ML20126F448
| ML20126F448 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1985 |
| From: | Mittl R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Butler W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8506170478 | |
| Download: ML20126F448 (30) | |
Text
Pudic Serece O PS G Company Electnc and Gas 80 Park Plaza, Newark, NJ 07101/ 201430-8217 MAILING ADDRESS / P.O. Box 570, Newark, NJ 07101
' Robert L. Mitti General Manager Nuclear Assurance and Regulation June 13, 1985 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Attn: Mr. Walter Butler, Chief Licensing Branch 2 Division of Licensing Gentlemen:
CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 The next scheduled amendment to the Hope Creek Final Safety Analysis Report (Amendment 11) will include updated informa-tion pertinent to the control of heavy loads and compliance with NUREG-0612 at HCGS. This issue was identified as Outstanding Issue 8 in the Hope Creek Safety Evaluation Report (SER), and was subsequently closed in Hope Creek SER Supplement No. 1, Appendix G. Pursuant to this matter, Public Service Electric and Gas Company hereby provides advance notification of the pending FSAR changes, as shown on the attached mark-ups for NRC information and review.
The attached FSAR changes are being made to reflect revised load paths for certain hoists and deletion of others, as well as to include recently updated design information.
Justification is provided for those particular changes identified below that may affect strict compliance with NUREG-0612. The remaining changes are considered to be minor and have no impact on compliance with NUREG-0612.
Personnel air lock hoist (10H217)
Revision: The statement on pages 9.1-110a and 9.1-110b indicating HCGS compliance with the safety factor require-ment of paragraph 5.1.6(1)(a) of NUREG-0612 for a single-failure-proof special lifting device is deleted.
Corresponding entries on FSAR Table 9.4-14 showing stress design f actor vs. yield, stress design factor vs. ultimate,
-and indicating NUREG-0612 compliance are revised
_accordingly.
The Energy People g506170478850613 E ADOCK 05000354 PDR os e vlu i
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.Mr. Walter. Butler 2 6/13/85 Justification: The' changes in safety factors for this hoist are acceptable since this hoist was not originally single-failure-proof and since the FSAR still contains the original-justification ~for this. An analysis showing that decay heat removal would be achieved even in the event that a load drop caused loss of ' suppression pool water is provided on attached FSAR page 9.1-110b.
SACS-heat exchanger hoist Revision: The statement on page 9.1-123 indicating that each of the,two hoist, sling, and lift point combinations is capable of independently supporting a SACS heat exchanger return end cover is deleted.
Justification: The attached FSAR page 9.1-123 identifies preventive and/or mitigative measures that will be imple-mented at Hope Creek,- based on the assumption that a cover could be. dropped. These measures include mechanically restricting the lift height to the minimum necessaryLdis-tance ,trom .the . floor and placing . energy absorbing material beneath the load path, cg; using another load handling system that satisfies the four evaluation criteria of Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612. On this basis, compliance with guideline 5.1.5'(1)(c) of NUREG-0612 is maintained and no single-failure-proof hoist is required for this application.
The attached revisions to HCGS FSAR Section 9.1 may affect information contained in HCGS SER Supplement No. 1, Appen-dix G, however, the HCGS design remains consistent with the guidelines of NUREG-0612.
Should you have any questions or concerns in regard to this-matter, please contact us.
Very truly yours, k
. Attachment
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)
Mr. Walter ' Butler 3 6/13/85 C .D.'H. Wagner USNRC Licensing Project Manager A.-R..Blough .
USNRC Senior Resident Inspector-00.08 01/03A I ii g
M I.
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1 ATTACHMENT
\ ' d. HPCI pump and turbine hoists (1AH211, IBH211) l l
These 4-ton capacity monorail hoists are located above
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- elevation 54 feet in the reactor building. For each .
hoist the top of the rail is at elevation 71 feet 3 1/2 inches, and the hook is at elevation 66 feet 10 1/2 inches when it is fully raised. They are used during maintenance of the HPCI pump and turbine. There is no lower floor elevation.
- e. RCIC pump and turbine hoist (10H212) ,
)
\
This 3-ton capacity monorail hoist is located above elevation 54 feet in the reactor building. It is used during maintenance of the RCIC pump and turbine. There is no lower floor elevation. The heaviest maintenance load (upper half of the turbine case) weighs 785 pounds. Therefore, this hoist does not handle heavy loads.
(y f. Main steam tunnel underhung crane (10H214, 10H223) l This crane is located above elevation 102 feet in the reactor building. Two parallel manually driven bridge
= beams connected by end trucks travel on two fimod girders located in the main steam tunnel. The top of the bridge beams is at elevation 140 feet. A manually operated 7. 3 ton capacity trolley and hoist (10H214) is mounted on one bridge beam, and a manually operated 3 ton capacity trolley and hoist (10H223) is mounted on the other. The hook is at elevation 137 feet 4 inches for 10H214, and 137 feet 3.5 inches for 10H223 when fully raised.iIt is used to lift the operator off of each of the four outboard MSIVs, the four main steam stop valves, and the two motor operated feedwater stop check valves for maintenance.
