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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARDD-99-12, Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review DD-99-12 Has Expired.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 9910281999-10-28028 October 1999 Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review DD-99-12 Has Expired.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 991028 ML20217N8261999-10-25025 October 1999 Discusses Errata Re 991021 Filing of Northeast Nuclear Energy Co Answer to Request for Hearing & Petition to Intervene B17901, Submits Statement of Personal Qualification (NRC Form 398) Along with Supporting Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee (NRC from 396) in Support of License Renewal for PM Miner.Encls Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-10-18018 October 1999 Submits Statement of Personal Qualification (NRC Form 398) Along with Supporting Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee (NRC from 396) in Support of License Renewal for PM Miner.Encls Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17886, Requests Permission to Utilize Code Case N-623, Deferral of Insps of Shell-to-Flange & Head-to-Flange of Reactor Vessel,Section Xi,Div 1, for Millstone Unit 21999-10-18018 October 1999 Requests Permission to Utilize Code Case N-623, Deferral of Insps of Shell-to-Flange & Head-to-Flange of Reactor Vessel,Section Xi,Div 1, for Millstone Unit 2 05000336/LER-1999-012, Forwards LER 99-012-00,re Unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 on 990917.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-012-00,re Unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 on 990917.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl B17900, Forwards Revised Assumptions Used in Fuel Handling Accident Analysis & Summary of Results.List of Regulatory Commitments Are Listed in Attachment 11999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Revised Assumptions Used in Fuel Handling Accident Analysis & Summary of Results.List of Regulatory Commitments Are Listed in Attachment 1 ML20217G9491999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Exemption from Requirements of 1-CFR50,App E, Section IV.F.2.c,re Conduct of full-participation Exercise in Sept 1999,at Plant,Units 1,2 & 3 ML20217D9671999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards Copy of Transcript of Public Meeting Held by NRC Staff & NNECO on 990825 at Waterford,Connecticut on Decommissioning Program for Millstone,Unit 1.Without Encl ML20217D3011999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util 990118 Request for Amend to License NPF-49 to Allow full-core Offloads to Spent Fuel Pool During Core Offloads to Spent Fuel Pool During Core Offload Events ML20217F0031999-10-0606 October 1999 Forwards Original Petition to Intervene Being Filed on Behalf of Clients,Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone & Long Island Coalition Against Millstone,Iaw Provisions of 10CFR2.714 ML20217P1201999-10-0606 October 1999 Informs NRC of Proposed Acquisition of Parent Holding Company of Central Maine & Requests NRC Concurrence,Based on Threshold Review,That Proposed Acquisition Does Not,In Fact, Constitute Transfer Subject to 10CFR50.80 B17892, Requests Withdrawal of License Amend Application Re 24-month SG Tube Insp Surveillance Extensions,Submitted in Util 950726 & s to NRC1999-10-0505 October 1999 Requests Withdrawal of License Amend Application Re 24-month SG Tube Insp Surveillance Extensions,Submitted in Util 950726 & s to NRC ML20217B4711999-10-0404 October 1999 Informs That Staff Did Not Identify Any Safety Concerns Re Licensee Proposals to Modify Commitments Made for Action Items 4.2.1,4.2.2,4.5.1 & 4.5.2 of GL 83-28 by Providing Addl Justifications or Safety Bases for Changes ML20212K1241999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltrs to Chairman Jackson,Commissioners & Wd Travers,Expressing Concern Re Millstone Npps.Nrc Continues to Monitor Performace of Millstone to Ensure That Public Health & Safety,Adequately Protected ML20212J3051999-10-0101 October 1999 Discusses GL 97-06 Re Degradation of SG Internals,Dtd 971230.GL Requested Each PWR Licensee to Submit Info That Will Enable NRC Staff to Verify Whether PWR SG Internals Comply & Conform to Current Licensing Basis for Facilities ML20212L2081999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltrs to President Wj Clinton,Chairman Jackson & Commissioners & Wd Travers,Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Continues to Monitor Plant Performance ML20212J9991999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to President Clinton,H Clinton, Chairman Jackson &/Or Wd Travers Expressing Concern Re Millstone Npps.Nrc Continues to Monitor Performance of Plant to Ensure That Public Health & Safety Adequately Protected ML20212L1971999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to Chairman Jackson & Commissioners Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Continues to Monitor Plant Performance to Ensure Public Health & Safety ML20212J2451999-10-0101 October 1999 Informs That Util 980807 & 990629 Responses to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at NPPs Acceptable.Nrc Considers Subj GL to Be Closed for Units 2 &3 ML20212L1831999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to Wd Travers Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Continues to Monitor Performance of Millstone to Ensure Adequate Protection to Public Health ML20212L2171999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to President Wj Clinton,Chairman Jackson & Commissioners,Wd Travers & Ferc,Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island ML20217A9271999-09-30030 September 1999 Discusses Investigation Conducted at Millstone Nuclear Power Station by NRC OI Region I on 980319 to Determine If Contract Training Instructor Was Terminated for Raising Concerns About Quality of Training Matls ML20217B3221999-09-30030 September 1999 Refers to Investigation Rept 1-1997-035 Conducted at Millstone Nuclear Power Station by NRC Ofc of Investigation Field Ofc,Region I on 970915 to Determine Whether Former Health Physics Technician Discriminated Against ML20212J6621999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Units 2 & 3 on 990916.Identified Several Recent Instances in Which Condition Repts Were Not Initiated,Resulting in Untimely or Inadequate C/As.Historical Listing of Plant Issues Encl B17887, Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR140.11(a)(4) Which Requires Licensees to Maintain Secondary Financial Protection Beyond Primary Layer1999-09-28028 September 1999 Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR140.11(a)(4) Which Requires Licensees to Maintain Secondary Financial Protection Beyond Primary Layer ML20216J1341999-09-28028 September 1999 Ltr Contract:Task Order 49, Millstone Units 2 & 3 Employee Concerns Program Insp, Under Contract NRC-03-98-021 B17883, Forwards Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6, IAW ASME Section XI,IWA-62301999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6, IAW ASME Section XI,IWA-6230 B17890, Provides Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal1999-09-27027 September 1999 Provides Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal B17888, Informs That There No Longer Exists Need to Maintain Millstone Unit 2 SRO License for CA Hines,License SOP-10741-01,effective 9909151999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs That There No Longer Exists Need to Maintain Millstone Unit 2 SRO License for CA Hines,License SOP-10741-01,effective 990915 B17884, Forwards NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, for Mnps,Units 2 & 3,per Administrative Ltr 99-031999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, for Mnps,Units 2 & 3,per Administrative Ltr 99-03 ML20212F4961999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-245/99-08,50-336/99-08 & 50-423/99-08 on 990615-0809.Four Violations of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as Ncvs,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy 05000336/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Thermal Reactor Power Limit That Was Exceeded.Commitments Made by Util Encl1999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Thermal Reactor Power Limit That Was Exceeded.Commitments Made by Util Encl B17867, Requests Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g),IAW ASME Section XI for Millstone,Unit 3.Util Requests Relief from Performing Visual Exam of Reactor Pressure Supports to Extent Required by Code for Class 