Text

Control of Heavy Loads at Nine Mile Point Unit 2.
	ML18037A018
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	07/10/1984
From:	; STONE & WEBSTER, INC.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML17054A875	List: ML17054A874; ML18037A018;
References
	REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR 12177, NUDOCS 8407130187
	Download: ML18037A018 (548)
	v • d • e

J.O.No. 12177 THE CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-410 8407i30i87 8407fo ADaCV OSaOa4~0 A. PDR

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2

'acae TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title INTRODUCTION t

l-l BASIS OF REVIEW', 2-1 RESULTS OF REVIEW 3-1 HAZARD ELIMINATION TABLE LIST OF FIGURES 5-1 LIFTING DEVICES 6-1 VERIFICATION OF TESTING, INSPECTION, AND MAINTENANCE 7-1 VERIFICATION OF CRANE DESIGN 8-1 8.1 Introduction 8-1 8.2 Differences Between Unit 2 Design and NUREG 0554 8-2 8' RBPC Ioss of Power and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 8-4 8.4 Cranes Other than RBPC 8-4 Operator Training, Qualification, and Conduct 9-1

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 LIST 'OF TABLES .

Table Number Title 3-1 OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS WHICH CARRY HEAVY LOADS OVER SAFE SHUTDOWN OR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL EQUIPMENT 3-2 OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS WHICH ARE EXCLUDED FROM FURTHER .CONSIDERATION 3-3 2MHR-CRN1/POLAR CRANE LOADS REACTOR BUILDING CRANES'- LOADS HANDLED 3-5 SCREENWELL 'AREA TRAVELING CRANES - LOADS HANDLED HAZARD ELIMINATION

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 LIST OF FIGURES Figure Number Title 5-1 Safe Load Paths for Heavy Loads Safe Load Paths for Heavy Loads, Refueling Floor 5-3 Safe Load Paths, Screenwell Building Crane Restricted Area Diagram

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter dated December 22, 1980, to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) contained NUREG 0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants. This letter requested NMPC to review the control for handling heavy loads to determine the extent to which general guidelines were addressed and to identify changes and modifications that would be required to satisfy these guidelines.

The information presented in this report is a summary of the heavy loads analysis of Unit 2. The concerns of the NRC staff as defined in NUREG 0612 have been specifically addressed in Section 3. The objective of NUREG 0612 to provide a maximum practical "defense-in-depth" approach to reduce risk involved in load-handling failures remains an ongoing objective of NMPC.

Section 8. 2 of this report provides a comparison and evaluation of the differences between the Unit 2 polar crane and NUREG 0554.

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 SECTION 2 BASIS OF REVIEW A heavy load has been defined by NUREG 0612 as any weight greater than the combined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its associated handling tool.

This report uses "greater than 1,000 pounds" as a basis for determining "heavy load." The actual weight for the spent fuel assembly and its associated handling tool is 1,129 pounds. In the area of the reactor and spent fuel pool, all loads which are hoisted and handled were investigated. This report does not address temporary rigging/load handling systems which are erected as needed during the course of normal plant maintenance; these are controlled by administrative procedures in accordance with NUREG 0612.

The general guidelines identified in NUREG 0612 were used as a basis for this review.

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 SECTION 3 RESULTS OF REVIEW

/

The results of the, review are listed as direct responses to of the NRC's December 22, 1980, letter. For convenience the NRC requested information is repeated, followed by NMPC's response.

The following format corresponds point by point to Enclosure 3 of the NRC's letter:

2. INFORMATION REQUESTED FROM LICENSEE 2.1 General Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems NUREG 0612," Section 5.1.1, , identifies several general guidelines related to the design and operation of overhead load-handling systems in the areas where spent fuel is stored, in the vicinity of the reactor core, and in other area of the plant where a load drop could result in damage to equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. Information provided in response to this section should identify the extent of potentially hazardous load-handling operations at a site and the extent of conformance to appropriate load-handling guidance.

2.1-1 Re uested Information Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis).

~Res orise This study included a systematic review of all permanent cranes', monorails, and hoists

'ntended for use at Unit 2. The overhead handling systems,.from which load drops may

', result in damage to a system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal, are listed in Table 3-1.

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 2.1-2 Re uested Information s

Justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from the above category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component. required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

~Res onse The overhead handling systems, which have been excluded from this study, are listed in Table 3-2. The specific justification for excluding each system is noted.

2 1 3

~ Re uested Information 6

With respect to the design and operation of heavy-load handling systems in the reactor building and those load-handling systems identified in Item 2. 1-1, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1. The following specific information should be included in your reply:

a.. Drawings or sketches sufficient to clearly identify the location of safe load'aths, safety-related equipment.

spent fuel, and

~Res onse See Section 5 for drawings which define safe load paths and show safety-related equipment.

b. A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within safe load paths, including procedures, if any, for deviation from these paths.

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Nine Mile Point, Unit 2

~Res onse Safe load paths will be referenced in procedures and shown on'quipment layout drawings. Ioad paths will not be marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled. There are 10 to 15 load paths for the reactor building operating floor. Ioad paths would be confusing and overlapped by other load paths. There are limit switches on the reactor building polar crane (RBPC) to limit movement of heavy loads over the spent fuel pool. Most of the other cranes discussed in Item 2. 1-1 are mono'rail which inherently define the load path.

I c ~ The tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its

designated lifting device, and verification that the handling of such load is governed by a written procedure containing, as a minimum, the information identified in NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.2(2).

~Res onse See Tables 3-3, 3-4, and 3-5, for tabulation of heavy loads handled by cranes, hoists, and monorails. The procedures will comply with NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.1(2), except that the safe load paths are not marked on the floors.

These procedures will be available for onsite review.

d. ~ Verification that lifting devices identified in Item 2.1-3c comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978, or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate. For lifting devices where these standards, as supplemented by NUREG 0612, Section

5. 1. 1(4) or 5. 1. 1(5) are not met, describe- any proposed alternatives and

-demonstrate'their equivalency in terms of load-handling reliability.

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Nine'Mile Point Unit 2

~Res onse See Section 6 for a discussion on lifting devices.

e. 'erification that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, has been invoked with respect to crane inspection, testing, and maintenance. Where any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient information should be provided to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed alternatives.

~Res onse See Section 7 for compliance with guidelines of ANSI B30.2-1976.

Verification that. crane design complies No. 70 ANSI

'nd with the guidelines of CMAA Specification B30.2-1976,'ncluding Chapter 2-1 of the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided.

~Res onse See Section 8 for verification of crane design.

g. Exceptions,

.ANSI B30.2-1976 if any, taken with respect to operator to

'raining, qualification, and conduct.

~Res onse See Section 9 for operator training, qualification, and conduct.

2.2'Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Reactor Building NUREG 0612; Section '5.1.4, provides guidelines concerning the design and *operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of spent fuel in th'e reactor vessel or in storage.

Information provided in response to this section should demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure 3>>4

Nine Mil'e Point Unit 2 that,'n'his area, either the likelihood of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criteria I through III.

2.2-1 Re uested Information Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment, designator, any cranes physically capable -'( i. e., ignoring interlocks, mechanic'"stop's, or operating procedures) moveable of carrying'oads over spent fuel in the storage pool or in the reactor vessel.

~Res onse Equipment Name ~Te ~ca acit

a. Reactor Building Polar. 125/25/0.5 ton 2MHR-CRN1 Crane

b. Fuel-Handling Jib 0.5 ton. 2MHF-CRN-1 C. Fuel-Handling Jib 0.5 ton 2MHF-CRN-2

d. Channel'-Han'dling Jib 200 lb 2MHF-CRN-3 e; Fuel Grapple Tele- NA

'scoping,

2. 2-2 Re uested Information Justify the exclusion of any crane in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of heavy load over stored. fuel or into any location where, following any failure, such load may drop into the reactor vessel or spent fuel storage pool. "

a

~Res onse The fuel-handling jib cranes and the channel-handling jib crane can be excluded since loads handled are less than 1,000 lb.

The fuel grapple handles only the fuel assembly and therefore is also excluded since 3-5

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 previous analyses postulated worst-case accident for spent fuel assembly drop over the reactor core. The calculated exposures (design base accident) were a small fraction of the allowable guidelines of 10CFR100 as discussed in Section 15.7.4 of the Unit 2 FSAR.

2.2-3 Re uested Information Identify any cranes listed in Item 2.2-1 which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make, the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i. e.,

complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.*

~Res ense The main hook (125 ton) of the reactor building polar crane is a single-failure proof design which complies with the criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6. See Section 8 for a more detailed summary of the RBPC design.

See Table 3-3 for the crane loads.

2.2-4 Re uested Information For cranes identified in Item 2.2-1 not categorized according to Item 2.2-3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG 0612, Section.5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in response to Section 2.3 of this request. With respect to Criteria I through discussion of your .evaluation III, provide of crane a

operation in the reactor building and your determination of compliance. Thi s response

All attachments are those accompanying Enclosure 3 of the NRC's December 22, 1980 letter.

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 should include the following information for each crane.

a. Where reliance is placed on the installation and use of electrical interlocks or mechanical stops, indicate the circumstances under which these protective devices can be removed or bypassed and the administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of such action. Discuss

'any related or proposed technical specifications concerning the bypass of such interlocks.

~Res onse In regards to the reactor building polar crane: electrical interlocks may be temporarily removed or bypassed with written approval, of the station shift supervisor and/or station superintendent.

The reasons for removal or bypassing will be included with the written approval. A site procedure which explains the conditions and requirements for temporary removal or bypassing will be developed.

b. Where reliance is placed on the operation of =the standby gas treatment system, discuss present and/or proposed technical specifications and administrative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid.

~Res onse Technical specifications will address required .operability of standby gas treatment system during fuel handling operations.

C. Where reliance is placed on other site-specific considerations.(e.g., refueling sequencing), provide present or proposed technical specifications, and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure the validity of such considerations.

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Nine Mile Point Unit. 2

.~Res ense The fuel-handling procedures now being formulated will follow the guidelines of NUREG. 0612 ...

d. Analyses performed to demonstate compliance with Criteria I thorugh III should conform to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A. Justify any exception taken to these guidelines, and provided the "

specific information requested in Attachments 2, 3, or 4, as appropriate, for each analysis performed.

~Res onse No such analyses, were required for this study.

2.3 Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating In Plant Areas Containing Equipment Required for Reactor Shutdown, Decay Heat Removal, or Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 0612, Section 5.1.5, provides guidelines concerning

'UREG the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of equipment or components required for safe reactor shutdown and decay heat removal. Information provided in response to this section should be sufficient to demonstrate .that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in these areas, either the likelihood of a load drop which might prevent safe reactor shutdown or prohibit continued decay heat removal is extremely small, or that damage to such equipment, from load drops will be limited in order not, to result in the loss of these safety-related functions. Cranes which must be evaluated in this section have been previously identified in your response to Item 2.1-1, and their loads in your response to Item 2 '-3c.

2.3-1 Re uested Information Identify any cranes listed in Item 2.1-1 which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried a'nd. the basis for this evaluation (i.e.,

compiete ."'" compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5. 1. 6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or 3-8

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 additional design features). For each crane so evaluated; provide the load-handling-system (ice ,, crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

~Res onse See Section 8, Verification of Crane Design.

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~ Re uested Information For any cranes identified, in Item 2.1-1 not designated as single-failure proof in Item 2.3-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided, including the following information:

a ~ The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-rel ated equipment. Heavy loads identification should include designation and weight or cross-reference to information provided in Item 2.1-3c.

Im'pact areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or by some other method such that the impact area can be located on the plate general arrangement drawings.

~Res onse See hazard .. elimination, tables in Section 4.

b. For each interaction identified, indicate which of, the load and impact area combinations can be eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, mechanical stops and/or electrical interlocks, or other site-specific considerations. Elimina-tion on the basis of the aforementioned consideration should be supplemented by the following specific information:

(1) For 'oad/target combinations eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, discuss the basis for 3-9

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 determining that load drops will not affect continued system operation (i.e., the ability of the system to perform its safety-related function).

~Res onse See comment section of the hazard elimination tables in Section 4.

(2) Where mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are to be provided, present details showing the areas where crane travel will be prohibited. Additionally, provide a discussion concerning the procedures that are to be used for authorizing the bypassing of interlocks or removable stops, for verifying that interlocks are functional prior to crane use,. and interlocks are

'or verifying that restored to operability after operations which require bypassing have been completed.

~Res onse See the drawings listed in Section 5 for "areas where crane travel is prohibited due to mechanical stops or interlocks.

Bypassing of interlocks or mechanical

~

stops will be covered in the load-handling procedures.

e

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(3) Where load/target combinations are eliminated on the basis of other site-specific considerations (e.g.,

maintenance ,.sequencing), provide present and/or proposed technical specifications -

and . discuss administrative procedures or physical constraints invoked to

'ensure the validity of such considerations.

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Nine Mile Point Unit, 2

~Res onse See comment section of the hazard elimination tables in Section 4.

For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of Item 2.3-2b, identify any handling systems for specific loads which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

~Res onse All interactions were eliminated by analysis of Item 2.3-2b.

For interactions not eliminated in Items 2.3-2b or 2.3-2c, demonstrate using appropriate analysis that damage would not preclude operation of sufficient equipment to allow the system to perform its safety function following a load drop (NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criterion IV).

For each analysis so conducted, the following information should be provided:

(1) An indication of whether or not, for the specific load being investigated, the overhead crane-handling system is designed and constructed such that the hoisting system will retain its load in the event of seismic accelerations equivalent to those of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).

(2) The basis for any exceptions taken to the analytical guidelines for NUREG 0612, Appendix A.

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (3) The information requested in Attachment 4.

~Res orise All interactions were eliminated by analysis of Item 2.3-2b.

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 TABLE 3-1 OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS WHICH CARRY HEAVY LOADS OVER SAFE SHUTDOWN OR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL EQUIPMENT Mark No. Identification Location ~Func ion 2MHR-CRN1 125/25/0.5-Ton Reactor Building Reactor Building at Refueling and maintenance Polar Crane El 387i 4>> and Azimuth 0'-359'rimary 2MHR-CRN3p 4 34-Ton Recirc Motor Handling Containment Remova I and rep tacement Cranes at El 284i 11ii and of pump motors AZimuth 'I35 and 315o 2MHS-CRN6 10-Ton Stop Log Screenwel I Building Remova I and rep I acement Area Crane Intake and Discharge of SWP motor-operated Shaft Area valves and stop logs EI 307'-9" 2MHS-CRN7 8-Ton Single Girder Crane Reactor Building at Remova I and replacement El 261'-0" and of'utboard main steam Azimuth 0 and feedwater valves 2MHR-CRN65 2-Ton Monorail System Primary Conta inment Remova I and replacement at El 305'-9" and of safety relief valves Azimuth 240 to 105 2MHR-CRN66 2-Ton Transfer Monorail Primary Conta inment Transfer safety relief System at El 261'-0" and valves and CRD cart Azimuth 165 to Removal and replacement 235'rimary 2MHR-CRN67 8-Ton Monorail System Containment at El 261'-0" and of'ain steam isolation Azimuth 315 to va Ives 2MIIS-CRN2, 5-Ton Emergency Diesel Diesel 45'mergency Maintenance of emergency and4 Generator Cranes Generator Building generators 3,

EI 261 '0" 2MHW-CRN1 75/40-Ton Screenwel I Room Crane Screenwel I Building Ma intenance of service above Service Water water pumps, circulating Pump Bays water pumps, feedwater heater tube bundles, and miscellaneous equipment 1 of 1

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 TABIE 3-2 OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS WHICH ARE EXCLUDED FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION Mark No. Identification and Justification 2MHN-CRN1 30-Ton Radwaste Building Crane This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not. result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHN-CRN5 6 Radwaste Building Monorail (10-Ton Capacity)

This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHN-CRN70 Grating and Miscellaneous Equipment Hoist (2-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHN-CRN71 Concrete Slab Hoist (3-Ton Capacity) This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHN-CRN72 Heat Exchanger Hoist (2-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHN-CRN73 Concrete Slab Hoist (4-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from thi s crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 TABLE 3-2 (Cont)

Mark No. Identification and Justification 2MHN-CRN74 Concrete Slab Hoist (4-Ton Capacity) This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHN-CRN75 Concrete Slab Hoist (4-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHF-CRN1 Refueling Area Jib Cranes - The capacities of and CRN2 these cranes are all 1/2 ton. Therefore, these cranes are excluded, from the Heavy Loads study.

2MHF-CRN3 Channel Handling Boom with Counterbalance. The capacity is 200 lb. Therefore, this crane is excluded from the Heavy Loads study.

2MHT<<CRN1 250/40-Ton Turbine Room Crane This crane is located inside the turbine building, which does not contain any safety-related mechanical equipment. A load drop from this crane will not preclude plant shutdown.

2MHS-CRN1 RDS Cart Crane (1.5-Ton Capacity) This crane is located in that area of the reactor building at El 289'-0" and Azimuth 221 F which does not contain safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result, in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHS-CRNS Workshop Crane (10-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located in the turbine building dirty workshop and large tool area at El 261'-0". A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHS-CRN9 Discharge Flume and Screenhouse Crane (10-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located in the 2 of 4

I Nine Mile Point Unit 2 TABLE 3-2 (Cont)

Mark No. Identification and Justification screenhouse. A 16ad drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

. 2MHS-CRN20 Lube Oil Tank Equipment Crane (1.5-Ton Capacity)

This jib crane is located over the turbine oil reservoir at El 277'-6". A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHK-CRN31 3-Ton Monorail Hoist System This is located inside the control building at El 261'-0" and is used for the removal of the hatch cover slabs and equipment. A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHK-CRN32 3-Ton Monorail Hoist System This hoist is located inside the auxiliary boiler room at El 261'-0". A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

I 2MHK-CRN33 10-Ton Monorail Hoist Systems These hoists and CRN34. are located in the turbine building for the handling of the condenser waterboxes during a plant shutdown. A load drop from these hoists would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHK-CRN45 5-Ton Monorail Hoist Systems These hoists are and CRN46 located inside the normal switchgear building. at respectively and >>e used for the handling of hatch cover slabs and equipment. Load drops from these hoists would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHK-CRN48 10-Ton Monorail Hoist System This system is located in the decontamination area at El 261'-

0". A load drop from this hoist system would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 TABLE 3-2 (Cont)

Mark No. Identification and Justification 2MHK-CRN49 1-Ton Monorail Hoist System - This hoist, is located in the screenwell stop log and trash rack area at El 261'-0". A load drop from this hoist would not xesult in damage to any system required fox plant shutdown or decay heat removals 2MHK-CRN55 4-Ton Monorail Hoist System This hoist is located in the control building above floor El 306'-0". A load dxop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHR-CRN50 Pipe Chase Hatch Cover Hoist (5-Ton Capacit;y)

This hoist, is located in the reactor building at El 353'-10" and Azimuth 50 . A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any syst: em required for plant shutdown.

2MHR-CRN51 Pipe Chase Hatch Cover Hoist (10-Ton Capacity)

This hoist is located in the reactor building at El 328'-10" and Azimuth 320 . A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown.

2MHR-CRN52 8-Ton Monorail Hoist System - This hoist is located in the reactor building at, El 328'-10" and Azimuth 125 . It is used for hatch cover. A load drop from this hoist will removing a not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown.

2MHR-CRN61 8-Ton Monorail Hoist System This hoist is used for the removal and replacement of the equipment hatch cover at Azimuth 315 and El 261'-0". A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown.

