ML19224C991

Forwards Addl Info to 790613 Response to IE Bulletins 79-01 & 79-01A.Class IE Equipment Has Been Found Capable of Functioning Under Postulated Accident Conditions,Except for Items Identified in Util 790613 Response

ML19224C991
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	07/03/1979
From:	Staffa R GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	Jennifer Davis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
NUDOCS 7907100437
Download: ML19224C991 (10)

Text

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n Power Supply Engineering and Services Georgia Power July 3, 1979 -

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Division of Reactor Operations Inspection

REFERENCE:

Office of Inspection and Enfozcement RII: JP0 Washington, D. C. 20535 50-321 50-366 ATTENTION: Director Gentlemen:

The following information is submitted as a follow-up to our letter of June 13, 1979, in response to IE Bulletins 79-01 and 79-OlA.

A review of the environmental qualifications of Class lE equipment located inside primary containment has been conducted for Hatch Units 1 and 2.

Enclosed please find the responses to Bulletin 79-01 for each unit. The item numbering used in the responses is consistent with that of the Bulletin. It should be noted that the information included is of a "first cut" nature, par-ticularly the information provided by General Electric in items 3h, 1, and j.

It is believed that the information contained in the enclosed responses is accurate; however, the qualifications are still under review. A revised report will be provided should it be necessary.

A separate response to Bulletin ;9-01A is also enclosed.

Should you have any questions, please contact my office.

Very truly yours,

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R. W. Staffa Manager of Quality Assurance JAB /bg Enclosures xc: U. S. Nuclear Regulc.cory Commission -

Office of Inspection and Enforcement ' k Region II - Suite 3100  % .-

101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 ATZ Mr. James P. O'Reillv f)h ]\ ,

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HATCH UNIT 1

1. Class lE equipment installed in HNP I drywell has been reviewed as described in IE circular 73-08 and has been found capable of functioning under postulated accident conditions as specified in the equipment specification with the exception of the items identitied in our preliminary response dated June 13, 1979.

Responses to the IE bulletins related to examples listed in IE Ciruelar No. 78-08 have been submitted to the NRC as indicated below:

a. Connectors IE Bulletin Nos. 77-05 and 77-05A dated December 8, 1977.

b. Penetrations IE Bulletin No. 77-06 dated December 8, 1977.

c. Terminal Blocks IE Bulletin No. 78-02 dated February 14, 1978.

d. Limit Switches IE Bulletin No. 78-04 dated March 29, 1978.

c. Cable Splices Electrical cable splices associated with electrical penetration assemblies arc of the following types:

(1) Bolted, cri=p type lugs (2) Inline splices (3) Terminals for terminal block connections.

Prototype tests were perfor=ed on the types of terminations listed above to environ =entally qualify them for Post-LOCA environment. Copies of the following test reports were submitted to the NRC as part of the response for HNP-2 from Georgia Power Co=pany dated March 2, 1978.

(1) GE Report, " Terminal 31ock LCCA Test for Electrical Penetration Assemblies," November 6, 1973.

(2) 'Jyle Laboratory Report No. 53387, May 3, 1973.

f. Other Potential Problems (1) Radiation and temperature effect on electrical cables.

Prototype test on sample cables have demonstrated the capability of adequate performance during and after test conditions simulating LCCA environmental conditions.

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b. Electrical Fenetration Asse=blies (1) Power, Control and Instrumentation Assemblies (2) Accident Environment (a) Temperature of 281*F for two (2) hours followed by 160*F for twenty-four (24) hours.

(b) Pressure of 56 psig. 7 (c) Accumulated radiation dose of 2.0 x 10 Roentgens.

(d) Relative humidity of 100 percent.

(3) Qualifying Environment (a) Temperature of 340*F (b) Pressure of 65 psig.

7 (c) Accumulated radiation dose of 3.3 x 10 Roentgens.

(d) Relative humidity of 100 percent.

(4) Manner of Qualification The test was performed in one continuous sequence where temperature and pressure were monitored throughout the test together with the leak rate measurement. The electrical tests were performed during and after the qualification test.

(5) Supporting Qualification Documentation (a) General Electric Company Qualification Test for electrical penetration assembly, April 30, 1971.

c. Drywell Cooling Unit (1) Fan Motor (2) Accident Environment - Post LCCA (a) Temperature of 281*F (b) Pressure - 56 psig.

(c) RelativeHumidity-100perceng.

(d) Cumulative radiation dosage 10 Rads.

(3) Qualifying Environment (a) Temperature of 300*F.

(b) Pressure - 80 psig.

(c) Relative Humidity - 100%

(d) Cumulative radiation dosage of 1 x 10 9Rads.

