ML20046B525

LER 93-007-00:on 930705,TS Required Surveillance Was Not Performed Because of Inappropriate Action Because of Lack of Attention to Detail.Generated WO 93047633 to Perform Required Surveillance on Unit 1 IPE CA 9010.W/930729 Ltr

ML20046B525
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire
Issue date:	08/04/1993
From:	Mcmeekin T, Pederson T DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-93-007-01, LER-93-7-1, NUDOCS 9308050027
Download: ML20046B525 (8)

Text

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11- I Duke Pourt Company T C Mwuxtv l McGuim Nuclear Generation Department lice President b

• 12700 Hagers Fern Road (MG01A) (704)Si5-4300 'l Hunterscille, NC 80i M 985 (704)STS-4803 fax j l

DUPUiPOWEU1 8 July 29, 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555  ;

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-369  :

Licensee Event Report 369/93-07 i Problem Investigation Process No.: 1-M93-0625 l t

Gentlemen:

i Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a) (1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 369/93-07 concerning a Technical Specification required surveillance not being performed because of an Inappropriate Action. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR .

50.73 (a) (2) (1). This event is considered to be of no' significance with respect to the health and safety of the public. .

Very truly ytwurs, f NM McMeekin T.C.

TLP/bcb t Attachment xc: Mr. S.D. Ebneter INPO Records Center '

Administrator, Region II Suite 1500 _

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1100 Circle 75 Parkway 101 Marietta~St., NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30339 Atlanta, GA 30323 j Mr. Victor Nerses Mr. P.K. Van Doorn U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Resident Inspector  ;

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation McGuire Nuclear Station- l Washington, D.C. 20555 ]

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R.C. Norcutt  ;

M.E. Patrick (ONS)

G.H. Savage j l G.B. Swindlehurst H.B. Tucker i

R.F. Cole D.B. Cook G.A. Copp [

C.A. Paton l M.E. Pacetti '

P.M. Abraham W.M. Griffin ,

NSRB Support Staff (EC 12-A) i i

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y46 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPR g OFg NO 50-0104 ESE

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McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000 369 1 OF 6 l TITLE (4) A Technical Specification Required Surveillance Was Not Performed Because Of An Inappropriate Action l'VEprT DATE( 5 ) 1.ER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE(7i PIUER FACILTTIES INVOLVED (0)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEqcENTIAL REVISION MON 31 DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES g NUMBER NUM!iER N/A 05000 j 07 05 93 93 07 0 08 04 93 05000 l

OPERATING UUTS REPORT IS SUBMI'!"TED PURSUANT 'IO RIOU1REMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or mnre of t he fo11nwing)(11)

MCDE(9) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b) i lorER 100% 20.405(a)(1)(1) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

LEVEL (10) 20.405(a)(1)(11) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v11) pER 20.405(a)(3)(iii) X 50.73(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) AL g

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20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(it) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.7 3( a) (2 )( x )

LICEN ;EE (X)NTACT tVR UTiIS LER(1J )

NAME TFLEPHONE NUMBER Terry L. Pedersen, Manager AREA WDE 704 875-4487 COMI'TJ"I'E ONE LINE FOR EACH COMWENT FAILURE DESCRIIED IN T iIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANLTAO'1VRER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS I

I SUPPLFXENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (34) EXPECTED MONTH PAY YEAR SUBMISSION lYES (If yes. complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X lNO DATE(15)

ABSTRACT [ Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approxinatmly fifteen single-space typewritten lines (16)

On July 5, 1993, the Work Control Specialist in charge of monitoring the McGuire Preventative Maintenance / Periodic Testing (PM/PT) program, discovered that the PM/PT functional verification tests for Reactor Protection (IPE) system Trains A and B, showed the same due date. Technical Specifications (TSs) require that these tests be performed on a frequency of 62 days such that both trains are tested on a staggered basis. The due dates should be 31 days apart for the PM/ pts. Upon investigation, the Specialist discovered the computer program had failed to properly update the PM/ pts after both were performed on May 22, 1993, at the end of Unit 1 EOCOB. Therefore, the required test on one of the IPE trains had not been performed as required on the 31 day stagger. A work order was generated and testing was satisfactorily completed on IPE system Train A at 1200, on July 5, 1993. Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power at the time the event occurred. This event is assigned a cause of Inappropriate Action because personnel reviewing the computer program did not properly test the part of the program used for updating the PM/ pts. All other such tests were verified to be within TS requirements and appropriate changes will be made to the computer program to ensure proper updating of future PM/ pts.

NRC Form h6 b/92

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CD FOHM 366A U.S. NUCLER REGUIATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 32 f>0-0104 (s/e2) ,

, EXPIRES $/31/9$

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH W IS LICENSEE l' VENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD

• COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE IWFORMATION TEXT CONTINUATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT ERANCH (MNBB M4), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCX4 MISSION, WASHING 1DN, DC 20555-0001, AND to THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJEcr (3150-0104), CFFICE or nervm m mnm mnw-w n- m en .

