ML20129B982
| ML20129B982 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1985 |
| From: | Lehman T TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8507290313 | |
| Download: ML20129B982 (109) | |
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- 1 BEFORE THE FACT FINDING TASK FORCE r).
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2 OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 - - - - -
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6 Davis-Besse event :
4 7 of June 9, 1985 :
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i 9 INTERVIEW OF TED LEHMAN t
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1 11 Interview of TED LEHMAN by the Nuclear j 12 Regulatory Commission Fact Finding Task Force, taken
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13 before me, Anne I. McBrayer, a Notary Public in and 14 for the S ta te of Ohio, at the Site Emergency 15 Operations Center, Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant, Oak 16 Harbor, Onio, on Wednesday, June 12, 1985, at 9:08 i
17 o' clock a.m.
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19 20 21 22 8507290313 850612
'24 RUNFOLA_& ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
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'l. APPEARANCES:
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2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4340 East West Highway 3 Bethesda, _ Maryland 20814 By Mr. Steve Burns, 4
On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory' 5 Commission.
6 Members of the Team:
7 Wayne Lanning.
8 Larry Bell J. T.-Beard 9 Ernie Rossi 10 11 12 13 14 15
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l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION I
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3 r- 1 TED LEHMAN D
2 being. called as a. witness, was interviewed as 3 follows: l 4 EXAMINATION 5 BY MR. ROSSI:
i i 6 Q. Okay. This is Ted Lehman. And, Ted, why
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1 7 don't you tell us what your position in the company 8 is?
l 9 A. Okay. I hold the-position of shift I
10 supervisor. I've held that since July lat of 1981.
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! 11 Before that, I was an assistant shift supervisor i
i 12 since the beginning of the plant operation. I was j
13 one of the original coal license members. Been in 14 the program since April'of 1972.
l 15 Q. Okay. And you were on duty, I guess, the I
l 16 night of the 9th?
17 A. 9th, yes, I was.
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18 -Q. At the. time that you had the problem with t
i 19 the main feedwater pump?
i 20 A. Yes.
1 21 Q. Maybe the best thing to do is to have him 22 describe what occurred and refer to.any. graphs or 23 racords that you.have?
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-24 BY MR. BEARD:-
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4 s 1 Q. Can I ask you one sort of administrative
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2 thing?
3 A. Go ahead.
4 Q. You were on that shift. What time at this 5 plant does that shift start?
6 A. Twelve midnight.
7 - Q. It starts at twelve midnight. In any 8 event, we're talking about it took place at roughly 9 - 1:30 in the morning, so you had been on duty an hour 10 and a half?
11 A. Hour and a half.
12 Q. And I presume when you came on duty in 13 your turnover, the shift from the previous shitt to 14 you folks, there were no significant or unusual 15 plant conditions or maybe you could cover that so it 16 would give us a background of where we're coming 17 into this from.
18 BY MR. ROSSI:
19 -Q. It might be good if you started at the 20 time you came onto the shift and tell us, you know, 21 wha t , if anything, occurred?
22 A. When we came on shift, the plant was at 90 23 percent power, 800, roughly 820' megawatts electrical.
24 .We -- the only significant difference from normal
[' 1 RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION ,
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0 1 operations, we had had problems with the main feed t
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.As a result of that, we were
- l. 2 pump oil systems.
3 running with t h e = N cL. 1 main feed pump in automatic, i i l 4 and No. 2 main feed pump was in manual. !
5 BY MR. BEARD:
6 Q. When you.say o'i l ~ s y s t e m , Ted, you're-not
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j 7 talking about lube oil, are you?
! 8 A. No, control ~ oil.
i i 9 'Q. Control. oil. Okay. -Just want to maxe I
I; 10 sure tha t's ~ clear.
.' 11. A. Yes. We hadiproblems of -- when we were 1
I j- 12 coming-up-from the last trip ~ that we'd had, during j
13 that trip both main-feed pumps had tripped shortly'
- 14 after-the reactor tripped. During the investigation
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1 15 of that, they discovered an. anomaly in the' oil j 16 system for the No. 1 main feed' pump. They didn't.
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- 17. really have a resolution to.that.
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- 18 While they were-down, they instrumented .;
19 both pumps. And then we brought the plant 1up, and 20 .they were.just going to wa tch the1 instrumentation. i
'21 See-if they .could find anything ou t ' about that.
22 LThey wanted one pump to be run-in automatic, one '
23 . pump manually. They didn't'have any preference '
whic'h one was-which.
f(} 24 We just, you know, we had the RUNFOLA &-ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
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6 q l line up we did in the way we started up.
Q 2 Q. Was there some rationale as to why one 3 automatic and why one manual?
4 A. Just in case something -- if something 5 - would happen, we'd have one pump that wasn't relying 6 on the control oil system as such.
7 Q. So the oil system that you were having 8 difficulties with was relating to the automatic 9 control and not related to the manual?
10 A. That was the theory.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. It had problems before where both pumps 13 would tend to -- oh, what can I say. They were 14 thinking that --
we have a, what they called, rapid 15 feedwater reduction system on our feedwater pump 16 that is supposed to aid in our feedwater control 17 following a trip, post trip. One of the functions 18 of that system is to increase the main feed pump 19 speed to keep our f eedwa ter delta P high~ due to the 20 increased steam pressure.
21 One of the theories was that the ra pid 22 increase that the system would give to the feed 23 pumps might be-causing the lube oil system to --
or I
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24 not the lube oil, but the control oil to fail in RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 1
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- 1 some method. Not necessarily fail, but have a 2 malfunction, some method that would cause the pumps 3 to trip.
4 Because ot that, they wanted us to run 5 with one feed pump in manual such that it would not 6 respond to that rapid feedwater reduction system in 7 the event it would trip.
8 Q. So the control system that was apparently 9 involved was the rapid reduction part, which as I 10 think is -- is that now part of the integrated 11 control system?
12 A. It's tied into the integrated control I
13 system. I t's not really a fault in a rapid 14 feedwater reduction, but more in response of the 15 feed pump to that. It would only appear usually 16 during a trip.
17 Q. Okay. So it wouldn't --
18 A. A post trip.
19 Q. It wouldn't be involved with the automatic 20 controls used to maintain the plant at s ta ted power?
21 A. No.
22 Q. But only in a post trip situation?
23 A. Just in post trip is when it showed up
(~T 24 before this.
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8 1 BY MR. ROSSI:
2 Q. What sort of problems -- well, let me go 3 back one step before that. Had this control system 4 for the main feedwater pumps, this was something 5 that was newly installed?
[ 6 A. The control systems on the main feed pumps 7 were put in during the last fueling outage.
8 Q. Which would have been what date about?
9 A. It was last fall.
10 Q. That's close enough.
11 A. Sometime. I can't remember exact dates on 12- that. But it was installed during that outage.
l 13 This was a new system from GE that was supposed to 14 be of a considerable improvement over the original 15 systems that came with the pumps.
16 BY MR. BEARD:
17 Q. In case I'm confused a bit, maybe you can l
18 help me understand this. Are you saying the rapid 19 feedwater reduction system was installed during this 20 outage or a new improved version of it was installed?
21 A. No. It was tho' actual control system for 22 the feed pump. The actual control cabinet and 23 control system for the feed pump itself was changed..
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() 24 Q. Okay.
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. ,e 1 A.- The rapid feedwater reduction, I couldn't b
L 2 .give you the exact dates when that had been put in.
3 It was sometime before even this. And that was just i 4 a modification to the ICS to aid in p l'a n t response 5 to a reactor trip.
6 BY-MR. ROSSI:
7 Q. Had they-been having -- had you been 8 having problems with the feedwater control system 7
9 since last fall or ---
f -10 A. No.
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11 Q. --
had these.--
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t 12 A. Up until this time, it had:been aJ pretty 13 nice system.
) 14 Q. The new one?
15 A. Yes. It ran very smoothly. Gave us.much !
16 better control of.the pumps. The.old oneLused to 17 tHe --
well, just cantankerous. Sometimes we'd have
- 18 trouble getting the pumps off gear when wegwere 4
19 bringing the' pumps up. We'd'have to go down and 20 crank on the contro1~1ers.down there to'get the thing i 21 to come up and just various problems like that.
22 Tnese were much better from that standpoint.
23 Q. And so the problems started like just ,
() 24 during'a recent reactor trip or.--
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, 1 A. On, it had been like -- we had a trip
- 2 about a week before mine, and it started sometime 3 shortly before that that they started experiencing 4 some of these problems.
~5 Q. So a couple of weeks is what you're saying?
6 A. At least.
7 BY MR. BELL:
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8 Q. That was my --
you're talking lixe the 9 feed pump problem started in May of '85 then?
10 A. I can't give.you an exact date, but yeah, 11 it was sometime previous to this they experienced z
12 some of these problems.
} 13 BY MR. ROSSI:
14 Q. But it'was on the order of maybe a month
- 15 previcus?
16 A. Yeah.
17 Q. Not several months previous?
18 A. Usually on a. post trip condition. They'd l
19 never given us any problems while we were operating.
20 BY MR. BELL:
21 Q. And did, as a part of the recovery, did
( 22 anybody other than instrument No.-l feed pump, did l 23 anybody make any changes to the adjustments of the ,
f 24 control oil sys tem or did they just decide to
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l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION .
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11 m . 1 instrument the system and not troubleshoot the
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2 system?
3 A. They troubleshot the-system as well as 4 they could with the pump not running.
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. And there wasn't a lot they could see. So 7 they -- the decision was made to not delay the
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8 s ta r t-u p any longer, to just go ahead and put the
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o 9 instrumentation on the pump and start the plant back i
i 10 up and observe what would happen.
11 Q. Was there any, discussion about limiting 12 plant power to the maximum power you can make on 13 only one feed pump while the other feed pump was 14 being troubleshot?
15 A. No.
16 Q. So that-you could get some actual -- there 17 was no discussion like that?
18 A. That wasn't really considered.
19 Q. And one final condition. One final 20 Equestion, and I'll let you continue. You said 't h e .
21 anomaly appeared in No. 1 main feed pump.
22 A. That was the one we observed it in first.
- 2. 3 Q. Okay. And what sort.of anomaly was that?
