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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML20024J2601994-10-0404 October 1994 LER 94-006-00:on 940913,automatic Reactor/Turbine Trip Occurred on Over Power Differential Temperature.Caused by Equipment Failure.Replaced Relay & Evaluated Failure Rate of Types of relays.W/941004 Ltr ML20029D1011994-04-20020 April 1994 LER 93-003-01:on 930925,reactor Tripped Due to Inadvertent Closure of Msiv.Caused by Inadequate Checking.Corrective Actions:Cros Throttled CA Flow & Entered Procedure EP/2/A/5000/01.W/940420 Ltr ML20046D5871993-08-17017 August 1993 LER 93-008-00:on 930718,reactor Tripped & Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Automatic Start Due to low-low-level in SG 1A. Developed General Troubleshooting procedure.W/930817 Ltr ML20045H2421993-07-12012 July 1993 LER 93-006-00:on 930612,automatic Reactor Trip Initiated by intermediate-range Channel N35 Hi Flux Reactor Trip Bistable.Caused by Blown Fuse in Channel.Entire Drawer Replaced & Channel Placed Back in svc.W/930712 Ltr ML20024G9751991-05-0909 May 1991 LER 91-004-00:on 910410,tech Spec Violation Occurred Re Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Being Inoperable. Caused by Inapropriate Action.Maint Staff Instructed Supervisors & Technicians of Correcting cause.W/910509 Ltr ML20024G7371991-04-18018 April 1991 LER 91-006-00:on 910323,nuclear Svc Water Valves Left W/O Emergency Power Supply.Caused by Inappropriate Action Due to Misreading of Operator Aid Computer (Oac) Graphics.Oac Graphics Training Will Be provided.W/910418 Ltr ML20029A3311991-02-12012 February 1991 LER 91-002-00:on 910113,reactor Exceeded 5% Power Level W/ RHR Sys Pump 1A Inoperable Due to Closed Suction Valve. Caused by Inappropriate Action & Procedural Deficiency. Incident Discussed W/Involved personnel.W/910212 Ltr ML20044B1761990-07-10010 July 1990 LER 90-013-00:on 900611,approx 5,000 Gallons of RCS Water Inadvertently Transferred to Refueling Water Storage Tank. Caused by Inappropriate Action.Proper Sys Parameters Restored & Analysis of Event performed.W/900709 Ltr ML20043G6441990-06-14014 June 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900430,high Pressure CO2 Discharge Occurred on Auxiliary Feedwater Fire Protection Sys.Caused by Const/ Installation Deficiency in Solenoids.Solenoids Orientation Verified to Be Installed correctly.W/900614 Ltr ML20043C8951990-05-29029 May 1990 LER 89-010-01:on 880314,auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A Discharge to Steam Generator 2A Isolation Failed to Completely Close.Caused by Design Deficiency.Mods to Actuator Torque Switch Setting increased.W/900524 Ltr ML20042G6301990-05-0909 May 1990 LER 90-025-00:on 900409,unexpected ESFs Actuation Occurred During Performance of Incore Thermocouple Testing.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised & Reviewed W/Personnel Lessons Learned from event.W/900503 Ltr ML20043A9271990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 89-030-01:on 890726,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Shipment of Two Liners of Secondary Bead & Powdex Resin Mixture.On 891215,same Tech Spec Violation Occurred.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Shipments suspended.W/900503 Ltr ML20042F4721990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 90-015-00:on 900402,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered When Both Trains of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Supervisor Incorrectly Denoting Valve Position.Valves 1RN-493 & 494 closed.W/900430 Ltr ML20042F4741990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 90-006-00:on 900321,discovered That Nuclear Svc Water Sys Assured Makeup Source to Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Surge Chamber 2A Would Not Provide Adequate Flow. Caused by Clogged pipe.W/900430 Ltr ML20042E3141990-04-0303 April 1990 LER 90-002-01:on 900103,containment Air Return Fan Failed to Start During Test & Breaker FO1A in Motor Control Ctr Opened.Caused by Inappropriate Action.Measures Taken to Ensure Positions of Breakers verified.W/900409 Ltr ML20012C6881990-03-15015 March 1990 LER 90-011-00:on 900215,discovered That Control Room Doors Were More Difficult to Open than Normal.Ventilation Sys Found to Be Incapable of Maintaining Positive Pressure. Caused by Design Deficiency.Walls sealed.W/900315 Ltr ML20012C6901990-03-15015 March 1990 LER 90-005-01:on 900126,Tech Spec 3.0,3 Entered Due to More than One Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Exceeding 5% Deviation.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Operations Procedure revised.W/900314 Ltr ML20012C3741990-03-13013 March 1990 LER 90-012-00:on 900127,central Alarm Station Operator Noted That Controlled Access Door Not Closed.Caused by Inappropriate Action Taken Which Was Unauthorized.Personnel Counseled on Importance of Sys operability.W/900313 Ltr ML20012C5091990-03-13013 March 1990 LER 90-009-00:on 900212,containment Purge Sys Heaters Not Being Verified to Be Running During Monthly Surveillance as Required by Tech Specs.Caused by Defective Procedures,Due to Incomplete Info.Procedures revised.W/900313 Ltr ML20012C5111990-03-12012 March 1990 LER 90-007-01:on 891108,discovered That Transmission Procedures Used to Perform Undervoltage Relay Tests Revealed That Test Acceptance Criteria Did Not Agree W/Tech Specs & Relays Not Being Adjusted as required.W/900316 Ltr ML20012B8121990-03-0909 March 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900203,discovered That Insulation Removed from Main Steam Auxiliary Equipment Piping to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine.Caused by Design Oversight Due to Unanticipated Interaction of sys.W/900309 Ltr ML20012C4961990-03-0707 March 1990 LER 90-010-00:on 900205,discovered That Standby Shutdown Facility Wide Range RCS Temp Indications Had Not Been Subj to Monthly Channel Check as Required by Tech Spec 4.7.13.6. Caused by Defective procedure.W/900307 Ltr ML20012A1781990-02-27027 February 1990 LER 90-005-00:on 900126,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Inoperable Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation (Prni) During Unit Shutdown.