ML20094A054

Provides Info Consistent W/Provision of 771102 Safety Evaluation Which Included Consideration & Approval of Using Fuel Assemblies Repaired by Replacement of Damaged Fuel Rod W/Inert Rod or by Removing Rod

ML20094A054
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	11/01/1984
From:	Fay C WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:	Harold Denton, John Miller Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC-49969, TAC-49970, NUDOCS 8411060224
Download: ML20094A054 (2)

Text

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A WlSCORGin Electnc m coum 231 W. MICHIGAN, P.O. BOX 2046. MILWAUKEE, WI 53201 November 1, 1984 Mr. H. R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. J. R. Miller, Chief Operating Reactors, Branch 3 Gentlemen:

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301 USE OF REPAIRED FUEL ASSEMBLY POINT BEACH UNIT 2 CYCLE 11 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 The NRC Safety Evaluation for Amendment Nos. 28 and 32, dated November 2, 1977, for Point Beach Nuclear Plant License Nos.

DPR-24 and DPR-27, respectively, included consideration and approval of using fuel assemblies which have been repaired by replacement of a damaged fuel rod with an inert rod, or by simply removing a damaged rod and leaving a " water hole". Provisions for using such repaired assemblies were accordingly incorporated in Point Beach Technical Specification 15.5.3.A.l. The NRC staff Safety Evaluation also provided that the Commission be notified of future use of fuel assemblies with damaged . fuel rods removed. The purpose of this letter is to provide information consistent with that provision.

The final loading pattern for Point Beach Unit 2 Cycle 11 includes a fuel assembly (N02) which has been repaired by removal of a peripheral fuel rod which was known visually to be leaking.

Sipping results following removal of the leaking fuel rod confirmed that this was the only defective fuel rod in the fuel assembly. Assembly N02 had previously experienced two cycles of irradiation at relatively low burnup. Because of its fissile content it was selected as the best replacement available for a Unit 2 fuel assembly (M55) which had sustained a torn grid strap.

To avoid the risk of possible grid damage due to additional fuel handling, it was decided to not use an inert rod in assembly N02 after the damaged rod was removed.

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Mr. H. R. Denton November 1, 1984 To accommodate use of assembly NO2 with a'" water hole" in place of the damaged fuel asembly, Westinghouse performed addi-t tional core analyses for Unit 2 Cycle 11. A new safety evaluation was performed for the revised core loading pattern. A safety evaluation 1similar to that performed previously in support of

-Amendment Nos. 28 and 32 discussed.above was also performed for

using' assembly NO2 with a water hole. Results were reported in

-a; revision to the Westinghouse Unit 2 Cycle 111 Reload Safety' Evaluation. The change in bottom nozzle stresses due to the different location of-the machined slot and the effects of small changes in -localized crossflow were assessed and found to be acceptable. Similarly, the small changes in the nuclear design

=due to relocation of some fuel assemblies and burnable poison

assemblies have no adverse impact on the parameters used in the Cycle 11 accident-analyses. Thermal and hydraulic considerations

-were'also evaluated. Since assembly NO2 has a higher burnup than

.related symmetric assemblies and since the peak Fxy does not occur near the water hole location, assembly N02 will not be in a high

-power, limiting core location any time in the cycle. Based on

.the Westinghouse revised Reload Safety Evaluation the conclusions .

of the original Reload Safety Evaluation still apply.

Very truly yours, fff-Vice President-Nuclear Power C. W. Fay Copy to'NRC Resident Inspector J