1 Supports1999-09-17017 September 1999 Requests Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g),IAW ASME Section XI for Millstone,Unit 3.Util Requests Relief from Performing Visual Exam of Reactor Pressure Supports to Extent Required by Code for Class 1 Supports B17865, Provides NRC Staff with Updated Proposed Rev of FSAR Section 14.6.3, Radiological Consequences of SG Tube Failure. Updated Proposed Rev Will Replace Info Provided in Attachment 3 of Initial Submittal1999-09-16016 September 1999 Provides NRC Staff with Updated Proposed Rev of FSAR Section 14.6.3, Radiological Consequences of SG Tube Failure. Updated Proposed Rev Will Replace Info Provided in Attachment 3 of Initial Submittal B17876, Informs That Util Will Adopt Last Approved Northeast Util QA Program (Nuqap) Tr,Rev 21,dtd 990630,as Unit 1 Nuqap,Per Decision to Permanently Cease Operations at Subject Plant1999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That Util Will Adopt Last Approved Northeast Util QA Program (Nuqap) Tr,Rev 21,dtd 990630,as Unit 1 Nuqap,Per Decision to Permanently Cease Operations at Subject Plant B17882, Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 369 in Support of License Renewal for Bb Parrish,License SOP-10399-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 369 in Support of License Renewal for Bb Parrish,License SOP-10399-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17881, Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Le Olsen,License SOP-10398-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Le Olsen,License SOP-10398-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17859, Forwards up-to-date Distribution Lists for NRC Correspondence to NNECO & NUSCO.Side-bars Indicate Changes from Previous Lists Provided to NRC on 9801281999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards up-to-date Distribution Lists for NRC Correspondence to NNECO & NUSCO.Side-bars Indicate Changes from Previous Lists Provided to NRC on 980128 B17880, Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Rf Martin,License SOP-10397-0.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Rf Martin,License SOP-10397-0.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17872, Informs of Election to Consolidate Previous Commitments Re Work Observation Program with Two New Programmatic Commitments Listed in Attachment 11999-09-14014 September 1999 Informs of Election to Consolidate Previous Commitments Re Work Observation Program with Two New Programmatic Commitments Listed in Attachment 1 ML20212A9011999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Environ Assessment & Finding of No Significant Impact Re Application for Exemption,Dtd 990803.Proposed Exemption Would Provide Relief from Requirement of 10CFR50 ML20212A3171999-09-10010 September 1999 Discusses Investigation Rept 1-1998-045 Conducted on 981112 to Determine If Former Senior Health Physics Technician Being Denied Employment at Millstone in Retaliation for Having Raised Safety Concerns in Past.Synopsis Encl B17838, Forwards Revs 34 & 35 to Physical Security Plan.Explanation of Changes Provided as Attachment 1.Without Encls1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Revs 34 & 35 to Physical Security Plan.Explanation of Changes Provided as Attachment 1.Without Encls ML20212A7501999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Staff Requirements Memo Response,Dtd 990525,which Provides Actions NRC Plans for Continued Oversight of safety-conscious Work Environ & Employee Concerns Program ML20211J9291999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards mark-ups & Retypes of Proposed Conforming License Changes Required in Connection with Transfers Being Sought in 990615 Application of Montaup Electric Co & New England Power Co for Transfer of Licenses & Ownership Interests ML20211K5171999-09-0202 September 1999 Expresses Appreciation for Support Provided for NRC Public Meeting on 990825 05000336/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,documenting 990804 Event of Failure to Perform ASME Section XI IST on Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Valve Following Maint Activities.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment 11999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,documenting 990804 Event of Failure to Perform ASME Section XI IST on Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Valve Following Maint Activities.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment 1 ML20216H0591999-09-0202 September 1999 Responds to Re Issues Submitted by Cullen on Behalf of Several Petitioners Concerning Offsite Emergency Prepardeness for Millstone Nuclear Power Station ML20211N9241999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Document Classification Form for Insertion Into Emergency Planning Services Department Procedures ML20211H0741999-08-30030 August 1999 Discusses GL 92-01,Rev 1, Rv Structural Integrity, Issued by NRC on 950519 & NNECO Responses for Millstone Unit 2 & 980715.Informs That Staff Revised Info in Rvid & Released Info as Rvid Version 2 Based on Response Review 1999-09-30
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217N8261999-10-25025 October 1999 Discusses Errata Re 991021 Filing of Northeast Nuclear Energy Co Answer to Request for Hearing & Petition to Intervene B17886, Requests Permission to Utilize Code Case N-623, Deferral of Insps of Shell-to-Flange & Head-to-Flange of Reactor Vessel,Section Xi,Div 1, for Millstone Unit 21999-10-18018 October 1999 Requests Permission to Utilize Code Case N-623, Deferral of Insps of Shell-to-Flange & Head-to-Flange of Reactor Vessel,Section Xi,Div 1, for Millstone Unit 2 B17901, Submits Statement of Personal Qualification (NRC Form 398) Along with Supporting Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee (NRC from 396) in Support of License Renewal for PM Miner.Encls Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-10-18018 October 1999 Submits Statement of Personal Qualification (NRC Form 398) Along with Supporting Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee (NRC from 396) in Support of License Renewal for PM Miner.Encls Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) 05000336/LER-1999-012, Forwards LER 99-012-00,re Unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 on 990917.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-012-00,re Unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 on 990917.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl B17900, Forwards Revised Assumptions Used in Fuel Handling Accident Analysis & Summary of Results.List of Regulatory Commitments Are Listed in Attachment 11999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Revised Assumptions Used in Fuel Handling Accident Analysis & Summary of Results.List of Regulatory Commitments Are Listed in Attachment 1 ML20217P1201999-10-0606 October 1999 Informs NRC of Proposed Acquisition of Parent Holding Company of Central Maine & Requests NRC Concurrence,Based on Threshold Review,That Proposed Acquisition Does Not,In Fact, Constitute Transfer Subject to 10CFR50.80 ML20217F0031999-10-0606 October 1999 Forwards Original Petition to Intervene Being Filed on Behalf of Clients,Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone & Long Island Coalition Against Millstone,Iaw Provisions of 10CFR2.714 B17892, Requests Withdrawal of License Amend Application Re 24-month SG Tube Insp Surveillance Extensions,Submitted in Util 950726 & s to NRC1999-10-0505 October 1999 Requests Withdrawal of License Amend Application Re 24-month SG Tube Insp Surveillance Extensions,Submitted in Util 950726 & s to NRC B17887, Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR140.11(a)(4) Which Requires Licensees to Maintain Secondary Financial Protection Beyond Primary Layer1999-09-28028 September 1999 Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR140.11(a)(4) Which Requires Licensees to Maintain Secondary Financial Protection Beyond Primary Layer B17883, Forwards Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6, IAW ASME Section XI,IWA-62301999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6, IAW ASME Section XI,IWA-6230 B17890, Provides Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal1999-09-27027 September 1999 Provides Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal B17884, Forwards NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, for Mnps,Units 2 & 3,per Administrative Ltr 99-031999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, for Mnps,Units 2 & 3,per Administrative Ltr 99-03 B17888, Informs That There No Longer Exists Need to Maintain