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Action Developed to Better Anticipate & Carry Out Prni calibr.W/900227 Ltr ML20006E8231990-02-14014 February 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 900104,contact Carrier Screws in nonsafety- Related Breaker Found Loose & in Bottom of Motor Control Ctr Cubicle.Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Loose Screws Secured. Part 21 related.W/900215 Ltr ML20006D4861990-02-0707 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900105,unexpected Auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Startup Occurred During Periodic Cabinet Test. Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Procedures to Be Revised to Prevent recurrence.W/900207 Ltr ML20011E2281990-02-0202 February 1990 LER 90-002-00:on 900103,containment Air Return Fan 1B Failed to Start During Quarterly Test & Breaker F01A in Motor Control Ctr Discovered Open.Caused by Inappropriate Operator Action.Lockout Breakers closed.W/900202 Ltr ML20011E3951990-02-0202 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 891116,potential Concern Identified W/ Pressurizer Safety Valve Blowdown Being Greater than Assumed in Safety Analyses.Caused by Functional Design Deficiency. Also Reportable Per Part 21.W/900202 Ltr ML19354E0191990-01-19019 January 1990 LER 89-020-01:on 891118,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered & 5-month Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Sys Inoperability Occurred as Result of Low Filter Exhaust Flow Condition on 891111.Caused by Design Oversight.Duct Will Be cleaned.W/900119 Ltr ML19354E0931990-01-18018 January 1990 LER 89-025-01:on 890922,power Lost to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans Due to Deenergization of 13.8 Kv Auxiliary Switchgear.Caused by Weather Conditions.Reactor Power Reduced to Maintain Condenser vacuum.W/900119 Ltr ML19354E0201990-01-18018 January 1990 LER 89-016-01:on 890913,generator 1B Power Circuit Breaker Opened,Causing Unit Runback to 54% Power & Failure of Generator Breaker Air Pressure Gauge.Caused by Equipment Failure.Pneumatic Gauge replaced.W/900117 Ltr ML19354D8261990-01-15015 January 1990 LER 89-029-00:on 891213,determined That Max Actuator Torque Switch Setting Insufficient to Overcome Friction Force Due to Age Hardening of Elastomeric Seat Matl on Bif/General Signal Corp Valve.Also Reported Per Part 21.W/900112 Ltr ML20005G4261990-01-12012 January 1990 LER 89-013-00:on 890726,two Carbon Steel Liners,Containing Mixture of Powdex & Bead Resins,Shipped to Barnwell,Sc,In Violation of Process Control Program.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Shipment suspended.W/900112 Ltr ML20005G3061990-01-0909 January 1990 LER 89-020-00:on 890921,abnormal Degradation of Steel Containment Vessels Observed.Caused by Corrosion by Standing Water in Annulus Areas.Steel Containment Vessels Will Be Recoated During Next Refueling outage.W/900109 Ltr ML20005E4021989-12-29029 December 1989 LER 89-028-00:on 891204,steam Generator 1D Power Operated Relief Valve Did Not Close on Train a Main Steam Isolation Signal During Valve Inservice Test.Caused by Failed Fuse. Fuse replaced.W/891229 Ltr ML20011D3321989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-021-00:on 890821,hydrogen Skimmer Fan 2A Declared Inoperable in Order to Replace Breaker,In Response to NRC Bulletin 88-010.On 890825,breaker Tripped & Power Reduction Resumed.Caused by Inappropriate action.W/891222 Ltr ML20011D3351989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-027-00:on 891120,chemical & Vol Control Sys Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B Declared Inoperable Due to Inability to Maintain Sufficient Charging Flow.Cause Not determined.Power-range Detector replaced.W/891222 Ltr ML20011D2321989-12-18018 December 1989 LER 89-020-00:on 891111,low Filtered Exhaust Flow Discovered by Control Room Operators During Observation of Indications. Caused by Design Oversight Re Interaction of Sys/Components. Clothes Dryer Filters to Be modified.W/891218 Ltr ML19332E7201989-12-0606 December 1989 LER 89-023-01:on 890915,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered as Result of Both Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Sys Being Inoperable.Caused by Equipment Malfunctions.Control Room & Area Pressurization Flow Rates revised.W/891120 Ltr ML19324B1141989-10-20020 October 1989 LER 89-024-00:on 890920,safety Review Group Staff Member Identified Committed Fire Door S102A as Possibly Inadequate. Caused by Design Deficiency.Fire Watch Established & Door repaired.W/891019 Ltr ML19324B4091989-10-20020 October 1989 LER 89-025-00:on 890922,13.8 Kv Auxiliary Switchgear Deenergized Resulting in Loss of Power to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans.Power Reduction Due to Hurricane Hugo.W/891019 Ltr ML19325C6381989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-023-00:on 890915,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Both Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Sys Being Inoperable.Caused by Defective pre-operational Testing Procedure.Train a Control Room Damper adjusted.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C6401989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-016-00:on 890913,four Channels of Power Range Instrumentation Showed Greater than 5% Allowable Mismatch Between Rated Thermal Power & Nuclear Power.Caused by Equipment Failure.Pneumatic Gauge replaced.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C6441989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-019-00:on 890912,capability of Switches 2CA-15A & 2CA-18B Disabled Rendering Feedwater Pumps 2A & 2B Inoperable.Caused by Defective Procedure & Inappropriate Actions.Procedure Revised & Update issued.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C1961989-10-0404 October 1989 LER 89-026-00:on 890823,tested Breaker Replaced W/Traceable Breaker in Response to Bulletin 88-010.Breaker Tripped. Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Work Request Written.Item Reportable Per Part 21.W/891003 Ltr ML19327B6071989-09-20020 September 1989 LER 89-025-00:on 890922,auxiliary Switchgear Deenergized, Resulting in Loss of Power to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans.Caused by Inoperable power-range Instrumentation Due to Hurricane Hugo.W/890920 Ltr ML17303B1821986-12-30030 December 1986 LER 86-058-01:on 861111 & 18,overtemp Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred on Increasing Reactor Coolant Temp Rate.Caused by Spike on Potentiometer.Valve Realigned & Unit Returned to Previous status.W/861230 Ltr 1994-04-20
