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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML20024J2601994-10-0404 October 1994 LER 94-006-00:on 940913,automatic Reactor/Turbine Trip Occurred on Over Power Differential Temperature.Caused by Equipment Failure.Replaced Relay & Evaluated Failure Rate of Types of relays.W/941004 Ltr ML20029D1011994-04-20020 April 1994 LER 93-003-01:on 930925,reactor Tripped Due to Inadvertent Closure of Msiv.Caused by Inadequate Checking.Corrective Actions:Cros Throttled CA Flow & Entered Procedure EP/2/A/5000/01.W/940420 Ltr ML20046D5871993-08-17017 August 1993 LER 93-008-00:on 930718,reactor Tripped & Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Automatic Start Due to low-low-level in SG 1A. Developed General Troubleshooting procedure.W/930817 Ltr ML20045H2421993-07-12012 July 1993 LER 93-006-00:on 930612,automatic Reactor Trip Initiated by intermediate-range Channel N35 Hi Flux Reactor Trip Bistable.Caused by Blown Fuse in Channel.Entire Drawer Replaced & Channel Placed Back in svc.W/930712 Ltr ML20024G9751991-05-0909 May 1991 LER 91-004-00:on 910410,tech Spec Violation Occurred Re Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Being Inoperable. Caused by Inapropriate Action.Maint Staff Instructed Supervisors & Technicians of Correcting cause.W/910509 Ltr ML20024G7371991-04-18018 April 1991 LER 91-006-00:on 910323,nuclear Svc Water Valves Left W/O Emergency Power Supply.Caused by Inappropriate Action Due to Misreading of Operator Aid Computer (Oac) Graphics.Oac Graphics Training Will Be provided.W/910418 Ltr ML20029A3311991-02-12012 February 1991 LER 91-002-00:on 910113,reactor Exceeded 5% Power Level W/ RHR Sys Pump 1A Inoperable Due to Closed Suction Valve. Caused by Inappropriate Action & Procedural Deficiency. Incident Discussed W/Involved personnel.W/910212 Ltr ML20044B1761990-07-10010 July 1990 LER 90-013-00:on 900611,approx 5,000 Gallons of RCS Water Inadvertently Transferred to Refueling Water Storage Tank. Caused by Inappropriate Action.Proper Sys Parameters Restored & Analysis of Event performed.W/900709 Ltr ML20043G6441990-06-14014 June 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900430,high Pressure CO2 Discharge Occurred on Auxiliary Feedwater Fire Protection Sys.Caused by Const/ Installation Deficiency in Solenoids.Solenoids Orientation Verified to Be Installed correctly.W/900614 Ltr ML20043C8951990-05-29029 May 1990 LER 89-010-01:on 880314,auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A Discharge to Steam Generator 2A Isolation Failed to Completely Close.Caused by Design Deficiency.Mods to Actuator Torque Switch Setting increased.W/900524 Ltr ML20042G6301990-05-0909 May 1990 LER 90-025-00:on 900409,unexpected ESFs Actuation Occurred During Performance of Incore Thermocouple Testing.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised & Reviewed W/Personnel Lessons Learned from event.W/900503 Ltr ML20043A9271990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 89-030-01:on 890726,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Shipment of Two Liners of Secondary Bead & Powdex Resin Mixture.On 891215,same Tech Spec Violation Occurred.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Shipments suspended.W/900503 Ltr ML20042F4721990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 90-015-00:on 900402,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered When Both Trains of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Supervisor Incorrectly Denoting Valve Position.Valves 1RN-493 & 494 closed.W/900430 Ltr ML20042F4741990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 90-006-00:on 900321,discovered That Nuclear Svc Water Sys Assured Makeup Source to Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Surge Chamber 2A Would Not Provide Adequate Flow. Caused by Clogged pipe.W/900430 Ltr ML20042E3141990-04-0303 April 1990 LER 90-002-01:on 900103,containment Air Return Fan Failed to Start During Test & Breaker FO1A in Motor Control Ctr Opened.Caused by Inappropriate Action.Measures Taken to Ensure Positions of Breakers verified.W/900409 Ltr ML20012C6881990-03-15015 March 1990 LER 90-011-00:on 900215,discovered That Control Room Doors Were More Difficult to Open than Normal.Ventilation Sys Found to Be Incapable of Maintaining Positive Pressure. Caused by Design Deficiency.Walls sealed.W/900315 Ltr ML20012C6901990-03-15015 March 1990 LER 90-005-01:on 900126,Tech Spec 3.0,3 Entered Due to More than One Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Exceeding 5% Deviation.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Operations Procedure revised.W/900314 Ltr ML20012C3741990-03-13013 March 1990 LER 90-012-00:on 900127,central Alarm Station Operator Noted That Controlled Access Door Not Closed.Caused by Inappropriate Action Taken Which Was Unauthorized.Personnel Counseled on Importance of Sys operability.W/900313 Ltr ML20012C5091990-03-13013 March 1990 LER 90-009-00:on 900212,containment Purge Sys Heaters Not Being Verified to Be Running During Monthly Surveillance as Required by Tech Specs.Caused by Defective Procedures,Due to Incomplete Info.Procedures revised.W/900313 Ltr ML20012C5111990-03-12012 March 1990 LER 90-007-01:on 891108,discovered That Transmission Procedures Used to Perform Undervoltage Relay Tests Revealed That Test Acceptance Criteria Did Not Agree W/Tech Specs & Relays Not Being Adjusted as required.W/900316 Ltr ML20012B8121990-03-0909 March 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900203,discovered That Insulation Removed from Main Steam Auxiliary Equipment Piping to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine.Caused by Design Oversight Due to Unanticipated Interaction of sys.W/900309 Ltr ML20012C4961990-03-0707 March 1990 LER 90-010-00:on 900205,discovered That Standby Shutdown Facility Wide Range RCS Temp Indications Had Not Been Subj to Monthly Channel Check as Required by Tech Spec 4.7.13.6. Caused by Defective procedure.W/900307 Ltr ML20012A1781990-02-27027 February 1990 LER 90-005-00:on 900126,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Inoperable Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation (Prni) During Unit Shutdown.