ML20045H982

LER 93-005-00:on 930612,manual Rt in Unit 1 Occurred Due to Equipment Failure Due to Failure of L-13 Field Cable Between Data Cabinet B & Bulkhead for Undetermined Reasons.Replaced Field cable.W/930709 Ltr

ML20045H982
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire
Issue date:	07/12/1993
From:	Mcmeekin T, Pederson T DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-93-005-02, LER-93-5-2, NUDOCS 9307220218
Download: ML20045H982 (10)

Text

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. DukeIbuer Company (704)375-4000

- McGuire NuclearStation 12I00Hagmikrry Road Huntmcille, NC28078-8985 i i

f DUKEPOWER

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.j July 9, 1993 1 o

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. '20555

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Station Unit.1 ,

Docket No. 50-369 Licensee Event Report 369/93 Problem Investigation Process No.: 1-M93-0551 Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR'50.73 Sections (a)f(1) and'(d), attached'is Licensee Event Report-369/93-05:concerning The Unit 1 Manual. Reactor  ;

Trip As A Result Of An Equipment-Failure Due To:An Unknown Cause. ..

This report is being submitted in accordance withL10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2):

-(iv). This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.  ;

Very truly yo s, T.C. McMeekin 0!! r' TLP/bcb Attachment xc: Mr. S.D. Ebneter INPO Records Center Administrator, Region II .

Suite 1500~

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1100 Circle 75 Parkway 101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA .30339 Atlanta, GA 30323 Mr. Victor Nerses Mr. P.K. Van Doorn.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .NRC Resident Inspector Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation McGuire Nuclear Station Washington,ED.C.- '20555 930"/2EO'2iB'930712-b'

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bxc: B.L. Walsh R.C. Futrell (CNS)

P.R. Herran R.C. Norcutt M.E. Patrick (ONS)

G.H. Savage G.B. Swindlehurst H.B. Tucker R.F. Cole G.A. Copp C.A. Paton  !

M.E. Pacetti D.B. Cook P.M. Abraham W.M. Griffin NSRB Support Staff (EC 12-A) i i

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!McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000 369 1 OF8 72TLE(4) Unit 1 Experienced A Manual Reactor Trip As A Result Of An Equipment Failure Due To An Enknown cause WENT DATEf 5) IJFIR NUMBERf 6) REPORT DATEf7) O'nIER FACILITIES INVOLVEDf 61 WETH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES gg NUMBER NUMBER NA 05000 93 93 05 0 07 12 93 05000 06 12 dPERATING 2 'nTIS nr.rvW IS SUBMT7TED PURSUANT TO REOUIREME!rPS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the fo110winalf111 20.405(c) X 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

FODE(9) 20.402(b) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) power O% 20.405(m)(1)(1)

LEVEL (10) 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) ER i D"

20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) $

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TELEPFDNE NUMBER l"^** AREA CODE

Terry L. Pedersen, Manager 704 875-4487 COMPLLTE ONE LINE FOR EACH CDPGONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN T. H S KEIWTil 3 )

CAUSE SYSTD4 COMPONENT MANUTACWRER REPORTABLE lCAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE M FPRDS TO NPRDS X AA CBL1 W120 N EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUPPLEMENTAL REPOTIT EXPECTEDf14)

SUBMISSION X NO DATEf15) lYES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 apaces, i.e. approximately fif teen sing;e-space typewritten lines (16)

On June 12, 1993, Operations personnel were commencing Reactor start up on Unit 1, fr6m refueling outage 1EOC 08. The unit was approaching initial criticality.

Zero Power Physics j l

l Testing was in progress. At approximately 0244, the Operations Unit Supervisor noticed a 1

l flashing General Warning light emitting diode (LED) and Rod Bottom LED for Control Rod L-13 of Shutdown Bank C on the Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) system display unit. The Operator Aid Computer Program General 76, which displays control rod position and other The

, pertinent data, was accessed for additional information by Control Room personnel.

information indicated that the rod position for rod L-13 was " unreliable". Operations personnel manually tripped the Reactor at 0245, on June 12, 1993 and immediately implemented

[ procedure EP/1/A/5000/01, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transitioned to procedure

, EP/1/A/5000/1.3, Reactor Trip. The four hour notification was made to the NRC on June 12, i 1993, at 0343, as directed by procedure RP/0/A/5700/10, NRC Immediate Notification l

Requirements. All systems operated as required. Unit 1 was in Mode 2 (Startup) at the time l This event has been assigned a cause of Equipment Failure due to the failure

$ of this event.

a of the L-13 field cable between Data cabinet B and the bulkhead for undetermined reasons.

