ML18040B036
| ML18040B036 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 12/27/1983 |
| From: | Kenyon B PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| PLA-2016, NUDOCS 8401050266 | |
| Download: ML18040B036 (166) | |
Text
RBGULAT 7ORMATION DISTRIBUTIONYSl (RIBS)
ACCESSION NOR;840105026e DOC ~ DATE: 83/1'2/27 NOTARIZED NO DOCKET FACTL:.50 387 "Susquehanna "Steam Electr ic Stationr Unit 1~ Pennsylva 05000387 AUTH ~ NAME AUTHOR At'FILIATION KENYONgB ~ DE Pennsylvania Power 8 Light Co.
,REC IP, NAMK RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MORLEYrT Es~ Region 1i Office of Director SUBJECT; Forwards 10CFR50.59 rept summarizing safety evaluations approved fram 820717 .1231.Rept format for responding,to ER i.tems descr ibed.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: B001S TITLE: Li.censing
'COPIES RECEIVED:LTR Submittali PSAR/FSAR Amdts L
/ ENC s Related Correspondence NOTES! icy NMSS/FCAF/PMPDR 2cys, 05000387 RKC IP IKNT COPIES RECIPIENT COP IES IO CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL NRR/DL/ADL .1 0 NRR LB2 BC 1 0 NRR LB2 LA 1 0 PERCHs R ~ 01 1 INTERNAL: ELD/HDS4 1 0 IE .FILE 1 1=
IE/DEPFR/EPB '36 3 '3 IE/DEPKR/IRB 35 1 1 IE/DEQA/QAB '21 NRR/DE/AEAB 1 0.
NRR/DE/CKB NRR/DE/EQB ii 13t 1
1 2 '2 1
NRR/DE/EHEB NRR/DE/GB 28 1
2 NRR/OE/MEB 18 1 1 NRR/DE/MTEB 17 1 1 NRR/OE/SAB 24 1 1 NRR/DE/SGEB 25 1 1 NRR/OHFS/HFEB40 1 1 NRR/OHFS/LQB 32 1 1 NRR/OHFS/PSRB 1 NRR/DL/SSPB 1 0 NRR/DS I /AKB 26 l 1 .NRR/DS I/ASB 1 1 NRR/DSI/CPB 10 .1 1 NRR/DSI/CSB 09 1 1 NRR/OS I/ICSB 16 1 NRR/DSI/MKTB 12 1 1 NRR/DSI/PSB 19 i NRR/DS I/RAB 22 1 1 NRA/OS I/RSB 23 1 04 1 1 RGN1 ~
3 '3 /MIB 1 0 EXTERNAL! ACRS 41 6 6 BNL(AMDTS ONLY) 1 1 DMS/OSS .(AMDTS) 1 1 FKh1A REP OI V 39 1 1 LPDR 0$ 2 2 NRC POR 02 1 NSIC 05 NTIS 1 1 NOTES: 3 3 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: l,TTR "57 ENCL
1
~ ~ 0 ~
Pennsylvania Power 8 Light Company Two North Ninth Street ~ Allentown, PA 18101 ~ 215/ 770.5151 Bruce D. Kenyon Vice President-Nuclear Operations 21 5/770-7502 DEC R7 l983 Dr. Thanas E. Hurley Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Canmission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 SUSQUEHANNA STER EUKTEGC STATION 10 CFR 50.59 REPORT ER 100450 FILE 841 PLA-2016 Docket No. 50-387
Dear Dr. Hurley:
In accordance with 10CFR50.59, enclosed are 40 copies of the Susquehanna SES Unit 1 report which surmttarizes the safety evaluations approved from July 17, 1982 to December 31, 1982.
The format of the report is as follows:
SER No. Unique number for each safety evaluation.
Cross Reference Reference to the design document which contained the safety evaluation.
Description of Change A brief description of the change made to proceduresr equipment or tests.
Sutrmary This conains a summary of the ttu~ requirements for determining an unreviewed safety question as contained in 10CFR50.59(a) (2).
If you have any questions, please contact us.
Very trul yours, o~i'
. Kenyon Vice Presid clear Operations cg Enclosures cc: R. L. Perch US NRC Director of Inspection and Enforcement L. R. Plisko US NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, DC 20555 g qg lb/ 02Co &
SER NO. 82-01 Cross
Reference:
BB 82-269 Part 1 D scription o Chance:
Electrica'solation of the 13.8kV system to achieve electrical separation between units, so that Unit 2 construction cannot affect Unit 1 oporations.
Sm~rg No. The 13.8kV system is not needed for Unit 1 safe shutdown and is therefore,not the basis for evaluations in, the FSAR.
No. Th's modification removes sucn possibilities by preventing Unit 2 construction frcm affecting Unit 1 operation.
No. The mi't'gating effects of this modification can only increase margins. 'afety SER NO. 82-02 Cross
Reference:
PIE 82-269 Part 2 Description of Chan e:
r Electrical isolation of Unit 2 systems under construction Jmt could affect Ir diesel generator secur'ty or operation.
Sunnezv:
No. This mcdification eliminates the possibility of Unit 2 construction affecting Unit 1 operation; it does not affect any FSAR evaluation.
)
No. Tne possibilities of unevaluated accidents or malfunctions are decreased due to this modification.
Unit separation by elect ical isolation increases margins of safety is defined in the Technical Specifications by eliminating potential Unit 2 construction impacts on Unit 1 operation.
-84010502GG
i SLR NO. 82-03 Cross
Reference:
Pi~R 82-269 Part 3 Description o~f Chan e:
Elect ical isolation of Unit 2 systems under constmction that could affect De fuel pool cooling system security or operation.
Sar.~:
I. No. This modification elhninates the possibility of Unit 2 construction affecting Unit l operation; -it does not affect any FSAR evaluation.
II. hM. Tne possibility of unevaluated accidents or malfunctions are decreased by this rrodification.
III. Yo. Unit seoaration by e'ectrical isolation increases margins of safety as cefined m the Technic"l Specifications by eliminating potential Unit 2 construction irpacts on Unit 1 operation.
SER KO. 82-04 Cross
Reference:
Pa'R 82-279 Description of Chan e:
Md a spare relay contact to the INOPERABLE annunciator circuit for the RHRSW radiation monitor to indicate that the sample motor is not >~ning.
~Sunma r
I. hM. This indication is not considered in any FSAR evaluations. It sharply provides information to the operator that adeauate s~~le fly<
does not exist.
II. No. Existing circuit~ will be used with an additional input to provide additional operator information. The use of existing equipment precludes the possibility of new accidents or malfunctions.
III. No. iYnnitoring functions such as -the one this modification provides have no effect on margins of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
S:"? NO.
~ 82-05 Cross
Reference:
~ Pi~& 82-281 Description o Chan e:
Rework of pipe supports on various systems to provide adequate contact between pape and piping supports.
Sure~:
No. The proposed action will enable the piping supports to function as originally designed; it therefore will not affect any FSAR evaluations.
No. The return of the piping supports to conformance with original design specification scannot result in any near accident or malfunction.
No. Rework or pipe supports to conform with their design specification will not reduce any Technical Sp cification margin of safety.
SER NO. 82-06 Cross
Reference:
P!W 82-282 Description of Chan e:
Relocation of Liquid Rad'oactive Waste (LRN) System flow trananitter to provide a better environnent, i.e., temperature and humidity, for its electronics.
Sundry:
I. No. No change to the LHÃ release system is proposed other than transmitter relocation. The transmitter will be recalibrated prior to reuse.
II. No. Physical relocation of the transmitter, with no other system changes, creates no new possibilities of accidents or malfunctions.
III. No. System operation remains unchanged and therefore affects no margin of safety, other than improver,"ent due to better tranunitter reliability.
Proper transmitter operation is verified by fulfillingTechnical Specification surveillance requirements.
~
SZK NO.~ 82-07 Cross
Reference:
~ PliR 82-244 Description of Chan e:
Addition of grounded w'ring to the Annunicator System 820 power supply/
inverters to provide voltage protection.
Sl i~MXV:
No. The annunciator system is not safety-related. This change has no effect on any other safety-related syste~
No. This addition o grounding ~;ire cannot cause failure of any safety-related sys ~m.
No. This addition of grounding wire to the enunciator system has no effect on the basis for any Technical Specification.
SER NO. 82-08 Cross
Reference:
PMR 82-167 Descri tion of Chan e:
Restoration of 125 VDC panel doors to conform to original design intent by unsmiling metal plates over open portions of panel which had been cut to alleviate equipment interference problems.
Sugary:
No. The panels are being restored to perform their original design intent. The structural integrity and internals of the cabinet were not affected by the ncn-conforming condition and therefore the change does not have to consider them.
No. The cabinet internals are unaffected by this modification. The possibility of the metal plate coming loose from the cabinet after installation has been considered through the use of Q materials and applicable static and dynamic analyses.
No. Only affects on the cabinet internals would affect Technical Specification bases. The internals re~in unaltered.
SER NO. 82-09 Cross
Reference:
Test No. HF 62 048 D scription of Chan e:
Perfozrance of RRl Level Znstrum nt Lines Steady State Vibration Test to verify that vibration is within acceptable ~~'ts.
SUIRMIXV:
No. This test is performed prior to fuel load with both reactor recirculation maps in service. No plant or system manipulation outside the constraints of any safety analysis will be perform d.
II. No. See I above.
hM. This test does not result in op ration outside the constraints of any safety analysis.
SM~ NO. 82-10 Cross
Reference:
Test No. HF-61-031 Descri tion of Chan e:
Performance of RhCU System Steady State Vibration Test to verify selected KJCU system piping vibration to be within acceptable limits.
Sumnazv:
Ya. The Rh~ system will b run in accordance with an approved op rating procedure. No system or plant manipulation outside the constraints of the safety analysis will be perforned.
1I. No. See I above.
hM. See I above.
SER NO.~ 82-11 Cross
Reference:
~ Test Ko. HF-50-044
~ ~
DescriDtion o Chan e:
Perfozreece of RCIC System P'ping Steady State Vibration Test to verify vibration to be within acceptable limits.
SUtiiM~~:
Zo No. This test will be performed prior to uel load utilizing auxiliary steam to run the RCZC turbine. No system operation outside of safety analysis constraints will oem~~.
IZ. No. See I above.
ZZI. No. See I above.
SER NO. 82-12 Cross
Reference:
PNR 82-287 Descri tion of Chan e:
Fuel Handling 1 System switch replacement.
Suan;~:
I. No. This rrcdification does not affect the fuel handling related accident analyses. The new switches will p rform the original function and will also allow interlock functioning for the entire length of bridge travel over the core.
II. No. The new switches serve the original design function. Neither norrral functioning of these a~itches nor their failure constitute a condition not bounded by previous analysis.
III. No. No Technical Specifications are affected by this change.
SFR NO.~ 82-13 Cross
Reference:
~ PNR 82-295 Description of Chan e:
Rewiring of fire protection system smoke detector.
SLRISZV:
I. No. The wires will be retenninated and retested to ensure that the system will perform its design function.
Ii. No. The design function of the system is not being changed.
III. Ko. Begins of safety are not reduced because the system function is not altered and retesting will verif'y system design operability.
SER NO. 82-14 C oss
Reference:
P5K 82-064 Descri tion of Chan e:
improve auxiliary boiler recirculation pump capacity and reliability by replacing bronze irrpellers with stainless steel impellers.
Surrzna~:
I. No. Tne Station Auxiliary Boilers are not safety-related. Their integrity is not affected by this material change and is not the basis for any FSAR evaluations.
ii. No. This modification has no effect on the operation of the boilers.
III. No. This material change does not permit or result in operation of any system outside the bounds of any safety analysis.
SM NO.~ 82-15 Cross
Reference:
~ P'G 82-164 Description o Chance:
!:edification to support replacement of Radwaste Building Chilled Hater System cooling coils with new coils of a different type.
I. No. Fne Radwaste Building Chilled Nater System has no safety-related function and therefore cmpno~ses no previous safety evaulation.
II. No. The only change from present design is the rework of non-safety related piping, which does not need to be considered in any new FSAR evaluations.
III. Ko. The Radwaste Building Chilled hater System is not addressed in the Technical Specifications and has no safety-related function.
SER NO. 82-16 Cross
Reference:
PNR 81-031 Description of Chan e:
R oval of manual valve actuators from various air-op rated contairment isolation valves, to preclude overriding of automatic isolation signals.
~SlZEE I. No. This modification will ensure the proper operation of the primary containment isolation system as evaluated in the FSAR.
II. No. This modification eliminates the possibil'ty of the valves from not performing their design functions.
III. hb. These ritual actuators are not considered in the basis for any Technical Specification.
Si.? NO. 82-17 Cross Re ference: Pi& 81-113 Description of Chan e:
Lastallation of lcw lead oil return system on chilled water syste~ for the eactor, turbine and radwaste buildings.
Sum~:
No. These chilled water systems have no safety-related function, and therefore do not compromise any FSAR safety analysis.
No. These chilled water systems are not safety-related, and pose no threat to any oNer safety-related systems.
No. These systems do not form the basis for any Technical Specification.
SF& NO. 82-18 Cross
Reference:
MR,82-302 Descri tion of Chan e:
Refueling bridge power cable and reel replacem nt.
Sawney:
No. The FSAR analyses on fuel handling have been rev'ewed and this rodification has no effect on them. The bridge will function as previously designed.
No. The bridge will function as previously designed, so new situations are created.
No. Fuel handling equiprent operation, addressed by the Technical Specifications, remains unchanged and therefore safety margins are unchanged.
S~R NO.~ 82-19 Cross Roference: ~ Pi& 82-107 Description of Chan e:
Relabeling of fire pro ection panels for ease of vetch identification.
Sumn~:
I. No. This modification involves no safety-related equiparant, and the design system operation remains unchanged.
II. No. See I above.
II1. No. This rradification dces not. reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications for fire protection systems.
SER NO. 82-20 Cross
Reference:
PMR 82-303 Description of Chan e:
Installation of refrigerant dryer assembly on the turbine, reactor and rachvaste building chillers.
SUiH~:
I. No. The chillers have no safety-related function, and this modification h"s no effect on any other safety-related systems.
II. Ko. See I above.
III. No. These chillers have no basis in the Technical Specifications.
10
SER NO. 82-21 f
Cross
Reference:
Procedure OP-PZ-005 Rev. 0 Description of Chan e:
Perforrance of LW 'f aterhanaer Test.
~SU!9M I. No. This test will be performed during initial fuel loading with the reactor cavity flooded and the spent fuel pool gates removed. ECCS systems are not required at this tiara. The ESl system will be operated under the provisions o Technical Specific",t'ons to support the operability of the diesel generators. Operation in this manner is within the limits imposed by existing FSAR analyses.
II. No. If the test loop and associated equiment is declared inoperable, one loop will still be available and this condition has been addressed by the Technical Specifications.
III. No. This test will b perfornad within the provisions of the Technical Specifications.
Sm~ NO 82-22 Cross
Reference:
PAIR 82-278 Descri tion of Chan e:
Replacem nt of flush metal door with a door with a window in turbine building airlock.
~Sunre hM. The design quality of construction and materials and the design function of the door is not altered. Secondary containment integrity will be maintained by the door on the Reactor Building side of the airlock if the replacement door fails.
No. The design function of the door has not been changed. The construction and installation is of the sam standards and therefore no new situations exist.
No. The quality of this replacement door will allow Technical Specification limits on secondary containment integrity to be maintained.
SKR NO. 82-23 f
C"oss
Reference:
P~~E 82-253 Descry>tion of Chan e:
Cnange name plates 'n conti room panels sA6ch provide lSIV ECB indications.
I. No. This change enhances operator information. The design function of the devices re~ins unchanged.
ii. No. See I above.
Xii. No. See I above.
SER NO. 82-24 Cross
Reference:
82-142 Description of Chan e:
Human factors lab ling changes to HVAC indications on control room panels.
Sumarv.
