse before this avent?
<]
24 A.
Oh, yes.
m RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
97 1
Q.
Does he visit the plant frequently?
%J 2
A.
Yes, ne does.
Comes around quito often.
3 Q.
Just as a matter of general information 4
gathering?
5 A.
That and just to show tne presence.
6 Q.
Goodwill?
7 A.
He's an old power plant man as it is, and 8
I think he sometimes enjoys just coming out to the 9
plant, walking around, talking to the operators.
10 Q.
Now, that sort of implies there's a good 11 relationship between labor and management.
Is tha t 12 trua?
n s-13 A.
At least for my part.
You Know, I enjoy 14 talking to Dick.
He's 15 Q.
How about on a broader scale?
16 A.
I don't Know.
Right now conditions, you 17 Know, if you're ta1xing union paople, it's kind of 18 rocxy juet from negotiations tnat are going on, 19 contractual-wise and such, but 20 Q.
Have you seen any impact of tnat on plant 21 operations or with plant maintenance has to be done 22 or --
23 A.
Not really.
()
24 Q.
Not really?
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUfERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 1
98 1
A.
Not really.
At least not with me.
g)
GJ 2
Sometimes it's personal from, you know, trom shitt 3
foreman to shift foroman.
Some guys #get along 4
better with people than others.
It's --
5 BY MR.
BEARD:
6 Q.
When you're talking union people versus 7
nonunion people, dous the union include the licensad 3
reactor operators?
9 A.
Yes.
10 Q.
Does the union include the supervisors of 11 the -- the licensed suporvisors ot the reactor 12 operators?
O 13 A.
No.
u-14 Q.
So tnat's the intertaco?
15 A.
Yes.
16 BY MR. BELL:
17 Q.
So you and tne assistant shitt supervisor 18 ara not union members?
19 A.
No, we're management.
20 Q.
You're managoment.
Yos.
21 BY MR.
BEARD:
22 Q.
Il a v e thera been any particular management 23 efforts or activities in the last fow months thac l
(~)
24 have baen particularly troublosome to the operators x-l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
99 1
'maybe with regard to maintenance or code of drous or
,lg 2
things of this na ture ?
3 A.
Yes, you've obviously heard.
They are 4
enforcing a dress code for the operators that has 5
ruobed some tur the wrong way.
They have put 6
maintenance personnel on nignt shitt coverage, which 7
most of them do not line.
8 Q.
Is it because it's shift work as a 9
different class of worn that they are objecting do?
10 A.
They just don't like worxing nights.
11 Q.
Well, I mean, are these maintenance people 12 tnat we're talning about normally in the past, 13 they'd been single shift people and they worked days?
14 A.
Day shitt.
15 Q.
And now they're being asked to work either 16 nights or some rotating shitt kind of situation?
17 A.
Yeah, wasn't well, wasn't so much as la asked.
They were said they will.
19 Q.
No, I don't mean that part.
I maan the 20 part tney object 3d to was the fact they were being 21 asked to either' work nights or rotating shifts?
22 A.
Back shifts.
23 Q.
Because wnen I was a technician many years f')
24 ago, a sort of a status symbol at that time was are mj RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-3477 l
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
l l
100 1
you a shift worker or are you a day person.
I don't
(
2 know whether there's any of that kind of feel up 3
here or not.
4 A.
Tha maintenance s ta t t and the rest or the 5
Edison system, tossil plants, has always been 6
strictly day shift.
And they just don't like 7
working back shifts.
8 BY MR.
LANNING:
9 Q.
What was the rationale for this back shift 10 work in need of tne maintenance?
das it to catch up 11 on maintenance backlog?
12 A.
- Wall, I'm told it was mora for to maka 13 people available for testing, and plant maintenance 14 type of activities on the back snitt.
15 BY MR. BEARD:
16 Q.
What was the idea bahind the dress now 17 dross code?
Could you toll us what tne naw dress 18 coca requiromants are or when they went into effect?
19 A.
Well, like I'm wearing the unitorm now 20 that's required for the management people.