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Nine Hile Point Unit 2 TABLE 3-3 2MIIR-CRNI/POLAR CRANE LOADS 4

Governing Weight Designated Handling Frequency Crane Load ~tons Liftin Device Procodure Handled Fuel Transfer Shielding 3>> Main Strongbacks Twice each Bridge and Sling refuoling Assemblies opera t ion Drywel I Shield Plug A 90 Ma in Strongbacks Twice each and Sling refueling Assemblies ope ra t ion Drywel I Shield Plug 8 102 Ha in Strongbacks Twice each and Sl ing refueling Asscmblios opera t ion Drywel I Shield Plug C 1 1941k Main Strongbacks Twice each (with rigging) and Sling refueling Assemblies opera t ion Drywel I Shield Plug D 90 Ma in Strongbacks Twice each and Sl ing rofuo I ing Assemblies operation Drywel I Shield Plug C 8P. Hain Strongbacks Twice each and Sling rofueling Assomblies operation Drywol I Shield Plug 93 Ma in Strongbacks Twice each and Sl ing refueling Assemblies ope ra t i on I'rywel I Shield Plug G 93 Hain Strongbacks Twice each and Sl ing refueling Assemblies operation Drywel I Shield Plug N 82 Ha in Strongbacks Twice each and Sling refueling Assemblies operation Drywel I Head 55 Hain Strongbacks Twice each and Sling refueling Assemblies opera t i on 1 of 3

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 TABLE 3-3 (Cont)

Governing Weight Designated llandling Frequency Crane Load g t~ons Procedure Handled Reactor Vessel Head 92 Hain Strongbacks Twice each and Sling refueling Assemblies operation Steam Dryer 50 Ma in Strongbacks, Twice each Sling Assemblies, refueling and Spreaders opora t ion Beams Steam Separator 80 Ha in Strongbacks, Twice each Sling Assemblies, refueling and Spreader opera t ion Boams Reactor Vessel Head Ma in Strongbacks Twice each Insulation and Support and Sl ing refueling I rame Assemblies operation Spent Fuel Shipping 100 Cask Lifting As needed over Cask Yoke the life of plant Reactor llead Sling Assemblies Twice each Stud Rack rofue ling operation Reactor Stud 5 Sling Assemblies Twice each Tensioner refue I ing operation Refueling Cana I 16 Ha in Strongbacks Twice each Plugs (max) and Sling refueling Assemblies operation WCS Filter 15 Main Strongbacks As needed over Deminera I Izer and Sling the life of Removal Plugs Assemblies plant SFC Filter 10 Hain Strongbacks As needed over Removal Plugs and Sling the life of Assemblies plant 2 of 3

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 TABLE 3-3 (Cont)

Governing Weight Oesignated Handling Frequency C ra SFC ne l.oa d Filter Deminera I izer Lemons II 'l

~Lift in Device ing Assembl ies Procedure Handled As needed the plant over life of Remova I Plugs Reactor Service Ma in Strongbacks Twice earh Platform and Sling refueling Assemblies operation Storage Pool roan Main Strongbacks Twice each Ga to and Sl ing refueling Assemblies operat ion Rccirculat.ion 33 5 Ma in Strongbacks As needed over Pump Motor and Sling the life of Assemblies plant

+Load-handl ing procedures wi I I be doveloped to cover load-handling opera-tions for heavy loads that are handled over or in proximity to spent fuel or safe shutdown equipment.

+<<Maximum load.

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I Nine Mile Point Unit 2 TABLE 3-4 REACTOR BUILDING CRANES - LOADS HANDLED Governing Crane Weight Designated tiandling Frequency O~rane osd Mark No ~tons Lif'tin Device Procedure Handled Main Outboard 2MHS"CRN7 Sl ing Assembly Steam Valve( s) 2MSS~HYV7A, O, C, and D MSS Valve Operators 2MHS-CRN7 6.3 Sling Assembly Feedwater Valves 2MHS-CRN7 Sling Assembly Hatch Cover 2MHR-CRN51 5.5 Sling Assembly

( Pipe Chase) at El 328'-10" Hatch Cover 2MHR-CRN52 Sling Assembly

( Pipe Chase) at El 328'-10" PSV Va Ives 2MHR"CRN65 1 ~ 8 Sling Assembly

( PSV-120 to 137)

CRD Cart 2MHR-CRN66 1.5 Sling Assembly Recirculation 2MHR-CRN3h4 33.5 Sling Assembly Pump Motors RDS Cart 2MHS-CRN1 Sling Assembly Cooling Coil Cart 2MHR-CRN3L4 Sling Assembly Equipment/Personnel 2MHR-CRN1 23 Sling Assembly Hatch Cover at EI 261'-0" I nboa rd Steam 2MHR"CRN67 6 5 Sling Assembly Va I ves 2MSS"HYV6A, B C, and 0

+Load-handling procedures will be developed to cover load-handling opera-tions for heavy loads that are handled over or in proximity to spent fuel or safe shutdown equipment. Frequency will depend on maintenance guidelines.

l Nine Mlle Point Unit 2 TABLE 3-5 SCREENWELL AREA TRAVELING CRANES - LOADS HANDLED Governing Crane Weight Designated Handling Frequency Crane Load Hark No. ~tons Llftin Device Procedure Handled Service Water 2HHW-CRN1 Sl ing Assembly Pumps Service Water 2MHW-CRNl 2.5 Sling Assombly Pump Motors C i rcu I a t i on 2MHW-CRNI 30 Sling Assembly Water Pumps Circulation Water 2HHW-CRNI 20 Sling Assembly Pump Motors Stop Log 2HHS-CRN6 Sling Assembly No. 6 Stop Log ?MHS-CRN6 2.5 Sling Assembly No. 9 6th Pt Heater 2HHW-CRN1 56 Sling Assembly 5th Pt Heater 2HHW"CRNl 34 Sling Assembly 4th Pt Heater 2MHW-CRN1 38 Sling Assembly 3rd Pt Heater 2MHW"CRN1 28 Sling Assembly

+Load-handling procedures wi I I be developed to cover load-handlto ing opera-in proximity tions for heavy loads that are handled over onormaintenance safe shutdown equipment. Frequency will depond guidelines.

~

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4

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 SECTION 4 HAZARD ELIMINATION TABLE Table 4-1 lists the potential impact where damage might occur to safety-related equipment upon a heavy load drop.

1. Hazard Elimination Categories

a. Crane travel for this area/load combination is prohibited bQ electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.

b. System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area.

C. Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load/equipment combination. (See comment at bottom of Table 4-1 for detailed explanation of the use of this category.)

Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely small (i.e., Section 5.1.6, NUREG 0612 satisfied).

e. Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not damage safety-related equipment.

Load is handled only in shutdown condition.

Safety-related components under the load paths are already inoperative due to plant conditions and/or maintenance requirements. Their failure does not prevent safe shutdown conditions from being maintained.

~

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Nine Mlle Point Unit 2 TABLE 4"1 HAZARD ELIMINATION HARK NO. 2MHR"CRNl (25-Ton Auxllfary Hoist) tp Reactor Building - Refuel lng Floor Impact Area:

Loca t I on: At EI 387 ft 4 in, Azimuth 0'o Safety-Related Hazard 359'oad Elimination

~EI eva i on E ul men Ca ocr WCS Filter 353 ft, 10 in Reactor and Spent Fuel Demlneralizer Removal Pool Plugs SFC Fl lter 353 ft, 10 in Reactor and Spent Fuol Removal Plugs Pool.

SFC Filter izer 353 ft, 10 in Reactor and Spont Fuel Domlnera I Remova I Pool Plugs Removal 353 ft, 10 in Reactor and Spent Fuel Ak Plate Gra t ings Pool Remova I 353 ft, 10 in Reactor and Ak Hoist Spent Fuel Plate Poo Gratings I'eactor Radioactive 353 ft, 10 in Spent Fuel and Ak Tunnol Access Pool Plug kElectrical Interlocks and limit switches will prevent the carrying of any of these loads over spent fuel or safety-related equipment. See crane restricted area diagram (Figure 5-4).

1 of 10

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Nine Ml le Point Unit 2 TABLE 4-1 (Cont)

MARK NO. 2MHR-CRN3 (Recirc Motor Handling)

Impact Area: Reactor Building - Orywell Location: At El 284 ft 11 in, Azimuth Sa fe ty-Re I a ted 135'oad Hazard Elimination

~Ei eva i on E ui men Ca eor Rec i rcul a- 261 ft, 0 in Tho recirculation C" tion pump and associated Pump piping and olec-(2RC-P1A) trical conduit not f'r Motor removed the lift operation

+This crane's sole purpose is for maintenance/removal of the pump motor and motor cooling coils.

This crane will be utilized only during cold shutdown conditions; howevor, failure of these components does not result in a loss of safe shutdown capability. Tho potontla I exists for damage to the pump or its associated piping.

2of 10

g Nine Mile Point Unit 2 TABLE 4-1 (Cont)

MARK NO. 2MHR-CRN4 (Recirc Motor Handling)

Impact Area: Reactor Building - Drywell Location: At EI 284 ft ll in, Azimuth Safety-Related Hazard Elimination 315'oad Elevation E ui ment Ca e or Reci rcula- 261 ft, 0 in The recirculation associated C>>

tlon pump and Pump piping and elec-trica I conduit not (2RC-P1B)

Motor removed for operation lift

>>This crane's sole purpose is for maintenance/removal of the pump motor and motor cooling coils. When this motor is replaced, it will be hoisted up floor the equipment hatch at Azimuth 315'nd carried over the reactor operating with the main hook of the RBPC (single-failure proof).

This crane will be utilized only during cold shutdown conditions. Thefailure potentia I exists for damage to the pump or its associatedsafo piping; however, of these components does not result in a loss of shutdown capability.

3of 10

II Nine Nile Point Unit 2 TABLE 4-1 (Cont)

MARK NO. 2MHS"CRN7 (Outboard MSS and FWS Valves) ftBuilding Impact Area: Reactor Main Steam Tunnel Location: At El 261 0 in, Azimuth Sa fe ty-Re I a ted 0'oad Hazard Elimination Elevation E ui ment Cate or 2MSS+HYV 261 ft, 0 in 2 1/2-in (3 trical conduit elec-7A, 7B 7C, and 70 MSS-750-170"2 2FWS+AOV23A 261 ft, 0 in MSS valves lines for and 23B 2FWS+MOV21A 261 ft, 0 in WCS-008-89-1 and 21B 4 of 10

I Nine Nile Point ljnit 2 TABLE 4-1 (Cont)

HARK NO. 2HHR-CRN65 (Hain Steam Safety Relief Valve Removal )

Impact Area: Reactor Building - Primary Containment Location: At El 305 ft 9 in, Azimuth 240'o 105 Safety-Related Hazard Elimination Load Elevation E ui ment Ca eor PSV Valves 296 ft, 6 in 2-ISC-750-107-2

( PSV-120 to PSV-137) 2-IAS"150-727-3 2RIIS-012" 125-1 2-MSS-026-43-1 2-HSS-026-44-1 2-MSS-026-45-1 2-HSS-026-46-1 5 of 10

I Nine Mile Point Unit 2 TABLE 4-1 (Cont)

MARK NO ~ 2MHR"CRN66

( PSV Valves and CRD Cart Removal)

Impact Area: Reactor Building - Primary Containment Location: At El 261 ft 0 in, Azimuth 135'o Safety-Related Hazard Elimination 231'oad Elevation E ui men Caeor PSV Valves 261 ft, 0 in 2-ICS-010-70-1 and CRO Cart 2ICS+MOV128 2-CCP-003-343-3 2-CCP-003-344-3 2MSS-026-43-1 2MSS-.026"44-1 2CX999GF1-1 1/2" 2CK993NA-3" 6 of 10

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Nine Hi le Point Uni t, 2 TABLE 4-1 (Cont)

HARK NO. 2HHR-CRN67 (HSS Isolation Valves)

Impact Area: Reactor Building - Primary Containment Location: At El 261 ft 0 in, Azimuth 315 Safety-Related Hazard Elimination Load ~EI eva i on E ui men Ca eor 2HSS+HVY 261 ft, 0 in 2>>FWS-024-031-1 6Ap 6B, 6C, and 60 2-FWS-024-032"2 2MSS-026-43"1 2MSS-026-44-1 2HSS-026-45-1 2HSS-026"46-1 7of 10

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Nine Mlle Point Unit 2 TABLE 4-1 (Cont)

MARK No. 2MHS-CRN2, 3, and 4 (Emergency Diesel Generator)

Impact Area: Emergency Diesel Generator Building Location: EI 261 ft 0 in Safety-Related Hazard Elimination Load ~El eva i an E ui men Ca eor Any Diesel 261 ft, 0 in 2EGS"EG1 F%

Component, Maintenance 2EGS+EG2 Too I, or F+

Auxi I iary 2EGS+EG3 Equipment

+The only time.when the load wil I be over safety-related equipment would be when the diesel generator is down and being serviced. The overhead crane structure is being recertified for seismic qualification. An alarm system with light wl I I alert operator when the crane is out of the stored position, 8 of 10

Nine MI Ie Point Un I t 2 TABLE 4-1 {Cont)

MARK NO. 2MHW-CRN1 Impact Area: Screenwell Building Location: Above Service Water Pump Bays Sa fety-Re lated Hazard Elimination Load ~EI eva i on E ui ment Caeor Service 224 ft, 0 in Sorvice water Water pumps and piping Pump Motors Ci rcula-tion 231 ft, 9 in Service water pumps and piping Water Pumps Ci rcula-tion 239 ft, 4 in Service water pumps and piping Water Pump Motors Feedwater Neater 280 ft, 0 in Service water Ctt pumps and piping Tube Bundles Stop Logs 261 ft, 0 In Service water pumps and piping "Administrative procedures will prevent crane travel over safety-related equipment, Seo Safe Load Path Drawing (Figure 5-3).

9 of 10

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 TABLE 4-1 (Cont)

MARK NO. 2MHS-CRN-6 Impact Area: Screenwell Building Location: Intake and Discharge Shaft Area Safety-Related Hazard El iminatlon Load ~EI eva I on E ul men Ca eor Stop Log( s) 261 and ft, 0 in 2SWPKMOV30A 285 ft, 0 In 2SWPKMOV30B 2SWP%MOV77A 2SWP+MOV77B SWP Piping

+Operating procedures wil I restrict crane travel over safety-related equipment. See Safe Load Path Orawing (Figure 5-3).

10 of 10

II 90

'TI I I 90 mERTUIIE.

CAO).

SAFE LOAD PATH 2tllH C N 7 (Qi/f SAFE LOAD PATH 2MH. N /

I REheVAL AND "EPL ACE'h'ENT SAF LOAD PATH (REMOVAL.REPLACEMENT 0 OUTEOARDMSSVALVESAND M - N OF SRV'S) HOLcT TVAY F JG VALViS). (REM VAI. AND REPLACEMENT OF MSS ISOI.ATION VALi

/ TO EL 261io I

290 N 30'-

10

')

e~ ~

I SAFE LOAD PATH I M I (REMOVAL AND REPI.ACEMENT G ND OF PUMP MOTOR) RECIRCULATION MOTOR AND PUMP 2RCcs PIB

~ A I 2 RECIRCULATION MOTOR AND PUMP 2RCS+PIA 3 EQUIPMENT HATCH COVER 4 ELEVATOR NO.4 y 5 PIPE CHASE 6 PSST SPACE 7 ELECTRICAL TRAY RISERS 8 2 HVR UNIT 9 FEEDWATER VALVES IO MAIN STEAM VALVES HOIST WAY II SAFETY RELIEF VALVES I FROM EL .9 SAFE LOAD PATH l2 IIEACTOR WR.CRN 66 (TRANSFER OF SRV S AND CRD CART)

SAFE LOAD PATH MHR-CRN 4 ~

(REMOVALAI8 REPLACEMENT CF PUMP MOTOR)

FIGURE 5-1 g~aQe M 2 0 SAFE LOAD PATHS

() PLAN EL 26I-O

&r~ FOR HEAVY LOADS ApertTTre NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 THE CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NMP2

gv' t 'N Iy I!

ea 9

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IIM II MlII I I I MINII I I I I ~ I ~ P ~

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TRAVEL OVER MOY'S RESTRICTED EXCEPT FOR SERVICE ON MDV'S I

~ THIS AREA SERVICED BV STOP LOG CVALYE MD CRAIIE 2MHS CRN-6 (IOTONT 2SW~ 77ABB TX j:RTtjgK cana TRAYELOVER SAFETY UIPMENT OPENINGS WATER PUMPS 'ICE RELATED CONTROL PANEL RESTRICTED 2 SWTOPI4.QB A'lao Availahte %

EQI '>MEN OPL'O'NG B BAY -OP SERVILE wA.EP STr <<'iTRS Aperfare Caxg L.

SCREENWELL ROOM CRANE'UIPMENT THIS AREA SERVICED BY 75/40 TON SERVICE OPENS WATER'PUM~

A BAY I NOTE: 7540 TON SCREENWEEL ROOM CRANE RESTRICTED FROM THIS AREA EXCEPT FOR MAINTENANCE ON SERVICE WATER EPU I PMENL FIGURE 5-3 SAFE LOAD PATHS SCREENWELL BUILDINGS NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 THE CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NMP2 s4ovsaok@e -o3

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'III

~J"1(TUI(E CARg I NT B OVTUHe OF ReSTRICTeD OVTLINe OF ReS 'RIOTRD OUTLINE OF RSSTRIC'TtD O'ReA of'peNT FveL AReA QC SPeNT Fve I ARSA OF SPENT FLIBL STORAC%. C CASK STCRAC,S 4 CASIC, 5PSNT FVDL CA5y LOADINI<<FOOLS ST OR.AI<<Ca POOL LDADINQ POOLS >

10 1K 0 UO<<

U<<tt <<Iblo<<

VNC%.

'90'O LOADIN( POOL BOUNDARY LINeS BOUNDARY LINeS SHOWINCI SBCIMFNTAL SHowIHcl sec'jMeHTAL LIMITATIONS OF LIIVIITATIOHS OF

~3 NOI5T (MNN) g NOWT (<<II<<) BOUNDARY

'I<< I HOIST (AIIX,PtN) SHOWINQ ~lrtCNTAL LIMIT A'T I ON 5 0 C 3 HOIST (MAIN) 0

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't gS l8O O

~<<5(s IOO'.O CeN'Tee, OF RKACTOR STATIOH f FIOINT A ceN Te<<L oF ReAC TOR STAT IOI4

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I CRHTtQ ck

'Rt<<CTOR STATIO ZID Z,VO f70 P AAI I Also AvailahIe Qn:

SELecToR

<<NO A swe A Re fB sel SC'ToR. Sw RM<<R, A It B TRIC.'TION Sel Q.c'ToIL Sw B DT.PASS oM Aperture GILrm H POSITION FOR THIS VIEW SNOWS AReA OF TNls view sNows AReA DF SSLSCTOQ A ON R,esTRIc'TI0N FoR I HolsT(Pe<<.

AND 3 IIOIST (MA<N)

P g H) RCS'TRIC:TIOH FOR. 2.NOIST (<<OX) ONLY

( f4OILMAL ReSTILIC.'TION POSITIO~

FIGURE 5-4 CRANE RESTRICTED AREA SHEET 1 OF 2 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 THE CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NMP2 840 7 180 18 '() P

I l.e 1

.I v<

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rl '

CRANE OPERATION DATA A key operated tvo selector (single key) svitch is located an the radio To restore crane operation and resume motion vith selectors in "normal transmitter and on the pendant push'utton station. restriction" position the folloving is required: and trolleyItravel vill be as follows:

Selector "A" Three positions labled:

"Normal Restriction" (a) - Insert key in selector "A" svitch and select either fl hoist (aux) or (Selector "A" vill be in "normal restriction" position and fl'hoist (aux P & H) and f2 hoist (aux) will be inoperable.

1) f2 hoist (aux) (2) by~ass position. See plan viev III.)

2) Key operated by-pass "PI hoist (aux. P & H)" (b) - Re-start crane and back out trolley. or rotate bridge to re-set proximity

3) Key operated by-pass "f2 hoist (aux. 2S Ton)" limit switch.

Key is removable in the "normal restriction" position only. (c) - Return selector "A" to "normal restriction" position and remove key. Brid e Travel Restriction (d) - Bridge and/or trolley may nov continue travel in normal unrestricted trolley[at either Selector "B" -Tvo positions labled areas.

With the end of bridge and with trolley proximity svitch in tripped position; any bridge motion from either direction which vill position

1) - "Normal Restriction" //3 main hook over the restricted spent fuel storage pool area, will trip che

2) Key operated by-pass -"f3 hoist (main)" bridge proximicyjsvitch, and in conjunction vith the trolley svitch, de-energize Key is removable in the "normal restriction" position only. operable crane motion and sec brakes. The bridge vill come to rest vith the (Note: To select any key operaced by-pass position on either selector, the corresponding selector svitch vill be in the "normal restriction" position.)

