Text

Forwards Description of Facility Alternate Shutdown Capability in Case of Fire in Control Room or Cable Spreading Room.Encl Info Allows Closure of Outstanding Issue (8)(a) of NUREG-0797
	ML20052E935
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	05/07/1982
From:	Schmidt H; TEXAS UTILITIES SERVICES, INC.
To:	Burwell S; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20052E936	List: ML20052E935; ML20052E941;
References
	RTR-NUREG-0797, RTR-NUREG-797 TXX-3515, NUDOCS 8205110552
	Download: ML20052E935 (131)
	v • d • e

TEXAS UTILITIES SERVICES INC. Log # TXX-3515 a .inin ss u ,m :n n u m .u:s i m om.r.o File # 10010 May 7, 1982 G W y %

{f IND $ Mr. Spottswood Burwell "

10 r

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission f -1 Licensing Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D.C. 20555 g 4 x

SUBJECT:

CCMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN REF: (1) NUREG-0797, SUPPLEMENT 2

Dear Mr. Burwell:

The purpose of this letter is to submit a description of the CPSES Alternate Shutdown capability in case of a fire in the Control , Room or Cable Spreading Room. The description attached to this letter is sufficient to allow closure of Outstanding Issue (8) (a) of reference (1), when considered in conjunction with the previous Power Systems Branch, Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch, and Chemical Engineering Branch reviews and site visits. There are 5 attachments to this letter. They are: A - A marked up copy of CPSES/FSAR Section 7.4 that reflects CPSES Alternate Shutdown; B - A marked up copy of selected pages for CPSES/FSAR Sectior. 9.5 that reflects CPSES Alternate Shutdown; C - An advanced copy of CPSES/FSAR Section 7.4 as revised; D - An advanced copy of the selected pages for CPSES/FSAR Section 9.5 as revised; and, E - A copy of the CPSES Alternate Shutdown Study dated April 1982. This documentation is provided for your information and, of course, the FSAR revisions will be reflected in the next amendment to the CPSES/FSAR. Sincerely, o o!$00 0 g DRW:tls

                                    \h          )               H. C. Schmidt Attachments

F-ATTACHMENT A FSAR SECTION 7.11 MARKED UP I l I i

CPSES/FSAR 7.4 SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN C The systems required for safe shutdown are controlled and monitored by instrunentation channels associated with those systems in both the 2 Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) and balance of plant (B0P) systems. QO32.22 These systems are nonnally aligned to serve a variety of operational functions, including startup and shutdown, as well as protective functions. There are no uniquely identified safe shutdown systems per se. However, prescribed procedures for securing and maintaining the plant in a safe condition can be instituted by appropriate alignment of selected systems. Two kinds of shutdown conditions are addressed in this section: L standby and cold shutdown. Hot standby is a stable condition of the reactor achieved shortly after a programmed or emergency shutdown, of the plant and is the safe shutdown design basis for CPSES. Cold shutdown is a stable condition of the plant achieved after the residual heat removal process has brought the primary coolant temperature below (. 2000F. In either case, the reactivity control systems maintain a subcritical condition of the core. The plant technical specifications explicity define both hot standby and cold shutdown conditions. The instrunentation and control functions required to be aligned for maintaining safe shutdown of the reactor that are discussed in this section are the minimun number under nonaccident conditions. These functions pennit the necessary operations that will:

1. Prevent the reactor from achieving criticality in violation of the technical specifications.

2. Provide an adequate heat sink so that design and safety limits are not exceeded.

The designation of systems that can be used for safe shutdown depends {*"' AMENDMENT 11 7.4-1 JULY 31, 1980 l _ _ - . . . . - . - .

CPSES/FSAR on identifying those systems which provide the following capabilities: I l

1. Reactivity control - reactor trip and boration l

2. Decay heat removal - auxiliary feedwater (AFW) supply and residual heat removal (RHR) [The RHRS is required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.]

7.

4.1 DESCRIPTION

In the event of a unit shutdown, the unit will be brought to and maintained at a safe shutdown condition from the main Control Rcom or the Hot Shutdown Panel (see Section 7.4.1.3). The portions of the Reactor Trip System required to achieve the shutdown condition are described in Section 7.2. The minimun systems, support systems, component controls, and monitoring indicators required QO32.22 under nonaccident conditions to maintain hot standby are tabulated and discussed in Section 7.4.1.1 and those required to maintain cold

                                                                                             .}.9) g          shutdown are tabulated and discussed in Section 7.4.1.2. SbMew %

eM4' W. teaba A h dM mA A sd 7,i4,l.L - l 7.4.1.1 Hot Standby 11 i QO32.23 The following systems, support systems, and monitoring indicators are Q032.51 required for hot standby: QO32.65

1. Essential Systems

a. Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFS)

b. Atmospheric steam relief valves

c. Chemical and Volune Control System (CVCS), baron addition portion.

AMENDMENT .M'$1 Jt'L 31, ;^0^ - T 7.4-2 >

l. . ...-.-..,.-..-... ...---.-.7....-.-_..

CPSES/FSAR 1

2. Support Systems

a. Station Service Water System (Sections 9.2.1 and 7.3.1.1.4) 9 QO32.22

b. Component Cooling Water System (Sections 9.2.2 and 7.3.1.1.4)

c. Onsite power system (Sections 8.3 and 7.3.1.1.4), including diesel generators (Section 9.5)

d. Control Room ventilation system (Sections 9.4.1 and 7.3.1.1.4) 11

e. ESF Ventilation System (Sections 9.4.5 and 7.3.1.1.4)

f. Safety Chilled Water System (Sections 9.4F and 7.3.1.1.4)

3. Monitoring Indicators

( a. Steam Generators (SG's)

1) Water level for each SG

2) Pressure for each SG

b. Reactor Coolant System

1) Pressurizer water level

2) Pressurizer pressure 9

c. Condensate storage tank level QO32.22

(- 7.4-3 AMENDMENT 11 JULY 31, 1980

CPSES/FSAR 7.4.1.1.1 Auxiliary Feedwater System At hot standby, decay heat is removed by supplying auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators. Heat is dumped to the condenser (if offsite power is available) or to the atmosphere via the atmospheric steam relief valves. For a description of the Auxiliary Feedwater System refer to Section 10.4.9. - For a description of the Auxiliary Feedwater System control refer to Section 7.3.1.1.4, Item 5. A discussion of instrumentation requirements is found in Section 10.4.9.5. The system flow diagram is shown on Figure 10.4-11. The system failure mode analysis is contained in Table 10.4-9 and the l pertinent illustration is Figure 10.4-12. g 7.4.1.1.2 Atmospheric Steam Relief Valves For normal plant cooldown, the Steam Dump System, described in Section 10.4.4, is used to control the cooldown rate by directing steam from t the steam generators to the condenser. The power-operated atmospheric steam relief valves enable heat removal from the steam generators to the atmosphere when the condenser is not in service. These valves, described in Section 10.3.2.2, will allow gradual cooldown of the RCS to the point where the RHRS can be employed to continue plant cooldown (less than 425 psig and 3500F). The main steam system is protected against overpressurization by the ASE B&PV Code-certified safety valves described in Section 10.3.2.1. In the event of loss of the Steam Dump System and loss of the power-operated atmospheric steam relief valves, the safety valves will i OCTOBER 2, 1981 7.4-4

CPSES/FSAR {' be used to dump steam to the atmosphere, thereby maintaining the plant at hot standby.

1. Initiating Circuits A pressure transmitter and controller is provided for each af.mospheric steam relief valve. Steam pressure developed in the SG is limited by the controller set point selected. Either automatic or manual control can be selected on the controller located in the Control Room, d

These valves are also equipped with handwheels to enable local manual operation on loss of air. For operation outside the Control Room, access to the valve's control circuitry in a local , panel is prnvided[M imAnuMdl veM 'w MM4 g

                                           & a, w h a:t tla.                                 SWM% b udL.

The initiation device for the safety valve is an intrinsic part (' of the valve.

2. Logic See instrumentation and control diagrams (ICD's) listed under

                           " Main Stream Reheat and Steam Dump System" in Tables 1.7-1 and 1.7-2 for atmospheric steam relief valve control.

The safety valves are spring-loaded valves that open on reaching the pressure set point.

3. Bypass There are no electrical bypasses on safety valves nor on atmospheric steam relief valves.

The atmospheric steam relief valves have manually operated (? l l ARENbundt M 7.4-5 'XT0" " 2,100E i )-- - . --- _ . _ - - -

CPSES/FSAR isolation valves upstream of the relief valves for relief valve maintenance. Administrative procedures will assure the proper , position of these isolation valves.

4. Interlocks There are none.

5. Redundancy The safety valves are redundant (backup) to the atmospheric steam relief valves.

6. Diversity The normally power-operated atmospheric steam relief valves can also be operated diversely and r.anually via the valve handwheel.

The safety and relief valves are of diverse design. 9

7. Actuated Devices None, other than the valves themselves.

8. Supporting Systems The following supporting systems are required for operation of the power-operated atmospheric steam relief valves.

a) Class IE electric power (see Section 8.3) b) Compressed Air System (see Section 9.3.1 and Figure 9.3-1) l l

9. Design Basis Information AMENDMENT 11 JULY 31, 1980 7.4-6 I

CPSES/FSAR a) See Table 10.3-2 for the design basis of the main steam (, safety valves. b) See Table 10.3-3 for the design basis of the power-operated atmospheric steam relief valves.

10. Electric Schematic Drawings See Table 1.7-1 for Unit 1 and common and Table 1.7-2 for Unit 2 schematics (electrical) associated with " Main Steam Reheat &

Steam Dump System."

11. Portions of System Not Required for Safety The power-operated atmospheric steam relief valves and pressure transmitter output indication displayed on the control board are not required for safety.

(. 7.4.1.1.3 Chemical and Volune Control System, Boron Addition Portion The functions of the CVCS discussed in Section 9,3.4 are those associated with nonnal operation. Safe and economical operation design parameters (see Table 9.3-6) dictate the design of the CVCS for nomal operation. For the safety evaluation of the overall CVCS operation refer to Section 9.3.4.1.3 and Table 9.3-9 for the failure modes and effectsanalysis(FMEA). If safe shutdown operation alone is to be considered, then the primary functions of the CVCS are that it provide a means, along with the proper operator action, to maintain adequate j shutdown margin by sufficiently borating the core and to maintain pressurizer level. These functions are those required to maintain adequate Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory. The instrunentation, control and electrical features associated with maintaining adequate RCS inventory are those applied to the following groups of equipnent: i l (' - 7.4-7 AMENDMENT 11 JULY 31, 1980

CPSES/FSAR a

1. Boric acid transfer p mps

2. Centrifugal charging peps ')

3. Letdown orifice isolation valves Further considerations, as would apply t one unit, are as follows:

1. Initiating Circuits Initiation is by automatic or manual commands. For discussion of automatic comands of the CVCS prcper, refer to Sections 9.3.4 and 9.3.4.1.2.3, and for a discussion of the pressurizer water level control portion, see Section 7.7. Maintenance of hot standby and cold shutdown is discussed in 9.3.4.1.2.6. Manual control may be taken either in the Control Room or outside the Control Room at the Hot Shutdown Panel. For the instru entation application, refer to Section 9.3.4.1.5.

Tn gp ba (Td A) od M ShM NM N y At the ";t L - m. n .;1, c operator action may transfer control of the boric acid transfer p eps, centrifugal charging p eps and letdown orifice isolation valves from the Control Room to the Hot Shutdown panel. At this location, start-stop operation of the . peps and open-close operation of the valves in question can be undertaken. If the redundant nonnal suction paths to centrifugal charging pmps that establish boration are not available, nonnally closed motor operated valve I-8104 (refer to Figure 9.3-10, sheet 3) can be opened either remotely in the Control Room or by handwheel at the local station.

3. Bypasses Control from the Control Room of the above groups of equipment is manually bypassed g when control is taken over at the Hot Shutdown 3Q t.ka.SbF b wT Q Y M (T N N M i ok k W 7.4-8 %#A%NA U )

CPSES/FSAR Panel. C..

4. Interlo:ks With control of those above groups of equipment at the Hot Shutdown Panel, there are no interlocks imposed on their operation.

5. Redundancy There are two centrifugal charging pu ps, two boric acid transfer peps, and three letdown orifice isolation valves.

6. Diversity No diversity is provided for the boric acid transfer peps. In addition to the centrifugal charging pups, there is a positive displacement charging pup. There are other valves in the k letdown line, which, in addition to letdown orifice isolation valves, can also be used to isolate the letdown line.

7. Actuated Devices The motor control centers for the centrifugal charging pu ps and boric acid transfer pmps and the solenoid valves for the letdown orifice isolation valves are the actuation devices of the CVCS required for safe shutdown.

8. Supporting Systems The centrifugal charging peps, the boric acid transfer pups, and the letdown crifice isolation valve solenoid valves are powered from Class IE buses. Additionally, the Safety Chilled Water System supplies chilled water to the charging pap fan coil b 7.4-9 AMENDMENT 11 JULY 31, 1980

CPSES/FSAR unit (see Section 9.4F) and the Station Service Water System ' supplies cooling water to the centrifugal charging pump lube oil coolers (seeSection9.2.1).

9. Design Basis Information The CVCS is not specifically designed to be a protection system.

Section 3, " Design Bases," of IEEE Standard 279 does not specifically apply to non-protection systems such as the CVCS. Portions of the CVCS, which are shared with the Safety Injection 27 System, come under IEEE Standard 279 design bases as discussed in Section 7.3.

10. Drawings For the CVCS flow diagram, refer to Figure 9.3-10. Also refer to the flow diagrams in Section 6.3 for shared functions of the Safety Injection System, as well as the electrical drawing list ;.;)

in Section 1.7. 11. Portion of System Not Required for Safety Refer to item 9 above. 7.4.1.2 Cold Shutdown Cold shutdown is achieved following hot standby and includes passing 9 through hot shutdown. Four key functions are required to achieve and maintain Cold shutdown. They are circulation of the reactor coolant, ' removal of residual heat, boration, and depressurization. The required means for performing these functions are described below. 1. Circulation of the reactor coolant is provided first by natural circulation that is effected by the reactor core providing the

AMENDMENT 27 OCTOBER 2, 1981 7.4-10 i

CPSES/FSAR - I i heat source and the steam generators the heat sink, and then by i ('l the residual heat removal punps.

2. Removal of residual heat is accomplished first via the Auxiliary Feedwater System and then via the residual heat renoval heat 11 exchanger. Hot standby is maintained by releasing steam via the Q212.32 safety grade steam generator safety valves. Cooldown to 3500F is QO32.6(

accomplished by releasing steam via operation of the steam generator power-operated relief valves. Then cooldown to cold shutdown conditions is achieved with the Residual Heat Removal e System. A sufficient seismic Category I supply of deaerated I auxiliary feedwater to pennit four hours operation at hot standby followed by cooldown to Residual Heat Removal System initiation conditions is provided by the condensate storage tank. i A backup seismic Category I source for the Auxiliary Feedwater 31 System is the Station Service Water System. This system provides QO32.66 an assured long-tenn supply of auxiliary feedwater.

( ,

3. Boration is accomplished using portions of the Chemical and Volune Control System. Boric acid from the boric acid tanks is 9 supplied to the suction of the centrifugal charging punps by the Q212.32 boric acid transfer pumps. The centrifugal charging punps inject the boric acid into the reactor coolant system via the safety injection flow paths or the normal charging and reactor coolant punp seal injection flow paths. Makeup in excess of that needed for boration can be provided from the refueling water storage tank.

I i

4. Depressurization is accomplished using portions of the Chemical i

and Volune Control System. Either boric acid from the boric acid tanks or refueling water from the refueling water storage tank is used as desired for depressurization with the flow path being via j the centrifugal charging punps and auxiliary spray valve to the h 7.4-11 AMENDMENT 11 JULY 31, 1980

   * * * * *

e ***w ee h e em e = ==w % .- ..

          ,.o,,.-

q--. . . . . , - _

p. p. .+,.

_,..m,..m. , ,e. - _ _ . . _ , ._,_.y -. ,. - , . . . . , .

CPSES/FSAR pressurizer. 1 In addition to the systens required for hot standby delineated in Section 7.4.1.1, the following systens, support systens, and monitoring indicators are required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.

1. Essential Systens

a. Residual ileat Removal Systen (RHRS)

b. Pressurizer pressure control during RCS depressurization

2. Support Systens - No additional support systems required other than those listed in Section 7.4.1.1, Number 2.

3. Monitoring Indicators

a. RCS wide range tenperature

.A

b. Boric acid tank level (per boric' acid tank) l Additionally, the safety injection signal trip circuit must be defeated and the accunulator isolation valves closed during the later stages of plant cooldown.

7.4.1.2.1 Residual Heat Removal Systen (RHRS) The Residual Heat Renoval System is designed to renove residual heat from the core and reduce the tenperature of the Reactor Coolant Systen (RCS) during plant cooldown to cold shutdown conditions. The system is pennitted to be manually initiated when the reactor coolant tenperature and pressure are reduced to 3500F and 400 psig or below. A detailed discussion of the RHRS is provided in Section 5.4.7. RHRS operation for reactor cooldown is discussed in Section 5.4.7.2.3. Manual actions

      .           AMENDMENT 11 JULY 31,1980                                               7.4-12                                     )

l

CPSES/FSAR required of the operator, both inside and outside Control Room, are (l discussed in Section 5.4.7.2.7. Further considerations are as follows.

1. Initiating Circuits Manual control of the RHRS is from the Control Roan. For operator actions outside the Control Room, refer to Section 5.4.7.2.7.

2. Logic For the logic diagram for control of the RHRS inlet isolation valves, see Figure 7.6-2.

3. Bypasses There are no automatic operational bypasses in the RHRS.

Isolation of the RHRS cannot be manually bypassed unless ( pennissive conditions have been automatically met as described in Section 7.6.2.

4. Interlocks For discussion of the RHRS inlet isolation valves interlocks, refer to Section 7.6. Section 5.4.7.2.7 discusses application of the single failure criteria.

5. Redundancy Two independant residual heat removal ptsnps are provided, either of which can provide the necessary heat renoval capacity for the RCS for the safe shutdown condition. Each RHR ptsnp is powered from a separate Class 1E bus.

{ (. N' . AMENDMENT 11 7.4-13 JULY 31, 1980 l l

CPSES/FSAR

6. Diversity

For opening permissives and for automatic closing of the RHR inlet isolation valves, diverse RCS pressure transmitters, made by different manufacturers, are used. There is no other diversity in the RHRS control.

7. Actuated Devices Electrical control equipnent for the RHRS punps, the inlet isolation valves, the mini-flow control, and the RHRS heat exchanger are the principal actuated devices.