- i. Ko. The changes serve to enhance operator information and mitigate operator error. The function of actual HVAC systems are not altered by this modification.
Ii. No. See I above.
III. No. The function as defined in Technical Specifications of the systems related to the indications in question are not altered.
12
".'".", NO. 82-25 Cross f s
Reference:
Pi~B 81-030 D,scription o Chan e:
Rc...oval of seal water low flow tarting logic.
s~ permissive from circulating water pumps Ko. The circulating water system is not required for the safe shutdown of the plant.
No. The reliability of the circulating water system is not decreased, as a mechanical contact is being replaced by a solid wire (jumper);
therefore no new failures are postulated.
r No. The circulating water system is not recpxired for safe plant shutdmm and no Technical Specifications are affected by the change.
SM NO. 82-26 Cross
Reference:
Pi~% 82-136 Description of Chan e:
Addition of rretallic impurity sampler in feedwater sample line; recpures removal of block shield wall for installation.
~Sunna No. The sander addition will not affect the function of either the sampling system or the fee&rater system. The sampling system is not safety-related and no safety-related system is affected by this change.
No. The system function remains the same and no instrumentation nor any other system is affected adversely by this change.
No. No system functions have changed (feedwater); therefore no margins of safety can be reduced.
S" 8 NO. 82-27 f
Cross
Reference:
P!8 82-305 Description of Chan e:
Replacement of control structure HVAC circuit boards.
~Sunna I. No. The FSAR safety analysis states that the subject valves are designed to maintain functional integrity during a DBA, by use of redundant components and controls to meet single failure criteria. This modification till meets the criteria, as it increases the reliability of the ci cuit board under DBA conditions because the new board has been upgraded to higher seismic and hydrcdynamic qualification standards.
II. No. See I above.
ili. No. Ko equipmnt used to form any basis in the Technical Specifications is affected by this modification.
SER NO. 82-28 Cross
Reference:
~ PMR 82-155 I
Descri tion of Chan e: ~
Install piping to permit use of mobile radwaste processing event that in-plant systems are unavailable.
equi'n the SUIAISZV:
No. The systems being modified are not safety-related. This modification is bounded by the existing FSAR analysis of failure of the Evaporator Concentrates Storage Tank. The new piping will not be subject to any uncontrolled release.
No. The subject piping is similar to existing piping located in the truck bay originally designed for nubile processing. Tne new lines do not present an uncontrolled release path.
No. The subject system are not safety-related and are wholly contained in the raSmste building; therefore margins of safety are not affected.
14
SER YQ ~ 82 29 Cross Rezerence: ~ P1W 82-308 Desc iotion of Change:
Addition o radwaste soliaification sampling system.
~Smaa I. No. The new pump and sanple tank serve the same tanks presently evaluated in the FSAR. The smple pump discharge does not present an uncontrolled release pa&, as it is presently served by existing liquid radwaste floor drains. The sampling system is not safety-related and does not ~~ ct safety-related equipment.
II. No. No uncontrolled release path is present as a result of this change.
The system 's designed to the same criteria as similar process pumps and piping. The add'tional electrical load is non-essential.
I1I. No. The insignificant afzect of the additional electrical loading is outweighed by the better control process quality of the radwaste oualifications; therefore safety margin is not reduced.
SER NO.~ 82-30 Cross
Reference:
~ Pi~i 82-318 Description of Chan e: ~
Replacement of existing 0-rings on CRD exhaust valves with material that can handle higher temperatures.
SU!llllBXV:
I. No. This modification will upgrade the present 0-rings in order to provide better assurance that, they will serve as a redundant pressure boundary in the event of vent valve seat leakage. This will decrease the probability of the "Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory" type of accident.
II. No. This change is a one-to-one change; no new situations therefore arise.
III. No. This replacement better insures that the CRD vent valves meet their operational requirements; margin of safety can only increase.
15
S="R NO. 82-31 Cross
Reference:
Pi~E 82-322 Description of Chan e:
Sleeve relays on insolent air system to prevent 'post accident rad'ation damage.
Suan'~:
Z. No. The instant air system is not safety-related as analyzed in the FSAR. This modif'cation has no affect on that analysis.
No. This change will increase the reliability of the non-safety related instrument air system.
IZZ. No. ILrgins of safety are not reduced becau e the system is not safety-related and does not prevent safe shutdown of the unit.
SER NO. 82-32 Cross
Reference:
PYB 82-323 De crivtion of Chan e:
Addition of legs to sinks in reactor building decontamination rooms to provide seismic qualifications for supporting walls.
Sum~:
I. No. Seismic cualification will decrease both accident probability and consequences.
II. No. This change will increase the reliability of the supporting ~ills; it does not create the possibility of any accident different or malfunction of a type tacan previously analyzed.
III. No. Yargirs of safety have been increased via seismic qualification of the subject walls.
S 82-33 Cross Be erence: Prie 81-019 Description of Chan e:
Rival of ladders in condenser water boxes.
Sumezv:
No. Condenser water boxes are not safety-rela& and their integrity has rot d'rLnished due to this change.
II. No. No new equiment has been installed which could create the possibility of ar. unanalyzed event.
No. For the reasons sp cified in I above, margins of safety are not reduced by this clue.
SER NO. 82-34 C oss
Reference:
PMR 81-129 Description of Chan e:
Redesign or" the debris pit drain valve screen to allow cleaning when debris pit rake is out of service.
Surnerv:
No. Tnis change does not involve safety-related ccmzmnents nor does it impact safetv-related systems. System function will improve by preventing valve clogging.
No. The function of this system has been improved by preventing valve clogging when the debris pit rake is out-of-service in winter or for maintenance.
No. This system is not safety-related ard this modification will only improve its function by providing an alternate means of operating the screen wash system. Yergins of safety as defined by the Technical Specifications are unaffected. "
17
c-,R NO 82-35 C f ass
Reference:
L% 82-169 Description of Chan e:
Inswllation of states links in the undervoltage tr'p schmes for all 4kV buses to provide test facilities for monthly surveillances.
S~zp I. No. The undervoltage trip logic for the 4kV bases is unaffected by this change. Te t procedures will ensure closure of the states links post-surveillance so that FSAR evaluations will amain valid.
II. No. The undervoltage trip logic has not been changed.
III. No. This modification re ponds to Technical Specification surveillance requirem nts and makes them easier and safer to perform, as well as lessening the possibility of inadvex~t trips during testing. t~argins of safetv are therefore improved.
SM NO. 82-36 Cross
Reference:
PI% 82-265 Description of Chan e:
Kodification to allow a high vibration alarm, to actuate prior to the turbine trip setpoint. They are simultaneous at present.
SUHKfiBrv:
I. hM. This sys'em is not safety related. The original high vibration trip will occur in accordance with the FSAR. A new module will be installed to allow an annunciator alarm at a lower vibration amplitude than the trip setpoint.
II. No. This modification is bounded by existing evaluations.
III. No. Technical Specifications are unaffected by this change.
SFR. NO.~ 82-37 Cross Referent:
~ ~ PNR 82-307 Description of Chan e:
Replacement of process radiation instruEt components to in+rove reliability.
Suamary.
No. This modification improves the reliability and repeatability of the stack annito s by upgrading controllers, transmitters and probes. The or'ginal design reauire~nts have not b en changed and no other systems are liiRcted.
No. This modification increases reliability, decreases maintenance, impacts no other systems, and allcws the monitor to perform its design function.
No. The improved reliability of this system has been verified by factory testing and field experience. No margin of safety is adversely a ffected.
Sr.R NO. 82-38 Cross
Reference:
PHR 82-317 Descri tion of Chan e:
Replacement of leaking conductivity-cells in the Yiakeup Demineralizer System.
Siam~:
No. This change has no effect on the operation of the system, nor does it impact any other safety-related system or ~nent.
II. No. See I above.
AI ~ No. The lakeup D~neralizer System is not addressed by the Technical Specifications.
S:"R NO. 82-39 Cross Re=erence: P."P.82-326 D scription of Chance:
4-made relay wiring and ala~ eset pushbutton munting spacers related to 4.16kV distribution system to meet environm ntal qualification requirem nts.
This modification corrects an existing condition which, if left uncorrected, could increase the consequences of an accident or an equi@rent malfunction as previously analyzed.
No. Th's ecn.i@rent improves the reliability of auxilia~ equipment in the 4.16kV ezitchgear bv .upgrading standards it to stricter environm ntal No. This doge does not affect the basis for any Technical Specifications.
SER NO. 82-40 f
Cross
Reference:
PAR 82-335 Description of Chan e:
Improvement of 480 V Hector Control Center relay insulation to meet environmental oualif'cation criteria.
Sufi%~:
I. No. This change is being implem nted to correct an existing condition which, if left uncorrected, could increase the consequences of a presently analyzed accident or malfunction.
II. No. By auxiliary upgrading itintothemore480stringent V NCC's envirornental standards, this has become rare reliable.
equipment III. No. This rmcU.fication is not addressed by the Technical Specifications.
S~~ NO. 82-41 Cross
Reference:
PIE 82-344 Description of Chan e:
Use of re ueling platform junct'on box "as is" after repair with welded steel plate.
Sum~:
No. The FSAR fuel handling acc'dent analyses are not affected by this rradification. The repaired box perform" its 'original function.
hM. The repai ed box serves the identical function as the box in its original "pre-damaged" condition.
No. No uel handling equipment that forms the basis for any Technical Sp cificat'on is a ected by this modification.
SER NO. 82-42 Cross
Reference:
Pi~E 82-345 t off Chan e:
Description R placem nt of refueling bridge junction box with original design equipment.
~Sunma No. FSAR fuel handling accident analyses are not affected by this modification. The box is being returned to its original design.
Ko. The refueling bridge will function as originally designed after this modification.
No. Ke fuel handling equips nt that forms the basis for any Technical Specification is affected by this modification.
e SM NO. 82-43 Cross
Reference:
Descr'ion of Chan BB e:
82-347 Replacement of refueling bridge power track links.
Surgery:
No. This modification does not affect any of the fuel handling related FSAR analyses. The bridge will function as originally designed.
No. The bridge will function as originally designed; therefore no unevaluated conditions will result.
III. No. No Technical Specifications are affected by this modification.
SER NO. 82-44 Cross
Reference:
PI% 82-348 D seri tion of Chan e:
Pe~t the use of either the original design refueling bridge junction box or the repaired boy with a welded back plate.
Sufi(1+:
I.
I I No. Th's rodification has no effect on the fuel handling related FSAR II analyses. Tne refueling bridge will function as previously designed.
II. No. The bridge will function as previously designed after this modification; no new conditicn will result.
III. No. Fuel handling equipment will operate as previously designed; no Technical Specifications will be affected by this change.
SER. NO.~ 82-45 Cross Rererence: ~ Pi~i 82-342 Description of Chan e:
Addition of starting resistors to limit the inrush current in the 250 VDC distribution system.
SUIHIKXV:
No. This modification only changes the values of existing resistors; it does not add new components. The change in starting cur ent will not affect system voltage, load sequencing, battery capacity, motor life nor the load profile as presently analyzed in the FSAR.
II. No. See I above.
No. T'nis mcdification does not impact the basis for any Technical Specification.
SER NO. 82-46 Cross
Reference:
PMR 82-343 D scription of Chan e:
Addition of starting resistors to 250 VDC valve notors in HPCI and RHR systems.
SUllMZV:
No. This modification only changes the values of existing resistors; it does not add new components. The change in starting current will not affect system voltage, load sequencing, battery capacity, vntor life nor the load profile as presently analyzed in the FSAR.
Ko. See I above.
Ko. This modification does not impact the basis for any Technical Specification.
SER N3. 82-47 f
Cross
Reference:
PMR 82-328 Description o C~ e:
Seniority System Card Reader trout modification.
~Suan I. No. The security system is not safety-related and affects no safety-related systems.
II. No. Malfunction of the security system has no impact on safety systems.
Loss of the system will be handled by security contingency m asures.
III. No. The security system is not addressed by the Technical Specifications.
S"R NO. 82-48 Cross
Reference:
PMR 82-203 Description of Chan e:
Change KKU annunciator engraving on operating benchboard.
~Saunn I. No. The FSAR analysis of the function associated with this annunciator is unaffected by this modification.
ZI. No. This modification does not affect the design or function of KKU; it simply enhances operator information.
III. No. Margins of safety are unaffected for the reasons in II above.
24
SZ'R NO. 82-49 f
Cross
Reference:
P~E 82-221/DCP 813 De criotion of Chance:
Replace:n nt, of Agastat GP series clays with Agastat BGP series relays.
Surmmw:
I. No. The iGP relay is functionally equivalent to the GP relay and is more reliable.
II. No. Th's 's a direct relay replacer nt with a mare reliable type. It therefore will not increase possibility of malfunction.
III. hM. This action does not change the function or reduce the margin of sa ety of any system addressed in the Technical Specifications.
I(
L
~
II SER NO. 82-50 Cross
Reference:
Pi~B 82-304 Description of Chan e:
i I
Replacement of Reactor Building airlock door seals.
I. Mi . The prcposed change reduces these possibilities by protecting the door seals from personnel traffic with the door jams. The proposed modification will cause no secur'ty impact to security doors because closing and latching functions are unchanged. Secondary Containment Integrity will not b affected by the new seals.
No. The installation method of the seals is being changed by this modification. The proposed seals, should they fail, are c~able to the failure of the existing seals.
No. The proposed seals will not degrade the rating of any fire-rated door per NFPA 80 Chapter 2. Seal leakage will be verified to be within Technical Soecification limits on reactor building drawdown tine and air flow dur'ng operation of the Standby Gas Treatment system.
0
SM NO.~ 82-51 Cross
Reference:
~ P&E 82-363/PDDR KRE-608 Rev. 0 Description of Chan e:
Perform panel wiring changes for conformance to vendor requirements.
SUI IQIRZV:
I. No. Niring changes will allow certain line codes to'be assigned to their originally assigned separation group. Neither the separation group nor any safety-related equipm nt is affected by this change.
IZ. No. See I above.
III. No. Divisional separation has not been violated and no design functions are a fected do to this change.
SER 'ÃO. 82"52 Cross
Reference:
PMR 82-366/FDDR KRI-655 Rev. l Description'f ~
Chan e:~
Replacem nt of temperature alarm @~itches with rn3el redesigned to solve an internal heating problem. ~
Summ~:
No. The existing switches are being replaced with physically and functionally equivalent britches. Probability of failure 's therefore no greater.
II. No. No new functions have been introduced by this modification.
No. Margin of safety has not changed since the replacement switches are functionally equivalent and no less reliable than the ex'sting switches.
SER R). ~ 82-53 Cross
Reference:
~ DCP 647/PlE 82-365 D scription of Claaae:
EPCI solenoid valve replacement. with environm ntally qualified valves.
~Sunma No. The proposed valve which action is a is rare reliable. The valves are on the vacuum ~
one-for-one replacement s;ith a qualified condensate puny discharge line and would, only indirectly affect HPCI operation; they are therefore not explicitly discussed in the FSAR.
No. The replacement decreases failure probability. The new valves meet all original design equirarents for a Q, safety-related installation.
Ko. The installation of environmentally qualified solenoid valves will not degrade system operability. Retention 6f the unqualified valves, with their risk of failure, would increase the probability of entering an LCO.
SER NO. 82-54 Cross
Reference:
PM 82-314 D scription of Chan e:
Installation of noise suppression capacitors to Reactor Recirculation YQ set scoop tub control circuit.
~SU!lltlR I. No. This mcdification is to a non-Q circuit. The change returns the circuit to its design standards by reducing speed cycling of the YD sets due to circuit noise.
II. Ko. This change corrects a non-Q dificiency. Failure of the capacitors would cause a scoop tube lockup. Repairs could occur at pc@mr, or manual control could b taken to change power level. A shutdown of one or both recirculation pumps is analyzed in the FSAR.