The field cable has subsequently been replaced.

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d FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATURY COMMISSION APPROVED EY OMB 90. 3150-0104

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. ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS

. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUESTS 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTINATE TO THE INFORMATION Arm RENoS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR TEXT CONTINUATION REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND '

a n r FACILITY NAME(I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE(3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER KcGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000 369 i3 05 0 2 OF 8 EVALUATION:

Background-Tha Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) system [EIIStAA] detects-and displays.the actual rod position of all the control rods in the Reactor [EIIS RCT] core. Each control rod attaches to a drive rod that is positioned by a drive mechanism. The position of all tha control rods is sensed by detectors mounted above the Reactor vessel [EIIS RFV) in the region where the drive rods are withdrawn. The detectors send signals to two Data cabinets located inside the Containment Building. The Data Cabinets process each dstsctor's data and transmit the data to the control board mounted Display Unit in the Control Room (CR) [EIIS NA). The Display Unit uses the Data Cabinets' information to display control rod position, update the plant computer, and generate various visual and audible alarms [EIIS ALM].

Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3.3 states that in Modes 3 (Hot Standby), 4 (Hot Shutdown), and 5 (Cold shutdown), one rod position indicator shall be operable and capable of datermining the control rod position within +/- 12 steps for each shutdown or control ,

rod not fully inserted. With less than the required rod position indicator (s) -

operable, immediately open the Reactor trip breaker.

TS 3.1.3.2 states in Mode 1 (Power Operation) and Mode 2 (Startup), the shutdown and control rod position indication system and the demand position indication system shall be operable and capable of determining the control rod positions within +/- 12 steps. With a maximum of one rod position indicator per bank inoperable either determine the position of j the non-indicating rod (s) indirectly by the movable incore detectors at least'once per 8 f hours and immediately after any motion of the non-indicating rod which exceeds 24 steps in one direction since the last determination of the rod's position, or reduce thermal power to <50 percent of rated thermal power within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

Description of Event on June 12, 1993, Operations personnel were commencing Reactor start up on Unit 1, from refueling outage lEOC 08. The unit was approaching initial criticality. Mode 2 had been

. declared at 0016, of the same day. All chutdown banks were withdrawn and Control Rod Bank l A was 204 steps withdrawn while Control Rod Bank B was 93 steps withdrawn. Zero Power f

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'IO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRG7ECT ( 3150-0104), OFTICE nr nnervrnT Ann mm wen-mn nc ?nsni.

l FACILITY NAME(1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE(3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000 369 93 05 0 3 or B

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Physics Testing (ZPPT) was in progresa. At approximately 0244, the Operations Unit Supervisor noticed a flashing General Warning (GW) light emitting diode (LED) and Rod Bottom (RB) LED for Control Rod L-13 of Shutdown Bank C on the DRPI display unit. No annunciator (EIIS ANN) alarms were received associated with these display indicators. The Operator Aid Computer (OAC) (EIIS ID) Program General 76, which displays control rod position and other pertinent data, was accessed for additional information by CR personnel. The information indicated that the rod position for Control Rod L-13 was

" unreliable". After discussion between the CR Senior Reactor Operator (SRO), the Unit Supervisor, and the Balance of the Plant (BOP) Operator, it was decided that since the expceted alarms had not been received and the position of L-13 was unknown, it would be prudent to trip the Unit 1 Reactor. Operations personnel manually tripped the Reactor at 0245, on June 12, 1993, and immediately implemented procedure EP/1/A/5000/01, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection, and transitioned to EP/1/A/5000/1.3, Reactor Trip. The four hour notification was made to the NRC on June 12, 1993, at 0343, as directed by procedure RP/0/A/5700/10, NRC Immediate Notification Requirements. All systems operated as required. Plant response was as expected with no unexpected plant behavior observed. At approximately 0520, Instrument and Electrical (IAE) personnel commenced troubleshooting cctivities on Control Rod L-13, under work order 93041676.  ;

At 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br /> on~ June 12, 1993, McGuire Management and Staff personnel attended a Unit 1  ;

Restart Meeting. As a result of troubleshooting performed by IAE personnel, Component f Engineering personnel concluded there was a fault with Data Cabinet B and disconnected the j input to Data Cabinet B for Control Rod L-13, leaving it in half accuracy. It should be noted that the DRPI system can be operated in this manner. The meeting participants concurred that Unit 1 should go critical and ZPPT initiated with the input to Data Cabinet B disconnected for Control Rod L-13.