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(4) Manner of Qualification Sequential steps of thermal aging, irradition and exposure to temperature, pressure and humidity.

(5) Supporting Qualification Documentation (a) Joy ::anufacturing Compat.. Report :o. Ta-4081 -

Qualification Test of a t n motor designed for service in nuclear containment.

(b) Joy Manufacturing Company Report X-411, October 23, 1971 -- Definition and Comparison of Motor Insulation Systems.

d. Motor Operated Valves (1) Valyc Operators (2) Accident Environment (a) Temperature of 2Sl*F.

(b) Pressure - 56 psig.

(c) Relative Humidity - 100%. 8 (d) Cumulative radiation dosage 2 x 10 Rads.

(3) Qualifying Environment (a) Temperature of 340*F.

(b) Pressure - 105 psig.

(c) Relative Humidity - 100%.

(d) Cu=ulative radiation dosage 2 x ld' Rads.

(4) Manner of Qualification Th 2 test has been performed sequentially where the test valve operators were exposed to radiation, exposure to temperature / pressure environment and electrical properties measurement.

(5) Supporting Qualification Documentation Franklin Institute Research Laboratories Final Report F-C3441 " Qualification of Test of Limitorque Valve Operators in Simulated Reactor Containment Post-Accident Steam Environment" prepared for Limitorque Corpor ation.

e. Connectors There are no pin type connectors used to terminate class lE cables inside the drywell,

f. Terminal Blocks Terminal blocks associated with electrical penetration assemblies have been qualified by prototype test as per GE report, " Terminal Block LOCA Test for Electrical Penetration Assemblies, November 6, 1973".

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g. Cable Splices (1) The enviroarental qualification for cable splices associated with electrical penetration assemblies located inside the drywell has been discussed in Item 1.e. of this response to IE Bulletin No. 79-01.

(2) The cable splices associated with cable terminations at equipment cable box located inside the drywell were made with crimped terminal lugs and taped. The environmental qualification requirements for the taps are as fol.'ows:

(a) Accident Environment Temperature of 281*F for two (2) hours followed by 160*F for twenty-four (24) hours.

Pressure of 56 psig.

Accumulated radiation dosage of 2 x 10 7Roentgens Relative Hunidity - 100 percent, (b) Qualifying Environment

• Te=perature of 324*F for four (4) hours followed by 252*F for seven (7) days.

• Pressure et 80 psig.

• Accumulated radiation dosage of 2 x 10 8Rads.

• Relative Eumidity of 100 percent.

(c) Ma m er of Qualification Sequential steps - Sample was initially aged in an air oven for 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> at 121*C, irradiated and exposed to temperature / pressure environment. Tested for electrical properties.

(d) Supparting Qualification Documentation

• Ckonica Engineering Report No. 141, February 29, 1972.

• Qualification of Ckoguard EPR insulation for nuclear plant service (medium vo".tage cable and field

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splice) the Ckonite Company, Form G-3 (February 16, 1979).

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h. > bin Steam Isolation Valve (1) Valve Operator (2) Qualifying Environment (a) Temperature - 340*F.

(b) Pressure - 110 psig.

(c) Relative Humidity - 100%. 7 (d) Cumulative Radiation Dosage of 3 x 10 Rads.

(3) Supporting Qualification Documentat.on (a) Rockwell Report No. 2792-03.

(b) GE >!amo 126-62.

1. Recire Pump Discharge Valve (1) Valve Op- or (2) Qualifyi., Envi .'onment (a) Tecperatute - 340*F.

(b) Pressura - Information i= mediately unavailable.

(c) Hunidity - 100%.

3 (d) Radiation - 2 x 10 Rads.

(3) Supporting Qualification Documentation (a) Test Reports FIRL - C2232-01.

FIRL - C3271.

FIRL - C3441.

j. Safety Relief Valves (1) Air Control Valve (2) Qualifying Environment (a) Te=perature - 340*F.

(b) Pressure - 65 psig.

(c) Eumidity - 1000.

(d) Radiation - 3 x 10 Rads.

(3) Supp,rting Qualification Documentation (a) GE Memo 126 - 62.

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HATCH UNIT II

1. Class lE equipment installed in HNP-2 drywell has been reviewed as described in IE circular 78-08 and has been found capable of functioning under postulated accident conditions as specified in the equipment specification with the exception of the solenoid on the Raactor Sample Isolation Valve 2331-AOV-F019 identified in aur preliminary response dated June 13, 1979.

Responses to the IE Circular No. 78-08 have been submitted to the NRC as indicated below:

a. Connectors IE Bulletin Nos. 77-05 and 77-03A dated January 9, 1978.

b. Penetrations - IE Bulletin No. 77-06.