III. Yo. The Technical Specifications address the loss of a recirculation pump; MG set speed cycling would require a shutdown of the pump(s). The noise suppression capacitors will eliminate this occurrence.
27
SER NO.~ 82-55 Cross
Reference:
~ PMR 82-080 D scr'ption of Cha~n e:
Addition of manuallymperated,. normally open block valves to water pretrea~nt level sensing lines.
~Suma No. t~~ater pretreatrent is a non safety-related system; it has no mechanical or electrical interlock with any safety-related system and Uris change creates no new interfaces with safety-related equipnent.
No. See I dmve.
No. The water pretreatment system is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
SER NO. 82-56 Cross
Reference:
PHR 82-324/DCP 773.1 Description of Chan e: ~
Core spray solenoid valve replacement to allow valve seating by gravity after testing. ~
Surm~:
hM. This change does not increase the failure probability of the associated testable check valve. Consequences due to failure of both the new and old solenoid valves are the sara. The actuator arm and linkages affected'y this change can fail without irrpading the check valve's capability to perform its safety function.
II. No. See I above.
No. This mndification affects only the testable portion of the check valves; the safety-related function is unaffected.
SER NO. 82-57 f
Cross
Reference:
PbK 82-373 Description of Change:
Change voltage rating of heat tracing circuits.
Sunm~
No. This edification will allow the as-built plant to obtain the design value wattage. This change will have no adverse effects on the electrical distribution system.
No. This modi ication makes the as-built condition of the plant consistent with the design analyzed by the FSAR.
No. The modification will make the as-built plant consistent with design safety margins.
SER NO. 82-58 Cross R ference: Setpoint Change Reauest 82-030 Description of Chan e:
Change extraction steam bleeder trip valve pressure switch setpoints.
S~~zg No. This change does not affect the established bleeder trip valve closure setpoint, which is the function discussed in the FSAR, i.e.
protecting the turbine after a trip. This change allows the valves to open after turbine reset.
This change will prevent excessive valve cycling which could impair No.
reliability and thereby affect t¹ protective function of the valve.
No. These valves are not safety-related and are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
SER NO. 82-59 Cross Re erence: Setpoint Change No.82-031, SFR-2969 Description of Chance:
Change EKCZ ~~ iwm flow opening setpoint.
I. hM. The setpoint is based on protection of the HPCZ pump bearings. The new setpoint is still within the vendor specification for all operating modes.
ii. No. Adjusting the valve opening setpoint within design limits does not a feet the accident analysis.
iii. No. This setpoint is not directly addressed by the Technical its Specifications; however, the reliability of HPCZ, as defined via operability requirements, will not be reduced.
SER NO. 82-60 Cross Re erence: OP TY 006 Rev. 0 Description of Chan e:
Performance of ES~ System Strain measurement test.
No. During initial fuel loading, one operable ESJ loop is required to support 2 diesel generators. This will be fulfilled during testing.
The requirem nts reflect the limitations posed by previous analyses.
No. The worst case failuie would be a waterhamner rendering one loop inop rable. Only one loop is required for initial fuel load.
No. All Technical Specification requirements will be fulfilled during this test.
30
SZR NO 82-61 Cross
Reference:
Pi~1R 82-329 Description of Change:
Change cyoher keypad card readers to non-keypad readers at various locations.
Su~~
No. Security is not a safety-related, system, nor does it interface with sa ety-related system . This change simply allows a one-to-one replacement of card reader type.
II. No. Loss of ecurity system is covered by security contingency plans.
No. The Technical Sp cifications do not address the security system and no margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is reduced.
SER NO. 82-62 Cross
Reference:
PMR 82-369 Descri tion of Chan e:
Routing off temporary cable to support thermal and vibration sensors associated with the Transient Monitoring System (RG) .
SUDS~:
No. The temporary cable is not part of a safety-related system. Cable installation will not interfere with any safety systems.
No. Cable tray support specifications are designed to handle the additional weight of the temrnrary cable. Cable tray fires are bounded by existing analyses in the FSAR.
No. Margins of safety are not reduced due to this temporary modification.
SKR NO.~ 82-63 Cross
Reference:
~ DCP 8153/PNR 82-367 Description of Chan e:
Xrprovem nt of rccm pressure seals to support reactor building HVAC design requirem nts.
SUIHPBZV:
Vo. Reactor Building HVAC will be consistent with the design characteristics described in the FSAR due to this rrodification. Reactor Building structural integrity is not ccrpromised by this modification.
No. The added sealing an accident, condition.
will not be located an~Aiere where it could cause Ko. Tec&'cal Specification margin of safety will be increased due to this change because contanination can be contained in Zone I.
SER NO. 82-64 C oss
Reference:
Pi~% 82-368/DCP 8137 Descri tion of Chan e:
Reorientation of Reactor Building lhin Steam pipeway door to allow a seating pressure, thereby maintaining design pressure in the pipeway.
~Surya No. This change creates consistency between the as-built condition and design require~i ts and therefore reduces such probabilities and conseauences.
No. This change will allow design pressure to be realized in order to support previous evaluation.
Ya. The Technic:1 Specifications do not speci ica'ly address these design requirem nts, but margins of safety can only ~rove due to this change.
SFR YO.~ 82-65 Cross
Reference:
~ Test No. FE'-92-001 Description of Chan e:
Performance of hot functional test to verify operation of the evaporator shell ide level control system and drain tank level control system.
Smnarv.
Ko. The Seal Steam System is not a safety-related system, and test operations will be within normal operating ranges.
No. The svstem is mainlined operable with a backup source of seal steam; level changes will be made within normal operating ranges.
No. This system does not form the basis for a safety margin as defined
'n the Technical Specif'cations.
SER NO. 82-66 Cross
Reference:
Test Nq. HF-64-014 t of Description Chan e:
Perfo~i ce of Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System tune-up at Test Condition 3.
~SUIHM No. This testing ensures that the Recirculation Flow Control System will meet the ST-29 (Reference FSAR Chapter 14.0) acceptance criteria.
The Open Xoop tests, which are not included in ST-29, are bounded by the FSAR analysis on Failure of the YG Set Speed Controller (mm demand),
Subsection 15.4.5.
XI. No. This test will not cause the system to behave in any mann r that has not been addressed in the FSAR.
ho. This test ensures that the Recirculation System will operate as designed. Du ing testing, it. will be operated within Technical Spec'f'cation limits.
0 33
SFR NO. 82-67 f
Cross
Reference:
PAIR 82-360 D scription of Chan e:
Reroute piping for of gas pretreatment radiation monitor to provide sufficient differential pressure for adequate flow.
~SUIKM I. No. This modification will allow the normal operation of the monitor.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. Ymrgin of safety is unchanged. This modification will restore the monitoring system to operational status.
SER NO. 82-68 Cross
Reference:
PIE 82-355 D scription of Chan e:
Realignment of limit switch allen screw holes associated with the Core Spray y
No. Failure of the limit switch tr'p levers, which is mitigated by this change, affects valve position indication only. The check valves would still perform their afety function.
II. No. See I above.
No. Yargin of safety is not reduced, because proper alignment of the set screws increases position indication reliability.
34
SER NO.~ .82-69 Cross Re erence: ~ Pi~i% 82-378 D scription of Chan e:
Rewiring changes associated with the Reactor Ihnual Control System.
SUFaaz ~:
No. Tne additional components from this modification are equivalent to e>'isting materials used for similar purposes.
No. See I above.
No. Virgins or safety are not reduced'This mxLification changes the process computer interface and an annunciator; these changes allow more consistent responses to the ccrputer and greater op rator awareness of system status.
I'ross SER NO. 82-70
Reference:
PiM 82-379 Description of Chancre:
Correct seismic qualification deficiency in RCIC turbine components (trip and throttle valve assembly, pedestal assembly).
SIKIGZV:
I. No. The correct level of seismic qualification will enhance the dependabiity o the RCIC system.
II. No. This is a one-for-one ccmnnent replacement with parts of upgraded auality.
lII. No. Yiargin of safety is increased due to the increased reliability of RCIC.
SFR NO.~ 82-7l Cross Re erence: ~ Pi~JR 82-370 Description of Chan e:
Replacem nt of RCXC Turbine Termrature Accessories with accessories fran a different vendor, therefore reauiring a nncL'fication to the original configuration.
X. No. The rradified instrumentation ha nc direct ef ect on safety, operability or reliability of the RCXC system. The ~i'fication does rot alter the original design function of RCXC as described in the FSAR.
XI. No. See I above.
XXI. No. The neagin of safety is unchanged, because the modified instnmentation will perform the original design function.
SM NO. 82-72 Cross
Reference:
Pic% 82-083 Descri tion of Change:
Allow scram timing inforaation frcm the R actor I~ual Control System to be connected to the GEARS transient mon'toring system.
SUIIHIRXV:
X. No. Both the CRD Scram T~ng Panel and GETARS are data-gathering systems which are not safety-related. This change does not affect or interface with any safety-related systems.
II. No. The added wiring due to this change will be installed per vendor (G.E.) approved specifications.
IIX. No. Data collection systems do not affect any margins of safety as defined in the ba is for the Technical Specifications.
36
SM NO. 82-73 Cross R erence: Pi~% 82-354 D scription of Chan e:
Acdition of metal oxide var'stors across certain Reactor Protection System (RPS) relay coils to eliminate voltage spikes.
~SIZIlM I. hM. Neither failure mode of the variation (i.e. open or closed) will result in adverse consequences to the normal functioning of the RPS system. If the varistor self des~cts, there is not enough heat or residue to cause adverse consequences.
II. No. See I above. At most, a channel trip of RPS will result fram varistor failure. This has been previously analyzed.
IXI. No. Possible trips due to varistor failure (which is improbable due to the field history of the device) are outwe'ghed by the trips caused by voltage spikes at present without varistors. Therefore, margin of safetv is at worst unchanged.
SER NO.~ 82-74 Cross
Reference:
~ HR 82-346 Descri tion of Chan e:
Addition of motor operator to ESP purrp discharge valves to enable and mitigate water hanner effects on the system.
tattling S~zp No. The entire electrical installation is Class 1E, as is the existing ES~ electrical system. Redundancy provides protection against single failure of either the operators or their power supplies.
No. Postulated failure modes due to the change were reviewed and none was found to result in an accident outside the envelope of FSAR analyses.
IXI e No. The bases of Technical Specifications affected were reviewed and found to be una fected by this change.
SER NO.~ 82-75 Cro s
Reference:
~ Pl% 82-228 Description of Chan e:
Installation of pressure regulator in CRD, KKU and feedwater smple lines for flors control to d'ssolved oxygen cells.
S HFicQQ:
I. No. This modification has no effect on the design function of the system. The change will allow proper operation of the cells by providing a constant flow to them.
II. No. No failure due to the regulator 's worse than the already analyzed sample line break.
III. No. edition of the regulator has no effect on system function.
Therefore, system safety margin is unaffected.
SER NO. 82-76 Cross
Reference:
PAR 82-394 Description of Chan e:
Upgrade insulation of lIDR relay coil pigtails.
Sum~a I. f Ko. This change corrects a deficient condition which could increase the consecyences of an accident or a malfunction of eguiprent related to safety.
II. No. The reliability of the relays is increased due to the wiring upgrade to nnre stringent environmental standards.
III. No. The Technical Specif'cations do not address the components affected by this rxxlification.
38
-SER NO.'2-77 Cross Re erence: PbR 82-396 Description of Chan e:
Relo""tion of IGR relays.
~Suma I. Ko. This change corrects a deficient condition which could increase the conseauences of an accident or a malfunction of equips related to safety.
No. Equiment reliability is increased by this reification.
No. The Technical Sp cifications do not address the components affected by this modification.
SER NO. 82-78 Cross,
Reference:
P&IR 82-353 D scrir>tion of Chan e:
of ReactorI Recirculation i Discharge Valve Actuator Motor Brakes, leaving position seating ifeature only.I
~ ~
Perraval I
~ ~ ~ ~
~~
~Suma All design concerns have been eva'uated and shown not to affect the safetv function of the valves, i.e. to close on a reci"culation system suction side break. This &mction has always been accomplished by position seating.
No. The position seating lirLt setpoint will be changed, but this has bern analyzed and no concerns exist.
III. Ko. See I and II above.
~ NO. 82-79 Cross Re erence: ~ P5B 82-304 Description of Chan e:
Replacement o= door seals on the Reactor Building airlock doors.
Surya:-~:
No. The new seal will be less susceptible to damage from personnel traffic, as they will be protected by the door jamhs. Secondary Containm nt Integrity, fire protection and security have been reviewed and are not adversely impacted by this change.
No. This is a one-for-one replacement of door seals therefore no new concerns coast.
No. The new seals will be rated at least as high as the door they are used on with respect to fire protection standards. Secondary Containm nt integrity requirements will be verified consistent with current Technical Specification requirements.
SER YO. 82-80 Cross
Reference:
PAR 82-268 Description of Chan e:
Hen factors changes to gaseous radwaste system control room panel.
Swam'~:
No. Such concerns are reduced via the minimization of operator error.
No system functions are altered by this change.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. See I above.
S R NO. 82-81 f
Cross
Reference:
Pi~& 82-009 Description of Chan e:
Change in location of backwash tim rs in River Intake Structure.
Smv~~.
I. No. This is a non-safety related system. The change in location reduces instament vibration. System function is unaffected by this modif'cation.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. See I above.
SER NO. 82-82 Cross
Reference:
PAR 82-393 Descri tion of Chance:
Replacement of FOCI steam line drain pilot solenoid valves.
~Summa No. This change will restore the originally intended design. This change will be made when Reactor Ste~ Dom pressure is less than or equal to 150 psig and prior to criticality, which is a configuration when HPCI is not required by previous analysis.
bo. Previously intended quality standards will be achieved by this modification. This is a one-for-one replacement which presents no new concerns.
hM. The ~~gin of safety is increased frcxn the current configuration due to the insmllation of qualified pilot op rators.
41
SER NO. 82-83 Cross
Reference:
PW 82-306 Description of Chan e:
AQdition of freouency transducer and resistor in main generator system panel.
~SIZMB No. The reliable supply of emergency power to essential busses is unaffected by any failure in the modified circuit.
II. No. See I above.
III. hM. See I above.
SER NO. 82-84 Cross
Reference:
P~1R 82-371 Descri tion of Chan e:
Installation of protective relaying to detect 230kV circuit breaker flashover.
~s~
No. No essential busses are impacted by the failure of the 230kV main generator synchronizing circuit breaker. This breaker does not support any FSAR analysis.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. See I above. This eauiment is not addressed in the plant Technical Specifications.
SER NO.~ 82-85 Cross
Reference:
~ P~~1R 82-359 Description of Chance:
Addition of support bracket for a solenoid valve in the Reactor Recirculation System for equiparant qualification purposes.
Sun@~~
No. This modification will not change the function, operability, or reduce the reliability of the valve, Valve'ailure is in the fail-safe (clo ed) position.
No. See I above.
No. The addition of the support to the solenoid valve will increase the margin of safety.
SER NO. 82-86 Cross
Reference:
Pb& 82-398 Description of Chan e:
Yodification of recirculation system piping restraints.
Sunx nary:
I. No. Tne pipe restraint is being modified to its originally intended design function. If left unnocLified, the capability of the restraint to prevent pipe wnip is indeterminate.
II. No. See I above. The reliability of the pipe restraint is ~roved due to this modification.
III. No. The margin of safety will be inproved by the prevention of pipe whip which could damage safety-related equign~t.
SKR NO. 82-87 f
Cross
Reference:
PiW~ 82-412 Description of Chan e:
Provide for spring tension adjustment on the RCIC Trip a.d Throttle Valve connecting rod.
S~rg hM. This modification will improve reliability and thereby decrease such concerns.
II ~ No. Tnis modification is a one-for-one change with respect to the op rational function of the RCIC system. Therefore no ne r concerns are created.