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Action Developed to Better Anticipate & Carry Out Prni calibr.W/900227 Ltr ML20006E8231990-02-14014 February 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 900104,contact Carrier Screws in nonsafety- Related Breaker Found Loose & in Bottom of Motor Control Ctr Cubicle.Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Loose Screws Secured. Part 21 related.W/900215 Ltr ML20006D4861990-02-0707 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900105,unexpected Auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Startup Occurred During Periodic Cabinet Test. Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Procedures to Be Revised to Prevent recurrence.W/900207 Ltr ML20011E2281990-02-0202 February 1990 LER 90-002-00:on 900103,containment Air Return Fan 1B Failed to Start During Quarterly Test & Breaker F01A in Motor Control Ctr Discovered Open.Caused by Inappropriate Operator Action.Lockout Breakers closed.W/900202 Ltr ML20011E3951990-02-0202 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 891116,potential Concern Identified W/ Pressurizer Safety Valve Blowdown Being Greater than Assumed in Safety Analyses.Caused by Functional Design Deficiency. Also Reportable Per Part 21.W/900202 Ltr ML19354E0191990-01-19019 January 1990 LER 89-020-01:on 891118,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered & 5-month Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Sys Inoperability Occurred as Result of Low Filter Exhaust Flow Condition on 891111.Caused by Design Oversight.Duct Will Be cleaned.W/900119 Ltr ML19354E0931990-01-18018 January 1990 LER 89-025-01:on 890922,power Lost to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans Due to Deenergization of 13.8 Kv Auxiliary Switchgear.Caused by Weather Conditions.Reactor Power Reduced to Maintain Condenser vacuum.W/900119 Ltr ML19354E0201990-01-18018 January 1990 LER 89-016-01:on 890913,generator 1B Power Circuit Breaker Opened,Causing Unit Runback to 54% Power & Failure of Generator Breaker Air Pressure Gauge.Caused by Equipment Failure.Pneumatic Gauge replaced.W/900117 Ltr ML19354D8261990-01-15015 January 1990 LER 89-029-00:on 891213,determined That Max Actuator Torque Switch Setting Insufficient to Overcome Friction Force Due to Age Hardening of Elastomeric Seat Matl on Bif/General Signal Corp Valve.Also Reported Per Part 21.W/900112 Ltr ML20005G4261990-01-12012 January 1990 LER 89-013-00:on 890726,two Carbon Steel Liners,Containing Mixture of Powdex & Bead Resins,Shipped to Barnwell,Sc,In Violation of Process Control Program.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Shipment suspended.W/900112 Ltr ML20005G3061990-01-0909 January 1990 LER 89-020-00:on 890921,abnormal Degradation of Steel Containment Vessels Observed.Caused by Corrosion by Standing Water in Annulus Areas.Steel Containment Vessels Will Be Recoated During Next Refueling outage.W/900109 Ltr ML20005E4021989-12-29029 December 1989 LER 89-028-00:on 891204,steam Generator 1D Power Operated Relief Valve Did Not Close on Train a Main Steam Isolation Signal During Valve Inservice Test.Caused by Failed Fuse. Fuse replaced.W/891229 Ltr ML20011D3321989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-021-00:on 890821,hydrogen Skimmer Fan 2A Declared Inoperable in Order to Replace Breaker,In Response to NRC Bulletin 88-010.On 890825,breaker Tripped & Power Reduction Resumed.Caused by Inappropriate action.W/891222 Ltr ML20011D3351989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-027-00:on 891120,chemical & Vol Control Sys Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B Declared Inoperable Due to Inability to Maintain Sufficient Charging Flow.Cause Not determined.Power-range Detector replaced.W/891222 Ltr ML20011D2321989-12-18018 December 1989 LER 89-020-00:on 891111,low Filtered Exhaust Flow Discovered by Control Room Operators During Observation of Indications. Caused by Design Oversight Re Interaction of Sys/Components. Clothes Dryer Filters to Be modified.W/891218 Ltr ML19332E7201989-12-0606 December 1989 LER 89-023-01:on 890915,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered as Result of Both Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Sys Being Inoperable.Caused by Equipment Malfunctions.Control Room & Area Pressurization Flow Rates revised.W/891120 Ltr ML19324B1141989-10-20020 October 1989 LER 89-024-00:on 890920,safety Review Group Staff Member Identified Committed Fire Door S102A as Possibly Inadequate. Caused by Design Deficiency.Fire Watch Established & Door repaired.W/891019 Ltr ML19324B4091989-10-20020 October 1989 LER 89-025-00:on 890922,13.8 Kv Auxiliary Switchgear Deenergized Resulting in Loss of Power to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans.Power Reduction Due to Hurricane Hugo.W/891019 Ltr ML19325C6381989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-023-00:on 890915,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Both Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Sys Being Inoperable.Caused by Defective pre-operational Testing Procedure.Train a Control Room Damper adjusted.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C6401989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-016-00:on 890913,four Channels of Power Range Instrumentation Showed Greater than 5% Allowable Mismatch Between Rated Thermal Power & Nuclear Power.Caused by Equipment Failure.Pneumatic Gauge replaced.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C6441989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-019-00:on 890912,capability of Switches 2CA-15A & 2CA-18B Disabled Rendering Feedwater Pumps 2A & 2B Inoperable.Caused by Defective Procedure & Inappropriate Actions.Procedure Revised & Update issued.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C1961989-10-0404 October 1989 LER 89-026-00:on 890823,tested Breaker Replaced W/Traceable Breaker in Response to Bulletin 88-010.Breaker Tripped. Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Work Request Written.Item Reportable Per Part 21.W/891003 Ltr ML19327B6071989-09-20020 September 1989 LER 89-025-00:on 890922,auxiliary Switchgear Deenergized, Resulting in Loss of Power to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans.Caused by Inoperable power-range Instrumentation Due to Hurricane Hugo.W/890920 Ltr ML17303B1821986-12-30030 December 1986 LER 86-058-01:on 861111 & 18,overtemp Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred on Increasing Reactor Coolant Temp Rate.Caused by Spike on Potentiometer.Valve Realigned & Unit Returned to Previous status.W/861230 Ltr 1994-04-20
