ML20006E823

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LER 90-004-00:on 900104,contact Carrier Screws in nonsafety- Related Breaker Found Loose & in Bottom of Motor Control Ctr Cubicle.Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Loose Screws Secured. Part 21 related.W/900215 Ltr
ML20006E823
Person / Time
Site: Catawba Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/14/1990
From: Glover R, Owen T
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
REF-PT21-90-033-000 LER-90-004, LER-90-4, PT21-90-033-000, PT21-90-33, NUDOCS 9002260392
Download: ML20006E823 (9)
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Text

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February 15, 1990 Document Control Desk U.,S. Nuclear-Regulatory Commission

- Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

Catawba. Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-413 LER 413/90-04 Gentlemen:

Attached is Licensee Event Report 413/90-04, concerning POTENTIAL' DEGRADED POWER SOURCE DUE TO LOOSE STARTER CONTACT CARRIER SCREWS AND A MISSED PART 21 REPORTABILITY DUE TO MANUFACTURER DEFICIENCY. This report is being submitted as a Courtesy LER.

This event was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

- Very truly-yciurs, b

Tony . Owen Station Manager keb\LER-NRC.TBO

.xc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter American Nuclear Insurers

-Regional Administrator, Region II c/o Dottle Sherman, ANI Library U. S. Nuclear Regulator Commission The Exchange, Suite 245 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 270 Farmington Avenue Atlanta, GA 30323 Farmington, CT 06032 M & M Nuclear Consultants Mr. K. Jabbour 1221 Avenues of the American U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

.New York, NY 10020 Wanhington, D. C. 20555  ;/

INPO Records Center suite 1500- Mr. W. T. Orders 1100 Circle ~15 Parkway NRC Resident Inspector Atlanta, GA 30339 Catawba Nuclear Station 9002260392 900214 PDR- ADOCM 05000413:'

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Courtesy LER LICEN$tt CONT ACT P0ei Tutt Lin 1121 NAME TELtPMONE NUMBER Amt A COD 6 R.M. Glover. Compliance Mananer 810l3 8 I 3111- l 3121316 COMPLtTE ONE LINE Fon ( ACH COMPONENT 8 AILunt DESCRISED IN TMit #tPORT 113i C2U58 SYSTEM COMPONENT "$%"E pl g t "fo0mT CAUS$ $ Y $T E M COYPONENT N

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t i I ! l I I I I I I I I I I l I l l l l I I I I I I I I SUPPLEMENT AL Ate 80RT E XPICTED (141 MONT ee DAY YEAR 4t$ til yet conces.,e LMPLCTRO SVShel3SION OA TEI NO g l *> 2lg glO AT.ACT-,,,.,...--,,.,.,,,-,,,,,M.,..,n.1 On January 4, 1990, at 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br />, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1, Power Operation, Maintenance Engineering Services (MES) personnel discovered that the contact carrier screws in a non-safety related breaker, 1MXC-F03C, had become L loose and the contact carrier was found in the bottom of the Motor Control l Center cubicle. A work request was initiated and the loose contact carrier was replaced. An MES Staff member identified five similar incidents in safety i related applications in 1988 and 1989. The vendor identified that loose contact carrier screws were discovered in June 1980, and changed the assembly process to use nylon-patch self-locking screws. On January 10, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode l 1, a Problem Investigation Report was initiated. All safety related contact carriers were inspected. All loose screwr were secured to establish a conditional operability until replacement screws are available. This incident l

is attributed to a Manufacturer's Deficiency for material selection resulting in the loosening of contact carrier screws during normal contactor operation, and l for a lack of communication due to the manufacturer identification in June 1980 l

without notification to the nuclear industry. This report is a Courtesy LER and 10CFR21 reportable.

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F A Nelson Electronic Class 1035U, Motor Control Center (MCC), typically consists of a string of totally enclosed, free-standing, dead front structural assemblies. Each MCC has a main horizontal 3-phase bus, which runs the entire length of the control center. Vertical 3-phase buses are connected to the horizontal bus to feed the breaker [EIIS:BRK] compartments in each structure.

