LER 90-001-00:on 891116,potential Concern Identified W/ Pressurizer Safety Valve Blowdown Being Greater than Assumed in Safety Analyses.Caused by Functional Design Deficiency. Also Reportable Per Part 21.W/900202 LtrML20011E395 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Catawba ![Duke Energy icon.png](/w/images/7/75/Duke_Energy_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
02/02/1990 |
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From: |
Glover R, Owen T DUKE POWER CO. |
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To: |
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
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References |
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REF-PT21-90, REF-PT21-90-021-000 LER-90-001-02, LER-90-1-2, PT21-90-021-000, PT21-90-21, NUDOCS 9002130347 |
Download: ML20011E395 (8) |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML20024J2601994-10-0404 October 1994 LER 94-006-00:on 940913,automatic Reactor/Turbine Trip Occurred on Over Power Differential Temperature.Caused by Equipment Failure.Replaced Relay & Evaluated Failure Rate of Types of relays.W/941004 Ltr ML20029D1011994-04-20020 April 1994 LER 93-003-01:on 930925,reactor Tripped Due to Inadvertent Closure of Msiv.Caused by Inadequate Checking.Corrective Actions:Cros Throttled CA Flow & Entered Procedure EP/2/A/5000/01.W/940420 Ltr ML20046D5871993-08-17017 August 1993 LER 93-008-00:on 930718,reactor Tripped & Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Automatic Start Due to low-low-level in SG 1A. Developed General Troubleshooting procedure.W/930817 Ltr ML20045H2421993-07-12012 July 1993 LER 93-006-00:on 930612,automatic Reactor Trip Initiated by intermediate-range Channel N35 Hi Flux Reactor Trip Bistable.Caused by Blown Fuse in Channel.Entire Drawer Replaced & Channel Placed Back in svc.W/930712 Ltr ML20024G9751991-05-0909 May 1991 LER 91-004-00:on 910410,tech Spec Violation Occurred Re Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Being Inoperable. Caused by Inapropriate Action.Maint Staff Instructed Supervisors & Technicians of Correcting cause.W/910509 Ltr ML20024G7371991-04-18018 April 1991 LER 91-006-00:on 910323,nuclear Svc Water Valves Left W/O Emergency Power Supply.Caused by Inappropriate Action Due to Misreading of Operator Aid Computer (Oac) Graphics.Oac Graphics Training Will Be provided.W/910418 Ltr ML20029A3311991-02-12012 February 1991 LER 91-002-00:on 910113,reactor Exceeded 5% Power Level W/ RHR Sys Pump 1A Inoperable Due to Closed Suction Valve. Caused by Inappropriate Action & Procedural Deficiency. Incident Discussed W/Involved personnel.W/910212 Ltr ML20044B1761990-07-10010 July 1990 LER 90-013-00:on 900611,approx 5,000 Gallons of RCS Water Inadvertently Transferred to Refueling Water Storage Tank. Caused by Inappropriate Action.Proper Sys Parameters Restored & Analysis of Event performed.W/900709 Ltr ML20043G6441990-06-14014 June 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900430,high Pressure CO2 Discharge Occurred on Auxiliary Feedwater Fire Protection Sys.Caused by Const/ Installation Deficiency in Solenoids.Solenoids Orientation Verified to Be Installed correctly.W/900614 Ltr ML20043C8951990-05-29029 May 1990 LER 89-010-01:on 880314,auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A Discharge to Steam Generator 2A Isolation Failed to Completely Close.Caused by Design Deficiency.Mods to Actuator Torque Switch Setting increased.W/900524 Ltr ML20042G6301990-05-0909 May 1990 LER 90-025-00:on 900409,unexpected ESFs Actuation Occurred During Performance of Incore Thermocouple Testing.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised & Reviewed W/Personnel Lessons Learned from event.W/900503 Ltr ML20043A9271990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 89-030-01:on 890726,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Shipment of Two Liners of Secondary Bead & Powdex Resin Mixture.On 891215,same Tech Spec Violation Occurred.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Shipments suspended.W/900503 Ltr ML20042F4721990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 90-015-00:on 900402,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered When Both Trains of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Supervisor Incorrectly Denoting Valve Position.Valves 1RN-493 & 494 closed.W/900430 Ltr ML20042F4741990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 90-006-00:on 900321,discovered That Nuclear Svc Water Sys Assured Makeup Source to Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Surge Chamber 2A Would Not Provide Adequate Flow. Caused by Clogged pipe.W/900430 Ltr ML20042E3141990-04-0303 April 1990 LER 90-002-01:on 900103,containment Air Return Fan Failed to Start During Test & Breaker FO1A in Motor Control Ctr Opened.Caused by Inappropriate Action.Measures Taken to Ensure Positions of Breakers verified.W/900409 Ltr ML20012C6881990-03-15015 March 1990 LER 90-011-00:on 900215,discovered That Control Room Doors Were More Difficult to Open than Normal.Ventilation Sys Found to Be Incapable of Maintaining Positive Pressure. Caused by Design Deficiency.Walls sealed.W/900315 Ltr ML20012C6901990-03-15015 March 1990 LER 90-005-01:on 900126,Tech Spec 3.0,3 Entered Due to More than One Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Exceeding 5% Deviation.