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML20024J2601994-10-0404 October 1994 LER 94-006-00:on 940913,automatic Reactor/Turbine Trip Occurred on Over Power Differential Temperature.Caused by Equipment Failure.Replaced Relay & Evaluated Failure Rate of Types of relays.W/941004 Ltr ML20029D1011994-04-20020 April 1994 LER 93-003-01:on 930925,reactor Tripped Due to Inadvertent Closure of Msiv.Caused by Inadequate Checking.Corrective Actions:Cros Throttled CA Flow & Entered Procedure EP/2/A/5000/01.W/940420 Ltr ML20046D5871993-08-17017 August 1993 LER 93-008-00:on 930718,reactor Tripped & Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Automatic Start Due to low-low-level in SG 1A. Developed General Troubleshooting procedure.W/930817 Ltr ML20045H2421993-07-12012 July 1993 LER 93-006-00:on 930612,automatic Reactor Trip Initiated by intermediate-range Channel N35 Hi Flux Reactor Trip Bistable.Caused by Blown Fuse in Channel.Entire Drawer Replaced & Channel Placed Back in svc.W/930712 Ltr ML20024G9751991-05-0909 May 1991 LER 91-004-00:on 910410,tech Spec Violation Occurred Re Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Being Inoperable. Caused by Inapropriate Action.Maint Staff Instructed Supervisors & Technicians of Correcting cause.W/910509 Ltr ML20024G7371991-04-18018 April 1991 LER 91-006-00:on 910323,nuclear Svc Water Valves Left W/O Emergency Power Supply.Caused by Inappropriate Action Due to Misreading of Operator Aid Computer (Oac) Graphics.Oac Graphics Training Will Be provided.W/910418 Ltr ML20029A3311991-02-12012 February 1991 LER 91-002-00:on 910113,reactor Exceeded 5% Power Level W/ RHR Sys Pump 1A Inoperable Due to Closed Suction Valve. Caused by Inappropriate Action & Procedural Deficiency. Incident Discussed W/Involved personnel.W/910212 Ltr ML20044B1761990-07-10010 July 1990 LER 90-013-00:on 900611,approx 5,000 Gallons of RCS Water Inadvertently Transferred to Refueling Water Storage Tank. Caused by Inappropriate Action.Proper Sys Parameters Restored & Analysis of Event performed.W/900709 Ltr ML20043G6441990-06-14014 June 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900430,high Pressure CO2 Discharge Occurred on Auxiliary Feedwater Fire Protection Sys.Caused by Const/ Installation Deficiency in Solenoids.Solenoids Orientation Verified to Be Installed correctly.W/900614 Ltr ML20043C8951990-05-29029 May 1990 LER 89-010-01:on 880314,auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A Discharge to Steam Generator 2A Isolation Failed to Completely Close.Caused by Design Deficiency.Mods to Actuator Torque Switch Setting increased.W/900524 Ltr ML20042G6301990-05-0909 May 1990 LER 90-025-00:on 900409,unexpected ESFs Actuation Occurred During Performance of Incore Thermocouple Testing.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised & Reviewed W/Personnel Lessons Learned from event.W/900503 Ltr ML20043A9271990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 89-030-01:on 890726,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Shipment of Two Liners of Secondary Bead & Powdex Resin Mixture.On 891215,same Tech Spec Violation Occurred.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Shipments suspended.W/900503 Ltr ML20042F4721990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 90-015-00:on 900402,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered When Both Trains of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Supervisor Incorrectly Denoting Valve Position.Valves 1RN-493 & 494 closed.W/900430 Ltr ML20042F4741990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 90-006-00:on 900321,discovered That Nuclear Svc Water Sys Assured Makeup Source to Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Surge Chamber 2A Would Not Provide Adequate Flow. Caused by Clogged pipe.W/900430 Ltr ML20042E3141990-04-0303 April 1990 LER 90-002-01:on 900103,containment Air Return Fan Failed to Start During Test & Breaker FO1A in Motor Control Ctr Opened.Caused by Inappropriate Action.Measures Taken to Ensure Positions of Breakers verified.W/900409 Ltr ML20012C6881990-03-15015 March 1990 LER 90-011-00:on 900215,discovered That Control Room Doors Were More Difficult to Open than Normal.Ventilation Sys Found to Be Incapable of Maintaining Positive Pressure. Caused by Design Deficiency.Walls sealed.W/900315 Ltr ML20012C6901990-03-15015 March 1990 LER 90-005-01:on 900126,Tech Spec 3.0,3 Entered Due to More than One Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Exceeding 5% Deviation.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Operations Procedure revised.W/900314 Ltr ML20012C3741990-03-13013 March 1990 LER 90-012-00:on 900127,central Alarm Station Operator Noted That Controlled Access Door Not Closed.Caused by Inappropriate Action Taken Which Was Unauthorized.Personnel Counseled on Importance of Sys operability.W/900313 Ltr ML20012C5091990-03-13013 March 1990 LER 90-009-00:on 900212,containment Purge Sys Heaters Not Being Verified to Be Running During Monthly Surveillance as Required by Tech Specs.Caused by Defective Procedures,Due to Incomplete Info.Procedures revised.W/900313 Ltr ML20012C5111990-03-12012 March 1990 LER 90-007-01:on 891108,discovered That Transmission Procedures Used to Perform Undervoltage Relay Tests Revealed That Test Acceptance Criteria Did Not Agree W/Tech Specs & Relays Not Being Adjusted as required.W/900316 Ltr ML20012B8121990-03-0909 March 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900203,discovered That Insulation Removed from Main Steam Auxiliary Equipment Piping to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine.Caused by Design Oversight Due to Unanticipated Interaction of sys.W/900309 Ltr ML20012C4961990-03-0707 March 1990 LER 90-010-00:on 900205,discovered That Standby Shutdown Facility Wide Range RCS Temp Indications Had Not Been Subj to Monthly Channel Check as Required by Tech Spec 4.7.13.6. Caused by Defective procedure.W/900307 Ltr ML20012A1781990-02-27027 February 1990 LER 90-005-00:on 900126,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Inoperable Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation (Prni) During Unit Shutdown.