Each compartment has one or more set of contact stabs which engage the vertical

! bus when pushed into place and thereby connecting the bus to the incoming

, terminals of the breaker. Plug-in combination starters and branch breakers are typical. .The starter is equipped with both stationary contacts secured within l the starter and moveable contacts mounted in the contact carrier. The contact t carrier is attached to the starter by two screws (see Attachment I). With the  !

MCC bus energized and the breaker closed, the starter uses a magnetic field, l l

energized by control power, to close the contacts and supply power to the load.

Power to motor operated valves [EIIS:V] is supplied from a MCC unit equipped with one breaker and two starters. One starter is used to supply power to move l

the valve in the closed direction when its contacts are closed. Two phases are swapped on the second contact such that when its contacts are closed the valve will move in the open direction.

The starter /contactor assemblies involved in this incident are NEMA size 00, 0,  !

1, and 2, manufactured by GTE/Sylvania. The assemblies are presently being supported by Joslyn Clark, Controls Division.

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i EVENT DESCRIPTION On January 4, 1990, at 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br />, Maintenance Engineering Services (MES) staff '

personnel discovered that the contact carrier screws for non-safety related I- breaker IMXC-F03C had become loose and the contact carrier was found in the l bottom of the Motor Control Center (MCC) cubicle. Unit I was at 100% power in i l Mode 1, Power Operation. Unit 2 was at 55% power in Mode 1, reducing power for t- repairs to valve 2BB-19A, S/G 1B Blowdown Containment Isolation. MES Staff

) personnel were in the process of performing a resistance check on the breaker I load to determine the cause of a malfunction when the loose contact carrier was  !

found. Work Request (W/R) 10937 IAE was initiated and the loose contact carrier was replaced.

I On January 5, an MES Staff Member performed a Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) search to identify Catawba's work history with nuclear safety related MCCs, particularly any problems associated with loose contact carrier screws. Of 71 identified work activities, from as early as 1985 to the l present, 5 work activities were for repairs associated with loose screws occurring in 1988 through 1989. (Reference W/Rs 50629 OPS, 50622 OPS, 39900 OPS, 40619 OPS, and 40575 OPS.) A search of the parts usage database by the MES Staff Member identified three additional work activities where contact carriers

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0l0 0l3 oF 0l8 Ten va== === = =,- v. ==-w wc wma nn were replaced on safety related equipment, however, the reason for the replacements could not be identified. The contact carrier manufacturer was contacted with a request for recommendations on the possible cause of the loosening screws.

On January 9, two General Engineering Documents (GEDs) were received from the t[ manufacturer addressing the loose screw incident. These documents wue used as

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the manufacturer's internal method of notification, dated June 2 and June 19, 1980, without notification being released to the nuclear industry. The documents identified that after many operations in service the contact carrier screws can potentially loosen on the size 00, 0, 1, and 2 starters and contactors. The manufacturer's short term resolution was to use Loctite 242 on the screw threads with a tightening torque of 15 inch-pounds. The manufacturer's long term resolution was to install replacement screws that utilized a nylon patch on the screw threads as a locking device with a tightening torque of 20 inch-pounds,

On January 10, an equipment vendor was providing training at Catawba on use of L thermal scanning equipment to-identify potential problems on MCCs. During the y training, non-safety related breakers in MCC IMXW were scanned for loose i connections. A contact carrier screw was found to be loose; one of the screws had disengaged from the contact carrier and had dropped to the bottem of the MCC cubicle. The MES Staff member used two recent incidents, the NPRDS search results, and the manufacturer's supplied information to initiate Problem Investigation Report (PIR) 0-C90-0008 identifying the potential problems.

Design Engineering (DE) was requested to review the information to identify the scope of the problem, and to make recommendations for resolution. At this time, Units 1 and 2 were operating in Mode 1 at 100% and 97% power, res,pectively.

On January 16, DE made recommendations to the station that all similar contact carriers required visual inspection for a gap between the contact carrier and the screw head to insure their operability. W/R 2157 MES was initiated to perform inspections of the 35 nuclear safety-related MCCs containing these types of contact carriers. Each MCC containing contained 7 to 60 combination ,

starters. There were 28 contact carriers found with loose screws, involving 16 of the 35 MCCs. Individual repair W/Rs were initiated to remove the affected contact carriers, inspect them for damage, and replace parts as determined necessary. All repairs were completed on January 18. Similar inspections were performed at McGuire and Oconee Nuclear Stations.