- g. Inboard MSIV hoists (10H219 10H7.03)
Th 2-toncapacityhoish located above elevation fgfk ([
b 102 feet in the reactor buildina. JIt is moved finny om sne uve monorail beams as needed. Thebetween top of the rails is at elevation 119 feet 7.5 inches, and the 2 nhoist hook is at elevation 117 feet 5.5 inches when it;
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9.1-91 Amendment is 11
,/er msmT 4 HCGS FSAR Isfullyraised. It is used to lift the operator off l of'the inboard MSIV for maintenance. _
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- h. CRD service hoist This monorail is located above elevation 102 feet in the CRD maintenance area of the reactor building. The top of the rail is at elevation 116 feet 6 inches. It is designed to accommodate a hoist for lifting control rods (450 pounds),-CRD maintenance equipment (up to 2000 pounds), and the neutron monitoring cask (less than 1150 pounds). Because a dedicated CRD service hoist was not purchased, one will be borrowed from another location when needed.
- i. Vacuum breaker valve removal hoist (10H207)
This 2-ton capacity circular monorail hoist is located above elevation 54 feet in the reactor building. The monorail is located inside the suppression pool chamber "
for maintenance and weigh The valves removal 912ofpounds the vacuum each breaker and thus do valves.
not constitute a heavy load.
- j. Main steam line relief valve removal hoist (10H202)
This 1-ton capacity circular monorail hoist is The located above elevation 121 feet inside the drywell. It is used monorail is actually at elevation 135 feet.
to remove the main steam line relief valves as required for maintenance. The main steam line relief valves weigh 1100 pounds each and do not constitute a heavy load.
- k. Turbine building bridge crane (10H102)
This crane consists of a 220-ton capacity main hoist and a 45-ton auxiliary hoist. It is located above .It is used elevation 137 feet in the turbine building. A second to lift the parts of the turbine-generator.
crane, identical to 10H102, and originally intended for use with the Unit 2 turbine, travels along the same rails as 10H102. A stator lift beam, supplied with the i
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k,kr building. They service the reactor feed pumps and their turbine drivers._
'q. Water box removal hoist (10H109, 10H110)_
i These 12-ton capacity monorail hoists are located above ;
elevation 77 feet in the turbine building. They are used for removal of the condenser water boxes that have inlet and outlet nozzles.
- r. Steam packing exhauster hoist (10H115) .
This 10-ton capacity chain-operated monorail hoist is ;
located above It is elevation'77 used during removal feet in the of turbine the tube bundle !
building.
from the steam packing exhauster condenser.
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l chain-operated monor hoists e Th se -
n capa[cevati n 77 1 ca d a ove et n th urbi e ,
y are us uring al of t bundles i b ding, !
from the steam air ejector interim and aftercondenser.
- t. Water box removal hoist (10H111, 10H112) ,
These 8-ton capacity chain-operated monorail hoists are located above elevation 77 feet in the turbine building. They are used for removal of the condenser t water boxes that do not have inlet and outlet nozzles.
- u. Chiller tube removal hoist (10H118) ,
This 5-ton capacity chain-operated monorail hoist is
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located above elevation 171 feet in the turbine :
building. It is used for removal of chiller tube bundles. ,
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9.1-94 Amendment'as t
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'K l j RPV Head Strongback 9.1.5.3.2.2 -.
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The Rgv head strongback is used as a lifting device for the j following loads: _
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- a. Drywell head
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- b. RPV head l l
- c. RPV head insulation and frame The RPV head strongback is aThe special lifting design device factors of as defined safety versus by ,
NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1.4. The I 1
yield and ultimate strengths are provided in Table 9.1-14.RPV
' failure-proof guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6. 1 The The RPV and drywell heads each have four lift points.
drywell head lift points meet the single-failure-proof The RPV head liftguidelines points of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6( 3)(a) .
will be upgraded to also satisfy the single-failure-proof guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(3).
The RPV head insulation and The its support support structure is carried structure is liftedover in the RPV when the head is on.The lift points on each piece are designed to meet two pieces.the single-failure-proof guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(3)(a).
In summary, the RPV head strongback and the associated heavy load lift points will satisfy th~e single-failure-proof A postulated heavy load guidelines drop is not of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6.
considered credible due to the single-failure-proof design.