8. Supporting Systens The RHRS is powered from Class 1E buses. The RHRS heat exchangers and ptinps are cooled with component cooling water (see Section9.2.2).

9. Design Basis Infonnation .)

The RHRS is not specifically designed as a protection system. Section 3, " Design Basis," of IEEE Standard 279 does not specifically apply to non-protection systems like the RHPS. Portions of the Safety Injection Systen which are shared with the RHRS came under IEEE Standard 279 design basis as discussed in Section 7.3.

10. Drawings For the RHRS flow diagram, refer to Figures 5.4-6 and 5.4-7. For the RHRS inlet isolation valve interlocks, refer to Figure 7.6-2.

Refer to the Section 1.7 list for applicable electrical drawings.

        . AMENDMENT 11 JULY 31, 1980                         7.4-14                               I

~ ~ ~

              ~
                                             ~

I CPSES/FSAR { 11. Portion of System Not Required for Safety Refer to item 9 above. { 7.4.1.2.2 Pressurizer Pressure Control QAa, h Pressurizer heater control is provided to maintain the RCS at operating if, pressure following a reactor trip to prevent excessive cooling 3and depressurization of the system. Normal operation is automatic via the proportional and backup heaters, as described in Section 7.7. If, for any reason, the normal pressure-regulating system is not available, the operator will control either of two back-up heater groups in the pressurizer by manual ON-OFF control switches. Air-operated valve 1-8145 in the auxiliary spray flow path, with manual control in the Control Room, provides spray for depressurizing when normal pressurizer spray control is not available. Means for depressurizing the RCS are also available from the pressurizer power-operated relief valves, with ( manual control in the Control Room, as well as from the normal pressurizer pressure spray control, which is active when the pressurizer pressure control system is operating. This pressurizer pressure control system, which also automatically controls the pressurizer heaters, as described in Section 7.7, is non-safety related. The pressurizer safety valves, which prevent the RCS frora exceeding its design pressure, are safety-related but are self-activated and do not require instrumentation, control, and electrical circuitry for operation.

1. Initiating Circuits In normal automatic operation, the pressurizer pressure control system is controlled by pressurizer pressure transmitters. In addition, the backup heater groups are provided with direct manual control dor initat by the operator. Y C

AmMom e S2 7.4-15

p- - -- -- ._

CPSES/FSAR

2. Logic I

See Figures 7.2-1 (sheets 11 and 12) and 7.7-4.

3. Bypass The control circuit provides no bypass of the manual backup heater control function other than maintenance provisions.

4. Interlocks -

All pressurizer heater groups are connected with a low-level switch to cut off power to the heaters on pressurizer low-low water level, thereby preventing heater damage. This interlock is g .MM..A. y~. h.. . . ,.a. u. . . . o. . _. . m._..,.

                                                                                 ... manual control of the pressurizer backup heaters / la                               T="tlk M s h PM.

5. Redundancy '

h g 4_ , n , g j u ,[,,, y--- q { --

p g Two backup heater groups are provided, either of which can provide the necessary energy input to the p = y ;y;t: ffor the i

safe shutdown condition. Either of two power-operated relief valves will perform the depressurization function.

6. Diversity l

t No diversity of control or power supply is provided between the backup heater groups. Diversity of depressurization is provided by power-operated relief valves, safety valves, spray valves, and auxiliary spray valves.

7. Actuated Devices The electrical control equipment for the pressurizer backup

                  . AMENDMENT # M                                                                                i A ;.l n , '.9    1                            7.4-16                                         -

l -....--.. -. -.. ... . _ ___

CPSES/FSAR

     '-                      heater groups, power-operated relief valves, safety valves, spray    '

valves, and auxiliary spray valves are the actuated devices.

8. Supporting Systems Provisions have been included to feed the pressurizer backup heaters from independent Class 1E power supplies. The pressurizer power-operated relief valves and the pressurizer auxiliary spray valve utilize air from the Instrunent Air System and control power from Class IE DC buses.

9. Design Basis Infonnation Section 3, " Design Basis," of IEEE Standard 279 does not apply because the pressurizer pressure control system, except for the <

safety valves, is not @_ecificaiMesignedhsafety 31 system. The design basis is derived from operational objectives. The safety valves are self actuated.

10. Drawings For piping and instrunentation flow diagrams for the pressurizer pressure control system, refer to Sections 5.4.10 and 9.8.4.1.

Figure 7.2-1, sheets 11 and 12, illustrate the logic.

11. Portions of System Not Required for Safety l

Refer to item 9 above. l 7.4.1.3 Shutdown From Outside the Control Room

                                                             %3 A common gontrol goom is provided.am/contains all controls and M

instrunentation necessary for the operation of Units 1 and 2 reactor, turbine-generator, and auxiliary and emergency systems under nonnal or (. AMENDMENT-4t 31 7.4-17 21' h3:_- ::--- _ - _ . - = - - - - -

                                                                 ' - - -- - - ~   ~   ~ - ~ '

CPSES/FSAR accident conditions. Sufficient radiation shielding, containnent integrity, missile protection and habitability provisions are provided to pennit access, exit, and continued occupancy of tt.e control room for the duration of accident conditions such that aggregate radiation exposure to personnel would be below that specified by 10CFR50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 19. , QAno4 %h M bh Consideringthedetailedstationdeqign provisions to ensure continuous g gontrol poom access, it is unlikelyfthat the necessity could arise for evacuation of the Control Room. Nevertheless, provisions have been F . ade to maintain the reartnr in a safe hot standby condition if access (e.g W llev m o the gontrol poom is lost}.Hot standby is maintained as described in I Section 7.4.1.3.2. Furthennore, cold shutdown can be achieved from outside the Control Room through the use of suitable procedures as described in Section 7.4.1.3.3. 7.4.1.3.1 Design Criteria , In designing for safe reactor shutdown in the event of Control Room evacuation, the following design criteria are aonliad- { m> > y , g ms3up varsm o. p % r qs uIh u .an h W h

1. Access back into the Control Room willgenerallgbe achieved priortotheinitiationofcoldshutdow(however he capability

                                          , for bringing the reactor to cold shutdown conditions exists outside the Control Room through the use of suitable procedures N                           and secondary controlsdaA                E               l N 'I'M' 2.

EQ % 0. CowTnM. P.eem. W CAM.S b Control goom evacuation is initiated for an undefined caus(for exanple, control environnent not habitablqj he event which causes Control Room evacuation does not degrade Control Room equi pnent.

3. Design basis accidents are not assuned to occur simultaneously with control room evacuation. However, loss of offsite power has

AMENDMENT +t- 32 7.4-18

                                   = ::, :=

9 kW W, &. W Y s O"TM Q N' . a @ m yJa A: FhL M , Le _ s_ h h . BQ /M S AJdeum. Po,a q Ca3Aa.S M(c.SR) ltevm. Th T% A Q s h Twp h%, W Re v m (c t) Be%. kPt S hTduaw.,P e % Tm T A ft M S h T% ?& . b;*: Sh Te B te & Jt b n ?- haA. (Bsh T4 6 Te a teauA. TEcom, shT4e<~T%e

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CPSES/FSAR been considered, ( g[ Ey Eoss gofo.safetyp system a th.redundancy 6ht hdoes m.notCnA. occ as5% h.3 a result of the event requiring control room evacuation [ Jrll equipment in

^~

the control room and all automatic controls continue to function. (os.4TAa, ShuTde wTQ ?g (STP 6/ The Hot Shutdown Panel (HSP)hcluding essential ecntrc! mounted yy* $ ofi esigned to withstand an SSE with no loss of essential functions. The essential local control stations are also designed to withstand an SSE with no loss of essential functions. 7I The Hot Shutdown Panel is normally untended and is -;f the lk kin "

a. Jem A. smasumn.. 3 m type it:, l eskcd accc;:; doc. a. Opening the - ? door 2will ,

initiate an alarm in the Control Room m SNTQ h Ac h

           %0 w.Ja   thJaA       w auaa h deer          & it AmA+:.nA wun.W         ah Aho&.%   C4Jit.tW demA. h.

9I The Hot Shutdown Panel, located in the switchgear area of the WtAs. shT4 44,, herTad as Safeguards Building, at elevation 831'-6",3 4gs easily accessitile p oaw,. ar to Control Room operators through controlled access areas. h 8' % I w tb. SwbuT"+ Pa=9. 9[ Electrical separation for the Hot Shutdown Panel, follows the same #N QO32.36 criteria as corresponding Control Room equipment. Loss of 0040.23 control or indication for one train for any reason will not Q040.64 affect its redundant counterpart. 10[ Controls (edt thonswramrmyg%a the Hot Shutdown Panel y Tu are im o,.A provided w3hm.withA4a y sciccte TA Bm) switch,that transfers control of Mtch - from the Control Room &g M Q Q032.25 to the Hot Shutdown Panel. Placing this local sc._r switch in Q032.23 the local all. CewDrd con %.v. ama Q032.66 CAW 5 s %'position board bG will, electrically isolate t" m wd. cl., from t e rest of the circuitry, will provide audible and visible indication in the Control Room and will turn W off pc; nica lights on the main control board. li g Each control circuit consists of cables that 1) connect the 11 transfer switches to control switches in the Control Room, 2) Q040.64 ( AME NDMENT-tt al DErr w, ok 7.4-19

CPSES/FSAR D (

    &#      been considered.

[EW pofca. p systema thAredundancy b h0Retrm N goss safety does note.08% occ S h b as a result of the event requiring control room evacuatione .All equipment in the control room and all automatic controls continue to function. N (QW.S h TW ?MUTh The Hot Shutdown Panel (HSP)hncluding essential =tr:M mounted J,y* $ on esigned to withstand an SSE with no Ioss of essential functions. The essential local control stations are also designed to withstand an SSE with no loss of essential functions. 7I The Hot Shutdown Panel is normally untended and is -cf the nelk ka "

a. W ams)asunn.. m t pc ith Icc 6 x x n dec a.S Openingtheaccas/ door)will initiate an alarm in the Control Room. Th SNTQ M M &

           %0 u- 4   tk.4.4hMdeer    auan w<st, ur # A h>.CrM om, od.%      iuksdL h A tKa,      W W.

ee, 9I The Hot Shutdown Panel, located in the switchaear area of the a,,4th. sw%Tg ht,, AuJul as Safeguards Building, at elevation 831'-6",34s= easily accessitile p p at f to Control Room operators through controlled access areas. h m o'-6 3 U { 9[ Mtk.Sh7 h T*^Q PM Electrical separation for the Hot Shutdown Panel ^ follows the same #N criteria as corresponding Control Room equipment. Loss of QO32 36 0040.23 control or indication for one train for any reason will not Q040.64 affect its redundant counterpart. to[ Controls on the Hot Shutdown Panel are provided with a sc? ct^M (d ta+. ww.r~T switch,that tra%%.L ps.TM M M%Jhm. Aat yTm,nsfers control of Mt M - from&g the Control to the Hot Shutdown Panel. W this local Placing g switch in cc._c 0032.25 QO32.23 the local position will electrically isolate the main control QO32.66 board controls from the rest of the circuitry, will provide audible AT and visible indication in the Control Room and will turn l I off pc;eE*ica

                   ;t         lights on the main control board.

lY Each control circuit consists of cables that 1) connect the 11 transfer switches to control switches in the Control Room, 2) Q040.64 i tf i I I AMENDMENT-tt O i DEC:" 5 13, isdu 7.4-19

CPSES/FSAR connect the transfer switches to the HSP-mounted control switches, 3) connect the transfer switches to the pertinent motor control center. Eachofthesecablesareinherentliseparated from their redundant counterpart. In addition, the cables from the HSP to the Control Room and the motor control centers are external to the HSP for almost all of their run. Loss of a control circuit does n'ot mean loss of function since control circuits are available at the HSP for each of the redundant 11 systems. Q040.64 , To prevent a single event (e.g., short-circuit) from affecting both the Control Room controls and the HSP controls, control-circuit fuses are either located in equipment accessible in such an event (e.g., 6.9 KV and 480V switchgear) or separate fuses, located in separate fire zones, are provided for both the Control Room control circuit and the HSP control circuit. The controls and monitoring indicators provided on the Hot Shutdown O Panel and required for hot standby are listed in Table 7.4-1. Instrumentation and controls provided on the Hot Shutdown Panel for operating convenience or cold shutdown are listed in Table 7.4-2. Instrumentation and controls requged for coldhdown are marked with 7 g the letter (c) in M Tables 7.4-1 nd 7.4h&Ms prwdd*A em. (th. sh Tes Pamd. au. A@ A a To.1Aa. 7.4-3. 7.4.1.3.2_ Hot Standby Fron Outside The Control Rnnm Crw Aa.WWd Atb.%J.attutifl camma % on.n 04483 cam. 5mw%b Olh4II Should 'ne control Room become uninhabitable, the reactor will be

b. Shdd***

manually tripped, the nautron level and control rod position will be verified before evacuation takes place. Also, the reactor can be tripped locally at the reactor trip switchgear which is in close proximity to the Hot Shutdown Panel. Sufficient controls are provided outside the Control Room on a Seismic 13 Category I Hot Shutdown Panel (See Tables 7.4-1 and 7.4-2) and other g AMENDMENT'M(3A E C OC:.1 15, lCC 7.4-20

i. T% u m m t p m . G m t 6 r.- h Ats N ve3amga.a3 ea

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CPSES/FSAR I locations to: Achieve prompt hot standby of the reactor Maintain the unit in a safe condition during hot standby. 7.4.1.3.3 Cold Shutdown From Outside the Control Room Cold shutdown can be achieved from outside the Control Room through the use of suitable procedures and by virtue of local control of the systems listed in Section 7.4.1.2. The design bases for the dchievement and naintenance of cold shutdown are as listed in Section 7.4.1.3.1. Insteunentation and controls on the Hot Shutdown Panel, marked with the letter (c) on Tables 7.4-1 and 7.4-2, are utilized to

         ' attain cold shutdown outside the Control Room. In addition, certain local manipulations of controls and initiating devices, as described ow    r             d.

gg , w g , _ca c n. Au,s A 7.4.l.S.'lg hThe sic procedure to established cold shutdown fr he hot standby w hh p* Mst h a cuA s MM ond tion, assuming the Control Room is uninhabi able, is as follows. Q Q .hf" _b o

                                                                                         "~u
                                                                                         . , ,, n a Borate to the cold shutdown boron concentration using boric acid transfer pumps and charging pumps.

Location: Hot Shutdown Panel. 9 QA\Q.99 Available Indications: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) boron concentration detemined by sampling. 3[ Cooldown the RCS by use of the steam generator power-operated atmospheric relief valves. C er = ::,: & 7.4-21

CPSES/FSAR Location: Hot Shutdown Panel and local patch panel or manual handwheel operation.

Available Indications: RCS tenperature, pressurizer [ pressure and level, steam generator level, auxiliary feed.4ater flow and condensate storage tank level. [ Depressurize *Le RCS by throttling the pressurizer spray valve while maintaining pressurizer level. Location: Hot Shutdown Panel and local patch panel Available Indications: pressurizer pressure and level, 9 charging and letdown flow. Q212.84 N At 1900 psig in the RCS, block the low pressurizer pressure safety injection (SI) and the low steamline pressure SI signals.

Location: Cable spreading room Available Indications: Pressurizer pressure indication on the Hot Shutdown Panel. Y At 1000 psig in the RCS, close the accun ator discharge isolation ' valves and rack out the safety injection punp and containnent spray punp breakers. Location: Switchgear and motor control centers.

n 3g Available Indications: Pressurizer pressure indication M the SR. 5b: thyr u , ;_ f ; r;;;. P M . [ At 3500F and 425 psig in the RCS, align the RCS for cooldown with AMENDMENT 11 JULY 31, 1980 7.4-22

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CPSES/FSAR the Residual Heat Removal Systen. 9 Q212.84 Location: Switchgear and Hot Shutdown Panel. oms.~ Available Indications: RCS pressure indication P t h

                              ;'r M ry : = f : r: - RCS tenperature indication on the Hot Shutdown Panel.                  ,s Mb                                                                                   j N 7.4.2      ANALYSIS Hot standby is a stable plant condition that is automatically reached following a reactor trip from power. Additionally, the plant design features pennit the achievenent of cold shutdown as described in Section 7.4.1.2. In the unlikely event that access to the Control Room is restricted, the plant can be safely kept at hot standby by the use of the monitoring indicators and controls listed in Section 7.4.1.3 until the Control Room can be reentered. Furthennore, cold shutdown r      conditions c g be g gyeg { g e th gtgofjn through the j

use of suitable procedures,and by virtug of local control of the gg E' TMw equipnent listed in Section 7.4.1.2, in conjunctggtk instrunentation and controls provided on the Hot Shutdown Panel 3(Tables 7.4-1[ 7.4-2f d '7A-M . The discussions below denonstrate confonnance to applicable General Design Criteria (GDC), Regulatory Guides, and IEEE Standard 279-1971. 32.14 See also Table 7.1-2 for criteria applicable to all systens, Section Q032.67 7.3, and other sections as referred to in the text. 7.4.2.1 General Analysis

1. Confonnance to NRC General Design Criteria

a. GDC 19

( 7.4-23 AMENDMENT 11 h J'J LY 31, l00 ' t

CPSES/FSAR The Hot Shutdown Panel and essential local control stations, discussed in Section 7.4.1.3, provide adequate controls and indications at locations outside the Control Room to maintain the reactor and the reactor coolant system in the safe shutdown condition and to ensure decay heat removal in the event the Control Room must be evacuated.

b. GDC 34 .

Essential controls are provided outside the control room on the Hot Shutdown Panel to ensure adequate decay heat removal from the Reactor Coolant System in the event the main Control Room must be evacuated.

2. Confonnance to NRC Regulatory Guides

a. RG 1.29 -

3 ShT4Y i d,' h The Hot Shutdown Panel 3 and essential local control stations are designed to withstand the effects of a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) without loss of fuggn orgsical damage. The Hot Shutdow'n d essen al local control stations are classified as Seismic Category I components.

b. RG 1.75 Proper separation in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 25 and IEEE Standard 384 is maintained within the Hot Shutdown Panel for Train A, Train B and non-Class IE equipment and wiring.

1

AMENDMENT MN AUCUST 7, n oi 7.4-24

                              ;                                 CPSES/FSAR

(,,. 3. Confomance to IEEE Standard 279-1971 A s&Twsp ?A The Hot Shutdown Panel,, including essential controls and i Q indications, and the essential local control stations are designed to confom to applicable portions of IEEE Standard 279-1971. The control circuits at the Hot Shutdown Panel and essential local control stations are designed such that a single failure will not prevent proper protective action (maintaining safe hot standby) when required. This is accomplished by providing independent Class IE power for the fully redundant controls for the systems required for safe shutdown. ( . 8Ef@lMNT 3 L 7.4-24a A "" ' W^ _ - . - . - . . ~ . . . - . - . . . . . - - . . - . .