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Action Developed to Better Anticipate & Carry Out Prni calibr.W/900227 Ltr ML20006E8231990-02-14014 February 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 900104,contact Carrier Screws in nonsafety- Related Breaker Found Loose & in Bottom of Motor Control Ctr Cubicle.Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Loose Screws Secured. Part 21 related.W/900215 Ltr ML20006D4861990-02-0707 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900105,unexpected Auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Startup Occurred During Periodic Cabinet Test. Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Procedures to Be Revised to Prevent recurrence.W/900207 Ltr ML20011E2281990-02-0202 February 1990 LER 90-002-00:on 900103,containment Air Return Fan 1B Failed to Start During Quarterly Test & Breaker F01A in Motor Control Ctr Discovered Open.Caused by Inappropriate Operator Action.Lockout Breakers closed.W/900202 Ltr ML20011E3951990-02-0202 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 891116,potential Concern Identified W/ Pressurizer Safety Valve Blowdown Being Greater than Assumed in Safety Analyses.Caused by Functional Design Deficiency. Also Reportable Per Part 21.W/900202 Ltr ML19354E0191990-01-19019 January 1990 LER 89-020-01:on 891118,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered & 5-month Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Sys Inoperability Occurred as Result of Low Filter Exhaust Flow Condition on 891111.Caused by Design Oversight.Duct Will Be cleaned.W/900119 Ltr ML19354E0931990-01-18018 January 1990 LER 89-025-01:on 890922,power Lost to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans Due to Deenergization of 13.8 Kv Auxiliary Switchgear.Caused by Weather Conditions.Reactor Power Reduced to Maintain Condenser vacuum.W/900119 Ltr ML19354E0201990-01-18018 January 1990 LER 89-016-01:on 890913,generator 1B Power Circuit Breaker Opened,Causing Unit Runback to 54% Power & Failure of Generator Breaker Air Pressure Gauge.Caused by Equipment Failure.Pneumatic Gauge replaced.W/900117 Ltr ML19354D8261990-01-15015 January 1990 LER 89-029-00:on 891213,determined That Max Actuator Torque Switch Setting Insufficient to Overcome Friction Force Due to Age Hardening of Elastomeric Seat Matl on Bif/General Signal Corp Valve.Also Reported Per Part 21.W/900112 Ltr ML20005G4261990-01-12012 January 1990 LER 89-013-00:on 890726,two Carbon Steel Liners,Containing Mixture of Powdex & Bead Resins,Shipped to Barnwell,Sc,In Violation of Process Control Program.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Shipment suspended.W/900112 Ltr ML20005G3061990-01-0909 January 1990 LER 89-020-00:on 890921,abnormal Degradation of Steel Containment Vessels Observed.Caused by Corrosion by Standing Water in Annulus Areas.Steel Containment Vessels Will Be Recoated During Next Refueling outage.W/900109 Ltr ML20005E4021989-12-29029 December 1989 LER 89-028-00:on 891204,steam Generator 1D Power Operated Relief Valve Did Not Close on Train a Main Steam Isolation Signal During Valve Inservice Test.Caused by Failed Fuse. Fuse replaced.W/891229 Ltr ML20011D3321989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-021-00:on 890821,hydrogen Skimmer Fan 2A Declared Inoperable in Order to Replace Breaker,In Response to NRC Bulletin 88-010.On 890825,breaker Tripped & Power Reduction Resumed.Caused by Inappropriate action.W/891222 Ltr ML20011D3351989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-027-00:on 891120,chemical & Vol Control Sys Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B Declared Inoperable Due to Inability to Maintain Sufficient Charging Flow.Cause Not determined.Power-range Detector replaced.W/891222 Ltr ML20011D2321989-12-18018 December 1989 LER 89-020-00:on 891111,low Filtered Exhaust Flow Discovered by Control Room Operators During Observation of Indications. Caused by Design Oversight Re Interaction of Sys/Components. Clothes Dryer Filters to Be modified.W/891218 Ltr ML19332E7201989-12-0606 December 1989 LER 89-023-01:on 890915,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered as Result of Both Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Sys Being Inoperable.Caused by Equipment Malfunctions.Control Room & Area Pressurization Flow Rates revised.W/891120 Ltr ML19324B1141989-10-20020 October 1989 LER 89-024-00:on 890920,safety Review Group Staff Member Identified Committed Fire Door S102A as Possibly Inadequate. Caused by Design Deficiency.Fire Watch Established & Door repaired.W/891019 Ltr ML19324B4091989-10-20020 October 1989 LER 89-025-00:on 890922,13.8 Kv Auxiliary Switchgear Deenergized Resulting in Loss of Power to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans.Power Reduction Due to Hurricane Hugo.W/891019 Ltr ML19325C6381989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-023-00:on 890915,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Both Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Sys Being Inoperable.Caused by Defective pre-operational Testing Procedure.Train a Control Room Damper adjusted.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C6401989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-016-00:on 890913,four Channels of Power Range Instrumentation Showed Greater than 5% Allowable Mismatch Between Rated Thermal Power & Nuclear Power.Caused by Equipment Failure.Pneumatic Gauge replaced.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C6441989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-019-00:on 890912,capability of Switches 2CA-15A & 2CA-18B Disabled Rendering Feedwater Pumps 2A & 2B Inoperable.Caused by Defective Procedure & Inappropriate Actions.Procedure Revised & Update issued.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C1961989-10-0404 October 1989 LER 89-026-00:on 890823,tested Breaker Replaced W/Traceable Breaker in Response to Bulletin 88-010.Breaker Tripped. Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Work Request Written.Item Reportable Per Part 21.W/891003 Ltr ML19327B6071989-09-20020 September 1989 LER 89-025-00:on 890922,auxiliary Switchgear Deenergized, Resulting in Loss of Power to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans.Caused by Inoperable power-range Instrumentation Due to Hurricane Hugo.W/890920 Ltr ML17303B1821986-12-30030 December 1986 LER 86-058-01:on 861111 & 18,overtemp Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred on Increasing Reactor Coolant Temp Rate.Caused by Spike on Potentiometer.Valve Realigned & Unit Returned to Previous status.W/861230 Ltr 1994-04-20