II Selector "A" in key operated position 'I "B" vill be in "normal rescriction" position.)

hoist (aux. P 6 H)" (Selector center line of P3 main hook at edge of a circular'egmental section determined by the center of~<reactor scacion to either inner corner of the pool areas Hook has access co the cask loading pool area. Limitations of this area will be determined byIIa line from the center of reactor station to the inner corner

'Ibis position vill allow un-restricted operation of the OI hoist (aux P 6 H) of the cask loading pool (point A), and by an arc line determined by the distance I Selector svitch "A" and "B" in "normal restriction"position; bridge and in all areas of the station. This includes those areas of the spent fuel from the center of reactor station to the far edge at (point B) of the cask trolley travel vill be as follows: storage and cask loading pools. ($ 3 hoisc (main) and P2 hoist (aux) vill be loading pool.

(see plan viev I & II) inoperable.)

Brid e Travel Restriction with the trolley at either end of bridge, and with trolley proximity svitch in Trolle Travel Restrictions the tripped position; any bridge motion from either direction which vould position With either end of the bridge positioned over thc restricted spent fuel storage hooks over restricted area, vill trip the bridge proximity svitch and in con- pool area, and wIth the bridge proximity svitch in tripped position, any trolley junction vith the trolley svitch de-energize all crane nations and set brakes. vill The bridge vill come to rest with the center line of hooks at the edge of a circular segmental section determined by the center of reactor station to III Sl t "I" I ky p tdp ltt in "normal restriction" position.)

"~PISS t *"(Sl I "I" ill motion which would posicion che f3 main hoak over the storage pool area, trip the trolleytproximity switch and in conjunction vith the bridge svicch, either inner corner of the pool areas.

be dc-energize operableI crane motions and set brakes. The trolley vill come to rest with the center line of main hook ac the edge of an arc line determined This position vill allow un-restricted operation of the f2 hoist (aux) in all by the minimum distance from the center of reactor station to the edge of the Trolle Travel Restriction areas of the station. This includes those areas of the spent fuel storage and spent fuel storage pool; in the area of the cask loading pool, the hook vill Hith either end of the bridge posicioned over the restricted area; and vith cask loading pools. (83 hoist (main) and fl hoist (aux P & H) will be inoperable. be at edge of anIarc line determined by the distance from the center of the bridge proximity svitch in tripped position, any trolley motion which vould reactor station to th e far edge a t (point B) of the k 1 di ol.

posicion hooks over che restricted area, vill trip the trolley proximity switch and in conjunction with the bridge svitch, de-energize all crane motions and sec brakes. 'Ihe trolley vill come co rest vith either the center linc f3 hook position, the fo loving is required:

(main) or the center line fl hook (aux.) (depending upon which end of the bridge is positioned over the restricted area) on the inner are line of a seg- (a) - Return selector "B" to "normal restriction" position. Remove and insert mental section determined by the minumum distance from the center of reactor key in selector"A" and place selector in either "81 hoist (aux P & H)"

station to the nearest edge of the storage pool area. or "42 hoist (aux)(1) by-pass position.

(b) - Re-start ctane, back out crolley, or rotate bridge to re-see proximicy limit svitch.

(c) - Return selector "A" to "normal restriccion" position, rcmove and insert key in selector "B" and again place selector in "f3 hoist (main)"

position.

(d) Bridge and/or trolley may nov continue travel again in all areas except the spent uel storage pool area.

Also AraBable Un Aperture Carrl MERrURE CARD FIGURE 5-4 CRANE RESTRICTED AREA SHEET 2 OF 2 RA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 THE CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NMP2 840 0 13018'Cog

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Nine Nile Point, Unit 2 SECTION 6 LIFTING DEVICES The following specially designed lifting devices consist of primary and redundant strongbacks and sling assemblies.

They are single-failure proof in accordance with NUREG-0554.

The design approach for these devices is consistent with the design criteria contained in ANSI N14.6. Quality Assurance program requirements in compliance with the provisions of 10CFR50, Appendix B 'and supplementary Quality Assurance requirements were mandatory in the purchase specification.

Critical items are identified as QA Category I components'ifting Rig Arrangement for Drywell and Vessel Heads Lifting Rig Arrangement for Insulation Support Frame

3. Lifting Rig Arrangement for Steam Dryer Lifting Rig Arrangement for Steam Separator

5. Lifting Rig Arrangement for Transfer Bridge

6. Lifting Rig Arrangement for Service Platform

7. Lifting Rig Arrangement for Shield Plugs 6-1

I Nine Mile Point Unit 2 SECTION 7 VERIFICATION OF TESTING, INSPECTION, AND MAINTENANCE Proc'edures will be written and approved for inspection, testing, and maintenance of the reactor building polar crane and those cranes identified in Item 2.1-1. These cranes will be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976 with the exception that tests and inspection will be performed prior to use where of or it is not practical to meet the frequency ANSI B30.2 where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency.

7-1

,Nine Mil'e Point Unit 2 SECTION 8 VERIFICATION OF CRANE DESIGN F 1 INTRODUCTION The . reactor building polar crane (RBPC) has been designed for, Class Al .standby service in accordance with Crane Manufacturers'ssociation of America (CMAA) Specification No. 70 and the mandatory requirements of ANSI B30.20 in addition to the technical requirements of SWEC Specification No. NMP2-251P ~ The RBPC is seismic Category I. The crane is designed for the following rated loads:

~

No. 1 Auxiliary Hoist No. 2 Auxiliary Hoist No 3 Main Hoist

~

'/2-ton 25-ton 125-ton

~ Crane Trolley 125-ton

~ , Crane Bridge 125-ton The main hoist is designed to provide a dual loading path so that the single-failure of, any. component shall not result in loss of the lifted load. The single-failure system criteria also applies to the hoist electrical system. The hoist motor is a 75 hp dc'shunt motor. The alternating power supply is rectified to supply the motor with dc power. The dc hoist controls are provided with phase loss and phase reversal protection.

The redundant main hoist system consists of a dual path through the hoist gear train,- the reeving system, and the hoist load block along with restraints at critical points to provide load. retention and to minimize uncontrolled motions of the load upon failure of any single hoise component. The system includes the complete gear trains connecting the hoist motor to the hoist drum, while the main hook is used for handling the spent fuel cask; positive interlocks are provided which prevent the transfer path of the cask to be over the spent fuel storage pool but still allow the hook to lower the cask into its proper position in the spent fuel loading pool.

The auxiliary hoists also have positive interlocks which prevent their transfer paths to be over the spent fuel storage pool. Overrides of these interlocks will be covered by special administrative procedures. The auxiliary hoists can also be placed. in operable modes by use of key-operated selector positions. The operating modes of these hoists will also be controlled by administrative procedures.

8-1

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 8.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT 2 DESIGN AND NUREG 0554 A thorough evaluation was made between the RBPC design features and those recommended in NUREG 0554. The RBPC main hoist as designed contains all the major safety features recommended by NUREG 0554 to quality as single- failure proof. The following section provides a detailed summary of the differences between the RBPC design and NUREG 0554 recommendations.

The significant differences between the Unit 2 design and NUREG 0554 are as follows:

a. NUREG Section 2.2 requires a 15-percent design margin for wear-susceptible components.

Evaluation All wear susceptible components, except the lifting eye thrust bearing have greater than a 15 percent design margin. - The lifting eye thrust bearing has a 4 percent design margin. However, failure of this component will not result in a load drop.

b. NUREG Section 2.4 specifies impact tests for materials over 1/2 in. The specification requires impact tests for materials over 5/8-in thick.

Evaluation ASME 'Section III, NC-2300, requires impact tests for materials greater than 5/8-in thick; the Unit 2 specification is consistent with this requirement.

c. NUREG Section 4.1 specifies a cable safety factor of 10 to 1 dynamic. The specification requires a cable safety factor of 10 to 1 static.

,Evaluation The dynamic safety factor of the crane when considering the maximum critical load (MCJ) to be 120 tons is slightly under 9.6 to 1. This conservative design more than surpasses requirements to sustain the dynamic effects of load transfer due to the loss of one of the two independent rope systems. An ample design margin will still exist in the remaining rope system of eight parts supporting the load..

8-2

Nine Mile Point Unit 2

d. NUREG Section 4.3 specifies load attachment points to be designed:for three times the load to be handled, static plus dynamic. The specification requires the load attachment points to be designed for three times the static load to be handled.

'Evaluation A design factor margin study and a main hoist load block design study were made to verify the safety of the RBPC design. For the main hoist load blocks study the structural components were reviewed for a 138-ton load (MCL plus 15 percent). The resulting stresses were less than 1/3 the minimum yield strength of the respective materials.

e. NUREG Section 4.6 specifies that lift beams and lifting devices be designed for three times the load, static plus dynamic. The specification requires three times the static load.

Evaluation The lifting rigs and sling assemblies were designed

',three times the static load times 1.05. The calculated for

,. stresses were less than the minimum yield strength of the respective materials. See Section 6 for further details on the design of these devices.

NUREG Section 5.1 specifies the bridge speed not, to

'exceed the slow recommendation of CMAA, which is 50 ft/min. The Unit 2 crane's bridge span is designed to be 75 ft/min.

Evaluation The RBPC design includes crane bridge inching motors with a speed of 2 ft/min. The 75 ft/min normal operating speed satisfies the moderate speed recommendation of CMAA-70. With these features the intent of NUREG 0554 is met.

g. NUREG Section 8.5 specifies that the MCL be marked on the crane. The specification uses maximum working load (MWL).

Evaluation The MCL will be identified on the RBPC.

8-3

Nine Mile Point Unit 2

h. NUREG Section'.0 specifies that the operating manual give the margin 'for degradation of wear-susceptible components.

Evaluation This is an administrative requirement which will be covered in the Inspection Procedures detailed in Section 7.- These procedures will be in compliance with ANSI B30.2.0.

NUREG Section 10.0 specifies that crane operator qualification be addressed.

Evaluation

~

Section 9 covers crane operator qualifications.

'I 8.3 RBPC LOSS OF POWER AND FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS With regard to the NRC's December 19, 1983, Clarification to Generic Letter 81-07, concerning electrical circuitry and phase loss of a single-failure proof crane, the dc hoist controls of the Unit 2 reactor building polar crane, Mark No. 2MHR-CRN1, are specifically provided with phase loss protection as well as phase reversal protection.

Inherently, the crane's dc hoist controls are provided with a fail-safe design such that power is removed from the hoist motor and the holding brakes applied upon any of the following contingencies:

~ Opening of an ac phase

~ Loss of ac fuses

~ Loss of voltage

~ *Loss of regenerative power capability

~ Loss of motor field Loss of dc fuse Additionally, the crane's dc hoist controls are provided with a torque check, which prevents the hoist holding brakes from being released until the motor field is energized and armature current, is flowing.

8.4 CRANES OTHER THAN RBPC

a. Cranes 2MHR-CRN3, 2MHR-CRN4, and 2MHS-CRN7 were designed so that the trolleys ,and crane bridges cannot be "

dislodged during an earthquake, in combination with SRV

Nine Mile Point, Unit 2 and LOCA phenomenona. The design of the single girder underhung motor-operated bridge crane includes the requirements of CMAA Specification No. 70 and all the mandatory requirements of ANSI B30.11. The design of the wire rope hoists and trolleys include the requirements of HMI-100 and the mandatory requirements of ANSI B30.16 in addition to the technical requirements of SWEC Specification No. NMP2-P251W.

b. The 75-ton screenwell area crane, 2MHW-CRN1, is designed in accordance with the requirements of CMAA Specification No. 70 and ANSI B30.2.0 in addition to the technical requirements of SWEC Specification No.

NMP2-P251C.

c. The wire rope hoists and trolleys of jib cranes 2MHF-CRN1, 2, and 3 include the requirements of HMI-100 hnd the mandatory requirements of ANSI B30.16 in addition to the technical requirements of SWEC Specification No. NMP2-P251Z.

d. 2MHR-CRN61, CRN65, CRN66, and CRN67 monorail hoist systems have been designed in accordance with the mandatory requirements of HMI-100 and ANSI B30.16 in addition to the technical and seismic requirements of SWEC Specification No. NMP2-P251R.

e. The remaining monorail hoist systems have been designed in accordance with all of the mandatory requirements of ANSI B30 16 in addition to the technical requirements of

~

SWEC Specification No. NMP2-P251K. Hand-operated chain hoists and trolleys include the requirements of HMI-200.

8-5

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 SECTION 9 OPERATOR TRAINING, QUALIFICATION, AND CONDUCT Unit 2 uses lesson guides to train crane operators. These lesson guides ensure proper and safe operation of floor-operated overhead cranes in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976.

The crane operator program ensures that the recommendations of ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-3, are adequately included.

The current crane operator training program includes the requirements for a practical operating examination. This practical examination is given after the operator undergoes detailed classroom instruction. In addition, the operator is required to meet certain physical qualifications before qualifying to train as a crane operator. These physical qualifications are consistent with ANSI B30.2-1976.

9-1

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.1 (8.2.1)

Section 8.2.1 does not specify transmission line lengths to the Scriba substation, nor does it include layout and right-of-way drawings. Provide these drawings or a date by which they will be supplied.

RESPONSE

Section 8.2.1 has been modified to include transmission line lengths to the Scriba substation.

See Figure 430.1-1 for layout and right-of-way drawing. iso Amendment 10 QScR F430.1-1 April 1984 8407260350l

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.'IGURE 430.1-1 UNIT 2 VOLNEY TO UNIT 2 TRANSMISSION RIGHT OF WAY

.NIAGARA MGHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT AMENDMENT10 APRIL 1984 /

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.2 (SRP 8.2)

The staff understands that the configuration of the offsite power circuits will be changed from that which is currently described in the FSAR. Accordingly, provide an FSAR amendment which includes:

a. A revised Figure 8.2-1 and narrative description of the new offsite power circuit configuration.

b. Drawings of the physical orientation of the offsite circuits around the .Nine Mile Point and Fitzpatrick Power Stations. Suggest using Figures similar to 2.1-2 and 2.1-3.

c. Drawings which show tower spacing for lines which share a common right of way.

d. Steady state and transient stability analyses results for the new offsite configuration including the loss of the largest capacity to the grid or removal of the largest load from the grid.

RESPONSE

See.".."..revi'sed Sections 8.1,.and.:.8..2.. .A tower spacing drawing is not provided since the 115 kV is not on a common right-of-way. See Figure 430.7-1.

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Amendment 8 QE(R F430.2-1 January 1984

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.3 (SRP 8.1.8.2)

Provide information and a discussion of grid availability, including the frequency, duration, and causes of outages as required by R.G. 1.70.

RESPONSE

NMPC's records indicate that there has been one trip of the Nine Mile-Volney No. 9 line since its original energization, occurring on May 17, 1983, at 10:41 am. Power was restored immediately, and the cause is unknown. There are no records on any other lines because these lines in and out of Scriba Station are new and have no record of operation. A.

study performed on the central region (including the Unit 2 transmission system) of the NMPC service area has shown 58 trips on 6,100 year-miles of 345-kV lines over a 15-yr period. This results in 0 '095 unplanned trips per mile per

'year."""'"These.:-.trips"include.~l .unplanned events, including the following:

1. Lighting strikes.

2. Equipment failures.

3. System disturbances.

It should be noted that the from all unplanned sources is experienced trip rate (0.0095) less than the design value for lighting strikes of 0.0117 unplanned trips per mile per