III. No. Safety will be increased due to the increase in reliability.
SER KO. 82-88 Cro s
Reference:
PbE 82-414 Description of Chan e:
Re-wire RCIC control system panel to correct terminations made in previous remodification.
S~xp I. No. The implem ntation of this change increases the reliability of RCIC operation.
II. 'flo. See I above.
lII. No. Tne improved level of reliability increases the margin of safety.
SER NO. 82-89 f
Cross
Reference:
P~R 82-243 Description of Chan e:
Providing terrorary po'~~er to racn aste mobile solidification system.
~SUIKPB No. The worst case failure involving this modification is a loss of power to a non safety-related Y~; therefore this modification has no effect on FSAR analyses.
No. loss of a non safety-related LAC will not affect any equipment in a manner other than previously evaluated.
No. The equipnent af ected by this change is not addressed in the Technical Sp cifications.
SER NO. 82-90 Cross
Reference:
PAR 82-395 Descri tion of Chan e:
Provide 120 V AC power supply for spent resin tank flow transmitters.
SUIIG~:
No. The additional load is being added to a non safety-related pm~er source.
No. Failure of the instrurant AC system has been evaluated previously in the FSPX.
No. The 120 V AC Instrument AC system is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
45
Sm NO ~ 82-9l Cross
Reference:
~ PiP.82-346
~
(DCP 82-346B)
Description of Chan e:
Stagger post-LOCA.
sta~ of ESN pumps and change in restart t~ of condensate pump No. The stagger start does not affect cooling of eauiprent nor electrical loadings. Delaying condensate pump restart tirre from 45 to 90 seconds has no impact since the pumps are not safety-related.
No. The electrical loading scheme associated with the stagger start is acceptable as long as the condensate pump restart time is altered; again, no cooling problems are c -eated by this change.
No. The related Technical Specifications were reviewed and found to be unaffected by this change.
SER NO. 82-92 Cross
Reference:
Pi~% 82-422 Description of Chan e:
Change of scale on two indicators on Standby Information Panel.
Surer ~:
No. These indicators are for backup information; neither were considered in any previous accicent.
No. The scale increm nts are being changed fo- familiarity to operating personnel. Tne meter function is not altered by the scale change.
No. The indicators provide a backup indication of flow and are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
S:"R NO 82-93 Cross
Reference:
DCPp 722.1 Rev. 0 Descri ton of Chan e:
Revise SGTS logic so there is no auto switchover on a high radiation signal.
S'JPUl2~
No. This switchover feature was not included in the FSAR safety analysis on SGTS. A reduction in switchover challenges will increase SGTS reliability.
hM. See I above. The safety-related design basis of SGTS is unaffected by this change.
IIX hb. T¹ Techrzcal Specifications on SGTS are unaffected by this change; the affected instr@rent system is not addressed by the Techn'gal Specifications.
SER NO. 82-94 Cross
Reference:
PMR 82-424 Descri ton of Chan e:
Addition of annunciator circuit or SPOZNH.
~SUtgllR I. No. This circuit will provide the operator with information of suppression pool temperature problems. It will not change the function, operability or reliability of the system.
II. No. None of the input param ters or initial conditions related to evaluations associated with this system are different due to this modification.
'XII. No. Margin of safety can only increase due to increased operator awareness.
NO.~ 82-95 Cross
Reference:
~ PHR 82-356 Description o Chancre:
hhaify relay contacts to allow Reactor and Turbine Building Chillers to trip on loss of power.
'Sumnarv.
X. No. .The Reactor and Turbine Building Chillers have no safety-related functions.
Ii. No. See I above.
XiX. hM. This equipnent is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
See I above. it also does not interact with any other systems that are addressed in the Technical Specifications.
SER NO. 82-96 Cross Re erence: PMR 82-176 Description of Chan e:
Provide freeze protection for River Intdce Structure Level Transmitter.
SlR aalu+:
I. No. The River Water Makeup System is not safety-related and its function is unchanged.
iX. No. See I above.
IIX. No. The River Rater lhkeup System is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
SER NO.~ 82-97 Cross
Reference:
~ HW 82-288 D scription of Chan-e:
Re~unting o 4kV undervoltage relays in the system for the purpose of achieving seianic qualification.
S~~zp No. This modification will improve a deficient condition by ensuring proper oual'ication of the safety-related equi@rent.
No. The new design 's improved for both seismic and hydrodynamic loads; failure to implemi nt the nndification could result in the loosening of this mounting and subsequent impact on nearby equipment.
ZIZ. No. Only the cabinet where the subject relays are mounted is affected by this change. No relays or adjacent equipnmt are being changed.
Therefore no margin of safety i affected.
SER NO. 82-98 Cross
Reference:
Ply 82-393 Sunray~:
D seri tion of Chan e:
Qualification of HPCI pilot solenoid valves.
hW. This modification, which restores the design intent of the HPCI system,,will be performed when HPCI is not required to be OPERABLE.
No. The valves are being replaced with better valves; no new concerns are introduced.
No. The qualified valves will increase the safety margin of the HPCI system.
SZR NO.~ 82-99 Cross
Reference:
~ P1P.82-438 Description of Chan e:
Addition of spacer and gasket to align prelube pump on diesel generator ("D")
prelube line.
SUPIUBZV:
No. The seism'c qualification of the lube oil and diesel auxiliary system is not afrected by the subject change. The lubricating system operability is also unaffected, and the probability of diesel malfunction is not increased.
IX. Ko. Failure of this single diesel due to this nndification meets the single failure criterion in that the other diesels are available to provide adequate power for safe shutdown.
X1X. No. The m.wgin of safety is unchanged for the reason in XX above.
S"R NO.82-100 Cross
Reference:
Pi~% 82-187 Description of Chan e:
Novem nt of end stop on monorail of Reactor Building Equipment Access Door Hoist to eliminate the possibility of contact with a safety-related raceway.
S~rg I. hM. This modification will prevent cabling for the HPCX, RHR and Core Spray systems from being affected by a suspended load. Therefore, previously evaluated malfunctions of safety-related equipnent can be
,prevented.
IX. No. The modi ication simply serves to relocate an already existing restriction on crane travel.
XII. No. The margin of safety is not reduced, because a greater restriction
's being applied which prevents the malfuncticn of safety-related equipm nt.
50
Reference:
PMR 82-430 Description of Chan e:
Drilling of holes into main turbine base plate for attachm nt of turbine sion targets.
~SU!HI'dl I. No. No previously evaluated accident is affected by this reification..
The holes will have no structural integ ity effects on the turbine, because the base plate supports no weight at the subject locations.
II. No. As stated in I, the foundation of the main turbine is unaffected by this modification.
III. No. The subject m9ification is not appl'cable to any Technical Spec'fications.
Reference:
PMR 82-427 D seri tion of Chan e:
Replacement of fmed reset pressure switch in the m ~action steam system with adjustable reset pressure mmtch.
SUIIl".BXV:
I. No. This change involves a one-for-one pressure switch replacement.
The new reset function will not affect any previous evaluations.
Il. No. See I above; the mcdification will not cause an increase in the probability of a Loss of Feedwater Heating Event.
III. hh. Bleeder trip valve closure tine is not affected; therefore no margin of safety is affected.
~
Sr.R NO.~ 82-103 C-oss
Reference:
~ PMR 82-413 D scription of Chan e:
?~aaification of l~BiV-ECS crain line p netration frcn a non-flexible grouted penetration to a flexible seal.
SUIEIBZV:
hM, for the following reasons: first, the subject seal is required only fo'- prevention of the spreading of airborne radioactive contamination.
The new seal will be subject to. the sane sealing criteria as the form r seal. Secondly, precautions will b taken to prevent damage to the drain line during this modification. Third, there are no structural concerns related to the roof slab through which the drain line travels.
Finally, the original pipe stress aralysis analyzed the connected piping as free-re>ving.
No. The new seal is perfectly by suitable for the subject application.
See I above.
No. A review of the Technical Specifications indicated no reduction in any specified safety margin.
Reference:
PNR 82-449 Descriation of Chan e:
Replacem nt of 10 Amp fuses with 20 Amp fuses in the HPCI System Topaz Inverter.
Sumnarv:
Z. No. The larger fuse is consistent with vendor recczrmndations; therefore, ECCS reliability is increased due to this change.
II. No. This is a one-for-one changeout with a more appropriately sized fuse, thereby increasing the current level of protection to a safety-related system.
III. No. Reliability a .d safety margin are increased by this change, for the reasons describe in I and II above.
Reference:
~ Setpoint Change Bequest 82-5.
Description o" Chan e:
Change in setpoints of redundant therrcstats in Standby Liquid Control System suction pip neat, tracing from 80'F to 75'F.
SUpii&rv:
Previous evaluations ~e credit or a control room alarm on the loss of the subject heat tracing. The new setpoint will allow suffic'ent tine for operator action to prevent precipitation b cause is well above the saturation temperature of the Sodium Pentaborate it solution. At the same tim , it will allow the redundant thernostats to funct'on only on the loss of the primary thezmostats, instead of possibly initiating when not required.
No. As stated in I above, the xunction and operability of the subject heat tracirg is not affected in any way that could create a new concern.
No. Ne'ther the associated Technical Specification surveillance requirement nor its basis are affected in a manner that can affect the availab'lity of power to the panel nor the operability no function of the printery heat, tracing.
Reference:
P~1R 82-170 D scription of Chan e:
Establishrent of a link between SSES Plant Ccmputer System and PP&L Power Control Center Computer System.
~Sumna I. No. The subject system is not safety-related; this link is required only to supply the Power Control Center with SSES data.
II. No. See I above. Plant operation is unaffected by the inoperability of this ccvmunication link.
III. No. See II above.
53
SFR NO.~ 82-107 C oss
Reference:
~ PYB 82-274 D seri tion of Chan e:
Replacerent o con~1 s~cture an belm.
~SUBEIB No. The subject fans will meet their design intent to maintain cooling recyirerents within specified limits, and to maintain positive pressure in the control structure.
II. hM. This one-for-one change w'll simply reduce fan vibration.
III. No. The subjec" fans are not addressed by the Technical Specifications.
Reference:
SCR 82-049 Descri tion of Chan e:
Charge of the setpoint on Control Structure H&V differential pressure switch.
Sunma~:
No. The setpoint change ensu es that the CREOASS fans will maintain their design flow rate, thereby meeting their design basis of keeping a positive pressure to preclude air inleakage.
II. No. See I above. Only the CREOASS fans are affected by this change.
No. No reouirement in the Technical Specifications (or bases thereof) is altered by this change.
54
S"R NO.
S82-109 Cross Roference: Pi~E 82-404/DCP 741 Description o Chan e:
Splitting of ccnmon 28VDC supply bus to all control room inner-ring panels and installation of in-line fuses.
S~zy:
No. Tnis modification prevents the comnn mode failure of the non-safety-related annunciator system.
Ya. Any ailure due to this ~i '.ication would affect the power supply to a section of non safety-related annunciators.
hM. No margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications will be affected by the changes described above.
Reference:
PIE 82-456 I
Description of Chan e:
Addition of rheostats in series with certain diesel generator system sensing c'rcuit relays to increa e their pick up voltage.
Surm cry:
No. The rheostats will be seismically qualified arid rmunted per Class 1E criteria. Having the voltage to the regulator applied at a higher potential ensures that the regulator and diesel generator will op rate in accordance with their previously evaluated design.
No. The new equipment will be Class lE, and the higher pick up voltage does not affect the diesel generator capability to attain rated voltage, frequency and loading time as previously evaluated in the PSAR.
No. This c~~ ge ensures that the diesel generator is capable of functioning as designed.
55
Cross Re erence: PM 82-481 Dascriotion of Chan e:
S dition o testability eature to reste shutdmm panel suppression chamber air t~rature mdicator.
SUtlllSXY:
No. This redi ication affects the test mode of operation only. It has no ~met on the indicator circuitry.
No. This rndification does not change the results of any previous analysis; ee I above.
No. The subject terp rature indicator is required to be OPERAB~M by the Technical Specification. This modification aids in the verification of its operability.
Reference:
PYB 82-245 D scription of Chan e:
Znstallation of additional drain pot in offgas treatment system.
No. The offgas system is not safety-related. Therefore failure of any piping associated with this modification will not impact a safety system. Non-inplem ntation could result in degraded reliability of downstream HEPA filters. This design is consistent with misting codes and standards.
No. Tne design is consistent with existing drain pots. Redundant level switches prevent the creation of an offgas flcx~th to the liquid radwaste sum by preventing the loss of a water seal.
No. No equipment related to the margin of safety associated with the offgas system is affected by this modification.
SER NO. 82-3.13 f
Cross
Reference:
P~~B 82-463 D scription of Chanqe:
Installation of blocking devices in the containm nt purge supply and ex1@ust valve operators.
~Sunma hM. The purge system is not safety-related, in that. it is not required for safe shutdcem. Tn's nedification will not affect the capability of the sM~ ject valves to isolate when required.
XX. No. Fne blocking devices will affect only the opening of the operators and valves. Spring closure is uraffected and is the ail sa e condition of the valves.
ILI e No. The Technical Specifications require the blocking limit. The margin of safety requires assurance of closure; this modification will not inhibit that function.
Reference:
ErlR 820534/Pi~% 82-245 Descri tion of Chance:
Tezporary operation of the offgas system without the inlet HEPA filters.
Sum~:
X. No. The purpose of the filters is to trap radioactivity associated with fuel leakage. This operation will be allowed only up to and including 5% pce~er, ~~hen leakage is nLninal. Any particulate would drop out in the chiller drain pot and be routed back to the LP condenser. Any not rewed will be picked up by the charcxwl guard beds.
XI. No. See I above.
XXX. Ko. Any particulate normally trapped by the 7KPA filters will drop out further dcwnstream (see I above) . No particulates will be released to the turbine building exhaust vent, m,the margin of safety is not reduced.
SER NO.~ 82-115 Cross Re erence: ~ Pl& 82-488 Desc idion of Chan e:
editions to circui~ of Transient IMnitoring System on HPCI to improve op ation Smear~~: of ZS.
- i. No. These rrcdifications affect the secondary HPCI pressure-related indications. The primary indication is flow and this rrocii fication.
it is not affected by Ii. No. Failure of the subject indicating loop will not affect the design intent of the FPCI system. iPCI control, isolation logic and flow indication are not affected.
Iil. No. As stated ~ve, failures due to this modification have no effect on HPCI perfo~~ .ce, and therefore have no effect on safety margin.
Reference:
P~ 82-487 Description of Chan e:
Rem>val of low reactor. vessel pressure from CS mx2 LPCI pump start logic for one unit operation ~onl . Ihdify operating procedures on SGTS and Control Room Fresh Air in order to maintain acceptable voltages under emergency conditions.
Suxary:
Ya. The injection logic for the CS and LWI system@ is unchanged by this mcdification. Tnis change reduces the probability that the startup of the CS, LPCI and ESW p~s will cause an undervoltage situation. The procedural controls have no effect on previous evaluations.
No. The original evaluations in the FSAR do not consider the low reactor vessel pressure permissive on the pump start logic.
The Technical Specifications do not require a low pressure permissive on the pump start logic, only injection valve opening.
Therefore safety margin is not reduced.
58
S-R NO. ~ 82-117 Cross
Reference:
~ PIR 82-479 D scription of Chan e:
Providing throttling capability to main turbine gland seal'ng system valves.
Sum~
I. No. The malfunction of the subject system is analyzed in the FSAR.
This modification will not increase the probability of nor the consequences of this malfunction. The valves in question have no automatic isolation function to the system.
II. bM. See I above.
III. No. The "team seal system is not clem nted to any basis for any Technical Specification.
S" R NO.82-118 Cross
Reference:
PY8 82-375A D scription of Chan e:
Installation of conduit, cables, instrum nts and control panels to facilitate modification requiring a change to the Technical Specificaticns (final modification to be approved only after approved Technical Specification change) .