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Operations Procedure revised.W/900314 Ltr ML20012C3741990-03-13013 March 1990 LER 90-012-00:on 900127,central Alarm Station Operator Noted That Controlled Access Door Not Closed.Caused by Inappropriate Action Taken Which Was Unauthorized.Personnel Counseled on Importance of Sys operability.W/900313 Ltr ML20012C5091990-03-13013 March 1990 LER 90-009-00:on 900212,containment Purge Sys Heaters Not Being Verified to Be Running During Monthly Surveillance as Required by Tech Specs.Caused by Defective Procedures,Due to Incomplete Info.Procedures revised.W/900313 Ltr ML20012C5111990-03-12012 March 1990 LER 90-007-01:on 891108,discovered That Transmission Procedures Used to Perform Undervoltage Relay Tests Revealed That Test Acceptance Criteria Did Not Agree W/Tech Specs & Relays Not Being Adjusted as required.W/900316 Ltr ML20012B8121990-03-0909 March 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900203,discovered That Insulation Removed from Main Steam Auxiliary Equipment Piping to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine.Caused by Design Oversight Due to Unanticipated Interaction of sys.W/900309 Ltr ML20012C4961990-03-0707 March 1990 LER 90-010-00:on 900205,discovered That Standby Shutdown Facility Wide Range RCS Temp Indications Had Not Been Subj to Monthly Channel Check as Required by Tech Spec 4.7.13.6. Caused by Defective procedure.W/900307 Ltr ML20012A1781990-02-27027 February 1990 LER 90-005-00:on 900126,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Inoperable Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation (Prni) During Unit Shutdown.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Action Developed to Better Anticipate & Carry Out Prni calibr.W/900227 Ltr ML20006E8231990-02-14014 February 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 900104,contact Carrier Screws in nonsafety- Related Breaker Found Loose & in Bottom of Motor Control Ctr Cubicle.Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Loose Screws Secured. Part 21 related.W/900215 Ltr ML20006D4861990-02-0707 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900105,unexpected Auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Startup Occurred During Periodic Cabinet Test. Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Procedures to Be Revised to Prevent recurrence.W/900207 Ltr ML20011E2281990-02-0202 February 1990 LER 90-002-00:on 900103,containment Air Return Fan 1B Failed to Start During Quarterly Test & Breaker F01A in Motor Control Ctr Discovered Open.Caused by Inappropriate Operator Action.Lockout Breakers closed.W/900202 Ltr ML20011E3951990-02-0202 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 891116,potential Concern Identified W/ Pressurizer Safety Valve Blowdown Being Greater than Assumed in Safety Analyses.Caused by Functional Design Deficiency. Also Reportable Per Part 21.W/900202 Ltr ML19354E0191990-01-19019 January 1990 LER 89-020-01:on 891118,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered & 5-month Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Sys Inoperability Occurred as Result of Low Filter Exhaust Flow Condition on 891111.Caused by Design Oversight.Duct Will Be cleaned.W/900119 Ltr ML19354E0931990-01-18018 January 1990 LER 89-025-01:on 890922,power Lost to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans Due to Deenergization of 13.8 Kv Auxiliary Switchgear.Caused by Weather Conditions.Reactor Power Reduced to Maintain Condenser vacuum.W/900119 Ltr ML19354E0201990-01-18018 January 1990 LER 89-016-01:on 890913,generator 1B Power Circuit Breaker Opened,Causing Unit Runback to 54% Power & Failure of Generator Breaker Air Pressure Gauge.Caused by Equipment Failure.Pneumatic Gauge replaced.W/900117 Ltr ML19354D8261990-01-15015 January 1990 LER 89-029-00:on 891213,determined That Max Actuator Torque Switch Setting Insufficient to Overcome Friction Force Due to Age Hardening of Elastomeric Seat Matl on Bif/General Signal Corp Valve.Also Reported Per Part 21.W/900112 Ltr ML20005G4261990-01-12012 January 1990 LER 89-013-00:on 890726,two Carbon Steel Liners,Containing Mixture of Powdex & Bead Resins,Shipped to Barnwell,Sc,In Violation of Process Control Program.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Shipment suspended.W/900112 Ltr ML20005G3061990-01-0909 January 1990 LER 89-020-00:on 890921,abnormal Degradation of Steel Containment Vessels Observed.Caused by Corrosion by Standing Water in Annulus Areas.Steel Containment Vessels Will Be Recoated During Next Refueling outage.W/900109 Ltr ML20005E4021989-12-29029 December 1989 LER 89-028-00:on 891204,steam Generator 1D Power Operated Relief Valve Did Not Close on Train a Main Steam Isolation Signal During Valve Inservice Test.Caused by Failed Fuse. Fuse replaced.W/891229 Ltr ML20011D3321989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-021-00:on 890821,hydrogen Skimmer Fan 2A Declared Inoperable in Order to Replace Breaker,In Response to NRC Bulletin 88-010.On 890825,breaker Tripped & Power Reduction Resumed.Caused by Inappropriate action.W/891222 Ltr ML20011D3351989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-027-00:on 891120,chemical & Vol Control Sys Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B Declared Inoperable Due to Inability to Maintain Sufficient Charging Flow.Cause Not determined.Power-range Detector replaced.W/891222 Ltr ML20011D2321989-12-18018 December 1989 LER 89-020-00:on 891111,low Filtered Exhaust Flow Discovered by Control Room Operators During Observation of Indications. Caused by Design Oversight Re Interaction of Sys/Components. Clothes Dryer Filters to Be modified.W/891218 Ltr ML19332E7201989-12-0606 December 1989 LER 89-023-01:on 890915,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered as Result of Both Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Sys Being Inoperable.Caused by Equipment Malfunctions.Control Room & Area Pressurization Flow Rates revised.W/891120 Ltr ML19324B1141989-10-20020 October 1989 LER 89-024-00:on 890920,safety Review Group Staff Member Identified Committed Fire Door S102A as Possibly Inadequate. Caused by Design Deficiency.Fire Watch Established & Door repaired.W/891019 Ltr ML19324B4091989-10-20020 October 1989 LER 89-025-00:on 890922,13.8 Kv Auxiliary Switchgear Deenergized Resulting in Loss of Power to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans.Power Reduction Due to Hurricane Hugo.W/891019 Ltr ML19325C6381989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-023-00:on 890915,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Both Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Sys Being Inoperable.Caused by Defective pre-operational Testing Procedure.Train a Control Room Damper adjusted.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C6401989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-016-00:on 890913,four Channels of Power Range Instrumentation Showed Greater than 5% Allowable Mismatch Between Rated Thermal Power & Nuclear Power.Caused by Equipment Failure.Pneumatic Gauge replaced.