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR switchyard. Reserve station service transformer 2RTX-XSR1B, energized from the offsite Power Source B, feeds Division II of the onsite emergency distribution system through its 4.16-kV tertiary winding; its 13.8-kV secondary winding serves as backup source for the plant nonsafety-related power distribution system. The auxiliary boiler transformer, normally energized from the offsite Source A, feeds the auxiliary boiler and associated loads through its 13.8-kV secondary winding; its. 4.16-kV tertiary winding provides a backup source for Divisions .I or II of the emergency power distribution system. Bus sectionalizing disconnect switch 2YUC-MDS20 is normally open, maintaining separation between the two of fsite sources. 'gg p7 7~+,
Under normal operating conditions, reserve station service transfer 2RTX-XSR1A and auxiliary boiler transformer 2ABS-Xl are energized from the 115-kV Scriba Substation source; reserve station service transformer 2RTX-SXR1B is energized from the 115-kV James A. FitzPatrick Substation source; and normal station. service transformer 2STX-XNS1 is energized from the,,main :generator. .The .115-kV disconnect switches 2YUI-MDS1,'2YUF-MDS2, and 2YUC-MDS10 are closed, and discon-nect , switch 2YUC-MDS20 is open. Circuit switchers 2YUC-MDS3, 2YUC-MDS5, and 2YUC-MDS4 are closed.
In case of the loss of power from Scriba Substation, trans-
'formers 2RTX-XSR1A and 2ABS-Xl can be energized from the James A. FitzPatrick Substation by operating the appropriate
" '115-'kV disconnect'switches:
In case of the loss of power from James A. FitzPatrick Substation, transformer 2RTX-XSR1B can be powered from Scriba Substatio.f "> by operating the appropriate 115-kV disconnect switches,:
In -case of loss- of power to the. normal station service.
transformer from the main generator, its associated normal switchgear buses are automatically transferred to the reserve transformer sources. The transfer scheme is described in Section 8.3.1.
The 115-kV circuit switchers and disconnect switches are designed to operate as described below. The opening or closing of the circuit switchers or the disconnect switches is controlled by actual permissive interlocks.
115-kV Circuit Switcher 2YUC-MDS3 closes when there is no electrical fault on reserve station service transformer 2RTX-XSRlA (i.e., lockout relays 86-2SPRX01 and 86-2SPRZOl are not tripped) and the control switch for 2YUC-MDS3 on the main control panel 2CEC*PNL852 is in the CHOOSE position.
Circuit switcher 2YUC-MDS3 opens when an electrical fault Amendment 7 8.2-7 December 1983
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~~Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.8 (SRP App 8A)~~
~~Regarding the degraded voltage condition and undervoltage relays discussed in FSAR Section 8.2.2:~~
a. You state that 517.5 V (90 percent of the motor 1.13 nameplate voltage of 575 V) is required at the 600 V 1.14 buses to ensure proper starting and running of all Class lE motors. Since 90 percent is the motor rated 1. 15 voltage for continuous operation, the additional voltage 1. 16 drop from the 600 V buses to the motor terminals will result in the motors operating at less than their 1. 17 continuous . rated voltage. Justify this condition. 1.18 Likewise, justify the capability to start 80% rated NSSS 1.19 and MOV motors with only 80% of the motor rated voltage 1.20 up at the buses.
b. You state that from the voltage profile study the grid 1.21 voltage needed to maintian adequate station voltages at 1.22 the lowest tap of the load tap changer (ZTC) is below 1.23 the normal operating range of the grid. Is this the 1.24 worst case condition? Since the sensing for the LTC is 1.25 on the 13.8 KV system, is there a lightly loaded 13.8 KV 1.26 condition which would result in the LTC being on a higher tap and consequently worse 4.16 KV voltages?
Also, provide the results of your analysis for the 1.27 opposite condition, i.e., heavily loaded 13.8 KV system '.28 and lightly loaded 4.16 KV system resulting in 4.16 KV 1.29 system overvoltages.
c ~ You state that, when the auxiliary boiler transformer is 1.30 supplying the onsite emergency power distribution system 1.31 and the grid . is at its normal operating minimum, the 1.32 voltage at the 600 V buses under the most severe load conditions is 460 V (80 percent of 575 V). Per the 1.33 discussion in item (a) above justify the capability to start NSSS and MOV motors and to operate continuously 1.34 all Class 1E motors at this low voltage.
d. Extend your analysis to include all Class 1E equipment 1.35 (not just motors) down to the 120/208 and 120/240 volt 1.36 levels, and provide t:he Class 1E bus voltage profiles 1.37 for, steady state and t'.ransient conditions.
e. Provide a detailed description of your second level 1.38 undervoltage relay design, including setpoints; and 1.39 address each position of SRP Branch Technical Position PSB-1.
RESPONSE 1.41 Amendment 6 QCcR F430.8-1 December 1983 ch1217718fqr6r 10/24/83 156
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RcVIsEO lNQRbl46 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR tern voltage fluctuations of 120.75 kV (105 percent) to 109.25 kV (95 percent) and secondary load fluctuations. The 4.16-kV tertiary winding voltage fluctuates in accordance with the foregoing selected tap position, primary voltage variation, and/or 4.16-kV emergency switchgear bus load condition.
The Class 1E motors are capable of starting at 75 percent 'n're:.; 0 and running at 90 percent of their rated voltage. The maximum permissible voltage drop between the 4.16-kV emergency bus and the connected load under normal running condition is 20 V, while that during motor starting is 60 V.
The maximum permissible voltage drop between 600-V emergency load center buses and their connected loads under normal operating conditions is 12 V; for the motor control centers, this is generally broken up as 4 V between the load center and the motor control center (MCC) and 8 V between the MCC and the motors. However, for MCC feeders having longer ca-ble lengths, the voltage drops from 600-V load centers to the MCC and from the MCC to the motor are redistributed within the framework of the total voltage drop limitation of 12 V. The voltage profile study of the plant electrical power distribution system- shows that with the preceding criteria for the permissible voltage drops, the minimum voltage that will ensure proper starting and running of all Class 1E motors at the 4.16-kV and 600-V level are: 1) 460 V (80 percent of the motor name plate voltage of 575 V) at 600.-V buses during the most severe motor starting condition at the 4.16-kV bus with the 4.16-kV bus loaded, and
~~2) 517.5-V (90 percent of the motor name plate voltage of 575 V) at the 600-V buses under full load condition of the 4.16-kV bus.~~
a From the voltage profile study, minimum 115-kV system voltage that it is observed that the will satisfy these con-ditions is 98 kV (85 percent of 115 kV) at the lowest tap of the ETC (103.5 kV). This is below the normal operating range of the 115-kV system (109.25 kV or 95 percent to 120.75 kV or 105 percent). The emergency onsite ac power distribution system undervoltage relays are set accordingly to prevent degraded voltage conditions of the offsite power sources from affecting site operating conditions.
From the case the voltage profile study it is also observed that in onsite emergency power distribution system is fed through the auxiliary boiler transformer, the minimum 115-kV system voltage that will provide at least 460 V (80 percent of 575 V) at 600-V buses und'er the most severe load eon-.'
jtion is 109.25 kV (95 percent of 115 kV).
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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.10 (SRP 8.2)
For. the Class 1E switchgea" 2ENS*SWG101, 102, and 103 shown 1n Figure 8.3-2,'tate whether the "cubicle only" positions for access to the alterna"e offsite source norma'ly have a c'cuit breaker installed. Describe what is required to connect the alternate of=site source to the safety buses through these cubicles.
~~RESPONSE~~
See revised Section 8.F 1.1.2.
Psa c.
If a safety bus is being powered from its a1ternate offsite power source and that source is subsequently lost, will the bus be automatically reenergized from the diesel generator? This shou1d be the. case.
4 JH ~ ~ Q, See r-cp, s, g Sec- /r'c~ + 3.I.>. 2-Amendment 7 QccR F-30.10-1 De embe 1983
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REYLsED woPbt Ng Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR rated speed, voltage, and freauency, the generator breaker 101-1 closes. Within 10 sec from the starting signal, the load secuencing,-begins. Similarly, the emergency bus 2ENS*SWG103 ' transferred to its erne gency diesel ge. erator 2EGS~EG3 upon loss of voltage or sustained degraded voltage from reserve trans ormer 2RTX-XSRlB. Upon loss of voltage or degraded voltage from reserve transformer 2RTX-XSRIA or 2RTX-XSRIB, the emergency bus 2ENS*SWG102 is also trans-ferred to its emergency diesel generator 2EGS*EG2 in a similar way, except that of'no load shedding on the bus is reauired. In case LOCA, the emergency diesel generators start and run on no-load so that they can pick up loads in the event a delayed loss of offsite power should occur following a LOCA.
The emerg ncy 4.16-kV switchgear is rated for 2SO MVA inter-rupting capacity. All breakers are rated for 1,200 con- amps continuous duty. Each divsional switchgear has two dc trol power buses . supplied by Class its associated divisional emergency dc power system. lE battery 2BYS*BAT2A feeds bus 2ENS*SWG101 via Class 1E 125-V dc switchgear 2BYS*SWG002A. Class lE battery 2BYS*BAT2B feeds bus 2ENS*SWG103 via Class 1E 125-V dc switchgear 2BYS*SWG002B.
.Similarly, Class 1E battery 2BYS*BAT2C feeds bus 2ENS*SWG102 via,Class 1E 125-V dc panel 2EGS*PNL002. One control bus supplies. control 'power to the main breake s, assoc'ted te'laying, -and control ci'rcuits; the other bus supplies con-trol power for the feeder. breake s, associated relaying, and cont ol circu'ts. The two"control buses are supplied by two separate cables originated at tne same breaker on the dc bus. The two caries are routed separately. Each control bus can be cc=aected to the o her dc feeder via a pullout fuse block a angement.
Eme gency 4.'16-kV switchgear buses are electrically indepen-dent and physically isolated from each other so that any failure in one d'vision will not jeopardize 16-kV the safety func-.
tion of any other division. Emergency 4. switchgear buses are located in separate rooms in the emergency switch-gear room structure.
at el 261 ft in the control building, a Category I 600-V Distribut on System The 600-V dist ibution system consists of the normal and emergency 600-V load centers, 600-V MCCs, and 600-V power distribution panels. The, load centers feed the MCCs, 600-V d'st 'bution pa. e's, 600-V motor loads from 50 to 200 hp, and other loads rom 60 to 150 kW. The MCCs feed plant auxil' y motor loads f om 1(2 to 50 hp, motor-operated Amendment 4 8.3-9 September 1983
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Nine iNile Point Unit 2.FSAR QUESTION F430.15 (SRP 8.3.1)
Provide the following information regarding the Division I and II automatic starting and loading systems:
a. If the offsite source is lost when Class 1E buses with the d'esel generator running in it is powering the standby will the residual bus voltage be allowed to decay prior to sequencing Describe how this is accomplished.
~~the f'st group of loads?~~
~~b. Explain the various starting times indicated'or the SW pumps in Table 8.3-1.~~
C. Clarify Tables 8.3-5 discern and 8.3-6. It is difficult to discrete load sequenc'ing intervals and to correlate the times given in these tables with the times given in Table 8.3.1. It is also difficult to correlate the numbers given in the "starting," "running" and
,"total load" columns of Tables 8.3-5 and 8.3-6.
~~d. Describe whether the Class lE LOCA loads are sequenced on offsite sequenced, power or block loaded.~~
we require that a If separate they are load sequencer for
'ffsite and onsite 'power =for each electrical division be provided. Alternatively,,provide a detai'led analysis to
'-demonstrate'hat there 'are no credible..'sneak,.circuits,.or
'common.-fai3.'ure"'-modes in: the sequencer .design which could.,
render .
both onsite and offsite power sources unavailable. In addition, provide information concerning the 'reliability of your sequencer and reference the design, detailed drawings.
e. Table 8.3-5 '~di"'.ates that the diesel generator load for the final load sequence interval during a simultaneous LOOP- '*and,LOCA .is 4,679..XW.... This is in excess of the 4400 KW cont'uous rat'ng of the d esel generator shown in Figure 8.3-2. Justify the operation of the diesel gene ator at greater than its continuous rating.
R" SPONSE See revised Sect'on 8.3.1.1.2 and revised Tables 8.3-1,.
8.3-2, 8.3-5, and 8.3-6.
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~~d. Provide more information on the sequencer is meant by sequential relaying? What circuitry. What used? Describe the location of the sequencerof relays are type~~
.983 Are they centrally located or distributed? circuits.
Will of one relay result in loss of the entire load failure sequencer?
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Nine i%i le Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430. 16 (SRP 8.3.'1)
Regard'ng the control and protect'on systems fo" Division I, II, and III diesel gene ators discussed in FSAR Section 8. 3. 1. 1. 2:
~~a. Is coincident logic used on the Divis'on I and II generator phase over-cu rent t 'p as required by R.G. 1.9?~~
~~b. Are all conditions which shu down the diesel gene ator during test but bypassed du ing emergency operation, alarmed in the main control room in accordance with.~~
~~R.G. 1.9?~~
c. Cross reference the diesel generator conditions you have identified in FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2 subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 with the annunc'ation provided in the main control room iden"-'fied in subparagraph 5. Do this for
~~"'":",both':Divisions...I,and I.I,and III.~~
~~RESPONSE~~
ee revised'ection 8.3.'1.1.2 and Table 8.3-3A.
C. ~ Regarding the alarms associated with the division I and II diesel generators - the single. common alarm in the control room which is designated as Emergency Diesel Generator System Trouble/Trip does not provide a clear indication the operator of whether the machine has a disabling or to non-disabling condition since both are annunciated in the same window. AII the conditions which render the diesel
. "'generator:incapable of responding .to-:an emergency auto-start signal should be alarmed in a cannon diesel generator inoperable window. Non-disabling conditions should not be mixed with these.
~ Regarding the alarms associated with the division, III diesel generators - if the "Iow fuel oil level in tank" and "low starting air pressure" conditions render thedaydiesel generator incapable of responding to an emergency start they should not be alarmed as "Engine Troubl'e" together with other non-disabling conditions.
Amendmen 7 QS~R F430 16-"-
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diesel engine conditions annuncia ed as an "Engine Trouble Al."~~'n the control room will exis'hile engine is in running mo de,. During en g ine standb mode "low fuel oil level n i
'dayi.tank"=or "low starting air,.pressure" condition will initiate "Engine. Trouble Alarm" in the control room to alert the operator of abnormal situation. The operator is required to take necessary action to ensure that proper fuel supply or adequate air supply to diesel engine is available.
,'he fuel oil day tank, is backed. by a seven-day storage tank.
Diesel generator starting air supply "system has two redundant trains; either train can start the diesel engine. Therefore, even if one"tank's at low pressure .adequate starting capability is still available through redundant air supply train.
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~~Nine M'le Point Unit 2 CESAR~~
~~h. Directional ground overcurrent (with shutdown).~~
~~i. Blown potential transformer fuse.~~
~~Mode selector switch in OFF position.~~
~~k. Incomplete sequence (starting) .~~
~~l. Overspeed engine (with shutdown).~~
~~m. Excessive vibration engine (with, shutdown).~~
~~Generator contxol in maintenance position or inoperable.~~
~~o. Generator space heater auxiliary switches or MCC no proper for auto operation.~~
~~5. All . conditions:.mentioned in items 1, 2, 3, and 4 are annunciated in a common window in the main con-trol room designated as Emergency Diesel Generator System Trouble/Trip.~~
~~6. ,Indicating instruments. which are provided for moni"oring 'the status of system pressuie,~~
':temperature, level, etc, locally in the diese3.
generator contxol room and/or main control room are
,discussed in Sections 9.5.4 through 9.5.8. In addition, the fol3.ow'ng f,ndica or@ are prov'ded for monitori.>g the status of the generators:
~~a. Voxtmeters.~~
~~b. Rrmeters, Amendment 7 December 1983~~
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Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR'UESTION
'F430. 18 (SRP 8.3. 1)
For the Division I, II, and III diesel generators add ess
'hethe" an, automatic start signal will separate 0he diesel ge'nerator from the test mode and return control of the diesel to the automatic system. Also, address whether a loss of power occurrence during a test will separate the diesel generator from the test mode this and make it loss available of power for automatic loading. For case, a signal may not be generated if maintains bus voltage, and overcurrent or underf requency the diesel generator trips must be relied on to separate from a the offsite circuits. These trips should not result in lockout for this condition. Describe the secuences which take place to separate the diesel generator from its test mode during the above events.
R:"SPONSOR "See revised..Section,.8.3.1.1.2..
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~ The response to this question for the division III diesel generator
'ncorrectly states the HPCS diesel 'generator is running in parallel with the offsite-power and no further, governor adjustment is necessary. Actually the HPCS diesel generator, has been separated "
'.'*from"offsite;power'.by'-tripping of.,the..dg feed breakers due to the LOCA signal. Therefore, it should be returned to the isochronous mode.
~ The response alsr "tates that ifwould the HPCS dg is running unloaded, automatically -trip the a LOOP signal or a LOCA signal feed breaker ana connect the diesel generator to the HPCS bus.
,If.offsite power is available and only a LOCA signal is received
"'with the"dg running unloaded, the LOCA, loads should be loaded onto the offsite power supply rather than the diesel generator.
Amendment 8 QGR F430.18-1 Janua y 1984
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Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.39 (8.3)
,'The avai'lability. on, demand of an emergency diesel generator is dependent upon, among other things, the proper functioning of its controls and monitoring instrumentation.
This equipment is generally panel mounted and in some instances the panels are mounted directly on= the diesel generator skid. Major diesel engine damage has occurred at some operating plants from vibration induced wear on skid mounted control and monitoring instrumentation. This sensitive instrumentation is not,made to withstand and function accurately for prolonged periods under. continuous vibrational stresses normally encountered with internal combustion engines ..Operation of sensitive instrumentation under this environment rapidly deteriorates calibration, accuracy, and control signal output.
Therefore, except for sensors and other equipment that must be.directlymounted.on the.,engine or associated piping, the
'ontro'ls 'nd'onitoring"'instrumentation should be installed on a free standing floor mounted panel separate from the engine skids, and located on a vibration free floor area.
If the floor is not vibration free, the panel shall .be equipped with vibration mounts ~
Confirm your compliance with the above requirement or
.-'.provide'.