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML20024J2601994-10-0404 October 1994 LER 94-006-00:on 940913,automatic Reactor/Turbine Trip Occurred on Over Power Differential Temperature.Caused by Equipment Failure.Replaced Relay & Evaluated Failure Rate of Types of relays.W/941004 Ltr ML20029D1011994-04-20020 April 1994 LER 93-003-01:on 930925,reactor Tripped Due to Inadvertent Closure of Msiv.Caused by Inadequate Checking.Corrective Actions:Cros Throttled CA Flow & Entered Procedure EP/2/A/5000/01.W/940420 Ltr ML20046D5871993-08-17017 August 1993 LER 93-008-00:on 930718,reactor Tripped & Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Automatic Start Due to low-low-level in SG 1A. Developed General Troubleshooting procedure.W/930817 Ltr ML20045H2421993-07-12012 July 1993 LER 93-006-00:on 930612,automatic Reactor Trip Initiated by intermediate-range Channel N35 Hi Flux Reactor Trip Bistable.Caused by Blown Fuse in Channel.Entire Drawer Replaced & Channel Placed Back in svc.W/930712 Ltr ML20024G9751991-05-0909 May 1991 LER 91-004-00:on 910410,tech Spec Violation Occurred Re Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Being Inoperable. Caused by Inapropriate Action.Maint Staff Instructed Supervisors & Technicians of Correcting cause.W/910509 Ltr ML20024G7371991-04-18018 April 1991 LER 91-006-00:on 910323,nuclear Svc Water Valves Left W/O Emergency Power Supply.Caused by Inappropriate Action Due to Misreading of Operator Aid Computer (Oac) Graphics.Oac Graphics Training Will Be provided.W/910418 Ltr ML20029A3311991-02-12012 February 1991 LER 91-002-00:on 910113,reactor Exceeded 5% Power Level W/ RHR Sys Pump 1A Inoperable Due to Closed Suction Valve. Caused by Inappropriate Action & Procedural Deficiency. Incident Discussed W/Involved personnel.W/910212 Ltr ML20044B1761990-07-10010 July 1990 LER 90-013-00:on 900611,approx 5,000 Gallons of RCS Water Inadvertently Transferred to Refueling Water Storage Tank. Caused by Inappropriate Action.Proper Sys Parameters Restored & Analysis of Event performed.W/900709 Ltr ML20043G6441990-06-14014 June 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900430,high Pressure CO2 Discharge Occurred on Auxiliary Feedwater Fire Protection Sys.Caused by Const/ Installation Deficiency in Solenoids.Solenoids Orientation Verified to Be Installed correctly.W/900614 Ltr ML20043C8951990-05-29029 May 1990 LER 89-010-01:on 880314,auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A Discharge to Steam Generator 2A Isolation Failed to Completely Close.Caused by Design Deficiency.Mods to Actuator Torque Switch Setting increased.W/900524 Ltr ML20042G6301990-05-0909 May 1990 LER 90-025-00:on 900409,unexpected ESFs Actuation Occurred During Performance of Incore Thermocouple Testing.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised & Reviewed W/Personnel Lessons Learned from event.W/900503 Ltr ML20043A9271990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 89-030-01:on 890726,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Shipment of Two Liners of Secondary Bead & Powdex Resin Mixture.On 891215,same Tech Spec Violation Occurred.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Shipments suspended.W/900503 Ltr ML20042F4721990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 90-015-00:on 900402,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered When Both Trains of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Supervisor Incorrectly Denoting Valve Position.Valves 1RN-493 & 494 closed.W/900430 Ltr ML20042F4741990-05-0303 May 1990 LER 90-006-00:on 900321,discovered That Nuclear Svc Water Sys Assured Makeup Source to Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Surge Chamber 2A Would Not Provide Adequate Flow. Caused by Clogged pipe.W/900430 Ltr ML20042E3141990-04-0303 April 1990 LER 90-002-01:on 900103,containment Air Return Fan Failed to Start During Test & Breaker FO1A in Motor Control Ctr Opened.Caused by Inappropriate Action.Measures Taken to Ensure Positions of Breakers verified.W/900409 Ltr ML20012C6881990-03-15015 March 1990 LER 90-011-00:on 900215,discovered That Control Room Doors Were More Difficult to Open than Normal.Ventilation Sys Found to Be Incapable of Maintaining Positive Pressure. Caused by Design Deficiency.Walls sealed.W/900315 Ltr ML20012C6901990-03-15015 March 1990 LER 90-005-01:on 900126,Tech Spec 3.0,3 Entered Due to More than One Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Exceeding 5% Deviation.