9.1.5.3.2.3 Shield Plug Sling g , g Y
The special lifting device for the reactor well shield plugs is single-failure proof in accordance with NUREG-0612, Section' 5.1.6(1)(a). The design factors of safety versus yield'andEach M lug ultimate strength are provided in Table 9.1-14.
has four lift points to prevent uncontrolled lowering of the
! 9.1-103 Amendment K y
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load, assuming a single lift point failure. Each lift point has
~o maximum combined static plus dynamic design safety facto.c of greater than 5 with respect to material ultimate strength.' The l design is conservative and satisfies the single-failure-proof A postulated )
guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(3)(a). l heavy load drop is not considered credible due to the ' single- l failure-proof design. l 9.1.5.3.2.4 Dryer-Separatgr Sling -
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The dryer-separator sling lifts the steam dryer and the moisture separator. The sling design satisfies the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978 in general, but does not explicitly comply as recommended by NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(4). The design factors l of safety versus yield and ultimate strengths are provided in Table 9.1-14. They are less than the values of 3 versus yield l
and 5 versus ultimate required by Section 5.1.1(4).
The dryer-separator sling and the lift points on the moisture separator and steam dryer will be upgraded to satisfy the single-failure-proof guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6. A postulated heavy load drop is not considered credible due to the d' } ,
single-failure-proof design. .
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9.1.5.3.2.5 W . ~. o uw m. .vyn The special lif ting device for the dryer-s- 'estor -0612,pool plugs is Section single-failure-proof in accordance with y versus yield and 5.1.6(1)(a). ~The design factors of a 9.1-14. The dryer-ultimate strength are provided in e liftepoints designed with a separator pool plugsstatic maximum combined eachplhaveynamic factor of safety greater erial ultimate strength. The design is than 5 with respect to conservative and sa les th's single-failure-proof guidelines of NUREG-0621, Sec 5.1,6(3)(a). A postulated heavy load drop is ot conside credible due to the single-failure-proof design.
9.1.5.3.2.6 Service Platform Sling l The service platform sling lifts the RPV service platform. The sling design satisfies the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978 in general, but does not explicitly comply as recommended by NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(4). The design factors of safety versus The yield and ultimate strengths are provided in Table 9.1-14. i
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. 9.1-104 Amendmenths11 f
y HCGS FSAR hy'85 accidentally raised off the floor, neither the sling nor the lift points will meet the single-failure proof criteria of NUREG-0612.
Because the box is not carried over the fuel pool or the open reactor, the first three evaluation criteria of Section 5.1 of NUREG-0612 (doses <25% of 10CFR100, K $0.95, water cover over fuel) are satisfied. If the inner box is accidentally raised and then dropped, it would not penetrate the refueling floor and would not cause spalling on the elevation below the refueling floor. Safe shutdown capability would be maintained. Therefore, the fourth evaluation criterion of Section 5.1 of NUREG-0612 (retained safe shutdown capability) is also satisfied. Table 9.1-23 provides a summary evaluation of a postulated load drop versus the four guideline criteria of Section 5.1 of NUREG-0612.
9.1.5.3.3 Other OHLHS Cranes All plant OHLHS cranes, except the reactor building polar crane, are evaluated below. The equipment tag numbers are shown in parentheses.
Each motorized hoist includes one 125%-capacity mechanical and one 125%-capacity electrical brake that is automatically applied on loss of power. Each bridge drive includes a 125%-capacity brake that automatically sets upon loss of power. Each trolley includes one 100%-capacity electrical brake that automatically sets upon loss of power.
The cranes and hoists shewn as seismically secured in Table 9.1-10 have positive restraints that prevent crane derailment or crane parts from falling during an earthquake.
These cranes are designed so that their parts will remain in place under a seismic acceleration of "79 vertical and 7g horizontal. The design also includes locking devices for use when the cranes are parked.
- a. Personnel air lock hoist (10H217)
This c'rane's load path is shown on Figure 9.1-33.
There is no safe shutdown equipment directly below the load path. A portion of the primary containment suppr ession pool is located below the load path on the next lower elevation. The air lock strongback design factors of safety versus yield and ultimate strengths are provided in Table 9.1-14. *'-" ---' " - -='-*" a
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The personnel air lock is part-of the primary containment pressure boundary. It is only moved when
'the reactor is shut down. The air lock lift height above the floor is administrative 1y limited to less than 2 feet 6 inches. This is the calculated maximum allowable lift height. A load drop would not penetrate the floor if dropped from less than 2 feet 6 inches above it. Movement of the nine shield blocks in front of the personnel air lock is administrative 1y limited to reactor shutdown. The calculated maximum allowable lift height for the shield blocks is 1 foot. When the upper seven shield blocks are moved, they are higher
,than this. Administrative procedures require that the removal cart be in position below these seven blocks before the blocks are moved. The cart would absorb some of the energy of a load drop. A major portion of 4
the remaining energy would be absorbed as the load punched through the floor. The low velocity impact on the suppression pool shell below would probably deform but not punch through it. If the dropped block managed -
to penetrate the upper suppression pool shell, the I residual energy would almost certainly be dissipated by ,
the internal hardware (piping and catwalk) and the l water itself before the block ruptured the lower-portion of the shell and caused any water loss.
