ML20117L086
| ML20117L086 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Missouri-Columbia |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1996 |
| From: | Ayers L MISSOURI, UNIV. OF, COLUMBIA, MO |
| To: | Reidinger T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20117K785 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-96-249 NUDOCS 9609120313 | |
| Download: ML20117L086 (10) | |
Text
. n . v: me . v . v., I F,01 A
Researcli Reactor Facility UNNERSITY OF MISSOURI ,
Columbia. M ss ri 65211 Telephone (314) 882 4211
- FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION Date: 8 . Tan-96
- Fax Number
- (708) 515-1259 Attention: Tim Reldinger NRC Region III Transmitter: Lynn Ayers University of Missouri Research Reactor
. FAX (573) 884-7557 4
'Plione (573) 882'5312 Attached are tracking sheets for all safety concern . reports submitted to MSOC since its inception. I have also attached a current MSOC membership list; one replacement has occurred i for a member who no longer works at MURR.
- Ken Herwig was selected as MSOC Chair in July,1995.
4
$W Pages: f (including cover sheet)
IF YOU HAVE PROBLEMS RECEIVING THE FAX, PLEASE CALL (314) 882 4211 9 9609120313 960828 COLUMBIA KANSAR CITY ROLLA an equal oppertunity institution ST. LOUIS WkSH 49 PDR b8
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1 MURR Safety Oversight Committee -
membership 15-Dec-95 Tier 1 Groun Repre**ntative Phone Service Applications Dorothy Van Ark 882-5286 Facility Operations David Nickolaus 882 5210 Reactor Operations Shift Supervisor on Duty 882-5213 Neutron Materials Science Program Ken Herwig 882-5316 Biomedical Program Lynn Ayers 882-5312 Nuclear Analysis Program Leon Krueger 882-5276 "CHIND" Committee Scott Keithley 882-5262 (CD,HP,lD,NE,DO)
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. . - m sw (use additional sheet if nscessary)
The submitted conecrn is that intercom announcements cannot be heard on the be .
states that announcements made by Reactor Control cannot be heard, and that there ha which an actual isolation / evacuation hu been confused with a test. Requeets level have been put forth in the past without success.
for speakers a eamport floor MSOC concluded that the inability to hear the intercom has minimal significance as a s MURR it.staff are clearly instructed to respond to the isolation / evacuation alarm unless disregard tests, not ignoring an actual isolation /cyacuation.If announcements to disregard a However, it is true that personnel throughout the Center are conditioned and desensitized to routine alarm tests, sometimes to the point of disregarding situations.
safety concern.The alarm generally does not produce an immediate, urgentThis response.
is considered a signiacant RE FTIJNG: 1 Date inst:al SCS action N/^ l Data refened to MSOC 1/5/ 95 _ or ApFEALED N/A _
ASSIGNEDTO N/A for review i 1
SUCGESTIONS FOR RESOLUTION (use additional sheet if necessary) t A. A speaker has been relocated from the Nuclopore platform to the south beamport floor area is presumed to occur. Two other speakers in the arca have been increased in volume. This sh the audibility ofintercom announcements for workers on the beamport floor.
There is a long list of areas 5 which the intercom esanot be heard, and our amplifier is alr2y ope or beyond its capacity. WhEwe agree that this system is inadequate and should be upgraded, w ne a facility maintenance / improvement issue, not a safety issue.
B. Recommendations to resolve the conditioning / desensitizing of staff to alarms.
1.
Remove routine testing of the isolation / evacuation alarm from the startup routine, and reschedule i approximately 04:20 on maintenance shutdown days (just after shutdown). This would condition very people to disregard the alarm, and only during a specific, predictablo period of time. The majority of workers will learn that the alarm is rarely heard, and they should respond with appropriate urgency it is used during an emergency.
2.
Since the alarm would not be routinely heard, the alarm sound should be included in indoctrinations, either in the video or u a separate audiotape. (It may already be in the video.)