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Operations Procedure revised.W/900314 Ltr ML20012C3741990-03-13013 March 1990 LER 90-012-00:on 900127,central Alarm Station Operator Noted That Controlled Access Door Not Closed.Caused by Inappropriate Action Taken Which Was Unauthorized.Personnel Counseled on Importance of Sys operability.W/900313 Ltr ML20012C5091990-03-13013 March 1990 LER 90-009-00:on 900212,containment Purge Sys Heaters Not Being Verified to Be Running During Monthly Surveillance as Required by Tech Specs.Caused by Defective Procedures,Due to Incomplete Info.Procedures revised.W/900313 Ltr ML20012C5111990-03-12012 March 1990 LER 90-007-01:on 891108,discovered That Transmission Procedures Used to Perform Undervoltage Relay Tests Revealed That Test Acceptance Criteria Did Not Agree W/Tech Specs & Relays Not Being Adjusted as required.W/900316 Ltr ML20012B8121990-03-0909 March 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900203,discovered That Insulation Removed from Main Steam Auxiliary Equipment Piping to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine.Caused by Design Oversight Due to Unanticipated Interaction of sys.W/900309 Ltr ML20012C4961990-03-0707 March 1990 LER 90-010-00:on 900205,discovered That Standby Shutdown Facility Wide Range RCS Temp Indications Had Not Been Subj to Monthly Channel Check as Required by Tech Spec 4.7.13.6. Caused by Defective procedure.W/900307 Ltr ML20012A1781990-02-27027 February 1990 LER 90-005-00:on 900126,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Inoperable Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation (Prni) During Unit Shutdown.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Action Developed to Better Anticipate & Carry Out Prni calibr.W/900227 Ltr ML20006E8231990-02-14014 February 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 900104,contact Carrier Screws in nonsafety- Related Breaker Found Loose & in Bottom of Motor Control Ctr Cubicle.Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Loose Screws Secured. Part 21 related.W/900215 Ltr ML20006D4861990-02-0707 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900105,unexpected Auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Startup Occurred During Periodic Cabinet Test. Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Procedures to Be Revised to Prevent recurrence.W/900207 Ltr ML20011E2281990-02-0202 February 1990 LER 90-002-00:on 900103,containment Air Return Fan 1B Failed to Start During Quarterly Test & Breaker F01A in Motor Control Ctr Discovered Open.Caused by Inappropriate Operator Action.Lockout Breakers closed.W/900202 Ltr ML20011E3951990-02-0202 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 891116,potential Concern Identified W/ Pressurizer Safety Valve Blowdown Being Greater than Assumed in Safety Analyses.Caused by Functional Design Deficiency. Also Reportable Per Part 21.W/900202 Ltr ML19354E0191990-01-19019 January 1990 LER 89-020-01:on 891118,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered & 5-month Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Sys Inoperability Occurred as Result of Low Filter Exhaust Flow Condition on 891111.Caused by Design Oversight.Duct Will Be cleaned.W/900119 Ltr ML19354E0931990-01-18018 January 1990 LER 89-025-01:on 890922,power Lost to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans Due to Deenergization of 13.8 Kv Auxiliary Switchgear.Caused by Weather Conditions.Reactor Power Reduced to Maintain Condenser vacuum.W/900119 Ltr ML19354E0201990-01-18018 January 1990 LER 89-016-01:on 890913,generator 1B Power Circuit Breaker Opened,Causing Unit Runback to 54% Power & Failure of Generator Breaker Air Pressure Gauge.Caused by Equipment Failure.Pneumatic Gauge replaced.W/900117 Ltr ML19354D8261990-01-15015 January 1990 LER 89-029-00:on 891213,determined That Max Actuator Torque Switch Setting Insufficient to Overcome Friction Force Due to Age Hardening of Elastomeric Seat Matl on Bif/General Signal Corp Valve.Also Reported Per Part 21.W/900112 Ltr ML20005G4261990-01-12012 January 1990 LER 89-013-00:on 890726,two Carbon Steel Liners,Containing Mixture of Powdex & Bead Resins,Shipped to Barnwell,Sc,In Violation of Process Control Program.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Shipment suspended.W/900112 Ltr ML20005G3061990-01-0909 January 1990 LER 89-020-00:on 890921,abnormal Degradation of Steel Containment Vessels Observed.Caused by Corrosion by Standing Water in Annulus Areas.Steel Containment Vessels Will Be Recoated During Next Refueling outage.W/900109 Ltr ML20005E4021989-12-29029 December 1989 LER 89-028-00:on 891204,steam Generator 1D Power Operated Relief Valve Did Not Close on Train a Main Steam Isolation Signal During Valve Inservice Test.Caused by Failed Fuse. Fuse replaced.W/891229 Ltr ML20011D3321989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-021-00:on 890821,hydrogen Skimmer Fan 2A Declared Inoperable in Order to Replace Breaker,In Response to NRC Bulletin 88-010.On 890825,breaker Tripped & Power Reduction Resumed.Caused by Inappropriate action.W/891222 Ltr ML20011D3351989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-027-00:on 891120,chemical & Vol Control Sys Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B Declared Inoperable Due to Inability to Maintain Sufficient Charging Flow.Cause Not determined.Power-range Detector replaced.W/891222 Ltr ML20011D2321989-12-18018 December 1989 LER 89-020-00:on 891111,low Filtered Exhaust Flow Discovered by Control Room Operators During Observation of Indications. Caused by Design Oversight Re Interaction of Sys/Components. Clothes Dryer Filters to Be modified.W/891218 Ltr ML19332E7201989-12-0606 December 1989 LER 89-023-01:on 890915,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered as Result of Both Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Sys Being Inoperable.Caused by Equipment Malfunctions.Control Room & Area Pressurization Flow Rates revised.W/891120 Ltr ML19324B1141989-10-20020 October 1989 LER 89-024-00:on 890920,safety Review Group Staff Member Identified Committed Fire Door S102A as Possibly Inadequate. Caused by Design Deficiency.Fire Watch Established & Door repaired.W/891019 Ltr ML19324B4091989-10-20020 October 1989 LER 89-025-00:on 890922,13.8 Kv Auxiliary Switchgear Deenergized Resulting in Loss of Power to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans.Power Reduction Due to Hurricane Hugo.W/891019 Ltr ML19325C6381989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-023-00:on 890915,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Both Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Sys Being Inoperable.Caused by Defective pre-operational Testing Procedure.Train a Control Room Damper adjusted.