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217H0201999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 ML20212B4711999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217H0321999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20211A9791999-08-20020 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20211C1291999-08-17017 August 1999 ISI Rept Unit 1 Catawba 1999 RFO 11 ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20210S2891999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20212B4871999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20210S2951999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4561999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20196A0001999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206P5201999-05-14014 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20206N8391999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr ML20206R1811999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196A0041999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N8261999-04-22022 April 1999 Rev 15 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr. Page 145 of 270 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20205S5551999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20205N3651999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting IPE of External Events Submittal ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML20206R1931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9521999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9561999-02-28028 February 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20204C9111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20203A2581999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of TR DPC-NE-3002-A,Rev 2, UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology. Rept Acceptable. Staff Requests Duke Energy Corp to Publish Accepted Version of TR within 3 Months of Receipt of SE ML20204C9161999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199K8711999-01-13013 January 1999 Inservice Insp Rept for Unit 2 Catawba 1998 Refueling Outage 9 ML20199E3071998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept ML20205E9441998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 10CFR50.59 Rept for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2, Containing Brief Description of Changes,Tests & Experiments,Including Summary of Ses.With ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor ML20203A4101998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-25, Catawba Unit 2 Cycle 10 Colr ML20203A4041998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 14 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 11 Colr ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998 Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas ML20196J8351998-12-0808 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request Re Relief Valves in Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Sys ML20199E3221998-11-30030 November 1998 Revised MOR for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Re Personnel Exposure ML20198E3151998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196C0251998-11-27027 November 1998 SER Accepting Clarification on Calibration Tolerances on Trip Setpoints for Catawba Nuclear Station ML20196A6881998-11-25025 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request 98-02 Re Limited Exam for Three Welds ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised ML20195E5521998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20198E3261998-10-31031 October 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154M7661998-10-12012 October 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980913,terminated Vendor Employee Entered Protected Area.Caused by Computer Interface Malfunction. Security Retained Vendor Employee Badge to Prevent Further Access & Computer Malfunction Was Repaired.With 1999-09-07
[Table view] |
Text
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May 3, 1990 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuc1 car Regulatory Commission ifashington, D. C. 20555
Subject:
Catawba Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-413 LER 413/89-30, Rov 1' Gentlemen:
Attached is Licensco Event Report 413/89-30, Rev 1 concerning
. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION DUE TO SHIPMENT OF TWO LINERS 0F SECONDARY BEAD AND POWDEX RESIN MIXTURE IN VIOLATION OF.THE PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM.
This event was considered to be'of no significance with respect to.the health and safety of the public.
Very truly yours, 7
! \.
Tony E. Owen Station Manager heb\LER-NRC.TBO xc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter American Nuclear Insurers Regional Administrator, Region II c/o Dottle Sherman, ANI; Library U. S. Nuclear Regulhtor Comission. .The Exchange, Suite 245 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 270 Farmington Avenue Atlanta,~GA 30323 Farmington, CT 06032 M & M Nuclear Consultants Mr. K. Jabbour 1221 Avenues of the Americas U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Now York, NY 10020 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D. C, ,20555 INPO Records Center Suite 1500 Mr. W. T.: Orders 1100 circle 75 Parkway NRC Resident Inspector
. Atlanta, GA 30339 Catawba Nuclear Station 9005230296 900503 ? O
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) l Detetti NUMDE R (21 F ACsE i3+
F ACILITY NAME tu Cntnebn Nuclear Stati m tinit 1 0 l6 l 0 l0 l 0i 4l113 1 loFl 017
" Technical Specification Violation Due To Shipment Of Two Liners Of Secondary 5ead And 1 Powdex Resin Mixture in Violatt on Of The l'roecss Control Procram i IVINT Daf t IS, Lt m NUMDt h (Si DEPORT DAf f (7) OTHim 9 ActLitttl INv0LvtD tel DDC d[Nu. alit mis 6 MON 9H DAY v4R vtan 58gy(Ab ~~