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C6441989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-019-00:on 890912,capability of Switches 2CA-15A & 2CA-18B Disabled Rendering Feedwater Pumps 2A & 2B Inoperable.Caused by Defective Procedure & Inappropriate Actions.Procedure Revised & Update issued.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C1961989-10-0404 October 1989 LER 89-026-00:on 890823,tested Breaker Replaced W/Traceable Breaker in Response to Bulletin 88-010.Breaker Tripped. Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Work Request Written.Item Reportable Per Part 21.W/891003 Ltr ML19327B6071989-09-20020 September 1989 LER 89-025-00:on 890922,auxiliary Switchgear Deenergized, Resulting in Loss of Power to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans.Caused by Inoperable power-range Instrumentation Due to Hurricane Hugo.W/890920 Ltr ML17303B1821986-12-30030 December 1986 LER 86-058-01:on 861111 & 18,overtemp Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred on Increasing Reactor Coolant Temp Rate.Caused by Spike on Potentiometer.Valve Realigned & Unit Returned to Previous status.W/861230 Ltr 1994-04-20
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML20024J2601994-10-0404 October 1994 LER 94-006-00:on 940913,automatic Reactor/Turbine Trip Occurred on Over Power Differential Temperature.Caused by Equipment Failure.Replaced Relay & Evaluated Failure Rate of Types of relays.W/941004 Ltr ML20029D1011994-04-20020 April 1994 LER 93-003-01:on 930925,reactor Tripped Due to Inadvertent Closure of Msiv.Caused by Inadequate Checking.Corrective Actions:Cros Throttled CA Flow & Entered Procedure EP/2/A/5000/01.W/940420 Ltr ML20046D5871993-08-17017 August 1993 LER 93-008-00:on 930718,reactor Tripped & Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Automatic Start Due to low-low-level in SG 1A. Developed General Troubleshooting procedure.W/930817 Ltr ML20045H2421993-07-12012 July 1993 LER 93-006-00:on 930612,automatic Reactor Trip Initiated by intermediate-range Channel N35 Hi Flux Reactor Trip Bistable.Caused by Blown Fuse in Channel.Entire Drawer Replaced & Channel Placed Back in svc.W/930712 Ltr ML20024G9751991-05-0909 May 1991 LER 91-004-00:on 910410,tech Spec Violation Occurred Re Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Being Inoperable. Caused by Inapropriate Action.Maint Staff Instructed Supervisors & Technicians of Correcting cause.W/910509 Ltr ML20024G7371991-04-18018 April 1991 LER 91-006-00:on 910323,nuclear Svc Water Valves Left W/O Emergency Power Supply.Caused by Inappropriate Action Due to Misreading of Operator Aid Computer (Oac) Graphics.Oac Graphics Training Will Be provided.W/910418 Ltr ML20029A3311991-02-12012 February 1991 LER 91-002-00:on 910113,reactor Exceeded 5% Power Level W/ RHR Sys Pump 1A Inoperable Due to Closed Suction Valve. Caused by Inappropriate Action & Procedural Deficiency. Incident Discussed W/Involved personnel.W/910212 Ltr ML20044B1761990-07-10010 July 1990 LER 90-013-00:on 900611,approx 5,000 Gallons of RCS Water Inadvertently Transferred to Refueling Water Storage Tank. Caused by Inappropriate Action.Proper Sys Parameters Restored & Analysis of Event performed.W/900709 Ltr ML20043G6441990-06-14014 June 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900430,high Pressure CO2 Discharge Occurred on Auxiliary Feedwater Fire Protection Sys.Caused by Const/ Installation Deficiency in Solenoids.Solenoids Orientation Verified to Be Installed correctly.W/900614 Ltr ML20043C8951990-05-29029 May 1990 LER 89-010-01:on 880314,auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A Discharge to Steam Generator 2A Isolation Failed to Completely Close.Caused by Design Deficiency.Mods to Actuator Torque Switch Setting increased.W/900524 Ltr ML20042G6301990-05-0909 May 1990 LER 90-025-00:on 900409,unexpected ESFs Actuation Occurred During Performance of Incore Thermocouple Testing.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised & Reviewed W/Personnel Lessons Learned from event.W/900503 Ltr ML20043A9271990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 89-030-01:on 890726,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Shipment of Two Liners of Secondary Bead & Powdex Resin Mixture.On 891215,same Tech Spec Violation Occurred.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Shipments suspended.W/900503 Ltr ML20042F4721990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 90-015-00:on 900402,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered When Both Trains of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Supervisor Incorrectly Denoting Valve Position.Valves 1RN-493 & 494 closed.W/900430 Ltr ML20042F4741990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 90-006-00:on 900321,discovered That Nuclear Svc Water Sys Assured Makeup Source to Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Surge Chamber 2A Would Not Provide Adequate Flow. Caused by Clogged pipe.W/900430 Ltr ML20042E3141990-04-0303 April 1990 LER 90-002-01:on 900103,containment Air Return Fan Failed to Start During Test & Breaker FO1A in Motor Control Ctr Opened.Caused by Inappropriate Action.Measures Taken to Ensure Positions of Breakers verified.W/900409 Ltr ML20012C6881990-03-15015 March 1990 LER 90-011-00:on 900215,discovered That Control Room Doors Were More Difficult to Open than Normal.Ventilation Sys Found to Be Incapable of Maintaining Positive Pressure. Caused by Design Deficiency.Walls sealed.W/900315 Ltr ML20012C6901990-03-15015 March 1990 LER 90-005-01:on 900126,Tech Spec 3.0,3 Entered Due to More than One Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Exceeding 5% Deviation.