24 A. It was something that occurred that they
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1 never could really say that it was'related to the
- m 2 ' problems they had experienced with the pumps. With 3 the pump-on turning gear, when you would initially 4 roll the pump up in'sp'eed, the standby. pump would 5 start.just because of the, you know, as the control 6 ' system picked up and the in-surge on the oil-system, 7 the second pump would kick-in momentarily.
8 ~ Q. oSo'just let me ~ interrupt you a minute.
9 When this pump rolls up, then there's a reduction in 10 oil ~ pressure ~ that picks up-the standby pump?
-Apparent reduction in: oil pressure?
12 ., A . Yeah, it's just. There's oil regulators O-' 13 in the system. The pumps put out something like-250 4
14 pounds of oil. And tha t's stepped'-down once=for 15 control oil and again for. lube oil.
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. And it's just when you initially start .
'18 rolling the pumps'up until the pressure' regulators 19 can catch it, sometimes the' pressure will just dip . .
20 low enough'it_will. catch the standby' pump and bring 21 it on. Then the, you know,/the -- it.will all. level
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- 22 oackDout,'and you'll turn the standby p u m p 'o f f . -
23 AsLit_ occurred, we were starting to' roll 24- the pump up as such,'and.the standby pump came on.
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. ,c) 1 And the operator looked down and saw that and he
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2 tripped it. As soon as he tripped the oil pump, the 3 main feed pump tripped.
4 Q. So he caught'it while pressure was still 5 low?
6 A. Well, the pressure had apparently 7 stabilized, but it shouldn't have done it under any 8 case.
9 Q. What tripped the feed pump then?
10 A. As they subsequently found out, it was, 11 for.some reason, it was the thrust bearing wear 12 detector trips, for whateverireason.
13 Q. Okay.. Now --
14 A. They never -- they couldn't find anything 15 that would say why this happened. It was just 16 something that, you know, if you caught it at just 17 the right time, just when the regulators were just, 18 you know, starting to catch it, if you dump that 19 standby-pump, the main feed pump was tripped, and it 20 was the thrust bearing wear detectors that would 21 trip.
'22 Q. Okay. Have you had-any problems with dirt 23 or foreign material.in this control _ oil system tha t 24 would make the system-act erratically?
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RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
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1 A. No.
^2 Q. Plugs, small orifices or that-kind of
-3 thing?
4 A. No.
, 5 Q. Okay. Thank you, sir, s
6 BY MR. ROSSI:
7 Q. Have you had these same kind of problems ,
8 witn-the main feedwater pump also; is that correct?
9 I1 mean, you --
10 A. It wasn't found on the No. 2. pump.
11 Q. This problem'wasn't?
12 A. N o .'-
13 Q. The one that was found during 14' troubleshooting.- But-the tripping of a after--
15 reactor trip had occurred on'it too?
4 16 A. Yeah,'on the last trip-before this one, 17 both pumps tripped within a matter of seconds of 18 each other, immediately after the trip.
l 19 BY MR. BEARD:
r 20 Q. Let:me make sure I understood what you
/ 21- said earlier,: .Ted. The problem had been observed
'22 with the No. 1 main feed pump. .And then for the
! 23 start-up it was decided one in automatic and one in 24 manual.
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-15 1 A. Yes.
2 Q. I think'you indicated that the guidance 3 that operators had received, it.really didn't make
, '4 any difference which one but whatever. But now when 5 .you did the otart-up or when the start-up was done, 6 which ones did you-have in automatic and which one 7 was in manual, do you remember?
8 ,A. When the plant finally got up on the line, 9 they had 2 in manual and 1 in automatic.
10 Q. So No. I was in automatic and No. 2 was in 11 manual?
12 A. Yes.
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kl 13 Q. And --
14 A. We discovered this problem one afternoon 15 when we were on afternoon shitt, and we played 16 around with this. And, you know, everybody 17 scratched their heads and looked at this. Then 18 they decided they would go ahead and instrument
, 19 the pump. Before they started.up they tried to 20 duplicate this problem again on the day shift, and 21 they couldn't.do it.
22 BY MR. ROSSI:
23- Q '. This problem being the one where you
(} 24 tripped off the standby pump?
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
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16 1 A. They couldn't duplicate the problem. So 7x L.,.)
2 they-tigured maybe it was just -- maybe they just 3 had to exercise the system or whatever. Tnat was 4 their explanation of it.
5 A decision was made to go ahead and take 6 the plant up with the pumps in that contiguration, 7 -and they didn't care which one we had in manual and 8 wnich one we nad in auto. It was up to our 9 discretion.
10 BY MR. BELL:
11 Q. When the rapid feedwater reduction system 12 sends a signal to increase main teed pump speed, A- 13 does that involve an increase in control pressure in 14 that feed pump to position the governor valve?
15 A. N o.t an increase.
16 Q. How do we ramp those valves up to a higher 17 position Lnon?
18 A. Well, they're hydraulic. Thete's -- the 19 system will put just -- put more oil to the cylinder, 20 the operating cylinder, and it hits the valves.
21 Q. So when it does put more oil to this 22 ope ra ting cylinder in the position, the low pressure 23 poppetts, then there -- then this regulator has to
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24 reposition to hold a constant control oil pressure?
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
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1 A. I would assume that much.
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- %s 2 Q. Okay.: ,
3 A. I ca n ' t -- you know, you're getting a 4 little bit past my knowledge of the --
just how the-5 sys tem - ope ra te s. - But it's my understanding of it.-
j 6 Q. All right, sir. Thank you.
7 BY MR. BEARD:
8 Q. In summary then, when.you came on shift at 9 midnight, the only, quote,. unusual thing you had to 10 contend with was this problem on the main feed' pumps..
11 . And everything else ran pretty much as typical?
'i l 12 A. Yes.
s 13 B Y --M R . ROSSI:
14 Q. .And then things stayed that way until 1:30, 15 just steady s ta te of operation?
16 A. Steady state.
! 17 Q. Uneventful.
1
!. '1 8 A. It was quiet, you know. Night shift.
19 Nothing_ abnormal was happening. The-weekend, there 20 .were no extra maintenance personnel-then. So -there 1,
21 was no testing, no maintenanca of any kind. going on.
- 22 Just a very quiet Sunday morning. .
23 BY MR. LANNING:
24 Q. Do you recall any problem with the source k'"N
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RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
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- 18 1- range detectors or anything to do with the source 2 -range?
3 A. The No. 1 source range was declared 4 unoperable.
5 .BY MR. BEARD:
6 Q. Was it really inoperable, Ted, or was it 7 legally inoperable on some technicality?
8 A. We've had the problem with the No. 1 9 source range in that as it's --
when it's -- the 10 source range during power operation is normally 11 deenergized.
12 Q. Right.
) 13 A. For whatever reason a static charge tends 14 to build up on the center probe or-the. center lead 15 of_the cable, and that feeds through the circuit.
-16 And with the thing deenergized, it will sit there, 17 and it will read counts, 30, 40, 50, maybe higher 18 counts on source range. And, you know, by rights, 19 -it's not right and we declared it inoperable per 20 textbooks.
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21 BY MR. LANNING:
i 22 -Q. How long has it been in this condition? ,
23 A. Really it's been quite a while. It will ,
(} 24 be in a condition like that. If the instrument and
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19 1 control technicians come over and they'll do the ST 2 on it, it will straighten back out and come down and 3 it will read right.
4 Q. I see.
-5 BY.MR. BEARD:
6 Q. And then I guess after a period of time, 7 the misbehavior reoccurs?
8 A. Sometimes it will reoccur and wind up in 9 the same condition again..
10 ~Q. Following up'on that same line, was it 11' inoperable such that in your opinion that on a plant 12- trip you wouldn't be able to. depend-upon its: release 13 or did it~have this misbehavior-that only seemed to 14 occur related to when~you were at power and the 15 detector was turned off so that it's been --
16 A. It only happened.when we were at power and 17 the detector was off.
18 Q. So you, as a supervisor or as an operator, 19 you -- did you feel that you could have depended
- 20. upon 'its reading on'a post trip situation or --
21 A. I wasn't concerned about it.
22 -Q. Okay.
23 A.- As such. Tha t was no concern.
24 Q. Okay.
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- 1 BY MR. ROSSI:
- 2 'Q.' Okay. Why don't you go on then and 3 describe how you first noted that something was f ,4 happening and tell us'what you observed about the
.5- event.
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'6 -A. I was,in my office, and-I had just gotten ;
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'7 up.- I don't even know where I was going to go now.
'8 But I~ heard something start to wind down. The shift I
i j 9 ' supervisor's. office sits in somewhat of a unique i l 10 position in that in that one spot, you.can hear a I 11 majority of the larger equipment that runs in the j 12 plant. And I heard something-just start to wind i
13 down.
4' l-4 I immediately went over to the control 15- room and discovered tha t the No. 1 feed pump had 16 tripped. The plant was in a runback. 1The RO had l 17 gone.to the No. 2' feed pump controller'and was 18 attempting to raise Lt in manual and attempt to 1 - 19 . bring the f ee: aa ter pressure and the flow up. He 4
20 wasn' t successf ul in'this. The. plant tripped on '
i 21 RCS pressure. 1hm went into our' emergency procedure l
7 22 for reactor trip. Started'--
! 23 L BY;MR.' BELL: .
24' 'o . This
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.,, . _ , - , - . _ _ . . _ ~ - - . _ . . _ , . _ ,s 4.. . . . . . . . . ....;_,,_.._.4., r.__,. . . . . . . . . , . _ , . - . , . . . - _ . _
21 3 1 A. That one right there.
4 2 Q. This is their emergency trip proceduro EP 3 1202.01.
4 BY MR. BEARD:
5 Q. This is your -- you use the term emergency 6 procedure, and that's a proper name. But it's 7 really the procedure that you use on any plant trip; 8 is that correct?
9 A. Yes.
10 0 Okay.
11 A. The assistant shift supervisor had opened 12 the procedure up, gone to the immediate actions and 13 read through those. And then started through the 14 supplementary actions in the procedure which 15 verifies the reactors trip, turbine trip, rods in i 16 the bottom, turbine valves are closed, electrical
{ 17 power, station air, instrument air, it goes through 18 a whole-list of parameters to check.