Millstone Unit 2 SRO License for CA Hines,License SOP-10741-01,effective 9909151999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs That There No Longer Exists Need to Maintain Millstone Unit 2 SRO License for CA Hines,License SOP-10741-01,effective 990915 05000336/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Thermal Reactor Power Limit That Was Exceeded.Commitments Made by Util Encl1999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Thermal Reactor Power Limit That Was Exceeded.Commitments Made by Util Encl B17867, Requests Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g),IAW ASME Section XI for Millstone,Unit 3.Util Requests Relief from Performing Visual Exam of Reactor Pressure Supports to Extent Required by Code for Class 1 Supports1999-09-17017 September 1999 Requests Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g),IAW ASME Section XI for Millstone,Unit 3.Util Requests Relief from Performing Visual Exam of Reactor Pressure Supports to Extent Required by Code for Class 1 Supports B17876, Informs That Util Will Adopt Last Approved Northeast Util QA Program (Nuqap) Tr,Rev 21,dtd 990630,as Unit 1 Nuqap,Per Decision to Permanently Cease Operations at Subject Plant1999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That Util Will Adopt Last Approved Northeast Util QA Program (Nuqap) Tr,Rev 21,dtd 990630,as Unit 1 Nuqap,Per Decision to Permanently Cease Operations at Subject Plant B17865, Provides NRC Staff with Updated Proposed Rev of FSAR Section 14.6.3, Radiological Consequences of SG Tube Failure. Updated Proposed Rev Will Replace Info Provided in Attachment 3 of Initial Submittal1999-09-16016 September 1999 Provides NRC Staff with Updated Proposed Rev of FSAR Section 14.6.3, Radiological Consequences of SG Tube Failure. Updated Proposed Rev Will Replace Info Provided in Attachment 3 of Initial Submittal B17881, Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Le Olsen,License SOP-10398-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Le Olsen,License SOP-10398-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17880, Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Rf Martin,License SOP-10397-0.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Rf Martin,License SOP-10397-0.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17859, Forwards up-to-date Distribution Lists for NRC Correspondence to NNECO & NUSCO.Side-bars Indicate Changes from Previous Lists Provided to NRC on 9801281999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards up-to-date Distribution Lists for NRC Correspondence to NNECO & NUSCO.Side-bars Indicate Changes from Previous Lists Provided to NRC on 980128 B17882, Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 369 in Support of License Renewal for Bb Parrish,License SOP-10399-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 369 in Support of License Renewal for Bb Parrish,License SOP-10399-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17872, Informs of Election to Consolidate Previous Commitments Re Work Observation Program with Two New Programmatic Commitments Listed in Attachment 11999-09-14014 September 1999 Informs of Election to Consolidate Previous Commitments Re Work Observation Program with Two New Programmatic Commitments Listed in Attachment 1 B17838, Forwards Revs 34 & 35 to Physical Security Plan.Explanation of Changes Provided as Attachment 1.Without Encls1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Revs 34 & 35 to Physical Security Plan.Explanation of Changes Provided as Attachment 1.Without Encls ML20211J9291999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards mark-ups & Retypes of Proposed Conforming License Changes Required in Connection with Transfers Being Sought in 990615 Application of Montaup Electric Co & New England Power Co for Transfer of Licenses & Ownership Interests 05000336/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,documenting 990804 Event of Failure to Perform ASME Section XI IST on Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Valve Following Maint Activities.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment 11999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,documenting 990804 Event of Failure to Perform ASME Section XI IST on Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Valve Following Maint Activities.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment 1 ML20216H0591999-09-0202 September 1999 Responds to Re Issues Submitted by Cullen on Behalf of Several Petitioners Concerning Offsite Emergency Prepardeness for Millstone Nuclear Power Station ML20211N9241999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Document Classification Form for Insertion Into Emergency Planning Services Department Procedures B17851, Forwards Semiannual fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data for 990101-990630 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1,2 & 3,IAW 10CFR26.71(d)1999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards Semiannual fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data for 990101-990630 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1,2 & 3,IAW 10CFR26.71(d) B17855, Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 396 in Support of License Renewal for SRO TE Grilley,SOP-4053-04.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.7901999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 396 in Support of License Renewal for SRO TE Grilley,SOP-4053-04.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 B17849, Forwards Second Quarter Backlog Performance Rept for 1999, Which Represents Fourth Rept on Mnps Performance Since Restart of Unit 3 & First Status Update for Unit 2.No Regulatory Commitments Are Contained in Ltr1999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Second Quarter Backlog Performance Rept for 1999, Which Represents Fourth Rept on Mnps Performance Since Restart of Unit 3 & First Status Update for Unit 2.No Regulatory Commitments Are Contained in Ltr B17854, Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2,per TS 6.9.1.7.Revised Repts for May & June Also Encl Which Reflect Correct Faulty Printometer Readings1999-08-14014 August 1999 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2,per TS 6.9.1.7.Revised Repts for May & June Also Encl Which Reflect Correct Faulty Printometer Readings B17850, Forwards First Lhc Quarterly Assessment Rept for Assessment Performed 990621 to 990701.NNECO Taking Appropriate Actions to Address Observations in Rept1999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards First Lhc Quarterly Assessment Rept for Assessment Performed 990621 to 990701.NNECO Taking Appropriate Actions to Address Observations in Rept B17837, Forwards COLR for Cycle 7, for Millstone Unit 3,IAW TS 6.9.1.6.Explanation of Changes to COLR Also Encl1999-08-0707 August 1999 Forwards COLR for Cycle 7, for Millstone Unit 3,IAW TS 6.9.1.6.Explanation of Changes to COLR Also Encl B17657, Requests Schedular Exemption from Emergency Plan Exercise Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Part Iv,Section F,Paragraph 2.c.Requests That Nrc/Fema Evaluated Exercise Be Conducted in Mar 2000 Rather than Sept 19991999-08-0303 August 1999 Requests Schedular Exemption from Emergency Plan Exercise Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Part Iv,Section F,Paragraph 2.c.Requests That Nrc/Fema Evaluated Exercise Be Conducted in Mar 2000 Rather than Sept 1999 B17845, Forwards Revised Commitment for Surveillance Scheduling & Tracking.Options for Surveillance Scheduling & Tracking Methodologies to Be Incorporated in Standardized Station Surveillance Program Are Currently Being Reconsidered1999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Revised Commitment for Surveillance Scheduling & Tracking.Options for Surveillance Scheduling & Tracking Methodologies to Be Incorporated in Standardized Station Surveillance Program Are Currently Being Reconsidered B17831, Informs NRC Staff That Change 3 to Rev 25 of Mnps Emergency Plan Was Implemented on 990715.Change Removes Facility Organizational Charts from Emergency Plan & Identifies Relocation to Nuqap1999-07-26026 July 1999 Informs NRC Staff That Change 3 to Rev 25 of Mnps Emergency Plan Was Implemented on 990715.Change Removes Facility Organizational Charts from Emergency Plan & Identifies Relocation to Nuqap B17834, Forwards Proprietary Revised NRC Form 398,which Certifies That SL Doboe Has Completed Eligibility Requirements for Sro,Per 10CFR55.31.Proprietary Info Withheld1999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Proprietary Revised NRC Form 398,which