CPSES/FSAR l (J- To prevent interaction between the redundant systems, the control channels are wired independently and separated with no electrical connections between redundant control systems. Nonessential control circuits and nonessential monitor circuits are electrically isolated from essential controls and indications to prevent jeopardizing the reliability of the systems required for safe shutdown. 7.4.2.2 Analysis for Shutdown From Outside the Control Room The discussion found in Section 7.4.2.1 is applicable. The additional guides, criteria, and standards listed in Table 7.1-1 apply only to the essential instrumentation and controls required for safe shutdown from outside the control room. Also see the criteria applicability matrix, Table 7.1-2, for further information. 7.4.2.3 Consideration of Selected Plant Contingenci 1 7.4.2.3.1 Loss of Instrument Air Systems Since electric-powered instrumentation is supplied from the Class IE Power System, loss of the Instrument Air System will not degrade instrumentation required for safe shutdown. An analysis of the effect of loss of plant instrument air is provided in Section 9.3.1 and Table 9.3-3. ! r~ u

7.4-25 AUGUST 7, 1981

CPSES/FSAR 7.4.2.3.2 Loss of Cooling Water to Vital Equipment

Cooling water for safety-related systems is supplied by the Safety Chilled Water System (Section 9.4F), the Component Cooling Water System (Section 9.2.2), and the Station Service Water System (Section 9.2.1). Each of these systems is redundant; therefore the loss of any one cooling loop or instruentation associated with that loop will not degrade the safety-related equipment serviced by the system. Also see the analyses presented in Sections 9.4F, 9.2.1 and 9.2.2 and Tables 9.2-1 and 9.2-5. 7.4.2.3.3 Plant Load Rejection, Turbine Trip, and Loss of Offsite Power In the event of loss of offsite power associated with plant load rejection or turbine trip, power for safe shutdown is provided by the onsite Class IE power systems. The description of the power systems is presented in Section 8.3. The standby diesel generators will provide 4 power for the operation of safety-related equipment. The station batteries will provide DC power for the operation of control and instrmentation required to actuate and control essential components. l l AMENDMENT 11 l JULY 31, 1980 7.4-26 l l

CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-1 (SHEET 1 of 4) INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function LI-501A (C) Steam generator 1 - level LI-502 (C) Steam generator 2 - level LI-503A (C) Steam generator 3 - level LI-504A, (C) Steam generator 4 - level PI-514B Steam generator 1 - pressure PI-524B Stean generator 2 - pressure PI-534B Steam generator 3 - pressure PI-544B Steam generator 4 - pressure LI-459B (C) Pressurizer - level LI-460B (C) Pressurizer - level PI-455B (C) Pressurizer - pressure LI-2478B (C) Condensate storage tank - level LI-2479B (C) Condensate storage tank - level MS-24snr (C) Motor-driven AFW pump 01 - local control IH5 - D y50 B N ms%,-ded+A A Ftd ^eW oI - J.M.aA Aw (C) Motor-driven AFW pump 02 - local co ntrol (31 HS-2451C MS-2451B (C) Motor-driven AFW pump 02 - local / remote J/1-APCHIL (C) Charging pump 1 - control Qi3/1- APCHI6 (ci%g4 ^ e 1 - 4a4.d/Aa iG. _ l31 1/2-AFUMZL (C) Chargin'g pump 2 - control 43/1-APCH2L (C) Charging pump 2 - local / remote 1/1 APRAIL (C) Boric acid transfer pump 1 - control Qis/t- APGmL (cT Bm mA %v w a (.t.c.a.0/M 134 1/2-APBA2L ~ (C) Boric acid trantier pump 2 - contro (C) - Required for Cold shutdown AmWDfnENT 31

4

l l

I CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-1 1 (SHEET 2 of 4) INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL ' LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function i 43/1-APBA2L (C) Boric acid transfer pump 2 - local / remote E -4250C (C) SSW pump 01 - local / control n QS 99509 (c4 ssW p + 0t - MM /MT In Hs-ezolu (c) ssW pump 2 - local control HS-4251B (C) SSW pump 2 - local / remote

                            -4518C        -

(C) CCW oumo 01 - local contrcl HS- 4 5~l 8 8 hs-so19C (Q ccQ W 01 (c) cuw pump Ad /Aaw?m Y 2 - local control jQ HS-4519B (C) CCW pump 2 - local / remote 43/1-456FT (F) Pressurizer PORV remote local 1/1-456FL (F) Pressurizer PORV local control 1-HS-2456FT (F) Motor-driven AFWP-1/ recirculation valve local control 1-HS-4286FL (F) SSW pump-1 discharge valve local control l 1-HS-4393FL (F) Diesel generator-A service water control valve local control 1-HS-4699FL (F) CCW to Reactor Coolant pump coolers isolation valve local control 1-HS-4701FL (F) RCP motor air and lube oil coolers CCW return header isolation valve i 1-HS-4514FL (F) CCW heat exchanger to non-safety loop-1 control valve local control 1-HS-4524FL (F) Non-safety loop return to CCW header isolation valve local control (C) - Required for Cold Shutdown (F) - Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown SW1EOD00E4T 39L

l CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-1 (SHEET 3 of 4) INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function 1-HS-452SFL (F) CCW to non-safety loop isolation valve local control 1/1-8106FL (F) Charging pumps to Reactor Coolant System isolation valve local control 1/1-8801AF (F) Charging pumps to Reactor Coolant System SIS isolation valve local control 43/1-8153FT (F) Reactor Coolant System excess let-down valve remote local 1/1-8153FL (F) Reactor Coolant System excess let-32 down valve local control 1/1-8110FL (F) Charging pump miniflow isolation valve local control 1/1-APRHIL (F) RER pump-1 local control 1/1-8701AF (F) RHR loop-1 inlet isolation valve local control 1/1-8701BF (F) RHR Loop-2 inlet isolation valve local control 1-HS-2333FL (F) Main Steam loop-1 isolation and bypass valvas local control 1-HS-2334FL (F) Main Steam loop-2 isolation and bypass valves local control 1-HS-2335FL (F) Main Steam loop-3 isolation and bypass valves local control 1-HS-2336FL (F) Main Steam loop-4 isolation and bypass valves local control i (F) - Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown QMEADmD4T SQL

CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-1 (SHEET 4 of 4) INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function 1/1-455AFL (F) Pressurizer power relief valve local control 1-HS-6700FL (F) Chilled water recirculation pump 5 local control CS/BT-1EA1L (F) Tie breaker BT-1EA1 local control CS/TIEBlL (F) Bus 1EA1 transfer TIEB1 feeder gQ breaker local control ~ CS/IEB1-IL (F) Incoming breaker IEB1-1 local control CS/TIEB3L (F) Bus 1EA1 transfer T1EB3 'cader - breaker local control CS/IEP3-IL (F) Incoming breaker IEB3-1 local control CS/BT-1EB13L (F) Tie breaker BT-1EB13 local control

Hand / Auto station with built-in transfer device to block control room signal and initiate control room local override alarm SSW - Station Service Water System CCW - Component Cooling Water System AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater System (F) - Added for Fire, Protection - Alternate Shutdown g(nENDmEh)T N

CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-2 (SHEET 1 OF 6) OTHER INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL 1 Identification Function FK-121A (C) Pressurizer Level Control Valve - Valve Control (Charging Flow Control) l 1/2-8149AL- -(C) Letdown valve 8149A - enntrol (Wi - T L 4 9 6 L-1/1-8149BL (CT h uo.144. St4% (C) Letaown valva R149B

                                                                &  4/ M @J contrn1 Igg d

(san - zm ui- (cLe a s 49e %/MJ l 32 3/1-814WCL (L)_ Letdown Valve R149C - controf [O/l-814%C.L- (CT__h th SI 49 C- der-e.A e /AA*CeIZ-l 32. SK-2452B* Turbine-criven arn pump - speec control SI-2452B Turbine-driven AFW pump - speed indication HS-2452C Turbine-driven AFW eumn - Inr=1 nnn wn 1 CHS-Q45LB HS-zeszt Th - om A FAFWWpump Turbine-criven N -- ).nead /M) local conuvA l32, l HS-2452D Turbine-driven AFW pump - local / remote FK-2459B* Turbine-driven AFW pump to steam generator 1-valve control FK-2453C* (C) Motor-driven AFW pump 01 to steam generator 1-valve control FK-2460B* Turbine-driven AFW pump to steam generator 2-valve control ' FK-2453D* (C) Motor-driven AFW pump 01 to steam generator 1-valve control FK-2461B* Turbine-driven AFW pump to steam generator 3-valve control FK-2454C* (C) Motor-driven AFW pump 02 to steam generator 3-valve control FK-2462B* Turbine-driven AFW pump to steam generator 4-valve control l FK-2454D* (C) Motor-driven AFW pump 02 to steam generator 4-(C) Required for Cold Shutdown ggg g i ___ _ i '"T

CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-2 (SHEET 2 OF 6) OTHER INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function valve control 1 /1 -PCPRIL Pressurizer heater backup - Group A contrni

  @h- PC Pit.tL        ? q h W . c, % A h u.0/ ha. d                              l%7 1/1-PCPR2L          Fressurizer heater backup - Group B control 43/1-PCPR2L         Pressurizer heater backup       -

Group B local / remote RCS (C) Reactor Coolant System Wide-Range Temperature NI-31F NIS Source-Range Indication NI-32F NIS Source-Range Indication FI-121B (C) Charging Pump to CVCS Charging and RCP Seals - Flow FI-183B Boric Acid Filter Recovery Line - Flow FI-132B (C) Letdown - flow 1/1-8104L Emergency boration valve - control 43/1-8104L Emergency boration valve transfer - local / remote 1/1-TCV-129L Letdown divert valve TCV-129 - contra' - A3/l -TcV- t29 L. h eut u.a.L>a.TcV-129 tea.40 /M I31 HS-5405C Containment recirculation fan 01 - contro (HS54ofG W As euw)% % on - A*4.a.D /An=4tk. [l ]31 HS-5409B Containment recirculation tan Uz - control BS-5409C Containment recirculation fan 02 - local / remote HS-5413C Containment recirculation fan 03 - contral Ees sma ch esw m w es- ; <4.p/ a f 132 PS-5417C ~Contalnme:m. recirculation Ian us - control

BS-5417B Containment recirculation fan 04 - local / remote FI-2463D (C) AFW to steam generator 1 - flow FI-2463B (C) AFW to steam generator 1 - flow (C) Required for Cold Shutdown

O CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-2 (SHEET 3 OF 6) OTHER INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS LCCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function FI-2464D (C) AFW to steam generator 2 - flow FI-2464B (C) AFW to steam generator 2 - flow FI-2465D (C) AFW to steam generator 3 - flow FI-2465B (C) AFW to steam generator 3 - flow FI-2466D (C) AFW to steam generator 4 - flow FI-2466B (C) AFW to steam generator 4 - flow PI-2477B Turbine-driven AFW pump - suction pressure PI-2455B Turbine-driven AFW pump - discharge pressure PI-2475B Motor-driven AFW pump 01 - suction pressure PI-2453B Motor-driven AFW pump 01 - discharge pressure PI-2476B Motor-driven AFW pump 02 - suction pressure PI-2454B Motor-driven AFW pump 02 - discharge pressure FI-425BB (C) SSW train A - flow FI-4259B (C) SSW train B - flow PI-4252B SSW pump 01 - discharge pressure PI-4253B SSW pump 2 - discharge pressure V-1EAl-L 6900-V bus IEA1 - voltage F-1EAl-L 6900-V bus IEA1 - frequency A-1EAl-1L 6900-V bus IEA1, preferred offsite source - amperes A-1EG1-L 6900-V bus IEA1, onsite source - amperes A-1EAl-2L 6900-V bus IEA1, alternate offsite source - amperes (C) Required for Cold Shutdown _ - .s ,.,s . . . - - - . . _ . _ _ . _ _

CPSES/ESAR TABLE 7.4-2 (SHEET 4 OF 6) OTHER INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function CS-1EAl-IL 6900-V bus IEA1, preferred offsite source breaker-control switch CS-1EGI-L 6900-V bus 1EA1, o'nsite source breaker - control switch CS-1EAl-2L 6900-V bus IEA1, alternate offsite source breaker - control switch V-1EA2-L 6900-V bus 1EA2 - voltage F-1EA2-L 6900-V bus 1EA2 - frequency A-1EA2-2L 6900-V bus 1EA2, alternate offsite source - amperes A-1EG2-L 6900-V bus IEA2, onsite source - amperes A-1EA2-1L 6900-V gus IEA2. creferred_offsite sourca - ' y['Mi- 8 g A amperes) [g,'$ Q8M', eggpMQN# g

 % . o ra i-1_           xMoo V be.A irm i & p m W.4 W.

cs-1sAz-2L 6900-V ous lEAZ, alternate-offsite source'~ l breaker - selector switch CS-1EG2-L 6900-V bus IEA2, onsite source breaker

                     - control switch CS-1EA2-1L          6900-V Bus IEA2, preferred offsite source breaker - control switch 43-1EA2-2           6900-V bus IEA2, alternate offsite source breaker - selecter switch 43-1EG2             6900-V bus 1Eh2, onsite source breaker
                     - selector switch 43-1EA2-1           6900-V bus 1EA2, preferred offsite source breaker - selector switch

1 CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-2 (SHEET 5 OF 6) EHER INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function 1-2L-2476B Motor-driven AFWP-2 suction pressure status light - 1-2L-2454C Motor-driven AFWP-2 discharge to SG-3 control valve 1-ZL-2454D Motor-driven AFWP-2 discharge to SG-4 control valve 1-2L-2459B Turbine-driven AFWP discharge to SG-1 control valve 1-2L-2460B Turbine-driven AFWP discharge to SG-2 control valve 1-ZL-2453C Motor-driven AFWP-1 discharge to SG-1 control valve SQL l 1-ZL-2475B Motor-driven AFWP-1 suction pressure j status light 1 1-ZL-2453D Motor-driven AFWP-1 discharge to SG-2 control valve 1-ZL 2461B Turbine-driven AFWP discharge to SG-3 control valve 1-2L-2462B Turbine-driven AFWP discharge to SG-4 control valve ZL-455 CF (F) Pressurizer spray valve ZL-455 BF (F) Pressurizer spray valve ZL-PCPX 1F (F) RCP-1 running ZL-PCPX 2F (F) RCP-2 running ZL-PCPX 3F (F) RCP-3 running ZL-PCPX 4F (F) RCP-4 running (F) Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown ArndDffnET3T U

t CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-2 (SHEET 6 OF 6) OTHER INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function TR-413F/423F (F) Reactor Coolant System loop-l & 2 wide range temperature TR-433F/443F (F) Reactor Coolant System loop-3 & 4 wide range temperature HS-5180F (F) Steam generator blowdown drains MLB-63 (F) Train B shutdown valves HC-2325 (F) SG-1 PORV HC-2326 (F) SG-2 PORV HC-2327 (F) SG-3 PORV HC-2328 (F) SG-4 PORV ( HC-455C (F) Pressurizer spray valve HC-606 (F) RHR discharge control valve HC-618 (F) RHR minimum flow valve Hand / Auto station with built-in transfer device to block control room signal and initiate control room local override alarm SSW - Station Service Water System CCW - Component Cooling Water System AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater System (F) - Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown AmsdDrnst3T %

CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-3 (SHEET 1 of 4) TRANSFER SWITCHES LOCATED ON SHUTDOWN TRANSFER PANEL (STP) Identification Function HS-2450B (b) Motor-drivenAFWP-1remotelocal HS-2453AF (F) Motor-driven AFWP-1 to SG-1 control valve remote local HS-2453BF (F) Motor-driven AFWP-1 to SG-2 control valve remote local HS-2456FT (F) Motor-driven AFWP-1 recirculation valve remote local 43/1-121-FT (F) Pressurizer level control valve remote local HS-4250B ()SSWpump-1remotelocal HS-4286FT (F) SSW pump-1 discharge valve remote local HS-4393FT (F) Diesel generator-A service water control valve remote local 3Q HS-4699FT (F) CCW to Reactor Coolant pump coolers isolation valve remote local HS-4701FT (F) RCP motor air and lube oil coolers CCW return header isolation valve remote

local HS-4518B (,C)CCWpump-1remotelocal HS-4514FT (F) CCW heat exchanger to non-safety loop-1 control valve remote local HS-4524FT (F) Non-safety loop return to CCW header isolation valve remote local l

l HS-4526FT (F) CCW to non-safety loop isolation valve remote local HS-5405B Containment recirculation fan 01 remote local (F) Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown AmNbmarr p _. r .-. . . _ __ . _- _-

e t CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-3 (SHEET 2 of 4) I i TRANSFER SWITCHES LOCATED ON SHUTDOWN I TRANSFER PANEL (STP) Identification Function 43/1-APCHIL (CD Centrifugal charging pump-1 remote local 43/1-APBAIL (C)) Boric acid transfer pump-1 remote local HS-5413B Containment recirculation fan 03 remote local 43/1-8106FT (F) Charging pumps to Reactor Coolant System isolation valve remote local 43/1-8801AF (F) Charging pumps to Reactor Coolant System SIS isolation valve remote local 43/1-8149AL (,C.) CVCS letdown orifice isolation valve remote local 43/1-8149BL (CC)remote CVCS local letdown orifice isolation valve 3[1 43/1-8149CL ($.)CVCSletdownorificeisolationvalve remote local 43/1-8110FT (F) Charging pump miniflow isolation valve remote local i 43/1-APRH1F (F) RHR pump-1 remote local 43/1-8701AF (F) RHR loop 1 inlet isolation valve remote local 43/1-8701BF (F) RHR loop 2 inlet isolation valve remote local HS-2452B Turbine-driven AFWP steam supply header #1 valve remote local 43/1-TCV-129 L Letdown to demineralizer or volume control tank remote local HS-2333FT (F) Main Steam loop 1 isolation and bypass valves remote local (F) Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown. AmsemEW N

e e CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-3 (SHEET 3 of 4) TRANSFER SWITCHES LOCATED ON SHUTDOWN TRANSFER PANEL (STP) Identification Function HS-2334FT (F) Main Steam loop 2 isolation and bypass valves remote local HS-2335FT (F) Main Steam loop 3 isolation and bypass valves remote local HS-2336FT (F) Main Steam loop 4 isolation and bypass valves remote local 43/1-455 AFT (F) Pressurizer power relief valve remote local 43/1-PCPRIL Pressurizer heater backup group-A remote local HS-XT (F) Water chiller control remote local HS-6700FT (F) Chilled water recirculation pump-5 remote 3;[ local 43/IEAl-1 Incoming breaker 1EAl-1 remote local 43/IEAl-2 Incoming breaker 1EAl-2 remote local 43/1EG1 Diesel generator breaker 1EG1 remote local 43/BT-1EA1 (F) Tie breaker BT-1EA1 remote local 43/TIEB1 (F) Bus 1EA1 transfer T1EB1 feeder breaker remote local (F) Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown

                                                 $(Y\END U\@T U

I e CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-3 (SHEET 4 of 4) TRANSFER SWITCHES LOCATED ON SHUTDOWN TRANSFER PANEL (STP) i Identification Function 43/1EB1-1 (F) Incoming breaker IEB1-1 remote local 43/TIEB3 (F) Bus 1EAI transfer'1EB3 feeder breaker remote local 43/1EB3-1 (F) Incoming breaker 1EB3-1 remote local 43/BT-1EB13 (F) Tie breaker BT-1EB13 remote local 3Ek l l

Hand / Auto station with built-in transfer device to block control room signal and initiate control room local override alarm SSW - Station Service Water System CCW - Component Cooling Water System AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater System (F) Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown A(n@ MN N

ATTACHMENT B FSAR SECTION 9.5 (SELECTED PAGES) MARKED UP i i t.

i

                             ,                          CPSES/FSAR not labeled as a fire-rated door because of the wicket.

