ML20078B644

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Requests Hearing on once-through Steam Generator Problem at Facility
ML20078B644
Person / Time
Site: Three Mile Island Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/07/1982
From: Lewis M
LEWIS, M.
To: Eisenhut D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20077J956 List:
References
FOIA-83-243 NUDOCS 8309270184
Download: ML20078B644 (1)


Text

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M. I. LEWIS 6504 BRADFORD TERR. '

PHILA., PA.19149 i

.ce of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 4.ention : D.C.Eisenhut Director

,1 vision of Licensing

' United States Nuclear Regulatory Coz=ission ,

i* Washington, D.20. 20555 -

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Dear sir:

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if By this30,1982 April letter .I wish to voice my opposition toMr H.D.Hu1111's request of -

that there be no hearings on the OTSG tubing problem.

  • j There should and must be hearings on the (7ISC problem at TrJJ1. This '

is a very specall instance of admitted management incompetence-admitted

by the very management in question.

)

i Dua to a management error, thiosulphate wac supposedly released into the wrong system , and this release eventually lead to 01SG tubing failure.

Thrre is no reason to believe that the management has improved , and ,

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this type of error will not continue unabated. Surely we need hasarings to deternine that management has improved or at least won't make the j

same mistale a6ain. .

i bzrther ttere is really no absolute nor even physical proof that the l

thiosulphate addition was the real culprit in the tubing failure, As GFWC has admitted, these ions are present due to other possibilities and there is no reason to exclude other possibilities for the presence i

of sulfup ani chlorine.Therefore, even if the tubing failure is related to the presence of sulfur and chlorine compounds, there is no reason tio i

excludeother/ sources for the chletine and sulfz:r attack. There is i

no physical proof thct the sulfur and ch]oride came fron the insdvertant thiosulph=.te a.ddition exclusively or totally. Therefere if the tubing '

i i

failure was related to the presence of chloride and sulfur , tizra is ,

ntill no reason to believe that the " prima causae" was exclusively / or l

partially related to the inadvertant addition of thiosulphate.

l The only thing t. hat the inadversant addition of thiosulfate proves is '

that the GEWC =gement was incompetent te avoid the imdvertant additica '

of thiosulphate. ,

Also the tubing was " sensitized." How' extensive and dangerous is this sensitization? Will new heat treatments really eliminate or ccntrol this sensitization? Are any other structur'eas "sensitised?" Waht in th2 rationale for changing the haat treatments and has thei' changed heat treatments worked in the paat? -

There are many , many other questions that bear answerin[,before 'the so-called undaraged reactqr cru be restarted. The relationship of PTS and tubing failure in just one trat ir act discussed in the GPUNO submissions. I hope t t this letter will get speedy and informed attention. '

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~g 8309270184 830629 Very truly yours, [ g p' PDR FOIA r DDROSHOB3-243 / 6 PDR M.1.[EWIS

. 215 CU 9 5964.

215 725 7825 215 326 9122 6504 BRA 7 FORD TERR.

PHilA., PA.19149 .N f)['d's V-o_ ~