~Suama I. No. The only safety system affected by this support work is Secondary Containment, which will be maintained by normal controls within Technical Specification limits.
II. No. See I above. Considerations for thermal interference, electrical separation, etc. have been incorporated in the design.
III. No. Ceration outside of design or operational limits will not occur due to this change.
59
S~ic NO.~ 82- ' 9 Cross Paference: ~ P~P.82-349 D script'on o. C~". e:
Installation of time delay in CRD puny low suction pressure trip circuit.
~Smma hM. The CRD pimps are not safety-related nor considered a nake-up source to the vessel in previous analysis. The time delay will decrease their probability of tripping.
No. See I above. The installation will co~sider environmental qualification, electrical separation, etc.
No. The operability of the CRD pumps is not necessary to support the basis for any Technical Specification margin of safety.
Reference:
Test No. HF-93-006 Description off
~ ~
Chan e:I Pressure i~ Control System Tuneup at. Test Condition
~
l.
Sugary:
I. No. This test method is essentially the same as that used in the system St@~up Test, with the rior are smaller or equal to the ST.
distinction being the step inputs, which II. No. See I above.
III. hb. Since the "bounding" ST was previously evaluated in the FSAR, no reduct on in safety margin exists.
60
S =R KO.82-121 C oss
Reference:
Test No. E'-93-030 D scription of Chan e:
?!ain Turbine HiC: Pressure Pagulator Operation Verification.
~SUIIIM I. No. The Turbine K~C system is not safety-related.
II. No. This test will not place the plant in a condition leading to accident nor mal unction.
III. No. This system is not directly related to any basis for margin of safety. Operation outside the constraints of the safety analysis will not occu".
Reference:
Test No. K4-92-050 D seri tion of Chan e:
I@in steam supply to steam seal evaporator pressure con~1 verification.
Sum~:
No. This test optimizes system operation, thereby decreasing the probab'lity of malfunction of the liain Turbine Gland Sealing System as previously evaluated.
No. This test will not create a situation that would not be bounded by previous I'SAR analysis.
No. Test fa'lure causes no impact to the basis for any Technical Specification.
SER NO.~ 82-123 Cross Be erence: ~ P~K 82-426 D scription of Chanqe:
Replacem nt of pressu"e transmitters in Control Structure and Reactor Building H&V systems and SGTS.
SUIHIIRXY:
No. The transmitters are being replaced vith environrrenmlly qualified transmitters, thereby decreasing the possibility of equipm nt malfunction.
No. This modificaton is a part-for-part changeout that does not affect system operation, oDer than to improve its reliability.
No. Since the change does not affect system operation, no related Technical Specifications are impacted.
Reference:
PlR 82-346 Description of Chan e:
Stagger start of ESW pumps.
SUIEiiBrv:
I. No. The stagger start does not affect the cooling capability of ESh'or does it adversely affect diesel generator loading or the 4kV system if offsite power is available.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. The items mentioned in I above are the integral ones in developing the safety margin. None are adversely affected.
SFR NO.82-125 Cross
Reference:
PiM 82-33.5 Description of Chan e:
Addition of valves to the hotwell drain flanges and installation of blind flanges on the outs'de of the valves.
Summ~:
No. No analysis associated with Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory nor. the ~~ ss of Condenser Vacuum is affected by this change. In addition,'the valve/blind flange arrangem nt provides redundant isolation for any leakage past the hotwell/valve flange.
No. Any equipm nt failures associated with tlat.s modification are bounded by the evaluations referenced in I above.
No. Condenser integrity is required by the bases for Technical Specifications; this mxLification does not reduce the margin of safety to maintain that integrity.
S~M NO.82-126 1
Cross
Reference:
P~R 82-460 Descri tion of Chan e:
Seismic qualification of solenoid pilot valves on various systems via the installation of a stiffening bracket.
Smprary:
I. No. This nnaification will upport previous evaluations on seismic and environmental cualification.
II. No. The brackets will increase system integrity during a seismic or hydrcdynamic event. Operation of the valves is not affected.
III. No. The Technical Soecifications are not affected by this modification; however, as described above, safety margin will be increased.
SER NO. 82-" 27 Cross
Reference:
PiM 82-494 Description of Chan e:
Radwaste Evaporator Level Transmitter relocation.
~Surma No. Current evaluations bound any failure due to this modification, which will alleviate a clogging problem.
No. See I above. Co~nents of cargatible auality standards will be used in this modification.
No. Sa ety-related systems are unaffected by this n'adification.
Reference:
SCR 82-095 D scription of Chan e:
Setpoint change on Reactor Building H&V Zone III differential pressure controller.
SUIPii~.
I. No. The setpo'nt change does not allow the design basis of the sys~
to be adversely effected. Design pressure boundaries will be maintained such that unf'ltered air coes not leave the reactor building.
II. No. See I above. No hardware changes are under consideration.
III. No. The reauirem nt for Secondary Contairurent Integrity will be met with th's change installed.
64
Reference:
~ PR~ 82-448 Description of Chancre:
Flex grounding of various RPS cables.
~S1 Illa'o.
This modification ensures that safety-related system@ will not fail due to a sirple connon fault frcm separate safety-related systems.
II. hM. See I above.
III. hM. For the reason in I above, margin of safety is increased.
Reference:
PYR 82-525 Description o Chan e:
Electrical separation of scram discharge volume vent and drain pilot valve switchesa Sumnarv:
Ko. This modification will achieve consistency with requirements concerning separation of RPS power supplies. No previous analyses are affected by this change.
No. This modification eliminates the possibility of pcx~er supply cross feeding; it does not create new rrcdes of failure.
hM. Failures assoc'ated with this modification cannot prevent any related system fran performing its safety-related function.
S" R NO.82-131 Cross
Reference:
PiM 82-400 D scription of Change:
Rework of cable in the Bypass Indication System.
S~rg I!o. The rework w'l bring the cable run back into design specifications; evaluations.
it will therefore allow consistency with previous LX ~ Ão. Both shorting and op n circuitry have been previously evaluated.
The addition of two junction boxes does not introduce any new failure modes.
III. No. See I above.
Reference:
, Description of Chan e:
Plex and ground on four RPS cables.
I. hM. This modification will help to prevent safety-related systems from functioning irproperly as a result of abno~nal operation of scme separate system. It is therefore important to previous single failure evaluations.
XX. hM. See I above.
III. No. See I above.
S~R NO.82-133 r
Reference:
Cross D scrip"ion of Chan e:
Circuit rework to allow proper op ration o the Transient lanitoring System on e RCIC svs~.
Suwazv:
No. This change has no impact on previous safety analyses b cause it only affects a pressure indicating loop. (The primary ind'cator is flow for De RCIC system). System operation is unaffected.
No. ass of pressure indication does not impact RCIC control or isola"ion logic.
No. Since the design and operation of the RCIC system are unaffected, no margin of safety is reduced.
Reference:
Pi~iR 82-542 Descripton of Chan e:
HEI pump d'scharge flow indicator replacement.
No. The change allows proper flow indication in the control. The safety function of the HPCI system is unaffected by this change.
No. See I above.
No. HPCI safety ?regin is ~~ffected as stated in I above. No other Technical Specifications are affected by this modification.
Reference:
PY8 82-375B Description of Chan e:
Installation of aui" iary materials in preparation of final design change which is contingent upon Technical Specification change approval by NFC.
No. The only safety system affected by these modifications is secondary containnant. Breaches of this system will be controlled in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
No. See I above. Considerations such as thermal interference, electrical separation, etc. have been incorporated.
ho. The safety margin prescribed in the Technical Sp cifications will be rret bv reeting the requirements for secondary containment integrity.
Reference:
PM 82-545 Description of Chan e:
Removal of unit separation boundary on YCC circuit breakers.
~SLERll3 I. No. This change restores the system to the configuration for which it was previously evaluated, i.e., Otic unit separation.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. See I above.
Reference:
~ P!G 82-245B D scription of Chan e:
ins allation of of gas system piping supports.
SUltlllRXV:
- i. No. Tne offgas system.'s not safety-related; failure of the piping or hangers will not affect a safety-related system.
No. 4'oxst case failure could lead to leakage of radwaste into the pipe tunnel. This has been previously evaluated in the FSAR.
Xii. No. This rredification will not reduce safety margins for the reasons above.
Reference:
PAIR 82-172 Description of Q~ e:
Lnstallation of data link be%men the PCS and the EOF.
SUH'si(l+:
- i. Iio. The PCS is not safety-related. The required conduit runs and cable pulling will take place in the EOF, which precludes safety systems -from being impacted.
ii. No. See i dmve.
iii. No. No limit in part of the PCS is required to support the basis of any safety the Technical Specifications.
Reference:
Description of Chanqe:
Change the Pi~% 82-375C trip logic for dzyv'ell coolers, instrurremt gas ccmpressors and instant air ccapressors so that they will not b interrupted on L2 or High Drywell pressure, and so that they will auto restart after a LOOP. The subject valves will be given an Ll and/or High Drywall pressure isolation.
Sum~:
hM. Ceration of this equip>ant is not required for safe shutdown.
LOCA analyses and diesel generator loading evaluations are not adversely affected bv the change. The change fran L2 to Ll do s not adversely impact the offsite dose analysis.
II. No. See I above.
No. This system is reouired to be operable by the plant Technical Specifications, but its loss affects only availability, not safety. A Technical Specification change is necessary to suoport installation of this andi.fication.
Reference:
PbR 82-480 DescriDtion of Chanqe:
Installation of station water cooling pipe i~gers.
SUIPiQ~:
No. The subject ystem is auxiliary to the main generator and has no safety function. Abnormal vibration in the line will be reduced due to this rxx2i fication.
R>. A malfunction will, at worst, result in a turbine trip, which has been previously evaluated.
No. The subject system has no part in forming the basis for a margin of safety.
70
1 SPR NO.82-141 C oss
Reference:
DCP 10010/PlR 82-492 Description of Chan e:
Strengthening of ram stop valve support/restraint.
SUIIlLMry:
I. No. This modification will reduce the con equences of accidents which impose loads on the subject piping.
IX. hM. See I above.
III. No. The increase in the capability of the piping to resist loads will increase safety margin.
Reference:
PHR 82-548 Description of~Chan e:
Replacement of butterfly valves in the gaseous radwaste recombiner system.
S~
The system is non-safety-related. Valve replacerrent will increase overall system reliability.
XI. No. Tnis action involves a one-for-one replacem nt of inferior valves with valves of a better design.
III. No. System reliability is improved due to this change.
71
S<R %0.~ 82-143 Cross
Reference:
~ P)E 82-549 D scription of Change:
Replacemont of but erfly valves in the circulation water system.
The system is not safety-related. Valve replacavmt will increase overall system reliability.
II. No. This action involves a one-for-one changeout of inferior valves with valves o a better design.
Iii. hM. System reliability is improved due to this change.
!~SR NO.82-144 Cross Re erence: PM 82-565 Description of Chan e:
Replacement of butterfly valves in the Turbine Building Chilled Pater System.
Smnr~.
No. The system is not safety-related. Valve replacem nt will increase overall system reliability.
Ii. Ko. This action involves a one-for-one changeout of inferior valves with valves of a better design.
XXI. No. System reliability is improved due to this change.
72
SEII MO ~ Sn-145 Cross
Reference:
~ . PW1.82-543 D scription of Chan e:
Drill hole in drain plug of R acto" Recirculation pump motor leak detection switch.
~Sunna No. This change will prevent false alarms and prevent sending personnel into the area to drain the switch cavity.
XI. No. Tnis change has no affect on the safety-related recirculation pump itself, only the rrator. hM other safety-related ecpxipment is affected bv the change.
IXI. No. A more reliable leak detection capability will be provided due to this modification.
SER NO.82-146 Cross R ference: P~R 82-570 Description of Chan e:
t~~ification to KlCU pump
~
"8".~
Summa:
I. No. The subject modifications will ensure pu~ operability. All the mxLifications include part-for-part changes consistent with the original design but ~~ roving the function of the pump.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. Since no new &actions are created, operation wiJda the safety margin defined in the bases for the Technical Specifications is not changed.
I 73
Reference:
P&P, 82-563A Description of Change:
Addition of time delay to spray pond bypass valves start logic.
~SIZI P-No.
due The subject t~ delay relay is Class 1E.
to this modiiication is bounded by loss of The worst case failure one ESN loop, wnich is within previous design evaluations.
ii. No. See I above.
Ko. See I above.
Reference:
PMR 82-429 Description of Cianqe:
dition of hanger supports to EHC tubing lines.
~SUER 1'e. The EHC systan is not essential to plant safety.. Failure of the subject lines will cause a turbine trip, which has been previously analyzed.
No. See I above. The new supports will decrease the probability of line failure.
No. The basis for the Turbine Overspeed Protection Technical Sp cification is unaffected by this change which improves safety rrexgin by in@roving system reliability.
Reference:
HR 82-541 Description of Chan e:
Hanger relocation to mitigate piping interferences in EHC system.
S~
The new hanger is not necessary to support any FSAR evaluation.
Tne structural capacity of the hanger is better than in the previous configuration due to this change.
No. See I above. Capacity is improved and the identical strut materials and construction details will be followed.
No. This hanger is not necessaxy to support any Technical Specification basis.
Reference:
Pi~% 82-530 Description of Chan e:
Installation o periiment hanger to replace temporary support on moisture separation piping.
Sa~rg I. No.. The moisture separator has no safety-related Qmction. The hanger support will increase the reliability of the main turbine pxotective trip system.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. See I above.
Reference:
P!W 82-346 D scription of Chan e:
I edification to ESw valves from open/close to just open.
SURlll3ZV:
I. No. These valves norrrally open on pump will not s~. The chiller condenser be adversely affected by leaving the valves open with ESW on.
h'ater ha@<<ver loads will be mitigated due to this change.
ZI. No. See I above.
IZI. No. See I above.
Reference:
Pl& 82-586 D scription of Chan e:
S~ing of condenser tube bundles.
S~rg I. hM. The main condenser is not safety-related. Shou'd a failure occur it is bounded by previous decrease evaluations.
in reactor coolant inventory II. No. See I above. Also, should a loosening of the stake result in tube rupture, there is no radiological hazard due to the inleakage created by the condenser vacuum.
III. No. This reification will not impact the level of condenser integrity recyired to maintain safety margin.
S:"R NO.~ 82-153 C oss Re erence: ~ PAR 82-585 D scription of Chan e:
dition of welds to pipe support assembly.
~Sunna I. No. Tnis radification will correct a previous design deficiency, thereby achieving consistency with previous design evaluations.
II. No. The additional welds create an improved design without creating new modes of failure.
Iil. Ke. See I and IZ ~ve.
Reference:
PNR 82-557 Description of Change:
Relocation of pressure switch I.
in the Solid No. The solid radwaste system does not change its capability Radwaste System.
is not safety-related. This aadification to contain radioactive material.
Ii. No. See I above.
III. No. See I above.
77
Sr R YO.82-155 Cross
Reference:
P'W 82-587 Description of Chanqe:
Addition of deflectors to bundle side of condenser byoass headers.
X. Yo. The main condensers are not safety-related. This reification will not create any missiles that would increase the consequences of a previous evaluation.
II. hM. See I above. Condenser tube failure is bounded by previous evaluations.
III. No. The level of condenser integrity required to support the current safety margin is not reduced due to this rmdification.
Reference:
Pi& 82-591 Description of Chan e:
iviodification of snubber endplate.
I. ho. This change will correct a previous design deficiency, thereby achieving consistency with previous evaluations.
II. No. See I above.
IXI. Ão. For the reason in I above, the margin of safety will be unchanged.
Cross Rezerence: PPP/DCP 81-067 Description of Chance:
Installat'on of drainage line between the chem'ml drain tank room sunp to the liquid radwaste drainage system.
~Sum+
I. No. The modified piping is not safety-related. Failure of the subject piping will not impact any safety-related system. Structural concerns due to th need to imbed the piping have been evaluated and do not create a. concern.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. See I above.