Since the fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlled occupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the environment or other areas of the plant due to a fire. l

9. Fire Area 9 The safety-related essential systems and components located in Fire Area 9 are:

a. Safety-related cables, Train A

b. Safety-related cables, Train B

c. 6.9-kV and 480-V switchgear, Train A

d. Motor control center, Train A -

e. Fan coil units, Train A

f. Electrical penetration assemblies, Train A 30.i g. s m T % w .,Ts e Fire Area 9, shown on Figure 9.5-2, is located on elevation 810 f t 6 in. of the Safeguards Building Unit 1. The only mechanical components in this area are two HVAC fan coil units located in a one-foot-thick reinforced concrete enclosure. The enclosure is not rated because the only combustible materials in the area are the cables serving the fan coil units.

As shown on Figure 9.5-38, the combustible loading for this area is classified a medium hazard which limits the maximum fire duration to less than 90 minutes, assuming all combustible AMENDMENT 13 31 9.5-24 Af"':L 7, != -

CPSES/FSAR material (electrical c[ble jacket and insulation material) in the ._ (.s area burns. This assumption is conservative, because the cable is self-extinguishing, fire retardant, and nonpropagating in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. Fire detectors are provided in this area to enable rapid fire detection. Figure 9.5-38 defines the number and type of fire detectors.[n

                                            .          this a D Where required by section 9.5.1.2.3.9, Train B essential safety-related cabling " thf: e-e #is_ protected by a one-hour                               m rated fire barrier._fA M M O 9 f'I N'b E                '

[ g & ' % m m k ar u s k % k s. d.w

                                                                                                        % reV@ % h i n d cakh. N )

a. gna.- j A portion of this fire area is protected by Gn aut6matic_gt-piliDd- f sprinkler system, designed to provide general area coverage. 6 e M AIEA pret;;ted ;r;Iand dwater spray densit($8' described M Figures 9.5-2 and 9.5-38. Tha. % n n.,cYe- c.cINoILT.AEM- -M 64am eJa44.

A" M.

M te :ti: eg.:..U e.a, d;;i; ed t: ;ppi, .etc. directi, un sable A tr:y, :re 31en < n e +=11 o a whero +horo <e

'igh j,n,; i, J ,g, ;, i r*1=+ad e*hla +reye, :: d: :: rit J ... . a "v.. 0.5.1.2.3.a. Fig.. ; t 9.5 2 :he:: th; lecette..s of there :pr"'Ae-r.

Hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided as a backup

) to the sprinkler systems. cAv 1ae -.-

                                               --nvided (nr electriem1 enninmant where discharop nf }

! i.1 5,5 tea, could d g; ::cr.t al e=fa+y re1=+ad *- alectrice' equip cr.t. A fire in this area will effect only Train A electrical equipment and cabling. The plant can be safely shutdown using the redundant safety train equipment. . AMENDMENT # 3 9.5-25 e n!'. 7, 1"*1

CPSES/FSAR J The rated fire barriers which physically separate Fire Area 9 from adjacent areas are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete walls and floor with approved doors, fire dampers, and i penetration seals of equivalent rating. As stated in Subsection 1 9.5.1.3.1, Item 8, door S-29c is designed and constructed to UL requirements, but is not labeled as a fire door because of a manway wicket in the door. The wicket is designed and constructed to the same requirements as door S-29c. The location of the door with respect to the combustible material in the area does not present a potential hazard to the adjacent area. Stairwell S-5, located in the corner of Fire Area 9, is enclosed in a two-hour rated fire barrier. See section 9.5.1.5.3.3 for further description. Since the fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlled occupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the environment or other areas of the plant due to a fire.

')

10. Fire Area 10 The safety-related essential systems and components located in Fire Area 10 are:

l :. Diesel generator, Train A l

b. Diesel generator, instrumentation and control equipment and cables, Train A

c. Diesel generator, Jacket water and lube oil coolers, Train A

d. Diesel generator, Air receivers, air dryers, air intake filters, compressors and after coolers, Train A

AMEN 0 MENT 17 9.5-26 APRIL 7, 1981 l

_n - -. CPSES/FSAR The rated fire barriers which physic 611y separate Fire Area 15 i from adjacent fire areas are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete walls and floors with approved fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals of equivalent rating. Since the fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlled occupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the environment or other areas of the plant due to a fire.

18. Fire Area 16

The safety-related essential sy'.tems and components located in Fire Area 16 are:

a. Hot shutdown panel, Trains A and B . ,g 3Q{ (Su.S 4 0 4.l.3 4 p + & $43

b. Safety-related cables, Train A and B Q

Fire Area 16, shown on Figure 9.5-3, is located on elevation 831 f t 6 in. of the Safeguards Building Unit 1. Fire Area 16 also contains non-safety related electrical equipment, penetrations and cables es well as the equipment listed above. The cables routed in this area are predominantly control and instrumentation. They are self-extinguishing, fire retardant, and nonpropagating in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. The hot shutdown panel is a walk-in type metal enclosure provided with entrance doors. The cables supplying the train A portion of the hot shutdown panel enter the panel via conduits from the area .. - below (fire area 9) and the cables supplying the train B portion . of the hot shutdown panel enter the panel via conduits from this AMENDMENT 17 3 APRIL 7, 1981 ~

CPSES/FSAR 1 area (area 16). Thus, train A and B cable entries are physically

k. separated from each other.

As shown on Figure 9.5-38, the combustible loading for this area is classified a medium hazard, which limits the maximum fire duration to less than 60 minutes, astuming all combustible material (electrical cable jacket and insulation material) in the area burns. This assumption is conservative, because the cable is self-extinguishing, fire retardant, and nonpropagating in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. h *B" M

      ^ # ire detectors o4 w whatL% are provided.in th area to enable rapid fire detection,. Figure 9.5- 8 define the number and type of fire detectors in this area.

e required by section 9.5.1.2.3.9, one train of essential i safety-related cabling is protected by a one-hour rated fire barrier. ( - .

o. pu. h A portion of this fire area is prot'cted by r aut^ +;f: eet pipet sprinkler system designed to provide general area coverage.

Figure 9.5-3 and 9.5-38 describe the protected area and the water spray density of the sprinkler system. Hose stations and portable extinguishers are also provided as a backup to the sprinkler system. Shields are provided for electrical equipment where discharge of a sprinkler system could damage safety-related essential N electrical equipment. n alternate shutdown system is provided which ensures that at least one train of essential safety-related equipment will be rational following a fire in this area. I l AMENDMENT 17 N .5-39 a ng 19 p NN m m .,.e.# kO p c a a e _ h Mse . a-> sm l l Q % t.14 ,

CPSES/FSAR The rated physical barriers which physically separate Fire Area , 16 from adjoining areas of the plant are constructed of poured, I reinforced concrete with doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals of an equivalent rating. Stairwell S-5, located in the corner of Fire Area 16, is enclosed in a two-hour rated barrier, as described in section 9.5.1.5.3. This stairwell serves as a means of and access for Fire Area 16. Since the fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlled occupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the environment or other areas of the plant due to a fire.

19. Fire Area 144 The safety-related essential systems and components located in Fire Area 144 are:

a. Safety-related piping and cables, Train A D3

b. Safety-related piping and cables, Train B

            . Fire area 144, shown on Figure 9.5-3 is located on elevation 831 ft. 6 in. of the Safeguards Building, Unit 1. This area is a piping penetration area for non-radioactive piping.

As shown on figure 9.5-38, the combustible loading for Fire Area 144 is classified a light hazard which limits the maximum fire duration to less than 30 minutes, assuming all combustible material (electrical cable jackets and insulation) in the area burns. This assumption is conservative, because the cable is self-extinguishing, fire retardant, and nonpropagating in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. - l AMENDMENT 17 APRIL 7, 1981 9.5-40 l-.-----. -

CPSES/FSAR 830 ft 0 in. There are no combustible materials in the area.

As shown on Figure 9.5-39, the combustible loading for this area is classified a low hazard. A fire in this area does not affect the safe shutdown of the plant. The rated fire barriers which physically separate Fire Area 62 from adjacent plant areas are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete walls rated at two hours with approved fire doors and dampers of equivalent rating. Where the stairwell connects with a medium hazard area, three-hour rated fire doors are provided to maintain the integrity cf the adjacent area fire barrier. The stairwell rating is in accordance with NFPA and OSHA requirements for stairwell enclosures.

21. Fire Area 63 The safety-related essential equipment and components located in -

this fire area are:

a. Safety-related cables, Unit 2, Trains A and B.

b. Temination cabinents at.d distribution panelboards, Unit 2 Trains A and B.

I Fire Area 63, shown on Figure 9.5-14, is located at elevation 807 ft 0 in, of the Electrical and Control Building. This fire area is the Unit ? Cable Spreading Room. There is no mechanical equipment located in this area. In addition to the cables listed above, there are non-safety-related cables extending through this ; area. All cables in this area are self-extinguishing, fire retardant, and nonpropagating, in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. - P . l AMENDMENT 17 9.5-102 3 APRIL 7, 1981 I I i.--.....----- .

CPSES/FSAR , ,. As shown on Figure 9.5-39, the combustible loading for this area

k. . is classified a high hazard. The method of assigning a fire ,

duration to a fire in this area is inappropriate as a fire involving IEEE 383-1974 qualified cables would propagate very slowly, if at all. Th: i;h r.t ::r. 5: ::fely :hstdc Y. jn the event ai dui;r.I5::i fire occurs in this fire area )dternate shutdown systems and gQ procedures are provided to ensure safe shutdown independent of, , the Cable Spreading Room. Sra. S M 7.4. la.4 pa. dLu>g+t Fire detectors are provided throughout this area to enable rapid fire detectior, and to actuate the primary fire suppression system. Figure 9.5-39 defines the number and type of fire detectors in this area. This fire area is provided with a total-flooding-automatically actuated Halon system. Section 9.5.1.4.2.2 describes the design I of the Halon fire suppression systems. As a backup to the Halon system, the fire area is protected by an automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system, designed to provide general area coverage. Figure 9.5-39 defines the sprinkler system design , density. In addition, hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided for extinguishment of small fires. A minimum height of seven feet is maintained between the bottom of the lowest tray and the floor of the area to faciliate manual fire fighting. Shields are provided for electrical equipment where discharge of a sprinkler system could damage essential safety-related electrical equipment. The three-hour rated fire barriers which physically separate Fire Area 63 from the adjacent plant areas are constructed of poured, 9.5-103 AMENDMENT.5f N APRIL 7, 1981

CPSES/FSAR reinforced concrete with approved fire doors, dampers, and

-)

penetration seals of equivalent rating. The fire dampers are equipped with automatic Halon override to ensure closure upon actuation of the fixed Halon system. A fire in this area will not result in a radiation release because there are no radioactive materials in the area. The area is considered an uncontrolled, unrestricted access area.

22. Fire Area 64 The safety-related essential equipment and components located in this fire area are:

a. Safety-related cables, Unit 1, Trains A and B

b. Termination cabinents and distribution panelboards, Unit 1, Trains A and B. -

y) Shown on Figure 9.5-14, Fire Area 64 is located at elevation 807 ft 0 in. of the Electrical and Control Building. This fire area is the Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room. There is no mechanical equipment located in this area. In addition to the cables listed above, there are non-safety-related cables extending through this area. All cables in this area are self-extinguishing, fire l retardant and nonpropagating, in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. . As shown on Figure 9.5-39, the combustible loading for this area is classified a high hazard. The method of assigning a fire l duration to a fire in this area is inappropriate, as a fire involving IEEE 383-1974 qualified cable would propagate very sl owly, i f at all . - I

AMENDMENT 17 APRIL 7, 1981 9.5-1 04

                                                                                                                        --            -- -. - -1
                     - - - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - , - . -              --.-----,.e.w.em--   - - - - ---yy   9,    -3._ o5-

CPSES/FSAR (. The plant. c , L: ::f:1,, anu 1. jn the event a 4 :!;r, 5 :3.. fi re occurs in this fire areahternateJ#iutdown Mstems and frocedures are provided to ensure safe shutdown independent of the g Cable Spreading Room. Sta S AM. 7 4 l.SM % t. Wh8~s b ' Fire detectors are provided throughout this area to enable rapid fire detection, and to actuate the primary Fire Suppression System. Figure 9.5-39 defines the number and type of fire detectors in this area. This fire area is provided with a total-flooding-automatically-actuated Halon sytem. Section 9.5.1.4.2.2 described the design o'f the Halon fire suppression systems. As a backup to the Halon system, the fire area is protected by an automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system, designed to provide general area coverage. Figure 9.5-39 defines the sprinkler system design densi ty. In addition, hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided in this area for extinguishment of small fires. A minimum height of seven feet is maintained between the bottom of the lowest tray and the floor of the area to facilitate manual l fire fighting. Shields are provided for electrical equipment where discharge of a i sprinkler system could damage essential safety-related electrical equipment. t The three-hour rated fire barriers which physcially separate Fire Area 64 from the adjacent plant areas are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete with approved fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals of equivalent rating. The fire dampers are . equipped with automatic Halon everrides to ensure closure upon .

   ,,            actuation of the fixed Halon system.

A. - AMENDMENT 3:2O 9.5-105 APRIL 7. 1981

i l CPSES/FSAR i A fire in this area will not result in a radiation release because there are no radioactive materials in the area. The area is considered an uncontrolled, unrestricted access area. l

23. Fire Area 65 Fire Area 65 is the Control Room complex. This area encompasses the main control consoles, the auxiliary relay panels, the production supervisors area, the locker room and lavatory, the kitchen area, and the observation area. Shown on Figures 9.5-15, 9.5-18 and 9.5-19, the control room complex on elevations 830 ft 0 in. and 840 ft 6 in. and is common to both units. Three-hour fire rated physical separation is maintained between this area and adjacent plant areas.

As shown on Figure 9.5-39, the combustible loading for Fire Area 65 is classified a light hazard which limits the maximum fire .g duration to less than 30 minutes. Fire detectors are provided at the following locations in this

fire area to enable rapid fire detection

(

a. Inside each main control console

b. Below the false ceiling in the main console area.

c. Below the false ceiling in the auxiliary relay panel area.

d. Above the false ceiling wherever cabling is routed.

e. In the locker room, kitchen, and production supervisors office.

f. In the control raom observation area.

APRIL 21, 1981 9.5-106 e-_---------- _ - - - - - - - - _ - . - - - - - . --- --. .

CPSES/FSAR

g. In the ventilation supply and return ductwork.

Hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided in this fire area for fire extinguishment. Figures 9.5-15 and 9.5-39 defines the type and location of the fire extinguishing equipment in the control room. The production supervisor's office, the kitchen area, and the locker room and lavatory are separated from the main control console area by concrete walls containing windows. Rated fire barriers are not required at these locations because of' the low amount of combustible material present. A fire outside of Fire Area 65 will not affect the habitability of the control room. Th; pio..t h aphla M he*q nf;b :htd^ n the event that a ( d=eir h : Y fire occurs in this fire area [3 Alternate,6hutdown systems and procedures are provided to ensure safe shutdown p independant of the Control Room. Saa. wN 7. 4.1.3.4 p m.

                 @ gh gh, The rated fire barriers which separate this area from other areas of the plant are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete or gypsum dry walls with approved fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals of equivalent rating.

A fire in this area will not result in a radiation release because there are no radioactive materials in this area. The area is considered an uncontrolled, unrestricted access area.

24. Fire Area 66 There are no safety-related systems and components located in -

Fire Area 66. This area contains the Unit 2 computer room. - Shown on Figure 9.5-15, it is located at elevation 830 f t 0 in. (' of the Electrical and Control Building. OmeNDfn#f 3*2. 9.5-107 1

                            ,                             CPSES/FSAR The rated fire barriers which physically separate Fire Area 83
                                                                                           ')

from adjacent areas are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete walls and floors with approved doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals of equivalent rating. The barrier between Fire Areas 83 and 84 includes a manually operated rollup steel door (Door S-29c) with a manway wicket. This door is constructed in accordance with UL requirements for rollup steel doors, but it is not labeled as a fire rated door because of the wicket. See Section 9.5.1.5.3.3 for further description. Since the area fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlled occupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the environment or other areas of the plant due to a fire.