Because the reactor would be already shutdown at the time of a shield block drop, the suppression pool would ,
2 not have to be available for decay heat removal. The !
residual heat removal (RHR) system, operating in the decay heat removal mode, would take suction from a ,
-eciculation loop, pump through a RHR heat exchanger and back to the reactor. Therefore, a load drop that caused suppression pool water loss would not prevent decay heat removal.
t
- b. Reactor recirculation pump motor hoist (IAH201, IBH201)
}- Figure 9.1-33 shows this hoist's load path. The hoist
- is only operated during reactor shutdown. l I
1 Dropping a motor during the short time it is raised and free hpnging is unlikely. The load is positively !
- attached to the hoist hook by the hook safety latch. ,
No intermediate lifting device is required. The hook 9.1-110b Amendmenth1La
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Main steam tunnel underhung crane (10H214, 10H223) _
Figure 9.1-35 shows the safe load path. TheThere reactor :
' 5 f is no will be shut down when this hoist is used. l decay heat removal equipment located in the load path. 1 All of the equipment below the valves is associatedIf an with either the main steam or feedwater systems. l it would hit one or more of the '
operator were dropped,following items before it could hit the steam tun floors its valve bodys' the pipe on either side of the I valve body; one of the other three main steam pipes; one of the feedwater lines; restraint steels structural
. steels and miscellaneous small pipe and valves of the ,
! main steam drains system. Because of the congested piping and massive restraint steel beneath the load l path it is nearly impossible for a dropped valve Together the operator to reach the steam tunnel floor.
congestion and energy absorbing capability make it certain that a dropped operator will not punch through !
the floor. If a dropped operator managed to cause spalling after striking the floor, the concrete could hit one or more of the pipes in this area, or the torus o
itself. The pipes are associated with nuclear boiler instrumentation, liquid radwaste, RCIC, reactor water cleanup, core spray, fire protection, None HPCI of the and primary equipment containment instrument gas.
below the load path is required to remove reactor decay heat. Therefore, decay heat removal ability would not l
' be affected by a load drop from this hoist.
I
- g. Inboard MSIV hois (10H219hH 20h 4hsha W h g g, NY shows the safe load path. The reactor is Figure 9.1-3 There is no decay shut down who thf r trict i- used. The heat removal equipent located in the load path.
tops of the drywell radial structural steel and drywell floor framing cross beams are located at elevation 100 feet, just below the main steam lines. All of the
. equipment above this structural steel network is associated with either the main steam, primary containment instrument gas, or breathing airIfsystems, the i None is required for decay heat removalit would hit its own valve body
' operator were dropped, or steam line, or one of the three other main steam pip s before it could contact the structural steel below, unless it were dropped in the Itremoval would space hit the between main steam lines A and D.
steel directly if it were dropped in the removal space.
. 9.1-112 Amendmenth(//
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T0/44 HCGS FSAR There is no safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment beneath the load path of these hoists or on )
the next lower elevation. -
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- n. Motor-generator set hoist (OAH105) ;
i There is no safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment beneath the load path of these hoists or on the next lower elevation.
- o. Secondary condensate pump hoist (10H106)
There is no safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment beneath the load path of these hoists cr on the next lower elevation.-
l
- p. Reactor feed pump hoist (IAH107, IBH107, ICH107)
There is no safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment beneath the load path of these hoists or on the next lower elevation.
- q. Water box removal hoist (10H109, 10H110)
There is no safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment beneath the load path of these hoists or on I
the next lower elevation.
- r. Steam packing exhauster hoist (10H115) l There is no safe shutdown or decay heat removal t
equipment beneath the load path of these hoists or on l the next lower elevation.
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- t. Water box removal hoist (10H111, 10H112)
S' There is no safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment beneath the load path of these hoists or on
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the next lower elevation.
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- u. Chiller tube removal hoist (10H118)
There is no safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment beneath the load path of these hoists or on l
the next lower elevation. 1
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! v. Emergency air compressor hoist (10H114) l 4
There is no safe shutdown or decay heat removal 1 equipment beneath the load path of these hoists or on the next lower elevation.
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- w. Main air compressor hoist (00H113, 10H113)
There is no safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment beneath the load path of these hoists or on ,
the next lower elevation. ;
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- x. Vacuum pump water cooler hoist (10H116) 1 l
There is no safe shutdown or decay heat removal (
equipment beneath the load path of these hoists or on l the next lower elevation. 1 1
! IBH119)
- y. Heating and cooling coil removal hoist (IAH119, l l
There is no saf e shutdown or decay heat remov'al ;
l equipment beneath the load path of these hoists or on '
l the next lower elevation.