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C6401989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-016-00:on 890913,four Channels of Power Range Instrumentation Showed Greater than 5% Allowable Mismatch Between Rated Thermal Power & Nuclear Power.Caused by Equipment Failure.Pneumatic Gauge replaced.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C6441989-10-11011 October 1989 LER 89-019-00:on 890912,capability of Switches 2CA-15A & 2CA-18B Disabled Rendering Feedwater Pumps 2A & 2B Inoperable.Caused by Defective Procedure & Inappropriate Actions.Procedure Revised & Update issued.W/891011 Ltr ML19325C1961989-10-0404 October 1989 LER 89-026-00:on 890823,tested Breaker Replaced W/Traceable Breaker in Response to Bulletin 88-010.Breaker Tripped. Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Work Request Written.Item Reportable Per Part 21.W/891003 Ltr ML19327B6071989-09-20020 September 1989 LER 89-025-00:on 890922,auxiliary Switchgear Deenergized, Resulting in Loss of Power to Condenser Circulating Water Cooling Tower Fans.Caused by Inoperable power-range Instrumentation Due to Hurricane Hugo.W/890920 Ltr ML17303B1821986-12-30030 December 1986 LER 86-058-01:on 861111 & 18,overtemp Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred on Increasing Reactor Coolant Temp Rate.Caused by Spike on Potentiometer.Valve Realigned & Unit Returned to Previous status.W/861230 Ltr 1994-04-20
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217H0201999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 ML20212B4711999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217H0321999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20211A9791999-08-20020 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20211C1291999-08-17017 August 1999 ISI Rept Unit 1 Catawba 1999 RFO 11 ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20210S2891999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20212B4871999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20210S2951999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4561999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20196A0001999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206P5201999-05-14014 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20206N8391999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr ML20206R1811999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196A0041999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N8261999-04-22022 April 1999 Rev 15 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr. Page 145 of 270 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20205S5551999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20205N3651999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting IPE of External Events Submittal ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML20206R1931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9521999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9561999-02-28028 February 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20204C9111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20203A2581999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of TR DPC-NE-3002-A,Rev 2, UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology. Rept Acceptable. Staff Requests Duke Energy Corp to Publish Accepted Version of TR within 3 Months of Receipt of SE ML20204C9161999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199K8711999-01-13013 January 1999 Inservice Insp Rept for Unit 2 Catawba 1998 Refueling Outage 9 ML20199E3071998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept ML20205E9441998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 10CFR50.59 Rept for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2, Containing Brief Description of Changes,Tests & Experiments,Including Summary of Ses.With ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor ML20203A4101998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-25, Catawba Unit 2 Cycle 10 Colr ML20203A4041998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 14 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 11 Colr ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998 Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas ML20196J8351998-12-0808 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request Re Relief Valves in Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Sys ML20199E3221998-11-30030 November 1998 Revised MOR for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Re Personnel Exposure ML20198E3151998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196C0251998-11-27027 November 1998 SER Accepting Clarification on Calibration Tolerances on Trip Setpoints for Catawba Nuclear Station ML20196A6881998-11-25025 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request 98-02 Re Limited Exam for Three Welds ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised ML20195E5521998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20198E3261998-10-31031 October 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154M7661998-10-12012 October 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980913,terminated Vendor Employee Entered Protected Area.Caused by Computer Interface Malfunction. Security Retained Vendor Employee Badge to Prevent Further Access & Computer Malfunction Was Repaired.With 1999-09-07
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l November 20, 1989 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 subject: Catawba Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-413
^LER 413/89-23, Rev. 1 Gentlement Attached is Revision 1 to Licensco Event Report 413/89-23, concerning Technical Specification 3.0.3 entered as a result of both trains of control room area ventilation.being inoperable due to an incomplete testing procedure and damper malfunction.