SER NO 82-158 Cross Bezerence: Pi~R 82-555 Description of Chan e:
Replacement of valve actuator seals in solid radwaste valves.
Surm~:
I. iNo. The mxhfied ~ipment is not safety-related, and does not impact sazety-related svstems. The system function is unchanged due to this modification.
II. hM. These seals do not function as a pressure boundary; their reliability will be increased due to this change.
ZII. No. No margin of safety is dep ndent on the subject seals.
Reference:
Pl@ 82-592 Description of Chan e:
Elimination of dissinilar weld in Condensate Demneralizer system.
SUllTCBLQ:
No. The sys~'in question has no safety-related function; this rrodification has no effect on system operability.
Ko. See I above.
The subject system does not foxm the basis for any rargin of safety in the Technical Specifications.
Reference:
Safety Evaluation bM. NPE-82-TP-54-001 Description of Change:
Approval of ESN water hair test procedure.
Su~gi:
I. No. Previous analysis has shorn that pipe stresses will not exceed code allcwables and the conclusions can be reasonably extrapolated to the subject testing, together with the hold points in the procedure.
II. No. Random failures associated with this te. t are covered by previous single failure evaluations. Also see I above.
III. No. The appropriate Technical Specification limits will be applied for the duration of the testing.
SER NO.82-161 Cross R ference: ~ Test No. HF-78-026
~
Description of Clm e:
TIP Purge System Leak Rate Test.
~Surma No. The test will be a pressure drop from norrral system pressure. No safety-related equipment operation will be impacted.
No. The plant w'l not be placed in a previously unreviewed condition.
III. No. See I and II above.
SZR NO.82-162 Cross
Reference:
M 82-375D Descri tion of Chan e:
Mdification of d~>ell cooling system trip logic.
. ~SUBlTD I.~ No.
~ The proposed changes will not affect equipment needed for safe shutdown. Valves required to isolate on a LOCA signal will still do so.
No previous FSAR evaluations are therefore conprcxnised.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. See I dmve.
Reference:
~ PMR 82-260 D scription of Chan e:
Flexing and grounding of cables in RPS and main steam systems.
Sumoary.
I. No. This change will prevent improper functioning of safety-related systems due to abnoxmal operation of scme separate system, i.e., avoid single failure.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. Margin of safety is increased by avoidance of single failure mechanisms.
Reference:
PMR 82-539 il Descri tion of Chan e:
installation of emergency seal leakoffs from reactor feed pumps to liouid radwaste.
~Sullma hM. Neither the condensate nor f'eedwater system is safety-related. Any ailure due to this ~i ification is bounded by previous analyses on Loss of All Feaiwater Flew and Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventoxy.
II. No. See I above.
No. The Technical Specifications do not address the design or operation of the reactor feed pumps nor do they address the m thod of routing leakage to liquid radwaste.
S:Z NO.82-165 Cross Be ference: Pi~LE 82-601 Description of'hw~ qe:
Rework of panel GBC-590 heat tracing.
Simnarv:
No. Tnis rework will bring the panel into ccapliance with design specifications wnich Mere intended to be followed as part of the original design.
No. See I above.
No. Various systems in the Technical Specifications require freeze protection'ithout de ining specific requirem nts. The requirezents are defined by the AE, and this modification is in accordance with his spec3.flcations ~
SEB NO 82 166 Cross
Reference:
P~R 82-602 Description of Chan e:
Rework of panel OBC-593 heat tracing.
~SUIHllB I. No. This rework will bring the panel into cczrgliance with design specifications which were intended to be followed as part of the original design.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. Various systems in the Technical Specifications require freeze protection without defining specific requirements. The requirements are defined by the AE, and this modification is in accordance with his specifications.
83
SER NO 82 167 Cross
Reference:
P&R 82-604 Desc idion of Chan e:
Rework of panel 0>M-595 heat tracing.
Suer~:
No. Tnis rework will bring the panel into ccnpliance with design specifications which were intended to be followed as paW of the or'ginal design, II. Ko. See I above.
"I ZZZ. No. Various systems in the Technical Specifications require freeze
(~
r protection without defining speci ic requirenents. The requirements are li
' defined by the PZ, and this modification is in accordance with his I
i specifications.
Reference:
Pi~& 82-605 Descri tion of Change:
Rework of panel XBC-292 heat tracing.
~Sumna No. This rework will bring the panel into compliance with design specifications which were intended to be followed as part of the original design.
II. No. See I above.
No. Various systems in the Technical Specifications require freeze protection without defining specific requirements. The requirezwmts are defined by the AE, and this modification is in accordance w'th his specifications.
84
Reference:
Pi&i 82-607 Description of Chanqe:
Rework of panel ~-191 heat tracing.
Smr~:
No. This rework will bring the panel into ccnpliance with design pecifications which were intended to be folio'ed as part of the original design.
II. No. See I above.
No. Various system~ in the Technical Specifications require freeze protection without defining specific requirem nts. The requirements are defined by the AE, and this modification is in accordance with his specifications.
S~ NO.82-170 Cross
Reference:
PRIER 82-609 Description of Chan e:
Rework of panel IBC-592 heat tracing.
~Sunma No. This rework will bring the panel into carpliance with design specifications which were intended to be followed as part of the original design.
II. No. See I above.
Yu. Various systems in the Technical Specifications require freeze protection without defiz~g specific requirements. The requirements are defined by the AE, and this modification is in accordance with his specifications.
Reference:
No Pl& or DCP: Use i of mobile radwaste processing system.
Description of Chan e:
Use of nubile radwaste processing system to solidify radioactive wastes.
SUFiil2lg:
I. ~~o. No safety-related systems are impacted by the use of this equipvant, and the probability of occurrence or the consequences of the bounding solid radwaste system evaluation in the FSSR, rupture of a radwaste tank, are not increased by its use.
Il. No. See I above. Also the system is acceptable for containnent of radioactive material, minimization of radiation and ensure, waste solidification, electrical loading, crosstie of waste transfer lines, and fire protection.
III. No. The mobile system can support normal ogeraton, including anticipated operational occurrences, by processing solid radwaste in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix A, GDC 60. The system is equivalent to the existing plant system in regards to 10CFB50.36a.
Cross
Reference:
PiB 82-642 Description of Chan e:
Ir Diesel Cinerator Intercooler replacement.
~SUIIKIH I. No. The new intercoolers are less susceptible to corrosion, are seismically qualified, and are cons~cted to AS~K Section III Class 3 standards. The operation of the diesels will re~in consistent with the present FSAR design and analysis.
II. bM. This is a one-for-one intercooler replacem nt on each diesel with mare reliable intercoolers.
III. hM. This change will correct a condition which has the potential to reduce the current safety margin by reducing the reliability of power supplies required for safe shutdown.
are capable of operating as designed.
It will ensure that the diesels S R NO.82-173 Cross
Reference:
PW 82-595 Description o Chan e:
Sealing of penetrations in the rrain generator exciter house to prevent air inleakage.
SUiPitH" v:
hM. Neither the p netrations nor the subject equipment are safety related.
II. ho. See I above.
Iii. No. See I above.
SF& NO,82-174 Cross
Reference:
PYR 82-271 Description of Chan e:
' Construction of walkway between the North gatehouse and the Training Center.
Sumo~:
I. No. This nedification has no interface with plant operations and is not safety-related.
Ii. Ko.'ee I above.
iii. No. See I above.
87
SZR NO.~ 82-175 Cross
Reference:
~ PYZ 82-657 Description of Chan e:
Correction of pipe support weld deficiency.
~SUIILM No. This modification serves to restore the pipe support to the design condition previously evaluated in the FSAR.
II. hM. See I above. No unanalyzed condition will be created.
No. See I above. Yexgin of safety is based on the original design requirements.
Reference:
PRE 82-658 Descri tion of Chan e:
Correction of pip support weld deficiency.
Sunna~:
No. This support is non-safety related and Seismic Category II. This rxdification serves to restore the pipe support to the design condition previously evaluated in the FSAR.
II. No. See I above. No unanalyzed condition will be created.
h>. See I above. Havpin of safety is based on the original design reauirements.
Reference:
~ PNR 82-670 Description of Cj~ e:
Able pull to support additional ESW circuitry interlocks repired to meet single failure criter'a.
Su:m~:
I. No. The Class 1E cd~ Des will be routed through Class 1E raceway of the same Division. The raceway capacity will not be exceeded due to this change.
II. No. See I above.
III. Ko. This cable routing is not addressed by the Technical Specifications.
Reference:
PNR 82-277 Description of Chan e:
Phase B S&A Building YMizications.
Summa:
I. No. The construction will add a four story building adjacent to the existing SGA building, which is not safety-related. Underground safety-related eauipmnt which could be impacted has been reviewed and neither cons~ction nor building failure will affect it.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. See I above.
SrM~ KO.~ 82-179 Cross Refe ence: ~ DCP 82-485 D scription of Chance:
Replacem nt of non-cyalified Reactor Recirculation discharge valve actuators.
Sum~:
- l. I~o. The rrcdified (oualified) actuator will perform the same function as the original. The design is consistent with original design requirerents, so its safety-related function is no affected.
Ii. Ko. See I above.
EIX. No. Ko Technical Specification reauirem nt is affected by this change.
SFR HO 82-180 Cross
Reference:
Pi~P.82-584 Description of'han e:
Provision of temporary undervoltage trip relaying schem until Unit 2 fuel load.
S~rg I. hM. This naaification will ensure the prevention of excessive loading onto critical power supplies for Uni" 1 LCCA epipmnt. Unit 1 response reliability to a LCCA is therefore improved during the Unit 2 test period.
ZE. Ko. This modi ication affects Unit 2 breakers only, until Unit 2 fuel load. No Unit 1 equipment is affected.
XXX. h'o. Unit 1 Technical Specifications require four operable Unit 1 4kV switchgear busses which are unaffected by this modification.
I I Sea NO.82-181 f
Cross
Reference:
I P~~R 82-669 scription of Chan e:
Besize fuse for Radwaste Solidificat'on Sanple Punp Control Circuit.
a No. The circuit to be modified is not safety-related and the increased loading requiring a larger size fuse is within the capacity of the electrical system.
hM. See I above. The new fuse will provide proper overcurrent protection.
No. See I above.
SER NO.82-182 Cross Emference: PbE 82-171E Description of Change:
Interim ERCS Video Link.
~SUBQK No. This modification is not safety-related. The proposed cable runs in non-safety related raceways and connects non-safety equipm nt.
II. No. The link tran@nits information to the EOF; see I above.
III. No. No Technical Specification is applicable to this change.
91
SER NO.
~ 82-183 Cross
Reference:
~ NCR
~ 82-1147 Description of Chan e:
Evaluation of existing condition: ganged re-opening of ~0 and L%3 containment isolation valves.
No. This condition does not af ect the safe shutdown of the plant nor the response of ESF system is accident conditions. Previous analyses reflected the existing condition. Previous analyses do not address long-term recovery, however, appropriate procedural controls restrict the inadvertant opening of a highly contaminated system due to the condition.
Xi. No. See I above.
No. Safe shutdoe and accident mitigation are unaffected. The identified isolation valves will close upon receipt of an isolation signal.
Reference:
PNR 82-675 Description of Chan e:
Condensate Demineralizer system valve replacem nt.
I. No. The new valve has no affect on the operability of the regeneration system of the condensate demineralizers, which has no safety-related function.
Xi. No. See I above.
XII. No. The subject system is not addressed in the Technical Specifications; this change will not, reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications for any other system.
- 92
Reference:
~ PM 82-660 Description o" Chance:
R~aaval of security cages on the Unit 2 Coolie Tower basin ~cup valves.
SliHKary:
I. No. This change removes a unit separation boundary, restoring the system to its design configuration.
Ii. No. Unit 2 preop rational testing was considered as a rmde of operation in the original design.
Iii. No. See I above.
Reference:
P~IR 82-661 Description of Chan e:
Rival of plug in Unit 2
- X. No.
system Cooling Tower basin blm<own line.
This change removes a unit separation boundary, restoring the to its design configuration.
Ii. No. Unit 2 preoperational testing was considered as a mode of operation in the original design.
III. No. See I above.
~
S=-R NO.~ 82-187 Cross Re ference: ~ BR-656 Descri tion of Chan e:
Addition of supports to RiK system pipe hanger.
SUIl'aa I. No. This change will restore the hanger to the original design intent.
Tnis edification will be carried out in accordance with applicable codes and standards.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. As described in I above, this change will,maintain the current margin of safety.
SER NO.82-188 Cross R ference: M 82-272 Description of Chan e:
River Water In~e i ccmposite sampler installation.
S m~a I. No. This modification has no impact on any safety-related equipment used to support FSAR analyses, it. is being done to gather information.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. This modification will facilitate compliance with a Technical Specification /CKM reauirement.
Cross
Reference:
Test No. TP-49-001 Desc iotion of Chanqe.
BHR pm@ internal tan rature verification test. This test. will verify that the R'.K pimps will operate for a minimum of 10 minutes without pump seal cooling and motor oil cooling frcm ESW.
~SUIHM No. This test will be perforned within the constraints of the plant Technical Specifications. The pump will be available to perform an auto if if initiation required; an operator will restore ESP flow required.
IX. No. See I above.
No. The LPCX mode of RHR will not be affected by this test such that it could not perforate its safety function. See I above.
Reference:
Pl4R 82-171F Descri tion of Chan e:
Relocation of MC/SPDS consoles and radio equipment in Technical Support Center; also addition of viceo copier for WC and coaxial cables between panels in the TSC.
Sma~:
No. These changes are being made in response to Em rgency Plan Drill results; no safety-related systen~ are impacted by these changes.
II. Mi. See I above.
Ya. Neither change as described in X above affects the margin of safety for any Technical Specification.
SER NO.~ 82-191 Cross Re erence: ~ PYZ 82-659 Description of Chan e:
Increase in ESÃ loop low flow alarm time delays.
Ko. The subject relays are fail-safe, i.e. if they failed and a low flow condition existed, the alum would corn.in, followed by operator actioi1.
No. If an alarm cane in prem-turely, an operator would in'tiate transfer of E&J, which is within design.
No. The basis for the ES< Technical Specification is unaffected by this change.
Reference:
Pi~& 82-153 Descri tion of Chan e:
Door harchvare replacem nt.
Sunmaxy:
I. Ko. This change has no affect on the function of the doors in question.
II. No. This change sinply replaces door knobs with levers.
III. No. The doors are part of the Secondary Containment boundary, but this change has no effect on their capability to perform that function.
SFB NO.82-193
/
Cross Be erence: Pi~E 82-376 Desc iation of Chancre:
Installation of conduit. to allow input of remote feedwater valve position to the Transient Yenitoring System.
I. No. The purpose of this modification is to allow more operator information. 'lnese valves have no function in support of safe shutdown.
II. No. See I above.
XXI. No. See I above.
SER NO.82-194 Cross Bererence: Pi~i 82-119 Description of Chan e:
Provide protective enclosures for protection of seismic monitoring instrumentation.
~SKIEIB I. No. The structural integrity. of the concrete slab will not be adversely cted due to the subject drilling or cutting of reinforcing bars, per the ACI Standard ACI 318-77. Control Bocm operators will be notified of this work which will activate the monitors.
IX. No. The ~~sion bolts have been designed to keep the enclosure in place. The enclosure will be painted with rust inhibiting paint to prevent. rust-clogging of drains.
III. No. System reliability is increased due to this modification; safety margin is therefore not reduced.
Reference:
~ ll/8/82 Description of Chan e:
Allow operation at levels not to exceed 35%
supply can be restored to the Containment Inst~~t pm'ntil a 30 day reserve Gas system.
Sama~:
No. This level of power reflects the present 2-day supply. Worst case LOCA and LOOP events were reviewed and found accep~le assuming a 35%
power level, i.e., the eactor could achieve safe shutdown. Possible malfunctions in the Contai~nt Inst~int Gas system were reviewed and no concerns were found.