9. Fire Area 84 The safety-related components located in Fire Area 84 are: ,

a. Safety-related cables, Train A

b. Safety-related cables, Train B

c. 6.9-kV and 480-V switchgear, Train A

d. Motor control center, Train A

e. Emergency fan coil units, Train A

f. Electrical penetration assemblies, Train A 3Q I

os. Sb h wT W 9 M gTM 6 Fire Area 84, shown on Figure 9.5-8, is located on elevation 810 ft 6 in. of the Safeguards Building Unit 2. The only mechanical components in this area are two HVAC emergency fan coil units

9.5-136 AMENDMENT #9 APRIL 7, 1981 i

l CPSES/FSAR located in a one-foot-thick reinforced concrete enclosure. The (. - enclosure is not rated because the only combustible materials in the arec are the cables serving the fan coil units. As shown on Figure 9.5-40, the combustible loading for this area is classified as a medium hazard which limits the maximum fire duration to less than 90 minutes, assuming all combustible material (electrical cable jacket and insulation material) in the area burns. The assumption is conservative because the cele is self-extinguishing, fire-retardant, and nonpropagating in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. - Fire detectors are provided to enable rapid fire detection. Figure 9.5-40 defines the number and type of fire detectors in this area. Where required by Section 9.5.1.2.3.9, safety-related Train B cabling in this area is protected by a one-hour rated fire l barrier. o, psa,. M . A portion of this fire area is protected by 3" "'+ m th g t 7,',,; sprinkler system, designed to provide general area coverage. Automatic sprinklers designed to apply water directly on cable trays are also installed where there is a high density of safety-related cable trays, as described in,Section 9.5.1.2.3.8. h r@ h u h s A. tr,- @ 4titutu. S p-Naw h W H a u A T%Wd.. Hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided as a backup to the fixed sprinkler systems. Shields are provided over electrical equipment where discharge of sprinkler system could damage safety-electrical equipment. l Based on the above considerations, a fire in this area will - affect only the Train A safety-related cables in the area. The 9.5-137 AMENDMENT 17 APRIL 7, 1981 l

      . . ~  '* : r ~ ~ r

CPSES/FSAR i redundant safety train equipment is available to safely shutdown the plant. The rated fire barriers which physically separate Fire Area 64 from adjacent areas are constructed of poured, reinforced ' concrete walls and floor with approved doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals of equivalent rating. As stated in Subsection 9.5.1.3.1, Item 8 Door S-29c is designed and constructed to UL requirements but is not labeled as a fire door because of the wicket. The location of the door with respect to the combustible material in the area does not present a potential hazard to the adjacent area. Stairwell S-5, located in the corner of Fire Area 84, is enclosed in a two-hour rate.d fire barrier. See Section 9.5.1.5.3.3 for further description. ' Since the fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlled, occupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the envirornent er other areas of the plant due to a fire. U ,'

10. Fire Area 85 The safety-related components located in Fire Area 85 are:

a. Diesel generator, Train A

b. Diesel generator instrumentation and control equipment and cables, Train A

c. Diesel generator jacket water and lube oil coolers, Train A

d. Diesel generator air receivers, air dryers, air intake filters, compressors and after coolers Train A '

9.5-138

AMEN & LENT 17 APRIL 7, 1981

CPSES/FSAR Since the fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire - duration, and since the area is a controlled occupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the environEent or other areas of the plant due to a fire.

18. Fire Area 91 The safety-related components located in Fire Area 91 are:

a. Hot shutdown panel, Trains A and B 3M (Sam M 7*l34 5 ^"* W

b. Safety-related cables, Train A arj B Fire Area 91, shown on Figure 9.5-9, is located'on elevation 831 ft 6 in. of the Safeguards Building Unit 2. Fire Area 91, contains non-safety-related electrical equipment and cables as well as the equipment listed above.

The hot shutdown panel is a walk-in type metal enclosure provided with entrance doors. The cables supplying the train A portion of the hot shutdown panel enter the panel via conduits from the area ' below (Fire Area 84) and the cables supplying the train B portion of the hot shutdown panel enter the panel via conduits from this area (Area 91). Thus, train A and B cable entries are physically separated from each other. L As shown on Figure 9.5-40, the combustible loading for this area is classified as a medium hazard which limits the maximum fire duration to less than 60 minutes, assuming all combustible material (electrical cable jacket and insulation material) in the area burns. This assumption is conservative, because the cable is self-extinguishing, fire-retardant, and nonpropagating in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. *

AMENDMENT 17 9. - 0 APRIL 7, 1981

=== _ - - . - - - __ .__

J CPSES/FSAR o,J b 4 N & M h g /f xre detectors are provided to enable rapid fire detection,. Figure 9.5-40 defines the number and type of fire detectors in this area.

1. Where required by Section 9.5.1.2.3.9, one train of safety-related cabling in this area is protected by a one-hour N ated fire barrierf _ A portion of this fire area is protecteda.by=t=:ti: ::pa.a4Kln

                                                                        .;;t pip:

sprinkler system designed to provide general area coverage. Fg15-4 o4 4 5 81,0 dw1An A PwGeJrJ % d% wcTuv g H t d ble extinguishers are also provided as a backup to the fixed sprinkler system. y 4 _ j hields are provided over electrical equipment where discharge of I a sprinkler system could damage safety-related electrical equ Pmen An alternate shutdown system is provided which ensures that at least one train of safety-related essential equipment will be

       \gerational following a fire in this ay The rated fire barriers which physically separate Fire Area 91 from adjoining areas of the plant are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete with doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals of an equivalent rating. Stairwell S-5, located in the corner of Fire Area 91, is enclosed in a two-hour fire rated barrier, as described in Section 9.5.1.5.3. This stairwell serves as a means of access for Fire Area 91.

Since the fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlled ocupational access area, there will not be an unscceptable radiation release to the env_f ronment or other areas of the plant due to a fire. Ab M A. h N N h h ) M4wf) { Nd h.:-151 4 AMENDMENT 17 th W 6 .Se.a.s d 7i.l.3.4. APRIL 7, 1981 [ .. -- - -

ATTACHMENT C FSAR SECTION 7.4 REVISED (ADVANCE COPY)

CPSES/FSAR 7.4 SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN The systems required for safe shutdown are controlled and monitored by instrumentation channels associated with those systems in both the 2 Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) and balance of plant (B0P) systems. Q032.22 These systems are normally aligned to serve a variety of operational functions, including startup and shutdown, as well as protective functions. There are no uniquely identified safe shutdown systems per se. However, prescribed procedures for securing and maintaining the plant in a safe conditfor, can be instituted by appropriate alignment of selected systems. Two kinds of shutdown conditions are addressed in this section: hot standby and cold shutdown. Hot standby is a stable condition of the reactor achieved shortly after a programmed or emergency shutdown of the plant and is the safe shutdown design basis for CPSES. Cold shutdown is a stable condition of the plant achieved after the residual heat rimoval process has brought the primary coolant temperature below 2000F. In either case, the reactivity control systems maintain a subcritical condition of the core. The plant technical specifications explicity define both hot standby and cold shutdown conditions. The instrumentation and control functions required to be aligred for maintaining safe shutdown of the reactor that are discussed in this section are the minimum number under nonaccident conditions. These functions pennit the necessary operations that will:

1. Prevent the reactor from achieving criticality in violation of the technical specifications.

2. Provide an adequate heat sink so that design and safety limits are not exceeded.

The designation of systems that can be used for safe shutdown depends 7.4-1

CPSES/FSAR on identifying those systems which provide the following capabilities:

1. Reactivity control - reactor trip and boration

2. Decay heat removal - auxiliary feedwater (AFW) supply and residual heat removal (RHR) [The RHRS is required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.]

7.

4.1 DESCRIPTION

In the event of a unit shutdown, the unit will be brought to and maintained at a safe shutdown condition from the main Control Room or the Hot Shutdown Panel (see Section 7.4.1.3). The portions of the Reactor Trip System required to achieve the shutdown condition are described in Section 7.2. The minimum systems, support systems, component controls, and monitoring indicators required QO32.22 under nonaccident conditions to maintain hot standby are tabulated and discussed in Section 7.4.1.1 and those required to maintain cold shutdown are tabulated and discussed in Section 7.4.1.2. Shutdown from outside the Control Room is discussed in Section 7.4.1.3. 7.4.1.1 Hot Standby 11 Q032.23 The following systems, support systems, ad monitoring indicators are 0032.51 required for hot standby: QO32.5E

1. Essential Systems

a. Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFS)

b. Atmospheric steam relief valves 7.4-2

CPSES/FSAR

c. Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), boron addition portion.

2. Support Systems

a. Station Service Water System (Sections 9.2.1 and 7.3.1.1.4) 9 Q032.22

b. Component Cooling Water System (Sections 9.2.2 end 7.3.1.1.4)

c. Onsite power system (Sections 8.3 and 7.3.1.1.4), including diesel generators (Section 9.5)

d. Control Room ventilation system (Sections 9.4.1 and 7.3.1.1.4) 11

e. ESF Ventilation System (Sections 9.4.5 and 7.3.1.1.4)

f. Safety Chilled Water System (Sections 9.4F and 7.3.1.1.4)

3. Monitoring Indicators

a. Steam Generators (SG's)

1) Water level for each SG t

2) Pressure for each SG

b. Reactor Coolant System

1) Pressurizer water level 1

9

2) Pressurizer pressure 0032.22

c. Condensate storage tank level 7.4-3

CPSES/FSAR 7.4.1.1.1 Auxiliary Feedwater System At hot standby, decay heat is removed by supplying auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators. Heat is dumped to the condenser (if offsite power is available) or to the atmosphere via the atmospheric steam relief valves. l For a description of the Auxiliary Feedwater System refer to Section 10.4.9. For a description of the Auxiliary Feedwater System control refer to Section 7.3.1.1.4, Item 5. A discussion of instrumentation requirements is found in Section 10.4.9.5. The system flow diagram is shown on Figure 10.4-11. The system failure mode analysis is contained in Table 10.4-9 and the pertinent illustration is Figure 10.4-12. 7.4.1.1.2 Atmospheric Steam Relief Yalves For normal plant cooldown, the Steam Dump System, described in Section 10.4.4, is used to control the cooldown rate by directing steam from the steam generators to the condenser. The power-operated atmospheric steam relief valves enable heat removal from the steam generators to the atmosphere when the condenser is not in service. These valves, described in Section 10.3.2.2, will allow gradual cooldown of the RCS to the point where the RHRS can be employed to continue plant cooldown (less than 425 psig and 3500F). The main steam system is protected against overpressurization by the ASME B&PV Code-certified safety valves described in Section 10.3.2.1. In the event of loss of the Steam Dump System and loss of the l power-operated atmospheric steam relief valves, the safety valves will 7.4-4

                                         ,2 CPSES/FSAR be used to dump steam.to the atmosphere, thereby maintaining the plant at hot standby.

1. Initiating Circuits A pressure transmitter and controller is provided for each atmospheric steam relief valve. Steam pressure developed in the SG is limited by the controller set point selected. Either automatic or manual control can be selected on the controller located in the Control Room.

These valves are also equipped with handwheels to enable local manual operation on loss of air. For operation outside the Control Room, access to the valve's control circuitry in a local panel is provided and manual operation of each valve is accomplished with a local controller at the Hot Shutdown Panel. The initiation device for the safety valve is an intrinsic part of the valve.

2. Logic See instrumentation and control diagrams (ICD's) listed under

          " Main Stream Reheat and Steam Dump System" in Tables 1.7-1 and 1.7-2 for atmospheric steam relief valve control.

The safety valves are spring-loaded valves that open on reaching the pressure set point.

3. Bypass There are no electrical bypasses on safety valves nor on atmospheric steam relief valves.

7.4-5

CPSES/FSAR The atmospheric steam relief valves have manually operated isolation valves upstream of the relief valves for relief valve maintenance. Administrative procedures will assure the proper position of these isolation valves.

4. Interlocks There are none.

5. Redundancy The safety valves are redundant (backup) to the atmospheric steam relief valves.

6. Diversity The nonna11y power-operated atmospheric steam relief valves can also be operated diversely and manually via the valve handwheel.

The safety and relief valves are of diverse design.

7. Actuated Devices None, other than the valves themselves.

l l 8. Supporting Systems The following supporting systems are required for operation of the power-operated atmospheric steam relief valves. a) Class 1E electric power (see Section 8.3) b) Compressed Air System (see Section 9.3.1 and Figure 9.3-1) 7.4-6 t l l l _ _ _ .- _. _ . - .

CPSES/FSAR

9. Design Basis Information a) See Table 10.3-2 for the design basis of the main steam safety valves.

b) See Table 10.3-3 for the design basis of the power-operated atmospheric steam relief valves.

10. Electric Schematic Drawings See Table 1.7-1 for Unit 1 and common and Table 1.7-2 for Unit 2 schematics (electrical) associated with " Main Steam Reheat &

Steam Dump System."

11. Portions of System Not Required for Safety The power-operated atmospheric steam relief valves and pressure transmitter output indication displayed on the control board are not required for safety.

7.4.1.1.3 Chemical and Volume Control System, Boron Addition Portion The functions of the CVCS discussed in Section 9.3.4 are those associated with normal operation. Safe and economical operation design parameters (see Table 9.3-6) dictate the design of the CVCS for nomal operation. For the safety evaluation of the overall CVCS operation refer to Section 9.3.4.1.3 and Table 9.3-9 for the failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA). If safe shutdown operation alone is to be l considered, then the primary functions of the CVCS are that it provide i a means, along with the proper operator action, to maintain adequate shutdown margin by sufficiently borating the core and to maintain pressurizer level. These functions are those required to maintain adequate Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory. The instrumentation, control and electrical features associated with maintaining adequate RCS inventory are those applied to the following groups of equipment: l 7.4-7 l l ..

CPSES/FSAR

1. Boric acid transfer pumps

2. Centrifugal charging pumps

3. Letdown orifice isolation valves Further considerations, as would apply to one unit, are as follows:

1. Initiating Circuits Initiation is by automatic or manual commands. For discussion of automatic commands of the CVCS proper, refer to Sections 9.3.4 and 9.3.4.1.2.3, and for a discussion of the pressurizer water level control portion, see Section 7.7. Maintenance of hot standby and cold shutdown is discussed in 9.3.4.1.2.6. Manual control may be taken either in the Control Room or outside the Control Room at the Hot Shutdown Panel. For the instrumentation application, refer to Section 9.3.4.1.5.

2. Logic At the Shutdown Transfer Panel (Train A) and Hot Shutdown Panel (Train B), operator action may transfer control of the boric acid transfer pumps, centrifugal charging pumps and letdown orifice isolation valves from the Control Room to the Hot Shutdown panel.

At this location, start-stop operation of the pumps and I open-close operation of the valves in question can be undertaken. If the redundant nomal suction paths to centrifugal charging pumps that establish boration are not available, normally closed motor operated valve I-8104 (refer to Figure 9.3-10, sheet 3) can be opened either remotely in the Control Room or by handwheel at the local station. 7.4-8

CPSES/FSAR

3. Bypasses Control from the Control Room of the above groups of equipment is manually bypassed at the Shutdown Transfer Panel (Train A) and at 32 the Hot Shutdown Panel (Train B) when control is taken over at the Hot Shutdown Panel.

4. Interlocks With control of those above groups of equipment at the Hot Shutdown Panel, there are no interlocks imposed on their operation.

5. Redundancy There are two centrifugal charging pumps, two boric acid transfer pumps, and three letdown orifice isolation valves.

6. Diversity No diversity is provided for the boric acid transfer pumps. In addition to the centrifugal charging pumps, there is a positive displacement charging pump. There are other valves in the letdown line, which, in addition to letdown orifice isolation valves, can also be used to isolate the letdown line.

7. Actuated Devices The motor control centers for the centrifugal charging pumps and boric acid transfer pumps and the solenoid valves for the letdown orifice isolation valves are the actuation devices of the CVCS required for safe shutdown.

7.4-9

CPSES/FSAR

8. Supporting Systems l The centrifugal charging pumps, the boric acid transfer pumps, and the letdown orifice isolation valve solenoid valves are powered from Class IE buses. Additionally, the Safety Chilled Water System supplies chilled water to the charging pump fan coil unit (see Section 9.4F) and the Station Service Water System supplies cooling water to the centrifugal charging pump lube oil coolers (see Section 9.2.1).

9. Design Basis Infonnation The CVCS is not specifically designed to be a protection system.

Section 3, " Design Bases," of IEEE Standard 279 does not specifically apply to non-protection systems such as the CVCS. portions of the CVCS, which are shared with the Safety Injection 27 System, come under IEEE Standard 279 design bases as discussed in Section 7.3.

10. Drawings For the CVCS flow diagram, refer to Figure 9.3-10. Also refer to the flow diagrams in Section 6.3 for shared functions of the Safety Injection System, as well as the electrical drawing list in Section 1.7.

11. Portion of System Not Required for Safety Refer to item 9 above.

7.4.1.2 Cold Shutdown 9 Cold shutdown is achieved following hot standby and includes passing Q212.23 through hot shutdown. Four key functions are required to achieve and 7.4-10

CPSES/FSAR maintain cold shutdown. They are circulation of the reactor coolant, removal of residual heat, boration, and depressurization. The required means for perfonning these functions are described below. 9 l Q212.2l

1. Circulation of the reactor coolant is provided first by natural circulation that is effected by the reactor core providing the l heat source and the steam generators the heat sink, and then by the residual heat removal pumps.

2. Removal of residual heat is accomplished first via the Auxiliary Feedwater System and then via the residual heat removal heat exchanger. Hot standby is maintained by releasing steam via the 11 safety grade steam generator safety valves. Cooldown to 3500F is Q212.32 accomplished by raleasing steam via operation of the steam generator power-operated relief valves. Then cooldown to cold 0032.66 shutdown conditions is achieved with the Residual Heat Removal System. A sufficient seismic Category I supply of deaerated auxiliary feedwater to pemit four hours operation at hot standby followed by cooldown to Residual Heat Removal System initiation conditions is provided by the condensate storage tank.

A backup seismic Category I source for the Auxiliary Feedwater System is the Station Service Water System. This system provides QO32.6 an assured long-tenn supply of auxiliary feedwater.

3. Boration is accomplished using portions of the Chemical and Volume Control System. Boric acid from the boric acid tanks is 9

supplied to the suction of the centrifugal charging pumps by the Q212.3 l boric acid transfer pumps. The centrifugal charging pumps inject l the boric acid into the reactor coolant system via the safety injection flow paths or the normal charging and reactor coolant pump seal injection flow paths. Makeup in excess of that needed for boration can be provided from the refueling water storage tank. l l 7.4-11

CPSES/FSAR

4. Depressurization is accomplished using portions of the Chemical and Volume Control System. Either boric acid from the boric acid 9 tanks or refueling water from the refueling water storage tank is Q212.32 used as desired for depressurization with the flow path being via the centrifugal charging pumps and auxiliary spray valve to the pressurizer.

In addition to the systems required for hot standby delineated in Section 7.4.1.1, the following systems, support systems, and monitoring indicators are required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.

1. Essentia! Systems

a. Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

b. Pressurizer pressure control during RCS depressurization

2. Support Systems - No additional support systems required other than ^. hose listed in Section 7.4.1.1, Number 2.

3. Monitoring Indicators

a. RCS wide range temperature

b. Boric acid tank level (per boric acid tank) l Additionally, the safety injection signal trip circuit must be defeated and the accumulator isolation valves closed during the later stages of plant cooldown.

7.4.1.2.1 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) The Residual Heat Removal System is designed to remove residual heat from the core and reduce the temperature of the Reactor Coolant System 7.4-12 s

CPSES/FSAR (RCS) during plant cooldown to cold shutdown conditions. The system is pennitted to be manually initiated when the reactor coolant temperature and pressure are reduced to 3500F and 400 psig or below. A detailed discussion of the RHRS is provided in Section 5.4.7. RHRS operation for reactor cooldown is discussed in Section 5.4.7.2.3. Manual actions required of the operator, both inside and outside Control Room, are discussed in Section 5.4.7.2.7. Further considerations are as follows.