On January 17, an INP0 Nuclear Network entry was made by Duke Power (OE 3767) i identifying for the industry the potential generic concerns with loose screws on l Sylvania contact carriers due to normal operation of the contacts. The notification identified the generic concerns as being a Part 21 reportable item.

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On January 18, a Design Engineer and an MES Staff member visited the manufacturer to discuss the findings of the Catawba inspections and to come to l

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l terms on a proposed resolution. It was concluded that the 1980 GED i recommendations would serve as the appropriate corrective action. The 20 inch-pound torque recommendat'on was verified through the manufacturer at this time, although it is not stated in any of the manufacturer's literature.

On January 25 DE issued an operability evaluation in response to PIR 0-C90-0008

. identifying all applications utilizing size 00, 0, 1, and 2 Sylvania starters and contactors as being conditionally operable. This determination was based on the results of te initial inspection and tightening activity. The evaluation ,

required that the contactors be inspected monthly to insure continued operable status until the contact carrier screws are replaced with nylon-patched screws.

The evaluation required that the screws be replaced prior to the end of the 1990 refueling outages for their respective Units. The evaluation also concluded that as long as one of the two screws in the contact carrier is tight, the contact is capable of performing its intended function. With two screws loose it becomes difficult to determine if the contacts will function properly. The

The inspection of all non-safety related MCCs was completed on January 25. ,

Parts were replaced as determined necessary and any loose screws were secured.

The nylon-patch self-locking screws were not used during this inspection.

CONCLUSION This incident is attributed to a Manufacturer's Deficiency for material selection resulting in the loosening of contact carrier screws during normal contactor operation. Also, this incident is attributed to a Manufacturer's Deficiency for lack of communication due to the manufacturer's identification of the potential problem in June 1980, but not communicating the information to the nuclear industry. At the time of the original problem identification, the manufacturer initiated the replacement of the contact carrier screw with nylon-patch self-locking screws within the assembly process for the size 00, 0, 1, and 2 contacts. All' size 00, 0, 1, and 2 Sylvania contact carrier screws are to be replaced with the nylon-patch self-locking screws to comply with the manufacturer's recommendations. Contributing to the lack of communication is a Manufacturer's Deficiency due to lack of doct. mentation in that assembly drawings supplied in part as maintenance instructions do not identify the type of screws required, nor do they identify the torque required to secure the screws.

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A search of the Operating Experience Program (0EP) Database identified one l previous incident within the past 24 months involving a manufacturer deficiency l relating to material selection (reference LER 413/88-005). Non-environmentally qualified terminal blocks were supplied with the cold leg accumulator discharge isolation valve motor operators. The cause of this incident was attributed to the manufacturer / supplier not meeting the material requirements of an approved Duke Power specification. No similar specification restricted the type of j

screws to be supplied with the Sylvania Contacts, therefore, these incidents are l

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! not conside' red similar. At the purchase of the Sylvania contacts, the manufacturer supplied equipment was expected to be acceptable for service

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p without any expectations of equipment failure. The manufacturer failed to l properly communicate to the industry upon discovery that the original screws l supplied with their equipment were deficient. A search of the OEP database for the past 24 months did not reveal any similar incidents where a manufacturer l failed to communicate to industry the discovery of a manufacturing deficiency.

A manufacturer lack of communication is not considered to be a recurring problem.

t i A search of the OEP database identified two previous incidents within the past l

24 months involving a manufacturer deficiency relating to deficient documentation (reference Station Report C89-004 and LER 413/89-022). The first j incident involved the Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Level Instrumentation j j which was determined to not meet its equipment environmental qualifications. A

manufacturer deficiency in not providing accurate, available information on the

! environmental qualification requirements contributed to this incident. The  ;

second incident involved a failure of a gasket on a main feedwater valve  ;

positioner control air manifold. The gasket failure was attributed to a lack of  ;

i torque information in the manufacturer's maintenance instruction and a marginal gasket design. Two recent notifications also addressed manufacturer deficiencies relating to documentation (reference IEN 88-057 and IEN 89-062).