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_ CNS. Unit 2 016 l 0 l 0 l 0 l 4l 114 Ol7 2! 6 8 9 8l9 0l3 l 0 O!1 0l$ 1 l4 9] O O151010101Ii ,
tHis alp 0nv is suewirtt 3 Puasua=, t0 vHE ataviatutNes 0, in C,n i <c, <* . ., , .,,.. ,.u.. , o n "00'
- to seriei ro aosi6, so.nwnan.i 7: tiini 1
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so.n.nin o _ gMg,sggeg n o . inn., T .on.imm o n en,n.mna, ma, n i.ima.i son.ninn w ni.nnn..n.i to sott.ilin.) SO ?36.ittniell to 73i.ntual LICEN541 CONTACT P0m THis Lin uti Noet fits
- HONE Nuesta Anta c006 C.L. Ilartzell. Compliance Manager BO3 i i 1 1 1i 31 6 6l5 831 COMPLif t DNt LINE FDA B ACH COMPONENT F AILumt OtscaistD IN THIS REPom? (131 Coust sytttv Cour0NtNT T[g$C "3o$,'n' s CAust syst tM CovPONENT "$'lC g ,Tpa sL l i I I I I I I I I I I I I I l 1 1 l 1 l i 1 i l i I 1 SUPPLEMENT AL,mtPORT t xPicitD Od! VONTH Dav VIAR SU'0 Vi S560 N
~~'] v e s ters.,.w.. tnotcroc suowssion carts J NO l l l A.we Ac i m ., M i m <.. . . . .,y.. ., ,, ...,,. . ,,,..,. .. ,. .., n e i On July 26, 1989, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1, Power Operation, two carbon steel liners containing a mixture of powdex and bead resins were shipped to the Low Level Waste Repository in Barnwell, S.C. Verbal Vendor approval of this shipment had been obtained. On December 7, 1989, Duke Power Company (DPC)
, Nuclear Chemistry issued a letter to CNSI Engineering discussing the possibility l of mixing of bead and powdex resins. This letter was copied to the CNS
- Chemistry Scientist who realized that these types of resin loadings had previously been shipped from CNS. CNSI Operations, Engineering and DPC Nuclear Chemistry were contacted. On December 15, 1989, it was determined that a l
Technical Specification violation had occurred due to the shipment of two mixed o media resin liners in violation of the Process Control Program. ~ Further shipments of mixed media secondary resin at CNS have been suspended until proper testing on dowatering effectiveness of mixed media resins haa been determined.
This incident is attributed to a Management Deficiency. Subsequent tests on conservatively similar loaded mixed resin liners have shown that the liners shipped on July 26, and buried at the Low Level Waste Repository at Barnwell, S.C., were adequately dewatered for burial.
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BACKGROUND i '
$ The Condensate [EIIS:SD) (CM) System takes Condensate from the Main Turbine Condenser Hotwell and purifies it to meet water chemistry specifications in the ,
t Condensate Polisher Domineralizers [EIIS:KD] (CPD) and after reheating delivers the Condensate to the Main Feedwater [EIIS:SJ)"(CF) System for delivery to the Steam Generators [EIIS:HX).(S/Gs). The CPD's are used to remove ionic and ,
particulate contaminants from the condensate to minimize corrosion products
- which could affect Unit performance. The CPD's utilize a powdered. resin form '
and a precoat filter media. When a CPD cell reaches the end of its life the spent powder resins and filter aids are backwashed and drained-to the CPD l Backwash Tank. The spent resins are sampled and isotopically analyzed prior to ;
discharge to insure the limits imposed by the State of S.C. and the NRC are not ;
- exceeded. This spent resin is not normally contaminated and is discharged via the Conventional Waste [EIIS:WH] (WC) System. If the limits are exceeded the spent resin is transferred to carbon steel liners for burial as Class A unstable waste at the Barnwell Low Level Waste Repository.
The S/G Blowdown [EIIS:WI] (BB) System assists jn maintaining-proper S/G shell side water chemistry by removing non volatile materials that would otherwise -
^
concentrate in the shell side of the S/G's. This ic accomplished by bleeding saturatad condensate from locations near the bottom of the S/G's to the BB tank. The BB tank receives the saturated bleed from the S/G's where part of the saturated condensate expands to steam and is delivered to the CF heaters for, l heat recovery. The remaining BB condensate normally flows through the BB Heat Exchangers, Profilters and demineralizers to the Condenser Hotwell. The BB domineralizers use a bead type resin to remove ionic and particulate
? contaminants. The spent resina from the BB domineralizers can be discharged to L the WC System if not contaminated or to a liner for burial at e Low Level Waste Repository if contaminated. i
, The Duke Power Company (DPC) Corporate Process Control Program (PCP) establishes *
~
b "a set of requirements that shall be met.at all Nuclear Stations to insure all solidification and dewatering activities are conducted in a ranner and produce a ;
final product that complies with all applicable Federal and State regulations ;
L and licensed burial site criteria". . Station specific procedures have been lr developed to implement the requirements'of the PCP, The station specific procedures incorporate the chem-Nuclear Systems Incorporated (CNSI) procedures for dowatering carbon steel liners. CNSI is contracted by DPC to provide l
dewatering services and provide the liners used for burial at the Low Level
- Waste Repository in.Barnwell, S.C. The' liners are equipped with dewatering l laterals designed for dewatering specific resin forms. The'powdex resin liners i
are equipped with three to four drain laterals located at different elevations in the liner, whereas the bead resin liners are equipped with one dewatering lateral located at the bottom of the liner. CNSI also provides specific-procedures for fill and dewatering of powdex and bead resin which are Enclosures e
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4.5 and 4.6, respectively, of Chemistry Procedure OP/0/B/6500/09, Operating Procedure For The Control And Use Of Vendor Procedure. OP/0/B/6500/53, Operating Procedure For Transfer And Dewatering Of Secondary Resins is used to document the resin transfer and boundary conditions for liner dewatering. This ,
procedure states that physical testing shall be performed if the PCP is not followed. The PCP states that boundary conditions will be established for all process parameters. The process parameters include waste form, settling time, drain (or pump) time and drying time. Waste' form is not specifically addressed i in OP/0/B/6500/53.