'.justification for .....;.noncompliance. (SRP 8.3. 1,
'arts II and III)
ESPONSE E
revised Section 8.3.1.1.2.
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The response appears to be acceptable The.mounting for the Division III DG control panel must be confirmed.
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Amendment 7 QE(R F430.39-1 December 1983
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Nine iNile Point Unit 2 FSAR not jeopardi e the safety function of,any other standby diesel generator.
Automatic Startinc and Loadin The HPCS diesel gener-ator starts automatically in case of a LOCA and loss of off-site powe supply. The sequence of events following such a condition is as follows:
0-3 sec Offsite power supply breaker 102-4 trips; HPCS diesel generator starts.
10 sec HPCS diesel generator supply . breaker 102-1 closes; HPCS pump starts; 600-V loads energized.
"27 sec HPCS pump at rated speed; HPCS injection valves fully open.
The control power for automatic starting and loading is
,provided from the Division III \
emergency 125-V dc system.
Periodic testing of the HPCS diesel generator does not im-pair its capability to supply emergency power within required times.
The diesel genera or performs its .emergency function automatically when it is operating in the test mode. During the ...test. mode,. the. d'esel...generator is either loaded by paralleling with the off site power system or is running unloaded. The erne gency ..start. demand signal that reverts
'the diesel to emergency mode from test mode is a loss of offsite power (LOC7; signal or a LOCA signal.
.If a ,LOOP occu s, a parallel-loaded to the offsite diesel generator would test loads through attempt to supply powe Me -
"closed';;feed "breake s. A set. of. three directional over-current relays will tr'p the offsite feed breakers when the overcurrent exceeds the preset value on the relays. The diesel generator wou'd cont',.ue to power the .PCS. bus. The diesel generator would keep runn'ng with the . voltage regulator in the automatic mode and the gove ..or shifting from the d oop mode to the isochronous mode.
If a LOCA signal is received during HPCS diesel generator periodic testing and the diesel generator is running in parallel with the o site power, the diesel generator feed breakers will trip. The LOCA signal would ove ride the test start signal and the diesel generator would continue running unloaded. The HPCS pump motor automatically would start from the HPCS bus. z,nce the,. HPC Amendment 9 8.3-24 Vlarch 1984
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0 Nine Nile Point Unit 2 'FSAR iesel 'generator is running in parallel with the offsite /Y power, no further governor adjustment is necessarv.
Except in, the case of a LOCA, diesel generator protective trips are operational. A LOCA signal causes all engine protective trips except engine overspeed and generator dif-ferential protection to be bypassed.
If theLOC diesel generator is running unloaded, a LOOP signal i na would automatically trip the bus.feed breaker or a ana connect the diesel generator to the HPCS Control and Protection System The logics for control and protection of the Division III standby power system are shown. on Figure 7.3-3. < The Division III standby diesel generator has a con and protection system designed to initiate die~ generator trouble alarms and shutdown sequences tWprevent damage or destruction of the engine or generator/shoul.d a malfunction occur during emergency or
'..test, mode .. operation... The protective functions are as "
follow The HPCS diesel generator is rendered incapable of responding to an emergency auto-start signal .in case of a LOCA and loss of,offsite power due to the following conditions. These conditions are annun-ciated in the d'esel generator -control room,and in "the-main. control room:
~~a. Low, fuel oil,level,,in day tank.~~
~~b. Lo~. starting air pressure.~~
~~C. Control powe failure.'I~~
~~d. Engine in ma'ntenance position.~~
~~e. Diesel engine trip/lockout not reset.~~
Generator t ip/lockout not reset.
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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QU" STTON F430. 19 (SRP 8. 1, 8. 3. 1, 8. 3. 2)
Regardi'ng protection of containment electrical penetrations:
a. FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.5 states that power feeders passing through electrical penetrations are provided . with primary and backup protective devices. The overcurrent protection should not be limited to power feeders. All electrical circuits with available fault current greater than the continuous rating of the penetration (to maintain mechanical integrity) should be protected by two overcurrent devices. Verify that this is the case.
b. All primary and backup breaker overload and short circuit protection systems 'should be qualif'ed for the service environment including seismic. However, the seismic qualification for non-Class 1E circuit breaker protection systems should as a minimum assure that the protection systems remain operable during an operating ba'sis'.earthquake...'Jn.~addition, the non-Class 1E circuit breaker and protection'system, shall be of h'gh quality.
~~Ver'y that this is the case.~~
c. indicate whethe redundant overcurrent penetration protection is provided on the low frequency mg se feeds to the reactor recirculation pump feeds. E',ther provide the redundant protec ion or justify omiss'on of the redundant device.
d. Where external cont ol power is needed for t ipping breakers, s'g".als for tr'pping the primary, and backup breakers shou'd be independent, physically separated and powered from separate sources. Verify that your des'gn complies and ide..tify the power suppes to the
~~""'..redundant.'c'rcuit breakers.~~
e. Provide the fault cu rent-clearing-time curves of the penetrations'rimary and secondary current inte upt'ng devices plotted aga'r st the thermal capability (i t) curve of the penetration (to maintain mechanical integrity) . Also provide a simplified one line diagram showing the locat'n o'f the protective dev'es in the penetration circu' and indicate the max'.-.;um available fault current of the circuit.
~~RESPONSE~~
See revised Section 8.3.1.1.5.
Amendment 7 QccR F430.19-1 L'ecembe 1983
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(sufficiently longer than the fault clearing time) without exceeding their thermal limit. They should be able to carry this current continuously unless they have two protective devices in series, otherwise a single failure of a protective device under a fault condition would damage the penetration.
Discuss your compl'iance with this position.
~~b. Response OK c.=':EOpen. Have not responded to this question."-~~
id.k The response nn1y address the RCP breakers. Are there any other penetration circuit breakers which require external control power for tripping? If so, address them as well.
e. The response does not provide the penetration I2t curves plotted against the fault current clearing time curves of the interrupting devices. Me need these curves to verify that the penetration is protected by both interrupting devices over the full range of the I2t curve. Each set of curves should show the maximum available fault current to
"= ' 1the:. penetration..an'd.should have a simple one line diagram showing orientation 'of the protective devices to the penetration. Penetration protection curves should also be provided for 120 VAC and 125 .VDC control circuits.
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Nine M'e Point Unit 2 FSAR Tvoe 5 Type 5 penetrations contain shielded signal cables and are used to connect nuclear incore innstrumentation cables in-side and outside the pr'mary containment. Type 5 pene-trations also use pigtail terminations and terminal enclosures.
All power feeders passing through electrical penetrations are provided with primary and backup protective devices which are capable of 'limiting the maximum heat produced by the fault current (I~t) at the penetration to a value less than the thermal capabili y of the penetration; For all control and ins rumentation circuits, the pene-able d'or an exten e pe iod ( su+ficientl on er t an ne ault clearing time wat out excee zng t err thermal lima.t.
All primary an backup circuit breakers are purchased as Class 1E except for the following:
~~l. 4.16-kV circuit breakers used for IFMG set (one in each feeder circuit).~~
~~2. Feeder breakers for loads that are operated only during plant shu down condition, e.g., containment hoist.~~
The breakers are'urchased"'a'",.non-lE. The non-lE breakers are simila to the Class lE breakers and are of a high quality. The motor cont ol centers housing the circuit breakers for the non-1E feeders going through the pene-trations are sei mically mounted.
The two 13.8-kV feeders to the reactor recirculation pumps have,two<'redundant.wcircuit b eakers,,in series in the 13.8-kV safety-related swi chgear. The 13.8-kV circuit breake s are electrically operated. The' ope ating time has been as-sured as 30 cycles for t".e purpose of calculation. This is very conserva ive. The actual time is expected to be around 10 cycles. The two breake s receive trip signals from the two sepa ate divisior.s of the RP5 system (see Section 8. 3. 1. 1. 3 ) 4AM A.
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Each 600-V feeder from the MCCs has a backup the mal-magnetic circuit breake in ser'es with the primary the mal-magnetic breaker. The backup ci cuit breaker trip setting is the same as the primary c'cuit breaker. 1-cycle The 600-V cir-cuit breake s are molded case type with ope ating time. The calculated wo s" case I~t for the different types Amendment 7 8.3-40 Decembe 1983
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Nine M'e Point Unit,2 FSAR QUESTION F430.20 (SRP 8.1, 8.3.1)
In FSAR Sections 1.8 and 8.3.1.3.1, you state that cables are marked at 15 ft. intervals. The requirement for marking
'cables at 5 ft,...intervals in Regulatory Guide 1.75 is not a typographical error. The mark'g interval is specif'd as 5 ft. in both the 1975 and 1978 vers'ns of the Regulatory Guide. Therefore, justify the wider marking interval used at Nine Mile Point Unit 2. Also, ve ify that raceways are marked, prior to installation of cables, not exceeding 15 ft. intervals and at entry to and exiting from enclosed areas in accordance with IEEE 384-1974.
~~RESPONSE~~
See revised Section 1.8.
PSa C-o~~~~r
~~The marking of cables'at 15 ft. intervals is not in accordance with the interval specified in R.G. 1-75. The staff has also been consistent in applying the 5 ft. interval requirement
',...current. license, reviews...,.You..shou1d, therefore, mark the in l cables at 5 ft. intervals beginning immediately or provide justification why it is not being done..
of raceways, I have not found. any response j )+Regarding the marking which indicates that raceways are marked, prior to installa ion of cables, not exceeding 15 ft. intervals and at entry to and exiting from..enclosed areas. Provide this response.
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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 1.8-1 (Cont)
Re ulator Guide 1.75, Revision 2 Se tember 1978 Physical Independence of Electric Systems FSAR Sections 7.1.2, 7.6 ', 8.3.1 Position The Unit 2 project complies with the Regulatory Position (Paragraph C) of this guide through the alternate approach described below and in Section 7.6.2 and 8.3.1.
Regulatory Position C.9 requires that cable splices in raceways be prohibited. Splicing in electrical penetrations
'.is"c'onsidered to .be, exempt. from this requirement.
Regulatory Position C.10 requires that the cables be marked at 5-ft intervals. This is a typographical error as con-firmed by the former Electrical, Instrument and Control Branch. Chief of USNRC, T. A. Ippolito, on October 10, 1975, and the NRC Power Systems Branch Section Leade R. G. FitzPatrick, on October 30, 1980. The correct "distance"is,15 ft,";which has;been. followed in Unit 2.
Amendment 7 89 of 169 December '983
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pell~EE RGRoiws Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR Channel IIB Blue Power supply Noncolor P'CIVICS Input channels Channel 1A Green Channel 1B Yellow Channel 1C Orange Channel 1D Blue Output and power supply HSLIV Noncolo NOV, SOV, Division I Green iNOV, SOV, Division II . Yellow All safety-related eauipment has permanently affixed color +
coded identification plates. Safety-related cables outside the control zoom are color coded through application of paint, colored tape, .or colored wrap-around split-sleeve "ma'rkers. 'Ca~'les"-'in"trays;.are color marked at each end,. at'-
internals not exceeding 15 ft, at both sides of walls, and at pa titions on floors separating area . Flexible o color markers with, pressure sensitive adhesive back-rig'lastic ing a e used for cable travs and conduits. All marke s used a e prequalified for the environmental conditions to which they may be exposed.
8.3.1.3.2 Alphanumeric Cod'ng Each piece of equipment, cable, and raceway is. identified by an alphanume ic cede number in.addition to the color coding.
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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.22 (SRP 8.1, 8.3.1)
In the d'cussion of electrical isolation in Section 8.3.1.4.1 you.state that whenever a safety-related powe o" control circuit is connected with any norsafety-related circuit, appropriate isolation devices are used.
D'scuss what you consider an appropriate isolat'on device for a powe circuit. In accordance with Regulato"y Guide 1.75 a circuit breaker tripped on a COCA signal is an acceptable isolation device. For the 600 V emergency lighting panels 2 LAC*PNK100A and 300B and their loads,1E identify which portions of the system are qualified Class and which a e. not and identify the isolation devices used between the Class 1E and non-1E portions. Since these panels feed other crit'cal Class 1E safety related loads, the panels themselves should not be tripped on a IOCA signal.
R"SPONSE 4I See revised Sections 8.3.1.4.1 and 8.3.1.1.2.
755 The response to,this question does not address how the emergency lighting circuits are isolated from the Class lE system. The
... l,ighting,fixtures. are not qualified. Class 1E, therefore, they must have isolation. 'n acceptable -isolation means are two overcurrent devices- in...series bothcoordinated with the. upstream, bus feeder overcurrent device.
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REVISED WORDIN6 Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR Redundant divisions of the emergency lighting system, fed from redundant divisions of plant emergency ac distribution system, illuminate essential areas so that failure of power supply to any one division will not cause total failure of lighting in these areas during an emergency. The emergency lighting system is a Class lE system except for the 1iqhtin fixtures, which are seismically supported. +k. P; All critical areas of the station requiring continuous lighting are also provided partial illumination by the essential lighting system. The essential lighting system receives power from the station normal UPS system.
't The egress lighting system provides adequate lighting for all egress signs inside the plant, exit doors, hallways, corridors, passageways, and stairways, etc, leading to the outside building exits. The system is designed for inside building egress emergency conditions in accordance with OSHA requirements. The=-egress lighting system receives power
'Crom <<""the;,.:.station'.:.:=normal, .".,UPS',systems which also feed the essential'ighting system. Seismically supported 8-hr
'battery packs will provide necessary illumination for access and egress routes for safe shutdown areas, with emergency lighting.
if not provided All battery pack lighting is Exide model B-200 or similar
'which .provides high efficiency lighting and instantaneous
'load transfer upon'.loss of ac supply. These are capable of feeding 2-25 watt lamps for 8 hrs. The battery packs are seismically supported.
9.5.3.4 Inspection and Testing .Requirements Since , the lighting system is , on, at all times, any malfunction;.is..;easily identified. The self-contained battery pack units are tested periodically. Relamping is done as required.
9.5.4 Standby Diesel Generator Fuel. Oil Storage and Transfer System Unit 2 is provided with three standby diesel generators, including one dedicated for the high-pressure core spray (HPCS) system. Each operates on No. 2D diesel fuel oil.
Each diesel engine has an independent fuel oil storage and transfer system to supply sufficient fuel to the diesel engine during a loss-of-coolant accident (ZOCA), as well as during loss of offsite power.
Amendment 7 9.5-22 December 1983
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Nine Nile Point Un' 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.23 (SRP 8.1, 8.3.1)
Regarding separation of electrical c'cu's:
a ~ Describe associated the c'rcuits separation of non 1E circ 's and Class 1E circuits. Also address from the qualificaiion and identification of the associated circuits.
~~b. In 6~~FSAR Section 8.3.1.4.2 you state that if inch separation cannot be mainta'ned between circuits the required on terminal boards a fire resistani barrier is provided between the terminals or an analysis is made to establish that a fire in one divisional circuit inside the panel will not disable both divisions. Identify the areas where an analysis is used and provide the analysis results for staff review.~~c. Does the elec rical, penetration separation discussed in~~~~'~ Section="8..".3 .1 '4,.',2.:.resul~n.,3 ft. horizontal and 5 ft. vertical clearance between redundant Class 1E circu'ts and Class lE and non-Class 1E circuits?~~d. Justify the routing of redundant Class, 1E circuits in the east ve tical cable chase and the routing of Class 1E and non-Class 1E c'cuits in the second and third elect ical tunnels.. Your r sponse should address posit'on C.8"of R.G. 1.75.e. Is flexible condu'.utilized. as .a, bar ier in i. NSSS or non-'NSSS por 'ons of the plants? If so ide."-ify the areas " whe e +it .is .used,. and,the, separation distances main-ained.~~f. 'Descr=:be'the ';separation provide&,for the RPS c'cuits.~~FSAR appendix 9Z, section 9.A.3.7.3, addresses ihe means used to route cables into the cont ol buding and througn the cable routing areas within t'"e cont ol building. P ov de a compa able description in FSAR Chapter 8 wh'h addresses the cable separa those a eas to meet the IEE=- 384-1974 and R.G. 1.75 'n used in recu'ents. Do these areas contain high ene gy eau'ent or piping (h'gh or moderate ene gy) that. could be a poteniial source of missi'es or pipe whip? Are powe cables routed th ough Che area? Amendmen~ 7 QGR F430.23-1 Dec elbe 1983 J' sYA ) 'i~ a 4 i 5v~ g,'. l tt , 'I I'L I 1 e' >l 1 4, V C ~, Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR~~RESPONSE~~See revised Sections 8.3.1.4.1 and parts a, c, d., e, 'f,. and g. 8.3.1.4.2 for res= nse to In response to part b, to date there are no cases analysis has been used to justify whe e less than 6-in sep ration. (g p C D I~ ~ e. ~ 1 a- Your response on. associated circuits should describe the identification and color coding used for these circuits. Oo the circuits become associated because of inadequate separation distances or by virture of being connected to the Class lE power system? '.Verify that the associated circuit is routed only with the division to which it is associated down to an isolation device, -',:,b.."- .Your response.to this .question states that to date there are'o cases where analysis"has'een used to justify less than 6-in. separation. Verify that this response includes cabinets located in the PGCC. 1~~c. Response OK~~~~d. ln accordance with position C.8 of R.G. 1.75 verify that~~~~.the" el'ectrical tunnels and vertical cable chases are ventilated.~~~~e. Your resprn e indicates that flexible conduit is used as a barrier in NSSS panels to achieve required separation.~~Provide an anhlysis supported by tests which indicate the flex conduit is a suitable barrier and describe the ,.:separation maintained between the flex conduit and external circuit. i We also understand that z "fire retardant tape will be used as a barrier in PGCC cabinets. Provide an analysis supported by tests which indicate the tape is a suitable barrier and describe the separation maintained between the tape and external circuit. 7 o /SB Co~ e 1> R~,sec( 5~ c. 7. ~ . 3.I. f, ( Amendment 7 QGR F430.23-2 - " 1983 Dece.. 1w V p1 I, qv b'; Within the PGCC, wherever the six inches be maintained for separation, air space cannot alternate employed as allowed by Regulatory Guide means have been 1.75 and IEEE-384; A summary'is provided below: (1) Use of flexible'.or rigid conduit containing redundant circuits (2) Use of'etallic plates as a barrier between redundant divisional'circuits (3) Use of Sil-Temp tape (4) Steel enclosures (cans) for devices in close prox-imity with redundant devices and circuits (5) Connector (metallic) housing used as an acceptable barrier (6) Use of common devices (fire-tested) for. divisional separation which includes scram contactors, Agastat relays, and P8B relays HFA relays, (7) Use of HDR relays with for divisional circuits.isolation barrier(metallic plate) 4 LZ8tel ~ >~ ~ I I 'J 1 ~ Af I ~$ ~'gC 1 t81ll M M 1L', I e i =- P 'I q-g e ,F. f~~e. Flexible steel conduit as a se ara ion barrier:~~. The testing has demonstrated that in a dl0 AWG, tefzel insulated w conti nuous. source of DC current, a he electrical short circuit rcuit flexible steel conduit, cannot cause electrsca supportted by 140 amp, >re of sufficient magnitude and induce thermal energy migration through a within a flexible steel conduit barrier. The wiring which generates heat to the separation barrier melts apart and becomes an open circuit before significant thermal damage can occur to the separation barrier. Fire retardant ta e as a se aration barrier: Tests were conducted on siltemp tape samples using "siltemp" as an electrical separation barrier. The tests demonstrated that the tape's capable of preventing propagation of damage between the circuits under maximum short circuit and neigboring rated current circuits. Thus the "siltemp" tape provides adequate thermal and electrical insulation to preclude propagation of '.,-;;:.",:,-:";;;."'damage.':between;.two:redundant:circuits. ~ ~ I ~l l a<~~9 a4'C>>~~~p cJ <<ting ~yhEQ wQRDlNG Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR 8.3.'1.4.1 Electrical Isolation c The three divisions of the plant onsite power system are . electrically independent of each other. This independence is maintained through the loads the divisions feed; each d'vision feeds a separate load group and there is no chance of interconnecting independent divisions through the loads. Each division has its dedicated standby power source that is independent of the standby power source of any othex division. There is no provision for paxalleling the standby power sources of different divisions or for ,using the standby power source of one division to feed 'the loads of any other division. Each division uses its own control power sources for instrumentation and control, and the con-trol powex source of each 'division is independent of the control power of any other division. There is no pxovision for interconnecting these control power sources or for feeding the control circuits of one division from the con-trol power sources of any other division. Each division is also isolated from the associated. nonsafety-related systems. Whenever a safety-xelated powe'x or control circuit is connected with any nonsafety-related circuit, appropriate isolation devices as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.75 and IEEE 384 are used. Nonsafyty powex loads are not fed from safety buses except the stub , bus . loads (see Tables 8.3-1 and 8.3-2). The stub buses are tripped on'KOCA signal. The .a'ssociated circuits are treated as Class lE circuits. The associated circuit cables meet -all the',requirements of Class 1E cables. 