The first notification identified that maintenance instructions were missing critical torque requirements for replacement screws on 25 KVA Invertors, j resulting in a potential loss of safe shutdown equipment. The second notification identified that maintenance instructions were missing critical disc adjustment instructions for swing check valves, resulting in improper seating and excessive seat leakage. A manufacturer's lack of providing complete documentation is considered to be a recurring problem. Design Engineering i performs a review of all information received from manufacturer's, in an attempt

! to verify all information is complete and accurate. The manufacturer's information is made available to the station in controlled documents and is revised as more accurate or complete information is obtained. When it is determined that the provided information is deficient by various methods of identification (station review, design evaluation, vendor notification, industry bulletins, etc.), the affected work groups are notified and the affected

. documents are revised.

This report is submitted as a Courtesy LER in that operability of some safety equipment could be affected (pending the outcome of the ongoing operability evaluations). Pursuant to 10CFR21, in-service Sylvania contact carriers are i considered " basic components"; the potential for carriers screws to loosen is considered a " defect"; and existence of a " substantial safety hazard" is dependent upon the particular equipment affected and its operability.

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CORRECTIVE ACTION f SUBSEQUENT

1) PIR 0-C89-0008 was initiated identifying a generic problem with loose I screws on size 00, 0, 1, and 2 Sylvania Contact Carriers.

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2) An inspection was performed of all nuclear safety related MCCs and loose screws were secured. 1

$ 3)- Station and General Office Personnel visited the manufacturer to

$ address the generic concerns and develop'a resolution.

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@. 4) DE issued an operability evaluation identifying alt size 00, 0, 1, and ,

5 2 Sylvania Contacts as conditionally operable, identifying compensatory actions for continued operation through the 1990 f? refueling outages on the respective Units.

5) Procedure IP/0/A/3850/09, Inspection and Maintenance Procedure For MCC l Breakers, has been revised to identify the nylon-patch self-locking screw for use in the size 00, 0, 1, and 2 Sylvania contact carriers.

, Proper ider,eification of the required torque valve is be included in

,[ the procedure. ,

PLANNED
.1) All contact carrier screws in size 00, 0, 1, and 2 Sylvania contacts, in safety and non-safety related applications, are to replaced with the nylon-patch self-locking screws.
2) All breakers, where loose screws were discovered during the inspection, will be evaluated for past operability.
3) Instruction manual CNM 1314.01-0140 will be revised to identify the nylon-patch self-locking screw for use in the size 00, 0, 1, and 2 Sylvania contact carriers, b 4) The MCC Breaker Testing and Preventive Maintenance Program will be expanded to include all MCCs, and will include inspection for loose screws.

,. 5) The Safety Analysis of this report will be revised upon completion of the Design Engineering Past Operability Review.

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0l0 +0l7 OF 0 l8 SAFETY ANALYSIS During the Design Engineers and MES Staff Member visit at the manufacturing facility on January 18, discussions with their Engineer and Quality Assurance Personnel revealed the following: '

p t 1) Loosening of screws on NEMA size 00 through size 2 contactors was

documented to have occurred in only two instances.

f L 2) Contact carrier screws will not loosen on NEMA Size 3, and above, r contactors since their design includes a lock washer installed under i the screw head.

I 3) Since beginning the use of screws with a nylon patch on the threads, ,

on approximately June 19, 1980, no instances of loose screws have been reported on contactors equipped with the modified screw design, i The extent that loose contact carrier screws would affect a contactor's ability to perform its function was also discussed with the manufacturer. As long as one screw is tight, the contactor will operate properly. With both screws h loose, but with threads still engaged, it is highly probable that the contactor will function properly, although contact carrier binding can not be totally excluded. It is impossible to conclusively determine if the contactor wili

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function properly with both screws loose or if one screw is missing (no threads

engaged) and the other is loose. Visual inspection and contactor operation is i the only means to determine operable status if one screw is missing and the other is loose or if both screws are loose.

i The majority of the contact carriers were found to have at least one screw tight during the visual inspection. Through further discussions with the Design Engineer, a screw that turned 1/4 revolution or less during the inspection and

tightening process is considered to have been sufficiently tight for contactor operation. With this consideration, of the 28 breaker units originally i

identified with loose contact carrier screws, the possibility still existed that 10 breakers might not function properly. Design Engineering is in the process of completing a past operability review for each breaker and associated equipment effected by loose contact carrier screws. This Safety Analysis will be revised upon completion of that review.

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