1.0 Plant Hatch Unit 2 utilizes containment electrical penetrations which depend upon an epoxy sealant and a nitrogen pressure environment to ensure containment leak tightness, and to ensure adequate functioning of electrical safety-related equipment (refer to HNP-2 FSAR section 3.8.2.1.4, Figs. 3.8-8 and 3.8-9). These penetrations are equipped with insulation jackets or insulating bushings at the point where the electrical conductors pass through the epory seal.

1.1 No electrical failures have occurred in electrical penetrations either during start-up testing or operation.

2.0 The manufacturer's Operation and Instruction Manual requires that nitrogen (not air) be used to leak test the pentrations.

In the past, although the as-found pressures were not required to be documented, pressure checks prior to pericdic leak tests showed adequate nitrogen pressure.

2.1 No degradation of insulation resistance or anomalous component operation has been detected duri:.g start-up testing or operation.

2.2 No malfunction or failure has occurred during operation attributable to a breakdown of insulation resistance in electrical penetrations. Assurance of systems operability is confirmed by observing normal modes of operation, through periodic testing, and proper operation of systems control functions and equipment located within primary containment.

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2.3 DC circuits are monitored by ground detection devices.

Any grounds which occur are located and corrected. AC circuits are monitored by observing proper operation of equipment during operation and testing, by protective relays, and electrical devices associated with the circuits.

3.0 There is no need to maintain pressure within the penetration during a LOCA. The purpose of the pressurization is to assure leak tightness and minimize moisture in the seal.

As long as the seal is leak tight during a LOCA, the existence of the nitrogen test pressure would be of no consequence.

3.1 Listed below are tests which were performed on the penetrations and the electrical circuits to ensure the equipment's ability to perform its design function.

(a) Qualification tests at the manufacturer's shop are described la the General ~ ectric " Electrical Pentration Asse=blies Prototype Testi Qualification Report" issued March 16, 1970.

(b) Construction Assurance Testing during plant start-up, including circuit continuity, megger tests, and entire circuit checks after installation.

(c) Type A integrated leak rate tests and type B local leak rate tests on pentrations where leakages through individual pentrations vere recorded.

3.2 The electrical penetrations for Plant Hatch Unit 2 were designed and procured in accordance with the Commission's regulations in effect at that time, which included CDC 4, Appendix A and Appendix B both of 10CFR 50.

c. Terminal Blocks IE Bulletin No. 78-02 dated February 14, 1978.

No unprotected terminal blocks have been installed at ENP-2 as compliance with the co==itment in the referenced response to the bulletin.

d. Limit Sutiches IE Bulletin No. 78-04 dated April 25, 1978.

e. Cable Splices The qualification documentations for the cable splices associated with electrical penetration assemblies have been submitted to the US Nuclear Regulatory Cc=nission in the letter dated March 2,1978, " Environmental Qualification of Primaty Containment Class IE Terminations and Penetrations.

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f. Other Potential Pr)blems

1. Radiation and Temperature Ef fects on Electrical Cables Prototype testa on sample cables have demonstrated the capaoility of edequate perfor=ance during and af ter test conditions simulating LOCA environmental conditions.

2. A documentation search has been performed for HNP-2 and it has been determined that there are no MAMCO models SL2-C-11, SL3CML, sal-31, sal-32, D1200j, EA-700 and EA-770 switches installed inside the drywell. The Unit II MSIV Limit Switches have been verifi d to be NAMCO Model EA 740-8000 which are environmentally qualified for LOCA condi: ions.

3. Environmental Qualification Test Reports for HNP-2 Class lE equipment installed inside the drywell have been submitted to the NRC in response to the FSAR second round questions Q221.14 and Q221.15.

With regard to the environmental qualification of the termination of class lE circu d .ts inside the dryvell, the information was submitted to the NRC in the Georgia Power Company's letter dated March 2, 1978. The qualifications for the HNP-2 Main Steam Isolation Valve Operator, Recire Pump Discharge Valve Operator, and the Safety Relief Valve Air Control Valves are the same as those on HNP-1.

These qualifications are listed in items 3.h, i, and j of the Unit 1 response to this bulletin.

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I. & E. BULLETIN 79-OlA

1. ASCO calenoid valves are used in the primary containment for the following functions.

a. Reactor Water Sample Isolation Valve - Unit 1&2

b. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Operation Air Contrt i Valves - Unit II only

c. Safety Relief Valve Air Control Valves - Unit 1&2

2. a. The ASCO solenoid valves identified above are qualified to a LCCA environment with the exception of the Reactor Water Sample Isolation Valves identified in our preliminary response dated June 13, 1979.

b. A preventative maintenance program will be developed to replace -

the resilient parts of the above solenoids in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.

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