ML19351A431

LER 89-011-00:on 890914,operations Personnel Logged Into Tech Spec 3.0.3 to Allow Leak Rate Testing of ECCS Check Valves.No Cause Assigned Since Station Voluntarily Entered Tech Spec.Personnel Aware of Sys alignment.W/891016 Ltr

ML19351A431
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire
Issue date:	10/16/1989
From:	Mcconnell T, Sipe A DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-011-04, LER-89-11-4, NUDOCS 8910240141
Download: ML19351A431 (7)

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Duke heer Company (704) &75-4000 '

,,i . McGuier Nudear Station P O Bax488 l ', Comdrus, N C 280310488 ,

? DUKE POWER October 16, 1989 .

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk ,

Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 2  :

Docket No. 50-370  !

Licensee Event Report 370/89-11 i Gentlemen Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a)(1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event  !

Report 370/89-11 concerning the inoperability of the Emergency Core Cooling System. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i), i This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and '

safety of the public.

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t Very truly yours, Y&Yg T.L. McConnell DVE/ADJ/cbl. f Attachment xc: Mr. S.D. Ebneter American Nuclear Insurers Administrator, Region II c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission The Exchange, Suit 245 '

l- 101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 270 Farmington Avenue l Atlanta, GA 30323 Farmington, CT 06032 +

l 1 INPO Records Center Mr. Darl Hood i Suite 1500 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3 1100 circle 75 Parkway Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Atlanta, GA 30339 Washington, D.C. 20555 M&M Nuclear Consultants Mr. P.K. Van Doorn 1221 Avenue of the Americas NRC Resident Inspector New York, NY 10020 McGuire Nuclear Station 3910240141 891016 f ,

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LER Cover Letter Page 2- i bxc B.W. Bline A.S. Daughtridge R.C. Futrell  ;

R.L. Gill  !

R.M. Glover (CNS)

T.D. Curtis (ONS) '

P.R. Herran t S.S. Kilborn (W)

S.E. LeRoy .

R.E. Lopez-Ibanez l J.J. Maher  !

R.O. Sharpe (MNS)

G.B. Swindlehurst  ;

K.D. Thomas L.E. Weaver R.L. Weber ,

J.D. Wylie (PSD)  ;

J.W. Willis ,

QA Tech. Services NRC Coordinator (EC 12/55)  !

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"" Technical Specification 3.0.3 Was Entered To Perform Reactor Coolant System Pretsure  !

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On September 14, 1989, at 1520, Operations personnel logged Unit 2 into Technical .

Specification (TS) 3.0.3 to allow leak rate testing of two Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) check valves. Entry into TS 3.0.3 was necessary when the ECCS became technically inoperable because one ECCS motor operated valve was realigned. The leak rate test was required prior to entering Mode 2, Startup. The test can only be performed in Mode 3, Hot Standby, becease of the Reactor Coolant System 12ressure >

required. The motor operated ECCS valve was realigned to meet TS requirements after completion of the leak rate test, returning the ECCS to operable status.

Operations personnel logged Unit 2 out of TS 3.0.3 at 1735. Unit 2 was in Mode 3 at the beginning of Fuel Cycle Six at the time of this event. No cause was assigned since the station voluntarily entered TS 3.0.3 to perform the leak rate testing. Operations personnel were aware of the system alignment and in full control of the unit during the test.

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Background

The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is designed to cool the Reactor [EIIS FCT) core as well as to provide additional shutdown capability following initiation of certain specified accident conditions. The Chemical and Volume Control (NV) System

[EIIS:CB], Safety Injection (NI) System [EIIS:BQ), and Residual Heat Remeval (ND)

System [EIIS:BPl form the ECCS.

The two NI pumps [EIIS:P) have the capability of supplying borated water to either the cold or hot leg connections on all four Reactor Coolant (NC) System [EIIS:AB}

loops.