9.1-116 Amendmentkn l . _ _ _ _ __
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tanden-to remove a SACS heat exchanger return end l cover. The configuration includes a separate sling and l : lifting point for each hoist. "'::t :f th: t . ;,,.J .,; , L l N U h _59b ! $ E2b'b,55"!b""bb595 [; 22 2 CI ^ -
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There is no safe shutdown or decay heat removal
- equipment beneath the load paths on elevation 102 feet l
or on the next lower elevation (77 feet). But the 18-inch RHR heat exchanger A inlet line, three Channel A Class IE cable trays, and some Channel A, Class IE conduits are located in the northwest corner of the RHR heat exchanger A compartment below elevation 77 feet and beneath a portion of the SACS heat exchanger A hoist load path. The 18-inch RER heat exchanger B inlet line and two Channel B Class IE cable
- trays are located beneath the load path on elevation 77 feet. Three additional Channel B Class 1E cable
, trays and some Channel B Class 1E conduits are located
! in the southwest corner of the RHR heat exchanger B compartment below elevation 77 feet and beneath a portion of the SACS heat exchanger B hoist load path.
i To preclude the possibility that a dropped SACS heat l exchanger end cover could penetrate the elevation 102 i i feet floor, the cover lift height will be mechanically '
restricted to the minimum necessary distance above the floor, and energy absorbing material will be placed
. beneath the load path, or another. load handling system j that satisfies the four evaluation criteria of Section 5.1gof NUREG-0612 will be used.
4
, Therefore, these hoists satisfy guideline 5.1.5(1)(c) of NUREG-0612. -
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nn. Recombiner system hoists (00H318, 108318) i This hoist does not handle heavy loads. )
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=== raan % i, ThatE 9.1-12 ," Po,e 1 er 0 g ORIM IAh88 OVER SAFETT-RELATED EQUIPMENT k
First Elevation ___
8econd Blevetion serety-pelates, sarety-selates, Safe Safe Spetdoom. Safe Shetdeer, Imad or Decay Essard or Decay pesard Imed Lifting Path Beat Removal Elimiastica Beat memoval E11minatten nearr Imad M Devise Fie8
- 8 Eggi Beelement Criterientst {3e1 Bestement Criterien l co- > m ;- -_-- m a ua _ - ,._- - i n 1. Table 9.1-101
,. -n Reactor well shield 197-1/2 9.1-32 201 RPT d 170 BSF FRTE Rectre. 4 I a.
plege teme psling.
e14 __. plag} Sht. 1 Unite l t
- b. Dryeell head 65 tese RFT head 9.1-32 201 RPT d 170 BSF FRTS Recire. 6 stren M sht. 2 Unite
- o. Rosetor vessel 97 tone BPT head 9.1-32 201 RPT 4 16 2 -Standby Ligeid 4 l head streagheek sht. 2 control (stc) i 16 2 -'A' sa Recombiner 4 l 162 -NaOs Analysere d l
- d. Meistare 73-1/4 aryer/ 9.1-32 291 RPT d 162 se meesabinere e i separator tems esperater sht. 3 l aling
- e. steen 45 toes Bryer/ 9.1-32 201 RPT 4 162 Be Recombinere d dryer esperater slet. 3 1 _
- II*I _
- f. Dryer /seposetor pool plege g 9.1-32 291 sht. 4 Wene Mk 178 BSF FSV5 Rectre.
Unite d I l
- g. Spent feel 110 tems Feel ensk 9.1-32 201 pone WA 162 Fuel Fool e i shippies cask yoke Sht. 5 coolin9 System l
- h. Assiliary helst 1 ten geene 9.1-32 291 -ASB MCs Exp. d 170 BSF FRTS Recirq.- d
- I lead block requizeal sht. 10 Tank seite l 162 -ste e 1 201 -RPT d 162 -Nece Analysere d I
- - 201 -Spent Feel Fool d 162 -Ne pocombinero d l 162 -Fool Fool Pompe d i 53 h Shind pg. sh,g ***==="- I W& wtom, %W,%n%
b f I Amendment \)
_____.,.. . _ _ . . _ . = .._ ,., ... . . ,
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7 scos rana ys -
. e TAsLa 9.1-12 (cont) . Page 2 of s ,
First Eiegation second Siegation safety-melated, safety-Relates,,
, safe safe metdeun, safe Shetdoun, c Lead or Decay masard or Decay Nasard -
Emed Liftiaq Path meet Removal 311mination seat Roe wel 311mination Mary _Imad MRAShh Devies_ Fie4*8 thel Z _ 1 -- : t criterienta3 M suetement criterien
- 1. Main boist 18 tone me 9.1-32 201 -Ass sacs Sap. e 118 SSF rays Recare. d load block required) sht. 9 Tank unite 261 -RN d 14 2 -SLC d 162 -s oe s Analysere d 162 -me Recombinere a 162 -Feel Fooi Pumps a g , 6 seat such.