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Operations Procedure revised.W/900314 Ltr ML20012C3741990-03-13013 March 1990 LER 90-012-00:on 900127,central Alarm Station Operator Noted That Controlled Access Door Not Closed.Caused by Inappropriate Action Taken Which Was Unauthorized.Personnel Counseled on Importance of Sys operability.W/900313 Ltr ML20012C5091990-03-13013 March 1990 LER 90-009-00:on 900212,containment Purge Sys Heaters Not Being Verified to Be Running During Monthly Surveillance as Required by Tech Specs.Caused by Defective Procedures,Due to Incomplete Info.Procedures revised.W/900313 Ltr ML20012C5111990-03-12012 March 1990 LER 90-007-01:on 891108,discovered That Transmission Procedures Used to Perform Undervoltage Relay Tests Revealed That Test Acceptance Criteria Did Not Agree W/Tech Specs & Relays Not Being Adjusted as required.W/900316 Ltr ML20012B8121990-03-0909 March 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900203,discovered That Insulation Removed from Main Steam Auxiliary Equipment Piping to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine.Caused by Design Oversight Due to Unanticipated Interaction of sys.W/900309 Ltr ML20012C4961990-03-0707 March 1990 LER 90-010-00:on 900205,discovered That Standby Shutdown Facility Wide Range RCS Temp Indications Had Not Been Subj to Monthly Channel Check as Required by Tech Spec 4.7.13.6. Caused by Defective procedure.W/900307 Ltr ML20012A1781990-02-27027 February 1990 LER 90-005-00:on 900126,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Inoperable Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation (Prni) During Unit Shutdown.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Action Developed to Better Anticipate & Carry Out Prni calibr.W/900227 Ltr ML20006E8231990-02-14014 February 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 900104,contact Carrier Screws in nonsafety- Related Breaker Found Loose & in Bottom of Motor Control Ctr Cubicle.Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Loose Screws Secured. Part 21 related.W/900215 Ltr ML20006D4861990-02-0707 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900105,unexpected Auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Startup Occurred During Periodic Cabinet Test. Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Procedures to Be Revised to Prevent recurrence.W/900207 Ltr ML20011E2281990-02-0202 February 1990 LER 90-002-00:on 900103,containment Air Return Fan 1B Failed to Start During Quarterly Test & Breaker F01A in Motor Control Ctr Discovered Open.Caused by Inappropriate Operator Action.Lockout Breakers closed.W/900202 Ltr ML20011E3951990-02-0202 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 891116,potential Concern Identified W/ Pressurizer Safety Valve Blowdown Being Greater than Assumed in Safety Analyses.Caused by Functional Design Deficiency. Also Reportable Per Part 21.W/900202 Ltr ML19354E0191990-01-19019 January 1990 LER 89-020-01:on 891118,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered & 5-month Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Sys Inoperability Occurred as Result of Low Filter Exhaust Flow Condition on 891111.Caused by Design Oversight.Duct Will Be cleaned.W/900119 Ltr ML19354E0931990-01-18018 January 1990 LER 89-025-01:on 890922,power Lost to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans Due to Deenergization of 13.8 Kv Auxiliary Switchgear.Caused by Weather Conditions.Reactor Power Reduced to Maintain Condenser vacuum.W/900119 Ltr ML19354E0201990-01-18018 January 1990 LER 89-016-01:on 890913,generator 1B Power Circuit Breaker Opened,Causing Unit Runback to 54% Power & Failure of Generator Breaker Air Pressure Gauge.Caused by Equipment Failure.Pneumatic Gauge replaced.W/900117 Ltr ML19354D8261990-01-15015 January 1990 LER 89-029-00:on 891213,determined That Max Actuator Torque Switch Setting Insufficient to Overcome Friction Force Due to Age Hardening of Elastomeric Seat Matl on Bif/General Signal Corp Valve.Also Reported Per Part 21.W/900112 Ltr ML20005G4261990-01-12012 January 1990 LER 89-013-00:on 890726,two Carbon Steel Liners,Containing Mixture of Powdex & Bead Resins,Shipped to Barnwell,Sc,In Violation of Process Control Program.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Shipment suspended.W/900112 Ltr ML20005G3061990-01-0909 January 1990 LER 89-020-00:on 890921,abnormal Degradation of Steel Containment Vessels Observed.Caused by Corrosion by Standing Water in Annulus Areas.Steel Containment Vessels Will Be Recoated During Next Refueling outage.W/900109 Ltr ML20005E4021989-12-29029 December 1989 LER 89-028-00:on 891204,steam Generator 1D Power Operated Relief Valve Did Not Close on Train a Main Steam Isolation Signal During Valve Inservice Test.Caused by Failed Fuse. Fuse replaced.W/891229 Ltr ML20011D3321989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-021-00:on 890821,hydrogen Skimmer Fan 2A Declared Inoperable in Order to Replace Breaker,In Response to NRC Bulletin 88-010.On 890825,breaker Tripped & Power Reduction Resumed.Caused by Inappropriate action.W/891222 Ltr ML20011D3351989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-027-00:on 891120,chemical & Vol Control Sys Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B Declared Inoperable Due to Inability to Maintain Sufficient Charging Flow.Cause Not determined.Power-range Detector replaced.W/891222 Ltr ML20011D2321989-12-18018 December 1989 LER 89-020-00:on 891111,low Filtered Exhaust Flow Discovered by Control Room Operators During Observation of Indications. Caused by Design Oversight Re Interaction of Sys/Components. Clothes Dryer Filters to Be modified.W/891218 Ltr ML19332E7201989-12-0606 December 1989 LER 89-023-01:on 890915,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered as Result of Both Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Sys Being Inoperable.Caused by Equipment Malfunctions.Control Room & Area Pressurization Flow Rates revised.W/891120 Ltr ML19324B1141989-10-20020 October 1989 LER 89-024-00:on 890920,safety Review Group Staff Member Identified Committed Fire Door S102A as Possibly Inadequate. Caused by Design Deficiency.Fire Watch Established & Door repaired.W/891019 Ltr ML19324B4091989-10-20020 October 1989 LER 89-025-00:on 890922,13.8 Kv Auxiliary Switchgear Deenergized Resulting in Loss of Power to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans.Power Reduction Due to Hurricane Hugo.W/891019 Ltr ML19325C6381989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-023-00:on 890915,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Both Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Sys Being Inoperable.Caused by Defective pre-operational Testing Procedure.Train a Control Room Damper adjusted.