Certifies That SL Doboe Has Completed Eligibility Requirements for Sro,Per 10CFR55.31.Proprietary Info Withheld B17836, Forwards Revised NRC Form 396 & Supporting Physician Rept for Licensed Operator Restricted from Licensed Duties, Effective 990628,due to Medical Condition.Without Encl1999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Revised NRC Form 396 & Supporting Physician Rept for Licensed Operator Restricted from Licensed Duties, Effective 990628,due to Medical Condition.Without Encl B17811, Submits Response to NRC AL 99-02,requesting That Licensees Provide Numerical Estimates of Licensing Actions to Be Expected to Be Submitted in Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-20020 July 1999 Submits Response to NRC AL 99-02,requesting That Licensees Provide Numerical Estimates of Licensing Actions to Be Expected to Be Submitted in Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20210S9911999-07-18018 July 1999 Requests NRC Intervene for All Shareholders of New England Electric System & to Help with Merger with National Grid Group & That NRC Petition Security & Exchange Commission to Investigate Matter Relative to No Shareholder Options B17835, Forwards Rev 33 to Millstone Station Physical Security Plan, Per 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Licensee Determined That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Rev Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790(d)(1)1999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards Rev 33 to Millstone Station Physical Security Plan, Per 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Licensee Determined That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Rev Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790(d)(1) B17818, Provides NRC Staff with Change to TS Bases Sections 3/4.5.2 & 3/4.5.3, ECCS Subsystems for Info Only.Change Was Reviewed & Approved by Unit 3 Plant Operations Review Committee IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.591999-07-16016 July 1999 Provides NRC Staff with Change to TS Bases Sections 3/4.5.2 & 3/4.5.3, ECCS Subsystems for Info Only.Change Was Reviewed & Approved by Unit 3 Plant Operations Review Committee IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.59 B17824, Forwards Monthly Oeprating Rept for June 1999 & Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Unit 21999-07-13013 July 1999 Forwards Monthly Oeprating Rept for June 1999 & Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Unit 2 ML20212K1701999-07-13013 July 1999 Submits Concerns Re Millstone & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Should Provide Adequate Emergency Planning in Case of Radiological Accident B17816, Provides Certification That M Lettrich,Has Completed Eligibility Requirements,Per 10CFR55.31 for Operator License.Util Requests That Licensing Action Be Taken for Named Individual1999-07-0101 July 1999 Provides Certification That M Lettrich,Has Completed Eligibility Requirements,Per 10CFR55.31 for Operator License.Util Requests That Licensing Action Be Taken for Named Individual B17801, Forwards 10CFR50.59 Annual Rept for Period Jan-Dec 1998. Various Changes That Were Initiated in Previous Yrs & Completed in 1998,also Incorporated Into Annual Rept1999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards 10CFR50.59 Annual Rept for Period Jan-Dec 1998. Various Changes That Were Initiated in Previous Yrs & Completed in 1998,also Incorporated Into Annual Rept B17819, Forwards Rev 17 to FSAR & Addendum 6 to Annual Rept.Nneco Recently Completed Review of Unit 2 Design & Licensing Bases Which Resulted in Changes to FSAR Provided in Encl 1.Encl 2 Includes Info Covering Changes Not Included in1999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Rev 17 to FSAR & Addendum 6 to Annual Rept.Nneco Recently Completed Review of Unit 2 Design & Licensing Bases Which Resulted in Changes to FSAR Provided in Encl 1.Encl 2 Includes Info Covering Changes Not Included in B17780, Forwards Rev 21,Change 0 to Northeast Utilities QAP (Nuqap) TR, IAW 10CFR50.54(a)(3).Changes to TR Are Shown as Text in Bold Italics1999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Rev 21,Change 0 to Northeast Utilities QAP (Nuqap) TR, IAW 10CFR50.54(a)(3).Changes to TR Are Shown as Text in Bold Italics B17723, Responds to NRC Request for Info Re GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Units 2 & 3 Encl.Without Encl1999-06-29029 June 1999 Responds to NRC Request for Info Re GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Units 2 & 3 Encl.Without Encl B17767, Forwards Rev 12 to FSAR & Addendum 3 to Annual Rept, for Millstone Unit 3,per 10CFR50.71(e) & 10CFR50.4(b)(6). No New Regulatory Commitments Contained in Ltr1999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Rev 12 to FSAR & Addendum 3 to Annual Rept, for Millstone Unit 3,per 10CFR50.71(e) & 10CFR50.4(b)(6). No New Regulatory Commitments Contained in Ltr 1999-09-03
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20064A8071990-09-11011 September 1990 Forwards Core Operating Limits Rept for Four & Three Loop Operation,Per Tech Spec 6.9.1.6.d A08900, Responds to Expressing NRC Views on Access to Util Internal or third-party Assessment Repts.Believes Internal Analysis to Support Amend of One of Util NRC OLs to Authorize Higher Power Level Is within NRC Purview & Access1990-09-11011 September 1990 Responds to Expressing NRC Views on Access to Util Internal or third-party Assessment Repts.Believes Internal Analysis to Support Amend of One of Util NRC OLs to Authorize Higher Power Level Is within NRC Purview & Access B13628, Forwards Correction to Error Discovered in Util 900727 Response to Notice of Violation from Insp Rept 50-336/90-09. Statement Corrected to Read That Contract Personnel That Have long-term Assignments,Certified as Testing Personnel1990-09-0707 September 1990 Forwards Correction to Error Discovered in Util 900727 Response to Notice of Violation from Insp Rept 50-336/90-09. Statement Corrected to Read That Contract Personnel That Have long-term Assignments,Certified as Testing Personnel B13624, Forwards Addl Info Re Relief Request from ASME Code Section XI Requirements for Temporary Repair to Piping Adjacent to Valve 2-SW-97A,per 900817 Telcon1990-09-0505 September 1990 Forwards Addl Info Re Relief Request from ASME Code Section XI Requirements for Temporary Repair to Piping Adjacent to Valve 2-SW-97A,per 900817 Telcon A08977, Advises of Commitment to Install Hardened Wetwell Vent at Facility,In Response to NRC .Util Will Be Proceeding W/Initial Design & Engineering of Hardened Vent, to Support Installation During 1993 Refueling Outage1990-09-0404 September 1990 Advises of Commitment to Install Hardened Wetwell Vent at Facility,In Response to NRC .Util Will Be Proceeding W/Initial Design & Engineering of Hardened Vent, to Support Installation During 1993 Refueling Outage B13596, Forwards Millstone Unit 3 Individual Plant Exam for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, Per Generic Ltr 88-20.Rept Identified That No Major Severe Accident Vulnerabilities Requiring Corrective Action Needed1990-08-31031 August 1990 Forwards Millstone Unit 3 Individual Plant Exam for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, Per Generic Ltr 88-20.Rept Identified That No Major Severe Accident Vulnerabilities Requiring Corrective Action Needed B13626, Informs That Info Provided in Re safety-related Equipment Classification Programs Also Applicable for Unit 3 of Facility1990-08-31031 August 1990 Informs That Info Provided in Re safety-related Equipment Classification Programs Also Applicable for Unit 3 of Facility B13618, Forwards Addl Info on Util 900815 Relief Request from ASME Code Section XI Requirements,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i),for Repairs to Pipe 3SWP-006-050-031990-08-24024 August 1990 Forwards Addl Info on Util 900815 Relief Request from ASME Code Section XI Requirements,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i),for Repairs to Pipe 3SWP-006-050-03 ML20059C2061990-08-23023 August 1990 Forwards Vols 1 & 2 to Semiannual Radioactive Effluents Release Rept Jan-June 1990, Per 10CFR50.36a.Rept Includes Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents A08918, Responds to Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty Re Insp Rept 50-245/90-08.Mitigation of Civil Penalty Requested.Corrective Action:List of Procedural Changes Provided1990-08-22022 August 1990 Responds to Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty Re Insp Rept 50-245/90-08.Mitigation of Civil Penalty Requested.Corrective Action:List of Procedural