FACILITY NAME(1) 90CTEC NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6I PAGE(3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000 369 93 007 0 2 OF 6 EUALUATION:

Background

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation (ESFA) system (EIIS JE) is used to monitor ,

selected plant parameters, determine whether predetermined safety limits are exceeded, and if they are, send signals into logic matrices that look for combinations that would indicate primary or secondary system boundary ruptures. Once the fequired logic is ,

satisfied, the system sends actuation signals to the Engineered Safety Features (ESP) '

components whose function best serves the situation.

The ESFA system consists of two discrete portions of circuitry. The first is an analog portion which is made up of instrumentation monitoring various plant parameters such as Reactor Coolant (NC) system [EIIS:A.B] pressure or Containment pressure. Each parameter r may be monitored by either three or four redundant channels. The second is the digital  ;

portion cor.sisting of two redundant logic trains. Each receives input from the analog protection channels and performs the needed logic functions to actuate the necessary ESF components. Each train is equally and independently capable of actuating the ESF components that may.be required.

Technical Specification (TS) surveillance requirements for the automatic trip and interlock logic state that each train be tested at least every 62 days on a staggered test basis. TS definition of a staggered test basis is as follows: ,

A staggered test basis shall consist of;

a. A test schedule for n systems, subsystems, trains, or other designated .

components obtained by dividing the specified test interval into n equal subintervals, and

b. The testing of one system, subsystem, train, or other designated component at the beginning of each subinterval.

The TS surveillance would in this case require that one train be tested each 31 days. The '

Preventative Maintenance / Periodic Testing (PM/PT) program allows 25 percent of the test frequency as a grace period for performance of the test. For a 31 day test this would be -

7 days. Therefore, the maximum allowable time to perform the test would be 38 days.

NBC PORM 366A I U.S. NUCLIER REGUIAIDRY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5/32) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TV COMPLY WIDI THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COPMENTS REGARDING EURDEN ESTIMATE 30 THE INFORMATION TEXT CONTINUATION AC RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEMt REGULA70RY COMMISFION, WASHINC1DN, DC 20555-0001, AND ,

70 THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE rw MANvem= m wmmm wn mwa-ww vv ?m m .

- FDCILITY KAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6r PAGE(3) r YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000 369 93 007 0 3 or 6 ,

Description of Event In June of 1992, the Work Management System (WMS) for generating work orders (WOs) electronically was initially placed into service at McGuire. As a part of the system the '

PM/PT WOs were entered and set up to be generated as they are needed. A part of the PM/PT [

program includes the periodiv functional surveillance testing performed on the Reactor .

Protection (IPE) system [EIIS:JC). The equipment identification numbers for these  ;

surveillances are Units 1 and 2 IPE CA 9010 and 9020 for IPE system Trains A and B, respectively. TSs require that these surveillances be performed every 62 days on a staggered basis.

Prior to June of 1992, the WOs were updated manually so that the two trains were kept on a '

staggered schedule 31 days apart. To accomplish this using the WMS program these PM/ pts were entered to be updated as an A type calculation. This should have had the computer recognize the particular equipment number for one of the IPE trains each time it was j entered.as complete, update the program for that PM/PT WO for 62 days, search for the corresponding equipment number for the opposite train, and once found update the. program to ensure that the PM/PT WO for that train was dated for 31 days.

The program was initially checked out by Wcrk Control (WC) personnel and the PM/ pts using the A type calculation appeared to be working properly. No further verification of the program was performed by WC personnel. Routine reviews of the PM/ pts were perforried and the PM/ pts associated with the A type calculation appeared to be updating in a proper manner.

On July 5, 1993, the WC Specialist in charge of monitoring the PM/PT program was performing a routine review of the PM/ pts due for a 7 day window 3 weeks in the future.

This particular printout covered a 7 day window from July 19 to July 25, 1993. During the course of the review the Specialist noted the PM/ pts for Unit 1 IPE Trains A and B had the same due date shown. The Specialist recognized the dates should have been 31 days apart.

Upon further investigation, the Specialist discovered the PM/ pts were performed together on May 22, 1993, at the end of Unit 1 EOC08. '

e ,

Consequently, the PM/PT surveillance for one of the trains should have been performed no  !

later than June 29, 1993. Realizing the error, the Specialist generated WO 93047633 to perform the required surveillance on Unit 1 IPE CA 9010 (Train A). The surveillance was begun at 1000, on July 5, 1993 and succensfully completed at.1200, on July 5. ". 9 9 3 .

NRC FORM 3MA U.S. NUCLEAR RECUIAMRY COMMISSION APPROVED BY CMB No. 3150-0104 (5/92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN FER RESPONSE 'IO COMPLY WITH 'THIS

, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD CO W.ENTS RECARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFOTORTION TEXT CONTINUATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA'IORY COMMISSION, WASHINGMN, DC 20555-0001, AND .

'IO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE f nP M v N m

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FACILITY NAME(I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (61 PAGE(3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER t McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000 369 93 007 0 4 Or 6 The Specialist performed a search to determine if any other PM/ pts using the A type calculation had been missed. No others were found to have been missed. Also, work was begun to find the cause for the error in the program and repair it.

