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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217K1051999-10-19019 October 1999 Ack Receipt of Ltr Dtd 990707,which Transmitted Rev 29 to Callaway Plant Physical Security Plan,Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(p).Based on Determination That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan,No NRC Approval Required 05000482/LER-1999-002, Forwards LER 99-002-00,re Identification of Surveillance Performed in Modes Other than Those Required by TS SR 4.6.3.2.a.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-002-00,re Identification of Surveillance Performed in Modes Other than Those Required by TS SR 4.6.3.2.a.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl 05000482/LER-1994-014, Forwards LER 94-014-00 Re Util Identification of Missed Surveillance Required by TS Prior to Changing Modes.List of Commitments Made by Licensee,Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 94-014-00 Re Util Identification of Missed Surveillance Required by TS Prior to Changing Modes.List of Commitments Made by Licensee,Encl ML20217F7481999-10-14014 October 1999 Informs That Based on Approval of Core Assessment Damage Guidance in WCAP-14696,rev 1 for Westinghouse Nuclear Power Plants,Licensee May Use WCAP-14696,rev 1 at Wolf Creek Generating Station ML20217G2071999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-483/99-10 on 990913-16.No Violations Noted.Insp Was to Review Emergency Plan & Procedures During Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise ML20217F8701999-10-13013 October 1999 Provides Summary of Meeting on 991007 with Representatives of Wolf Creek Nuclear Station in Burlington,Kansas Re Status of Licensee Radiation Protection Program.List of Meeting Attendees & Licensee Presentation Encl ML20217C1721999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-09 on 990830-0903.No Violations Noted.Purpose of Insp to Perform Routine Operational Status Insp of Emergency Preparedness Program & to Resolve Questions Re Revised Emergency Plan ML20217B5711999-10-0505 October 1999 Discusses GL 98-01 Issued by NRC on 980511 & Uec Responses for Callaway NPP Unit 1 ,990224 & 990628.Informs That Staff Reviewed Responses & Concluded That All Requested Info for GL 98-01 Provided ML20217B5901999-10-0505 October 1999 Informs That Staff Concludes That Licensee Responses to GL 97-06 Provides Reasonable Assurance That Condition of Util SG Internals in Compliance with Current Licensing Bases for Callaway Plant,Unit 1 ML20217A4881999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Changes to Plant Data Point Library,Iaw 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a.ERDS Point Affected Is RDS0001 ML20216H9291999-09-29029 September 1999 Informs That Licensee Responses to GL 97-06, Degradation of Steam Generator Internals Acceptable & Did Not Identify Any New Concerns with Condition of SG Intervals at Plant ML20212G1681999-09-24024 September 1999 Notifies NRC of Change in Status of Licensed Individual at Plant,Per 10CFR50.74.RL Acree Holds License OP-42654 at Plant,But Has Been Permanently Reassigned from Position for Which Plant Has Certified Need for RO License ML20216F9591999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards Withdrawal of Amend Request Re Ultimate Heat Sink Temp for Wolf Creek Generating Station ML20212G0221999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-483/99-11 on 990812-20.No Violations Noted.Team Found,Weakness in flow-accelerated Corrosion Monitoring Program Resulted in No Previous Insp of Pipe Segment Which Failed ML20212G5641999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-13 on 990725-0904.Three Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations 05000482/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Identification of Missed Surveillance Due to Exceeding Flow Rate Specified in TS for Ccps.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment I1999-09-17017 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Identification of Missed Surveillance Due to Exceeding Flow Rate Specified in TS for Ccps.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment I ML20212D9381999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That NRC Staff Completed Midcycle PPR of WCGS on 990818.Areas of EP & Engineering Warranted Increase in NRC Action.Nrc Plan to Conduct Add Insp Beyond Core Insp Program Over Next 7 Months to Address Listed Questions 05000482/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,re Failure to Correctly Perform TS Surveillance 4.3.3.6.Encl Identifies Actions Committed to by Util1999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,re Failure to Correctly Perform TS Surveillance 4.3.3.6.Encl Identifies Actions Committed to by Util ML20212D9341999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That on 990818,NRC Completed Midcycle PPR of Callaway Plant.In Area of Ep,C/As Taken in Response to Problems Identified During Previous Exercises Warrant More in-dept Review.Details of Insp Plan Through March 2000 Encl ML20217D5791999-09-15015 September 1999 Provides Formal Documentation of Reviews & Discussions Re Technical Ltr Rept for Proprietary Info.Review of Ltr Was Discussed in Telcon & Via e-mail Messages. Summary of Telcons as Documented on 990708,included ML20212C9211999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536, Operating Licensing Examination Data, in Response to NRC Administrative Ltr 99-03 05000482/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-01,re Identification of Failure to Enter LCO for TS 3.6.1.1 While Taking Containment Atmosphere Samples During Power Operation.