19 Q. Now, _in tha t area comes up the question 20 about what' indication did you have on your nuclear 21 instrumentation system of the' flux level at that i
22 time?
23' A. Normal post trip. It would be in the
, /'l 24 intermediate range.
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i 22 1 Q. You were still in the intermediate range g 1 ks i 2 at that time?
3 A. Yes, decaying down immediately after trip.
4 It takes quite a few minutes to get down into the 5 source-range post trip. We were going through that.
6 At the same time I was obaerving the feedwater 7 system along with the RO that had been trying to 8 bring the feed pump up. One'of our concerns was too 1
9 that the feedwater system would cut back and come 10 down onto low level limits on the steam generators 11 and hold there.
12 We've had occasions where it would O 13 undershoot, and we would have a SFRCS actuation on 14 low steam generator level. So I was watching this 15 pretty close as the levels came down. And levels 16 came down-nicely, came right in. We watched the 4
17 valves, the start-up feedwater valves pick up. The 18 levels came in right at low level limits and 19 appeared to be stable. Was looking real good.
20 During this period of time the safeties had been 21 litting, and then they reseated.
22 Q. You're talking about steam line safeties?
i 23 A. Yes, main steam line safeties, which, you 24 know, as they should have. And then as we were
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23 1 observing this, all of a sudden the safeties picxed 2 up again, which was unusual. I looked up to see 3 what was causing this and discovered that the MSIVs 4 had gone. closed for no apparent reason that we could 5 discern.
6 We.immediately checked the enunciators.
7 We had no SFRCS t ri p aus would be indicated'by those.
8 We had no other equipment actuation wnich would 9 indicate an SFRCS trip. No --
10 Q. No ESP either?
11 A. Nothing. Just had gone closed.
12 Q. With regard to enunciators, just to give 13 me a feel for it, how many enunciators were on 14 roughly prior to the start of the event? I mean, 15 are we talking half a dozen, a dozen?
16 A. Wo.would normally have maybe -- maybe a 17 dozen.
18 Q. Okay. So that prior to the event, there 4
19 was maybe a dozen lit. Now,_at the time that you i
.20 found out that~the MSIVs were closing, you were 21 looxing around for causes. And one of the places' i
22 you had looked was the enunciator panels. About t
23 roughly, if you can remember, how many panels were l
24 lit at that time? 200, 207-(])
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24 1 A. No. Let me think about this for a minute.
2 A. I'd have to say maybe 30, 40.
-3 Q. 30 or 40, okay.
4 A. That is a rough guess.
5 Q. I was just trying to get a feel for about 6 how many.
7 A. The enunciator _ panel that I was looking at 8 had none lit on it.
9 Q. Now, is this a special enunciator panel?
10 A. The enunciators are divided up into 11 sections around there, and there's one section that 12 has all the SFRCS alarms on it.
13 Q. Tha t's it'was the SFRCS enunciator panel?
14 A. And it had nothing lit on'it. It's got 15 the SFRCS alarms and steam generator level on it.
16 And it's the fir't.
s place I looked, and it was blank.
17 Nothing lit.
- 18 Q. Do you have a separate enunciator panel 19 for the ESF actuation systom?
i 20 A. Yes, clear over on the other side.
21 Q. Were any of those lit as you remember?
22 A. For emergency safety features?
23 Q. Yes.
(} 24 A. Nothing for that.
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 l COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
L
25
,- m 1 Q. Okay.
Y_]
2 A. We had enunciators for the RPS system that 3 would be associated with the reactor trip. host of 4 the enunciators were normal for the reactor trip and 5 for the trip of the main feed pump.
6 Q. Okay.
7 A. There was really nothing abnormal in the 8 enunciators that we had for the conditions we had.
9 Q. So I guess I interrupt you quite a bit, 10 but I think the point you wore at was that you found 11 that the one steam safeties had basically lifted and, 12 I guess you were saying, stayed open. And in O
\J 13 looking to that, you found the two MSIVs closed, and 14 you looked around and found no obvious reason why 15 they closed, is that about where you were?
16 A. It wasn't just one satety. A number of 17 them lifted again. It's hard to tell. A loud roar.
18 And when I looxod up to see what the cause of that 19 was, the first thing that caught my eye, we got two 20 big lights over there that are indicators tor the 21 MSIVs, and they are closed.
22 BY MR. BELL:
23 Q. Ted, it's normal on any reactor lift to
(')
\s 24 lift the safety valves?
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-P477 COMPUTERIZED T,RANSCRIPTION
E 26 1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And when they closed, you thought 3 everything was normal. And when the steam shot up, 4 that increased steam pressure for the second time, 5 and safeties lifted for the second time, and tha t's 6 the abnormal lift?
7 A. It was the second lift of the safeties 8 that caught my attontion, yes. The initial lift of 9 the safeties is normal. We'll lift all 18 safetien, 10 and they'll blow for a given period of time and t t.e n 11 ressat. Sometimes you'll get one that -- well, you 12 know, any main steam safety, code safety, is -- can 13 be erratic. Sometimes when they get hot, they'll 14 simmer and sometimes relitt a littlo bit. But this 15 was a major blow the second time, and that was what j
16 brought my attention up. And I looked around and 17 saw the MSIVs were closed.
18 BY MR. BEARD:
19 Q. So the first abnormality in this post trip 20 situation was the closure of the MSIVs?
i 21 A. Yes, because up until that time, the --
22 f or a post trip, the conditions were looking good.
23 I felt our chances of stablizing out were very good 24 at the time. And I was surprised to see those
(( )
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
, COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION I
, . -. _ ~ _ - - . - - -. . . .. .
27 1 things going shut especially with no other I ~
2 indications as to what closed them.
3 BY MR. LANNING: ;
i 4 Q. What type of signals would normally close
- 5 the MSIVs?
i 6 A. The only thing that we've got would really 7 close them would be an SFRCS actuation.
i 8 -BY MR. BEARD:
9 Q. You mentioned in-answer tc'the question -
10 about what signals would operate the MSIVa?
4 11 A. Yes.
j 12 Q. That the steam feed rupture control system 13 would cause that?
l 14 A. Yes.
15 Q. My question was, would the ESF actuation 16 sys te m also cause it?
17 A. Yes. j 18 Q. okay. Are those basically the only two
{
19 sources of automatic closure signals to the MSIVs?
1 20 A. Yes.
4
! 21 Q. okay.
22 .A. Okay. Having.seen the safeties were --
i 23 having seen that.the MSIVs were closed, we-know 24 there wasn' t going to be any easy way out of it.
I
(])
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
J 28 1 You know, it's not something that you can 2 immediately reopen. They were closed, and they were 3 going to stay that way.
I 4 So in anticipation of an SFRCS actuation,
! 5 which we knew we would get if we waited long enough, 6 the steam generator levels would boil down, and we f
! 7 would pick up a low level trip, the reactor operator
- 8 asked permission to trip SFRCS manually.
a j 9 Q. I t's anticipatory?
4 l
? 10 A. Anticipatory. It's just an anticipatory !
11 action, you know. The quicker we can get ourselves --
t i 12 the sooner we catch the steam generator levels, the 13 better off we'd be. He went over to the back panel 14 and tripped the SFRCS.
4 15 Q. By back panol --
16 A. Tha vertical panels.
17 Q. .The vertical panel in the main control 4
18 . room, not a back panel in the sense of --
l 19 A. No, just the vertical panels as opposed to 20 the bench panels in the front. He went back and i
21 tripped the SPRCS. Came back around. And we 5
22 watched _for proper actuation of the auxiliary 23 f eedwa ter system. The first thing I saw were the
() 24 aux. feedwater segregation valves. It's AF 69 RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
- 29
- 1 through 72. These are the runs that line up the 2 feedwater flow for whichever steam generator.
i 3 I looked at those, and the valves were 4 lined up such that I would feed 2 and 2 would feed 1.
l j 5 This was abnormal for a low level trip. They should 6 have lined up so that No. 1 system'would fit in No.
7 1 generator and No. 2 would feed No. 2.
8 The RO looked at that and immediately 9 looked over to the back panel and observed that he
, 10 had tripped the'SFRCS system ~ on low steam generator i 11 pressure rather than low levels.
- 12 Q. So it was at the point that'you realized i
13 the aux. feedwater trains had lined up in a 14 crisscreas pattern rather than a straight-in s
l 15 pattern -- r
- 16 A. Yes.
17 Q. -- that you deduced that the actuation had la not been a desirable one?
]
19 A. Yes. I immadiately walked to the back 20 panel myself. We reset the low-pressure trips and' 21 retripped it on low level.
r j 22 Q. Okay.
l 23 A. It was during this same time that the aux.
j
{} 24 feed pumps had started, come up in speed. And the l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
. COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
r 30 1 RO observed them coasting back down'again and looked 2 up, and we had the overspeed trip alarms in for both.
3 Q.- On both?
4 A. For both aux. teed pumps.
5 Q. What's a normal start-up time on one of 6 your aux.-feed pumps from the' time, for example, if 7 the -- if the operator-had gone over and hit this 8 manual' actuation, wha t's a typical response time 9 that the pump would be up to proper feed and be able 10 to put out water?
11 A. It could be 25, 30 seconds.
12 Q. Okay.
13 BY MR. LANNING:
14 Q. Did the RO' realize he had pushed the wrong 15 buttons?
16 A. He was the first one to see it. He 17 discovered his own mistake. And we immediately 18 reset it.
19 BY MR. ROSSI:
20 Q. And you noticed both aux. feed pumps now 21 had tripped?
22 A. Yes. At the same time, while this was 23 occurring, the assistant shift supervisor had walked 24 around to the back panel to verify proper actuation
(])
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-0477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
l
! 31 1 of the steam valves that supply the aux. feed pumps.
j 1
2 It was while he was back there that he observed that 1
3 AF 599 and AF 608, which are the aux. teedwater stop 4 valves, had closed. He attempted to roset and open i 5 theso valves.
i
. 6 BY MR. BEARD:
l 7 Q. Excuse me, was the closure of those valves 8 a proper response or something abnormal?
9 A. It was a proper response for the low 10 pressure ~ trips that was initially i nserted.
i
} 11 Q. Yes.
I 12 A. They should have come back open.
- 13 Q. Based on the resetting of.the low pressure 14 actuation, manual input of the low pressure 15 actuation followed by the manual input of low level 16' actuation?