This event was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.
Very truly yours, Q so-To . Owen Station Manager heb\LER-NRC.TBO xc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter American Nuclear Insurers Regional Administrator, Region Il c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library U. S. Nuclear Regulator Commission The Exchange, Suite 245 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 270 Farmington Avenue Atlanta, GA 30323 Farmington, CT 06032 M & M Nuclear Consultants Mr. K. Jabbour 1221 Avenues of the Americas U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission New York, NY 10020 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D. C. 20555 INPO Records Center Suite 1500 Mr. W. T. Orders 1100 Circle 75 Parkway NRC Resident Inspector Atlanta, GA 30339 Catawba Nuclear Station Jg2iggCK 050oo433 omo, 3
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'" Technical Specification 3.0.3 rntered As A Result of Both Trains Of Control Room Area Ventilation Being Inoperable Due To An Incomplete Testing Procedure And Damper Malfunctions eve =, can m u m =ven ..i mieOu can ni etnia e acumis i=votvio m MONTH DA, Yta tiah 6%',h[h &6 ma s e g yogt. 0.y y g g,, s acigaiv w4we8 ODCk t 1 huw6t te:Si Catawba. Unit 2 o g g , o , o , o , 4 1 ,4
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On September 15, 1989. at 1315 hours0.0152 days <br />0.365 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />5.003575e-4 months <br />, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1, Power Operation, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered due to both trains of the Control Room Area Ventilation (VC) System being inoperable. Train B of the VC System was already inoperable for maintenance. Train A of VC was declared inoperable following the unsatisfactory performance of a Control Room positive pressure test with only one of the two outside air intakes oten. The Control Room return air damper was adjusted on Train A and the Control Room positive pressure test was performed with acceptable results in all alignments. Both trains were returned to operability on September 16, following successful >
testing. On October 10, with Train A of VC operable and Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1, Train B failed to satisfactorily pressurize the Control Room with only one intake open, during the performance of a VC flow balance test. Following damper adjustments, Train B satisfactorily pressurized the Control Room. It was found that several VC dampers were leaking by. These incidents are attributed to incomplete testing during pre-operational testing of the VC System, and to ventilation damper malfunctions. All other appropriate ventilation systems' pre-operational tests are being reviewed to assure complete testing was performed.
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4 BACKGROUND
.' The Control Room Area Ventilation [EIIS:UC] (VC) and Chilled Water [EIIS:UE]
(YC) Systems combine to form cne system which is designed to maintain a suitable y environment in the following plant areas at all times: Control Room, Cable Room, Battery Rooms, Switchgear Rooms, Motor Control Center (MCC) Rooms, and the
}i Electrical Penetration [EIIS: PEN] Rooms at elevation 594+0. The VC/YC System is i, shared between both Units. There are two 100% redundant trains of VC/YC
[ equipment. Each is capable of being powered by Unit 1 or Unit 2 Essentiai Auxiliary Power, but under normal conditions both trains are aligned to Unit 1.
p Two Diesel Generators [EIIS: GEN] (D/Gs) are provided per Unit to energize the n Essential Auxiliary Power buses during emergency conditions.
Pressurization of the Control Room and Control Room Area is affected by the induction of outside air into the air handling systems serving these areas by way of filter [EIIS:FLT] trains and associated fans [EIIS:BLO]. The two outside air intakes are at two separate locations and consist of isolation valves
[EIIS:V], a tornado damper, a radiation monitor, two chlorine detectors
[EIIS:XT] and a smoke detector in each intake. The radiation monitors and the chlorine and smoke detectors are arranged so as to close their respective air l
! intake valves upon detection of radiation, chlorine or smoke. Train separation provides for one shut-off valve in each intake to be Train A and the other to be Train B. The duct for the outside air intakes is arranged so that the Train A
- and Train B filter trains can take air from either intake location. This allows
' the Operator to switch to the alternate intake if one should become contaminated. The filtration system is also arranged so that a percentage of the return air from the Control Room and Control Room Area is routed through the filter train for clean-up purposes.
[ Technical Specification 3.7.6 specifies that two independent trains of VC/YC shall be operable during all operational modes. If one train becomes inoperable while either Unit is in Mode 4, Hot Shutdown, or above, the inoperable train must be restored to operability within seven days, or the operating Units must be shutdown. If both Units are below Mode 4 and one train is inoperable, the train must be restored to operability within seven days or the operable train l
must be operated in the FILTER mode. If both trains are inoperable, or with the operable train not capable of being powered by an operable emergency power source, all core alterations and positive reactivity changes must be suspended on both Units. The requirement for an operable emergency power source is only specifically stated for Units operating below Mode 4. However, the bases for l Technical Specification 3.7.6 states that the operability of VC/YC ensures that ambient air temperature does not exceed allowable limits for equipment and
[
instrumentation, and the Control Room will remain habitable, during and following all credible accident conditions. This implies that an operable l emergency power supply should be a prerequisite to VC/YC operability in all modes.