Technical Specification 3/4.11.3 states that radioactive waste shall be solidified or dewatered in accordance with the PCP to meet shipping and trancportation requirements during transit, and disposal site requirements when received at the disposal site. This Technical Specification is applicable at all times and requires the following actions:
- a. With Solidification or dewatering not meeting the disposal site and shipping and transportation requirements, suspend shipment of the inadequately processed wastes and correct the PCP, the procedures and/or the Solid Radwaste System [EIIS:WB) as necessary to prevent recurrence,
- b. With the Solidification or dewatering not performed in accordance with the PCP, test the improperly processed waste to insure that it meets burial ground and shipping requirements and take appropriate '
administrative action to prevent recurrence.
- c. The provisions of Technical Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. i EVENT DESCRIPTION In March 1989, the question of feasibility of loading of bead resin into powdex i
liners, at CNS, was first raised, after the Secondary Chemistry Supervisor noted that the amount of bead resin transferred into a bead resin liner from the CPD Backwash tank was less than the amount transferred from the BB demineralizers to l the CPD Bac;; wash tank. Further investigation by the Chemistry Supervisor found I
that bead resin would tend to settle in the bottom of the horizontal CPD l Backwash tank during sluicing operations. This discovery led the Chemistry l Supervisor.to investigate handling of the possibly mixed media resins in the i bottom of the CPD Backwash tank. The CNSI Site Operator was contacted with the question of the possibility of mixing bead and powdex resin in the same liner. -
l The CNSI Site. Operator contacted a CNSI Operations Supervisor in the Columbia, S.C. headquarters who indicated on March 7, 1989,~that bead and powdex resin-l could be. mixed in powdex liners and dewatered using the powdex dowatering.
l procedure. A follow-up telephone conference with the CNS Radiation Protection (RP) Associate Scientist and the CNSI Barnwell Manager of Regulatory Affairs was O
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s made concerning the proper waste description to be used on the shipping manifest containing the mixed bead and powdex resin. The CNS1 Regulatory Affairs Manager stated that such shipments should be labeled "dowatered filter media" on the
- waste descriptions when completing the radioactive shipment manifest. This l
conversation was also documented in a Memorandum To File by the RP Associate Scientist on March 9, 1989. ,
on March 22, 1989, a meeting between Station Chemistry and RP personnel was held
- to discuss secondary bead resin handling problems. Topics included mixing bead
! and powdex resins in the same liner, and bead resin sampling problems caused by residual resin in the CPD Backwuh tank. The RP Associate Scientist explained that RP did not have a problem with mixing bead and powdex resin from a sampling standpoint, since the densities and waste streams were virtually the same.
Also, a plan for preventing residual bead resins in the CPD Backwash tank from contaminating clean resin in the CPD Backwash tank was addressed. This meeting was documented in a Memorandum To File by the Chemistry Scientist on April 3, 1989 and copied to Station Chemistry management.- The Corporate Nuclear Chemistry personnel were not involved in this meeting.
l l On April 21, 1989, 33 cubic feet (cf) of bead resin were added to liner serial l number 451804-01. On May 2,.67 cf of powdex resin and 85 cf of bead resin were mixed in the backwash tank and transferred to liner 451804-01 and the liner was subsequently dewatered using the powdex dewatering procedure. On June 7, 18 cf of boad resin were added to the top of liner serial number 448885-28 which had previously been loaded with 88 cf and 79 cf of powdex on October 12,.1988 and February 10, 1989, respectively. Liner serial number 448885-28 was subsequently dewatered per the powdex dewatering procedure.
t l On July 19, 1989, CNSI Barnwell Regulatory Affairs personnel advised the RP Associate Scientist to use the description "dowatered powdex and bead resin" for the mixed media resin liner shipping manifest instead of using "dewatered filter media" as previously stated during the March 7 conversation. On July 26, 1989,
~
the two mixed media resin liners were chipped to the Low Level Waste Repository i in Barnwell, S.C.
In December of 1989, McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) contacted Corporate Nuclear Chemistry and requested permission to dowater bead and powdex resin at MNS. On 1 December 7, 1989, a letter from the DPC Corporate Nuclear Chemistry was sent to CNSI Engineering referring to previous telephone conversations, between Corporate Nuclear Chemistry and CUSI, concerning the possibility of loading powdex and bead resins in the same powdex liner. Thjs letter was initiated after MNS Chemistry had notified Corporate Nuclear Chemistry that they were not able to completely fill bead resing liners due to the amount of water required to sluice. bead resin. Shipments of mixed resin could eliminate this problem and better utilize storage space. The letter stated that DpC was interested in pursuing this for disposal of secondary powdex and bead resin and referred to testing required to determine if mixed loadings are feasible. This letter was
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also copied to the Chemistry Scientist at Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS). Upon receipt of this letter the chemistry Scientist noted that two powdex liners consisting of bead and powdex resin had been previously shipped to the waste 4,
repository at Barnwell, S.C., on July 26, 1989. On December 12, 1989, the L Chemistry Scientirt promptly notified the CNSI Site Operator who was also aware h of the prior shipment, to determine if there was a problem with the 7uly 26, 1989 shipment. The CNSI Site Operator contacted the CNSI Operations Manager who
- stated that it was acceptable to dowater mixtures of bead and powdex resin in powdex liners using the powdex dowatering procedure. The issue of mixed resin liners, however continued to be pursued by the Chemistry Scientist and Corporate Nuclear Chemistry was notified of the problem.
On December 15, 1989, at 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />, Problem Investigation Report (PIR)
, 0-C89-0381 was issued due to a violation of Technical Specification 3/4.11.3.