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C6401989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-016-00:on 890913,four Channels of Power Range Instrumentation Showed Greater than 5% Allowable Mismatch Between Rated Thermal Power & Nuclear Power.Caused by Equipment Failure.Pneumatic Gauge replaced.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C6441989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-019-00:on 890912,capability of Switches 2CA-15A & 2CA-18B Disabled Rendering Feedwater Pumps 2A & 2B Inoperable.Caused by Defective Procedure & Inappropriate Actions.Procedure Revised & Update issued.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C1961989-10-0404 October 1989 LER 89-026-00:on 890823,tested Breaker Replaced W/Traceable Breaker in Response to Bulletin 88-010.Breaker Tripped. Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Work Request Written.Item Reportable Per Part 21.W/891003 Ltr ML19327B6071989-09-20020 September 1989 LER 89-025-00:on 890922,auxiliary Switchgear Deenergized, Resulting in Loss of Power to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans.Caused by Inoperable power-range Instrumentation Due to Hurricane Hugo.W/890920 Ltr ML17303B1821986-12-30030 December 1986 LER 86-058-01:on 861111 & 18,overtemp Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred on Increasing Reactor Coolant Temp Rate.Caused by Spike on Potentiometer.Valve Realigned & Unit Returned to Previous status.W/861230 Ltr 1994-04-20
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217H0201999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 ML20212B4711999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217H0321999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20211A9791999-08-20020 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20211C1291999-08-17017 August 1999 ISI Rept Unit 1 Catawba 1999 RFO 11 ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20210S2891999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20212B4871999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20210S2951999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4561999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20196A0001999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206P5201999-05-14014 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20206N8391999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr ML20206R1811999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196A0041999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N8261999-04-22022 April 1999 Rev 15 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr. Page 145 of 270 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20205S5551999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20205N3651999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting IPE of External Events Submittal ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML20206R1931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9521999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9561999-02-28028 February 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20204C9111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20203A2581999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of TR DPC-NE-3002-A,Rev 2, UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology. Rept Acceptable. Staff Requests Duke Energy Corp to Publish Accepted Version of TR within 3 Months of Receipt of SE ML20204C9161999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199K8711999-01-13013 January 1999 Inservice Insp Rept for Unit 2 Catawba 1998 Refueling Outage 9 ML20199E3071998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept ML20205E9441998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 10CFR50.59 Rept for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2, Containing Brief Description of Changes,Tests & Experiments,Including Summary of Ses.With ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor ML20203A4101998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-25, Catawba Unit 2 Cycle 10 Colr ML20203A4041998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 14 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 11 Colr ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998 Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas ML20196J8351998-12-0808 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request Re Relief Valves in Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Sys ML20199E3221998-11-30030 November 1998 Revised MOR for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Re Personnel Exposure ML20198E3151998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196C0251998-11-27027 November 1998 SER Accepting Clarification on Calibration Tolerances on Trip Setpoints for Catawba Nuclear Station ML20196A6881998-11-25025 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request 98-02 Re Limited Exam for Three Welds ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised ML20195E5521998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20198E3261998-10-31031 October 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154M7661998-10-12012 October 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980913,terminated Vendor Employee Entered Protected Area.Caused by Computer Interface Malfunction. Security Retained Vendor Employee Badge to Prevent Further Access & Computer Malfunction Was Repaired.With 1999-09-07
[Table view] |
Text
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Catauk hurhar Statwoo l'0 ha 236 Gwt; S C 29710 DUKEPOWER February 2, 1990 Document control Desk U. S.-Nucicar Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Subject:
Catawba Nuc1 car Station
- Docket No. 50-413 LER 413/90-01 Gentlement Attached is Licensco Event Report 413/90-01 submitted as a Courtesy Report concerning PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE BLOWDOWN INCONSISTENT WITH DESIGN ANALYSES AND GREATER THAN MANUFACTURER'S RATING.