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-01,re Identification of Failure to Enter LCO for TS 3.6.1.1 While Taking Containment Atmosphere Samples During Power Operation.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl ML20216F1641999-09-14014 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-12 on 990816-20.No Violation Noted.Determined That Solid Radwaste Mgt & Radioactive Matls Transportation Programs Were Properly Implemented ML20212A4921999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-483/99-08 on 990725-0904.Two Severity Level IV Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20212B1521999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-483/99-07 on 990809-13.No Violations Noted.Inspectors Used Annual Licensed Operator Requalification Exams to Assess Licensed Operator Performance ML20212A4701999-09-10010 September 1999 Rssponds to NRC 990709 RAI Re Util Relief Request to Allow Use of 1998 Edition of ASME Section Xi,Subsection Iwe. Acceptance Criteria for Liner Plate Pressure Boundary Thickness Will Be Limited to 10% Nominal Thinning 05000482/LER-1999-009, Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Util Identification of Fire Suppression Issue Affecting Safe Shutdown Components. Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in Encl LER1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Util Identification of Fire Suppression Issue Affecting Safe Shutdown Components. Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in Encl LER ML20212A5651999-09-10010 September 1999 Informs of Completion of Review of & Encl Objectives for Wolf Creek Generating Station 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Scheduled for 991117.Determined Exercise Objectives Appropriate to Meet EP Requirements ML20211M7151999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Changes to Wolf Creek Generating Station Data Point Library.Emergency Response Data Sys Points Affected Are EJL0007 & EJL0008 05000482/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Efsa at Plant.Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in LER1999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Efsa at Plant.Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in LER ML20211K8301999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards marked-up TS Page Deleting Inequality Signs from Trip Setpoints in SR 3.3.5.3 & Reflecting Info on Calibr Tolerance Band,Per 990708 Application to Amend License NPF-42 ML20211N0081999-09-0202 September 1999 Informs That NRC Staff Has Reviewed Submittals & Concluded Util Adequately Addressed Actions Requested in GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power- Operated Gate Valves ML20211N0321999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards SE Concluding That Util Adequately Addressed Actions Requested in GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20211K1941999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Rev 31 to WCGS Physical Security Plan,Safeguards Contingency Plan & Training & Qualification Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20211H1491999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-16 on 990809-13.No Violations Noted.Insp Focused on Low as Is Reasonably Achievable Program,Training Program for Contract Radiation Protection Personnel & Radiation Protection QA Program ML20211A8581999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-08 on 990316-0724.One Violation Being Treated as Noncited Violation ML20211B0241999-08-18018 August 1999 Ack Receipt of Ltr Dtd 990714,transmitting Scenario for Licensee Upcoming Biennial Exercise.Based on Review,Nrc Determined That Exercise Scenario Sufficient to Meet Emergency Plan Requirements & Exercise Objectives ML20211G2201999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Exam Rept 50-482/99-301 on 990726-29.Exam Evaluated Six Applicants for SO Licenses & Three Applicants for RO Licenses ML20210U0991999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-11 on 990712-16.No Violations Noted.Insp Was to Review Radiological Environ Monitoring Program ML20210U9751999-08-13013 August 1999 Informs That Licensee Identified That Answer Key for One Question on 990720 Written Exam & Event Classification for on Job Performance Measure Required Mod.Description & Justification for Proposed Mod,Including Technical Ref,Encl ML20210T9121999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-483/99-06 on 990613-0724.One Severity Level 4 Violation Occurred & Being Treated as Ncv,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20210R7241999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data Rept for Callaway Nuclear Plant for 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d) ML20210R5621999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Wolf Creek Generating Station,Per TS 6.9.1.8 & GL 97-02.Revised Repts for Apr,May & June 1999,correcting Number of Hours Reactor Critical,Encl ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ULNRC-04085, Forwards Rev 4 to Callaway Plant Cycle 10 COLR, Per TS 6.9.1.9.COLR Has Been Revised to Update Rod Bank Insertion (Ril) Limits,As Function of Rated Thermal Power1999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Rev 4 to Callaway Plant Cycle 10 COLR, Per TS 6.9.1.9.COLR Has Been Revised to Update Rod Bank Insertion (Ril) Limits,As Function of Rated Thermal Power ML20210P0371999-08-10010 August 1999 Forwards SE Granting Licensee 980710 Requests for Relief (ISI-13 - ISI-18) from Requirements of Section XI of 1989 Edition of ASME B&PV Code for Second 10-year Interval ISI at Plant,Unit 1 ML20210P7491999-08-0909 August 1999 Ack Receipt of ,Which Transmitted Wolf Creek Radiological Emergency Response Plan 06-002,Rev 0,under Provisions of 10CFR50,App E,Section V ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams ML20210N0061999-08-0303 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990401 RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Motor-Operated Gate Valves ULNRC-04079, Forwards 180-day Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal1999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards 180-day Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal 1999-09-03