1. Initiating Circuits .-

Manual control of the RHRS is from the Control Room. For operator actions outside the Control Room, refer to Section 5.4.7.2.7.

2. Logic For the logic diagram for control of the RHRS inlet isolation valves, see Figure 7.6-2.

3. Bypasses There are no automatic operational bypasses in the RHRS.

Isolation of the RHRS cannot be manually bypassed unless permissive conditions have been automatically met as described in Section 7.6.2.

4. Interlocks l For discussion of the RHRS inlet isolation valves interlocks, refer to Section 7.6. Section 5.4.7.2.7 discusses application of the single failure criteria.

l t 7.4-13 l - - _ _ _ _

CPSES/FSAR

5. Redundancy Two independant residual heat removal pumps are provided, either l of which can provide the necessary heat removal capacity for the RCS for the safe shutdown condition. Each RHR pump is powered from a separate Class 1E bus.

6. Diversity For opening permissives and for automatic closing cf the RHR inlet isolation valves, diverse RCS pressure transmitters, made by different manufacturers, are used. There is no other diversity in the RHRS control.

7. Actuated Devices Electrical control equipment for the RHRS pumps, the inlet isolation valves, the mini-flow control, and the RHRS heat exchanger are the principal actuated devices.

8. Supporting Systems The RHRS is powered from Class 1E buses. The RHRS heat exchangers and pumps are cooled with component cooling water (see Section 9.2.2).

9. Design Basis Information The RHRS is not specifically designed as a protection system.

Section 3, " Design Basis," of IEEE Standard 279 does not specifically apply to non-protection systems like the RHRS. Portions of the Safety Injection System which are shared with the RHRS came under IEEE Standard 279 design basis as discussed in Section 7.3. 7.4-14

CPSES/FSAR

10. Drawings For the RHRS flow diagram, refer to Figures 5.4-6 and 5.4-7. For the RHRS inlet isolation valve interlocks, refer to Figure 7.6-2.

Refer to the Section 1.7 list for applicable electrical drawings.

11. Portion of System Not Required for Safety Refer to item 9 above.

7.4.1.2.2 Pressurizer Pressure Control Pressurizer heater control is provided to maintain the RCS at operating pressure following a reactor trip to prevent excessive cooling of the pressurizer fluid and subsequent depressurization of the system. Nomal operation is automatic via the proportional and backup heaters, as described in Section 7.7. If, for any reason, the nomal pressure-regulating system is not available, the operator will control either of two back-up heater groups in the pressurizer by manual ON-0FF control switches. Air operated valve 1-8145 in the auxiliary spray flow path, with manual control in the Control Room, provides spray for depressurizing when normal pressurizer spray control is not available. Means for depressurizing the RCS are also available from the pressurizer power-operated relief valves, with manual control in the Control Room, as well as from the normal pressurizer pressure spray control, which is active when the pressurizer pressure control system is operating. This pressurizer pressure control system, which also automatically controls the pressurizer heaters, as described in Section 7.7, is non-safety related. The pressurizer safety valves, which prevent the RCS from exceeding its design pressure, are safety-related but are self-activated and do not require instrumentation, control, and electrical circuitry for operation. 7.4-15

CPSES/FSAR

1. Initiating Circuits In normal automatic operation, the pressurizer pressure control system is controlled by pressurizer pressure transmitters. In addition, the backup heater groups are provided with direct manual control by the operator.

2. Logic See Figures 7.2-1 (sheets 11 and 12) and 7.7-4.

3. Bypass The control circuit provides no bypass of the manual backup heater control function other than maintenance provisions.

4. Interlocks All pressurizer heater groups are connected with a low-level switch to cut off power to the heaters on pressurizer low-low water level, thereby preventing heater damage. This interlock is not used when manual control of the pressurizer backup heaters is 32 transferred to the Hot Shutdown Panel.

5. Redundancy Two backup heater groups are provided, either of which can provide the necessary energy input to the pressurizer fluid to 32 develop the requisite pressure for the safe shutdown condition.

Either of two power-operated relief valves will perfonn the depressurization function. 7.4-16

1 l CPSES/FSAR I

6. Diversity No diversity of control or power supply is provided between the backup heater groups. Diversity of depressurization is provided by power-operated relief valves, safety valves, spray valves, and auxiliary spray valves.

7. Actuated Devices The electrical control equipment for the pressurizer backup heater groups, power-operated relief valves, safety valves, spray valves, and auxiliary spray valves are the actuated devices.

8. Supporting Systems Provisions have been included to feed the pressurizer backup heaters from independent Class 1E power supplies. The pressurizer power-operated relief valves and the pressurizer auxiliary spray valve utilize air from the Instrument Air System and control power from Class IE DC buses.

9. Design Basis Information Section 3, " Design Basis," of IEEE Standard 279 does not apply because the pressurizer pressure control system, except for the safety valves, is not designed as a safety system. The design 32 basis is derived from operational objectives. The safety valves are self actuated.

10. Drawings For piping and instrumentation flow diagrams for the pressurizer pressure control system, refer to Sections 5.4.10 and 9.8.4.1.

Figure 7.2-1, sheets 11 and 12, illustrate the logic. 7.4-17

CPSES/FSAR

11. Portions of System Not Required for Safety Refer to item 9 above.

7.4.1.3 Shutdown From Outside the Control Room A common Control Room is provided that contains all controls and instrumentation necessary for the operation of Units 1 and 2 reactor, turbine-generator, and auxiliary and emergency systems under nomal or accident conditions. Sufficient radiation shielding, containment integrity, missile protection and habitability provisions are provided to pemit access, exit, and continued occupancy of the control room for the duration of accident conditions such that aggregate radiation exposure to personnel would be below that specified by 10CFR50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 19. Considering the detailed station design provisions to ensure continuous Control Room access, it is unlikely (save for the required Control Room i fire considerations) that the necessity could arise for evacuation of l the Control Room. Nevertheless, provisions have been made to maintain 32 the reactor in a safe hot standby condition if access to the Control Rcom is lost (e.g., Control Room fire). Hot standby is maintained as described in Section 7.4.1.3.2. Furthemore, cold shutdown can be achieved from outside the Control Room through the use of suitable l procedures as described in Section 7.4.1.3.3. 7.4.1.3.1 Design Criteria In designing for safe reactor shutdown in the event of Control Room evacuation, the following design criteria are applied.

1. Access back into the Control Room will generally be achieved prior to the initiation of cold shutdown except, of course, for a 32 fire that destroys either the Control Room or the Cable Spreading 7.4-18 l

CPSES/FSAR Room. The capability for bringing the reactor to cold shutdown conditions exists outside the Control Room through the use cf suitable procedures and secondary controls as described in Section 7.4.1.3.3. . 32

2. Except for a Control Room or Cable Spreading Room fire, Control Room evacuation is initiated for an undefined cause (for example, control environment not habitable) and the event which causes Control Room evacuation does not degrade Control Room equipment.

3. Design basis accidents are not assumed to occur simultaneously with control room evacuation. However, loss of offsite power has been considered.

4. For four specific plant fires, shutdown capability is provided as follows:

Fire Location Loss Shutdown From Cable Spreading Both Hot Shutdown Panel using Train Room (CSR) Trains A and Shutdown Transfer Panel transfer. Control Room (CR) Both Hot Shutdown Panel using Train Trains A and Shutdown Transfer Panel transfer. Hot Shutdown Train B Control Room using Train A Panel (HSP) Shutdown Transfer Train A Control Room using Train B Panel (STP) 7.4-19

CPSES/FSAR For any other postulated plant fire, shutdown is accomplished from the Control Room utilizing either surviving train.

5. Except for a fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room, loss of safety system redundancy does not occur as a result of the event requiring control room evacuation and all equipment in the control room and all automatic controls continue to function.

6. The Hot Shutdown Panel (HSP) and the Shutdown Transfer Panel (STP) including essentia1' equipment mounted on them, are designed to withstand an SSE with no loss of essential functions. The 32 essential local control stations are also designed to withstand an SSE with no loss of essential functions.

7. The Hot Shutdown Panel is normally untendet and is surrounded by a locked enclosure. Opening the enclosure doors will initiate an alarm in the Control Room. The Shutdown Transfer Panel is also normally untended and access to it is restricted via normally locked doors. Opening the enclosure doors will initiate an alarm in the Control Room.

8. The Hot Shutdown Panel, located in the switchgear area of the Safeguards Building, at elevation 831'-6", and the Shutdown Transfer Panel, located one floor below at elevation 810'-6", are easily accessible to Control Room operators through controlled access areas.

i l 32 9. Electrical separation for the Hot Shutdown Panel and the Shutdown l Q032.36 Transfer Panel follows the same criteria as corresponding Control i Q040.23 Q040.64 Room equipment. Loss of control or indication for one train for any reason will not affect its redundant counterpart. 32 10. Controls on the Hot Shutdown Panel are provided with a transfer Q032.25 switch (at the Shutdown Transfer Panel for Train A and Hot Q032.23 6 Q032.66 7.4-20

i CPSES/FSAR Shutdown Panel for Train B) that transfers control of equipment i from the Control Room to the Hot Shutdown Panel. Placing this local transfer switch in the local position will electrically Q032.25 isolate all Control Room and Cable Spreading Room equipment from Q032.23 the rest of the circuitry, will provide audible and visible Q032.66 indication in the Control Room and will turn off status lights on the main control board.

11. Each control circuit consists of cables that 1) connect the transfer switches to control switches in the Control Room, 2) connect the transfer switches to the HSP-mounted control switches, 3) connect the transfer switches to the pertinent motor control center. Each of these cables are inherent.ly separated from their redundant counterpart. In addition, the cables from the HSP to the Control Room and the motor control centers are it external to the HSP for almost all of their run. Loss of a Q040.64 control circuit does not mean loss of function since control circuits are available at the HSP for each of the redundant systems.

12. To prevent a single event (e.g., short-circuit) from affecting both the Control Room controls and the HSP controls, control-circuit fuses are either located in equipment accessible in such an event (e.g., 6.9 KV and 480V switchgear) or separate fuses, located in separate fire zones, are provided for both the Control Room control circuit and the HSP control circuit.

The controls and monitoring indicators provided on the Hot Shutdown Panel and required for hot standby are listed in Table 7.4-1. Instrumentation and controls provided on the Hot Shutdown Panel for operating convenience or cold shutdown are listed in Table 7.4-2. Switches provided on the Shutdown Transfer Pa,sel are listed in Table 7.4-3. Instrumentation and controls required for cold shutdown are marked with the letter (c) in Tables 7.4-1, 7.4-1 a nd 7.4-3. Those 7.4-21

                                      ,     CPSES/FSAR marked with the letter (f) are added for Alternate Shutdown for a fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room.

7.4.1.3.2 Hot Standby From Outside The Control Room Should the Control Room become uninhabitable, the reactor will be manually tripped, the neutron level and control rod position will be verified before evacuation takes place. Also, the reactor can be tripped locally at the reactor trip switchgear which is in close proximity to the Hot Shutdown Panel. Sufficient controls are provided outside the Control Room on a Seismic Category I Hot Shutdown Panel (See Tables 7.4-1 and 7.4-2) and other locations to: Achieve prompt hot standby of the reactor Maintain the unit in a safe condition during hot standby. 7.4.1.3.3 Cold Shutdown From Outside the Control Room Cold shutdown can be achieved from outside the Control Room through the use of suitable procedures and by virtue of local control of the systems listed in Section 7.4.1.2. The design bases for the achievement and maintenance of cold shutdown are as listed in Section 7.4.1.3.1. Instrumentation and controls on the Hot Shutdown Panel, marked with the letter (c) on Tables 7.4-1 and 7.4-2, are utilized to attain cold shutdown outside the Control Room. In addition, certain local manipulations of controls and initiating devices, as described below, are required. l 32 For cold shutdown from outside the Control Room due to a Control Room ; Q212.84 l or Cable Spreading Room fire, see Section 7.4.1.3.4. The basic 1 7.4-22 l

^ CPSES/FSAR procedure to established cold shutdown from the hot standby condition, for reasons other than fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room and assuming the Control Room is uninhabitable, is as follows. 32

1. Transfer control from the Control Room to the Hot Shutdown Panel, Q212.84 as required, using the transfer switches at the Shutdown Transfer Panel for Train A and the transfer switches at the Hot Shutdown Panel for Train B.

2. Borate to the cold shutdown boron concentration using boric acid transfer pumps and charging pumps.

Location: Hot Shutdown Panel. Available Indications: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) boron concentration determined by sampling.

3. Cooldown the RCS by use of the steam generator power-operated atmospheric relief valves. 9 Location: Hot Shutdown Panel and local patch panel or manual 0212.84 handwheel operation.

i l Available Indications: RCS temperature, pressurizer i pressure and level, steam generator level, auxiliary feedwater flow and condensate storage tank level.

4. Depressurize the RCS by throttling the pressurizer spray valve while maintaining pressurizer level.

Location: Hot Shutdown Panel and local patch panel 7.4-23

CPSES/FSAR Available Indications: pressurizer pressure and level, charging and letdown flow.

5. At 1900 psig in the RCS, block the low pressurizer pressure safety injection (SI) and the low steamline pressure SI signals.

9 Location: Cable spreading room Available Indications: Pressurizer pressure indication on the Hot Shutdown Panel.

6. At 1000 psig in the RCS, close the accumlator discharge isolation valves and rack out the safety injection pump and containment spray pump breakers.

Location: Switchgear and motor control centers. Available Indications: Pressurizer pressure indication on the Hot Shutdown Panel.

7. At 350 F and 425 psig in the RCS, align the RCS for cooldown with the Residual Heat Removal System.

Q212.84 l Location: Switchgear and Hot Shutdown Panel. Available Indications: RCS pressure indication and RCS temperature indication on the Hot Shutdown Panel. 7.4.1.3.4 Alternate Shutdown System 32 The Hot Shutdown Panel had been designed to enable control to a hot standby condition if, for unspecified but non-catastrophic reasons, the Control Room (CR) had to be evacuated. The circuits required for 1 7.4-24 l t

CPSES/FSAR shutdown on the Hot Shutdown Panel have been redesigned to comply with ' the CPSES fire protection requirements. The present design enables control via Train A equipment even if a complete loss of the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room is postulated due to fire. Thus, the Hot Shutdown Panel, Shutdown Transfer Panel and specific portions of the plant systems noted in this section function as the Alternate Shutdown System for CPSES for a fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room. The Hot Shutdown Panel and Shutdown Transfer Panel are each located in different fire zones which are, in turn, different from the fire zones associated with the Cable Spreading Room and Control Room. Since the postulated complete loss of either the Cable Spreading Room or the Control Room would also cause the loss of both Train A and Train B shutdown control and associated monitoring, alternate shutdown capability was provided to survive this highly improbable catastrophe by: 32

1. Relocating Train A transfer circuits from the Hot Shutdown Panel to the Shutdown Transfer Panel,

2. Providing redundant Train A shutdown control circuits independent of the Control Room and Cable Spreading Room, and

3. Providing monitoring circuits for Train A shutdown systems which are independent of the Control Room and Cable Spreading Room equipment and cabling.

If the postulated fire occurs in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room, the transfer of Train A will take place at the Shutdown Transfer Panel and the control of the required Train A shutdown equipment is established at the Hot Shutdown Panel. For this scenario, Train A has been chosen for alternate shutdown control with the requisite Train B and non-safety related indications independent of the Control Room and Cable Spreading Room. 7.4-25

CPSES/FSAR The shutdown procedures are basically the same as described in Section 7.4.1.3.2 and 7.4.1.3.3. For cold shutdown, however, step 6 of Section 7.4.1.3.3 is carried out immediately. 32 To sumarize, loss of either the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room will require Train A transfer from the Shutdown Transfer Panel and Train A control at the Hot Shutdown Panel. Loss of the Hot Shutdown Panel will require Train A control in the Control Room. Loss of the Shutdown Transfer Panel will require Train B control in the Control Room. 7.4.2 ANALYSIS Hot standby is a stable plant condition that is automatically reached following a reactor trip from power. Additionally, the plant design features permit the achievement of cold shutdown as described in Section 7.4.1.2. In the unlikely event that access to the Control Room is restricted, the plant can be safely kept at hot standby by the use of the monitoring indicators and controls listed in Section 7.4.1.3 until the Control Room can be reentered. Furthermore, cold shutdown conditions can be achieved from outside the Control Room through the use of suitable procedures as described in Sections 7.4.1.3.3 and 7.4.1.3.4 and by virtue of local control of the equipment listed in Section 7.4.1.2, in conjunction with the instrumentation and controls 32 l provided on the Hot Shutdown Panel and the Shutdown Transfer Panel (Tables 7.4-1, 7.4-2 a nd 7.4-3) . The discussions below demonstrate conformance t9 applicable General Q032.14 Design Criteria (GDC), Regulatory Guides. # IE/E Standard 279-1971. Q032.67 See aiso Table 7.1-2 for criteria aprW W ?.o all systems, Section 7.3, and other sections as referred 'c is. a. t. ext . l 7.4-26

CPSES/FSAR 7.4.2.1 General Analysis

1. Conformance to NRC General Design Criteria

a. GDC 19 The Hot Shutdown Panel and essential local control stations, discussed in Section 7.4.1.3, provide adequate controls and indications at locations outside the Control Room to maintain the reactor and the reactor coolant system in the safe shutdown condition and to ensure decay heat removal in the event the Control Room must be evacuated.

b. GDC 34 Essential controls are provided outside the control room on the Hot Shutdown Panel to ensure adequate decay heat removal from the Reactor Coolant System in the event the main Control Room must be evacuated.

2. Conformance to NRC Regulatory Guides

a. RG 1.29 The Hot Shutdown Panel, Shutdown Transfer Panel, and essential local control stations are designed to withstand the effects of a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) without 32 loss of function or physical damage. The Hot Shutdown Panel, Shutdown Transfer Panel, and essential local control stations are classified as Seismic Category I canponents.

7.4-27 1

1. _ . _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ . - - -- -- . - -

CPSES/FSAR

b. RG 1.75 Proper separation in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 25 and IEEE Standard 384 is maintained within the Hot Shutdown Panel for Train A, Train B and non-Class IE equipment and wiring.

3. Confonnance to IEEE Standard 279-1971 The Hot Shutdown Panel and Shutdown Transfer Panel, 32 including essential controls and indications, and the essential local control stations are designed to conform to applicable portions of IEEE Standard 279-1971. The control circuits at the Hot Shutdown Panel and essential local control stations are designed such that a single failure will not prevent proper protective action (maintaining safe hot standby) when required. This is accomplished by providing independent Class 1E power for the fully redundant controls for the systems required for safe shutdown.