Changes Provided B13610, Requests Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Requirements Re Mods to Pipe 3SWP-006-050-03. Results of Insps & Required Repairs Will Determine Schedule for Future Insps1990-08-15015 August 1990 Requests Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Requirements Re Mods to Pipe 3SWP-006-050-03. Results of Insps & Required Repairs Will Determine Schedule for Future Insps B13595, Notifies NRC That Utils Volunteer to Participate in Emergency Response Data Sys Project for All Four Nuclear Units,Per Generic Ltr 89-15 & NUREG-13941990-08-14014 August 1990 Notifies NRC That Utils Volunteer to Participate in Emergency Response Data Sys Project for All Four Nuclear Units,Per Generic Ltr 89-15 & NUREG-1394 B13607, Requests Relief from ASME Code Section XI to Reflect Mod to Piping Adjacent to Valve 2-SW-97A,in Response to Generic Ltr 90-051990-08-10010 August 1990 Requests Relief from ASME Code Section XI to Reflect Mod to Piping Adjacent to Valve 2-SW-97A,in Response to Generic Ltr 90-05 A08845, Responds to NRC Backfit Analyses of Hardened Wetwell Vent, Contained in .Benefit of Installing Hardened Wetwell Vent to Satisfy Basic Design Objective of Preventing core-melt Event Not Sufficient for Immediate Decision1990-08-0808 August 1990 Responds to NRC Backfit Analyses of Hardened Wetwell Vent, Contained in .Benefit of Installing Hardened Wetwell Vent to Satisfy Basic Design Objective of Preventing core-melt Event Not Sufficient for Immediate Decision ML20058N2181990-08-0707 August 1990 Notification of Change in Senior Operator Status.Util Determined That Need to Maintain Senior OL of LS Allen No Longer Exists.Determination Effective 900719 ML20058M8321990-08-0707 August 1990 Discusses Spent Fuel Racks Poison Surveillance Coupon Boraflex Degradation.Visual Exam of Remaining Surveillance Coupons Revealed Similar Situation Existed in All Coupon Samples B13590, Responds to NRC 900718 Request for Addl Info Re Util 900418 Request for Schedular Exemption from 10CFR50,App E,Section IV.F.3 to Allow Dec 1990 Full Participation Exercise to Be Exchanged W/Oct 1991 Partial Participation Exercise1990-08-0101 August 1990 Responds to NRC 900718 Request for Addl Info Re Util 900418 Request for Schedular Exemption from 10CFR50,App E,Section IV.F.3 to Allow Dec 1990 Full Participation Exercise to Be Exchanged W/Oct 1991 Partial Participation Exercise A08881, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-423/90-08.Corrective Action:Operators Directly Involved W/Event Removed from Licensed Duties & Counseled by Operations Manager on Causes of Event1990-07-31031 July 1990 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-423/90-08.Corrective Action:Operators Directly Involved W/Event Removed from Licensed Duties & Counseled by Operations Manager on Causes of Event B13594, Forwards Rev 13 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21(b) & 2.790(a))1990-07-30030 July 1990 Forwards Rev 13 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21(b) & 2.790(a)) ML20055J4621990-07-27027 July 1990 Advises That Need to Maintain OL or Senior OL for Listed Individuals No Longer Exists,Effective 900701 B13585, Provides Supplemental Response to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Request for Action Concerning Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47.Plant Procedures Modified to Provide Operability Verification of Steam Generator Protection Sys1990-07-26026 July 1990 Provides Supplemental Response to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Request for Action Concerning Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47.Plant Procedures Modified to Provide Operability Verification of Steam Generator Protection Sys A08565, Responds to NRC 900302 Request for Addl Info Re LPCI Swing Bus Transfer Design & Single Failure Vulnerabilities1990-07-26026 July 1990 Responds to NRC 900302 Request for Addl Info Re LPCI Swing Bus Transfer Design & Single Failure Vulnerabilities B13592, Requests Extension to Respond to NRC Backfit Analyses of Hardened Wetwell Vent1990-07-24024 July 1990 Requests Extension to Respond to NRC Backfit Analyses of Hardened Wetwell Vent ML20063P9791990-07-23023 July 1990 Notification of Change in SL Jackson Status Effective 900701,due to Permanent Reassignment within Util B13563, Discusses Util Comprehensive Review of Options Re Degraded Grid Undervoltage Protection.Confirms Previous Conclusion That Splitting Loss of Normal Power Logic Would Have Overall Adverse Impact on Plant Safety1990-07-20020 July 1990 Discusses Util Comprehensive Review of Options Re Degraded Grid Undervoltage Protection.Confirms Previous Conclusion That Splitting Loss of Normal Power Logic Would Have Overall Adverse Impact on Plant Safety B13566, Advises That Util Has Reasonable Assurance That Safety Relief Valves Operable & Will Perform as Expected Until Next Outage1990-07-20020 July 1990 Advises That Util Has Reasonable Assurance That Safety Relief Valves Operable & Will Perform as Expected Until Next Outage B13588, Corrects 900703 Submittal of Results of Second in-cycle Insp of Steam Generators.All Tubes W/Cracks Stacked & Plugged1990-07-18018 July 1990 Corrects 900703 Submittal of Results of Second in-cycle Insp of Steam Generators.All Tubes W/Cracks Stacked & Plugged A08822, Submits Addl Info Requested Re Util Response to Generic Ltr 88-11, Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Matls. Charpy Impact Use Values for Welds Provided in Evaluation of Irradiated Capsule W-971990-07-18018 July 1990 Submits Addl Info Requested Re Util Response to Generic Ltr 88-11, Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Matls. Charpy Impact Use Values for Welds Provided in Evaluation of Irradiated Capsule W-97 ML20055G5331990-07-18018 July 1990 Forwards Decommissioning Financial Assurance Certification Rept B13587, Requests Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 3.5.F.2 Re Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Limiting Condition for Operation.Waiver Would Extend Available Time to Repair Damaged Electrical Components1990-07-16016 July 1990 Requests Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 3.5.F.2 Re Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Limiting Condition for Operation.Waiver Would Extend Available Time to Repair Damaged Electrical Components ML20055D3461990-07-0303 July 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 90-001 Re Loss of Fill Oil Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount.Operability Determinations Performed & Documented for All Rosemount 1153 & 1154 Transmitters at Facility B13545, Forwards Rev 3 to Updated FSAR for Millstone Unit 31990-06-29029 June 1990 Forwards Rev 3 to Updated FSAR for Millstone Unit 3 ML20055D7191990-06-29029 June 1990 Amends 900604 Rev 13 to QA Program ML20055D3481990-06-29029 June 1990 Forwards Addl Info Re Facility Crdr & Isap,Including Justification for Human Engineering Discrepancies Dispositioned for No Corrective Action B13531, Forwards Rev 8 to Updated FSAR for Millstone Unit 21990-06-29029 June 1990 Forwards Rev 8 to Updated FSAR for Millstone Unit 2 B13550, Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions. Implementation & Completion Tables for staff-imposed Requirements Encl1990-06-27027 June 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions. Implementation & Completion Tables for staff-imposed Requirements Encl B13499, Forwards Corrected Tech Specs Page 3/4 9-1 for Incorporation Into Proposed Amend 36 to License DPR-21 Re Auxiliary Electrical Sys1990-06-26026 June 1990 Forwards Corrected Tech Specs Page 3/4 9-1 for Incorporation Into Proposed Amend 36 to License DPR-21 Re Auxiliary Electrical Sys ML20043F8721990-06-11011 June 1990 Corrects Name of Vendor Supplying Replacement Plug Valves, Per Util 900511 Ltr.Replacement Bolts,Not Valves,Purchased from Cardinal Industrial Products Corp ML20043H0161990-06-0808 June 1990 Requests Exemption from App J to 10CFR50 for 12 Valves in Reactor Bldg Closed Cooling Water Sys.Valves Not within Definition of Containment Isolation Valves in App J & Not Required to Be Tested ML20043E8831990-06-0505 June 1990 Requests NRC Authorization to Use Plugs Fabricated of nickel-chromium-iron Uns N-06690 Matl Alloy 690 to Plug Tubes in Steam Generators of Plant ML20043D0451990-05-30030 May 1990 Discusses Proposed Rev to Tech Specs Re Facility ESF Actuation Sys Instrumentation Trip Setpoint,Per 900330 Ltr ML20042H0311990-05-0909 May 1990 Discusses Steam Generator Safety Assessment.Concludes That Continued Operation Through Remainder of Current Cycle 10 Fully Justified ML20042F0941990-04-30030 