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEAR05000482/LER-1994-014, Forwards LER 94-014-00 Re Util Identification of Missed Surveillance Required by TS Prior to Changing Modes.List of Commitments Made by Licensee,Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 94-014-00 Re Util Identification of Missed Surveillance Required by TS Prior to Changing Modes.List of Commitments Made by Licensee,Encl 05000482/LER-1999-002, Forwards LER 99-002-00,re Identification of Surveillance Performed in Modes Other than Those Required by TS SR 4.6.3.2.a.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-002-00,re Identification of Surveillance Performed in Modes Other than Those Required by TS SR 4.6.3.2.a.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl ML20217A4881999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Changes to Plant Data Point Library,Iaw 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a.ERDS Point Affected Is RDS0001 ML20212G1681999-09-24024 September 1999 Notifies NRC of Change in Status of Licensed Individual at Plant,Per 10CFR50.74.RL Acree Holds License OP-42654 at Plant,But Has Been Permanently Reassigned from Position for Which Plant Has Certified Need for RO License 05000482/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Identification of Missed Surveillance Due to Exceeding Flow Rate Specified in TS for Ccps.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment I1999-09-17017 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Identification of Missed Surveillance Due to Exceeding Flow Rate Specified in TS for Ccps.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment I 05000482/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,re Failure to Correctly Perform TS Surveillance 4.3.3.6.Encl Identifies Actions Committed to by Util1999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,re Failure to Correctly Perform TS Surveillance 4.3.3.6.Encl Identifies Actions Committed to by Util ML20212C9211999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536, Operating Licensing Examination Data, in Response to NRC Administrative Ltr 99-03 05000482/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-01,re Identification of Failure to Enter LCO for TS 3.6.1.1 While Taking Containment Atmosphere Samples During Power Operation.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-01,re Identification of Failure to Enter LCO for TS 3.6.1.1 While Taking Containment Atmosphere Samples During Power Operation.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl ML20217D5791999-09-15015 September 1999 Provides Formal Documentation of Reviews & Discussions Re Technical Ltr Rept for Proprietary Info.Review of Ltr Was Discussed in Telcon & Via e-mail Messages. Summary of Telcons as Documented on 990708,included ML20212A4701999-09-10010 September 1999 Rssponds to NRC 990709 RAI Re Util Relief Request to Allow Use of 1998 Edition of ASME Section Xi,Subsection Iwe. Acceptance Criteria for Liner Plate Pressure Boundary Thickness Will Be Limited to 10% Nominal Thinning 05000482/LER-1999-009, Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Util Identification of Fire Suppression Issue Affecting Safe Shutdown Components. Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in Encl LER1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Util Identification of Fire Suppression Issue Affecting Safe Shutdown Components. Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in Encl LER ML20211M7151999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Changes to Wolf Creek Generating Station Data Point Library.Emergency Response Data Sys Points Affected Are EJL0007 & EJL0008 05000482/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Efsa at Plant.Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in LER1999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Efsa at Plant.Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in LER ML20211K8301999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards marked-up TS Page Deleting Inequality Signs from Trip Setpoints in SR 3.3.5.3 & Reflecting Info on Calibr Tolerance Band,Per 990708 Application to Amend License NPF-42 ML20211K1941999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Rev 31 to WCGS Physical Security Plan,Safeguards Contingency Plan & Training & Qualification Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20210U9751999-08-13013 August 1999 Informs That Licensee Identified That Answer Key for One Question on 990720 Written Exam & Event Classification for on Job Performance Measure Required Mod.Description & Justification for Proposed Mod,Including Technical Ref,Encl ML20210R5621999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Wolf Creek Generating