This was due to two liners of mixed media (powdex and bead resin) being shipped in violation of the PCP. Since the boundary conditions for resin form were not mot, a Technical Specification violation occurred. The conclusion, that l Technical Specification 3/4.11.3 had been violated, was drawn following a telephone conference between Corporate Nuclear Chemistry, Station Chemistry and CNSI Operations and Engineering Departments.
l l Further shipments of mixed secondary resin liners were suspended until testing l of mixed media liners has been performed and the required procedure changes had-
- been issued. Resin loading similar to the least conservative liner shipped, on l July 26, has been tested to insure adequate dewatering. The dewatering test
- report was issued on February 7,1990. The test report concluded that the mixed resin liners were adequately dewatered and met the Barnwell Site acceptance-criteria. CNSI is issuing a prbcedure to allow dewatering of bead and powdex resin mixtures in powdex resins in powdex liners.
CONCLUSIONS
~
Technical Specification 3/4.11.3 was violated due to two liners of bead and powdex resin mixtures being shipped to the Barnwell Low Level Waste Repository, after being dewatered using an inadequate procedure for the type of resin form.
The CNSI procedure used (FO-OP-22, Ecodex-Precoat/Powdex/Solka-Floc /Diatomacious Earth Dewatering Procedure For CNSI 14-215 or Smaller Liners), Enclosure 4.5 of OP/0/B/6500/09, specifies that "this procedure applies only to the dewatering of Ecodex-Precoat/Powdex/Solka-Floc / Diatomaceous Earth or equivalent base forms in CNSI 14-215 or smaller liners with less than 1% oil". The dewatering procedure used was inadequate for the liner loading since it did not include bead resin in the applicability statement. The CNS Chemistry personnel, however, interpreted-the "or equivalent base forms" to include bead resin, since the bead resin and-powdex resin are of the same chemical composition. Also the CNSI Operations and Barnwell Regulatory Affairs Personnel had indicated that bead and powdex resin mixtures could be dowatered in powdex liners using the FO-OP-22 procedure, fu s a .v.s. era,nn .no w,movo
s, A NRCPermanSA Ua NUCtr *.3 C t;ULi,. TORY COMMISSIDN 2 o LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CSNTINUATION u erovio eMe No m o-e m g EXPtRES. D'3Ug8
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This incident is assigned a root cause of Management Deficiency, due to inadequate policy or directive, in that the pCP allowed a deviation from the normal practice of handling bead and powdex resin separately to be changed i without the involvement of Corporate Nuclear Chemistry. The involvement of Corporate Nuclaar Chemistry would have provided an additional level of review and would have probably led to consultation with CNSI Engineering. Chemistry is now directed to inform Corporate Nuc1 car Chemistry when any changes to the handling of radioactive waste are anticipated or required.
This incident is assigned a contributing cause of management deficiency, due to poor management interface, in that the CNSI Operations group, Barnwell Site Regulatory Affairs and the CNSI Engineering group had conflicting
- interpretations as to the applicability of Procedure FO-OP-22 to handle mixtures
, of bead and powdex resin. The discussions between station personnel and the CNSI Operaticno and Barnwell Regulatory Aff airs personnel led to the misinterpretation of the procedure applicability.
This Technical Specification violation is also assigned a contributing cause of a possible procedure deficiency, in that the statement "or equivalent base forms" was misinterpreted by the CNSI Operations group, Barnwell Site Regulatory Affairs, and by the CNS Chemistry personnel. Also OP/0/B/6500/53, Enclosure 4.15, Dewatering Record does not specifically list the waste form as a process parameter for which boundary conditions are established. Although the Chemistry Supervisor was aware of the applicability statement in FO-OP-22, listing of the waste form in the boundary conditions may have instigated further review. If the boundary conditions are not met or are in doubt physical testing of the liner can be performed to insure proper dewatering per the PCP. Physical L Testing, per OP/0/B/6500/53, consists of visual inspection and a probe penetrato l test. OP/0/B/6500/09 will be evaluated to determine if clarification of the l applicability statement is warranted. Also, OP/0/B/6500/53 was evaluated to I determine that all process parameters are adequately addressed.
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A review of the Operating Experience Program database for the past 24 months, does not yield any Technical Specification violations due to procedural or management deficiencies. Therefore, this incident is not considered to be a recurring problem or a recurring event.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SUBSEQUENT l
- 1) Shipments of mixed bead and powdex resins were suspended'until test loaded liners were tested ~and any required procedure changes are issued.
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, itxt .a . ,. nc s,. w w nn 3 2) Resin loadings similar to the least conservative liner shipped, on July 27, 1989, were tested to insure adequate dewatering.
/ 3) Chemiatry personnel have been made aware of this incident through significant event notification training.
- 4) The PCP and/or station procedures concerning radioactive waste shipments was revised to require notification of Nuclear Chemistry when any changes or deviations in the solidification or dewatering of radioactive waste is anticipated or required and may affect the pCP.
b) A clearer term for equivalent base forms in the applicability statement for OP/0/B/6500/09, Enclosure 4.5 (FO-OP-22) was established
, and included in the procedure applicability statement.
- 6) OP/0/B/6500/53, Operating Procedure For Transfer And Dowatering Cotitaminated Secondary Resins, was evaluated to determine that all process parameters are adequately addressed.
SAFETY EVALUATION The two mixed resin liners (serial. numbers 44885-28 and 451804-01) shipped, on July 26, 1989, have been buried at the Barnwell Low Level Waste Repository.
These liners were dewatered using a procedure that was untested for the mixed resin loading, however, the top of the resin beds were visually inspected and the liners were sounded by the CNSI Site operator prior to shipment. The visual inspection and sounding did not indicate the presence of freestanding liquid in either liner. Subsequent certification testing of a liner loaded with powdex and bead resin using the powdex dewatering procedure, conducted by CNSI, indicates that the mixed resin liners, shipped on July 26, meet the Barnwell Site acceptance criteria for moisture and freestanding liquid. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were unaffected by this incident.
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