'if ~ '4IP 8'. 3. l. 4. 2 Physical Separation T e, A~A Ph sical Se aration of the Class 1E "Ecruioment The items of equipment associated with each of the three in-dependent divisions of the Class 1E onsite power systems are located in separate Seismic Category I structures to phys-ically isolate them from each other. The Class 1E 4.16-kV switchgear buses of the three divisions are located in the Division I, II, and III emergency switchgear rooms in the control building at el 261 ft. The Class 1E 600-V load cen-ters associated with Divisions I and II are located -'in the emergency switchgear room of the respective division. The Class 1E MCCs associated with Divisions I and II are located in the emergency switchgear rooms of the respective division, in separate rooms in the sc eenwell building (el 261 ft), and in the reactor auxiliary building auxiliary Amendment 7 8.3-49 December 1983 '4 tl ~. 1 >L ~ V~~S pi I ~~~/+4 g% l pW ll >e 4 'V Pr ad%~',a P ~ 4 l J C ~1E ~tlat ~~K ~ ~ IE- ~ ~LZJ ~ &PM >the A C Op~ 1 ~ ~ U 1 r II '\ h hW'C C k~ . ~ I ~t~ ~ ~(y ~ Nine Mi le Point Un' 2 FSAR QU" STiON 430.2L (SRP 8.3.2) Regarding the 1"5 U dc Class 1E power distribution syste..s:~~a. What is the operating voltage range of the loads connected to the Division I, II and III dc distribut=on systems?~~~~b. Are the metal battery racks grounded?~~~~c. Does the Division III system have a battery d'scha ge alarm or low voltage alarm set approximately at batte v open circuit vo 1tage?~~d. Describe the location of the wate facilities in the battery rooms and discuss the potential for inadverte .t spill'ng of water on the batteries from these facilities.~~e. Recent operating, experience -~~has shown that an incompat'ibi;lity between'-the batte y rack and the batte y may cause cracking of the battery case. The c ack'ng may be caused in part by improper support at the batte y stress points. Describe the battery stress points a"d their relationship with battery rack support. R:"SPONSOR See revised Sect'on 8.3.2.1.2. PSB COMMENTS~~a. The maximum battery terminal voltage indicated on FSAR page~~'8.3-'"'57 for the"division III batteries:is 2.5 volts higher (137.5 V vs 1.35 V) than the maximum operating voltage of the loads. Denenstrate how a 2.5 volt drop to the terminals of the loads is ma'intained at light load and maximum voltage while no more than a 2.5 volt drop is maintained during heavy load and minimum voltage (battery voltage 112.5 V vs load voltage 110 V). There a1so appears to be a discrepancy between the Ntaximum battery voltage (137.5 V) indicated on FSAR page 8.3-57 and that indicated on page 8.3-58 (2.33 V/cell X 60 ~ 139.8). Resolve this discrepancy. c The division III bus low voltag alarm setting of 112.5 V $s not set sufficiently high to act as a battery discharge alarm. A battery low voltage alarm set at 123-125 V dc or a separate discharge alarm should be provided.~~RESPONSE~~The division III batteries are floated at 2.22V/Cell (133.2Vdc) to minimize the periodic equalization of the batteries. Mhenever equalization is required, the vendor recommends equalizing at 2.28-2.29 Volts/Cell (137.4Vdc). The normal operating voltage range of the dc loads is 110 to 135Vdc, which is maintained by battery float voltage of 133.2 volts. However, during equalization state (137.4Vdc) and lightly loaded conditions, the voltage drop in the circuit brings the voltage at the load terminals the operating range. For the low voltage and'heavy load condi ion, the dc bus~ voltage is. expected to be about 120 V or.. above. The lo voltage condition will be annunciated in the control room whe ever the bus voltage drops below 120Vdc . See revised section 8.3.2.1.2. gL+ ~ r ~ J ~4 Mr+ ) p$ ~ hg ~ 8 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR~~f. Division III standby diesel generator standby fuel pump.~~Division III standby diesel generator field flashing. All the. loads with their magnitudes and durations are given in Tables 8. 3-8 through 8. 3-10 l fvSEK> Safet -Related Dc S stem Desi n Criteria The safety-related dc system is designed to the following criteria: The emergency 125-V dc system consists of three physically separate and electrically independent dc power divisions corresponding to the three divisions of the onsite ac power system. Each division feeds a separate emergency dc load group through a separate distribution system. 2 ~ Each division of .the emergency dc system has its own battery, primary and backup battery chargers, dc switchgear and distribution panels, which are all Class 1E and Category I.~~3. Each emergency battery is sized in accordance with~~' Regulatory Guide 1.32, IEEE-308-1974, and IEEE-'485-'1978. It is'apable of performing its duty cycle (Tables 8.3-8 through 8.3-10) following the loss of chargers after the battery had been floated between .130, and 135 V dc, is fully charged at 65 F, < and with capacity deteriorated to 80 percen : Adequate design margin is included in sizing the battery to support future load growth ~ and; less.-than-,optimum operating, conditions. Should both battery chargers for any particular battery be out of service at any point in the dc load cycle, the battery is capable of starting and operating its associated loads for 2 hr according to a precalculated load profile without the battery ter-minal voltage falling below 105 V dc. Each emergency dc bus has a primary and a backup battery charger. Each emergency battery charger is capable of supplying the largest combined demands of the steady-state loads on the battery while recharging the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state within 24 hr. 8.3-57 f' ~C 4 Il IW wit ll 0 ~ ~ cfyy,ut ~gSE~g T A The normal operating voltage range of the Division III dc loads listed in Tables 8.3-10 is 110 to 135 Volts. The Division III 125V dc battery terminal voltage is normally maintained between 112.5 and 137.5 volts'c in order to provide adequate operating voltage for the connected loads. I) -pter ~to lie, I y.'a V'4 Cto gp,'~ AP Al, "rp0 I I~ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR5. All components of the emergency 125-V dc system are designed as Class 1E and Category I. The com-ponents of the three divisions are located in separate. rooms in a Category I structure.Each emergency battery room has a separate exhaust duct that is directly discharged to the atmosphere that limits the hydrogen accumulation to less than 2 percent by volume, and maintains the battery room ,temperature between 65 and 104 F. Each battery room has smoke detection equipment located in 3 hr rated fire areas.~~7. The installation design for the emergency batteries provides adequate space for inspection, maintenance, replacement, and testing of the batteries;~~~~8. The emergency dc system is ungrounded.~~Safet -Related Dc'S stem'Descri tion Emer enc Batteries Division I and II emergency batteries 2BYS*BAT2A and 2BYS*BAT2B are calcium grid. type lead-acid at 77 F. The average float voltage 's batteries having an amp-hr rating of 2,550, on an 8-hr basis 2.22 V/cell; the~~e. average equalizing voltage is .2.33 V/cell.~~rating of Division I and II batteries is 2,720 amps at 1.75 V.per cell. One minute Division III emergency battery 2BYS*BAT2C consists of cal-cium grid lead acid cells having an amp-hr rating of 100 on an 8-hr basis.~> She average float voltage is 2.22 V/cell. The average equalizing voltage is .3 V/cell. rating'of, Division.III battery ..is148 amps at One1.75 minute cell. V per The battery cell containers are made of translucent plastic material. The cells are sealed type with covers fixed in place with permanent leakproof joints. High and low elec-trolyte level markers are provided on all four sides of the..- plastic containers. Cell covers have flash vent arrestor and sample tube openings. All Class 1E batteries are . mounted on two-step Category I steel racks with restraining members arranged to prevent motion of the cells relative to each other or to Me rack. The battery racks are grounded. The emergency batteries 2BYS+BAT2A, 2BYS*BAT2B, and 2BYS*BAT2C are located in three separate batte'ry rooms in the control building on el 261 .ft. The emergency batteries are qualified for their service environment in accordance Amendment 7 8.3-58 December 1983 .MA ~, ~ I ~ + >1 ~v k . ~C)Xr, 'lL.) 8 .V,"< 'I ~ d Zg , "ply i~ 1 Nine Mile Point. Unit 2 FSAR The Division III emexgency 125-V dc panel is designated as 2CES*IPNL414. The bus is rated for 100 .amp which is based on the maximum 1-min demand on the battery. The main and feeder breakers are molded case circuit breakers with over-current protective . devices. The main breaker for the bat-tery is rated for the maximum 1-min demand on the battery. The circuit breakers are rated for 10-kA interxupting capability. The panel has ground detection and bus und voltage alarm. Loss of power to the battery charge and the bus undervoltage conditions are annunciated in con-trol xoom when the bus voltage falls below 112.5 V dc. The bus voltage and the battery current are indica ed in the control room for monitoring. The Division III emergency g 125-V dc panel is located in the Division generator control room in the emergency diesel generator III diesel g+ building at el 261 ft. 'P g The Division X and II emergency 125-V dc systems utilize G> q PW other emergency distribution panels connected to the dc ~g + switchgear for miscellaneous dc circuits. These panels are =.in'NEMA 12 enclosures ,suitable fox indoor application. /{0 These panels '>have fusible switches for branch circuit protection. Safet -Related Dc S stem Instrumentation and Control Remote indications and alarms are provided for all three divisions -.in the main control room for monitoring the status of'the.emergency'dc system as .follows: Indications:~~a. Ammeter for the battery current.~~~~b. A common ammeter for We primary and backup~~~~charger output currents.~~~~c. Voltmeters for the dc bus voltages.~~~~2. Alarms:~~a Division I dc system trouble alarm, actuated by the Division I dc bus undervoltage/over-voltage bus ground, battery breaker open, and battery charger undexvoltage. Division II dc system trouble alarm, actuated by the 'ivision II dc bus - undervoltage/ overvoltage, bus ground, battery breaker open, b.;'mendment and battery charger undervoltage. 7 8.3-61 ' December 1983 ~ I~ h ' ~ $ 1 ~ ~ ="4'~ w tq ~ .~ ~ ~ w5lA'.v k ~J Nine Mile Point Un' 2 2'SAR QUESTION F430.25 (SRP 8.1) Describe the means used 'o bypass the therma've load protec ion to Class 1E MOVs during accident cond'ions. Describe what indication of the bvpass or lack of bypass is provided in the cont ol room. Give NOV drawing references as specific examples of the design.~~RESPONSE~~The thermal overload on all safety-related NOVs is bypassed by any automatic safety signal and manually by the operator ~ holding the spring return"control switch. Annunciation. is provided in the control room for those overload control conditions. An example is shown on Drawing No. ESK-6CSE,02 ~~2 in the drawing package. Esp -@c5'603 /5g C-o~ w ~f->> The response to'his question'proV'ided on page gKR F430.25-I appears in conflict with that provided on FSAR page 8.3-42a. Resolve this conflict and provide a description of the detailed operation of the bypass circuitry. ge.gjkp-.~ 'A6 Cd~m~PS ~ Po - <, 3.I, l.f g ~~)-:~ l~ 8'mendment 7 Q6R E430.25-1 De ember 1983 ( 1 4 ~ e'h %41" < h'4i" I C, Kf >OP, t'C .1 I" Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR The thermal overload protection devices for Class lE MOVs are bypassed using auxiliary relays during. normal plant -operation and.. accident conditions. Only during test con-ditions are these overload protection devices active. In-dication of these active overload protection devices is provided in the main control room. The relay trip se point drift problems are minimized by appropriate testing and preventive maintenance. The thermal overload on all safety-related MOVs is bypassed b yanyauo automatic safety signal and manually by the operator spring return control .'those switch. Annunciation Ann is o xng .. the, ',holdin e control ~provided'~ in the'ontrol .room f .room,'-.. oor overload ESk-6CSL02 'f 5~ ( C5M3 "conditions. An example is shown on Drawing No. ES in the drawing package. Amendment 7 8.3-42a December l983 t A L V c.P ~, lO ,g'~) 'l V R < 120 of 169 imp $ C 4~ 1f g' I~~i i@@.pp <~.~~I Nine Mile Point Un't 2 FSAR QU" STlON F430.26 (SRP 8.3.2) Note 1 in, Table 8.3-8 on the Battery Toad Profile indicates that the motor starting currents occur approximately 1 second after the beginning o" the load cycle, and the tripping amps for circuit brea' s occur during the first second of the load cycle. Provide the rationale behind this statement and also p ovide the one minute ratings of the Class lE batteries.~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 8.3.2.1.2. The rationale is stated in Footnote 1 on Table 8.3-8 and was discussed with the NRC on Novembe 4, 1983. P$ $ Ce~~ ~ty " ' '" "'Document'the'"rationa1'e",used:,in:-assuming currents and the circuit breaker tripping that the motor starting amps do not occur simultaneous1y. Provide this documentation as a response to this question or as a revised footnote. Alnendment 7 Q&R F430.25-1 December 1983 4 ~ x'- i' ~ I pC'b~~<<:3>hgMK(~~+r ~ 0 P a$ V' Nine Mile Point. Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.35 (SRP 8.3.1, 8.3.2) Recent experience with nuclear power plant Class 1E motor- ,.ope ated valve motors has shown that in some instances the motor winding on the valve operator could fail when the valve is subjected to frequent cycling. This is primarily due to the limited duty cycle of the motor. Provide the required duty cycle of the ECCS and RCIC, steam and water line motor operated isolation valves as they relate to their respective system modes of operation during various events. Demonstrate that the availability of the safety systems in the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 design will not'e compromised .,-due to the limited duty cycle. of the valve. operator motors.~~RESPONSE~~The frecpxent cycling of ECCS motor-operated valves (MOVs) is ended after the first hour of a I.OCA or transient" event by ope ator action. , In this hour, the maximum expected duty ~ 'ycle.,of 'any"<<HPCS.'.isolation'va'lve is 5 strokes open and 5 strokes, closed, or 10 cycles (energized to deenergized) . ~ This expected duty cycle is less than the allowable for any of the HPCS valves.'. During normal operation> ".the ECCS MOVs are expected to open and close up to two times during monthly testing, well with'n their allowable duty cycling. For the <<low-pressure~ECCS and,RCIC, MOVs, a. response'will be provided by June 1984. f'5g'C o~~~ 1->> Additional response to be Partial response provided is K. OK. prov ided 'Hay" 19S4. Amendment 11 Q<R F430. 35-1 June 1984 t 4 1'I C k" J< ~ ()v I J 1 ~Cd o~ .Hd Vs O s- 6 .7 ~, p W -s z-l9 o s.V ii.< II E fi V . ",g%AQk@ ~N 4 all v Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR B31. 1 and the additional . requirements of the design ( specification 'll when power-actuated applicable. valve operators have been assembled, factory tested, and adjusted on the valve for proper operation, position and torque switch setting, position t'ransmitter function (where applicable), and speed requirements at the manufacture 's shop. Valve actuator electric motors have been furnished in accordance with applicable sections o f NENA Standard MG-1. Assembled power-actuated valves have been tested to demonstrate adequate stem thrust (or torque) capability to operate the valve within the specified time at specified differential pressure. Tests verified that no mechanical damage to valve components occurred during full stroking of the valve. I Operational Anal sis Preoperational and. operational testing performed on the ," insta'lied valves;."consists;. of ..total circuit checkout and performance, tests. Valves that function as containment isolation valves, will be exercised in accordance with Technical Specifications (Chapter 16) to assure their ope ability at the time of an emergency or faulted condition. Other valves, serving as~~,system-,,blocks., or>, throttling valves, 'wi.'.1 be exercised when appropriate.~~5.4.13 Safety and Relief Valves 5.4 '3.1 Safety Design Bases ls Overpressure protection has. been .provided at isolatable portions of" systems in accordance with the rules set forth in Safety Class 1, 2, and 3 components. 5.4. 13.2 Descriptionredesign Pressure relief valves have been designed and constructed in accordance with the same code class as that of the line valves in the system. Table 3.2-1 lists the applicable code classes for valves. The design criteria, loading, and design procedure are described in Section 3.9.3B. Specific data (e.g., capacity, set point) are discussed in Section 5.2.2. 5.4-51 '~ >A A ~ P g)..~~!3Q( /a 5. /. /1. '(, p5 < 5/ R~~ /E ~M 'y.c2<~e /BEE-Zb" 3 /1~~ ~p~<~ o" g!s. g:~~ Qi..y;,, l p, gp~.~i-/.':Pry~, g 4.g 4m~v~ t - i' L ~4 y~ ~ tl I I4 C +$ % h la p~ t~c(E 4 ~I ~ a P g ll ~ e 4 I tl I 4 we" A ~ I f-k Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.36 (SRP 8.3) Operating experience at certain nuclear power plants which have two cycle turbocharged diesel engines manufactured by the Electromotive Division (EMD) of General Motors driving emergency generators have experienced a significant number of turbocharger mechanical gear drive failures. The failures .have occurred as the result of running the emergency diesel generators at no load or "light load conditions for extended periods. No load or light load operation, could occur during periodic equipment testing or during, accident conditions with . availability of offsite power. When this equipment is, operated under no load conditions insufficient exhaust gas volume is - generated to operate the turbocharger. As a result the turbocharger is driven mechanically from a gear drive in order to supply enough combustion air to the engine to maintain rated speed. The turbocharger and mechanical drive gear normally supplied l,-.--.-..<<c"~with ...these ,.engines..are, no~designed for standby service ~ encountered, in nuclear, power; plant application where the. equipment may be called upon to operate at no load or light load condition and full rated speed for a prolonged period. The EMD equipment was originally designed for locomotive service where no load speeds for the engine and generator are much lower than full load speeds. The locomotive turbocharged diesel. hardly ever runs at full speed except at full "load; """The ":EMD'";has strongly-'recommended to users of this diesel engine design against operation at no load or light load conditions at full rated speed for extended periods because of the short, life expectancy of the turbocharger mechanical gear drive unit normally furnished. No load or light load .operation also causes general deterioration in any diesel engine. To cope with the-severe service the equipment is normally subjected to and in the interest of reducing failures and increasing the availability" of their equipment EMD has developed a heavy duty turbocharger driven gear unit that can, replace existing equipment. This is available as a replacement kit, or engines can be ordered with the heavy duty turbocharger drive gear assembly. To assure optimum availability of emergency diesel generators on demand, applicant's who have in place, on order or intend to order emergency generators driven by two cycle diesel engines manufactured by EMD should be provided with the heavy duty turbocharger mechanical drive gear assembly as recommended by EMD for the class of service encountered in nuclear power plants. Confirm your .compliance with this requirement. (SRP 8.3.1, Part III) , Amendment 6 QE(R F430.36-1 December 1983 0 f P E P -,S 1 e Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR~~RESPONSE~~See Section 1.12, licensing Issue 16. cc Yl&LKQ,~ l @std l~ & /4 pg b~ ~LGR- ro Amendment 6 QE(R F430.36-2 December 1983 ~ ~ ~ g~ g Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.37 (SRP 8.3) Provide a, detail discussion (or plan)- of the level of training proposed for your operators, maintenance crew, quality assurance, and supervisory personnel responsible for the operation and maintenance of the emergency diesel generators. Identify the number and type of personnel that will be dedicated to the operations and maintenance of the emergency diesel generators and the number and type that will be assigned from your general plant operations and maintenance groups to assist when needed. In your discussion identify the amount and kind. of training .that will..be received by each of the above categories and the type of ongoing training program planned to assure 'ptimum availability of the emergency generators. Also discuss the level of education and minimum experience requirements for the various categories of operations and maintenance ,personnel, associated with the emergency diesel generators. (SRP 8.3.1, Parts II and IIX)~~RESPONSE~~~~Information will be provided in January 1984. SEE KTNcg&Q N'll 4. e~~~~ +;<<(~J~~~~l. MRo (~oui ~ f<',,~~'"g~'"g + ~g~~~')i +4~ C.R. ta4O M~9 Q~gg~ ~ $ '~~ 4 45 U bh tlg/ 7 / ~, Amendment 7 QE(R F430. 