Station,Per TS 6.9.1.8 & GL 97-02.Revised Repts for Apr,May & June 1999,correcting Number of Hours Reactor Critical,Encl ML20210R7241999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data Rept for Callaway Nuclear Plant for 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d) ULNRC-04085, Forwards Rev 4 to Callaway Plant Cycle 10 COLR, Per TS 6.9.1.9.COLR Has Been Revised to Update Rod Bank Insertion (Ril) Limits,As Function of Rated Thermal Power1999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Rev 4 to Callaway Plant Cycle 10 COLR, Per TS 6.9.1.9.COLR Has Been Revised to Update Rod Bank Insertion (Ril) Limits,As Function of Rated Thermal Power ML20210N0061999-08-0303 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990401 RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Motor-Operated Gate Valves ULNRC-04079, Forwards 180-day Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal1999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards 180-day Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal ML20210J1371999-07-29029 July 1999 Requests NRC Approval of Methodology for Determining RCS Pressure & Temp & Overpressure Mitigation Sys PORV Limits. Attachment I Provides Proposed Changes to Improved TS ML20210H2551999-07-29029 July 1999 Provides 180-day Response to NRC Request for Info Re GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal ULNRC-04076, Informs of Implementation of Amend 131 to License NPF-30, Revising OL to Reflect Requirement in TS 3/4.7.1.7 for Four Operable ASD Lines & Associated Revs,Rather than Three Operable ASDs1999-07-28028 July 1999 Informs of Implementation of Amend 131 to License NPF-30, Revising OL to Reflect Requirement in TS 3/4.7.1.7 for Four Operable ASD Lines & Associated Revs,Rather than Three Operable ASDs ULNRC-04075, Forwards Response to NRC 990618 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of SR Motor-Operated Valves1999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990618 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of SR Motor-Operated Valves A93443, Forwards Addl Info as Committed to in Telcon Between Amerenue & NRC Personnel on 990616,re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of MOV Gate Valves1999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Addl Info as Committed to in Telcon Between Amerenue & NRC Personnel on 990616,re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of MOV Gate Valves ULNRC-04071, Informs That Util Anticipates Approx Ten Licensing Actions That Could Occur During Fys 2000 & 2001,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-021999-07-27027 July 1999 Informs That Util Anticipates Approx Ten Licensing Actions That Could Occur During Fys 2000 & 2001,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02 05000483/LER-1998-008, Forwards Amended Response to GL 81-07, Control of Heavy Loads, to Address Corrective Action Described in LER 98-008-00.Discrepancy Between Earlier Submittals of Snupps Rept on Control of Heavy Loads & TS Re RHR Sys,Resolved1999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Amended Response to GL 81-07, Control of Heavy Loads, to Address Corrective Action Described in LER 98-008-00.Discrepancy Between Earlier Submittals of Snupps Rept on Control of Heavy Loads & TS Re RHR Sys,Resolved ULNRC-04070, Forwards Rev 3 to Callaway Plant Cycle 10 COLR, IAW TS 6.9.1.9.COLR Has Been Revised to Update RAOC Axial Flux Difference (Afd) Limits,As Function of Rated Thermal Power1999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to Callaway Plant Cycle 10 COLR, IAW TS 6.9.1.9.COLR Has Been Revised to Update RAOC Axial Flux Difference (Afd) Limits,As Function of Rated Thermal Power ML20210F5931999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Performance Data Rept for Wcnoc,Per 10CFR26.71(d).Rept Covers Period of 990101- 0630 ML20210F5881999-07-23023 July 1999 Submits Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operator Reactor Licensing Action Estimates, ML20212A3291999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Scenario Manual Containing Description of Callaway Plant 1999 Biennial Emergency Response Plan Exercise to Be Conducted 990914.Correspondence to Satisfy 60-day Submittal Requirement ML20209H0751999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Wolf Creek Generating Station,Per TS 6.9.1.8 & GL 97-02.Max Dependable Capacity Has Been Updated from 1163 to 1170,as Determined by Calculations Based on Capacity Test Results of July 1998 ML20209H0441999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990326 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs. Summary of Util Commitments Provided in Attachment 2 ML20209G9871999-07-14014 July 1999 Informs of Changes Affecting Wolf Creek Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Encl Provides Description of Changes & Justification for Changes ML20209F3471999-07-0909 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990624 RAI to Complete NRC Review of Relief Request to Allow Use of 1998 Edition of ASME Section Xi,Subsection IWE ML20209E0611999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Addl Pages to Rev 12 of USAR & Commitment Changes, Inadvertently Omitted from 990311 Submittal ML20209H2471999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Rev 29 to Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p). Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20209C6031999-07-0606 July 1999 Provides Applicants View as Result of 990618 Memo & Order Directing Parties to Address Proper Disposition of Existing Antitrust License Condition Attached to OL for Facility Due to Planned Changes in Ownership of Facility.With Svc List ML20196K8231999-07-0606 July 1999 Submits Kansas Electric Power Cooperative,Inc Ltr Pursuant to Commission Direction in Memo & Order CLI-99-19.Addresses Disposition of Existing Antitrust Conditions Attached to License for Wolf Creek Unit 1 Re Proposed License Transfer ML20209B7131999-07-0101 July 1999 Submits Response to NRC Request for Info Re GL 98-01, Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Response on Status of Facility Y2K Readiness Was Requested by 990701.Disclosure Encl ML20209B5151999-06-29029 June 1999 Informs That Util Completed Analyses & Modifications to Address Items Discussed in GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions ML20209C0171999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards Special Rept 99-01 Re Fifteenth Year Inservice Containment Bldg Tendon Surveillance Failure.Observed Voids in Sheathing Filler Grease Do Not Indicate Degradation of post-tensioning Sys,Based on Encl Evaluation ML20209B6851999-06-28028 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Rept Encl ML20196G9681999-06-22022 June 1999 Informs NRC That BC Ryan Will Be Leaving Ks State Univ for Position with Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp,Effective 990701 ML20196G5621999-06-21021 June 1999 Informs NRC of Implementation of Amend 132 to Callaway License NPF-30 to Allows Installation of Electrosleeves for Steam Generator Tube Repair for Two Cycles Following Installation of First Electrosleeve ML20212J2441999-06-18018 June 1999 Submits Request for Alternate Exam Requirements for Plant Re ISI Program Plan.Plant Does Not Torque Bolted Connections to Stress Values Greater than 100 Ksi 05000482/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Condition in Which Wolf Creek Generating Station TS 3.3.2 Was Not Met.Commitments Made by Util Also Encl1999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Condition in Which Wolf Creek Generating Station TS 3.3.2 Was Not Met.Commitments Made by Util Also Encl ML20196A0251999-06-17017 June 1999 Requests That Written Exams for Reactor Operator & SRO for Plant Be Administered Beginning Wk of 990719 & Followed by Operating Exam During Wk of 990726 to Personnel Listed in Attachment.Proprietary Info Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld ML20195K0641999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards MOR for May 1999 for Wolf Creek Generating Station & Corrected Page 2 of 2 of Apr 1999 Mor,Adding That Unit Entered Intomode 5 for Restart During Month of Apr & Correcting Shutdown Duration Hours from 672 to 671 1999-09-03
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April 22, 1981 SE/IP 81-04-05 Mr. Robert Giardina Power Systems Branch Division of System Integration Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Bob,
Enclosed is my second version of the safety evaluation of SNUPPS 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, 10.4.1, and 10.4.4 for you to tear apart. Please give me your further advises and inputs at your convenience.
Thank you for your patience. ,
t i
\ tthar l ERWIN FISCHER-COLBRIE NSS/ Safeguards Program l
Nuclear Systems Safety Program el/2070 Enclosure l
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SNUPPS-SER ORAFT 4/15/81 LLNL-EF-C 10.0 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM 10.1 Summary Description s
In this section a general description is given of the system and its overall function, protective features, its important design features.. and performance characteristics. In addition to these features, the applicant should provide a general discussion of the criteria and bases of the various steam and condensate instrumentation systems in section 10.1 of the FSAR. The FSAR should differentiate between normal operation instrumentation and required safety instrumentation. (0 pen item 1, 10.l). This open item of 10.1 will be pursued with the Applicant and the results will be reported in a supplement to this report.
10.2 Turbine Generator The Turbine Generator (TG) receives high pressure steam from the main steam system and converts a portion of the thermal steam energy into electrical energy. The associated turbine control and overspeed protection system is l designed to control turbine action under all normal and abnormal conditions and to assure that a loss of its full load will not cause the turbine to overspeed beyond acceptable limits. The turbine control and overspeed protection system is, therefore, essential to the overall safe operation of l the plant.
The TG is manufactured by the General Electric Company. The generator is designed for 1,373,000 kVA at 1,800 rpm' under 75 psig hydrogen pressure.
The turbine consists of double flow, high pressure and low pressure elements in tandem. Four combined moisture separation-reheater assemblies are provided between the high pressure and the low pressure elements.
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I SNUPPS-SER ORAFT 4/15/81 LLNL-EF-C Turbine control and overspeed protection is provided by the Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system. This system utilizes electronic control in conjunction with high pressure hydraulic actuating techniques. The system comprises electrical control circuits for steam pressure control, speed co'ntrol, load control, and steam control valve positioning. Overspeed protection at loss of load is achieved by three independent and diverse systems.