II ~ hM. See I above. No hardware modifications are in progress; this SER affects power level only.
No. The Technical Specification bases assum ADS availability upon loss of HPCI. A 35% ~ver level assures this to b true. Containment Instrunant Gas Isolation valves are unaffected by this reduced power.
Reference:
~ PYB 82-670B Descri tion of Chan e:
Hcdifications to correct cmrcon mode single failure in ESW system which affects the cooling to all four diesel generators.
~Sama I. No. This change will ensure adequate diesel cooling, while mitigating any water hanmer effects. The FSAR LOCA analyses were evaluated, and with this edification, adequate core and containmwt cooling is maintained. This was confirmed in part by test.
II. No. These changes do not affect any separation requirenents for ESV, nor do they permit any single failure fran disabling both loops of ESV.
III. No. The basis for the ESV Technical Specifications are unaffected by this mxKfication. No other related Technical Specifications which have their basis in the LOCA analyses in I above are affected.
98
SZR NO.82-197 Cross Re erence: PYR 82-626 Description of Chan e:
Yiodification to LRi'ilter inlet piping and hangers to resolve cracking problem.
~Sunna No. This modification, addition of weldolet and pipe supports, is b ing done to prevent failure of this non safety-related line.
kio. This circe vali create a functionally eouivalent condition as cd-u..ed to the originally evaluated design.
XXI. No. The subject filter and piping is not addressed by the Technical Specifications in support of any margin of safety.
Reference:
P~P,82-751 Description of Chan e:
Actdition of device to allow drainage of diesel generator jacket water drain line to 1azardous waste collection point.
SM~G T
W ~ No. The device will be installed to the standards of the equiprent it is associated with at a position downstream of the normally closed drain valve. This has no effect on diesel generator operation.
XI. No. See I dmve.
IXX. No. This device will enhance diesel generator maintenance. The bases for their operation in the Technical Specifications will not be affected.
99
Reference:
Pl& 82-357 Descri tion of Chan e:
Conversion o" security carr@uter "alarms" to "messages".
Senary:
No. This is a software modification (only) to a non-safety-related computer vstem.
Ko. This modification is to be implemented on a sys~ which cannot independently control the plant.
IXI. No. The security computer has no effect on plant operation as governed by the Technical Spec'fications.
S"R NO.82-200 Cross
Reference:
AD QA 311 Descri tion of Chan e:
Method e of dewater'ng solid radwaste for o"f ite disposal.
~SUfW&
X. No. The FSAR evaluation of the rupture of the worst case radwaste tank bounds any failure associated with the dewatering of a radwaste line per the subject method.
IXe No. See I above. Contaipzent of radioactive material, liner drop accident, dewatering process, gas production, and radiation measure were all evaluated and found to be acceptable.
No. Tnis method will reduce the amaunt of solid radwaste material released for offsite disposal. The proposed m thodology has no adverse affect on the bas s for the Technical Specifications or the associated safety margins.
100
SFR NO.82-201 Cross
Reference:
PAR 82-730 Doscriotion of Chance:
Extension of o ain line on Liauid Radwaste Evaporator condenser to facilitate maintenance.
~SUIRII No. Failure of the sQ~oject line would result in a leak pathway to the save floor drain to which the condenser is currently piped.
No. See i above.
No adverse effects on any safety-related system nor its associated echnical Specification will occur due to this modification.
Reference:
P!S 82-277A Description of ~w~e:
Provide drilled piers for the foundation of the new addition to the existing SGA building (Phase B modification) .
Surya@:
- i. No. The new addition has no safety-related functions, and its collapse will not affect any Category i structures. Safety-related duct banks and piping have b en reviewed and are not impacted by the mcdification.
ii. No. See 1 above.
iii. No. See i above.
101
E YO.
SEi?82-203 Cross
Reference:
PiF 82-280 Description of Chance:
Provision o. em@uter 'nputs for Residual Heat Removal Service Plater (RHRSV) tezgeratu e elements.
SUIXBZV:
No. This change removes a signal from a recorder which is difficult to read and places it in the comuter where it is easily accessible. REGS outlet tezgerature availability is unaffected by this modification.
No. This modification lessens the chance of BHR Heat Exchanger damage by enabling it to be more accurately monitored. These temperature elements are used during the Steam Condensing Yance only.
No. The Technical Specifications do not address the Steam Condensing FaQe of RHR operation. This change has no effect on the basis for any Technical Specification.
Reference:
Pi~% 82-743 Descrivtion of Chan e:
Building up of existing welds on Service h'ater pipe support.
Sunmary:
I. No. The welds will be consistent with existing standards. This rrodification will restore the support to the originally evaluated design.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. Safety margin will be naintained,due to this ~i 'fication as specified in I above.
102-
Reference:
~ PAR 82-745 Description of Chan e:
Building up of existing welds on Reactor Building chilled water pipe support.
Sumn=.m:
No. The welds will be consistent with existing standards. This modification will restore the support to the originally evaluated design.
Ii. No. See I ~ve.
IXX. No. Safety margin will be maintained due to this reification as specif'ed in I above.
Reference:
Pi& 82-747 Descri tion of Chan e:
Building up of existing welds on chilled water pipe support.
S~rg X. Ko. The welds will be consistent with existing standards. This modification will restore the support to the originally evaluated design, Ii. No. See I above.
Iii. No. Safety margin will be maintained due to this modification as specified in I above.
103
Reference:
~ M 82-750 Description of Chan e:
Building up of existing welds on RCIC system pipe support.
S~rg No. The ~"elds will be consistent with existing standards. This modification will restore the support to the originally evaluated design.
Zl. No. See i above.
No. Safety margin will be maintained due to this modification as specified in I above.
SER NO.82-208 Cross R ference: PORC Ytg.82-234 11/24/82 Descri tion of Chan e:
i Evaluation of dewatering of solid radwaste for shipment offsite.
Sugary:
No. The radwaste ~
current accident evaluation of the rupture of the wors6 case bounds any failure of a dewatering radwaste liner within the Radwaste Building.
hM. Based on acceptable reviews of the following: containment of radioactive material, line drop accident, dewatering process, gas production and radiation exposure.
No. The. proposed process is optional and will be used in support of other available processes. Solid radwaste release for offsite disposal can be reduced by the proposed method.
104
SER KO.82-209 Cross Re erence: PORC t Yitg.82-234 11/24/82 Description of Chanqe:
Use of Yr bile Radwaste Processing System for radwaste solidification.
~SUII1llB Yo. Th current accident evaluation of the rupture of the worst case radwaste tardy bounds any failure of the system, wnich will be located in the Radwaste Building.
No. Based on acceptable reviews of the following: contairzent of radioactive material, radiation exposure, solidification process, electrical loading, crosstie of waste transfer lines, fire protection, liner corrosion, use of cement, and ATZBA.
No. The mobile system is ecpxivalent to the existing in-plant system, with respect to 10CFR50.36a. The amount of solid radwaste generated will b' essentially the same as if the in-plant system was used.
Reference:
PI% 82-790 Description of Chan e:
Mx3ification of the APBH printed circuit board logic to allow a direct input to the cmparator from the LPRM output.
Smi~:
bM. This change allows a less tim consuming, rmre accurate adjustment of the power range aanitoring system in response to an increase in the total core peaking factor. The operation and function of the system are not altered.
Ko. See I above. This change affects only the neans of adjusting pcwer range system response.
Ko. This change is consistent with the bases of the Technical Specifications on APRN setpoints, which defines the method of circuit adjustm nt.
- 105
Cross Refe ence: PORC t Ytg. No.82-238 11/30/82 scription of Chan e:
Evaluation of operation up to 50% power with one leaking train of the nitrogen storage portion of the Containment Xns~mnt Gas system.
Sunna~:
Ko. Short term ADS requirements are unaffected as long as accumulator pressure is maintained at or hive 150 psig. Long term requirements are m t based on a calculation showing Jmt 2 ADS valves are sufficient to "eave decay heat 1 day after shutdvm from 50% rated them+1 power, assuming that 50% rated thecal power has never been exceeded.
XX. No. See I above.
XXX. No. See I <~Grave. The short and long term requirements being met satisfies the bases for rrargin of safety in the Technical Specifications.
SER NO. 82-21 Cross
Reference:
Pi& 82-081 Description of Chan e:
Phase A modifications to S&A building.
~Sunma I. No. The subject modifications cover various facility additions generally within the existing SSA building, which is not safety-related.
Construction-related concerns due to underground piping and ductwork have been reviewed and found acceptable.
XI. No. See I above.
IXX. No. See I above.
106
S"R YO. 82-.213 Cross
Reference:
P.P.82-800 Description of Chan e:
Addition of or'ices in each of the six combined intercept valve fast acting olenoid valves.
SUI18lRrv:
X. No. -
The fast acting solenoid is a non-safety valve; however, integral to the turbine trip analysis in the FSAR. This modification it is has no effect on that analyses with respect to turbine trip, closure t~( s or overspeedo No., Failure of an orifice will not cause oversp"-ed or prevent turbine trip. See I above.
XXI. No. Based on XI above, no margin of safety is reduced by this modification.
SER NO.82-214 Cross Re erence: PL% 82-433 Description of Chan e:
Revised SGTS logic to delete automatic fan switch-over on a high-radiation signal.
~SUIWB No. The feature being deleted is not considered in any FSAR analysis, including offsite dose. Eauipm nt reliability will b increased by preventing unnecessary automatic witch-overs.
XI. No. Tnis mod'fication allows the SGTS to conform to the original safety analysis by letting i" function on a LOOP rather than tripping b c-use the SGTS radiation monitors fail high.
it XXI. No. The basis for the SGTS Technical Specifications is unaffected by this change.
107-
SER KO.~
~ 82-215 Cross
Reference:
~ PM 82-718 Description of Chan e:
Replacement of containm nt instrument gas pressure switches with static 0-ring pressure switches.
SUI'i'+:
No. The pressure switch is b ing replaced with a switch of the sana rating and, improved reliability.
No. This is a one-for-one swap of pressure m~itches. No new situation is created and reliability is increased.
ib. The bas's for the related ECCS system, ADS, is unaffected by this changeout for the reasons in I and II above.
Reference:
PAR 82-744 Descri tion off Chan e:
t.riding of stiffening plate to existing HPCI pipe support base plate.
No. The mxLLfication corrects a deficiency thereby allowing the support to meet original design requirem nts.
Ii. No. The modification will create the design previously evaluated.
III. No. Safety nargin will be upgraded to the level previously evaluated.
108
SER NG.82-217 Cross Be erence: PIE 82-748 Description of Chan e:
Addition of welds and support material to BHR pioe support.
SUIKORIV:
- i. R>. This modification will ~lem nt the intent of original design reouirem nts.
ii. Ko. See I above.
IXI. Ke. Performing this modification will maintain the previously evaluated safety margin.
SER ÃO.82-218 Cross B ference: Pi~E 82-779 Descri tion of Change:
Yodification to ESV pipe support.
S~rg I. No. This modification will ~lcm nt the intent of the original design reauirem nts.
Xi. ho. See I above.
Iii. Ye. Performing this modification will maintain th previously evaluated safety margin.
109
e GER NO.82-219 Cross
Reference:
Descri tion of Chancre:
Pi~% 82-780 Modification to RKU pipe support.
~SU!1tBB I. No. This modification will inplemnt the intent of the original design retirements. i)
II. hM. See I above.
III. Ko. Performs.ng this modification will maintain the previously evaluted safety margin.
Reference:
Setpoint Change Pwcnxest 82-109 Descr'ion of Chan e:
Revision of various 480 VAC Y~C breaker settings.
SUIPa9~:
Ilo. These settings are not described in the FSAR. The new settings neet the standard design objectives, i.e. high enough to handle both inrush and full load currents without random tripping wnile low enough to detect short circuits.
Yo. The new settings are in accordance with existing design philosoph'es and therefore create no new accident situations.
III. Vo. By meeting the objectives in I above, safety margin is maintained.
110-
S" R NO.82-221 Cross
Reference:
Setpoint Change Reauest 82-110 D scription of Chan e:
Revision of various 480 VAC YCC breaker settings.
SAP'~:
Ko. These settings are not cescribed in the FSAR. The new settings rect the standard design objectives, i.e. high enough to handle both inrush and ull load currents without random tripping yet low enough to detect short circuits.
R. The new settings are consistent with existing design philosophies and therefore create no new accident situations.
III. No. By m eting the objectives in I above, safety margin is maintained.
Reference:
Setpoint Change Request 82-111 Descri tion of Chan e:
Revis'on of var'ous 480 VAC KCC breaker settings.
~SUIKAB I. No. These settings are not described in the FSAR. The new settings m et the standard design objectives, i.e. high enough to handle bo&
inrush and full load currents without random tripping yet low enough to detect short circuits.
II. No. The new settings are consistent with existing design philosophies and therefore create no new accident situations.
III. No. By rreeting the objectives in I above, safety ~~ in is maintained.
111
Reference:
t Setpoin" Change Bequest 82-112 D scription of Chance:
Revision o various 480 VAC ICC bred~'er settings.
SLZHi~:
No. These settings are not described in the FSAR. The new settings meet the standard design objectives, i.e. high enough to handle both i@rush and full load currents without random tripping yet low enough to detect short circuits.
hM. The new settings are in accordance with existing design philosophies and therefore create no new accident situations.
III. Ko. By meeting the objectives in I &nve, safety margin is maintained.
Reference:
S tpoin" Change Request 82-113 Descri tion of Chan e:
Revision of various 480 VAC &AC t bre~wer settings.
~SUIIQlR No. The .e settings are not described in the FSAR. Tne new settings meet the standard design objectives, i.e. high enough to handle both inrush and full load currents without randem tr'pping yet low enough to detect short circuits.
hM. Tne new settings are consistent with existing design philosophies and therefore create no new accident situations.
III. No. By meeting the objectives in I above, safety margin is maintained.
112
SM NO 82-22>
Cross Ro erence: Setpoint Change Request 82-114 Baser'ation of Chan e:
Revision of various 480 VAC YCC breaker settings.
Sun@~~:
I. No. These settings are not described in the FSAR. The new settings rreet the standard design objectives, i.e. high enough to handle both inrush and full load currents without random tripping yet low enough to detect short circuits.
Ii. No. The new settings are consistent w'th existing design philosophies and therefore create no new accident situations.
III. No. By meeting the objectives in I above, safety margin is maintain&.
SFR NO.82-226 Cross
Reference:
Setpoint Change R~est 82-149 Descri tion of Chan e:
Change temperature differential switch tim r on SGTS heaters to allow rmre tive to establish delta T due to colder outside air temperatures.
SUl1lMXV:
The tiDe it takes to develop the required delta T across the heaters is not considered in FSAR analysis. The trip function is maintained.
No. The ti~ to meet the delta T interlock does not affect or interact
~riA any other safety-related systems, and the single failure criteria is met via the redundant system. The ability of SGTS to perform all of its safety functions is unaffected.
No. The Technical Specification requirerrents related to SGTS are not affected by th's change.
113
v ~2~
82-227
~S.".R Ihl NO.
~ I Cross v
Reference:
I PIE 82-692 Description of Chan e:
Deletion of pressure switches and relays from vacuum breaker test logic in the printery containm nt vents vacuum relief system.
SUIHMIV:
No. The affected ccnaponents were'art of a seal-in circuit which was defeated by an earlier mxiification. The only function o the breakers which is altered is that the operator can no longer leave them unattended in the test position; a pushbutton must be continuously depressed.
No. A review of FSM Table 15.0-2, and analyses of primary/secondary containment, Control Room habitability, pipe breaks, and instrum nt time responses are unaffected.
No. The function of the vacuum relief valves is unchanged by thi.s modification, and their reliability is not reduced.
SER- h%.~ 82-228 Cross
Reference:
~ Pi~IR 82-387 Description of Chan e:
Addition of axial vibration monitoring equipm nt to the reactor recirculation moto /pump.