3.
Establish a policy to reserve the " touch tone" attention signal for certain critical announcements: reacto j
status, emergencies, or situations Glke alarm tests) that may be confused with emergencies.
Distribution of report / recommendations: Jim Rhyne, Chrrlie McKibben. Walt Meyer 1 /18 /95 Data approved by MSOC(Initial) 1 /11 /95 (bcg-term) 1/11/ 95 Date initial Action tmplemented 1/9/95 Date long-term Action implemented _ Sea om 2 ~.flhis reoort RE DISTRIDUTION/ POSTING Date distributed tdposted for initiator. Subcommittee members. Lobby file:lait 61 rw omtxt 1/2095 Und.va casted 8/11/95 Qgg 10/(,[45.
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MSOC Tracking ID e MSOc.0001 STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS Ramnonse from Walt M*ver 1/ 27 / 96:
Recommendation B.1 requires installation of a cut out switch for the evacuation horne, so that the Reactor Safety System function can be tested just before startup, with the horns silenced at that time. The ET Shop was asked to evaluate the feasibility of this approach. Operations is willing to implement the recommendation on a trial basis if it is feasible.
Recommendation B.2: The sound of the isolation / evacuation horns is on the indoctrination videotape.
Recommendation B.3: Operations opposed making a policy of the touch-tone attention signal. There was concern that some staff might become dependent on the touch tone, assuming that any announcement made without the signal is of low significance. If an operator forgot to use the signal in an emergency, signal-dependent persons might be discouraged from finding out what was said.
Fn11nw.Un Meetinc ? /14 / 9&
Walt Meyer again expressed wilhngness to implement recommendation B.1 on a trial basis. The ET shop indicated ;
that a new cut-off switch could be instaDed fairly easily in a location behind the operator's console, but operators I were concerned that non. visibility might cause the switch to be forgotten during startup. A preferable approach, mounting the new switch in a visible location on the control panel, would be more difficult. Competing priorities in the Electronica Shop have delayed planning and implementation of this recommendation.
Several concerns about recomndation B.1 were discussed. One is the risk of starting up after several Imurs of maintenance work, during whien the alarms might unknowingly sustain damage. Although unlikely, this scenario was judged a much more significant hazard than is caused by personnel conditioning. Another weakness of Becommendation B.1 is that its effectiveness would be extremely difficult to evaluate. A " trial basis" could require ut leest a year, probably longer, to observe any consistent change in personnel responses. The final and most important issue is that conditioning / desensitization is probably not the causo of the most objectionable
" straggling" behaviors. Members estimate that conditioned personnel, mistakenly assuming a test situation, might hesitate for no more than 5-15 seconds during an actual emergency. After that period, the ongoing alarm clearly differs from a test prompting personnel to make the expected response. Walt and Nolan reported a much different behavior pattern for individuals identified as non responders during past drills and isolai. ions. Some of these it.dividuals have remained on the phone with hands over their ears to block out the alarm, or continued to delay after operatore instructed them to leave. MSOC does not believe that changing alarm testing times would improve the response of such individuals, who clearly understand the required behavior but refuse to comply.
Considering the probable limited benefit, potential new risks, and technical difficulties involved, MSOC chose to drop recommendation B.1, replacing it with recommendation B.4, presented below.
New Reen-mandatiom B 4: In regard to willful non. responders, the committee concluded that such individuals pose a threat to themselves, to the emergency response team, and to the Center's regulatory standing. MSOC recommends that the Center adopt and adhere to a firm policy imposing penalties for non responders. Re-training ;
or counseling in response to a first offense should involve both the individual and his or her supervisor / sponsor '
(as is currently done), and be documented in the offender's personnel files (not currently done). Repeat violations must result in negative consequences (i.e.: loss of unescorted access) to preserve personnel safety and to clearly communicate that this serious infraction will not be tolerated.