This event was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safcty of t.bc public.
Very truly yours, 7
Tony B. Owen Station Manager kob: COURTESY LER xc Mr. S. D. Ebneter American Nuclear Insurers Regional hdministrator, Region Il c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library U. S. Nuclear Regulator Commission The Exchange, Suite 245 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 270 Farmington Avenue Atlanta, GA 30323 Farmington, CT 06032 M & M Nuclear Consultants Mr. K. Jabbour
'1221 Avenues of the Americas U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission New York, NY 10020 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D. C. 20555 INPO Records Center Suite 1500 Mr. W. T. Orders 1100 circle 75 Parkway NRC Resident Inspector Atlanta, GA 30339 Catawba Nuclear Station E'
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'"d'* Pressurizer Safety Valve Blowdown Inconsistent With Design Analyses And Greater Than Manufacturer's Rating SV4WT Datt 19) 4th WUMeth101 htPORT Datt (7) OtHth S ACILititS INVOLvtD #i
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- , ,. ...,. ,. ., o .1 016 31 1 9 10 On November 16, 1989, a potential concern was identified with pressurizer safety valve blowdown being greater than assumed in the safety analyses. Unit I was in Mode 1, Power Operations, at 100% power and Unit 2 was in Mode 1, Power Operations, at 97% power at the time. Review of FSAR Chapter 15 feedwater line break analyses indicated that the pressurizer safety valves may not reseat as assumed due to high Reactor Coolant System temperatures. The vendor's analyses did not properly include consideration of the safety valve's blowdown. Whereas the manufacturer's rated blowdown wias approximately 5%, testing indicated blowdown of 10-12% occurs with current valve settings. Evaluation of the effects of increased blowdown concluded that no degradation of overpressure protection resulted. Further, none of the conclusions of the FSAR Chapter 15 analyses were invalidated and no Technical Specification limits were violated.
Reanalysis of the feedwater line break accident will be performed. This report is provided as a Courtesy LER with respect to the inconsistencies with the FSAR i analyses and pursuant to 10CFR Part 21 with respect to actual valve blowdown in excess of the value rated by the manufacturer.
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BACKGROUND f The Reactor Coolant [EIIS: AB) (NC) System consists of four heat transfer loops
, connected in parallel to the Reactor Vessel [EIIS:VSL). Each loop contains a Reactor Coolant Pump [EIIS:P] and a Steam Generator [EIIS:HX] (S/G). The B loop
, also includes a Pressurizer, a Pressurizer Relief Tank (PP.T), interconnecting piping and instrumentation necessary for operational control.
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- i. NC System pressure is controlled by the use of the pressurizer where water and steam are maintained in equilibrium by electric heaters [EIIS:EHTR) and water sprays. Steam can be formed (by the heaters) or condensed (by the pressurizer
- spray) to reduce pressure variations due to contraction and expansion of the Reactor coolant. Three spring loaded safety valves [E!!S
- V) 1(2)NC-1, 2 and 3, are connected to the pressurizer and discharge to the pressurizer relief tank.
I The three pressurizer safety valves are of the totally enclosed pop-type. The valves are manufactured by Dresser, Model 6-31749A-2-XNC019, and are spring-loaded, self-activated with back pressure compensation. The combined capacity of the valves is equal to, or greater than, the maximum surge rate resulting from complete loss of load without Reactor Trip or any other control.
Temperature indicators [E!!S:XI] in the safety valve discharge manifold alert the Operator to the passage of steam due either to leakage or valves lifting.
The Pressurizer is equipped with three Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) which limit system pressure for a large power mismatch and thus prevent actuation of the fixed high-pressure Reactor trip. The PORVs are operated automatically or by remote manual control. The operation of these valves also limits the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded safety valves. Remotely operated valves are provided to isolate the inlet to each PORV if excessive leakage occurs.
The PRT condenses and cools the discharge from the Pressurizer safety and relief valves. Steam is discharged through a sparger pipe [EIIS: PSP] under the water level. The PRT is equipped with an internal spray and a drain which are used to cool the tank following a discharge. The PRT is protected against a discharge exceeding the design value by two rupture discs which discharge into the Reactor Containment.
The Feedwater [EIIS:SJ) System (CF) and the Auxiliary Feedwater [EIIS:BA] System (CA) function to provide feedwater to the S/Gs. The steam Turbine Driven i Feedwater Pumps discharge through two stages of high pressure feedwater heaters
! (A and B) with equalization headers preceding and following the two parallel l heater strings. The feedwater then divides into four main feedwater lines, each feeding one of the four S/Gs. A tempering flow line also originates from the l feedwater equalization header. This line splits into four lines, each connecting to one of the S/G auxiliary feedwater nozzles, i l
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0l0 013 or 0 l7 vinna-. . c, r.mn Each S/G has a sixteen inch diameter main feedwater nozzle and a six inch diameter auxiliary feedwater nozzle. A line connects each S/G main feedwater i
line.to its corresponding auxiliary feedwater nozzle. Feedwater flow is
- normally delivered by the main feedwater lines to the main feedwater nozzles.