37-1 December 1983 v kL ~ ~ t4 L M t) N H' k ATTACHMENT A ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE REFERENCES APN EDUCATIONL REQUIREMENT EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENT APN-10A = High School Diploma 2 years at time Licensed Operator Candidate or equivalent of NRC exam (Section 3.2) (Section 3.2) APN-10B Same As APN-10A Licensed NRC Operator Holding Current NRC Retraining License APN-10L Meet Req. of APN-10A Training'f Non'-;Licensed ~:, ,(Sections,3. 1 p.-3: 2, Operators and 3.3) APN-10M Sanction"'3.2 Labor Section 3.3 Training for Mechanics Agreement and Progressive Qualifications APN-10N Section 3.2 Labor Section 3.3 Training for Electricians Agreement and Progressive Qualifications ~' L ll g A 1 9 ~ V t I 4 f '( ATTACHMENT B LESSON PLAN OUTLINE I. PURPOSE II. SAFETY DESIGN BASES III. GENERAL DESCRIPTION -Overall Operation -Basic Theory of Operation IV. DETAILED DESCRIPTION -Starting Systems -Lube Oil Systems -Governoring Systems -Cooling Systems -Turbocharging System -Fuel Oil System -Electrical Generator System -Electrical Distribution System V. INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS -Control Room -Local VI . PRECAljTIONS AND LIMITATIONS VjI. INTERLOCKS VIII. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IX. MITIGATION OF CORE DAMAGE 'I 11 f4 I r ATTACfiMENT 8 (continued) X. PROCEDURES -Start Up -Shut Down -Normal OPS This is a proposed outline that will coincide with text material found in the Operations Technology course, which is presently being written. I il I l 4 ~ "p I 1" P C' r> i P ATTACHMENT C MAINTENANCE LESSON PLAN OUTLINE DIESEL GENERATORS PURPOSE II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION/DESIGN BASIS III. GENERAL DESCRIPTION A) Engine B) Generators C) Power Panels/Loads Supplied J DETAILED DESCRIPTION A) Starting Systems B) Fuel Oil System C) Cooling System D) Turbocharger Operation E) Lube Oile System F) System Interconnection G) Controls Il) Protective Devices l) Overspced~~2) Temperature~~~~3) Oil Pressure~~~~4) Low Water~~~~1 I 7 L4 ~ ~ ATTACHMENT C (continued) IV. DETAILED DESCRIPTION (Continued)~~~~5) Crankcase Pressure~~~~6) Generator Protection Devices~~7) Fire V. STANDBY STATUS VI. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS VII. MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES n " ao - for Main e t s 1 for The physical requirements are designated in APN-lOM, and APN-lON.~~P~~~~6 II r.~~f),$ 1 ~ 4s ~ 4 lk Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.40 (9.5.2) The information regarding the onsite communications system (Section 9.5.2) does, not adequately cover . the system capabilities during 'transients and accidents. Provide the following information: (a) Identify all working stations on the plant site where it may be necessary for plant personnel to communicate with the control room or the emergency shutdown panel during and/or following transients and/or accidents (including fires) in order to mitigate the consequences of the event and to attain a safe cold plant shutdown. (b) Indicate the maximum sound levels that could exist at each of the above identified working stations for all transients and accident, conditions. (c) Indicate the'ypes'-of 'communication systems available at each 'of the above identified working stations. (d) Indicate the maximum background noise level that could exist at each working station and yet reliably expect effective communication with the control room using: " '1'..'he'"'dia'l t'elephone "system~~2. the PP/PA system~~~~3. the~bi/CC system~~4. the SPC system (e) Describe the performance requirements and tests that the above onsite working stations communication systems will be required to pass in -order to be assured that effective communication with the control room or emergency shutdown panel is p'ossible under all conditions. (SRP 9.5".2, Parts I and II)R SPONSE (a),(b),(d),(e) See revised Section 9.5.2.4. (c) See Section 9.5.2.2 and Figures 9.5-5 through 9.5-39. PS 5 ~e "<<rg Notacceptable. The applicant has not responded adequately to -parts (a) and (c) 'of the question. (The necessity for a response may disappear depending on the acceptability of the applicant's +~'position that the plant;design,idoes.not;require coomunications.) I t '~l k r I ,.I "%p j~. I pC rl Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.41 (9.5.2) Expand the communication section of your FSAR to provide a discussion on how effective communications will be maintained under the following cond'tions: (a) loss of offsite power (COOP) (b) design basis seismic event (w/E.OOP) (c) IOOP (seismic event) coincident w/single active failure of one emergency diesel generator Describe any operator actions which may be required to establi sh and/or restore communications to the wo'rking stations identified previously. State where the action must be taken, and the time required for this operation. (SRP 9.5.2, Part II and II)~~RESPONSE~~Seerevised Section 9.5.2.4. Not acceptab1e. The app1icant has responded to parts (a) and 'of the question, and these responses are acceptable. (c) The app1icant has no.< responded to part (c) of the question. (Part may a1so become academic - see comments for (c) tl430.40.} 7 0 f S8 C 0~~/A y entre's~d. sec.fr~ 'mendment 7 QGR F430. 41-1 December 1983 4 g e e l A ~ t+'0' 9 i l' t'1 '5 ~ CAN<'1 ~ ~ (lg Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR (backup) via dc switchgear 2BYS-SWGOOlB. The normal and the bypass ac sources are normally energized from the normal station service transformer. In case of loss of power from the normal station service transformer, these are automatically transferred to the offsite power sources through the reserve station service transformers. In case of loss of offsite power the bypass sources 2NJS-US5 and 2NJS-US6 are c'onnectible to the standby ,diesel generators, except when a LOCA condition exists. 'In case of a LOOP coincident with failure of one diesel generator, the other diesel generator will supply the UPS system via its associated stub bus.. In case of loss -of all;ac sources, the UPS systems are energized from the dc backup sources. The backup batteries are rated for 2 hr. Separate cable trays Thus, no additional operator action 's are used to run cables associated with two UPS systems. necessary establishing communication with any working station under for above conditions.. The M/CC system is powered from the'lant "normal:ac ~system. The portable radio communication system is powered by rechargeable batteries and is. independent .of the plant electrical system. The SPC system requires,no plant electric power. g I (~~e~cg e ..-intraplant .communication...systems will not be subjected "to any'ommon mode"failure through damage to the system wiring since the PP/PA,,dial telephone, and.M/CC systems are run. in separate raceways... The.,communication system. wiring is not treated as safety related. Only the te"ephone system .has interconnecting wiring, ' However, outside, the. station the telephone lines are run in two::,directions -;east .;and west,- .to,.",different telephone company switchboards for redundancy. Failure of one communication system will not.'ffect the performance of any other communication system since these are independent of each othe H.l Ti& 6tit. v In case of any accident conditions, the plant can be shut down from the control room or remote shutdown room-and this does not require any communication with other locations in the plant. The communication systems will provide satisfactory voice communication in noisy surroundings up to 120 db. For PP/PA -system coverage, the output of speakers in a given area will exceed ambient noise. The soundproof telephone booths provided in areas with high ambient noise level are designed Amendment 7 9.5-17 December 1983' E I If C I f I ~ 'Ih ~~"1 i.Ph. I II "h ' ~ \,>gfc", f ,Ih W ifi 'I I, hI ' I CI ' $ J~ C P wh$ I t h gÃ.4o W. i I E t 1 I A G} Z-~ . T 'A I h 4 h '~~t Q~~~ i~~ ~q~rp ~ *Mt =I p ,Ir \' E t i I (qm +i ) OV A QP I ~ I~~ 4 7 'e ~ ',Wg '\ ~ H 'C W I W += V "c e~ i m-' T ~r 'P' Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION 'F430.44 (9.5.3) ln FSAR Section 9.5.3.2, you discuss emergency lighting for ..plant a eas ,required for "operat'ng" . safety related equipment. However, there is no discussion of emergency lighting in the areas where the actual safety related equipment is located. This is not in conformance with SRP 9.5.3 recommend'ations and guidelines. ,Revise your design to provide justification for 'on-compliance. (SRP 9.5.3, Part II)~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 9.5.3.2. g>8, Co~w~ts The app1icant's position that lighting is not.required in areas containing safety related equipment is being. evaluated. TO lt ~p GCIR ~g pj b'~ oJLl PA' /HO<'4, p(dl > (ning y~ y~ I: bing ci'r~b. u4~ ~~ve~ Q C l~ Amendment 7 Q6cR F430.44-1 December 1983 ~ pt k ~~ ~ e jl tl IA b ~ g <.s CC~c+. C>i C f C, ,t l k' Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.46 (9.5.3) In FSAR Section 9.5.3.3, you state that emergency light'ng to essential plant areas is fed from redundant emergency lighting divisions. In Table 9.5.1, you provide a list which shows the percentage of total lighting for var'ous plant areas which is provided by emergency lighting.However, fed it is not clear (in Table 9.5.1) which areas are from redundant, divisions, and what percentage 'of emergency lighting is fed from each division. Revise Table 9.5.1 to provide this information. Also, provide a tabulation of the areas for which emergency lighting is provided and the lighting levels maintained by the emergency lighting system. Show that the lighting levels are adequate to perform all necessary functions in all listed plant areas under design basis seismic event or accident conditions.~~(SRP 9.5.3, Parts I and II)~~~~RESPONSE~~See .xevised Table 9.5-1. ~~a C rs Some additional clarification is required: Ex: Table 9.5-1 page 6 of 9 - lighting data for control room and relay and computer rooms needs explaining. page 8 of 9 - adequacy of 7 foot candles in OG rooms (NUREG-0/00 calls for a minimum of 10) le <c ~:se, 1 T~hl~ 9'.z=> Amenamerx ~ 'E \ 'E 4 'I t g c I eEVlsED I 1 Nl" Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 9.5-1 (Cont) Pover Source Emeraencv Level of Illunination Pron Each Normal Division Essential Distribution gaea Percent Percent Foot CandleC1o Perceri t Interl eav'e Zona l Service Buildina and Poan Roon El 261'eneral area lighting >1Od Auxiliary Boiler Buildina El 261'nd 2751 ill bay area 100 C1> X Morking areas 100 C1> Nezzanine area 100 C1) X Electrical eguipt)ent areas 100 C1) X Diesel Generator Buildi.naC>> El 261'eneral area lighting Morccing areas Electrical eguipnent areas 90 70 70 20C0) 20C0) ~ I ll 10 10 10 x x X 261'00 Truck aisle Malcc vays Elect:rical El Coamon Inside Bay Ar'eas 106 100 C1 > C1) C 1) X X Stairvays 100 X Eqress paths 100 X Exit. signs 100 X El 214'-6" Electrical tunnels 100 C1> X HVAC equipnent area 100 C1) X Amendnent 8 8 of 9 January 1984 f r't I Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.47 (9.5.3) The essential lighting syst: em is non-Class 1E, and cannot be connected to onsite emergency power. Therefore, lighting for passageways to and from safety related equipment areas would be lost immediately following a design basis se'smic event, or within a short time (1-2 hours) following a LOOP. This is not in conformance with SRP 9.5.3 recommendations and guidelines. Revise your design ,to provide access lighting to safety related areas under all accident and/or transient conditions, or provide justification for non-compliance. (SRP 9.5.2, Parts I and II) ESPONSE See revised Section 9.5.3.2. c.. 'gf acceptable'. -Eight'hour battery packs are acceptable for egress and personnel safety, provided they are seismically mounted. Access to safety related areas, as well as lighting within those areas, must be Class 1E or equivalent, i.e., capable of operation in excess of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . 1~ PS/ I p 5e< r~.'~~X g~~f~ g8 lo Amendment 7 QEcR F430.47-1 Dece.>er 1983 s, h '1" er E.4 J+ Yi J V A' "I a I 4 1 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTI.ON F430.48 (9.5.3) The egress lighting system is non-Class 1E. Therefore, following the design basis seismic event, there would be no egress lighting for evacuation of personnel. This is not in conformance with SRP 9. 5. 3 recommendations and. gu'delines. Revise your design to provide.,egress lighting which will remain functional following 'the seismic, event, or provide justification for non-compliance. (SRP 9.5.3, Part II)~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 9.5.3.2. ~~e f3 should be Not acceptable. Lighting for safe egress of personnel accident and/or basis operable during and following any design Class lE and is UPS is not transient. .The station normal'following a .seismic,.event. Consequently, - con'sidered to"'be'unavailable egress lighting would also not be available. ~ ' *~ ~~ ~ J S m~7" ~ ',98. /0. '4 Q+ Amendment 7 Q6R F430-48-.1 December 1983 hh ~ hll, ~, ~ l Iq Q, hh'h .hh lJ h,h,' ~ I <> ~ l h j<< I Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.49 (9.5.3) Provide additional discussion on the battery pack-type lighting units around the main control board as described in FSAR Sections 9.5.3.2 and 9.5.3.3. State whether these units are seismically supported, describe their operation, give the illumination levels that these units will provide, and a detail description of the maintenance and periodic testing these units will receive.~~RESPONSE~~See revised Sections 9.5.3.2 and 9.5.3.3. Com~ t(ot acceptable. The question is not completely answered. The applicant must demonstrate that: (a) battery pack illumination at control room work stations is 10 foot candles or greater, or (b) battery pack illumination is adequate for any task requiring operator action prior to availability of onsite power (1 i ghting), (c) no operator action is required for any design basis accident or transient prior to availability of onsite power (lighting). QgS $5 i 'Q~ It/ ~~15, es.iD ~ W 1t tg '" II PC C J>> Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.50 (9.5.4 through 9.5.8) The staff requires that emergency diesel generator auxiliary systems piping and components be fabricated and installed in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 3 requirements, and be seismic Category I. The staff requirement is applicable to all auxiliary system.. piping and components, including engine mounted, up to the 'iesel engine interface. The diesel engine interface is defined as the first connection, off the diesel engine block, be screwed. it welded, flanged, or The design of the diesel engine auxiliary systems, as discussed in FSAR Sections 9.5.4 through 9.5.8, does not fully comply with the .above requirement, and is therefore not acceptable. Revise your design and, appropriate FSAR sections requirements. to, demonstrate Show the compliance with the staff auxiliary systems piping and component classifications on the appropriate PAID', along with the diesel engine interface. (SRP 9.5.4 through 9.5.8, Part'II.,'=and-Regulatory. Guide .1.26)~~RESPONSE~~I See revised Section 9.5.4.1 for a description of the standby diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system piping and components. quarter o e P6ID wx ~ap~edMy th~ ~ The HPCS diesel engine cooling water, heat exchanger and air start system air receivers.. are. in accordance with ASME Section III, Cla~s'~3, requirements. All other piping and components of the,+PCS: emergency diesel generator auxiliary systems conform to ANSI B31.1. Equipment that conforms only -to ANSI B31.1 will be pressure tested up to the diesel -'engine "~interface "at'.above noimal, operating pressures. See revised Figures 9.5-43, 9.5-46, and 9.5-48 for system piping and component classifications. A summary of the HPCS emergency diesel generator auxiliary systems piping and components quality group classifications and seismic categories is given in revised Table 3.2.-1. Amendment 7 QBR F430.50-1 December 1983 A~ P 5.6 . C.e. Not acceptable. The staff is concerned with all diesel auxiliary systems~ but the applicant has addressed only ageneratorlimited number of these systems. Before this question can be considered closed, we will require the following information: Division I and II 0="'s (a) complete PAID's for all auxiliary systems (b) engine interface data as requested (c) verification of design to ASME Section Class 3 requirements III Division III OG (a) complete P8ID's for all systems (b) a comparison which demonstrates that ANSI 831.1, with pressure testing, is equivalent to ASME Section III in terms of system function and inservice reliability. (see Perry and River Bend) (c). details of Division III auxiliary systems pressure testing n pfd S F o~ 5'v sr~ F~ pve~ I 0 II 'J l i' I' 0:I P~~ai '- --'-e,.-o-5.5~~t O.~~~~7'. QIEDS5'~ E ~ N~~~~6) g~(SP A~~~ V<< ~ I ~ <<)Vl <<W ~ I ~ 6 s1DA ~W ~ <<o<<<<<<<<<<e~<<v 'IRRIIR ~ CO5IfA/i "* W i ~:~t Q<<g ~-- "6E,556" 'EYE" "l <<QV <<ew I <<I ~ QV ~ O. ~ ~ ~ ~ I C ) TJ o << w<<N eve<<I<< ~ Ll TIN{'vw '--e ~ ~ << I ~ I"v'&i ~ << I I<< ~I el "- WWI I R ~'+ el ~l g ...'........:.. V'<<e <<e<<e <<<<<< tQi WW<<l W<<<<l <<<<<<I ~O ~ <<I SJ I; ceo'I !=4cl .c.(+ 5 )j W<<<<I I-",W CLDE \<<V<< SD 6 a <<I stQ i)cd <<<<H << a<<<<l ~ N~<<l <<ov<< W ~ ~ I ~ I mlRm W ~ wv I ep Ie ~ <<<< Ee<<a<< ~ <<I ~ IY 1X ~ a e<<v<<l 'o'~{<<e RtW 9 o. f5 II W<<l Sj " V<<I Wa<<I ~. ~ I-~" IE<<I C-ij-Sih) )v= 'TgcRRR W <<I ~ <<<<I ~ av'<<\ Ve<<<< I g) QggERD S~std @No ~ lect<<C. NESX7) O W<<e <<<< '<<<<I I<<<< ~ <<<<I p V<<<<\ ~ ~ \ eeo Ihlgdt ~~t '. ~ WO<<l i ~ -~ ~ --- -- ~ ~ ~-- .....%)S,wq! ~.... ~( ~ el <<<<w ~ (Q D <<W ~ ~ f5 -XeSL~ ~- ~gq 5'Lgu): '6 t. Wv<< ~ <<<. 6)st4 NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION-UNIT 2 QEC<<VIVII<<4 TINAL SATETY ANALYSIS RERORT c'+ ' I'i j II ) tt I S V M ~<< ~ r P~l>>llew L.+..q.....le~~.::,, h. Qr r~~~~'--:. ..g <<rrr r ~ I lsh\rA a !Gh<<r<<' .:'.+;...Q>> a) C,~. ~ 'p'v <<rv<<<< &a,Q~C-eg s)Q <<(~ggrr'r 0~~~~IM v,~~~ <<<<Pf ~ <<rrr<<r <<<<r <<r<<v'<<<<<<<< <<<< ~ ~ t Nl~ << rr r V<< ~ << I. kv r ~r << r~ ap5ll)~ ng C rl<<B~a. ", .' + t ~~~~ ~ \ lilthrq h'Lh P 4~ AI g b o ~ ~ ~ << (u ~ <<r<< << ~ r< ~ 'c% rv4 ~ <<gvh <<rw(v ~ << ~8 FIGURE 9 5" 4Ob S1AtCOY A<<M OEKRAIOR SYSILlAS P41O NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT-2 FNAL SAff1Y ANALYSIS RCPORT IC og ~ ewwwas%w+ c ~ 'w I <<r V t I -gk a~* I ~ T%~-+ I ~ "C g t JV ~ ~ , pE t h r hl 0-v (i) "'.0 ~ ~ Q~ lh IIIA ~l ~ ~ - () ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ nl ~ ~ ~ f eI~ &~RA EI.SSI ~~ ~~ I'I III III ~~ II I : (-) h (p :i-'=-- --. (-) rv n H r nn<< ~ ~n ~ 'nf+ rar hl Air/ hl n ~ lr~ ~ lva ra h hl ~ I~ ~ n rV' I I VI ~ I Fll'URF. ' IiIi, I Atlatl/ l4'll lA II I *IIII SII I( ti I'/.L3 IIIIIC IA I L C P 0 I II T NUCLCAR STATIOII UIIIT-2 CWAL SAFCI C AIIALYSiS RCPORI lt ,k ~, 1,"a ~4. ~:~,~ 0 e g* 4 14 I+PE,RE.NTIAL SWITCH (ALAR!h) PRE~~PI: LEX. COIYN.TCS. Axl2 (RL WITH I NP IM NIPPLE,5 EIACH ENb M0TIOP DRIVEN FLEX. COIIN.CS. g4'xl2'OAL VIITH >/4 IVPTM. IIIPPLES EACh UATI MOWTED VALVE. CMICE >74 NPT STE.LI 15 ORIFICE M6" l GhUGE PRESSURE. 0 TG'ICO PSI EI15)IAC ITIOUN1ED 14 10 FUEL TEMPERATVRI. GAGE (PANEL YDNTE~D PUMP FUEL ENGINE igiVEN RI GPM 60 PSl ENGINE 12 x ENGINE 9 STRAINER tfIOOMTED ( DRIVEN VA~LVE RELIEF 3 IO PCI GWITCU ALARM LAA5 OF PRE55VRF I GAUGE PRE55URE O TO IIU l5I) A '/A" IAIIEL MOUUTEU 14 15 PUMP FUEL~AGCY 5 GPM ORIVEN OV 5/+ IIP 115VUE MITOR VALVE RELIR.F, I'EI l3 YALVE RELIEF~ 65 PS1, VALVE RELIEF 3O PS.I FILTER MPLEX ELEMENT PN 842'313Z TV/0 PER FILTER. INJ CTDR VALVE FUEL CUT-OF F I NPT NOTE.5: I'INE I~ - -LINE5 INblCATES PIPING IME El OTHERS. 3/4 I.INE~~2. ALL COMMENTS MOUNTEb DM MAIN ENG)NE BASE..~~.3. 1TEM5 10 AND 5 COMBINED INTO VALVE ASSEMBLY PN S+3ZSbb WHICH THE FIL'TERS BOLT TD. TWO OF'HESE VALVE ASSEMBILIES ARE USED. T815 REQUCE5 EX TERNAL PIPING AND FITTINGS. I I I 4. LOCATION OF 'THE FUEL DIL Mf TANK MUST NOT I I I PUT 'A PQSITIVE, HEAD QN ENGINE FUEL INJECTDRS I WHICH ARE 8'o >/+'BOVE 50TTfNI DF ENGINE BASE. I FUEL SUPPLf FUEL RETURN 6; 1TEM 9 SET PDINTS ARE 6" HtO ALAPM C 4" H?0 RESET. FROM DA'I TAIIK 'TO DII'I 'TANK io. ALL PIPIIAK5- NON- ASME (ANSI 831.1). ill GRAVITY (SUPPUEO N FIQW OTHERS) FIGV15E, 9.G DIP&E.L '66.14E.FlA'7oFTl FuE.L O11 +V+TEm 'Pl'RIR+lohL 0 \ NIAQARP, QOHAANVP, PoWGP, COERF ORATIO NINE. Mll E. POIN'7-UNlY Z. FlhLAOAt CA% ET Y C5 N5IA1-V515 TORERO>T 4- 't ' u I~ A' h 0COMPARISON OF ASME III 8 B31.1 FOR DG AUXILIARYSYSTEMS The HPCS diesel generator auxiliary systems are designed to either ASME Code Section III or B31.1 but subjected to seismic Category I.qualification and preoperational test requirements. In addition, conservative design pressures were utilized in the auxiliary systems piping design. Verification that-correct piping and component materials were used (material certification) during the manufacturing process will eliminate the need for actual mill test reports for piping.~~ASME SECTION III 3 ANSI 831.1~~~~1) Requires ASME materials 1) Requires only material and mill test reports for certifications.~~~~piping.~~2) Requires seismic design in 2) Requires design for pressure, addition to the B31.1 re- temperature, and normal oper-quirements. ating loads.3) Requires liquid penetrant 3) Requires only visual inspec-examination for welds over tion of welds for design 4" IPS. pressure and temperatures of the auxiliaries.~~4) Requires hydrostatic test 4) Requires initial service leak~~. to 1.25 x design pressure., test. The diesel generator auxiliaries are separated intothree different. segments for design and manufacturing: a) The auxiliaries that are supplied as a part of the diesel engine skid and diesel starting air skid. b)' The"fuel 'oi'1'storage'tanks'n'd"'day"tanks"(provided-by a tank fabricator). c) The piping that connects the Diesel Starting Air skid with the engine skid, fuel oil day tank to the engine skid, the cooling service water to the cooling. water heat exchanger and the diesel engine air in-take and exhaust. A discussion of each segment follows. a) Diesel En ine and Diesel Startin Air DSA Skid The engine-mounted piping and components of the fuel oil, engine cooling water (except heat exchangers which are'esigned to ASME Section III, Class 3), starting air and lubricating oil systems are seismically qualified 'o'ategory I requirements as part of the 'diesel'ngine skid. These systems, furnished with the engine, are the standard systems developed by the engine manufacturer in accordance with DEMA standards and have a long history of service and reliability. These systems,'piping, and components EH: ca 1/K06256-1 6/25/84 lt ~l, A II ~+18 $ g'k 1 ~e 6 I!'