The normal electric speed control which on loss of load closes the control and intercept valves uses two independent rotor speed control circuits. Loss of both speed signals will initiate trip via the Emergency Trip System (ETS). As turbine stage pressure decreases, extraction nonreturn valves swing closed.
Control and intercept valves are designed to be fully closed at 104% of the design speed.
The mechanical overspeed control is activated when the speed rises to 110% of the nominal speed. Mechanical overspeed trip signals all valves to close by dumping ETS pressure. This speed can only be reached if the normal control fails to function. For reliability, two-aut-of-three logic is employed in both mechanical and electrical overspeed trip circuitry. Operation of air relay dump valves then releases spring closure mechanisms of extraction nonreturn valves.
The electrical backup overspeed control signals all valves to close at 111% of normal speed. In case of failure of both normal and mechanical overspeed control, the three speed pickups for the electrical backup overspeed trip provide signals inoependent of the spee,d control unit.
Additional turbine trips can be accomplished by the following events:
o Emergency trip pushbutton in control room o Moisture separator high level o Low condenser vacuum o Low lube oil pressure
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SNUPPS-SER DRAFT 4/15/81 LLNL-EF-C o LP turbine exhaust hood high temperature o Reactor trip o Thrust bearing wear o Manual trip handle on front standard '
o Loss of stator coolant o Low hydraulic fluid pressure o Any generator trip o Loss of EHC electrical power o Excessive vibration The main stop and control valves are in series and have completely independent operating control and operating mechanisms. The primary function of the main stop valves is to quickly shut off the steam flow to the turbine. Their closure time is 0.19 sec. Closure of either all four stop valves or all four control valves shuts off all main steam flow to the HP turbine. The combined stop and intercept valves are also in series and have completely independent operating controls and operating mechanisms. Closure of either all six stop valves or all six intercept valves shuts off all moisture separator reheater outlet steam flow to the three LP turbines.
With the overspeed systems closing at least two valves in series in each steamline, failure of one valve to operate would not disable the overspeeo control function.
The extraction steam valving closure times are shown to be about 0.2 seconds.
l Discuss in more detail the valve' closure times and extraction steam valve arrangement in relation to stable turbine operation after a turbine generator
! system trip (SRP 10.2 Part III, items 3, 4) (0 pen item 1,10.2) 3 The electrical and mechanical overspeed trip devices can be test.ed remotely at rated speed, under load, by means of lighted pushbuttons on the EHC test panel. Operation of the overspeed protection devices under controlled, overspeed condition is checked at startup and after each refueling.
SNUPPS-SER DRAFT
, 4/15/81 LLNL-EF-C An inservice inspection program for the main steam stop and control valves and reheat valves is provided and includes: (a) dismantling and inspection of at least one main steam stop valve, one main steam control valve, and one reheat stopvalve,andonereheatinterceptvalve,atapproximately3-D3 year intervals during refueling or maintenance shutdowns coinciding with the inservice inspection schedule required by ASME Code Section XI; (b) exercising and observing as required the main steam stop and control, reheat stop, and intercept valves.
The applicant will include pre-operational and startup tests of the turbine generator in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.68, " Initial Test Pr. jrams for Water Cooled Power Plants."
The turbine generator system meets the recommendations of Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1, Protection Against Postulated Piping Failuras in Fluid Systems Outside Containment" and MEB 3-1, " Postulated Break and Leakage Locations i' Fluid System Piping Outside Containment." Evaluation of protection against dynamic effects associated with the postulated pipe system 7
failure is covered in section 3.6 of this report. However, an additional
! discussion is needed what protection will be provided for the turbine overspeed control system equipment, electrical wiring and hydraulic lines from the effects of high or moderate energy pipe failure so that the turbine overspeed protection system will not be damaged to preclude its safety function (SPR 10.2, Part III, Item 8). (0 pen item 2, 10.2).
A description with the aid of drawings ,should be provided in the FSAR of the bulk hydrogen storage facility including its location and distribution system and also including the protective measures considered in the design to prevent fires and explosions during operations such as filling and purging the
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generator, as well as during normal operations (0 pen item 3,10.2).
The scope of review of the trubine generator included descriptive information in section 10.2 of the FSAR, flow charts ano diagrams. The basis for t . . . . . .. ...
SNUPPS-SER ORAFT 4/15/81 LLNL-EF-C acceptance in our review was conformance of the design criteria and bases and design of the turbine generator system to acceptance criteria to Section II of Standard Review Plan 10.2 and industry standards.