IAE personnel completed work on the DRPI system June 14, 1993. IAE personnel, in addition to other troubleshooting activities performed on the DRPI components, replaced the field cable associated with Control Rod L-13 from Data Cabinet B to the bulkhead. This corrective Maintenance returned Control Rod L-13 to full accuracy.

Unit 1 entered Mode 1 (Power Operation) on June 14, 1993, at 1616.

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id' FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REQUIAIORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY CMB NO. 3150-0104 5 (12 )'

EXPIRES 5/31/I5 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TV COMPLY WITH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) IN NRMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 ERS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORD 3 MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NT. E. CAR TEXT CONTINUATION REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, Aho 20 THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE ne m e m mn e m wm n e rc msnt rAcILITY NAME(1) DOCxer NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (61 PAGE(3)

YEAR EEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000 369 93 05 0 4 or 8 Conclusion This cvent has been assigned a cause of Equipment Failure due to the failure of the L-13 field cable located between Data Cabinet B and the bulkhead. During troubleshooting cctivities performed by IAE personnel, it was suspected that the problem existed within ths Digital Display Cabinet. This conclusion was reached as a result of previous knowledge of an intermittent problem with control Rod L-13. The detector / encoder card was replcced during rod drop testing which had been pel.-formed earlier in the week. IAE perconnel believed the problem was resolved at that time.

During this event, there were no annunciator alarms received, just the flashing GW LED and the RB LED. The GW LED flashes when the data is not completely reliable, while the RB LED drnotes a control rod is at the bottom of the core, has dropped to the bottom of the core, or anytime the DRPI system car.not tell where a rod is located in the core. The lack of alarms resulted from a parity error between Data Cabinet A and Data Cabinet B. The DRPI eyctem recognized a problem existed but did not recognize the information it was.

{

receiving, or what to do with that information, because the DRPI system is limited in the cmount of data combinations it is capable of detecting.

While working on the DRPI system, IAE personnel received an Urgent Failure annunciator cicrm. The Urgent Failure alarm is received when any of the folloung comditions exist; j Dcta A and Data B failure on the same control rod, the A and B data for a rod or rods f differ by more than the distance corresponding to one detector coil (six steps), and/or the combination of A and B data produces a rod height that is greater than 228 steps.

After unsuccessfully trying to clear the alarm by reseating the display card, IAE personnel pulled each display card and replaced it with a known good card. This activity did not resolve the Urgent Failure annunciator alarm problem. The original display card was then re-installed.

The problem was eventually traced to the field cable associated with Control Rod L-13, loce:ted in Data Cabinet B and terminating at the bulkhead. IAE personnel fabricated a new field cable and at the completion of ZPPT, on June 14, 1993, replaced the defective cable with the newly fabricated cable. After replacing the field cable, IAE personnel contacted Ch personnel to verify that all indications had returned to normal.

IAE personnel have not determined what caused the failure of the field cable or the 1

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FACILITY NAME(1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6 i PAGE(3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 4cGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000 369 93 05 0 5 OF 8 location of the failure within the cable. The cable is located in the containment building and travels in cable trays for more than one hundred feet. It would not be practical to remove the cable at this time. Consequently, IAE personnel will fabricate a spara field cable to be used as necessary and will be available for use on either unit.

A review of the Operating Experience Program database for twenty-four months prior to this event revealed five Engineered Safety Features Actuations (ESFAs) as a result of Equipment Failures. The previously identified ESFAs did not involve the DRPI system. This event is therefore not considered to be of a recurring nature. However, ESFAs due to Equipment Failures are a recurring problem.

This event did not result in an unmonitored release of radioactive material, personnel injuries, or radiation overexposures.

This event is not Nuclear Plant Reliability Data S3 .em (NPRDS) reportable.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Immediate: 1) Operations personnel manually tripped the Unit 1 Reactor.

Sub equent: 1) Troubleshooting activities were performed by IAE personnel under work order 93041676.

2) 'The display card for control Rod L-13 was replaced and the field cable from Data Cabinet B to the bulkhead was replaced by IAE personnel.

Planned: None l

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! EAPETY ANALYSIS:

I

The actions taken by the CR personnel during this event represent conservative decisions.

l Their choices were made in the interest of ensuring the safety and stability of the l

i Reactor. At the time of the event, the plant was in Mode 2. The plant condition which

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• U.S. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION APPHOVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 i

[5(92)' EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED DURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WIIM THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INIVRMATION TEXT CONTINUATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR l REGUIATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND l TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRCL7ECT ( 3150-0104), OFFICE j cm numm m en wmm-w rc m ot ,

1 i FACILITY NAME(1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (61 PAGE(3)

YEAR SEQUEfff1AL REVISION )

NUMBER NUMBER

$cGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 '05000 369 93 05 0 6 or 8 l

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differentiates Mode 3 from Mode 2 is the effective neutron multiplication factor (Keff) which describes the change in neutron population over time. The difference between the two modes is that with the plant in Mode 3, Keff is <0.99. However, with the plant in Mode 2, Keff is >/= 0.99. The value of Keff is not a measured parameter, though it can be calculated. The calculation necessary to determine the exact value of Keff is tedious and would not provide the CR personnel with any useful information which is why it is not usually performed.