4 17 A. Yes, sir.
4 18 Q. Okay.
) 19 BY MR. ROSSI:
20 Q. Those valve numbers, again, those were 1
21 aux.-feed numbers, and their numbers wore?
22 A. AF 599 and AP 608. Okay. These valves 23 were observed to be closed. He immediately hit the
() 24 resets and tried to reopen them.
l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
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32 1 BY.MR. BEARD:
2 Q.' Now, resets here, you're talking about a l t
3 local component reset versus a system?
. ll A. Yes. It's a local -- it's a local I
i 5 , component reset on each valve. They've each got a 6 reset button. And then each valve has two 7 controllers. Both of those have to be hit to open
~8 them. '
j 9 Q. Okay, b 10 A. He tried those. And the valves did not 11 respond. He then immediately went'to the cabinet
! 12 room in the back to the SFRCS cabinets.
I p -
13 BY MR. ROSSI:
i 14 Q. This.is the assistant shift supervisor?
l 15 A. This is the assistant, yeah, shitt
. 16 supervisor. And went to what we call initial bypass l
! 17 and block. This is a procedure that will clear any 18 trips that are in the system and block them. Once 19 he released on that, the system would have lined i
. 20 back up by the low' level trips that were locked into i
l 21 them.
j 22 BY MR. BEARD:
i 23 'Q. But it would -- would it block the manual 1
24 input or --
i I
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RUNFOLA &' ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCR3PTION t
- , ,, ,, .-. system for a while. That's
- 22 1800 PPM. boron. We knew we,would_have. increasing 23 xes.sn_from the. post trip conditions which aida in 2'4 our shutdownimargin. And then we did start pumping
(
I RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 l
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
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t 63 1
-1 in concentrated boric acid. So the --
from the
,c V
2 conditions that had gone before, this.was something
- i 3 that had to be watched but was not a major concern 4 at the. time.
5 Q. What about the condition of the -- or the
,i 6 position of the control rods?
7 A. They were all on the bottom. That had 8 been verified early in the trip. Just part of the 9 post trip operator response, that the conditions 10 we'd'have to check. Those had been, immediately 11 after the trip, had been verified a l l' on the bottom.
12 Q. So would it be a proper summary to say-
- 13 that your feeling was that,were the: rods on the f 14 bottom and this that and the other,'the core was
'15 not criticality in danger, but you only had an i'
16 instrumentation problem?
r 17 A. Yes. I had no concerns about,. you know, ,
18 any-inadvertent criticalityfat the time.
19 BY MR. BELL:
20 Q. I have about three quick q..s s ti on s . L 21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. When, on a. normal trip,-when that high-l 23 voltage is reenergized--to a source range, and we're i.
l } 24 talking source range channel 2 tha t's not on. scale
! RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
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- . l' now?
' ~
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. You already told us source range channel 1 4 was not in service?
5 A. NI 2, yes. Well, you're going to have 1
6 to -- NI 2 is channel 1 if you want to talk channels.
7 You want to talk NI numbers?
! 8 Q. Okay. You tell'me wnich one was out of a
9 service. What. do you call it?
10 A. NI 2.
11 Q. NI 2 was out of servico?
12 A. Yes, it was off-scale.
- '13 Q. . Now. NI 1 -- now, I'm talking about 14 before the trip,.NI 2 was the one you declared 15 inoperable?
16 A. No, NI 1 was the one declared inoperable 17 'before the trip.
18 Q. .NI ;2 , when 'the interchange turns it on, 19 you should get a high start-up ra te . alarm .com a s on ,
20 right,.because it spikes -- sees a rapid change in 21 neutron level, did tha t enunciator.come on?
. 22 A. I can't tell you. -
23 Q. Did you have high voltage on the
() 24 enunciator? ,
, RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
! COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 6
l
, .~ . . - . _-
(
65 l A. Yes, that was verified. The primary side dg~ .
2 RO went to the back cabinet.
3 Q. To the RPS?
i 4 A. To the RPS. Opened the cabinet to see'the
(~
5 indication-that was in there.- It was also failed, 6 but he did observe approximately 2,000 volts, high 7 voltage, through the detectors.
'8 Q. All right.
9 MR. ROSSI: Well, see, I had a question 10 there. Was -- go ahead, finish.
a 11 MR. BELL: I've got two'more, and I'll I 12 shut up.
f" 13 BY MR. BELL:-
14 Q. Also you haven't --
we were' told-in the 15 earlier interview that SP6A-failed.
16 MR. BEARD: 7A.
17 A. 7A.
18 Q. Excuse me, 7A failed during this transient 19 also.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Did that give'you any concern?
t-22 A. When we put the start-up feed pump on, the' 22 reactor operator grabbed for - the. control that was
() 24 closest to him. That was 7B'for the No. 1 generator.
i RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
. - ., - ~ . . _ . . -
66
- 1 And'he got feedwater established to that.
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. He subsequent to that tried to get flow to J
4 the other steam genera tor through SP7A and got no 5 satisfactory response from'the valve that he could I
6 observe. Then, like the same time', he got the No. 2 7 aux. feed pump available. So he fed the No. 2 8 generator with the No. 2 aux. feed pump.
9 Q. Okay. Finally, during this trip.that '
10 occurred in, I think you said, June the 2nd or so, 11 the trip before this trip.
J 12 A. Yes.
13 Q. What caused those feed pumps to trip-on 14 that occasion? What -- you have no idea?
15 A. Can't tell you.
16 -Q. Okay. I'm'through.
17 MR. ROSSI: You asked the-question-that I 18 wanted to ask, was about the SP7A, so you covered
-19 that.- That's it.
20 BY MR. BEARD:
21 -Q. I had a-couple that were along the same 22 line. This is, I think, a little further into the 23 recovery' stage or s tabiliza tion phase, Ted.
24 _Do you remember any problems with regard
. ().
, RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZUD TRANSCRIPTION l
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67 l 1 to the sourco of water for the No. 1 aux. feedwater
~
i 2 pump?' I 3 A. Yes. That happened. When they were l 4 trying:to bring the No. 1 aux. feodwater pump up, it
^ 5 tripped a second time. And at tho same time it 6 tripped, I don't know which came first, the auction 7 to the pump swapped over to service water.
8 Q. That was unexpected o r --
'9 A. That w a's unexpected. I -- I don't know.
10 I still don't know wha t caused it. There's a --
I ,
11 saw the enunciator for high DP come-in - - -
or --
1 12 there's a suction strainer for those pumps-and it 13 has'a.DP alarm across it. The enunciator came in.
14 Same time the pump tripped, and.the'RO observed that 15 the suctions had swapped.
16 Q. Okay.
~
17 A. We -- the ^ EOs tha t' we re down in the aux.
18 . feed pump'immediately started to relatch the pump.
, 19 At the same time the RO opened the suction from the t
20 condensate atorage tanks to the pump, and then I 21 closed the service water valve, which lineo up.
22 normal suction to the pump. Was after'-- thun after
-23 this was accomplished, they brought.that pump up and.
24 in speed, and we kept ~i t on.-
{
1 -
(') .
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION.
l i
68 c 1 Q. Okay. So there were -- if that spurious 2 actionJ-- it was a spurious action. It basically 3 occurred once and didn't reoccur. In otner-words
-4 when you refigure back to the original configuration, 5 it held in there?
6 A. Yes, that only happened that one time. I 7 have no explanation for why that happened.
8 Q. Did you have any problems with turbine-9 bypass valves?
10 A. Much later into the recovery. The SFRCS 11 actuation, when it -- well, with the MSIVs closed, 12 the turbine bypass valves served no purpose.
( 11 3 -There's no steam. Control goes to the atmospheric l 14 vent valves. We were using those for pressure 15 control on the steam generators.
16 When they finally got the atmos --
or the 17 MSIVs open, we swapped control to the turbine bypass 18 valves. When they did this, on the -- let's see.
19 ~It's SP13A. Would-be on the-No. 2' steam ~line. When 20 ~they opened the MSIV.for the No. 2 steam line, I was 21 !
sitting in my office at the time.
22 I heard a rather loud'- : it almost sounded 23 like a-rattic, but it was a-water hammer. And
-[~).
-w/
2 4' sometime snortly after this, one of the equipment RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES'(614)445-8477 (s ' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
L -
l
69
- 1 operators called up and said that the -- one of the 2 turbine bypass valves on that line was rather 3 severely damaged. Broke it.
-4 BY MR. BELL:
5 Q. Do you think that's a result of the 6 opening the MSIV on that side?
7 A. They figured it got a slug of water in the 8 line.
9 BY MR. BEARD:
10 Q. Is that typical, that you can get a water 11 slug when you reopen the MSIVs or --
12 A. Here's what, in conjecture, happened is
. /3 k~) 13 the main steam to aux. steam reducer, this is a 14 valve that takes main steam, reduces it down 235 15 pounds for the auxiliary steam system of the plant.
16 There is a desuperheating valve associated with 17 that. So when the pressure on-the steam is dropped,-
18 it doesn't super' heat.
19 That valve malfunctions. We have a hard
.20 time with it because that comes 'off of main 21 feedwater,.and it will wind up with like 1100 pounds 22 of pressureLon one side of it, and it has a hard 23 ' time coatrolling.- The valve, as1 1t turns ~out, the
[j 24 controller to this valve was out of. service for
- n RUNFOLA &' ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477.
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION V
y - ,-a w,-
4 70 1 whatever reason.
2 INC was working on it. And the manual
~
3 bypass was cracked open.to provide desuperheating 4 water.for this thing. They figure while the MSIVs
!4 5 were closed, this desuperheating water just filled 6 up the steam line, backed up the aux. steam system
, 7- and put a slug of water in the main steam line.
8 When the MSIV was subsequently opened and turbine 9 bypass valves opened, that slug of water went right 10 down the line and hit the turbine bypass valves.
11 BY.MR. ROSSI:
12 Q. What did it do to the valve when you say.
(s%)- 13 it was severely damaged? Was it then leaking or --
14 A. It broxe it. It broke the yoke right in 15 half, and -- that's a rather substantial yoxe on 16 those things. It's quite heavy. -Snapped it right 17 in half. And broke the. actuator. These things work 18 ~ on an air piston, and it just cracked it~ all the way i
19 around.