During some modes of operation, feedwater is delivered to the auxiliary feedwater nozzles, i
I EVENT DESCRIPTION
) Recognition of this issue arose as part of a Design Engineering (DE) evaluation of the performance of the Pressurizer Code Safety Relief Valves (PSVs), which
> was undertaken due to recent industry problems with the calibration of valve
' lift setpoints. These problems occur due to loop seal conditions differing between calibration and operation. In order to obtain stable PSV performance
.c (minimize the potential for valve chatter) the desired ring settings may result 4' in blowdowns in excess of original specification values. Blowdown is defined as the difference in PSV lift and reseat pressures, divided by the lift pressure, expressed as a percentage, Whereas the expected blowdown (rated by the manufacturer) was approximately 5%, the results of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) tests and Duke Power tests showed that blowdown up to 10-12%
> occurs with current valve settings; the current valve settings are sufficient to prevent valve chatter. Based on this information, an evaluation of what 2 blowdown is acceptable was requested of DE.
l Based on knowledge of FSAR Chapter 15, the feedwater line break (FWLB) is
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recognized as the transient that presents the greatest challenge to the PSVs, with respect to NC temperatures, (Section 15.2.8). A FWLB evolves into an overheating event, which, along with safety injection, causes the NC to go water solid. NC heats up until auxiliary feedwater flow matches and then exceeds decay heat. The vendor, Westinghouse, has adopted an acceptance criterion which states that the transient response is acceptable as long as NC remains subcooled. The FWLB is analyzed with assumptions and modeling which conservatively minimize the available heat sink. Neither the PSVs nor their blowdown is explicitly modeled in the analysis. PSV lifting and reseating is modeled as coolant inventory loss initiated when primary pressure exceeds the ,
PSV lift setpoint (+1 percent) and terminated when primary pressure falls below l the PSV lift setpoint. NC overpressure protection is the primary safety concern. Core cooling is demonstrated by ensuring that NC remains subcooled.
The PSVs provide overpressure protection since credit is not taken for the PORVs.
A preliminary evaluation of what blowdown was acceptable concluded that the reseat pressure should be greater than the saturation pressure at the time of the hottest NC temperature during the FWLB, This would preserve the Westinghouse criterion of NC remaining subcooled. A review of the most recent l
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TexTo . w. - we w .,im i FWLB analyses for Catawba (to be submitted in the next FSAR update) indicates that NC temperatures result in saturation pressures greater than the reseat
[; pressure for both the expected 10-12% blowdown, and for the originally specified S 5% blowdown. Recognition of this fact prompted the generation of PIR 0-C89-0352 i on November 16, 1989. Unit I was in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 100% power and S Unit 2 was in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 97% power, at the time the PIR was generated. This issue is applicable to each Unit from initial startup; both 6 Units have operated in all modes and at all power levels since that time.
p An operability evaluation completed on November 17, 1989, concluded that the PSVs were operable as an extension of the time required for them to reseat would not degrade their ability to preclude primary system overpressurizetion.
Further, it was determined that none of the conclusions of the FSAR Chapter 15 analyses were invalidated and no Technical Specification limits were violated. i i
As NC pressure increases following a FWLB, the PSVs are challenged initially by steam and then later by liquid. The valve will lift at approximately 2500 psig s
and cause NC pressure to decrease. Provided that the reseat pressure is greater -
than the NC saturation pressure, the valve will reseat. NC will then p
repressurize and a cyclic valve response will occur until the cause of continued pressurization is terminated. If, however, high NC temperatures exist, the ,
< depressurization will stop when the NC saturation pressure is reached. If the
.,' saturation pressure is above the PSV reseat pressure, then the valve will not
. reseat and sustained relief will occur. Eventually NC temperatures will decrease, NC saturation pressure will decrease, and the valve will reseat. If excessive NC inventory addition persists, due to continued safety injection, additional valve cycling will occur, but without continuous relief.
CONCLUSI0'N This incident is attributed to a functional design deficiency in that the ,
vendor's analysis did not properly account for PSV blowdown. A contributing functional design deficiency is attributed to the fact that blowdown of 10-12%
occurs with current valve settings, exceeding the valve manufacturer's rated l blowdown of 5%. It was concluded that the only potential adverse consequences l
of extended PSV blowdown are the effects of an increase in NC inventory loss during the reference feed. vater line break accident.
The increased blowdown and potential increase in NC inventory loss are only a problem if NC temperatures are high following the FWLB. A review of the FSAR analyses (Section 15.2.8) has identified conservative modeling and assumptions which result in excessively high NC temperatures. A major assumption is that the auxiliary feedwater flow to the S/G with the feedwater line break is lost.
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Operator and provides a substantial heat sink. Upon isolating the affected S/G.