1 Spent feel pool l JdT tede slage- 9.1-32 201 -spent Ftnel Fool d 170 'F' FRTS Rectre. A slot plege faitese proof sht. 3 201 -RN d hit -
eling
- k. Spent feel 3.4 tone a e- 9.1-32 201 spent Fuel Fool 4 162 spent Feel Fooi d pool gates f are proof Sht. 2 s cask pool eling estes
- 1. SPT service S tone servion 9.1-32 201 RFv d 17e es' PRys Recare. A slatform platterm sht. 5 anit eling
- a. seed stud 2.1 tone single- 9.1-32 201 RPV e 17 0 SSF FRTS Recire. e zeck failure proof Sht. O Unito eliaq 162 -se Recombinere e 16 2 -n ce e Analysere e 162 -str 162 -Peel Fool Pumpe g l 8 seat such.
- m. Dessel head 5 tone R M head 9.1-32 201 RPT d 170 BSF FRTS Rectre.
Ananlation and strong back sht. 1 Unite '
irene .,
- o. F1sz monitor 2.5 tone sing e- 9.1-32 201 mone NR 16 2 -'A' na Recombiner e shipping failure proof sht. 2 16 2 -SLC e crate ellag 162 -'A' s a 0s Analyser e
- p. Stad teneiceer S.3 tone R M stad 9.1-32 201 RPV e 178 35F FRWS Recire. e frame tensioner sht. 3 Unite sling S 11 162 -sLC e i
Amendment h IJ w _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _
I %.
? .
i BCGS FSAR 85 l .
f .
TASLE 9.1-12 (cont) Page 4 of 8 i
j Yh-t Elevation Second Elevation
{ Safety-Deleted, Safety-Related,
- Safe Safe Rutdown, Safe Shutdown, i Imad or Decay Hazard or Decay Hazard i- Imad Lifting Path Heat Resoval Elimination Beat Removal Elimination
[
Beavy. Load Mg,ight Device rigi+.1 reet sautoment criterionn> Feet seuimment criterion
- y. Spent fuel rack 10 tons Fuel rack 9.1-32 201 -RPV d 162 'B' Fuel Pool d modules lifting Sht. 4 201 -Spent fuel d Pump 5 Heat Exch.
fixture pool l S. Fuel rack 1.1 Single- 9.1-32 201 -RPV d 162 'B' Fuel Pool d
. lifting fixture tons failure- Sht. 4 201 -Spent fuel d Pump 8 Beat Exch.
! proof sling pool aa. Reactor teell 4.5 (None 9.1-32 201 RPV d 178 BSF FRVS Recirc. d shield plug tons required) Sht. 9 Units sling 162 -SIC d 16 2 -R, Recombiners d 162 -Raos AnalYsers
~
d (PELET a c
! bb. se r or A *aam '
- 0. *-M - 2 ^ ! !?"." f 11" "" 'fi._ E::1-1 A 1 pia .'6. e0; Cr. . ^ p %
, 1 -ASJ11 Re iner d
! 62 -A8B Reo salys a 162 A rnel 1 Pam /d ,
SH t Esc . / )
cc. New fuel inner box 1.0 ton Inner box 9.1-32 201 None NA 162 -Fuel Pool Pumps & d l lifting sling Sht. 13 Heat Exch. l dd. New fuel inner box 1.0 ton Inner box 9.s-32 201 None NA 162 -Fuel Pool Pumps & a l tilting sling Sht. 13 neat Exch. l j Crame/Boist Personnel Air Lock moist (Item 2. Table 9.1-101 O. Air lock 30 tons Air lock 9.1-33 102 None NA 77 -Torus c strongback 77 -RPCI disch. piping b,c 77 -SRV disch. piping b,c 77 -Core spray disch. b,c 4
1 piping f
i I
- b. Upper shield block 21 tons (None required) 9.1-33 102 None NA 77 -Torus c 77 -HPCI disch. piping b 17 -SRV disch. piping b,c 77 -Core spray disch. b,c
- piping $
Amendment l
^
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'7 HCGS FSAR k85 l TABLE 9.1-12 (cont) Page 7 of 8 First Elevation Second Elevation Safety-Related, Safety-Related, Safe Safe Shutdown, Safe Shutdown, Load or Decay Hazard or Decay Hazard Load Lifting Path Heat Removal Elimination Heat Removal Elimination BeaTY_ Load Weight Device Fic(*3 Feet Equipment criterionu3 Poet _ Equipment criterion Crame/Boist: CBD_ Service Boist_(Item _39. Table 9.1-10L 77 .gg CRD maintenance 1 ton Conventional 9.1-35 102 None NA 7 -RER pump A dis- e equipment (maximum) slings charge piping 77 -RNR shutdown e cooling suction 77 -HPCI pump e '
discharge line 77 -HPCI turbine e steam supply 77 -RPV instrument I e
lines Crane /Boist: SACS Punos A and C_Holst (Item 40 Table 9.1-10)
Motor 3.1 tons Conventional 9.1-35 102 SACS loop A b 77 SACS Loop B e sling pumps, remain- piping (TACS &
ing motor, diesel supply &
associated return)
Piping Crane /Holst: SACS Pumps B and D Holst (Item 40 Table 9.1-10)
Motor 3.1 tone Conventional 9.-35 102 SACS Icop B b 77 RHR Post-LOCA e sling pumps, remain- containment ?