No. The design has taken into account the ba~ce of the motor/pump assembly and potential missiles. Therefore, previous evaluations are unaffected.
No. Split-ring failure is the only postulated accident; involve previous evaluations. However, it it would is not expected to occur, per a tudy conducted under the most adverse operating conditions.
No. The Technical Specifications on the Reactor Recirculation System are unaffected by this modification.
114
S..R NO.82-229 Cross Re erence: PYR 82-402 Lescriation of Chan e:
Installation of two photoelectric smoke detectors in Fire Zone 1-6I.
Smarmy:
I. No. This modification allows previous FSAR cumiitnants and. analyses to be met.
II. No. After ccvmletion of this modi ication, the as-built configuration of this system will conform to previous analysis.
XII. No. This system was not included 'n the Technical Specifications.
Reference:
P>R 82-472 D seri tion of Chancre:
Relay replacenmnt to eluninate overreach due to transient responses of coupling capacitor voltage transformers.
SUBIWRZY:
X. No. Safety-related equipment is unaffected by this modification.
II. No. Cperation of the new relay will trip generator lockout and the turbine as previously evaluated in the FSAR.
III. No. The Technical Specification bases do not address generator output as it is not required to safely shutdown the plant or control accident conditions within the plant.
115
SER NO.82-231 Cross Rererence: 2'lB.82-722 D scription o+ Chancre:
Supply power from lighting panel breakers to suppression chamber receptacles.
Sm~:
No. This rradification will bring the plant into accordance with design documents, allowing 120 VAC power for convenience in the suppression chamber during outages.
Ko. A short circui" will trip a 20 anp light'ng panel breaker which has no safety significance.
Yo. Tn's edification does not affect any sy tern considered in the development of safety margin.
Reference:
PiM 82-746 Description o+f Chan e:
Replacement of struts on i water pipe support.
ch'lied
~Surmn I. hO. Larger supports will bring the as-built condition up to the design starBards previously analyzed.
II. No. See I above. The replacem nt struts were the ones intended by the original design.
III. No. l&rgin of safety is maintained since no analysis is to be changed.
116
Cross
Reference:
P~~B 82-758 Descry>tion of Chan e:
Replacerent of butterfly valves in the circulating water system.
X. No. This mcdification is a one-for-one valve changeout with valves of a more reliable design. Circulating water is not a safety system.
XX. No. Sys~~~ function is uncnanged, yet nnre reliable due to this aerification.
XXX. No. The improvenent in system reliability cannot cause a reduction in safety margin.
GER NO.82-234 Cro s
Reference:
PI& 82-766 Description of Chan e:
P rovide single failure protection to the reactor recirculation YQ set trip circuit.
Su~rur:
No. The unction of the system remains unchanged. This change corrects a deficiency tha" would allow redundant devices to be negated by an electrical failure of a lockout relay contact.
XI. No. Tnis change provides a redundant path for lcekout relay energization. No new failure modes are created.
XX ~ No. The protective circuitry function addressed by the Technical Specif'cations is unaltered by this modification.
117
Reference:
Pi~E 82-773 D scription of Chan e:
Re lacemnt of butterfly valves in the I~Me-ua Demineralized Nater
'l~=eus fer/Storage System.
Summary:
No. This modification is a one-for-one changeout with valves of a more reliable design. PD~'eup demineralized water transfer is not a safety system.
System Qmction is unchanged, yet more reliable due to this pxLLfication.
No. The improvement in system reliability cannot cause a reduction in safety margin.
Reference:
Pi~% 82-775 Description of Chan e:
Replacement of butterfly valves in the makeup demineralized water transfer/storage system.
~Svxme No. This rradification is a one-for-one changeout with valves of a rmre reliable design. Yakeup demineralized water transfer is not a safety system.
No. System function is unchanged, yet more reliable due to this modification.
Yo. The izprovemnt in system reliability cannot cause a reduction in safety margin.
118
S:"R NO.~
~ 82-237 Cross
Reference:
~ Pi~R 82-778 D scrir>tion of Chan e:
Replacement of butter ly valves in the circulating water system.
~Smma X. 1'.e. This modification is a one-for-one changeout with valves of a more reliable design. Circulating water is not a safety system.
XI. No. System function is unchanged, yet more reliable due to this rxxlification.
XXX. hM. The irprovemnt in system reliability cannot cause of reduction in safety margin.
SKR NO.82-238 Cross
Reference:
PAR 82-811 Description of Chan e:
Relocation of leads from the reactor recirculation YQ control pemr failure relay to allow alarm initiation upon fuse failure.
Sumnnrv:
I. No. Thi modification allows detection of a credible failure rreae (i.e.
control fuse failure) .
Xl. No. This modification allows detection of a previously analyzed system operation.
XXX. No. The Technical Specifications do not specifically addre s the cogznents affected by this change.
119
Reference:
~ P~E
~ 82-816 Description of Chanqe:
Replacement of butter.ly valves in the condensate system.
~Sama No. This rradification is a one-for-one changeout with valves of a more reliable de ign. Concensate is not a safety system.
No. System function is unchanged, yet more reliable due to this modification.
No. The improvement in system reliability cannot cause a reduction in safety m rgin.
Reference:
P2B 82-817 Descri tion of Chan e:
Replacerrent of butterflyf valves in the Feed Pump Turbine Steam System.
SU? FaiR+:
I. No. This modification is a one-for-one changeout with valves of a mre reliable design. Feed Pump Tu bine Steam is not a safety system.
II. No. System &nction is unchanged, yet more reliable due to this modification.
III. No. The improvem nt in system reliability cannot cause a reduction in safety margin.
120
Cross
Reference:
PMR 82-818 Description of Chan e:
Replacem nt of butterfly valves in the IMe-up Mater Supply System.
Sumaarv:
No. This edification is a one-for-one changeout with valves of a more reliable design. Make-up water supply is not a safety system.
No. System function is unchanged, yet more reliable due to this modification.
No. Tne irprove~L nt in system reliability cannot cause a reduction in safety margin.
Reference:
PMR 82-819 Description of Chance:
Replace@ant of butterfly valves in the miscellaneous drainage system.
Summa:
bM. This modification is a one-for-one changeout with valves of a more reliable design. Miscellaneous Drainage is not a safety system.
No. System function is unchanged, yet more reliable due to this modification.
No. The improvem nt in system reliability cannot cause a reduction in safety margin.
121
Reference:
Cross PiM 82-823 Description of Change:
Replacement of butterfly valves in the Turbine Building Chilled 4'ater System.
No. This modification is a one-for-one changeout with valves of a more reliable design. Turbine Building Chilled aeter is not a safety system.
IX. No. System function is unchanged, yet more reliable due to this modification.
No. The improve nt in system reliability cawot cause a reduction in safety margin.
NO.82-244 Cross
Reference:
Setpoint Change Request 82-157 Description of Chan e:
Change level switch setting on regeneration waste surge tanks.
S~~rg I. No. The waste sludge collection, transfer, and processing system is not safety-related. This change increases the usable volum in the surge tank by allowing the discharge pumps to start sooner.
XI. No. See I above.
III. No. The Technical Specifications address effluent releases to u~aestricted areas. This does not apply to this modification.
122
SFR NO.82-245 Cross
Reference:
P~R 82-788 D scription of Chan e:
A3.low FHR valve operation rom the remote shutdown panel without manual actions.
Smmarv:
No. Tne design basis of the remote shutdown panel (RSP) requires no event other than con~1 rnxn evacuation. This ncdification has no impact on safety operaton under that criteria. (Several NSSSS isolation signals will no longer interlock the valves when their control is trans erred to th RSP.)
No. This modi ication allows Fore control fran the RSP without creating the possibility of an unanalyzed event.
No. %as action does not reduce safety margin as defined in the basis fo any Technical Specification.
Reference:
Pi~% 82-081 Description of Chan e:
Setting of mechanical equipnent on the SEA building roof.
SUM+
I. No. This activity, which affects a non safety-related structure, has been reviewed and found not to impact the safety of buried piping nor duct banks.
Ij. No. See I above.
III. No. See I above.
123
SMi NO.82-247 Cross Re ference: PlW 82-763 Descr'o"ion of Chanoe:
Reproval of unit isolation mechanic on clarified water system.
Sme~:
No. The de-isolation of the system will allow seal water to flow to the circulating and service water pumps in Unit 2. This will not affect any previous evaluation in the FSAR.
XX. No. See I above.
XXX. No. No systems timt form any basis for a Technical Specification are affected by this modification.
S~M NO.82-248 Cross
Reference:
PM.82-83S Description of Chan e:
Restoration of SPING sample ourn nestor.
SKTiVB~
X. No. This modification resto es the original design of the sample system without affecting the Reactor Building SPIC op ration.
XX 0 No. The subject SPRIG is not safety-related, and its operation remains unchanged.
XXX. No. The monitoring system will be fully capable of performing its intended function.
124
Si.R HO.~ 82-249 Cross Beference: ~ i'm 82-277B wscr'ation of Change:
Belocation of Yard L'ghting and Cathodic Protection Fquipzaat to support S&A building mcQifications (Phase B) .
Sumaarv.
No. The subject modification does not affect safety-related systems other thm concerns related to excavation for foundations in areas oi buried Class lE piping and duct bariMs. Standard construction precautions will be followed.
No. See I above.
No. The subject systems are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
SEB NO.82-250 Cross Beference: Pi~% 82-081 Descri tion of Chanre:
Addition of drains to LRN system to support decontamination shop equipment in S&A building Phase A modification.
~Surmax No. The additional drains do not interface with any safety-related equipment.
h>. Tnis modification will not allow inadvertant transfer of con~nated fluid to a clean drainage system.
No. These drains have no affect on the basis for the LRV system, as specified in the Technical Specifications.
125-
SEic NO.82-251 Cross
Reference:
Pi~Z 82-815 D scription of Chan e:
Rove ire hose reel 1 HR-222 to a more visible location.
S'LUTii Ko. The relocation of the hose reel dces not jeopardize any safety-related equip+ nt.
IX. No. See I above.
III. No. Th's hose reel is not listed in the Technical Specifications.
Reference:
Pl& 82-729 Description o Chan e:
Application of epoxy surfaces to the walls of the L%'ilter valve gallery to
~~ e decontamination easier.
S~zp I. No. The application of epoxy has no adverse affect on equipment. In the event of a leak, the epoxy will make decon~nation easier.
II. No. See I above.
III. No. See X above.
126
S"B NO.82-253 Cross R ference: PiM 82-624 Descrir>tion of Change:
Prov'de a flush for the LH? evaporator level sensing lines to prevent pluggilig~
SUIHt Df:
No. Any failure related to this edification is bounded by the previous analyses in the FSAR. Ywterials used in this modification shall be consistent with existing standards.
No. All input param ters and initial conditions in existing FSAR analyses remain unchanged.
hM. No adverse effects on any safety-related systems will occur due to this aerification; the margin of safety therefore remains unchanged.
SFR NO.82-254 Cross
Reference:
Pi~E 80-007 D scription of Chan e:
Replacement of &C mechanical Trip Valve (lTZV) with a higher quality valve, thereby increasing turbine generator reliability.
Buanarv:
No. Tnere is no difference with respect to FSAR evaluations due to this modification. However, the probability of sticking of the VIV spool piece will be greatly reduced due to its stainless steel parts not being as susceptible to corrosion as the previous carbon steel spool piece.
II. No. The new KZV will functionally behave exactly as the former VIIV.
No. Since the H1V will functionally behave as its predecessor, no margin of safety is reduced.
127
S" R NO.82-255 Cross Re f.erence: P&Z 82-862 D=scriation o Chance:
Znstallation of 30 any breaker and wiring to support a new receptacle in the Service and Adnunistration Building.
SU~a I. No. This modification has no affect on safety-related eauipzent.
II. No. See I above.
Iii. No. See I above.
Reference:
PiE 82-687 Descri tion of Chan e:
ReplaceEt of relays in RHP., RCIC, RviCU and mainsteam (tlS) with AGASTAT tim delay relays so that systems do not isolate in the event of a loss of 120 VAC ins~~nt bus.
glZG~~:
I. No. Tne tirre delay (1.0 + 10% seconds) does not affect the results of the MS line br~ outs'de contairarent analysis. Redundant high flow isolation trips will isolate breaks in the affected piping systems.
II. No. Previous FSAR analyses elied only upon the high flow isolation trips; these mips are unaffected by this modification.
III. No. This action will not affect valve closure t~~ s; tim response of area high temperature instrum nts are not considered in the margin of safety as defined by the Technical Specifications.
128
Reference:
St~up Subtest ST 1ri.5 Description of Chan e:
Exception due to RCIC 150 psig test not being ccnpleted during Test Condition 2.
Sc!EQezv:
I. No. RCIC is not safety-"elated; all other RCIC startup testing has been cmgleted.
II. Ko. See I above.
III. No. Th RCIC svstem is not included in the basis for
't. any Technical Specification safety l~~
SER NO.82-258 Cross Referent: Startuo Test ST 13 Deecr'orion of C~cfe:
Startup Test 13, "Process Computer" will not be cmpleted during Test Condition 2, but during Test Condition 3 instead.
Su~rroary.
X. No. The backup to the process canputer for thermal limits calculations, BUCLZ, is available.
II. No. See I ~ve.
III. Yo. BU"LE is available to perform as computer backup for thermal limits calculations.
129-
S ER YO.82-259 Cross P ference: Startup Test ST 5.7 Description of Ch=nae:
Standup Test 5.7, "Scram Timing o Selected Rods Dur'ng Plarz.ed Sera";.s of Startup Test Progran" will not be perfonred in conjunction with Star'p Test 31.1, "Loss of Turbine Cinerator and Offsite Pc;er" due to loss of powe to the Rcd Posit'on jndicat'on System..
No. Although Startup Test 5.7 is not per owned during Test Condition 2, individual scram tir,. tests are performed du ing the test co..dition.
Thus the functio . served by Startup Test 5.7 is met (via Engineering Surveillance SE-55-001) .
Ij. No. See I above.
Ko. All requirements set foM by the Technical Specifications were met by the implementation of SE-55-001 during Test Condition 2.
Reference:
Setpoint Change Rect~est 82-347 Description of Chance:
Revised circuit breaker settings in the 480V AC Fotor control centers.
~SI'lflB Ho. The revised settings are not cescribed in the FSFB; eacn revised setting is high enough to pexmit ccmpleticn of the flow path for and full load ~~ rents without xandom tripping. They are also 1m'rish low enough to enable sensitive short circuit detection.
No. The subjec" settings are consistent with existing design philosophies and co~entation.
No. The basis for the margin o safety is covered by the design cx'iteria expressed in I above.
130
GER NO.82-261 Cross
Reference:
Setpoint Change Bemest 82-348 Descri tion of Chan e:
Revised circuit breaker settings in the 480 V BZ motor control centers.
~Burma No. he revised settings are not descend in the PSAR; each revised setting is high enough to perry't cargletion of the flow path for both inrush and full load currents without random trippings. They are also low enough to enable sensitive short circuit detection.
No. Tne subject settings are consistent with existing design philosophies and documentation, No. The basis for the margin of safety is covered by the design criteria expressed in I above.
Reference:
PDS82-887 Descri tion of Chan e:
Removal of boundary tag frcm valve in condensates and refueling 1 water system on the Unit 1 side o. the security boundary to allow flushing of Unit 2 piping.
Ko. This modification doe rot affect equiprent necessary fo" safe shutdown of the plant. Due to the existence of two other boundary valves, no pipe break can deplete either the refueling water storage tank, condensate storage teak, or denuneralized water storage tar3'..
No. This modification sinnly allows denineralized water to f.'cw through Unit. 1 piping frcm Unit 2 piping, without jeopardizing the boundary see I above.
No. No ecuiprrent and/or systers which are part of any basis or criteria in any Technical Specification are affected by this change.
131
'