April 1990 Provides Addl Info Re Environ Impact of 900226 Application for Amend to License NPF-49,revising Tech Specs to Allow Containment Pressure to Increase to 14 Psia During Modes 1-4,per NRC Request ML20042F0661990-04-30030 April 1990 Responds to NRC 900404 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Safety Insp Rept 50-336/90-01 on 900120-0305.Corrective Action:Ler 90-004 Submitted on 900430 to Document Condition Prohibited by Plant Tech Specs ML20042E8331990-04-27027 April 1990 Forwards Annual Environ Protection Plan Operating Rept for 1989, & Monitoring Marine Environ of Long Island Sound at Millstone Nuclear Power Station Annual Rept 1989. ML20012E2681990-03-23023 March 1990 Responds to NRC 900226 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-423/89-23.Corrective Actions:Requirement to Review All Changes on Safety Sys for Potential Operating Procedure Changes Stressed to Operations & Engineering Personnel ML20012C3141990-03-13013 March 1990 Forwards Info Re Insp of Facility Emergency Operating Procedures,Per 900119 Ltr ML20012B4111990-03-0202 March 1990 Provides Addl Info Requested to Clarify Changes Proposed to Tech Spec Action Statements for Inoperable Accumulator B13453, Advises That Mods to Steam Generator Blowdown Sample Sys Completed,Per Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-423/89-14 & Salp.Sys Will Be Evaluated for Next 2 Wks to Ensure Blowdown Radiation Monitor Operating Reliably1990-02-26026 February 1990 Advises That Mods to Steam Generator Blowdown Sample Sys Completed,Per Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-423/89-14 & Salp.Sys Will Be Evaluated for Next 2 Wks to Ensure Blowdown Radiation Monitor Operating Reliably ML20011F7541990-02-26026 February 1990 Notifies That Jh Parillo Reassigned & No Longer in Need of License SOP-10263-2 as of 900219 1990-09-07
[Table view] |
Text
,
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- NOIrrHt!/L!Tr trrit.rrl!!!i ATFORO CONNEOTICUT DE ?C-
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October 22, 1979 Docket No. 50-336 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn: Mr. R. Reid , Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 2^555
References:
(1) W. G. Counsil letter to R. Reid dated September 28, 1979.
(2) Telecopy from E. L. Conner for Additional Information dated October 16, 1979.
(3) W. G. Counsil letter to R. Reid dated August 22, 1979.
Gentlemen :
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Feedwater System Piping In usponse to Reference (2), a meeting was held in Bethesda on October 19, 1979 to discuss the NRC request for additional information regarding Reference (1).
As a result of the October 19, 1979 meeting, additional information enclosed herein is submitted in response to the NRC Staff request regarding the ASME Section II applicability of the existing feedwater piping system linear indica-tions.
Attachment 1 provides a discussion of the methods of analyses including the fatigue crack growth analysis and the determination of the critical flaw size.
Attachment 2 provides the assessment of crack growth for the worst feedwater line flaw considering both the design basis transients and the thermal loading conditions observed from the Hillstone Unit No. 2 instrumentation data.
Attachment 3 provides the critical flaw e.izes for part-through wall cracks and through-wall cracks using the established loading cor,litions.
In reference to the submitted information, we note the following:
(1) The stresses calculated and presented in Tables 2 through 5 of Attachment 2 are conservative, because they were generated from a model meant to umbrella a number of different feedwater line observations. Specifii . ally, the maximum stresses in Table 4 (Attachment 2) should be multiplN by 0.753 for specific applicability to Millstone Unit No. 2.
1208 251 7910250
\
[i O
Thus, the largest value of the stress intensity factor (K) which would result from a 0.100 inch deep flaw is 34.0 ksi /in.
(2) The results of the detailed piping integrity analyses confirm that the ductile f ailure limits of ASME Section XI are met. However, the upecific LEFM criteria for flaw evaluation in ASME Section XI
-- IRE-3600 is not applicable to the feedwater piping system.
(3) Using the results of the fatigue crack growth analysis and compering them to the established critical flaw size, it is concluded that there is a large safety margin.
It is, therefore, concluded that the existing condition of the Millstone Unit No. 2 feedwater pipit.g system is in compliance with the applicable criteria of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as docu=ented in Reference (3).
Additional information presented at the October 19, 1979 meeting will be submitted by October 24, 1979.
We request ycur immediate attention to this matter and trust this information satisfactorily dispositions the Staf f's concerns.
Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
,m g
W. G. Counsil Vice President Attachments 120e m am
DOCKET NO. 50-336 ATTACIDiENT 1 MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPING e n
)}0Ei OCTOBER, 1979
METHODS OF ANALYSIS In this work, the observed indication is treated as a sharp crack, and analyzed as to its behavior in future service. Growth due to further cycling is evaluated in fatigue crack growth analyses, and then the final flaw size is compared with the critical flaw size for normal and upset and other operating conditions. In this section, the methods used in these analyses will be detailed .
(1) FATIGUE CRACK GRO'n~H ANALYSIS The f atigue crack crowth analysis was conducted in the same manner as suggested by ASME 3ection XI, Appendix A. The operating transients which af f ect the feedwater line are all considered, and scheduled out over a 40-year period. The initial flaw depth assumed was that of the original indication, but slightly greater depths were also considered, to give further information.
Crack tip stress intensity factors (K ) Iwere calculated using an expression for a continuous flaw oriented circumferentially at the inside surface of the pipe. The stresses were linearized through the pipe wall thickness, and used to calculate KI and AK I . The fatigue crack growth for any single transient was calculated from a crack growth rate law deter-mined to be applicable for the materials of the pipe, exposed to a water enviro nment.
(2) DETERMINATION OF CRITICAL FLAW SIZE The feedwater piping and welds are fabricated from carbon steel and operate at elevated temperature. A great deal of study of the failure aspects of piping and tubing have been undertaken in recent years and considerable experimental data are now available. A large number of failure theories have been developed, both analytically based and empirically based, with
- varying degrees of success. This section will briefly review various types of theories, and provide the basis for use of the plastic insta method in predicting the critical flaw size for the area of interest.
I208 25;
Fracture mechanics was first developed for the case of low energy fracture which involved small deformations. This is termed brittle fracture, and the theory is called linear elastic frc ture mechanics (LETM). The theory is generally applicable only to brittle materials for example high strength alloys and those which operate at low temperature.
A further requirement for strict applicability of LEFM is the presence of a heavy section, where the stress state is plane strain. Failure in these materials and geometries is abrupt, and the crack propagates at speeds approaching the speed of sound. The theory predicts that failure will occur when the applied stress intensity factor exceeds the material's fracture toughness, or resistance to failure.
There is a large range of materials and geometries where the conditions necessary for linear elastic or brittle fracture do not exist. This happens in lower strength carbon steels, stainless steels, and Inconel, particularly those with high ductility, and also in structures with thin sections with low constraint on the opening of a crack. A good example of this geometry is piping and tubing. In this case, once a crack is loaded to the point where it begins to propagate, failure does not occur at once. Instead, as the crack propagates, the plastic zone ahead of the crack grows with the crack, and a steady increase in the magnitude of the load becomes necessary to overcome the increasing resistance of the material to fracture. Consequently, a toughness oriented single para-meter fracture criterion becomes totally inadequate to deal with the problem of ductile failure.