Conclusion This event is assigned a cause of Inappropriate Action because of lack of attention to detail. When WC personnel reviewed the WMS computer program for the A type calculation, they did not properly ensure the program updated'PM/ pts to accomplish the required stagger. Subsequent routine reviews of PM/ pts failed to reveal the problem with the ,

program.

When the PM/ pts on IPE Trains A and B were performed together at the end of Unit 1 EOC08 the program updated both for 62 days in the future. The next routine check of these PM/ pts, on July 5, 1993, revealed they had the same due date. The WC Specialist performing the review recognized this was an error and checked the last date the PM/ pts were performed to determine the correct date the 31 day staggered PM/PT should be performed. He consequently discovered the PM/PT should have been performed no later than June 29,1993. Immediate action was taken to generate a WO to perform the test on the available train. The test was completed successfully at 1200, on July 5, 1993.

Subsequently, the WC Specialist verified all other PM/ pts associated with the A type calculation to confirm that no other surveillances had been missed. Also, the WC Specialist notified the appropriate personnel at Catawba and Oconee of the discrepancy.

An investigation was performed to determine the problem with the A type calculation used by the program. It was concluded as a result of the investigation that the calculation had never recognized the existence of the associated PM/PT when one of the PM/ pts was updated. It had only updated the PM/PT entered for the 62 day cycle. Since the PM/ pts involved had always been done on time, until Unit 1 EOC08 forced them tc be performed together, the program had appeared to stagger the due dates properly. Appropriate changes will be implemented to the computer program to resolve the discrepancy. No other problems were found to have occurred as a result of the discrepancy.

A review of the Operating Experience Program (OEP) Data Base for twenty-four months prior to this event revealed no events attributed to a cause of Inappropriate Action resulting in a TS violation involving the IPE system. Also, no other events occurred involving the WMS program or inadequate testing of the WMS program. Therefore, this event is not i

l NRC FORM 36fA U.S. NUCLEAR REGUIAERY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104

($/92) .

EXPIRES 5/31/95 l

~

j l

ESTINATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE 'IO COMPLY WITH 'TilI5 i LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INIVRMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 ERS. FORWARD 1 COMMENTS REGARDING BUPDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION TEXT CONTINUATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. FUCLEAR '

REGULAMRY COMMISSION, WASHINGmN, DC 205S5-0001. AND W THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE I nr Frxerrvm yxn emm wamrtwme y ?m m _ i FACILITY NAME(1) DOCTET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE(3) l l

nM SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000 369 93 007 0 5 OF 6 P

considered recurring.

i This event is not Nuclear Plant Reliability Data system (NPRDS) reportable.

There were no personnel injuries, radiation overexposures, or uncontrolled releases of radioactive material as a result of"tnis event.

i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Immediate: 1) WC personnel generated WO 93047633 to perform the required surveillance on Unit 1 IPE CA 9010 (Train A).

2) Instrumentation And Electrical personnel successfully perfcrmed the PM/PT on Unit 1 IPE CA 9010.  :

i

3) WC personnel performed a search to determine if any other PM/ pts using  ;

the A type calculation had been missed.

4) WC personnel notified appropriate personnel at Catawba and Oconee of the discrepancy.

Subcoquent: 1) WC personnel performed an investigation to determine the cause for the error in the WMS A type calculation for PM/ pts.

2) WC personnel manually checked the stagger on all A type calculations and verified proper scheduling of the associated PM/ pts.

Planned: 1) WC personnel will r:take appropriate changes to the WMS computer program and verify that the A type calculation program will properly update PM/ pts on a staggered basis.

___m_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _

3mc FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR RECULA'ILRY CCPDGSSION 5

APPROVED BY OMB No. 3150-0104 (5/C2), , EXPIRES $/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH-THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INTDRFJLTION TEXT CONTINUATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND

'IU THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRN'ECT (3150-0104), OFTICE or erwacev m pyn m yrw wr etrywm ne m e3_

FACILITY NAME(1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (61 PAGE(3) i YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000 369 93 007 0 6 OF 6 EAFETY ANALYSIS:

The event described in this LER is technical in nature in that it deals with the failure i

to perform a portion of a surveillance requirement. The TS surveillance requirements for the automatic trip and interlock logic state that each train be tested at least every 62 ,

days on a staggered test basis. The portion of the surveillance not performed was the testing of one train Ec the beginning of the subinterval (31 days). Since the testing performed upon discovery of the problem found no inoperable equipment or circuitry, and l since the equipment history of this equipment and circuitry shows no failures in past tests, this equipment is not considered to have been past inoperable. There is no evidence to suggest that the equipment would not have actuated as required during an ,

accident.

1 To render the entire ESFA system inoperable, multiple failures of components would have had to occur. During the time when the portion of the surveillance was missed until the portion of the surveillance was performed, there were no conditions or combinations of conditions that would have required the ESFA system to actuate. There were also no conditions or combinations of conditions which would have been aided by the use of the ESFA system. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected as a result of this event.

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