21 Q.
How would you describo that uniform for i
22 the record?
I mean 4
23 A.
It's just a decas shirt and slacks.
()
1 24 Q.
Okay.
RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 I
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
~
101 l
A.
The g~
s 2
BY MR. ROSSI:
3 Q.
tio color requirements or anything of tha t?
4 A.
Woll, yeah, I've got tha dark blue pants 5
and light blua shirt.
Tho union people are going to 6
have the same pants with a darkar colored shirt, 7
blue.
8 dY MR.
BELL:
)
9 Q.
Is the company turnishing these?
10 A.
Yes.
11 BY MR.
BEARD:
12 Q.
No tios involved?
13 A.
No ties.
They're a safety hazard.
Can't 1
14 have ties around rotating equipment.
But the wnole 15 tning, the reason behind the whole thing Kind of 16 ranxles a lots of people becausa it got into just a 17 contest butween our chief executive officer and Mr.
18 Koppler.
19 Q.
Mr. Koppler?
20 BY MR. BURNS:
21 Q.
Rugion 3.
22 A.
Region 3.
23 BY MR.
BEARD:
()
24 Q.
What do you think the objactivo ot I
R U !1 F O L A & ASJOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
102 1
guess you're saying 2
A.
Tho objective was tnat for Toledo Edison 3
to prove it had sufficient control over its people.
4 Q.
But you're saying tne dross code for union 5
people wnicn would include reactor operator snowroom 6
would be the same for union peopla?
7 A.
Yos.
8 Q.
Wero there other distinctive classes 9
involvad?
10 A.
No.
11 Q.
Did you teel like that this dress code had 12 a adverse impact on the attitude of your resctor would you describo that 13 oporstors that was 14 significant or how would you daucriba the magnitude 15 of the fooling?
-16 A.
Oh, it hasn't improved morale any, if you 17 want to put it that way.
Some peopla don't care.
la Soma paoplu, you know, some don't have other clothes.
19 Some people, boing ex-Navy, don't liko uniforms at 20 all.
It's an individual thing.
But it's just 21 ranklod a lot of foolings.
22 BY MR. BELL 1
23 Q.
Does the operating staff fool tha t the NRC
()
24 has mandated these uniforms, if we may call them 1
RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 i
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
L-______-______-__-_________-________________
l 103 1
unitorms?
2 A.
I don't Kngw if they go so far as that, 3
but I thinx everybody realizes the underlying cause.
4 Q.
And tney blame tne regional administrator, 5
Koppler, for forcing this on Tolado Edison?
6 A.
Not necessarily.
7 BY MR.
BEARD:
8 Q.
I got the tooling earlier that you woro 9
saying it was as a result or some sort of a contost 10 between your chief executive otticar and the 11 regional administrator.
12 A.
Um-nmm.
O-13 Q.
I could speculate on enings, but I don't 14 think that's appropriato.
15 A.
No.
16 BY MR.
BELL:
17 Q.
This is leaving tno incident behind?
18 A.
I do7't havo tne detsils, and a lot of 19 it's by rumor.
I'm not going to say anymore.
20 BY MR. BEARD:
21 Q.
Lot me say anothor area.
I understand you 22 do have a union shop nore, and contract renewal is 23 coming up.
And could you tell un how the how you
()
24 attad on that with regard to possibility of strikes RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
104 1
and unings of that nature?
g~s U
2 A.
It looks line a striko me y be very 1
3 probabla.
They're changing the health benetits, 4
cutting the haaltn benefits of the union parsonnel.
5 It's not going over very wall at all.
1 6
Q.
Is the cut in offect now on the banefits?
7 A.
Not for the union paople.
8 Q.
Or is that something that is proposed for
.9 the new contract?
i 10 A.
That's wha t's trying to be that tha 11 company wants in the new contract.
12 Q.
If they were to go out on strike havo 13 they had strikos hara at this plant botore?
14 A.
Not at this plant.
Not since the plant's they havon't had a 15 gone in.
Woll, tney've had 16 strike of the operations personnol.