ing motor, flooding line associated Piping Crane /Holst: SACS Heat Exchancer A Hoists (Item 41, Table 9.1-10) i Return end 9.2 tons Conventional 9.1-35 102 None NA 77 -RHR loop A piping e cover sling 77 -Channel A Class e 1E cable trays 77 -Channel A Class e 1E conduit Crane /Holst: SACS Heat Exchanger B H31sts (Item 41. Table 9.1-10)
Return end 9.2 Conventional 9.1-35 102 None NA 77 -RHR loop B piping e cover tons sling 77 -Channel B Class e 1E cable trays 77 -Char.rel B Class e 1E conduit II Amendment K l
_s I '
BCGS FSAR 8 85 l -
Table 9.1-14 (Page 1 of 2) gQgg CREEK RP EAL LIFTING DEVICE FACTORS OF SAFETY ,
Maximum .
i combined Static Stress NUREG-0612 Maximum Lifting Maximum and Design Stress Section 5.1.1 ( 4)
Rated Load Device Static Dynamic Dynamic Factor Design Factor of
' Capacity Weight Weight Load Load Load vs. Factor vs. Safety M Special Lifting Device tons tons tons __ tons Factor (*3 tons __ Yieldts3 Ultimatecs3 Compliance o
- 1. RPV head strongback 100 97 4.4 101.4 0.15 116.6 3.5 5.7 Yest*3 ,
- 2. Dryer separator sling 73.5 73.3 2 75.3 0.15 86.6 2.6 4.3 No(*3
- 3. RPV service platform 7.2 5.9 0.1 6 0. 17 5 7.1 3.0 3.1 No(*>
sling ,
cm3 cal 0.15 cm3 cm3 can cap 4 Fuel cask yoke 110 110
- 5. Reactor well shield 107. 5 107.5 .- 0.15 '3s '5. Yest**
ping sling 5'. go.o 6 so i
( De cerrcp)
,_1;;1: sa 20 5 : ;. a 50,1 ; en r;_ ,_
- 6. (, : 1 r' v ~
- 7. Deleted m S. RPV etud tensioner 5.3 5.3 0.2 5.5 0.175 6.5 14.2 14.7 Yes sling
- 9. Personnel air lock 30 30 0.7 30.7 0.15 35.3 hb. )
strongback .3 N/
- 10. Fuel rack lifting 10 10 1.1 11.1 0. 17 5 13.0 6 10 Yes f1sture
- 11. New fuel inner 3.4 0.97 0.01 0.98 0. 17 5 1.16 11.4 11.9 Yes I kom lifting slinq l
- 12. New fuel inner 2.1 0.96 0.01 0.97 0. 17 5 1.14 5.7 6.0 Yes l kom tilting sling l M8 883 Deleted to) n e spent fuel shipping cask and yoke are not yet known for HCGS. S e cask weight and dimensions used for the RCGS design are based on the projected 125-ton NLI 26/32 rail cask. A 110-ton load is used here to acknowledge Amer.dment Y l
% ~
. i 5 i r
- 1 Table 9.1-14 (Coct'd) (Page 2 of 2) l assemption of the NLI cask design responsibility by Nuclear Assurance Corpo' ration (NAC) and subsequent developseent of the NAC 12/32 cask to replace the projected NLI cask.
CD3 Deleted '
- to) Dynamic load factor = 0.15 5 0.005 (hoist speed, feet per siinute) 5 0.50.
(3 3 WDREG-0612, section 5.1.1 (4) requires a factor of safety of 3 versus yield and 5 versus ultimate strength for the combined static and dynamic load. The static load includes the weight of the load plus the weight of the special lifting device. '
(03 the_liftino device will be upgraded to meet the single-failure-proof guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 (1) (a) .