SUMMARY
OF RECOMMENDATIONS- STATUS AS OP 7/M/9N A Adjust speakers. COMPLETED 1/9/95.
B.1 Move alarm testing time. DROPPED, B.2 Incorporate alarm sound into indoctrination. ALREADY EXISTS - ITEM CLOSED.
B.3 Use touch. tone signal for critical announcements. DROPPED.
B.4 Define & impose penalties for non-responders. DRAPT POLICY COMPLETE. TO BE INCLUDED IN NON FEO TRAINING 8/95.
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m,. w: .::= n.u-F.04 MSOC Tracking ID # McOC-0002 MURR SAFETY OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE TRACKING SHEET SAFETY CONCERN (use additional sheet if necessary)
The initiator's concern regards the replacement of Jay Kunze as Chair of the RAC Reactor Safety Subcommittee end speculation that this action may have been taken in response to positions, statements or issues raised by Dr.
Kunze in his capacity as Chairman which were unfavorable with management. The initiator states that Dr. Kunze had nat intended to step down, did not know he was being replaced before a public announcement was made of Turk %rvick's appointment to the position, and speculated that he must have made somebody mad.
MSOC mornbers had varied perceptions of the safety significance of this concern. Members also debated whether or not this concern falls within the scope of this committee's responsibilities (safety vs. chilling ciTect). The securney of the speculations which form the basis of this concern is not known. Because the concern is submitted I by an outside party rather than the affected individual, the committee decided that a diroct inquiry should be !
made to determine Jay Kunze's perception of the issue. A member was delegated to contact Dr. Kunte and report b:ck to the Committee, which will then consider any need for fr.ther deliberation / action.
RE FIIJNC:
D2te initial 808 action N/A Data referred to MSOC _1/ 31/ 95 InitialEvaluation 2 / 8 / 95 ASSIGNED TO_ not ana % Mr for review SUGGESTIONS FOR EESOLUTION (use additional sheet if n.cessary)
NONE.
A member of MSOC contacted Dr. Kunze by phone on 2/20/95. Dr. Kunze stated that he does not perceive his replacement as Chairman to be a retaliatory action against him, nor does he have any concern regarding Dr.
Storvick's ability to assume the Chairmanship. The MSOC, upon hearing the report ofits delegated representative, has closed the issue.
l l
l Date clowl by MSOC (Initial) 5/19/ 95 (Long-term) not aochcaMe Date Initial Action implemented not nocHc2b'e Date long-term Action implemented notannW*M-RE DISTRIBUTION /POSTLNG Drte distnbuted tvposted for irutintor, Subcnmmtttee members, bby fil _5/ 26 /95 fome blw.
Leo eMM-@
.w-F.05 MSOC Tricking ID e MSOC-0003
( NAP-94-01 )
MURR SAFETY OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE TRACKING SHEET SAFETY CONCERN hise additional eheet if nesensary)
The concern relates to alpha emitters which could become airborne during the TRUMP-S upgrade project requeets establishment of a MURR respirator program (to include the affected TRUMP-S workers), because NRC regulations do not allow employees to use respirators for protection from airborre radioactivity except under th control of a qualifica respirator program. (This concern originated in the NAP and was forwarded to the Director's Office before the MSOC was operational, it was reviewed by the MSOC ce part of the Committee's clearinghouse function for concerne handled within the various subcommittees.)
MSOC considers this request to be a legithnate concern of high priority and significance. Members are aw management has agreed to establish a qualified respirator pmgram for a limited number of MURR staff. and that other approaches are bemg actively pursued to minimise the potential airborne alpha contamination for the TRUMP-S upgrade (extensive decontamination efforts, controlled airflow, etc.).
The Committee reouests a current status / progress report and projected timetable for implementatinn of tha proposed respirator program, including confirmation of appropriate budget allocations.
is rtuNo:
Dateinstial SCS action 11 / 28 / 94 g. Date referred tn *.fW 1 ' 19 / M Committ+e Evaluatma 9 i e i os ASSIGNED'lV Nrlir. MeEhtme. for response.