Based on our review, we conclude that the turbine-generator overspeed protection system is in conformance with the above cited criteria and design basis, it can perform its designed safety functions, and is acceptable after the above identified three open items have been pursued with the applicant and satisfactorily clarified. The results will be reported in a supplement to this report.
10.3 Main Steam Supply The Main Steam Supply System (MSSS) transports steam from the nuclear steam supply sysi.em to the power conversion system an various safety related and non-safety related auxilaries. The portion of the MSSS from the steam generator to the steam generator isolation valves is safety related and is required to function following a Design Base Accident (DBA) and to achieve and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition. Section 10.3.1.1 of the FSAR l describes the safety design bases for the safety related portion of the MSSS.
An adquate safety evaluation of the safety related portion of the MSSS is given in Section 10.3.~3 of the FSAR, except for the following items:
In the event of a steam line break upstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) certain systems downstream can be used for ir.itigation of the accident.
If these systems are not available or decision is made to use other means to shut down the reactor a description is needed in the FSAR of how these systems are secured to assure positive steam shut off. The description shall inc.lude what operator's actions (if any) are required. (Issue No. 1 of NUREG 0138)
(0 pen item 1, 10.3)
Additional information is needed on the system capability to withstand the effects of pipe whip and jet impingement forces associated with pipe breakr (SRP 10.3-3) Open item 2, 10.3)
SNUPPS-SER ORAFT 4/15/81 LLNL-EF-C The scope of review of the main steam supply system (between the main steam isolation valves and up to and including the turbine stop valves) included descriptive information in section 10.3 of the FSAR, and flow charts and diagrams. The basis for acceptance in the staff review was conformance of the design criteria and bases and design of main steam supply system to the l
acceptance criteria in Section II of Standard Review Plan 10.3.
Based on our review, we conclude the main steam supply system between the main steam isolation valves and up to and including the turbine stop valves is in conformance with the above cited criteria and design bases, it can perform its designed functions, and is, therefore, acceptable after the two open items identified above have been pursued with the applicant and satisfactoriiy clarified. The results will be reported in a supplement to this report.
10.4.1 Main Condenser The main condenser is the steam cycle heat sink. During normal operation, it is capable of accepting and condensing full load main turbine exhaust steam, steam generator feedwater pump turbine exhaust steam, and up to 40% of the main steam flow turbine bypass steam. The main condenser is also a collection point for other steam cycle miscellaneous flows, drains, and vents.
The main condenser is utilized as a heat sink in the initial phase of reactor cool down during a normal plant shutdown. It is a multi-pressure, three shell, deaerating unit.
The main condensers are not required to effect or support safe shutdown of the reactor or to perform in the operation of reactor safety features.
Although some of the following items have been described in the FSAR, the FSAR should show a tabulation of the following characteristics and performance requirements of the main condenser including such items as: 1) the number of condenser tubes, material and total heat transfer surface, 2) overall
SNUPPS-SER ORAFT 4/15/81 LLNL-EF-C dimensions of the condenser, 3) number of passes, 4) hot well capacity, 5) special design ' >.ces, 6) minimum heat transfer, 7) normal and maximuc steam flows, 8) normal and maximum cooling water temperature, 9) normal and maximum exhaust steam temperature with no turbine by-pass flow and with maximum turbine bypass flow, 10) limiting oxygen content in the condensate in cc per liter, and 11) other pertinent data. (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, item 1). (0 pen item 1, 10.4.1)
The FSAR also does not specifically discuss the measures that are taken 1) to prevent loss of vacuum, and 2) to prevent corrosion / erosion of condenser tubes and components (SRP 10.4.1 Part III item 1) (open item 2, 10.4.1)
There is also a need to provide the permissible cooling water inleakage and time of operation with inleakage to assure that condensate /feedwater quality can be maintained within safe limits. (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, item 2). (0 pen item 3, 10.4.1)
! An indication is also needed as to what design provisions have been made to
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preclude failures of condenser tubes or components from turbine by-pass blowdown or other high temperature drains into the condenser shell. (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, item 3). (0 pen item 4, 10.4.1)
The effect of loss of main condenser vacuum on the operation of the main steam isolation valves needs discussion in the FSAR (SRP 10.4.1, Part III item 3).
(open item 5, 10.4.1)
The scope of review of the main condense'r included layout drawings and descriptive information of the condenser in section 10.4.1 of the FSAR. The basis for acceptance in the staff review was conformance of the design criteria and bases and design of the condenser to the acceptance criteria in Section II of Standard Review Plan 10.4.1 and industry standards.