(73 (ti++ ins deyjee }_
h,, _ _ _ _ __ _ ____ _..12 J a clin; '-- t-1 1::f ; " e 2:.;;;.;ysatisfies the single-failure-proof requirements of NUREG-0612, section 5.1.6 (1) (a) . l l
I I
i l
4 i
i i
amendmentk"l
- r. . .. .
y BCGS FSAR k85 l i Tagg1g (Page 1 of 2)
~ '
SINGLE-FAILURE-PROO8 LIFTING DEVICES AND ASSOCIATilD HEAVY LOAD LIFT POINTS l Special Single NUREG-0612 i Lifting Device / Heavy Load Lifting Failure Applicable Lift Point Device (1) Proof Criteria
- 1. Fuel Cask Yoke Yes Yes Note 2
- Spent Fuel Shipping Cask NA Yes Note 2
- 2. RPV Head Strongback Yes Yes Note 3
- Drywell head NA Yes 5.1.6(3)(a) l
- RPV head NA Yes Note 3 ,
- RPV head insulation & 'i frame NA Yes 5.1.6(3)(a) )
- 3. Shield Plug Sling Yes Yes 5.1.6(1)(a) l 1
- Reactor well shield 5.1.6(3)(a)
~
plugs NA Yes
- 4. Dryer / Separator Sling Yes Yes Note 3
- Steam dryer NA Yes Note 3 l
- Noisture separator NA Yes Note 3 '
^
- 5. :
' =
- h " Meel""- # ".' 'M !'.',
- De er/ Separator pool y ugs NA Yes 5.1.6(3)(ah l 6. Service Platform Sling Yes Yes Note 3
- Service platform NA Yes Note 3
- 7. Fuel Rack Lifting Fisture Yes Yes 5.1.6(1)(a) 1
- Spent fuel rack module NA Yes Note 4 l
- 8. RPV Stud Tensioner Sling Yes Yes 5.1.6(1)(a)
! - RPV stud tensioner NA No NA 1 t
I )
i l
- Amendmentk11l '
l
. - - - . . . _ _ - - . _ . _ . ._ __ . . - _ = . -
. _ - - . -- . . - . - - - ~ ~ - . . . . .- ._ . . _ . .
l Table 9.1-23 (Cont'd) Page 2 of a l i
- NUREG-0612 EVALURTION CRITERIA
- I II _ III IV FSAR Section l'
- i Beavy Load Doses Lose Reff Imse No Fuel No Loss of for Safety 1 than 251 of than 0.95 Uncovery safe shutdown Evaluation 10CFR100 Function l
- t. Batch Cover 10' x 10' (1) (1) (1) (1) 9.1.5.3.2.9
- o. Refueling mellows ouard Ring (e) (e) (e) (e) 9.1.5.3.2.9 l
i v. Jib Crane (1) (1) (1) (1) 9.1.5.3.2.9
- c. Channel mandling soom Crane (10) (10) (10) (10) i 9.1.5.3.2.10 l
! M. Dryer-Separator Sling (4) (4) (4) (4) 9.1.5.3.2.4 ,
- y. spent Fuel Rock Nodules (1) (1) (1) (1) 9.1.5.3.2.7 I
S. Fuel Rack Lifting Fixture (1) (1) (1) (1) 9.1.5.3.2.7 j aa. Reactor Well Shield Flug Sling (1) (1) (1) (1) 9.1.5.3.2.3 bb. -
--'^- - 1 M a----?- "** '$' '11 815 . " . 0. ". :: . 0 1
) cc. New Fuel Inner Container (11) (11) (11) (11) 9.1.5.3.2.11 5 12 l 1
NOTES ,
! (1) The crane, lifting device, and lift goints of the heavy load satisfy the single-failure-proof guidelines of
. 30R38-0412, Section 5.1.6. No load erop analysis is required.
t (2) A single-failure-proof fuel cask lifting device (yoke) and cask lift point design in accordance with NUREG-0612
) will he selected for ECG8. No load drop analysis is required.
(3) The polar crane and its main hoist load block and auxiliary hoist load block satisfy the single-failure proof guidelines of NUREG-0612. No load drop analysis is required.
(3) The heavy load lift points and associated lifting device will be upgraded to satisfy the single-failure-proof guidelines of NUREG-0612, section 5.1.6. No load drop analysis is required.
(5) The lift points of the heavy load currently satisfy the single-failure-proof guidelines of NUREG-0612. The lifting I device will be upgraded to satisfy single-fallure-proof guidelines. No load drop analysis is required. l (6) The head stad rack is lifted by a single-failure-proof sling selected in accordance with NURE3-0612, Section 5.1.6 (1) (b) . The head stud rack has a single lifting point. The head stud rack is not carried over the spent fuel s: col, and therefore cannot impact irradiates fuel. ASministrative controls will be used to ensure the head stud i
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