20 BY MR. BELL:
21 -Q. .You're talking both sides'of.-the' yoke?
22 A. Both sides of-the yoke. The actuator'wea 23' sitting there going up and down'as the valve wanted
[} 24- to move.. So with the. valve. moving,' the actuator x,
RUNFOLI. &-ASSOCIATES -(614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION.
R ,
71 1- went up and down, it broke o f f' the valves and 2 snapped the position feedback.
3' BY MR. BEARD:
- 4. Q. So a'rather severe water. hammer, 'wouldn't 5 _you say?
6 A. -I t was probably rather nasty a t' the time.
7 Q. Well, i n t h e process.of reopaning'the 8- MSIVs, help me understand this one ,H doe s.' one
.9 normally-open, say,.aEsmaller' valve around the:-MSIVs
-first? _ ,
11' A .' _Yes,.we open-up the' bypass valve and 12 pressurize the steam:line. We have toiget the' delta x 13 P reduced down to --
14 Q. So you-opened-theimain one?
15 A~. As low as wetcan get it. -
~16 Q. Does that serve the: ~pu rpos e of warmingithe
. 17 line' downstream also?
18 'A. It will warm the-line a3 such..
- 19 'Q. Okay.
~ 20- A. And it'a pressure -- you know s-pressurizes.
- 21. the ~ downs tream -dido'.
. 22 Q. And was ,tha t' :done during'this?
~
23 A '. Yes..
24 So . tha t the ' opening lof the MSIV.was done l[ ,
~Q. .
RUNFOLAT&~ ASSOCIATES-(614)445-8477-COMPUTERIZED" TRANSCRIPTION.
- [
i- .
72 1 in the normal sort of way. And the reason you had fS
\v' 2 damage apparently was because an unusual source of 3 water would fill up the lines is what did you?
4 A. Yes. Yes, _tha t's not -- we normally don't 5 have tnat kind of a problem.
6 BY MR. LANNING:
7 Q. I'd like to go back and' discuss what 8 alternative methods that you might have,used if you 9_
had not been successful in getting this start-up 10 feedwater pump operating. Did you give any thought 1 1- to restoring the main feedwater pumps to operation?
12 A. That was completely out of the question.
- 13 Q. And why is that?
14 A. There was no steam available.
15 Q. Because the --
t 16 A. MSIVs were closed.
17 Q. And it must take a long period.of time'--
18 A. It takes a period of time,;maybe'20, 30 19 minutes just to repressurize the line. Once you get 20 the condition, you can do that.
2 1' Q. N o w ,- if the MSIVs had not closod, cauld 22 'you.have possibly used_those pumps?
. 23. A. If the MSIVs had not closed, we would not
~24 .have been in this condition a t' a ll . -
RUNFOLA.& ASSOCIATSS (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 1.__
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w 73 l= Q. I~ don't understand.
> 2 A. Ne would not have -- the No. 2 feed pump
< 3 would ha ve: supplied us.all the feedwater we needed.
1 4 The steam generators had come onto low level limits 5 nicely. We would have gone outLinto a normal post i .
-6 trip configuration. We1would have wound up right in f 7 -a. post trip window and we would have been in pretty 8 d e c e n t .. s h a p e .
9 Q. When w o u l d . y o'u have decided =~to use the-t l 10 feed #and bleed method of. removing heat from the *
- 11- reactor vesso17 -
12 A. When the start-up feed pump became ,
l* 13 available'to us, at that period of time I was to' 14 the. point where if_it.didn't happen within the-15 .next few seconds, I would have gone to the HPI.PORV.
i
. 16 of cooling.- And :it was just --
you know, we had 17 gone -- t'ime .was- s ta r ting to stretch.out, and we s
118 . were to appear'there-in the ?. con trol' room . where 19 'nothing was happening.
20 You1know, we wera just standing t h e r e'.
~
4 ;21 -The guys were out~ working, and nothing was. happening,
~
-22 and the plant was heating'up. :An'd it was just?ati 23 the point where if it didn't happen 'now,-we were 24' . going to'have to go the other way. .AndEright at-
. (} '
'RUNFOLA^& ASSOCI ATES -( 614 ) 445-8 47 7- ,
COMPUTERIZED-TRANSCRIPTION C
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~
'l that time the start-up feed pump became available-to 2 us. And i t was just a closo decision right there.
3 Q. Do you have a lot of confidence in that i
4 method?
v 5 A. . I have, you know, we've had training'on 6 that from B&W. We've observed it on tne
-7 similarities. We have gone through the c a s u a l t'i e s ,
8 that they've given us similar to this whero you have 9 a total loss of feedwater.and you'go to that'
{-
. 10 situation, and we have followed it'all the way=down-1 11 to-cold shutdown.
12 And -it = appea rs to work well, if you want 13 to say that. . I mean, it's a method that-works.- It, 14 you.know, it makes a mess out of your plant,- but it 15 works. But, you knowi you got to realize'what your 16 primary concern is, core integrity.. You can't --
{.
17 you know, it'it comes to that, it comes to that.
- 18 Q." Were1the subco'oling meters of.use during-19- this transient? ,
20 A.- Yes.
i - 21 '.Q. How did-'you use them?
22 A; I mean, you know, they'reright-there.
- l. 23 'And we observedithose things closely at various-( 24 times, kee ping -:tra ck of our. subcooling margin. And RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477'
' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION c
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75 1 we never observed a subcooling margin of any less 2 than 47 degrees is the lowest we ever got. So we 3 always --
4 BY.MR. BEARD:
5 Q. What time during the event, do you 6 remember the minimum subcooling occurring roughly?
7 I don't mean clock time. I mean, what was going on?
8 A. Let me think.
- 9 Q. Was this before the aux. feed and start 10 feeds got running, for example?
11 A. Yes, it would have been.
12 Q. Oxay.
13 A. That was the lowest we saw. Once we'got
', 14 the feedwater in there and it ' cooled off, the margin 15 became greater.
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. 47 -- 47 degrees was the lowest we saw at 18 any one timo.
'1 9 BY MR. LANNING:'
20 Q. From an operating standpoint, wuuld you 21 have preferred to have the start-up feedwater-pump 22 not locked'out, not valved out?.
23 A.' Sure.
() 24 Q. Now, has'it always been valved out?
! RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614')445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
i
- u. . _
76 1 A. No. I can't give you the dates that this 2 came about, but it was discovered that the lines for 3 the start-up feed pump.had not been properly 4 analyzed by Bechtel Engineering when-the place was
{
5 constructed, . and there was the danger of a high 6 energy line break from either the feedwater lines to 7 the start-up feed pump or the cooling water lines 8 which could'endt.nger the aux. feed pump that sits in 9 the same room. As'a result of this, they made us --
10 -when the pump was not in service, it has to be 11 valved out.
12 Q. They is -- who is they? -
13 A. The NRC.
14 Q. Okay.
15 BY MR. BEARD:
16 Q '. Along the same line, when you say there is 17 a danger of a high energy line break, are you 18 referring to the c a's e where a -- just a failure 19 occurs or are you referring to the ~ situation where 20 there's some external phenomena such as seismic.
21 event which might cause such~ a failure?
22 A.. Whatever condition would cause it. It 23 could be anything. 'That if you,. you Know, if the
]
, - , - (,. ./ . 24 feedwater line would rupture, the concern was the~
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
~ COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
77
- 7. 1 damage it would cause to the aux. feed pump in the V
2 same room. When we have the pump in service, we 3 are required to keep a man in the room that is 4 knowledgeable in the actions that have to be taken 5 to isolate the pump in case of a break.
6 Q. So the concern then is that the 7 pipe related to the start-up feed pump may not 8 be adequately designed or analyzed such that 9 its failure potentially could affect the 10 safety-related aux. feed pump that is in the room?
11 A. Yes, sir.
12 Q. Okay.
(3
(. J 13 MR. LANNING: Is there --
14 BY MR. ROSSI:
15 Q. You started to say something about how 16 long ago you were required to do that. Do you 17 roughly remember about when? I mean --
18 A. At least last year sometime.
19 Q. So it's about a year ago?
20 A. At least. I don't --
I just don't have a 21 good feel for that n u;a b e r .
22 BY MR. LANNING:
23 Q. If you were going to factor this event and 24 experience you gained from this event into a
{})
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
78
,. 1 training program for the operators, is tnere --
k) 2 which parts would you emphasize most and is there 3 areas which you felt that you could have benefited 4 by either additional experience, additional training 5 or whatever?
6 A. I feel that the-training that we have 7 received since the Three Mile Island 2 event dealing 8 with ove rhe a ting conditions in the RCS have been 9 adequate for the conditions I observed during this 10 incident. We knew what had to be done. We knew 11 what the results would be. I don't think there's 12 anything that we could emphasize that hasn't.already O
13 been done in a case like this.
14 Q. Or anything you would have done 15 differently during this e v e n t?
16 A. I might have ordered the start-up feed I
17 pump put in service sooner. It could have been by a 18 matter of two, three, four minutes. 'But, you know, 19 it would have helped. That's about the only thing I 20 can see.
21 BY MR.-BELL:
22 Q. Was the ATOG, A.T.O.G., display in service 23 .during this transient?
f; m-24 'A. No.
'RUNFOLA &-ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
. . - .. - . . . ~ . . . _ . . -. . - . _ _ . . - - .
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a e a
). - .79
. . l' . Q. .Why not?
2 A. .I t ' j us t ~ wa sn ' t tunctioning.
'3 JYou don't.-- would it-be normal for t h a t.
' Q.
t 4 system to function? Would'it not normally.be done
{
I 5 if the system were operational?
6 A. Its reliability has been marginal for 7 having.it available to the operators.
Would you nave l'i k e d t h a t' display to be~in 8 Q.
i
! 9 operation during that t ra n s i e n t ?.
J' .
2'
'10 A.- .Yes,EI would . have.. We all would have.
! 4
-11 We'va gotten used to seeing'those displays in our i
, fl2 . planning at.B&W and they'aro quite-nelpful, l 13' especially its the event ot this Kind..
14 BY MR. BEARD: ,
15 Q. Point of. clarification, ATOG_dispiny, is i
j 1 6~ that the same as a safety parameter display system
! 17 display or-is tnat different? '
1
-18 A. Yes. Tha t 's your SPDS?
i -
- 19 Q. Yes.