During the cold leg injection phase following a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA),

the NI pumps takes borated water from the Refueling Water Storage Tank [EUS:TK]

(RWST). The NI pumps then deliver borated water to the Reactor Vessel [EIIS:RFV]

through a common 4 inch header and four 2 inch branch lines to the 10 inch accumulator [EIIS:ACC) discharge lines connected to the reactor cold legs. NI check valves prevent injection until NC pressure has decreased below the shutoff head of the NI pumps. Throttling valves [EIIS:V) are provided in each 2 inch branch line to limit NI pump runout and maximize flow conditions with one pump delivering through four lines. This also equalizes flow through all four lines such that the amount of coolant loss is mininiized if one of the injection lines spills into containment. The NI pumps are started automatically on a safety injection signal. When the RWST is depleted and cold leg recirculation is initiated, the NI pumps are realigned by operator action to take suction from the ND pump B discharge and deliver through the same flow path as during the cold leg safety injection phase. The ND pump takes suction from the containment recirculation sump during the recirculation phase.

For hot leg recirculation, the suction piping alignment remains the same, but each NI pump discharge is aligned to deliver through separate 4 inch headers and two 2 inch injection lines from each header to the NC hot leg connections. Throttling valves are provided in each 2 inch branch line to limit NI pump runout to. design conditions with one pump delivering through two injection lines, equalize flow through the branch lines, and limiting the quantity of coolant lost if one of the injection lines spills into containment.

Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 states: Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be operable with each subsystem comprised of:

a. one operable NV pump,

b. one operable NI pump,

c. one operable ND heat exchanger [EIIS:HX) 1

d. one operable ND pump, and eaC ,oan us. .v.s . m, m, w me

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TS 4.5.2 requires in part, that for the NI subsystems to be operable, valve 2NI-121A, Hot Leg Recirculation Isolation, must be closed with power, removed. This TS requirement is applicable for Mode 1 (Power Operation), Mode 2 (Startup), and Mode 3 (Hot Standby).

TS 4.4.6.2.2 requires in part, that NC system pressure isolation valves 2NI-125, ND to Hot Leg I.oop 3 Check, and 2NI-129, ND to Hot Leg Loop 2 Check, be demonstrated operable by verifying leakage to be within its limit. This TS is applicable for Mode 1 and Mode 2.

TS 3.0.3 states that when a Limiting condition of Operation (LCO) is not met, except as provided in associated action requirements, within one hour action shall be initiated to place the affected units in a mode in which the specification does not apply.

Description of Event On September 14, 1989, at approximately 1520, Performance personnel were preparing to leak test check valves 2NI-125 and 2NI-129 using approved periodic test procedure PT/2/A/4200/08B, NC Pressure Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test. Test procedure enclosure 13.12, step 8.5, requires breaker [EIIS:52] EMXA, RIC for valve 2NI-121A to be closed. Step 8.6 then requires that valve 2NI-121A be opened.

Control Room Supervisor A recognized that placing power to the valve operator for valve 2NI-121A resulted in a condition other than specified in TS 3.5.2 LCO and associated action requirements. Also, Unit 2 was already logged into TS 3.5.2 Action Requirement A because Train A ECCS was inoperable due to preventative maintenance work being performed on NI pump 2A and Nuclear Service Water Pump 2A.

Control Room Supervisor A notified the Unit 2 Operations Manager of the need to enter TS 3.0.3 to test check valves 2NI-125 and 2NI-129. Cor. trol Room Supervisor A logged Unit 2 into TS 3.0.3 at.1520. After ccmpletion of the valve leak test, valve 2NI-12LA was cloced as required by procedure step 12.9.2 and power was removed from the valve operator as required by step 12.9.3. Control Room Supervisor A logged Unit 2 out of TS 3.0.3 at 1735.

Conclusion This even.t is being reported because Unit 2 was logged into TS 3.0.3 for

~approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. TS 3.0.3 was entered because power was placed to the valve operator for valve 2NI-121A, and valve 2NI-121A was opened which made both ECCS subsystems inoperable. This action was necessary to allow leak rate testing of check valves 2NI-125 and 2NI-129. These check valves are required to be leak tested prior to entering Mode 2 pursuant to TS 4.4.6.2.2. This test can only be  ;

done in Mode 3 because of the NC system pressure necessary to perform the test.

