ML19305A944

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Info Re Manpower Availability & Utilization of Personnel in Event of Fire in Cable Spreading Room.Informs of 3-h Barrier Encasements for Safety Div a Raceways
ML19305A944
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 03/12/1980
From: Andognini G
BOSTON EDISON CO.
To: Ippolito T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8003180601
Download: ML19305A944 (2)


Text

e.

w BOSTON EDISON COMPANY DENEnri QFricts 800 BovLsTON STREET Boston. MASSACHUSETTS 02193 G. Cant Anocausus NucLEam GPER ONS DEPARTMENT' March 12, 1980 Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Operating Reactors Office Nuclear Reactor Regulation USNRC Washington, DC 20555 License No. DPR-35 Docket #50-293 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS

References:

(a) BECo Letter #80-12 dated January 21, 1980, G. C. Andognini (BECo) to T. A. Ippolito (NRC)

(b) BECo Letter #80-19 dated January 31, 1980, G. C. Andognini (BECo) to T. A. Ippolito (NRC)

Enclosure:

(A) Four (4) Copies of " Cable Spreading Room Fire, Proposed Utilization of Available Personnel".

Dear Sir:

Enclosure (A) comprises the information on manpower availability and utilization of personnel, in the event of a fire in the Cable Spreading Room, which was promised in Section 7.0 (Shutdown Procedure) of the report forwarded with Reference (b).

The safe shutdown analysis, which was conducted for critical Fire Zone 2.1 (Switchgear Room B), and submitted by Reference (a), identified the need to encase Safety Division A raceways by a 3-hour fire rated barrier (see page

  1. 51). We wish to document the fact that Safety Division A trays and conduits have been encased in 3-hour barriers using unistruts, wire lath and Pyrocrete 241. This design is similar to the one used for encasing power conduits in the Cable Spreading Room. In our judgement, the fire protection measures presently in place will ensure that a fire in Fire Zone 2.1 will not adversely affect safe shutdown capability.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Very truly yours, 4 a

/CjC g eoa isa Got

-W '

Enclosura A J

CABLE SPREADING ROOM FIRE PROPOSED UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE PERSONNEL In order to be as conservative as practical, it is assumed that at the time

  • the Cable Spreading Room fire is detected, the minimum number of personnel will be on site.

This will include seven (7) security personnel,. three (3) of which by procedure, will be committed to the " fire brigade".

Along with this, there will be five (5) operations personnel. This group con-sists of the Nuclear Watch Engineer, Operating Supervisor and three (3) Nuclear Plant Operators. .

1 In the situation indicated, the Nuclear Watch Engineer is the leader of the fire brigade and the brigade itself is made up of three (3) security personnel and One (1) Nuclear Plant Operator as determined by the Nuclear Watch Engineer.

When a Cable Spreading Room fire is detected, the Operating Supervisor and two (2) Nuclear Plant Operators are available to place the unit in the most

. conservative operational position.

I

{

I l