They did tor 17 the ottice wornors.
18 Q.
Okay.
19 MR. ROSSI:
Do you have anything more 20 anybody?
21 BY MR. BEARD 22 Q.
I think the only thing I'd like to do in 23 may we've asked you a tremendous amount of questions,
(])
24 and I think you've done a really superb job in R Uf4 FO L A & ASSOCIATES (614)445-6477 COMPUTBRIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
l f
105 1
giving us good answers, honest answers I teal.
2 A.
Tried to keep it straight.
3 Q.
Tnat's tne only way to go.
4 MR. ROSSI:
You have a good knowledge ot 5
what went on during the ovent.
6 BY MR.
BEARD:
7 Q.
I'm trying to say can wa turn the table 8
and say rather than anxing us questions, is there l
9 anything tha t maybe we haven't touched on you'd like 10 to convey to us 01 any general nature?
j 11 A.
You've boen pretty tnorough.
I can't 4
j 12 think of anything tna t's happened tnat I teel l
13 anywhere near significant that you haven't touched.
14 You just about covered it all.
15 BY MR. LANNING:
16 Q.
Well, it anything does occur to you, next 17 couple days, we'll be here.
18 A.
Okay.
19 BY MR. BEARD:
t 20 Q.
Certainly want to thank you for staying 21 ovar.
I r1alize tnis is at the and after a shitt ot 22 working hard, and you're obviously tirod, and msybe 23 now you can go homa and get n o ta s sleep.
()
24 A.
I'm surprised I was as 21ert, to tell you RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)44S-d477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
LO6 1
the trutn.
2 MR. ROSSI:
Let's go off the record.
3 4
Thoroupon, the interview was 5
concluded at 11:05 o'clocx a.m.
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
)
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-0477 COMPUTERI4HD TRANSCRIPTION
i 107 i
1 CERTIFICATE f
k i
2 I,
Anne I.
McBrayer, a Notary Public in v
fl
~3 and for the State of Ohio, do horoby certify t4at I l
t l
4 took tho interview of Tad Lehman and that the 5
toregoing transcript of sucn_ proceedings is a tull, 6
-true and correct transcript of my atenotypy notes as i
i 7
so taken.
8 I do further certify that I was called 9
tnere in the capacity of a Court Reporter, and am 10 not otherwise interested in tnia proceeding.
11 IN WITNESS dii E R E O F, I nave hereunto set my i
i 12 hand and atfixed my seal of office at Columbus, Ohio, 13 on this _
day ot
//hp-1985.
l Cl Y
35
~~~
ANNE I.
- Mc5RAIER, a Notary.
J 16 Public in and tor tho State of Ohio.
j 17 l
18 My Commission expires February 3,
1988.
{
19 i
20 I
l 21 i
j 22 i
23
(}
24 l
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATCS (614)445-0477 i
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION a
Pace Line Correatich # c% nce and reason therefor 3
is ckoma e 'ceaf % 'cM.
' T2xtl.O.me(a Ak d ck M ' sad,5p o.
i
~
~
e
\\o to za 19
' w a s ' i k m u L ' a r s a to s "
t9 i
4',t' Alm.Li Ac a r ss1z '.
" d m d.M.
- M ".
Eq
-l A%
z.e G
' la-6 " hM L *.Lo ct '.
\\
bl D'
QG3h A % &%L CI Q CL.
__s
\\L vs-7
%9-1" 4Lautd L'to '
~70 2
I k.t C "
- dch b I1f C.,
ei tz M " Abde) 9A *./dia ";
n
?M A naD u-M " R T
' ~ %
to T L A L e d.h %
1 L wi w\\
m GI r.n n s tot to bru 3 a5 onao\\n? ch a i q
s s y
0 Q_N -- dol 4 Gw MAA L
9Qh n
e
,G l
JO3 7--
VI uA 6(nkri a d, k( hfut T to 9[uo
\\\\ U S2uS LAA -
oma.
y F
4,...
./g/20/9,T SIGtlATUR d 8[L LL pay no.
DATg f
y
.