A number of concepts have been developed for the prediction of ductile failure, and these are reviewed in detail in a number of recent works, for example references 1, 2, 3, and 4. Two of the more popular parameters for ductile fracture are the J-integral [5] and the crack opening displacement (COD)[6] concert. These parameters have been shown to be successful at predicting the onset of ductile crack propagation, but are only now being extended to the prediction of final failure. Extensions to the point of unstable propagation and final failure have thus fai been centered on R-curve technology [7] and development of the Tearing Modulus concept by Paris [8] is an extension of this trend.
mcr 12 0
Based on the level of Charpy energy at 0*F from tests of the actual material as well as experience with results from similar materials, the transition f rom orittle to ductile behavior should occur at room temperature or below.
The operating regime for the feedwater lines as well as their material and geometry places the fracture mode squarely in the large strain -
general yield regime. As such, the crack will generally not become unstable until beyond the point where the entire remaining ligament becomes plastic.
If this occurs, the failure will b'e well predicted by the plastic limit load of the structure, corrected to account for the material strain hardening behavior.
There is considerable body of experimental data which shows that the governing mode of failure for ductile cracked pipes and tubes is that of plastic instability. Several series of experiments on piping geometries were completed by both General Electric and Bat;1ile Memorial Institute as early as 1968, and these results, as well as other more recent results are well-predicted by the plastic instability method, as discussed in Appendix A. Therefore, the approach taken in this analysis was to evaluate the propensity for failure by the plastic instability mode.
(3) SAFETY ASSESSMENT Once the growth of the assumed crack-like def ect has been calculated, the resulting flaw is compared with the critical flaw size to determine the margins of safety for further operation. T' *.s assessment metted is similar to that used in Section XI of the ASME code, but the details of the calculations are different, especially the critical flaw size calculation for ductile failure. Note that there are presently no rules or guidelines in the ASME code for such calculations in secondary systems. The assessment method used is, therefore, based on good engineering practice.
1208 256
APPENDIX A DETERMIMTIOS OF THE MOMEST CAPACITY OF FRESSURIZED FIFINS WITH CIRCUMFERENTIALLY ORIESTED THROUGH WALL FLAWS A straignt section of pipe with a circumf erential1y oriented through wall flaw; as shown in Figure A-1, is considered. It is assumed that plane sections re=ain plane during deformation, and that the flaw is not tov Iarge in comparison with the pipe circumference. For flaw lengths which approach one-half of the circum-ference, the present method is not accurate.
The pipe is loaded by internal pressure, P, an axial force, F, and a bending moment, M. Because of the bending moment, the axial stress will be compressive somewhere in the cross section. The point of de=arcation between tensile and compressive stresses is the neutral ayls, as shown in Figure A-1. To determine the location of the neutral axis, the axial force on the pipe from the internal pressure and other loads, N, is equated to the integrated stresses over the cross-sectional area of the pipe, No as follows:
N = PnR2+F (A-1)
Where:
P = Internal Pressure R = Mean Radius of the Pipe F = Other axial force (if any) n -8 N =2 of Rt de
+ 2[ - of Rt d6 (A-2)
~1
-8 2 Where:
t = Pipe Thickness of = Flow Stress = 0.4 (cy , + ou) a = Crack angle as shown in Figure A-1.
B = Angle to located neutral axis, Figure A-1.
1208 57 9
Equating the quantities in (A-1) and (A-2) leads to the definition of the neutral axis which is:
Of to- (A-3) 0 " 2 cf t - PR Figure A-1 also illustrates that the angles a and 8 are related at the limit moment; therefore, equating areas above and below the neutral axis results in the following:
a = 28 (A-4)
The fully-plastic limit moment capacity, M ,b is obtained by taking moments about t'
the aeutral axis as follows:
(90 - a) (2n - 6)
Mb=2 [-S ( t cf sin 0 de - [R (n + S) m t of sin 0 de (A-5)
Where: of = 0.4 (cys + Ou), that is, of is the flow stress.
After integration and substitution of the limits, the moment capacity for a pipe without internal pressure is found to be:
Mb = 2cf Ro 3
t (2 cos 6 - sin a) (A-6)
For simple pressure loading with no bending, the limiting force is equal to:
No - 2 (n - a) R m E f (A-7)
For any arbitrary pressure, P, the force produced is:
N = WR 1 2 P (A-8) 1208 75:
Then, the ratios of axial force to li=it axial force and moment to limit moment are defined as follows:
n=bm=b ho Mb (A-9)
Since the internal pressure and bending moment interact, the combined effect will cause a reduction in the moment capacity Mb to M. From Hodge's interaction theory (1) . The corrected limit moment is determined from:
M= (1 - n 2) Mb (A-10)
Substituting for all the parameters from equations (A-6) through (A-9), we obtain:
2 2 2 2 4 9 4 (v - a)2 Rm t of -n Ri P' ML= 2 [Ro 2 (2 cos 8 - sin a)] (A-ll) 2 (n - a)2 Rm E Of (1) Hodge, P. G., Plastic Analysis ot' Structures. McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959, pp. 130 - 190.
1208 ::57
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ECFET No. 50-336 ATTACleiEST 2 MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPING 1208 :". 6 1 OCTOBER, 1979
ASSESS"ENT OF GRLTH OF FEED:ATER LI' E FLAWS MILLSTONE II U.H. Bamford The purpose of t'his work is to estimate the future growth of a flaw located in the counterbore region near the feedseter nczzle safe-end-to-pipe weld. The flaw cf interest has been confirred by UT to be approximately 0.10 inches deep, and oriented circurferentially.
As a result of the location of this flaw, instrumentation was in-stalled to acnitor the terperature fluctuations in one loop. Results showed that in a certain flow rate range the water stratifies, pr du-cinc significant stresses which are potentiall ir.ncrtant for crack growth.
The types of stratification produced were typical of those observed in other plants, but not as severe. The observed stratificaticns were classified under five different types, as shown in Figure 1. The tem-perature difference from top to bottom of the pipe for profile 1 was measured at about 350*F, whereas for other plants it has been found
~~~
-to be as high as 450 F. -
A three dimensional finite element stress analysis has been completed for each of the five temperature profiles in Figure 1, and transient studies have shown that the five profiles represent limiting conditions compared with the stress results obtained for any transient step in be-tween the profiles.
To accomplish a fatigue crack growth analysis, the system design tran-sients for normal, upset and test conditions were corbined with the
. cycles ci stress from stratification, which occurs during hot standby operaticn. As shown in Figure 2, there are approximately nine cycles of varicus degrees which for the purpose of this cnalysis, we will assccc, occur eacP time hot strndby cccurs.
,o 120n ubi
2-A tabul.ation of the cycle types used in .oe crack crowth analysis, along with acplicable stresses, is provided in Table 1. Tables 2 through 5 show the stresses et various locations around the pipe as a result cf the stratification.
Tne actual stresses from the three dimensional analysis were used for the fatigue crack growth analysis, except in two cases, where compres-sive stresses far exceeded the yield stress in ccc ression. The locat-ion is at the top of the pipe, and the condition c.ccurs only when the pipe is nearly filled with cold water (profile 1) at low floa. For this case, tensile residual stress values were assumed to exist, ecual to the yield strength. This is seen at locations 1 and 2 in Tables 2 and 4. This assumption is considered to be extremely conservative.
~
Crack growth was calculated at each of thirteen locations around the pipe for periods of 1, 2, 3 and 4 years, assuming an initial flaw of 0.100 inches deep, extending entirely around the inside of the pipe.