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Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 o ls jo lo jo l 4l1 l3 8l9 0 l 2l 3 03g or 07 0l1 g o rm v--. . w. w , mm,nri j The acceptance criteria for VC is as follows; each VC train must be capable of
[ maintaining the Control Room at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1 0.125 inch water gauge (in.wg) relative to adjacent areas with pressurization 2 air flow to the Control Room of less than or equal to 4000 cubic feet per minute y (cfm).
?
2 EVENT DESCR!pTION On August 23, 1989, during performance of Work Request 1512 MES, the Control Room (CR) pressure increased to a higher than normal level when an access door a on 2CR-AHU-1 was opened (see PIR 0-C89-0277). Design Engineering requested that
? Performance conduct PT/0/A/4450/08, Control Room Positive Pressure Test, to y ensure that no CR penetrations were degraded, by the higher pressure experienced y on August 23, and that VC could establish the required positive pressure.
5 On September 15, 1989, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1, Power Operation, plans had been made to conduct the Control Room positive pressure test. At the time of the test, Train B of VC/YC was inoperable due to work on the Train B chiller and
.: the Unit 2 VC inlet line (Train B) was isolated due to an inoperable EMF on that W duct work.
P, With Train B of VC inoperable due to chiller work being performed, the CR El positive pressure test was performed, at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />, with Train A of VC in service and the Train B outside air intake isolated due to EMF-43B being inoperable. The test failed with a CR pressure of 0.05 in.wg and 2396 cfm of '
s outside air for pressurization. Train B had been declared inoperable on September- 14, 1989, at 0625 hours0.00723 days <br />0.174 hours <br />0.00103 weeks <br />2.378125e-4 months <br />.
i EMF-43B was repaired and declared operable on September 15 at 0845 hours0.00978 days <br />0.235 hours <br />0.0014 weeks <br />3.215225e-4 months <br />, and <
Train B outside air intake was opened. The CR positive pressure test was performed again and the results were acceptable with 0.15 in.wg and 3780 cfm of outside air for pressurization.
Work Request 7230 PRF was written to investigate the cause of inadequate CR 1 pressurization with only one outside air intake open. Bahnson walked down the ducts and found no obstructions. In addition, Work Request 44238 OPS was written to inspect all CR penetrations for leaks.
fhe CR positive pressure test was performed again, with Train A in service, and all of the CR doors were taped per Work Request 44239 OPS. The test failed with each outside air intake individually isolated and CR pressurization increased only after both intakes were opened.
At 1315 hours0.0152 days <br />0.365 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />5.003575e-4 months <br />, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered due to both trains of l
the VC System being inoperable. The NRC was notified and, based on the
! extensive compensatory measures established, granted an extension to 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> L on Septebmer 16, 1989, to return one train to service. These measures included l
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. limitations on burning in the areas of the intakes, establishment of a fire watch in the intake areas, restriction of movement of chlorine cylinders in the
. plant, and instructions of the Operators on actions to take if one or both intakes became isolated.
- The VC System was then aligned to Train B and the CR positive pressure test was performed. The results were acceptable in all alignments. After throttling the CR return air damper (1PFT-MVD-2) on Train A, the CR positive pressure test was performed with acceptable results in all alignments.
Performance tested Train B with acceptable results, with damper IPFT-MVD-2 throttled, in all alignments and it was declared operable at 0909 hours0.0105 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.0015 weeks <br />3.458745e-4 months <br /> on
, September 16, 1989. Train A was balanced (returning damper IPFT-MVD-2 to its original position) and tested with acceptable results in all alignments and
- declared operable on September 16 at 1751 hours0.0203 days <br />0.486 hours <br />0.0029 weeks <br />6.662555e-4 months <br />. Train B was not retested, because the effect of damper IPFT-MVD-2 position on Train B was not known at the time.
As a result of flow balance concerns, Design Engineering reviewed the testing criteria for the VC System. Between September 16 and October 5, Design Engineering developed specific flow criteria for the split of flow exiting the Control Room Area Pressurizing Filter Train. PT/0/A/4450/08C, Control Room Area Ventilation Flow Balance, was developed to measure flow at various locations in the VC System, and provides for the performance of damper adjustments to achieve proper flows and Control Room pressurization.
On October 10, at 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br />, Train B of the VC System was declared inoperable for the performance of a Train B flow balance, under PT/0/A/4450/080. Train A was operable, and Units 1 and 2 were in Mode 1. Train B failed to pressurize the Control Room with either intake isolated. The October 10 test data differed from the September 16 results due to damper IPFT-MVD-2 position: on September 16 it was throttled, and on October 10, it was in its original position. Following damper adjustments, Train B satisfactorily pressurized the Control Room with .I either intake isolated, and Train B was declared operable by 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />. Due to operability concerns, Operations performed a Control Room pressure test, with '
satisfactory results.
On October 11, Performance successfully tested Train A per PT/0/A/4450/08C.
Test results agreed with the September 16 data.
- An evaluation of past test data led to the conclusion that flow could be leaking l past damper ICR-D-9 (Train A Suction Damper), into the Train A recirculation line, and into the Train B Filter Unit from the common supply header (see Figure '
L 1). On October 11, Work Request 7524 PRF was written to investigate / repair l
damper 1CR-D-9. The damper was subsequently found to be leaking, secured, and Train A of the VC System was declared inoperable. Damper ICR-D-10 (Train A Discharge Damper) was also found to be Icaking. A Compensatory Action was initiated, on October 11, to verify Control Room pressurization on each shift.