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SNUPPS-SER ORAFT 4/15/81 LLNL-EF-C Based on our review we conclude that the main condenser is in conformance with the above cited criteria and design bases, it can perform its designed function and is therefore acceptable after the five above identified open items have been pursued with the applicant and satisfactorily clirified. The results will be reported in a supplement to this report.
10.4.4 Turbine Bypass System The Turbine Bypass System (TBS) provides operational flexibility so that the plant may accept certain load changes without disturbing the nuclear steam supply system. The TBS is designed to discharge a stated percentage of rated main steam flow directly to the main condensers, bypassing the turbine. This steam bypass enables the pla.it to take step load reduction up to the TBS capacity without the reactor or turbine tripping.
There are 12 air activated turbine bypass valves. Seven valves discharge into the low pressure condenser, four valves discharge into the intermediate condenser, and a single valve discharges into the high pressure condenser.
The valves are pilot-operated, spring-opposed, and fail closed upon loss of air or loss of power to the control system.
The TBS is not a safety related system and is not required for plant shut down l
following an accident.
The turbine bypass (TBS) includes all components and piping from the branch connection at the main steam system to the main condensers. The scope of I review of the turbine bypass system for the SNUPPS plants included layout drawings, piping and instrumentation diagrams, and descrip'tive information tir the TBS and auxiliary supporting systems that are essantial to its operation.
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The following items have been found to need additional information and discussion to be included in the FSAR.
SNUPPS-SER ORAFT 4/15/81 LLNL-EF-C Although partially described in the FSAR additional description (with the aid of drawings) is needed of the turbine by-pass valves and associated control.
The discussion shall include the number, size, principle of operation, construction, set points, and the malfunctions and/or modes of fhilure considered in the design of the turbine by-pass system. (SRP 10.4.4, Part III, Item 1.) ((0 pen item 1, 10.4.4)
Additional description (with the aid of drawings) should be provided of the turbine by-pass system (condenser dump valves and atmosphere dump valves) and associated instruments and controls. The discussion should include: 1) the size, principle of operation, construction, and set points of the valves, 2) the malfunctions and/or modes of failure considered in the design of the' system. (SRP 10.4.4, Part III, Items 1 and 2) (0 pen item 2, 10.4.4)
In section 10.4.4 .4 tests and initial field inspection have been discussed but not the frequency and extent of inservice testing and inspection of the turbine by-pass system. This information should be provided in the FSAR.
(SRP 10.4.4, Part II). (0 pen item 3. 10.4.4) 1 Provision of the results of an analysis is needed indicating that failure of the turbine by-pass system high energy line will not have an adverse effect or preclude operation of'the turbine speed control system or any safety related componemts or systems located close to the turbine by-pass system. (SRP 10.4.4, Part III, item 4). (0 pen item 4, 10.4.4)
' Assurance is needed that a high energy line failure of the turbine by-pass system will not have an adverse effect or preclude operation of turbine speed controls or any safety-related components or systems located close to the turbine bypass system. (SRP 10.4.4, Part III, itr,m 4). (0 pen item 5, 10.4.4)
Section 10.4.4 of the FSAR describes the TBS and tates in 10.4.2.2 that the TBS dumps steam to the condenser through condenser spargers. Fig 10.3-1 Sheet 3 of the FSAR shows the TBS. On this figure also six separate lines ar shown
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SNUPPS-SER ORAFT 4/15/81 LLNL-EF-C branching off the TBS line prior to the TBS valves. These lines are labeled "to condenser sparger" and seem to have normally open valves. With the set of diagrams explain the purpose of these lines and confirm that the valves are normally closed. (0 pen item 6, 10.4.4)
The applicant will include pre-operational and startup tests of the turbine bypass system in accordance with recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.68, "Inititial Test Programs for Water Cooled Reactor Power Plants." The turbine bypass system meets the recommendations of Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1,
" Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment." Evaluation of protection against dynamic effects associated with the postulated pipe system failures is covered in Section 3.6 of this report.
r The scope of review of the turbine bypass system included drawings, piping and
- instrumentation diagrams and descriptive information of the system in section
- 10.4.4 of the FSAR.
i The basis for acceptance in the staff review was conformance of the design criteria and bases and design of the turbine bypass system to the acceptance l criteria in Section II of Standard Review Plan 10.4.4 and industry standards.
l Based on our review we conclude that the turbine bypass system is in conformance with the above cited criteria and design bases. It can perform its designed function, and is, therefore, acceptable after the six open items identified above have been pursued with the applicant and satisf:ctorily clarified. The results will be reported in a supplement to this report.
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