To prevent interaction between the redundant systems, the control channels are wired independently and separated with no electrical connections between redundant control systems. Nonessential control circuits and nonessential monitor circuits are electrically isolated from essential controls and indications to prevent jeopardizing the reliability of the systems required for safe shutdown. 7.4.2.2 Analysis for Shutdown From Outside the Control Room The discussion found in Section 7.4.2.1 is applicable. The additional guides, criteria, and standards listed in Table 7.1-1 apply only to the essential instrumentation and controls required for safe shutdown from outside the control room. 7.4-28

CPSES/FSAR Also see the criteria applicability matrix, Table 7.1-2, for further informatio7. 7.4.2.3 Consideration of Selected Plant Contingencies 7.4.2.3.1 Loss of Instrument Air Systems Since electric-powered instrumentation is supplied from the Class IE Power System, loss of the Instrument Air System will not degrade instrumentation required for safe shutdown. An analysis of the effect of loss of plant instrument air is provided in Section 9.3.1 and Table 9.3-3. 7.4.2.3.2 Loss of Cooling Water to Vital Equipment Cooling water for safety-related systems is supplied by the Safety Chilled Water System (Section 2-4F), the Component Cooling Water System (Section 9.2.2), and the Station Service Water System (Section 9.2.1). Each of these systems is redundant; therefore the loss of any one cooling loop or instrumentation associated with that loop will not degrade the safety-related equipment serviced by the system. Also see the analyses presented in Sections 9.4F, 9.2.1 and 9.2.2 and Tables 9.2-1 and 9.2-5. 7.4.2.3.3 Plant Load Rejection, Turbine Trip, and Loss of Offsite Power In the event of loss of offsite power associated with plant load rejection or turbine trip, power for safe shutdown is provided by the onsite Class 1E power systems. The description of the power systems is presented in Section 8.3. The standby diesel generators will provide l power for the operation of safety-related equipment. The station batteries will provide DC power for the operation of control and instrumentation required to actuate and control essential components. l 7.4-29

CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-1 (SHEET 1 of 4) INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function LI-501A (C) Steam generator 1 - level LI-502A (C) Steam generator 2 - level LI-503A (C) Steam generator 3 - level LI-504A, (C) Steam generator 4 - level PI-514B Steam generator 1 - pressure ~ PI-524B Steam generator 2 - pressure PI-534B Steam generator 3 - pressure PI-544B Steam generator 4 - pressure LI-459B (C) Pressurizer - level LI-460B (C) Pressurizer - level PI-455B (C) Pressurizer - pressure LI-2478B (C) Condensate storage tank - level LI-2479B (C) Condensate storage tank - level HS-2450C (C) Motor-driven AFW pump 01 - local control l 32 HS-2451C (C) Motor-driven AFW pump 02 - local control HS-2451B (C) Motor-driven AFW pump 02 - local / remote 1/1-APCHIL (C) Charging pump 1 - control l 32 1/1-APCH2L (C) Charging pump 2 - control 43/1-APCH2L (C) Charging pump 2 - local / remote 1/1-APBAIL (C) Boric acid transfer pump 1 - control 32 1/1-APBA2L (C) Boric acid transfer pump 2 - control (C) - Required for Cold Shutdown

CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-1 (SHEET 2 of 4) INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function 43/1-APBA2L (C) Boric acid transfer pump 2 - local / remote HS-4250C (C) SSW pump 01 - local / control 32 HS-4251C (C) SSW pump 2 - local control HS-4251B (C) SSW pump 2 - local / remote HS-4518C (C) CCW pump 01 - local control 32 HS-4519C (C) CCW pump 2 - local control HS-4519B (C) CCW pump 2 - local / remote 43/1-456FT (F) Pressurizer PORV remote local 1/1-456FL (F) Pressurizer PORV local control 1-HS-2456FT (F) Motor-driven AFWP-1/ recirculation valve local control 1-HS-4286FL (F) SSW pump-1 discharge valve local control 1-HS-4393FL (F) Diesel generator-A service water 32 control valve local control 1-HS-4699FL (F) CCW to Reactor Coolant pump coolers isolation valve local control 1-HS-4701FL (F) RCP motor air and lube oil coolers CCW return header isolation valve 1-HS-4514FL (F) CCW heat exchanger to non-safety loop-1 control valve local control 1-HS-4524FL (F) Non-safety loop return to CCW header isolation valve local control (C) - Required for Cold Shutdown (F) - Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown

CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-1 (SHEET 3 of 4) INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function 1-HS-4526FL (F) CCW to non-safety loop isolation valve local control 1/1-8106FL (F) Charging pumps to Reactor Coolant System isolation valve local control 1/1-8801AF (F) Charging pumps to Reactor Coolant System SIS isolation valve local control 43/1-8153FT (F) Reactor Coolant System excess let-down valve remote local 1/1-8153FL (F) Reactor Coolant System excess let-doun valve local control 1/1-8110FL (F) Charging pump miniflow isolation valve local control 32 1/1-APRHIF (F) RHR pump-1 local control 1/1-8701AF (F) RHR loop-1 inlet isolation valve local control 1/1-8701BF (F) RHR Loop-2 inlet isolation valve local control 1-HS-2333FL (F) Main Steam loop-1 isolation and bypass valves local control

 .          1-HS-2334FL                (F) Main Steam loop-2 isolation and bypass valves local control 1-HS-2335FL                (F) Main Steam loop-3 isolation and bypass valves local control 1-HS-2336FL                (F) Main Steam loop-4 isolation and bypass valves local control (F) - Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown

CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-1 (SHEET 4 of 4) INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function i 1/1-455AFL (F) Pressurizer power relief valve local control 1-HS-6700FL (F) Chilled water recirculation pump 5 local control CS/BT-1EAIL (F) Tie breaker ST-1EA1 local control CS/TIEBlL (F) Bus IEA1 transfer TIEB1 feeder breaker local control CS/1EB1-1L (F) Incoming breaker 1EB1-1 local control CS/TIEB3L (F) Bus 1EA1 transfer T1EB3 feeder breaker local control CS/IEB3-1L (F) Incoming breaker 1EB3-1 local control CS/BT-1EB13L (F) Tie breaker BT-1EB13 local 1 control 32 I

Hand / Auto station with built-in transfer device to block control room signal and initiate control room local override alarm SSW - Station Service Water System CCW - Component Cooling Water System AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater System (F) - Added for Fire, Protection - Alternate Shutdown

_ ___ _ ._ - , . . . . _ __ ._._ - _ _ = _ _ _ -

O-O CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-2 (SHEET 1 OF 6) OTHER INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function FK-121A (C) Pressurizer Level Control Valve - Valve Control (Charging Flow Control) 1/1-8149AL (C) Letdown valve 8149A - control 32 1/1-8149BL (C) Letdown valve 8149B - control l 32 1/1-8149CL (C) Letdown valve 8149C - control 32 SK-2452B* Turbine-driven AFW pump - speed control SI-2452B Turbine-driven AFW pump - speed indication HS-2452C Turbine-driven AFW pump - local control HS-2452E Turbine-driven AFW pump - local control HS-2452D Turbine-driven AFW pump - local / remote FK-2459B* Turbine-driven AFW pump to steam generator 1-valve control FK-2453C* (C) Motor-driven AFW pump 01 to steam generator 1-valve control FK-2460B* Turbine-driven AFW pump to steam generator 2-valve control FK-2453D* (C) Motor-driven AFW pump 01 to steam generator 1-valve control FK-2461B* Turbine-driven AFW pump to steam generator 3-valve control FK-2454C* (C) Motor-driven AFW pump 02 to steam generator 3-valve control FK-2462B* Turbine-driven AFW pump to steam generator 4-valve control FK-2454D* (C) Motor-driven AFW pump 02 to steam generator 4-(C) Required for Cold Shutdown

   -                                                                                                   l CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-2                                               ,

(SHEET 2 OF 6) l OTHER INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function valve control 1/1-PCPRIL Pressurizer heater backup - Group A control 32 1/1-PCPR2L Pressurizer heater backup - Group B control 43/1-PCPR2L Pressurizer heater backup - Group B local / remote RCS (C) Reactor Coolant System Wide-Range Temperature NI-31F NIS Source-Range Indication NI-32F NIS Source-Range Indication FI-121B (C) Charging Pump to CVCS Charging and RCP Seals - Flow FI-183B Boric Acid Filter Recovery Line - Flow FI-132B (C) Letdown - flow 1/1-8104L Emergency boration valve - control 43/1-8104L Emergency boration valve transfer - local / remote 1/1-TCV-129L Letdown divert valve TCV-129 - control 32 i HS-5405C Containment recirculation fan 01 - control l l 32 l HS-5409B Containment recirculation fan 02 - control HS-5409C Containment recirculation fan 02 - local / remote I HS-5413C Containment recirculation fan 03 - control 32 HS-5417C Containment recirculation fan 04 - control HS-5417B containment recirculation fan 04 - local / remote FI-2463D (C) AFW to steam generator 1 - flow FI-2463B (C) AFW to steam generator 1 - flow (C) Required for Cold Shutdown

     - = .--          .-       . . -           . : -- -

CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-2 (SHEET 3 OF 6) OTHER INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function FI-2464D (C) AFW to steam generator 2 - flow FI-2464B (C) AFW to steam generator 2 - flow FI-2465D (C) AFW to steam generator 3 - flow FI-2465B (C) AFW to steam generator 3 - flow FI-2466D (C) AFW *o steam generator 4 - flow FI-2466B (C) AFW to steam generator 4 - flow PI-2477B Turbine-driven AFW pump - suction pressure PI-2455B Turbine-driven AFW pump - discharge pressure PI-2475B Motor-driven AFW pump 01 - suction pressure PI-2453B Motor-driven AFW pump 01 - discharge pressure PI-2476B Motor-driven AFW pump 02 - suction pressure PI-2454B Motor-driven AFW pump 02 - discharge pressure pome \ FI-4258B (C) SSW t_>:in-A - flow FI-4259B (C) SSW B - flow PI-4252B SSW pump 01 - discharge pressure PI-4253B SSW pump 2 - discharge pressure V-1EAl-L 6900-V bus 1EA1 - voltage

        'F-1EAl-L             6900-V bus IEA1 - frequency A-1EAl-IL            6900-V bus IEA1, preferred offsite source - amperes A-1EGI-L             6900-V bus IEA1, onsite source - amperes A-1EAl-2L            6900-V bus IEA1, alternate offsite source - amperes (C) Required for Cold Shutdown

CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-2 (SHEET 4 OF 6) OTHER INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function CS-1EAl-1L 6900-V bus IEA1, preferred offsite source breaker-control switch , CS-1EGI-L 6900-V bus IEA1, onsite source breaker - control switch CS-1EAl-2L 6900-V bus IEA1, alternate offsite source breaker - control switch V-1EA2-L 6900-V bus 1EA2 - voltage F-1EA2-L 6900-V bus 1EA2 - frequency i A-1EA2-2L 6900-V bus IEA2, alternate offsite source - amperes A-1EG2-L 6900-V bus 1EA2, onsite source - amperes A-1EA2-1L 6900-V bus 1EA2, preferred offsite source - amperes y CS-1EA2-2L 6900-V bus 1EA2, alternate offsite source breaker - selector switch CS-1EC2-L 6900-V bus IEA2, onsf.te source breaker

                                                           - control switch CS-1EA2-1L                  6900-V Bus IEA2, preferred offsite source breaker - control switch 43-1EA2-2                   6900-V bus IEA2, alternate offsite source breaker - selector switch 43-1EG2                     6900-V bus IEA2, onsite source breaker
                                                            - selector switch 43-1EA2-1                   6900-V bus IEA2, preferred offsite source breaker - selector switch

_ - . _ - . . - . . . . ._ - _ J - -

O CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-2 (SHEET 5 OF 6) OTHER INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function 1-ZL-2476B Motor-driven AFWP-2 suction pressure status light' 1-2L-2454C Motor-driven AFWP-2 discharge to SG-3 control valve 1-ZL-2454D Motor-driven AFWP-2 discharge to SG-4 control valve 1-ZL-2459B Turbine-driven AFWP discharge to SG-1 control valve 1-ZL-2460B Turbine-driven AFWP discharge to SG-2 control valve 1-ZL-2453C Motor-driven AFWP-1 discharge to SG-1 control valve 1-2L-2475B Motor-driven AFWP-1 suction pressure status light 1-ZL-2453D Motor-driven AFWP-1 discharge to SG-2 32 control valve 1-ZL-2461B Turbine-driven AFWP discharge to SG-3 control valve 1-2L-2462B Turbine-driven AFWP discharge to SG-4 control valve ZL-455 CF (F) Pressurizer spray valve ZL-455 BF (F) Pressurizer spray valve ZL-PCPX 1F (F) RCP-1 running ZL-PCPX 2F (F) RCP-2 running ZL-PCPX 3F (F) RCP-3 running ZL-PCPX 4F (F) RCP-4 running (F) Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown

o t CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-2 (SHEET 6 OF 6) OTHER INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS LOCATED ON HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Identification Function TR-413F/423F (F) Reactor Coolant System loop-1 & 2 wide range temperature TR-433F/443F (F) Reactor Coolant System loop-3 & 4 wide range temperature HS-5180F (F) Steam generator blowdown drains MLB-63 (F) Train B shutdown valves HC-2325 (F) SG-1 PORV HC-2326 (F) SG-2 PORV HC-2327 (F) SG-3 PORV HC-2328 (F) SG-4 PORV HC-455C (F) Pressurizer spray valve HC-606 (F) RHR discharge control valve HC-618 (F) RHR minimum flow valve 32

Hand / Auto station with built-in transfer device to block control room signal and initiate control room local override alarm SSW - Station Service Water System CCW - Component Cooling Water System AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater System (F) - Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown

O t CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-3 (SHEET 1 of 4) TRANSFER SWITCHES LOCATED ON SHUTDOWN TRANSFER PANEL (STP) Identification Function HS-2450B (C) Motor-driven AFWP-1 remote local HS-2453AF (F) Motor-driven AFWP-1 to SG-1 control valve remote local MS-2453BF (F) Motor-driven AEWP-1 to SG-2 control valve remote local HS-2456FT (F) Motor-driven AEWP-1 recirculation valve remote local 43/1-121-FT (F) Pressurizer level control valve remote local HS-4250B (C) SSW pump-1 remote local HS-4286FT (F) SSW pump-1 discharge valve remote local 1 HS-4393FT (F) Diesel generator-A service water control valve remote local 32 1 ! HS-4699FT (F) CCW to Reactor Coolant pump coolers isolation valve remote local HS-4701FT (F) RCP motor air and lube oil coolers CCW return header isolation valve remote local HS-4518B (C) CCW pump-1 remote local HS-4514FT (F) CCW heat exchanger to non-safety loop-1 control valve remote local HS-4524FT (F) Non-safety loop return to CCW header isolation valve remote local HS-4526FT (F) CCW to non-safety loop isolation valve remote local HS-5405B containment recirculation fan 01 remote local (F) Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown

e t CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-3 (SHEET 2 of 4) TRANSFER SWITCHES LOCATED ON SHUTDOWN TRANSFER PANEL (STP) Identification Function 43/1-APCHIL (C) Centrifugal charging pump-1 remote local 43/1-APBAIL (C) Boric acid transfer pump-1 remote local HS-5413B Containment recirculation fan 03 remote local 43/1-8106FT (F) Charging pumps to Reactor Coolant System isolation valve remote local 43/1-8801AF (F) Charging pumps to Reactor Coolant System SIS isolation valve remote local 43/1-8149AL (C) CVCS letdown orifice isolation valve remote local 43/1-8149BL (C) CVCS letdown orifice isolation valve remote local 43/1-8149CL (C) CVCS letdown orifice isolation valve remote local 32 43/1-8110FT (F) Charging pump miniflow isolation valve remote local 43/1-APRH1F (F) RHR ylmp-1 remote local ! 43/1-8701AF (F) RHR loop 1 inlet isolation valve remote local 43/1-8701BF (F) RHR loop 2 inlet isolation valve remote local Turbine-driven AFWP steam supply header #1 HS-2452B valve remote local 43/1-TCV-129L Letdown to demineralizer or volume control tank remote local HS-2333FT (F) Main Steam loop 1 isolation and bypass valves remote local (F) Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown.

I. . . , s CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-3 (SHEET 3 of 4) TRANSFER SWITCHES LOCATED ON SHUTDOWN TRANSFER PANEL (STP) Identification Function HS-2334FT (F) Main Steam loop 2 isolation and bypass valves remote local HS-2335FT (F) Main Steam loop 3 isolation and bypass valves remote local HS-2336FT (F) Main Steam loop 4 isolation and bypass valves remote local 43/1-455 AFT (F) Pressurizer power relief valve remote local 43/1-PCPRIL Pressurizer heater backup group-A remote local HS-XT (F) Water chiller control remote local HS-6700FT (F) Chilled water recirculation pump-5 remote local 32 43/1EA1-1 Incoming breaker 1EAl-1 remote local 43/1EAl-2 Incoming breaker 1EAl-2 remote local 43/IEG1 Diesel generator breaker IEG1 remote local 43/BT-1EA1 (F) Tie breaker BT-1EA1 remote local 43/TIEB1 (F) Bus IEA1 transfer TIEB1 feeder breaker remote local (F) Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown

a e CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.4-3 (SHEET 4 of 4) TRANSFER SWITCHES LOCATED ON SHUTDOWN TRANSFER PANEL (STP) Identification Function 43/1EB1-1 (F) Incoming breaker IEB1-1 remote local 43/TIEB3 (F) Bus IEA1 transfer.1EB3 feeder breaker remote local 43/1EB3-1 (F) Incoming breaker 1EB3-1 remote local 43/BT-1EB13 (F) Tie breaker BT-1EB13 remote local 32 l

Hand / Auto station with built-in transfer device to block control room signal and initiate control room local override alarm SSW - Station Service Water System CCW - Component Cooling Water System AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater System (F) Added for Fire Protection - Alternate Shutdown

            . , . . . _ - _                    t  - ._. _

ATTACHMENT D FSAR SECTION 9.5 (SELECTED PAGES) REVISED (ADVANCE COPY)

I CPSES/FSAR l not labeled as a fire-rated door because of the wicket. Since the fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlled occupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the environment or other areas of the plant due to a fire.

9. Fire Area 9 The safety-related essential systems and components located in Fire Area 9 are:

a. Safety-related cables, Train A

b. Safety-related cables, Train B

c. 6.9-kV and 480-V switchgear, Train A

d. Motor control center, Train A

e. Fan coil units, Train A

f. Electrical penetration assemblies, Train A

g. Shutdown Tronsfer Panel, Train A 32 Fire Area 9, shown on Figure 9.5-2, is located on elevation 810 ft 6 in, of the Safeguards Building Unit 1. The only mechanical components in this area are two HVAC fan coil units located in a one-foot-thick reinforced concrete enclosure. The enclosure is not rated because the only combustible materials in the area are the cables serving the fan coil units.