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On October 13, following adjustments to reduce leakage through dampers ICR-D-9 and ICR-D-10, Trains A and B successfully pressurized the Control Room when
! tested under PT/0/A/4450/080.
f' An inspection of dampers 2CR-D-4 (Train B Discharge Damper), 2CR-D-9 and 2CR-D-10 found all three dampers to be leaking. On October 17, Work Requests
[
7264 PRF, 7265 PRF and 7266 PRF were written to repair these dampers.
L On October 20, a Train A flow balance was successfully performed under PT/0/A/4450/08C. On October 25, the linkages for dampers 2CR-D-4, 2CR-D-9 and
[' 2CR-0-10 were adjusted to ensure that they fully closed, under their associated work requests. A Train A flow balance was subsequently performed, on October i 25, with satisfactory results, under PT/0/A/4450/080. The Compensatory Action was terminated on October 26, at 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br />.
f CONCLUSION These incidents have been attributed to defective pre-operational testing procedures. The test procedures did not test the system in all possible Modes ;
e of operation. The ability of each train of VC was not verified to be capable of meeting the acceptance criteria with only one outside air intake open. All other appropriate ventilation pre-operational tests are being investigated to ensure they were performed to demonstrate adequate performance during multiple intake alignments.
These incidents have also been attributed to equipment malfunctions. Returning damper IPFT-MVD-2 to its normal position had enabled cross train flow, due to leakage past damper ICR-D-9. The linkages for dampers 1,2CR-D-9 would not sufficiently close the blades, and required adjustments. Over a period of time, the linkages for these dampers had apparently slipped out of adjustment.
Standing Work Requests (SWRs) have been developed to inspect dampers ICR-0-4, ICR-D-9 and ICR-D-10 and 2CR-D-4, 2CR-D-9 and 2CR-D-10 every six months, to ensure that they fully close. The actuators for these dampers are currently checked every six months under 3064 SWR, A list of other dampers which should be periodically inspected to ensure full blade closure will be developed.
Dampers 1,2CR-D-4, 9 and 10 consist of an ITT-General Controls Linear Hydramotor Actuator and a damper / linkage assembly manufactured by Ruskin Mfg. Co. These linkage malfunctions are not NPRDS reportable.
A review of previous events showed two other cases in which Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered for two trains of the VC System being inoperable, within the past twelve months (see LER 413/88-23 and LER 413/89-10).
LER 413/89-10 also involved an equipment malfunction, however, the failed component was not similar -(Train A Control Room Area Air Handling Unit 1 in-board motor [EIIS:M0] bearing). A review of the Operating Experience Program database did not indicate any previous VC System events being caused by a damper malfunction, or by defective pre-operational testing.
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$ 1) All CR penetrations were inspected for leaks under Work Request 44238
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k 2) Train A's CR return air damper was adjusted under Work Request 1230 r PRF.
- 3) Train B of VC was tested satisfactorily (in all intake alignments) and c
Train A of VC was balanced (returning Train A's CR return air damper to its original position) and tested satisfactorily.
- 4) From September 15 to September 16, 1989, compensatory measures were j taken to limit burning in the area of the intakes, to establish a fire ,
watch in the intake areas, to restrict movement of chlorine cylinders in the plant, and to instruct the Operators on actions to take if one
-. or both intakes became isolated.
} 5) Design Engineering revised the criteria for Control Room and Control j Room Area pressurization flow rates.
- 6) Performance developed a VC flow balance procedure, to ensure adequate l! pressurization in all alignments.
- 7) , Dampers were adjusted per PT/0/A/4450/080, enabling Train B to satisfactorily pressurize the Control room with either intake
] isolated.
- 8) Dampors ICR-D-9 and ICR-D-10 were repaired.
- 9) Dampers 2CR-D-4, 2CR-D-9, and 2CR-0-10 were repaired under Work Requests 7264 PRF, 7205 PRF, and 7266 PRF.
- 10) Both trains of the VC System satisfactorily pressurized the Control Room, in all alignments, under PT/0/A/4450/080.
- 11) SWRs have been developed to inspect dampers 1,2 CR-0-4, 9 and 10 every six months.
- 12) A Compensatory Action was initiated to verify adequate Control Room pressurization once per shift.
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0l2l3 0l1 ol 7 or ogy van v a== = w we , maa v tm PLANNED ;
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h 1) All appropriate ventilation pre-operational tests are being reviewed y to assure adequate testing of multiple intake alignments.
4
! 2) A list of other dampers which should be periodically inspected to
' ensure full blade closure will be developed.
[ SAFETY ANALYSIS g
Technical Specification 3.7.6 allows one train of the VC System to be inoperable i providing appropriate actions are taken. Technical Specification and FSAR 4 requirements were met for flow, pressurization and filtration with Train B.
The Train A operability Technical Specification and FSAR requirements could have L- been met with both outside air intakes open. However, the Technical j.' Specification and FSAR requirements could not be met with only one outside air intake open with only Train A in operation. In this case VC was still able to n
provide 0.05 in.wg of pressurization in the CR. This is adequate to prevent ,
j migration of radioactivity into the CR until such time as the other train or ,
t outside air intake could be placed in service.
! On October 10, 1989. Train A was in operation. Train A was demonstrated, on <
- October 11, to be capable of meeting Technical Specification and FSAR
- ' requirements, when tested under PT/0/A/4450/08C.
The health and safety of the public were unaffected by this incident.
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