-auxiliary feedwater flow increases to the intact S/Gs. Another method of reducing NC temperatures is to stop the Reactor Coolant Pumps. There is a significant benefit in reducing pump heat input to the NC, as is evident when '
the results of the FSAR FWLB analyses with and without offsite power are i compared (Section 15.2.8.2). Operator action to increase auxiliary feedwater t flow is also available.
n In order to resolve this issue, Duke Power plans to reanalyze the FSAR FWLB with '
I less :onservative assumptions in order to demonstrate that lower NC temperatures are expected with resulting NC saturation pressures below the PSV reseat pressures associated with 10-12% blowdown. This analysis will then replace the i existing FSAR analysis. Changes to emergency procedures to provide additional
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guidance for Operator actions to decrease NC temperatures will be developed if p indicated by the FWLB reanalysis.
This issue is reported as a Courtesy LER with respect to the inconsistency between the FSAR analyses and expected PSV performance during the postulated FWLB' accident. Pursuant to 10CFR Part 21, the PSVs are considered a " basic component" as defined therein; blowdown performance in excess of the
- manufacturer's rating constitutes a " defect"; existence of a " substantial safety j hazard" will be dependent upon the licensing basis analyses applicable to each plant.
Inctnsistencies between design bases / analyses and actual plant operating characteristics is a previously recognized recurring event / problem. In response, Duke Power Company has initiated a comprehensive, long-term Design Basis Documentation improvement program'. The results of th.s effort will L
significantly improve understanding of both assumed and actual system / equipment operating characteristics and will help identify and eliminate inconsistencies.
l Deficiencies in valve manufacturer analyses of valve operating characteristics is also a previously recognized recurring event / problem. Recent Catawba LER (413/89-029) and internal report (2-C88-0143) have documented incidents in which valve operators have been unable to open/close the valve because actual friction forces and/or valve factors exceeded values assumed in determining operator i output requirements. NRC IE Bulletin 85-03 and Generic letter 89-10 also deal with this issue. Catawba Nuclear Station has an on-going program to ensure valves will function properly under all anticipated conditions. It should be noted that this program is primarily focused on the proper interaction of valves and valve operators. The current event did not involve a valve operator nor was l the pressurizer safety valve's overpressure protection function impaired. Thus, these events are not exactly similar.
This incident is NPRDS reportable because the PSVs were shown to operate outside the manufacturer's stated range.
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CORRECTIVE ACTION SUBSEQUENT ,
- 1) An operability evaluation for extended blowdown of pressurizer safety ;
valves was performed, concluding that the valves are operable.
PLANNED
- 1) The FSAR feedwater line break accident will be reanalyzed with less ~
conservative assumptions. 4
- 2) Changes to emergency procedures to provide additional guidance for ,
Operator action to reduce NC temperatures will be implemented if indicated by the reanalysis. ,
- 3) This report will be revised to reflect the results of these actions.
SAFETY ANALYSIS The issue of sustained water relief through the PSVs following a FWLB was evaluated.to determine any unacceptable consequences. The reference transient response is the latest FSAR FWLB analysis. The new situation to be evaluated is sustained water relief, for an intermediate period of time, through the PSVs.
The reference analysis does not explicitly model PSV behavior in terms of blowdown. Westinghouse holds NC pressure at the PSV lift setpoint, and whatever ,
water relief results from NC inventory expansion is relieved. This approach is conservative based on the analysis objective of maximizing NC temperature and ,
pressure. With modeling of cyclic PSV behavior, additional safety injection
! flow and NC cooling would result. If blowdown was explicitly modeled, it is expected that additional water relief will result. This aspect is addressed further below.
l The impact of increased blowdown on the overpressure concern related to FWLB is L non-existent. The effect of blowdown is to decrease pressure.
l The impact of increased blowdown on the integrity of the PSV is judged to be a net benefit. Increased blowdown will result in fewer valve cycles, and valve duty increases with the number of cycles.
It is concluded that the only potential adverse effects due to PSV blowdown are related to the consequences of an increase in NC inventory loss. Core cooling, doses, and containment response effects have been evaluated.
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- rsn w ~. w. m , m a uc w. w won I The containment response to any transient which does not release sufficient mass k and energy to deplete the ice inventory is bounded by a LOCA. Therefore, there is no impact on the design basis containment response.
l The dose consequences for the reference FWLB are considered to be bounded by the
! steam line break. The FWLB consequences should be only minimally impacted by l
increased NC inventory loss into containment, since the dominant source term is
- the pre-existing contamination of the S/G secondary inventory caused by the 1 gpm Tech Spec leakage. This source term is unaffected by the increase in NC inventory loss to containment.
Core cooling is not challenged by the increased NC inventory loss. The three intact S/Gs are being supplied with greater than 450 gpm of .nuxiliary feedwater, f
This heat sink is mainly what stabilizes NC temperature in the reference
, analysis. As decay heat decreases, NC temperatures decrease. This heat sink is i- unaffected by the blowdown issue. Furthermore, should the NC reach saturation, the latent heat of boiling the NC inventory is a substantial energy relief process that is unavailable during subcooled conditions. A transition to steam relief must occur prior to' core uncovering. High-head charging pumps are continuously delivering makeup during the transient. An additional consideration is the expectation that the pressurizer PORVs, not the PSVs, will in reality be the relief path should the scenario of concern actually occur.
) (The PORVs are not proven to be environmentally qualified for the FWLB conditions, and are therefore not taken credit for in the reference analyses.
The PORVs are qualified for low temperature overpressure protection conditions.)
The combination of these mitigating processes ensures that core cooling is not impacted by increased PSV blowdown. None of the conclusions of the FSAR Chapter 15 analyses are invalidated and no Technical Specification Limits are violated.
Thus, it is concluded that the health and safety of the public were not affected
! by this incident.
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