4 20 A. ~Yes.
1
. 21 Q., That's the.same. interval?
1
-!22 A. Same critter.
- 23 Q.. I have a question with regard to -- it's I
- 11ong.the-line of T sat meters. To ~what extent were
! (')
24 RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 i " COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
+
4-d 80 i
J l the acoustic monitors on the PORV used or of benefit 2 or not of~ benefit during the event as you remember 1
1 '3 it?
> 4. A. I didn't personally observe them at all.
i 5 Tne primary operator, I believe, looked at tnose in 6 relation to his operations on the PORV. Those
, 7 displays are available right to nis rignt as ne --
i 8_ or to_his left as he.vas standing in tront of-his I
9 panel.
i i 10 Q. Do you think-this had --
or do you 1
11 remember whether or not what he observed on the ,
12 acoustic monitors for the PORY is to have,-that may 13 have inputted to nis decision to use the PORY block o
14 valve?
1 .
T.
i 15 A. I couldn't tell-you.
i 16 BY MR. LANNING:
! 17 Q. When management arrived-in the control l 18 room after the event, can you sort'of give us somt i
19 insight as'to what their reactions were or comments 1-4 20 or. interactions with'the operators?
21 BY MR. ROSSI:
I ,
- 22 Q. You mig h t 's ta r t by telling us at what f 23 point did otners.arrivo?
24 A. O'K a y . Let me catch up to wheru I had'left I 'RUNPOLA"& ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
, ,_ - _. _ - - _ . . , - __-_ , - - _ , - . ,, , - . .-..,.w-, ,.. . - , . .
l f 81 1 off and will continue.
2 We were.to the point where the plant was f 3 ' fairly s.able. We had good control of most I. - . .
i 4 everything. I stood back and took a look at the 5 emergency plan. I realized that during this r.
i 6 transient, we were deep.into the emergency plan, but 7 there was no way that I could take time at the time j 8 to declare any Kind of an event.
I 9 By the time I could stand back and look at L
- 10 it, we were notLin any emergency action level.- The ,
11 one that would have been called would have been a i,
3 12 site area emergency, which is a rather severe i p l v 13 emergency action level. ,
j i '14 Q.- What would have triggered the site area i 15 emergency? ,
[
1-16 A.. A loss of all feedwater.
- j. 17 BY MR. BEARD:
1 18 Q. In terms of the events, you.have,-I guess, i
l 19 an unusual' event is the lowest and then you have an ,
l 20 ' alert.
21 A. Alert.
1
)
22 Q. And then sido emergency and then~a general
! 23 emargency?
24 A. General.
t
]}
l RUNFOLA & AJSOCIATES (614)445-8477 '
l COMPUTEdIZED TRANSCRIPTION 3
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. 82
~ 1. Q. So you would have been at the No. 3 out or
' .\J 2 47 3 A. Yes. Realizing that I was in that 4 condition for a while, I felt tnat some-declaration 5 of some Kind was warranted. Between myself and the ,
6 assistant shift supervisor and the'shitt technical 7 a ss i s ta n t , the STA, we debated back and forth for a 8 minute.
9 I decided that I would declare an unusual 10 event just as a notification process. My feeling 11 was more just to wake psopin up such that if-12 conditions would get worse for me, people would be
( '
13 aware of what had already occurred.
14 Just as I was sitting.down -- I was going
~
13 to sit down and write up the. message that would be 16 put onto the tape for the-automatic pager --' it was 17 right at this time when Louie Simon, the operations
'18 supervisor, arrived. . His major. concern was, you 19 know,~what is tha plant condition and, you know,'how 20 do we stand. And, you know, he started looxing at i 21 that, bringing himself up to da te on the conditions.
l .
22 I sat down and wrote out a message' tor the i
23 emergency plan notification. I gave that to the e s
() 24 admin assistant, and she. proceeded to put the l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTSRIZED-TRANSCRIPTION
- - , ~ . . - , - _ . - -
,83 1 message on the tape. It was shortly after this that 2 Steve Quonnoz, the plant manager, arrived, and then 3 Bill O'Connor, the operations engineer, arrived.
4 And we s ta r ted ' looking at just plant s ta bliza tion ,
'5 - what we'would have to do to put the plant in a hot 6 standby. condition.
7 We were a secondary site system. We had.
8 no vacuum. That had b, a broken because we lost all 9 steam. For'that period of time that the MSIVs were 10 c l o s e d , an) lost seals to the turbine. We lost' steam 5
,' 11. to the. air ejectors, and we broke-vacuum just to I
l 12 prevent any -- it's just not good to draw-cold air
)
l 13 along the hot turbine shaft, so we broke vacuum.
I 14 because of that, so we had no vacuum.
15 When the turbine coasted to a stop, the s
i 16 turning gear would not engage. This had happened.on
! 17- the last trip. That gave me-en indication of where 18 to look. We had one electrician there,:and I l.
19 instructed'him on the circuits-to' investigate. They
.20 had found ' blown' fuses before in5a' sensing circuit i
, 21 that enabled the turning gear. I directed him to 22 look at that. .
{' 23 BY MR. BELL:
!. ] x 24 Q. 'Zero speed circuit 7 RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES -(614)445-8477 l' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION I
t 5 -_
t 84 1 A. No, it was lift pressure. I t's a circuit 2 that observes lift pressure to the turbine bearings.
3 And if that's available, then theLturning gear will 4 start and engage. So we were in a ' condition where 5 we-had~ no vacuum. 'The turbine was off gear. There 6 wasn?t much I could do at'that time until I could --
7 I had to get the turning gear -- or the turbine on 8 gear before I could put seals on.
9 I had to have seals before I could put 10 vacuum. I had to have vacuum back before I could 11 get the MSIVs back open. It was that kind of chain 12 reaction,oso we were stuck right where we were at.
13 Between Bill O'Connor and Steve Quennoz, they.
14' started looking at what support we would.nood for 15 the problems that we had.
16 They-called in people from the tech 1l7 section to delog the computers that would have all 18 the transient data on it. We gotnextra i nstrument a
19 'and control people in here to look at the -- well, 1
20 like we had' problems with the'NIs, problems.with 4
21; tha -- starting the feedwater valve. control'. circuit.
4 22 They called in maintenance people from the i
- 23. maintenance shop to.look at problems ~like controls l
24 for the aux. feedwater pumps. Well, you' fkn ow , the
' (])
RUNFOLA,& ASSOCIATES-(614)445-8477-COMPUTERIZED' TRANSCRIPTION m
I f !
- 85
- 1. governor control problems we had that way. They got EO 2 some engineers in there -- well, let's see. Tney i
3 called in the maintenance ongineer.
j 4 Ha got.other maintenance engineers in 5 there to~ aid in writing work requests for the work 6 that had to be done. It pretty well geared up the 7 whole plant staff that way. Extra operations people i
j 8 .were called in. . .They called in the day shift of 4
' 9 operators to aid because. the -- you know, I've only i
,10 got five-equipment operators on the shift, and we
~
[
i 11 were protty well strapped by what we had, so they
) 12 called in the day shift' to aid in what would have to
'13 be dona just-to bring the plant to a - hot s tandby 14 condition.
j 15 BY MR. BEARD:
i 4
l l'6 Q. Hot standby? Terminology question?
17 A. Mode 3.
) 18 Q.. Mode 3. You were in mode 2 I guess? <
i 19 A.. Yes.
20 -- Q . So you were1wanting-to go --
I i 21 A. Well, we were really in mode 3 at the time, 22 but w'e'were sitting at 546. we had.to cool down-532.
23 .Thore was a lot that had to be done'on the secondary 1
24 . side'of<tholplant in the way of the turbine seals
()_
i RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
! .COMPUTBRIZED TRANSCRIPTION.
6 1 s
.. .. - ! 2
h 86' 1 and the vacuum and just that kind of thing tha t-i:
, 2 would take people.
I i 3 Q. Going back to Wayne's question about the i
4 management people, I got the flavor from what you're i
h 5 saying that the Kinds of things th t they did appear ,
I 6 to be very supportive --
, 7 A. Yes.
8 Q. -- of your. running the show .and getting ->
9 .you. help?
I 10 .A. Yes..
i.
11 Q. .Did management people give you any -- or
{
l 12 did you-perceive any reaction trom the management 13 types of their percaption of the gravity ot the r i 14 situa+
l .
i 15 .A. They know it was serious. The feeling I j 16 got was that they were surprised we could get it 4
17 back as quick a s nwe did. That was s ta ted more than ;
i 18 once. We w e r's only for a period of --
19 BY MR. ROSSI:
20 Q '. That'you could get it back as quick as you 21 could?
- 22 A. . Yes, wa were only in that condition for a i
j 23 periodoof . twelve minutes. ~For having everything l
24 dead and in the water like that, the-entiro. shift
(}
RUNFOLA &: ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 l
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
i-i
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87 1 did an excellent job. It was good efforts made by 7-(-)
2 everybody.
3 BY MR. LANNING:
4 Q. So the move was to do wha t? Get ready to 5 come back up to power or --
6 .A. No, they know that was a long way oft. It 7 was just to got us down into a normal plant 8 configuration. We were at an in-between spot. Our 9 normal conditions for post trip would be to come 10 down to 532 low level limits on the steam generators.
11 Q. Which is hot standby?
12 A. Which it hot standby. We weren't there as k 13 such.
14 BY MR. BEARD:
15 Q. I don't know whether I'd be interrupting 16 Wayne's train of thought or not, but along tha t sama 17 line I'd be curious as to the shift technical 18 advisor.
l 19 .
A. Yes.
20 Q. Who was he, what did he do. Did he 21 provido you good assistance? Was he involved in 22 doing things for you? How did that seem to work out
- 23 there during this event?
(~l
\._/
24 A. The fellow's name is Tod Lang. That's RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-d477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION t
t
! 88 I
- 1 L-a-n-g. He's one of our newer STAS. As it turned 2 out, this was his first trip as an STA. He did
< 3 provide some assistance in going through the i
4 - emergency procedure, helping me sort out tho 5 :
emergency plan. He made'the initial red phone call j i 6 to-the NRC. Provided more administrative assistance.