SUGGESTIONS FOR RESOLUTION (use additional sheet if necessary)
UPDATE: 30-Oct 95 The TRUMP.S facility upgrade was completed without need of napimenrn. CanaidomMe doubt has arisen regardin the cost. benefit of an approved respiratorprogram: even the NRC has discouraged this approach. Respirator u radiation protection has been declining thmuchout the indantry, due to inerraeed time for taa completion (increasirg external exposure in most applicatiatu), impaired communication, crul physical stress and discomfor respirntor utarers. In consideration of the cost, pernar.nr1 impart, and inw parcoit+d need or benefit of a respirator pmgram. MSOC unanimously apprvtied a motion to retract the earlier assignment of high priority for this issue.
The committee defers to the Radiatinn Safety Offirar in Ernpienent or close the proposed respiratorprogmm at he deems appropriate for the Center's needs. The initiator of this safety conearn was an artive participant in th discuutan and drei<ir.n Unte approved by MSOC Gni-ial) A (Long term) A DateInitial Actionimplemented A Date 14ng. term Ac: ion truolemented N/A RE DIRTRim rrf0N/PORTWG Date distributed tofposted for initiator, Submmmittee members, Icbby file / /
Pew th/9c,. g
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mcer e id:co P.06 MSOC Tracking ID o MSOC-0004
. (Onorations 06/02/93)
MURR SAFETY OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE TRACKING SHEET SAFETY CONCERN (us) additional sheet if necessary)
Emergency response actions called for in the TRUMP.S Waste Contingency Plan (a document concerned with EPA-regulated components of TRUMP-S waste) conflict with actions called for in MURR Facility Emergency Procedures (FEPs). Because both documents are currently in force, the discrepancies could cause confusion in emergency response or set us up for regulatory violations from EPA or NRC. Operations proposed that the TRUMP-S Waste Contingency Plan should be revised to obtain compatibility. They delegated Derek Pickett and Tony Schoone (the Emergency Managers for the Contingency Plan) to meet with Environmental Health & Safe staff to revise the Contingency Plan as necessary.
i The concern was forwarded to MSOC for tracking. '
i RE FILING:
Date initial SCS action 6/19/cA I Date referred to MSOC e /19 / 95_ Initial Evaluation _6 / 30 / 95 l ASSIGNED TO nerek Picke+t / Tonv hane i
SUGGESTIONS FOR RESOLUTION (use additional sheet if necessary)
Lonn-Term; MSOC concurs with Operations' recommendation. I Derek is making good progress on revising the Waste Contingency Plan. lie met with Ruseell Hanson of EH&S on 6/22/95 and obtained agreement on proposed revisions. He has also discussed the proposed revisions with Operations staff to ensure that the resisions would be adequate to resolve the concern. As of 7/19/95, he is simply waiting for EH&S to incorporate the changes and issue the revised Contingency Plan.
l Short. Term:
MSOC recommends that Walt Meyer issue a Standing Order to clarify that Facility Emergency i
Procedures shall superecde the TRUMP.S Contingency Plan in the event of conflicting recommendations. This !
will formally clarify expectations until the revisions are implemented.