' A fatigue crack growth law which accounts for mean stress or R ratio (omin./ o max.) as well as the presence of the water environment was used. The law is shown in Figure 3.
Results of the crack growth analysis are shown in Table 6, for each of the locations considered. These results show that the observe flaws will not grow significantly during the next years service. The final flaw size for the worst location is a factor of 5 smaller than the critical flaw size for the pipe, as shown in Figure 4.
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OF TEMPERATURE PROFILE OCCURRENCES flUMBER( ) RANGE PLANT EVENT NUMBEROFOCCU_RRENCES(I)0FPROFILE OF EVENTS PROFILE 1 PRCFILE 2 2 3 4 5 1
27f-l?42 5 9 115 276- 1242 MILLST0tlE Il0T STANDBY 6 6 6 (LI.NE2). ..
- L tM ca (I) fiUMBER OF OCCURRENCES (WITH ATT0P/ BOTTOM lilFORMATION.
" 300 F) IS BASE '
N os (2) NUMBER OF EVENTS IS BASED ON PRESENTLY AVAILABLE PLANT OPERATIflG HISTORY U1 RANGE = (li 0F OCCURRENCES 20%)
(3) RAtlGE FOR TOTAL tlUMBER OF OCCURRENCES OF THE PROFil.E AND IS CALCULATED AS:
4 (# EVEliTS) X S, WHERE S = EVENT SIMILARITY FACTOR AND 5.5 51.5.
AITEND!X A - NONMANDATORY Fr;:. A-t_%I i i e i ie i i ! e i e r . . .
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g . Applicable f or R ratio 9 _
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- g , i i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 to 20 30 40 50 00 70 8090 C0 STRESS INT EN SITY F t.CTC R RANGE, o K: (KS1 T )
F.C T:E 2 FATIGUE CPACK GROWTH DATA FOR SA-503, CL ASS 2 AND CLASS 3 AND SA-533, GRADE 6, CLASS 1 STE'ELS
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TAELE 2 STRESS RESULTS - AXIAL DIRECTIO!;
C0!iDITI O!? 5 HOT STA!;CEY #1 Inside Surface Outsi:'e Surface Location Max. Min. Max. Min.
(Ksi) ( /,s i )
1 40.0 0.0 -40.0 0.0 2 40.0 0.0 -40.0 0.0 3 9.46 -23.0 8.56 8.29 4 35.12 4.63 11.23 7.02 5 68.97 - 1.43 13:20 4.66 6 65.05 - 7.28 12.61 1.71 7 46.17 - 8.06 10.83 -0.33 8 24.37 7.27 7.34 3.68
.9 24.61 7.27 8.98 2.01 10 23.67 - 2.47 6.47 -3.44 11 14.93 - 5.67 - 0.44 -7.05 12 9.30 - 5.44 - 6.03 -8.45 13 7.62 M.95 - 8.11 -8.69 ,,g; g :ig ] -l A w'.,,
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TAELE 1 TE ';SIESTS USED I" FATIG L'E C P ' C P. GF T.7P '. LYSIS MILLSTONE II Cycles Inside Surface Stress Outside Surface 5-Description (40 years) Max. Min. Max.
~~ ~
Hot Standby 1 50 )
Hot Standby 2 1500 )
These stresses are dependent on circumferert-Hot Standby 3 500 ) position. See Tables 2 through 5.
Hot Standby 4 2500 )
10.47 7.71 8.49 ;
Unit Lead-Unload 15000 ,
Step Increase / Decrease 2000 9.56 7.87 7.89 7 partial Loss of Flow 40 23.7 8.42 3.79 7 Loss of Load 40 23.02 8.42 3.18 7 Reactor Trip 400 22.69 8.21 2.88 7 Secondary Leak Test 200 11.23 0.0 10.04 C 1208 268
TABLE 3 STRESS RESULTS - AXIAL DIRECTIO!;
CONDITIC'; 5 HDT STA';:EY s2 Inside Surface Outside Surface Location Max. Min. Max. P.i n .
(Ksi) (::si) 1 13.49 9.78 9.62 3.24 2 12.57 9.6S 9.40 3.25 3 9.46 9.34 8.56 3.24
-4 8.76 4.63 3.21 7.02 5 8.23 -1.43 3.17 4.60 6 7.91 -7.28 3.17 +1.71 7 7.69 -8.06 3.18 -0.33 8 7.60 7.27 3.22 3.63 9 24.61 7. 71 8.97 3.37 10 2'3.67 8.02 6.47 3.53 11 14.93 8.44 -0.44 3.96 12 9.30 8.76 -6.03 4.20 13 7.61 8.86 -8.11 4.29
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TM LE 4 STRESS RESULTS - AXIAL DIRECTIO:'
CONDITIC'; 2 + 1 - HOT STANDEY #3 Inside surface Outside surface Location Max. Min. Max. Min.
(Ksi) (Ksi) 1 40.0 0.0 -40.0 0.0 2 40.0 .0.0 -40.0 0.0 3 16.19 23.71 9. 31 8.30 4 35.12 10.11 11.23 8.45 5 68.97 2.39 13.20 6.52 6 66.05 - 4.85 12.61 3.45 7 46.17 -11.04 10.83 -0.88 8 24.37 -15.29 7.34 -5.64 9 7.27 -14.93 2.01 -8.39 10 - 2.48 - 3.19 - 3.44 -4.21 11 19.41 - 5.67 7.35 -7.05 12 35.44 - 5.44 16.75 -8.45 . . , _ . . , .
13 41.23 - 4.95 19.41 -8.69 Tr+j E.r.
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TAELE 5 STRESS RESULTS - AXIAL DIRECTICN CONDITION 2 FiOT STA'D5Y #4 Inside Surface Outside Surface Locaticr Max. Min. Max. Min.
(Ksi) (Ksi) 1 21 .51 9.78 9.73 3.24 2 20.0 9.68 9.60 3.24 3 16.19 9.34 9 . 31 3.24 4 10.11 8.76 8.45 3.21 5 8.23 2.39 3.17 6.52 6 7.91 - 4.88 3.17 3.45 7 7.69 -11.04 3.18 -0.88 8 7.60 -15.29 3.22 5.64 9 7.71 -14'.93 3.37 -8.39 10 8.02 - 3.12 3.63 -4.21 11 19.41 8.44 7.35 3.96 12 36.44 8.76 16.75 4.20 ,,g..::q::.g: .l 41.23 8.85 19.41 4.28 .
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TAELE 6 F.ESULTS OF FATIGUE CFACK GC.lTH A',A'_Y::E INITIAL CF;ACK LEt;GTH = 0.100 It;CHES Crack Depth After Year Location .1 2 3 4 1 .1008 .1016 .1024 .1032 2 .1002 .1004 .1007 .1009 3 .1001 .1001 .1002 .1003 4 .1001 .1003 .1004 .1005 5 .1021 .1045 .1067 .1092 6 .1042 .1090 .1137 .1190 7 .1011 .1023 .103; .1046 8 .1001 .1002 .1003 .1003 9 .1001 .1002 .1003 .1004 10 .1001 .1002 .1002 .1003 11 .1001 .1003 .1004 .1006 12 .1014 .1030 .1045 .1062 13 .1032 .1067 .1105 .1146 U!
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.3 1208
DOCFET NO. 50-336 ATTACINENT 3 MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATI0li, UNIT NO. 2 FEEDWATER SYSTDi PIPING OCTOBER, 1979 1208 2/3
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