7 But he-was of some help.
8 Q. Did you feel like that the overall 9 diagnosis'of'what the overall plant condition was i
1 10 from a global.perspectivo, in this particular event 11 did you do the majority of that or was it you and i
12 the assistant supervisor or how did tnat -- how
, s 13 would you describe that?
14 A. I think;everybody tha t was in the control
. 15 room the way of licensed operators and the STA was
- . 16 aware of what the c o n'di tio n s were. They really l 17 didn't have to be pointed out by somebody.-- by'one
.18 .porson to anybody else.
We all were aware of the 19 situation and the gravity'of11t.
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. Wasn't something that.really had to be .
4 L22 pointed out as such..
23 Q. So I guess I get the flavor that'your 24 training, especially-the post TMI part of various
_( )
l RUNPOLA.& ASSOCIATES (61'4)445-8477 LCOMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 4
+
1 - ~-r-'E
-- r - -
w -r-v- * ~p --.v,.m.
r 9 - * + = r-m ar w - se -- e 7
I s
89 1 . scenarios, wall enveloped the situation. It was
~'
2 recognized.
.3 A.. Yes, indeed.
4 Q. There weren't any unusual developments 5 that maybe the shift technical advisor was 6 originally envisioned to help you diagnose.?
7 A. Tha t's - true. I don't think anybody that 8 was in there had any trouble recognizing the 9 conditions that we were in or what it would 10 eventually lead to. "
11 Q. Okay. And all the actions-were within, I 12 guess, the envelope of.your. procedures and' training?
13 A.. Yes.
14 BY MR. BELL:
15 Q. So the --
16 A. The effort'was all in one. direction.
17 Q. If I may summarize ~both-his question and your answer then, the.STA really wasn't required'for 18 l
, c19 this event?
I' 20 A. Not for the original-purpose that~the'STA
, 21; .was envisioned tor.
22' MR. BEARD: Excuse me. Did I interrupt j 23- your train of. thought there, . wayne?
24 BY MR.~'LANNING:
l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
! COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l .
9
b
^
i:
90 1 Q.: I wanted to get back to the management 2 question. And are-they generally supportive of the
-3 operations personnol? I guess I'm talking about
! -4 managemont a t the corporate level now. Like, is
- 5 there a relationship ther'e'that warrants some sort 4
j 6 of discussion or you feel has some strong feelings f 7 about it one way or the other?
- 4. 8 A. Nothing one way or the other. They've 4
9 always been supportive. Dick Crouse, the vice f
j -10 president of nuclear, did come in also. I can't 11 tell you exactly what ~ time ha showed up,-but he was 12 there. Ho realized that he was.of no real help of a 13 technical nature,.but he'said he would
- -- he was 1 5 l 14 there to give any help in obtaining resources that t
4 15 we might need as such. No, we had no - Eno problems i
i 16 with support. Everybody'was very supportive.
l i 17 Q. Suppose this had been a more routine
- ~18 reactor trip?
19 A. It-wouldn't have been nearly as involved. ;
20 Q. And management's attitudo would have been 21 .what?
. 22: A. If it had been a routine tripa,when we had
, 23 finally stabilized out-I would have called the i
24 opera tions ' engineers ' required.- 'And we'Would have (f-
{, RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 i -COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
91 g3 1 discussed, you know, any problems that we might have
'w) 2 nad, you know. If it had been a normal trip, there 3 wouldn't have really been any. We would have 4 stabilized ourselves out at standby and probably 5 stayed-there until morning. People probably would 6 have come in on day shift. I don't know if anyone 7 would have come in in the middle of night.
8 BY MR. BELL:
9 Q. Why would you have not restarted the plant?
10 A. They probably would not have just because 11 of the problems with the main feed pump. Wa had 12 problems with it before, and some people were uneasy f)')
( 13 about going up with them in the condition they were 14 in. But we did anyway. And to have it trip again 15 just out of the blue, they would have had to, you 16 know, do some kind of troubleshooting.
17 BY MR. LANNING:
la Q. Now, who is some people? Did you feel 19 personally that --
20 A. We would -- they would have had to get --
21 it would have been between like the plant manager 22 and upper management, you know. They're the ones 23 that will say, you know, push for getting plant on
,( ) 24 the line, make money.
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
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i 92
._- 1 1 Q. This is corporates you'ro talking about
^
2 now?
3 A. Yes. It would have been from that i
! 4 standpoint. And, you Know, decision would have had
+
! 5 to have been made~to bring in factory ,
4 6 representativos from GE to, you Know, troubleshoot-7 this situation some.more.
i
- 8 BY MR. ROSSI
} 9' Q. Had tha t been done-before? Had GE people 10 come in to look.at the --
f 11 A. Yes.
j 12 Q. They had been here before?
13 A. They wore.the ones that had como in and i
14 instrumented the pumps before'tnis last' start-up.
[ 15 BY MR. BELL:
i 16 Q. Does it-irk you that you put in trouble l 17 reports on the nuclear in s t rume n ta tion system and it i
I -18 'doesn't seom to get fixed, and'you also'put in -- I 19 assume you ~put in trouble reports on this ATOG l .
l-20 display, and 'it doesn' t. ge t fixed, does that. get 21 under your skin?
l 22 A. A'little bit. It does. I mean, it's an I- ~
l 23 ongoing' situation. And there's -- I've boon told j
l
() 24 ,that there's.somo kind of a fixfbeing-drawn up that-RUNFOLA &L ASSOCIATES.(614)445-8477 l
COMPUTERIZED. TRANSCRIPTION l
. J . . - -- ., -,, , .,_. _ - , _ , =..- .. , .
93 1 will correct this problem, but, you know, it's not (2) 2 there yet.
3 Q. You know, these are problems that 4 evidently have been going on for several months.
5 And do you feel like that paople aren't responsive 6 to the trouble reports that the oporators submit?
7 A. Sometimes. I can't say that all the time.
8 But, you know, this occurs again and again.
9 They'll -- we'll declare the thing inoperable, and 10 then it we trip and the seal comes oft and they'll 11 do ST on it and it comes back and it's good and it 12 comes back up, then it's inoperable again. Same
)
(J
\ 13 conditions.
14 BY MR. BEARD:
15 Q. You're referring to the NI?
16 A. To the NI in this case.
17 Q. Do you feel like that tho raason you're 18 not getting things tixed either in a' timely or in a 19 good way relates to more of management providing 20 resources or that maybe when the technicians do gat 21 around to looking at a piece of equipment like an NI, 22 they basically go through and do a survoillance test 23 on it. And if it passos, they write it off versus
} 24 doing really investigative troubling shooting? I'm RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
94-f 1 trying to understand wnero you would like to see the
[1( )
more improvemonts?
4 2 :
! 3 A. Well, improvements would probably have to 4-l 4 come from the top down. You Know, it's-a problem 5 tnat it takes an engineering fix to correct. You G can't really throw it onto the technician. I mean, 1
7 he -- they'll get sometimes just as frustrated as ,
f 8 anybody else because.they'll go in, thay know wnat 9 the problem is, and t'hoy can look at it. 'And it
, 10 winds up the same way.
I' 11 Q. So the problem is not one t h a t. they're notL ,
I
- 12 doing _enough. investigative troubleshooting-for you.
4
! 13 It's just that the~ --
i 14 A. A lot of times the conditions are-known.
J ,
l 15 They're just not fixed. ,
16 Q. Oxay. Because it's beyond a' repair effort
{ 17 that a technician would do? 3
, 18 A. Yes. It takes.some Kind of_ engineering i 19 fix to do it, and somotimes they're a.long time! ;
20 -coming. '
i 21 'BY MR. BELL: h 22 Q.- But if this were -- ~ these problemo-were of f 23 a technical spacification nature, that rcquired them
() 24 to1 be repaired.before you could restart the unit or' RU tJ FOL A & ASSOCIATES (614)445-6477
! COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION ,.
g
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95
^
1- 'i f they weren't repaired, you'd have to shut the O '2 . unit down, do you get prompt'responsa?
l,
~3 A. Yes, it's no choice. It costs monay when i 4 the unit is down. It costs them a lot of. bucks a 5 . day. And, you Know, they don't like-that either. .
6 So if it comes down to it, if there's-something in 7 the road tha t can't be bypassed that has to be fixed, I
8 tnen,'you.know, a good. effort will be made to fix it. ,
'9 !Q . 'So if we have to fix-(t to make it run.
10 .I f we can get.along without it, it's something 11 that's nice to'have-in order to run, we just sort of i
12 -let that'allp?
13 A. I won't say.theyllet'it slip, but it might #
14 not have the prompt :a ttention ' and ' response that 15 ~ 'something else might get.
f~ 16 BY.MR. BEARD:
J-17 ,Q. While we're on thejguick"fix' issue for la your plant,-with one start-up source? range' nuclear i
1 i 19 ' ins trumen ta tion inoperable, I; guess 1that leaves you 20 with a second one, are you' allowed to start.up in 21 .that condition? i
, 22 A.- No, not start up. Once you're up', 'they t
23 can-go out of service and they're,not; required. p i
{).
~
24 Q. One or both of them?
RUNFOLA'& ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
.. COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i 1 .
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96 1 A. I'd have to read it to be sure, but at g3 V
2 least one. I thinx both of them. You don't need 3 source range when you're at power. Once you trip --
4 Q. Then you need it?
5 A. Then you need them.
6 BY MR. ROSSI:
I 7 Q. But you can't start up without both being 8 in service?
9 A. You can't start up witn one of them being 10 broke.
11 BY MR. BEARD:
12 Q. I guess the last time you restarted the Ik-13 plant prior to this event, I get the clavor this 14 source range channel that was on-again, ott-again 15 operability s ta tus and it happened to be operable at 16 the time you wanted to start up, so you went up.
17 And then apparently it died, if I can use that term, 18 after you got out of the source range?
19 A. Um-hmm.
20 Q. Oxay.
21 BY MR. LANNING:
~22 Q. Had you had an opportunity to moet Mr.
23 Crouse before this avent?
<]
m 24 A. Oh, yes.
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
97 1 Q. Does he visit the plant frequently?
%J 2 A. Yes, ne does. Comes around quito often.