Rather than perform the calculation to determine Keff, the CR personnel will normally declare Mode 2 as soon as they begin to withdraw the control banks, of control rods, during tha normal Reactor startup sequence. The decision to administratively declare Mode l 2 before it actually occurs is a conservative one based upon the need for the operators to pay attention to the Reactor indications during startup instead of performing j calculations. The declaration is also made because the TS are, in most cases, more i limiting in Mode 2 than in Mode 3.

One case where TSs are less limiting is the TS dealing with rod position indication. TS 3.1.3.2, Position Indicating Systems-Operating, which is applicable in Modo 1 and Mode 2, l requires that with one position indicating system per bank of control rods inoperable l operation may continue without restriction up to 50 percent power. Operation is allowed j ebove 50 percent provided that the incore neutron flux detectors are used to determine the I rods position once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, and after any movement of the non-indicating control rod exceeding 24 steps. However, TS ~.1.3.3, which is applicable in Mode 3, Mode 4 and Mode 5 requires that without the digital posi'; ion indicator for any control rod, the Reactor trip breakers must be opened immediately.

The control rod which lost indication, L-13, was at the fully withdrawn position. The CR l personnel, upon the disco"ery of the lack of indication, made a conscious decision to apply the TS requirements for Mode 3 for two reasons. The CR personnel knew from experience that the Reactor was actually in Mode 3, since the amount of rod withdrawal that they had performed would not have been sufficient to increase the value of Keff to

>/= 0.99. The CR personnel also did not feel comfortable with what they were seeing.

Typically, when indication is lost on one control rod, there are several annunciator alarms, associated with the control rods and the rod position indicating system, which will alarm in the CR. These alarms were not received. The CR personnel knew of the indication loss through observation of the rod position indicators. When the CR personnel noticed the lack of indication and realized they had not received any annunciator alarms, I

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YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit l' 05000 369 ~ 93 05- _O 7 OF S they chose to make a conservative decision and open the Reactor trip breakers. There were  !

no indications to support that Control Rod L-13 was anywhere but the fully withdrawn .

position even after it lost indication. However, the loss of indication and the failure-of the annunciators pointed to a possible major failure in the DRPI system. A. lack of a [

reliable DRPI system while performing a Reactor startup was not a condition that the CR personnel would allow. The fact that a Reactor trip was initiated does not in itself mean j that there was any significant transient to the plant. The Reactor was in the early stages of a startup and the Reactor power was in the lower area of the source range. The opening of the Reactor trip breakers caused all of the control rods, which had been withdrawn, to fall into the core. This action added a large amount of negative reactivity which caused the Reactor power to go to an even lower point in the source range. A Reactor trip from this condition yields no significant. plant transient; therefore, this  ;

event is considered to be not significant.

The health and safety of the public was not effected as a result of this event.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:  ?

Sequence of Events:  !

PR - Personnel Recollection SSL - Unit 1 SRO Logbook PTR - Post Trip Report WO - Work order Date Time Event 6/12/93 ~0244 The Unit 1 CR Supervisor noticed a flashing GW LED and RB light for Control Rod L-13 of the DRPI display unit. (PR) 0245:46 Operations personnel manually tripped the Unit 1 Reactor. (PTR, SSL, PR) ]

Operations personnel entered procedure EP/1/A/5000/01, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection and transitioned to procedure EP/1/A/5000/1.3, Reactor Trip. (SSL) l I

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FACILITY NAME(1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE(3)

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YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER fcGuireNuclearStation, Unit 1 05000 369 93 05 0 8 OF 8 I

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l 0343 The four hour notification was made to the NRC, as directed by procedure RP/0/A/5700/10, NRC Immediate Notification Requirements.

(SSL)

Work order 93041676 was generated by Planning personnel to troubleshoot the DRPI system. (WO) i i

IAE personnel replaced the display card for rod L-13. (WO,PR) 1 1

6/14/93 IAE personnel replaced the field cable between Data Cabinet B and )

the bulkhead. (WO, PR) l