9.5-24

CPSES/FSAR As shown on Figure 9.5-38, the combustible loading for this area is classified a medium hazard which limits the maximum fire duration to less than 90 minutes, assuming all combustible material (electrical cable jacket and insulation material) in the area burns. This assumption is conservative, because the cable is self-extinguishing, fire retardant, and nonpropagating in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. Fire detectors are provided in this area to enable rapid fire detection. Figure 9.5-38 defines the number and type of fire detectors. A portion of this fire area is protected by a pre-action sprinkler system, designed to provide general area coverage. In addition, where required by section 9.5.1.2.3.8, directional sprinklers are installed in areas where there is a high density of safety related cable trays. The locations and water spray densities are described in Figures 9.5-2 and 9.5-38. The detectors used to actuate these sprinklers have been class "A" wired. Where required by section 9.5.1.2.3.9, Train B essential safety-related cabling is protected by a one-hour rated fire barrier. l Hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided as a backup to the sprinkler systems. A fire in this area will effect only Train A electrical equipment and cabling. The plant can be safely shutdown using the redundant safety train equipment. I 9.5-25

CPSES/FSAR The rated fire barriers which physically separate Fire Area 9

from adjacent areas are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete walls and floor with approved doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals of equivalent rating. As stated in Subsection 9.5.1.3.1, Item 8, door S-29c is designed and constructed to UL requirements, but is not labeled as a fire door because of a manway wicket in the door. The wicket is designed and constructed to the same requirements as door S-29c. The location of the door with respect to the combustible material in the area does not present a potential hazard to the adjacent area. Stairwell S-5, located in the corner of Fire Area 9, is enclosed in a two-hour rated fire barrier. See section 9.5.1.5.3.3 for further description. Since the fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlled occupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the environment or other areas of the plant due to a fire. b)

10. Fire Area 10 i

The safety-related essential systems and components located in Fire Area 10 are:

a. Diesel generator, Train A

b. Diesel generator, instrumentation and control equipment and cables, Train A

c. Diesel generator, Jacket water and lube oil coolers, Train A

d. Diesel generator, Air receivers, air dryers, air intake filters, compressors and after coolers, Train A

AMEN 0 MENT 17 9.5-26 APRIL 7, 1981

                                                                                      '~ ~ ~ ~ ~

CPSES/FSAR The rated fire barriers which physically separate Fire Area 15 from adjacent fire areas are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete walls and floors with approved fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals of equivalent rating. Since the fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlled occupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the environment or other areas of the plant due to a fire.

18. Fire Area 16 The safety-related essential systems and components located in Fire Area 16 are:

a. Hot shutdown panel, Trains A and B 32 (See section 7.4.1.3.4 for desci iption)

b. Safety-related cables, Train A and B Fire Area 16, shown on Figure 9.5-3, is located on elevation 831 ft S in. of the Safeguards Building Unit 1. Fire Area 16 also contains non-safety related electrical equipment, penetrations and cables as well as the equipment listed above.

The cables routed in this area are predominantly control and instrumentation. They are self-extinguishing, fire retardant, and nonpropagating in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. 32 As shown on Figure 9.5-38, the combustible loading for this area is classified a medium hazard, which limits the maximum fire duration to less than 60 minutes, assuming all combustible material (electrical cable jacket and insulation material) in the 9.5-38

CPSES/FSAR area burns. This assumption is conservative, because the cable is self-extinguishing, fire retardant, and nonpropagating in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. Class "A" wired fire detectors are provided in this area to enable rapid fire detection and to actuate the suppression system. Figure 9.5-38 defines the number and type of fire detectors in this area. A portion of this fire area is protected by a pre-action sprinkler system designed to provide general area coverage. 32 Figure 9.5-3 and 9.5-38 describe the protected area and the water spray density of the sprinkler system. Where required b, u tion 9.5.1.2.3.9, one train of essential safety-related cabling is protected by a one-hour rated fire barrier. Hose stations and portable extinguishers are also provided as a backup to the sprinkler system. In the event of a fire in this area, shutdown is achieved from the control room. See Section 7.4.1.3.4. 32 9.5-39

l l CPSES/FSAR The rated physical barriers which physically separate Fire Area - I 16 from adjoining areas of the plant are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete with doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals of an equivalent rating. Stairwell S-5,1c,cated in the corner of Fire Area 16, is enclosed in a two-hour rated barrier, as described in section 9.5.1.5.3. This stairwell serves as a means of and access for Fire Area 16. Since the fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlled occupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the environment or other areas of the plant due to a fire.

19. Fire Area 144 The safety-related essential systems and components located in Fire Area 144 are:

a. Safety-related piping and cables. Train A b ')

b. Safety-related piping and cables, Train B

                    . Fire area 144, shown on Figure 9.5-3 is located on elevation 831 ft. 6 in. of the Safeguards Building, Unit 1. This area is a piping penetration area for non-radioactive piping.

As shown on figure 9.5-38, the combustible loading for Fire Area 144 is classified a light hazard which limits the maximum fire duration to less than 30 minutes, assuming all combustible material (electrical cable jackets and insulation) in the area burns. This assumption is conservative, because the cable is self-extinguishing, fire retardant, and nonpropagating in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. - I AMENDMENT 17 APRIL 7, 1981 9.5-40

CPSES/FSAR 830 ft 0 in. There are no combustible materials in the area.

-}

As shown on Figure 9.5-39, the combustible loading for this area is classified a low hazard. A fire in this area does not affect the safe shutdown of the plant. , The rated fire barriers which physically separate Fire Area 62 l from adjacent plant areas are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete walls rated at two hours with approved fire doors and dampers of equivalent rating. Where the stairwell connects with a medium hazard area, three-hour rated fire doors are provided to maintain the integrity of the adjacent area fire barrier. The stairwell rating is in accordance with NFPA and OSHA requirements for stairwell enclosures.

21. Fire Area 63 The safety-related essential equipment and components located in -

this fire area are: N 1

a. Safety-related cables, Unit 2. Trains A and B.

l

b. Temination cabinents and distribution panelboards, Unit 2 Trains A and B.

Fire Area 63, shown on Figure 9.5-14, is located at elevation 807 ft 0 in. of the Electrical and Control Building. This fire area is the Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room. There is no mechanical equipment located in this area. In addition to the cables listed above, there are non-safety-related cables extending through this area. All cables in this area are self-extinguishing, fire retardant, and nonpropagating, in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974.

AMENDMENT 17 9.5-102 APRIL 7, 1981 l

CPSES/FSAR As shown on Figure 9.5-39, the combustible loading for this area is classified a high hazard. The method of assigning a fire l duration to a fire in this area is inappropriate as a fire I involving IEEE 383-1974 qualified cables would propagate very slowly, if at all . In the event a fire occurs in this fire area, alternate shutdown systems and procedures are provided to ensure safe shutdown 32 independent of the Cable Spreading Room. See section 7.4.1.3.4 for a description of these systems. Fire detectors are provided throughout this area to enable rapid fire detection, and to actuate the primary fire suppression system. Figure 9.5-39 defines the number and type of fire detectors in this area. This fire area is provided with a total-flooding-automatically actuated Halon system. Section 9.5.1.4.2.2 describes the design of the Halon fire suppression systems. As a backup to the Halon system, the fire area is protected by an automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system, designed to provide general area coverage. Figure 9.5-39 defines the sprinkler system design density. In addition, hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided for extinguishment of small fires. A minimum height of seven feet is maintained between the bottom of the lowest tray and the floor of the area to faciliate manual fire fighting. Shields are provided for electrical equipment where discharge of a sprinkler system could damage essential safety-relatcd electrical equipment. The three-hour rated fire barriers which physically separate Fire Area 63 from the adjacent plant areas are constructed of poured, l 9.5-103

CPSES/FSAR reinforced concrete with approved fire doors, dampers, and

penetration seals of equivalent rating. The fire dampers are ~ equipped with automatic Halon override to ensure closure upon actuation of the fixed Halon system. A fire in this area will not result in a radiation release because there are no radioactive materials in the area. The area is considered an uncontrolled, unrestricted access area.

22. Fire Area 64 The safety-related essential equipment and components located in this fire area are: -

a. Safety-related cables, Unit 1. Trains A and B

b. Termination cabinents and distribution panelboards, Unit 1, Trains A and B. ..

& ]

, Shown on Figure 9.5-14, Fire Area 64 is located at elevation 807 ! ft 0 in. of the Electrical and Control Building. This fire area is the Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room. There is no mechanical equipment located in this area. In addition to the cables listed above, there are non-safety-related cables extending through this area. All cables in this area are self-extinguishing, fire retardant and nonpropagating, in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. As shown on Figure 9.5-39, the combustible loading for this area is classified a high hazard. The method of assigning a fire duration to a fire in this area is inappropriate, as a fire involving IEEE 383-1974 qualified cable would propagate very slowly, if at all. -

AMENDHENT 17 9.5-104 APRIL 7, 1981

CPSES/FSAR In the event a fire occurs in this fire area, alternate shutdown systems and procedures are provided to ensure safe shutdown independent of the Cable Spreading Room. See section 7.4.1.3.4 for a description of these systems. Fire detutors are provided throughout this area to enable rapid fire detection, and to actuate the primary Fire Suppression System. Figure 9.5-39 defines the number and type of fire detectors in this area. This fire area is provided with a total-flooding-automatically-actuated Halon sytem. Section 9.5.1.4.2.2 described the design of the Halon fire suppression systems. As a backup to the Halon system, the fire area is protected by an automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system, designed to provide general area ce"erage. Figure 9.5-39 defines the sprinkler system design density. In addition, hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided in this area for extinguishment of small fires. A minimum height of seven feet is maintained between the bottom of the lowest tray and the floor of the area to faciliate manual fire fighting. Shields are provided for electrical equipment where discharge of a sprinkler system could damage essential safety-related electrical equipment. The three-hour rated fire barriers which physcially separate Fire Area 64 from the adjacent plant areas are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete with approved fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals of equivalent rating. The fire dampers are equipped with automatic Halon overrides to ensure closure upon actuation of the fixed Halon system. 4.5-105

CPSES/FSAR

                                                                                                                                                                    ~
                                                                                                                                                                             )

A fire in this area will not result in a radiation release because there are no radioactive materials in the area. The area is considered an uncontrolled, unrestricted access area.

23. Fire Area 65 Fire Area 65 is the Control Room complex. This area encompasses the main control consoles, the auxiliary relay panels, the production supervisors area, the locker room and lavatory, the kitchen area, and the observation area. Shown on Figures 9.5-15, 9.5-18 and 9.5-19, the control room complex on elevations 830 ft 0 in. and 840 ft 6 in. and is common to both units. Three-hour fire rated physical separation is maintained between this area and adjacent plant areas.

As shown on Figure 9.5-39, the combustible loading for Fire Area 65 is classified a light hazard which limits the maximum fire ,i duration to less than 30 minutes. Fire detectors are provided at the following locations in this fire area to enable rapid fire detection:

a. Inside each main control console

b. Below the false ceiling in the main console area.

c. Below the false ceiling in the auxiliary relay panel area.

d. Above the false ceiling wherever cabling is routed,

e. In the locker room, kitchen, and production supervisors office.

In the control room observation area.

])

f. APRIL 21, 1981 9.5-106 4

CPSES/FSAR

g. In the ventilation supply and return ductwork.

Hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided in this fire area for fire extinguishment. Figures 9.5-15 and 9.5-39 defines the type and location of the fire extinguishing equipment in the control room. The production supervisor's office, the kitchen area, and the locker room and lavatory are separated from the main control console area by concrete walls containing windows. Rated fire barriers are not required at these locations because of the low amount of combustible material present. A fire outside of Fire Area 65 will not affect the habitability of the control room. In the event that a fire occurs in this fire area, alternate shutdown systems and procedures are provided to ensure safe 32 shutdown independant of the Control Room. See section 7.4.1.3.4 for a description of these systems. The rated fire barriers which separate this area from other areas of the plant are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete or gypsum dry walls with approved fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals of equivalent rating. A fire in this arts will not result in a radiation release because there are no radioactive materials in this area. The area is considered an Lncontrolled, unrestricted access area.

24. Fire Area 66 There are no safety-related systems and components located in Fire Area 66. This area contains the Unit 2 computer room.

Shown on Figure 9.5-15, it is located at elevation 830 ft 0 in. of the Electrical and Control Building. l l l 9.5-107

CPSES/FSAR The rated fire barriers which physically separate Fire Area 83 from adjacent areas are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete walls and floors with approved doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals of equivalent rating. The barrier between Fire Areas 83 and 84 includes a manually operated rollup steel door (Door S-29c) with a manway wicket. This door is constructed in accordance with UL requirements for rollup steel doors, but it is not labeled as a fire rated door because of the wicket. See Section 9.5.1.5.3.3 for further description. Since the area fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlled occupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the environment or other areas of the plant due to a fire. s

9. Fire Area 84 The safety-related components located in Fire Area 84 are:

a. Safety-related cables, Train A

b. Safety-related cables, Train B

c. 6.9-kV and 480-V switchgear, Train A

d. Motor control center, Train A

, e. Emergency fan coil units, Train A l

f. Electrical penetration assemblies, Train A 32 g. Shutdown Transfer Panel, Train A 9.5-136 1 - _

CPSES/FSAR Fire Area 84, shown on Figure 9.5-8, is located on elevation 810 f t 6 in. of the Safeguards Building Unit 2. The only mechanical components in this area are two HVAC emergency fan coil units located in a one-foot-thick reinforced concrete enclosure. The enclosure is not rated because the only combustible materials in the area are the cables serving the fan coil units. As shown on Figure 9.5-40, the combustible loading for this area is classified as a medium hazard which limits the maximum fire duration to less than 90 minutes, assuming all combustible material (electrical cable jacket and insulation material) in the area burns. The assumption is conservative, because the cable is self-extinguishing, fire-retardant, and nonpropagating in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. Fire detectors are provided to enable rapid fire detection. Figure 9.5-40 defines the number and type of fire detectors in this area. I A portion of this fire area is protected by a pre-action sprinkler system, designed to provide general area coverage. Automatic sprinklers designed to apply water directly on cable trays are also installed where there is a high density of 2 safety-related cable trays, as described in Section 9.5.1.2.3.8. The detectors used to actuate these sprinklers have been Class "A" wired. Where required by Section 9.5.1.2.3.9, safety-related Train B cabling in this area is protected by a one-hour rated fire barrier. Hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided as a backup to the fixed sprinkler systems. 32 9.5-137

CPSES/FSAR Based on the above considerations, a fire in this area will affect only the Train A safety-related cables in the area. The redundant safety train equipment is available to safely shutdown the plant. The rated fire barriers which physically separate Fire Area 84 from adjacent areas are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete walls and floor with approved doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals of equivalent rating. As stated in Subsection 9.5.1.3.1, Item 8 Door S-29c is designed and constructed to UL requirements but is not labeled as a fire door because of the wicket. The location of the door with respect to the combustible material in the area does not present a potential hazard to the adjacent area. Stairwell S-5, located in the corner of Fire Area 84, is enclosed in a two-hour rated fire barrier. See Section 9.5.1.5.3.3 for~further description. Since the fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlle'd, occupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the environment or other areas of the plant due to a fire.

10. Fire Area 85 The safety-related components located in Fire Area 85 are:

a. Diesel generator, Train A

b. Diesel generator instrumentation and control equipment and cables, Train A

c. Diesel generator jacket water and lube oil coolers, Train A

d. Diesel generator air receivers, air dryers, air intake filters, compressors and after coolers, Train A 9.5-138

CPSES/FSAR Since the fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlled occupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the environment or other areas of the plant due to a fire.

18. Fire Area 91 The safety-related components located in Fire Area 91 are:

a. Hot shutdown panel, Trains A and B 32 (See Section 7.4.1.3.4 for description)

b. Safety-related cables, Train A and B Fire Area 91, shown on Figure 9.5-9, is located on elevation 831 f t 6 in. of the Safeguards Building Unit 2. Fire Area 91, contains non-safety-related electrical equipment and cables as well as the equipment listed above.

32 As shown on Figure 9.5-40, the combustible loading for this area is classified as a medium hazard which limits the maximum fire duration to less than 60 minutes, assuming all combustible material (electrical cable jacket and insulation material) in the area burns. This assumption is conservative, because the cable is self-extinguishing, fire-retardant, and nonpropagating in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. Class "A" wired fire detectors are provided to enable rapid fire 32 detection and to actuate the suppression system. Figure 9.5-40 defines the number and type of fire detectors in this area. 9.5-150

CPSES/FSAR A portion of this fire area is protected by a pre-action sprinkler system designed to provide general area coverage. Figure 9.5-6 and 9.5-40 describe the protected area and the water spray density of the sprinkler system. Hose stations and portable extinguishers are also provided as a backup to the fixed sprinkler system. In the event of a fire in this area, shutdown is achieved from the control room. See Section 7.4.1.3.4. The rated fire barriers which physically separate Fire Area 91 from adjoining areas of the plant are constructed of poured, reinforced concrete with doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals of an equivalent rating. Stairwell S-5, located in the corner of Fire Area 91, is enclosed in a two-hour fire rated barrier, as described in Section 9.5.1.5.3. This stairwell serves as a means of access for Fire Area 91. Since the fire barrier rating is greater than the postulated fire duration, and since the area is a controlled ocupational access area, there will not be an unacceptable radiation release to the environment or other areas of the plant due to a fire. l

19. Fire Area 147 The safety-related components located in Fire Area 147 are:

a. Safety-related piping and cables, Train A

b. Safety-related piping and cables, Train B Fire Area 147, shown in Figure 9.5-9 is located on elevation 831 l ft. 6 in. of the Unit 2 Safeguards Building. This area contains

! piping penetrations for non-radioactive piping. 9.5-151 _ _ _ _ _- o

" ^

CPSES/FSAR As shown in Figure 9.5-40, the combustible loading for Fire Area 147 is classified as a light hazard which limits the maximum fire duration to less than 30 minutes, assuming all combustible material (electrical cable jacket and insulation) in the area burns. This assumption is conservative, because the cable is self-extinguishing, fire retardant, and nonpropagating, in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. Fire detectors are provided to enable rapid fire detection. Figure 9.5-40 defines the number and type of fire detectors in this area. Where required by Section 9.5.1.2.3.9, one train of safety-related cabling in this area is protected by a one-hour rated fire barrier. This fire area is protected by an automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system designed to provide general area coverage. Hose stations and portable extinguishers are located in the adjacent fire area as a backup to the fixed sprinkler system. 9.5-152

ATTACHMENT E ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN ! STUDY 1 i}}

ML20052E935

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