The Unit 2 Control Room Operator and Control Room Supervisor A were aware of the system alignment and in full control of the unit during the test.

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'- text a . we s anmim Previous tests, in the last two years, of check valves NI-125 and NI-129 were performed by logging the respective unit iato TS 3.5.2 Action Requirenent A by declaring only Train A NI pump as inoperable when valve NI-121A was powered up and opened. Entry into TS 3.0.3 is the more conservative approach when powering up and opening valve NI-121A.

A review of McGuire LERs for the past 12 nonths revealed one event, LER 370/89-06, that documented entering TS 3.0.3 to perform a test. LER 370/89-06 documented entering TS 3.0.3 to perform a one time special test for reactor coolant system thermal mixing. This test was performed to acquire data for Design Engineering to be used in accident analyses %r main steam lines break scenarios. This event involved different systems and components. Therefore, this event is not considered to be recurring.

This event is not Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) reportable.

There were no personnel injuries, radiation overexposures, or releases of radioactive material as a result'of this event.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Immediate: Operations personnel closed valve 2NI-121A and removed power from the valve operator af ter the completion of the check valve test.

Subsequent: None Planned: 1) Compliance personnel will investigate the need to pursue a change to TS 4.5.2.a that would allow valves NI-121A to be realigned for testing pursuant to TS 4.4.6.2.2 as is currently permitted for other identified ECCS subsystem valves.

2) Compliance personnel will investigate the need to issue a TS interpretation allowing realignment of valves NI-121A provided that NI Trains A and B are both operable and isolated from ead. ,

other.

3) Af ter TS interpretation approval, Performance personnel will revise the NC Pressure Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test procedure to identify specific system conditions and alignment consistent with the TS interpretations.

SAFETY ANALYSIS:

The primary function of the ECCS following a LOCA is to remove the stored and fission product decay heat from the reactor core such that fuel rod [E11S: ROD]

l damage, to the extent that it would impair effective cooling of the core, is l

prevented. At the time of this event, Unit 2 was in initial start up processes at

the beginning of fuel cycle six, approximately 70 days after shutdown for j

refueling. The NC system was at approximately 520 degrees-F and 1720 PSIG.

Approximately 37 percent of the core, 72 of 193 fuel assemblies had been replaced

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o l$ OF text wa . .am nac a ,ammim with new unfrradiated fuel assemblies. The old fuel assemblies had been undergoing decay heat removal by either the ND system while in the core or by the Fuel Pool Cooling system [EIIS:DA) while in the fuel pool. The residual decay heat would i have been reduced at the time of this event. .

Although the ECCS was technically inoperable, injection would have occurred since all Train B subsystem pumps and cold leg accumulators were functional. The Train B NV pump would inject highly borated water at system pressure. The cold leg accumulator would have reflooded the core if NC system decreased to approximately 600 PSIG. The ND pumps would have injected more than 3000 gallons per minute if NC system pressure decreased to approximately 160 PSIG. The NI pump would also have injected borated water when NC system pressure decreased to approximately 1500 PSIG. This NI injection would have been through all four NC system cold legs and two NC system hot legs because of the realignment of ECCS valve 2NI-121A.

At the time of this event, safety injection on low pressurizer [EIIS:PZR] pressure and low steam line pressure was blocked since the NC system pressure was below 1955 PSIG. The one pound high containment pressure automatic safety injection signal and the manual safety injection signal were the only safety injection signals operable at these unit conditions. Control Room [EIIS:NA] Annunicator [EIIS: ANN)

Alarms [EIIS: ALM) actuating at 0.2 and 0.5 PSIG would have warned Control Room Operators prior to reaching a high containment pressure safety injection. Control Room Operators would have had ample time to close valve 2NI-121A prior to a manual '

or high containment pressure safety injection signal.

No event occurred during the leak rate t.est that would have required activation of the ECCS.

The event did not affect the health and safety of the public, r

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