3 Q. Just as a matter of general information 4 gathering?
5 A. That and just to show tne presence.
6 Q. Goodwill?
7 A. He's an old power plant man as it is, and 8 I think he sometimes enjoys just coming out to the 9 plant, walking around, talking to the operators.
10 Q. Now, that sort of implies there's a good 11 relationship between labor and management. Is tha t 12 trua?
n s- 13 A. At least for my part. You Know, I enjoy 14 talking to Dick. He's --
15 Q. How about on a broader scale?
16 A. I don't Know. Right now conditions, you 17 Know, if you're ta1xing union paople, it's kind of 18 rocxy juet from negotiations tnat are going on, 19 contractual-wise and such, but --
20 Q. Have you seen any impact of tnat on plant 21 operations or with plant maintenance has to be done 22 or --
23 A. Not really.
() 24 Q. Not really?
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUfERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 1
98 g) 1 A. Not really. At least not with me.
GJ 2 Sometimes it's personal from, you know, trom shitt 3 foreman to shift foroman. Some guys #get along 4 better with people than others. It's --
5 BY MR. BEARD:
6 Q. When you're talking union people versus 7 nonunion people, dous the union include the licensad 3 reactor operators?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Does the union include the supervisors of 11 the -- the licensed suporvisors ot the reactor 12 operators?
Ou- 13 A. No.
14 Q. So tnat's the intertaco?
15 A. Yes.
16 BY MR. BELL:
17 Q. So you and tne assistant shitt supervisor 18 ara not union members?
19 A. No, we're management.
20 Q. You're managoment. Yos.
21 BY MR. BEARD:
22 Q. Il a v e thera been any particular management 23 efforts or activities in the last fow months thac l (~) 24 have baen particularly troublosome to the operators x-l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
99
, 1 'maybe with regard to maintenance or code of drous or lg 2 things of this na ture ?
3 A. Yes, you've obviously heard. They are 4 enforcing a dress code for the operators that has 5 ruobed some tur the wrong way. They have put 6 maintenance personnel on nignt shitt coverage, which 7 most of them do not line.
8 Q. Is it because it's shift work as a 9 different class of worn that they are objecting do?
10 A. They just don't like worxing nights.
11 Q. Well, I mean, are these maintenance people 12 tnat we're talning about normally in the past, 13 they'd been single shift people and they worked days?
14 A. Day shitt.
15 Q. And now they're being asked to work either 16 nights or some rotating shitt kind of situation?
17 A. Yeah, wasn't -- well, wasn't so much as la asked. They were said they will.
19 Q. No, I don't mean that part. I maan the 20 part tney object 3d to was the fact they were being 21 asked to either' work nights or rotating shifts?
22 A. Back shifts.
23 Q. Because wnen I was a technician many years f')
mj 24 ago, a sort of a status symbol at that time was are RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-3477 l
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
l l
100 1 you a shift worker or are you a day person. I don't
(
2 know whether there's any of that kind of feel up 3 here or not.
4 A. Tha maintenance s ta t t and the rest or the 5 Edison system, tossil plants, has always been
- 6 strictly day shift. And they just don't like 7 working back shifts.
8 BY MR. LANNING:
9 Q. What was the rationale for this back shift 10 work in need of tne maintenance? das it to catch up 11 on maintenance backlog?
12 A. Wall, I'm told it was mora for to maka 13 people available for testing, and plant maintenance 14 type of activities on the back snitt.
15 BY MR. BEARD:
16 Q. What was the idea bahind the dress -- now 17 dross code? Could you toll us what tne naw dress
- 18 coca requiromants are or when they went into effect?
19 A. Well, like I'm wearing the unitorm now 20 that's required for the management people.
21 Q. How would you describo that uniform for i 22 the record? I mean --
4 23 A. It's just a decas shirt and slacks.
1
() 24 Q. Okay.
RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 I
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
_. ._- _ _ _ . ~ -_ .__ _
101 g~ l A. The --
s 2 BY MR. ROSSI:
3 Q. tio color requirements or anything of tha t?
4 A. Woll, yeah, I've got tha dark blue pants 5 and light blua shirt. Tho union people are going to 6 have the same pants with a darkar colored shirt, 7 blue.
8 dY MR. BELL:
)
9 Q. Is the company turnishing these?
! 10 A. Yes.
11 BY MR. BEARD:
12 Q. No tios involved?
13 A. No ties. They're a safety hazard. Can't 1 14 have ties around rotating equipment. But the wnole 15 tning, the reason behind the whole thing Kind of 16 ranxles a lots of people becausa it got into just a 17 contest butween our chief executive officer and Mr.
18 Koppler.
19 Q. Mr. Koppler?
20 BY MR. BURNS:
21 Q. Rugion 3.
22 A. Region 3.
23 BY MR. BEARD:
() 24 Q. What do you think the objactivo ot -- I R U !1 F O L A & ASJOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
102 1 guess you're saying --
2 A. Tho objective was tnat for Toledo Edison 3 to prove it had sufficient control over its people.
4 Q. But you're saying tne dross code for union 5 people wnicn would include reactor operator snowroom 6 would be the same for union peopla?
7 A. Yos.
8 Q. Wero there other distinctive classes 9 involvad?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Did you teel like that this dress code had 12 a adverse impact on the attitude of your resctor 13 oporstors that was -- would you describo that 14 significant or how would you daucriba the magnitude 15 of the fooling?
-16 A. Oh, it hasn't improved morale any, if you 17 want to put it that way. Some peopla don't care.
la Soma paoplu, you know, some don't have other clothes.
19 Some people, boing ex-Navy, don't liko uniforms at 20 all. It's an individual thing. But it's just 21 ranklod a lot of foolings.
22 BY MR. BELL 1
23 Q. Does the operating staff fool tha t the NRC 1
() 24 has mandated these uniforms, if we may call them RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 i COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
L-______-______-__-_________-________________
- l 103 1 unitorms?
2 A. I don't Kngw if they go so far as that, 3 but I thinx everybody realizes the underlying cause.
4 Q. And tney blame tne regional administrator, 5 Koppler, for forcing this on Tolado Edison?
6 A. Not necessarily.
7 BY MR. BEARD:
8 Q. I got the tooling earlier that you woro 9 saying it was as a result or some sort of a contost 10 between your chief executive otticar and the 11 regional administrator.
12 A. Um-nmm.
O- 13 Q. I could speculate on enings, but I don't 14 think that's appropriato.
15 A. No.
16 BY MR. BELL: -
17 Q. This is leaving tno incident behind?
18 A. I do7't havo tne detsils, and a lot of 19 it's by rumor. I'm not going to say anymore.
20 BY MR. BEARD:
21 Q. Lot me say anothor area. I understand you 22 do have a union shop nore, and contract renewal is 23 coming up. And could you tell un how the -- how you
() 24 attad on that with regard to possibility of strikes RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
104 g~s 1 and unings of that nature?
U It looks line a striko me y be very 2 A.
1 3 probabla. They're changing the health benetits, 4 cutting the haaltn benefits of the union parsonnel.
5 It's not going over very wall at all.
1 6 Q. Is the cut in offect now on the banefits?
7 A. Not for the union paople.
8 Q. Or is that something that is proposed for
.9 the new contract? i 10 A. That's wha t's trying to be -- that tha 11 company wants in the new contract.
12 Q. If they were to go out on strike -- havo 13 they had strikos hara at this plant botore?
! 14 A. Not at this plant. Not since the plant's 15 gone in. Woll, tney've had -- they havon't had a 16 strike of the operations personnol. They did tor 17 the ottice wornors.
18 Q. Okay.
19 MR. ROSSI: Do you have anything more 20 anybody?
21 BY MR. BEARD 22 Q. I think the only thing I'd like to do in 23 may we've asked you a tremendous amount of questions, 24 and I think you've done a really superb job in
(])
R Uf4 FO L A & ASSOCIATES (614)445-6477 i COMPUTBRIZED TRANSCRIPTION l
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105
- 1 giving us good answers, honest answers I teal.
2 A. Tried to keep it straight.
3 Q. Tnat's tne only way to go.
4 MR. ROSSI: You have a good knowledge ot 5 what went on during the ovent.
6 BY MR. BEARD:
7 Q. I'm trying to say can wa turn the table 8 and say rather than anxing us questions, is there l 9 anything tha t maybe we haven't touched on you'd like 10 to convey to us 01 any general nature?
j 11 A. You've boen pretty tnorough. I can't 4
j 12 think of anything tna t's happened tnat I teel l'
13 anywhere near significant that you haven't touched.
14 You just about covered it all.
15 BY MR. LANNING:
- 16 Q. Well, it anything does occur to you, next 17 couple days, we'll be here.
! 18 A. Okay.
19 BY MR. BEARD:
t 20 Q. Certainly want to thank you for staying
., 21 ovar. I r1alize tnis is at the and after a shitt ot 22 working hard, and you're obviously tirod, and msybe 23 now you can go homa and get n o ta s sleep.
() 24 A. I'm surprised I was as 21ert, to tell you RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)44S-d477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
LO6 1 the trutn.
2 MR. ROSSI: Let's go off the record.
3 4 Thoroupon, the interview was 5 concluded at 11:05 o'clocx a.m.
6 - - - - -
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
)
RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-0477 COMPUTERI4HD TRANSCRIPTION
i 107 i
1 CERTIFICATE f i
k 2 I, Anne I. McBrayer, a Notary Public in
! v
~3 and for the State of Ohio, do horoby certify t4at I l fl t
4 took tho interview of Tad Lehman and that the l
5 toregoing transcript of sucn_ proceedings is a tull, 6 -true and correct transcript of my atenotypy notes as i
i 7 so taken.
8 I do further certify that I was called
- 9 tnere in the capacity of a Court Reporter, and am
- 10 not otherwise interested in tnia proceeding.
11 IN WITNESS dii E R E O F , I nave hereunto set my i
i 12 hand and atfixed my seal of office at Columbus, Ohio, 13 on this _ day ot __ //hp- _
, 1985.
l Cl 35 &_ - Y ~~~
ANNE I. Mc5RAIER, a Notary.
J 16 Public in and tor tho
- State of Ohio.
j 17 l
18 My Commission expires February 3, 1988. ,
{ 19 i 20 I
l 21 i
j 22 <
i 23 .
24
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