I Date closed by MSOC (Initial) 7 /19 /95 (Long-term) not nenNQ Date Initial Action implemented not nop%hle Date Long-terrn Action implemented not aedid "ll9 CM6 RE DISTRIBUTION / POSTING Date distributed to/ posted for initiator, Subcortmittee members, Lobby file
- s. . . . . . ~ _ .v ,
p,07 MSOC Tracking ID 0 Msoc_ooos MURR SAFETY OVERS;GHT CCMMITTEE TRACKING SHEET SAFETY CONCERN (use additional sheet if necessary)
An anonymous initiator is concerned that a proposal for management evaluations by MURR staff, raised twice in MURR wide staff meetings, has been ignored by management. The initiator states that J. Rhyne (at the Aug. 3 and Sept. 6 staff meetingal promised to discuss the matter at the next available meeting of Group Leaders and Managers. The initiator further states that his/her Group lander / Manager said the matter has not been placed on tha agendu nr rai.ied by anynna at a meeting, and that ha (tha Group T.asdar/ Manager) faared retaliation if he were to bring up the subject. The initiator is disappointed, having anticipated that such a review would provide an avenna fnr staff fendback. The initintnr ntaten that anfaty in impacted by undermining ntaff con 5 dance 'that future sa'cty concerns will be properly addressed in an atmosphere of continued fiscal / management problems and fniled penmicas by mnnngement
- Hn/=hn proposen that n *falc, enmplete, and nnnnymnne review nf all Gennp Leaders, Managers, and Directors" be conducted, with the entire staff allowed to participate and responses reported at least one level above each evaluated individual RE FILING:
Date initial SCS action n/n Data tsferred to MSOC 9 /1a / 95_ Initial Evaluation ,9 / 29 / 95 ASSIGNED TO . im RNw Gretm in4m & We-m SUGGESTIONS FOR RESOlalTION (use additional sheet if necessary)
Upon initial review, MSOC perceives that the initiator has submitted this concern to the Cocimittee due to frustration in seeking to raise the subject at a manageriallevel. The Committoo regards the issue as primarily a management decision, although some Chilling Effect is implied in the Group Leader / Manager's alleged fear of retaliation. Without judging the proposal for management evaluations, MSOC recommends that Rhyne raice the issue for consideration by the Group Leaders & Managers. MSOC requests feedback from Rhyne regarding the outcome of the managerial discussion (s) or his rationale for rojoeting thic recommendation.
Dete closeo Dy .200 un2taan (tong.terrn)
Date Irattal Actico implerr.ented Date Is.ctem Action irnplemented RE DISTRIBUTION / POSTING Date distributed to/ posted forinitiator 10 / 6 / 95 lobby Ele -
.m. .. ,.- . ...
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l UNTVERSITY OF MISSOURI COLUMBIA INTRA DEPARTMENT CORRESPONDENCE Date: October 18,1995 l TO: Ken Herwig, Chair MSOC FROM: Jim Rhyne i RE: Evaluation of MURR Management The issue raised by the anonymous concern brought to your committee about the evaluation of MURR management by non-management personnel was discussed in j the Managers and Group Leaders meeting October 17,1995. '
I was personally surprised and amazed by the' feeling expressed that the person 4 bringing up the concern felt that he/she could not " pursue the issue through normal managarial channels, as indicated by the belief that his/her Group Leader /MGgor feared retallation in bringing up the issue." This concern about possible retaliation i occma to be rather inconsistent with the free-ranging level of discusslou that occurs lu ;
the Group Leaders and Mangers meetings (and in other MURR meetings for that urutter). If any concrete examples are available supporting this " fear of retaliation",
it would be most helpful to have this information .
Essentially universally, the MURR managers have no problem with the concept of i evaluation by the persons they supervise. However, the precise methods by which this could be implemented and tha format to be used was now immediately obvious to '
the group. For example, on quick examination, the formats used by departmental _ i faculty to evaluate department chairs and deans do not appear to be applicable for the broad spectrum of positions we have'here at MURR. Fran Malloy, who has-extensive personnel experience in her position hi the Graduate School, did not know of l i
any other unit on campus for which such an evaluation procedure is in place that we could copy.
The opinion was also voiced by several that the evaluation of management ought to be contained in the two-way communication procedure that is part and parcel of the ;
annual (or more frequent) employee evaluation process.
We do plan to discuss this further at a later meeting. Meanwhile, we are certainly I open to more specific suggostiono on implementation of such an evaluation procedure.
i TOTAL P.08