> + ~ ~ J 4 . h .k 4 -~ g~gf~ f 3g,yo- < (a.~ F) 're.,designed, fabricated, inspected, .instal.led, and.,tested in accordance with the requirements of ANSI B31.1. To meet the intent of ASNE Section III requirements for the engine skid and DSA-skid, the pressure test will be performed using ASHE Section III, Class-3-hydrostatic parameters. The skids are qualified to seismic Category I requirements. Piping over 4 inches, (6" lines between the .cooling water heat exchanger,, expansion tank and engine block) will be liquid penetrant examined prior to preoperational testing. Furthermore, the expansion tank will be hydrostatically tested at 1.5 times its design pressure. b) Diesel Oil Stora e Tank Da Tank Su lied b Fabricator These components are ASHE Section III, Class 3. c) Pi in and Com onents Connectin Skids The fuel oil piping up to the diesel engine skid and the cooling water system piping and components up to the diesel engine heat exchanger are ~g des'igned,'fabricated,'nspected;"installed and tested in accordance with ASNE Section III, Class 3 requirements. The piping connecting the diesel fuel oil storage tank and day tank is designed to ASME Section III, Class 3. The piping connecting the DSA skid to the engine skid is designed to ANSI B31.1 and is designated seismic Category I. Hydrostatic testing of 1.5 times design pressure will be accompli'shed during-onsite. testing. of. the auxiliary systems. Essential components of the 'air starting. system are designed .to Section III. The system is classified Safety Class .3 and seismic Category I from the check valve upstream of the receiver tanks. The air intake and exhaust system, except for the crankcase vent lines and exhaust silencers is,.classified as seismic Category I Safety Class 3. Piping and"components up to the'iesel engine interface, are designed to Section III requirements. For both systems, the operating pressure and testing duration are -representative of the BSHE Code Section III requirements. EH:cal/K06256-2 6/25/80 k U 'j ~ . r, 'i i i . c t Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.52 (9.5.4) Revise FSAR Section 9.5.4 and Figures 9.5-40b and 9.4-40c to include the following information: (a) A complete description of the fuel oil system from the day tank to the diesel generator, including engine mounted piping and components. The FSAR.should identify all system components and describe their operation/function during both normal and emergency operation. ~ ~ ~ t (b) A 'PAID for that portion of the fuel oil storage and transfer system described in (a) above..~~RESPONSE~~See revised "Sect'.5.4.2. T&e ' &ID vill be provi e e quarter of 19 'ot acceptabl e. The res ponse acceptable', but'he r'equest'ed in revised PAID's ha've. FSAR Section 9 5 4 2 not'een provided. is 4g lo ~M ~ ~y Amendment. 7 QEcR F430.52 "1 December 1983 +'l ~P' ppt V V J d~ ~ s ~4, ~ I 0 c ,Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR 'QUEST1'ON F430.51 (9.5.4 through 9.5.8) Identify all high and moderate energy lines and systems that will be installed in the diesel generator room. ofDiscuss the measures that will be taken in the design the diesel .generator facility to protect the safety related systems, piping and components from the effects of high. and moderate energy line failure to assure availability of the diesel generators when needed. (SRP 9.5.4 through 9.5.8, Parts II and III)~~RESPONSE~~See revised Sections 9;5.4.3 and 9.5 '.5. C om~~ , The response .is.acceptab1e;, Note: In section 9.5.5.5, the air start s ystem pspsng ss referred to p to be inco rect', and the e rev se accordingTy. Amendment 7 QE(R F430.51-1 December 1983 ~ l I Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Should any of the above leakage occur, the operator would be .,alerted by one or more. of the following alarms prior to degradation of engine performance: Jacket water pressure low Jacket water standpipe/expansion tank level low Lube oil pressure low Diesel generator service water discharge pressure low In addition, the possibility of any tube leakage is minimized by periodic inspection, testing, and maintenance of the I . and II diesel generator jacket water heat systems'ivision exchangers are provided with separate and independent service water supply headers and service water discharge headers. The Division III diesel generator jacket water -..heat~exchanger'is fed from both;,Division I and II supply and discharge headers. This arrangement insures that failure in any one division will not jeopardize the safety function of any other division. The service water system design bases are described in Section 9.2.1. There is no high energy piping in, the diesel generator building other'han..that associated with the diesel generators themselves". The high energy piping associated with .the diesel generators, is e- star xng. air system piping Amendment 7 9.5-37a December 1983 ~ 1 ~ 4't 4 O., 4 L( 'f4<q, C l II e4 ~ Wl t g %~f ia,f " Q $ 14 %.~l E rg ~ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR and the combustion air exhaust system piping. Failure of any of syste can only affect the associated, diesel generator. The moderate energy piping 'systems in the diesel generator building,- 'not associated with. the diesel generators, are service air, fire protection, and floor drain piping. Failure of any of these systems cannot jeopardize the safety function of the ,diesel generator jacket water system. The Division I and II diesel generators are designed and built .to operate continuously during a discharge of the fire protection system. The Division III diesel generator is retrofitted with the capability of operating continuously during a discharge of the fire protection system. The moderate energy piping systems associated with the diesel generators themselves are the fuel oil system, starting air system, service water system, and combustion air intake system piping. Failure of the piping of any of these systems will affect the performance of the associated diesel generator alone. Each. standby diesel'enerator'is capable of running in a no load condition for 4- hr for Division III and 6 hr for Divisions I and II. After this period they will be loaded according to manufacturer recommendation (for Division III greater than, 50 percent load for 30 min,>and for Divisions I and II greater than 75 percent for 30 min). The."failure modes.'and'effects analysis (FMEA) evaluation of the diesel generator is provided in .the, Nine Mile Point .Unit 2 FSAR FMEA Report. 9.5.6 Diesel Generator Starting, System Each standby diesel generator has two independent, redundant compressed .,air .starting. systems, ,either of which has adequate capacity 'to - 'assure quick, reliable, automatic starting of the diesel generator following a loss of offsite power. 9.5.6.1 Design Bases The standby diesel generator starting system is designed to meet the following safety design bases:~~1. Each standby diesel generator has independent, redundant, air starting systems either of which is capable of starting the engine.~~2. The starting air receiver, in each of the redundant starting systems has sufficient capacity to start the engine within 10 sec. Each air'tarting system can crank a cold diesel generator five times without recharging the receiver tanks. Each Amendment '7 9.5-38 December 1983~ . 'C I ~ C h k N C e Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR 'UESTION F430.53 (9.5.4) Describe the instruments, controls, sensors and alarms provided for monitoring the complete diesel engine fuel oil storage and transfer system and describe their function. Discuss the testing necessary to maintain, and assure a highly reliable instrumentation, controls, sensors and alarm system and where the alarms are annunciated. Identify the temperature, pressure,, and level sensors which alert the operator when these parameters exceed the ranges recommended by the engine manufacturer and describe what operator ~ actions are required during ala rm conditions to prevent f harmful e fects to the diesel engine. Discuss the system interlocks provided. 9.5.4, Part III) ~r~ (SRP 'ESPONSE Qo'ee ~qv"" response to Question F430.92. >o /s 8 c-l,~~~~ >) See response ~)'y 57~ $ 7g5cl"ry gs Ve),+- ~ die') 48 T~>>e >~~I'"s A'e( o.'l, ~ps A r< n~7 r7 5m~v'~~ S~~ivg le~5X ~ 5 leSE&. V t.~( ~;( 5 5S~ Sf <C8. ICS7 ++'~Wt~f <~ +@sr ~+ <-( @< f $g pyC >p s l'~ (~ p(~4d.' Amendment 7 QEcR F430.53-1 December 1983 ~l V I P v',. ~ k 2,p. I) tk t i %HE; ALA,~ cN aw-, X ~~ Fl(> C>v < HG ~ 9'<~~i ~4 CoNHoN Ai~~, F'ueL, CcL. VRA4F6R IlkM Ge~@C l$ tPak~ ~W7 VQ~~ ~@~ ~w ital Ec~gf ccol F~ 43i~waa wq c <~ i~ ~iiL iN>i~m c,ow Fvv=-R V.~~~hsHi~~ Ai AM ~<@ eQ Mz ~c i <oc4l Mc PC4R+ <0 (cA cQHPU ~ C4r AHco 7 R.tw T-' w .~e /~AD?W ~rF'~ oF QVP AS , lN '5 iMP 5'Y5'r c~ ZD6(C Z>)~Wrv$ roc ~~Pa<<c~ iW mr@. 9. g--qr w~~~rS ~ Ave CcckwC~ dug r gQ 5'4 5 W~ AND ZcJ8& O!C 5'~/7 ~/ ~ V(~Lac,W W~~~&(= S W~f~ 4') t+iC y+ 4O l g C>i~ +AS 6~Wb-'lau~ gZ F 4G C.came i D~v~c t=5 CCH BVS'n C ~ Ai P Ziu m~- ~D ~%/~i'iaaf 7 Pic u~g ~ i V- .<e 8 re;~z~s~ 1 Q Amendment 7 QEcR F430. 63-I December 1983 ( y iJ \'lt '14, r > $ s*+Lkk 'I ~4 '4 nr !~ I '/'~ Z'r,il.. isa ~ r Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR~~a. lQ>~~PJZ(" /2.4=.0. "/v 9 i.'.<~.". Association (NFPA) Standard 37, Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines (1979), which provides for over 1 hr of continuous 'operation of the diesel generator at full load. Earth day tank is isolated in a room enclosed by 3-hr rated fire barriers and protected, by automatic sprinkler systems. Each diesel generator day tank room contains a curb sized to contain the 660-gal volumetric capacity of the fuel oil day tank in addition to an amount of fluid from the fire protection system (30 gal per minute per square foot for a 10-min period). This curb precludes spilling fuel oil into the diesel generator room. Each day tank room curb can be emptied into the diesel generator ,building floor and equipment drain system. Once fuel oil or cooling water accumulates in the floor drain sump (one sump per diesel generator division), a level switch monitors the quantity of fuel. oil or cooling water collected. This fluid is then dispersed to a common oil separator. In addition to the curb arrangement, a low-level storage tank alarm and a low- -'"'level"day tank 'larm .-also,.alert the operators 'to the possibility of a fuel oil leak in the day tank room. In summary, large leaks are detected by low-level alarms in the day tanks. Small leaks are detected by a shorter than normal cycle of the floor drain pumps. The capped inlet of each storage tank fill line is located above the probable maximum flood level, thereby preventing the entrance of water. Each storage and day tank's vent pipe is also located above the flood level and is designed to prevent rain from entering. The fuel oil storage tank fill, vent, and sounding lines are located outside the diesel generator building and are 'ex osed; to -'.the -."atmos here after enetratin In the event of a tornado missile resulting in the 5 ft of fill. obstruction of these fill, vent, and sounding lines, the fuel oil storage tank is vented by a 4-in vacuum relief valve,and a 4-in pressure relief valve mounted on a 4-in connection on the storage tank. The vacuum relief valve and pressure relief valve are within the diesel generator building which is designed for missile protection. The fuel oil day tank vent 1'ine is located in the diesel generator building day tank room and penetrates through the diesel generator building roof. In the event of a tornado missile accident resulting in the obstruction of the vent line, the fuel oil day tank is vented by a 4-in vacuum relief valve and a 4-in pressure relief valve mounted on the vent line. The vacuum relief valve and pressure relief valve are within Amendment 7 9.5-25 December 1983 LJ "V 4 4 II f, ~ +<<g t= jH Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Ll3 f I the diesel generator building which is"designed for missile protection. . A sounding rod is utili "ed periodically to check the accuracy and operation .of the tank level indicator by insertion into the 'sound'g .tube furnished,.in each storage and day- tank.. The possible accumulation of water at the bottom of each diesel fuel oil storage and day tank is also checked by applying a water-indicating paste to the sounding rod. water. The paste changes color when Should the water level be it comes in. contact with excessive, water is removed from the storage tanks by the use of a portable pump and from the day tanks by opening a drain valve located near the bottom of each tank. . Adequate sources of diesel quality fuel oil are available in the cities of Oswego (8 mi), Belgium (25 mi), and Syracuse (35 mi). Under extremely unfavorable environmental condi-tions, fuel oil will be delivered onsite via tanker truck .-escorted by.highway- snow. removal,,equipment. C This will permit each standby diesel generator system to supply uninterrupted emergency power. Fuel oil meets or ~ exceeds the quality requ'ements of ASTM D975-1978 and the diesel engine manufacturer'r recommendations.- growth of algae in the " fuel oil storage . tank is The oxidative stability in <, determined'. 'by 'easuring "accordance . 2 mg/100 with ASTM D2274-74. the Ef .:it ml, the fuel oil in the 'affected storage, tank will .,'is more .than be appropriately treated (filtration or- biocides) to reduce the level to acceptable concentrations. 9.5.4.4 inspection and Tes ing Requirements The standby'iesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is designed to pe m' periodic inspect'n and maintenance of active components. F ocal display and indicating devices are provided;for periodic inspection of tank oil level and operating parameters such as pump discharge pressure and pressu e drop across each fuel oil strainer. >" ~;Cr.. Fuel oil storage-'nd day tanks and piping are oil. hydrostatically tested p ='or to filling with fuel System operability is tes ed in conjunction with the diesel generator. Continued sys em integrity is verified with pe iodic testing with the diesel generator. Amendment 7 9.5-25a December 1983 4 ~4 6'~~Pl~~'~~~~LI'~ V I t I 'Z.O. I . UZI QM i~~~~p. 3o< z~~>!P.C G.'f30.~9 f s~c.~~ A ip I ~ g ~s' Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.55 (9.5.4) In FSAR Section 9.5.4.1, you state that the fuel oil storage and transfer system conforms to ANSI Standard N195-1976. Expand your FSAR to include a detailed discussion of. the internal and external corrosion protection- that is provided; for the fuel oil storage tanks. Include the appropriate industry codes and standards that will be followed in the design and application of this protection. Also, include a discussion of the cathodic protection that is provided, or, if cathodic protection is not used, a justification for not having it. (SRP 9.5.4, Part II)~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 9.5.4.2. F /ST Ce wm e~~S The response is acceptable with regard to external corrosion protection provided that: -'<- (a) The complete storage tank is encased in concrete, including the portio~which extends beyond the, diesel generator building, and (b) adequate protection is: provided for- the so'as-fill, concentration vent, and of corrosion sounding lines to preclude where these lines meet the tank. Th e app 1 scan t must provide detailed technical information on the , functionof the fuel oil additive to be used xn preventing innternal tarik corrosion.'"~The. appl."icant-,must address how free water is ted how water is retained in suspension, what gums and tars are prevented from forming, etc. Pending receipt an p 1*p i II f 58 c. ~) ~oncrc c.o.~p I ~ y e s l or~~ ~ c fe Amendment 7 tv :d d -o,u>r,~.am QScR F430 55-1~ m~Dece..>er M coal~ og moN,~~ 19'ing g 4 IP h c . wgi,,~~ <<>m .~ 1 P" I Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR Provide fuel oil storage capacity for each diesel generator, based on continuous diesel gene ator operation at rated capacity (4,400 Kw for each of the standby diesel generators, and 2,600 Kw for the HPCS diesel generator) for 7 days, without interconnection to any other ons'te fuel oil system.2. Provide pumps, piping, valves, and strainers that are designed, constructed, and tested in accordance with AS&1E Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Subsection ND, 1977 Edition. The fuel oil storage ASii1Etanks and fuel oil day tanks are classified as III,Section I,'lass 3, and are constructed in accordance with the rules of ASME III,Section I, Subsection ND.~~3. Provide a system conforming to ANSI Standard~~,N195-1'976, Fuel 'Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators, and meeting Category I and Safety Class 3 requirements. 9.5.4.2 System Description The sta..dby diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer ,system is shown on Figu e 9.5-40. The sys em consists of: Three diesel fuel oil storage tanks, one for each diesel engine. Each storage tank (approximately 53,150 gal. for each of the standby d'esel generator fuel oil storage tanks, and 46,850 gal. for .the HPCS diesel generator fuel oil storage tank) is sized to store sufficient fuel for "continuous '- ope,ation -,of, its,. respective diesel engine at rated capacity for 7 days. Interior and exte ior surfaces are not coated, but are prepared in accordance with ANSI N45.2.1 Component's - Cleaning of Fluid Systems and Associated during Construction of Nuclear Power Plants June 1, 1973. The cleaning of the internal surfaces of these carbon steel vessels is in accordance with ANSI N45.2.1 . Class C) requirements. diesel fuel oil s" abilizer, such as D , is A added to the fuel lIto prevent oxidation of the fuel oil and the oi l storage tanks C.a (;--. formation of gums and tars that would plug fuel I lines. The wate emulsifier component of SDi-35 keeps any wate contamination suspended in the fuel .oil and prevents it from settling out in the bottom rusting would occu . SDI-35 also I of the tank where Amendment 7 9.5-23 December 1983 t 'V kh V'" y P. "g I ~ . II '~ r y gr E & \q H 0 V~ -;I 4 I gh I 'I Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR contains agents to prevent internal storage tank corrosion and biotic rowth in the fuel. The external surfaces of the fuel oil storage tanks 'equire 'o special coating but are free from oil, grease, loose rust, and loose. paint..'.The tanks .are buried in concrete below the diesel ge..erator 'building. Since galvanic reactions are unlikely to . occur in such an environment, cathodic protection of the fuel oil storage tanks is ,not required. After the interior and ..exterior .surfaces are cleaned, tested, and dried, they are inspected in accordance with Subsection 3.1 of ANSI N45.2.1. The fill generator of each tank extends- below the diesel mat beyond the exterior wall .line, thereby positioning the tank fill .line,'ounding line, and vent line outside the building. Each storage tank is filled from its own tank truck station located in the yard. The storage tanks a e fill 'constructed 'w'ith baffles, -10 "-': reinforcement sti ffeners, 4 reinforcement rings, and X5-degree off-center drains to minimize turbulence within the tanks during filling. The 4-in. fill lines for the three divisional fuel oil storage tanks are located 51 ft 3 in. and 55 second 'pump ft suctions, 3 in. from 'he respectively. fi st and Seven -3/4 in..x 8'~in. stiffener. rings are evenly spaced ~ between the fill, line and the first pump suc ion in the Division I and II fuel oil storage tanks. Five 3/4 in. x 8 in. stiffener'rings are evenly spaced between- the, fill line and .the first pump suc ion in the Division III fuel oil storage tank. Since the fill of, line and pump suctions are located on opposite , ends between the 'ti each. storage f tank, sediment feners during'he affect the pump suction inlets. agitated ' illing will not separate f'll lines are capped when not in use and a e each provided with a locked-closed isolation valve and a capable of fi ltering out sediment. Minor 'trainer, stirring of the sediment may occur in the fuel oil storage tank when fuel oil is recirculated through the 2-in. fuel oil day tank overflow line. For all divisions, the overflow line is located 3 f" 10 in. and 7 ft 10 in. from the first and seco..d pump suctions, respectively. Two 3/4 in. x 8 in. stiffener rings are located in the vic'nity of the two pump suctions. These stiffener rings, along with the fuel oil pump stabilizer assembly, minimize any turbulent effects .around the pump. suctions. Each storage tank 'also has a man".ole for maintenance access from within the diesel generator Amendment 7 9.5-23a December 1983 / k 'q k% I't aC E ~ t r (0 f W P l N tV Win 4 i,' Pi) .~ ~ 'I P I I 1 vwa 'i1~ 'll 1 r 7Z>I IvXCG OAI~( Nuchem Corporation Division St., P.O. Box 120 NU Chem Boonton, New Jersey 07005 201-334-8088 April 19. 1984 Mr. Ken Floyd Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation 3 Executive Campus Box 5200 Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08034~~Dear Ken:~~Thank you for your interest in our products and specifically those products that relate to conditioning of fuels for long term storage. I would just <<like to mention that NuChem was incorporated shortly after Economics Laboratory made a de'cision'o cease operations at, Apollo Technologies. Formally I was Vice President of Apollo having .the over-all responsibilities for chemical-,. manufacturing and equipment engineering. We were a major manufacturer and marketer of fuel additives', fuel conditioners, flue gas conditioners, slag modifiers and dust control products to many of the majorutility companies throughout the world. I havei enclosed some product information on our fuel conditioners. The fuel conditioning products are based on accepted and proven products 'eNuChem previously manufactured and marketed under the Apollo tradename. The following is a list of companies that have used NuChem FC-101 or the equiv-alent product Apollo SDI-35. Anachemia Canada Inc. C.P./P.O. Box 147 Lachine, Quebec, Canada John Gilmour 48S 4A7 Duke Power Company McGuire Station Cornelius, North Carolina Private Tele-Communications Company - Florida J. Zedalis......This company will not allow us to use there name, however, Mr. Zedalis will vouch for the product and its effectiveness. Baltimore Gas il Electric Company Calvert Cli ff Lusby, Maryland r 1W PQ 4 pE 4'I E n ~, ~ y~ ( Nr. Ken Floyd, Stone 8 Webster April 19, 1984 South Central Bell P.OS 32410 Louisville, Kentucky 40232 John Bushau Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. Kingshill, P.O. Box 127 St. Croix, Virgin Islands Hess 'Oil 5 Chemical Division Amerada Hess Corporation P.O. Box 500 Woodbridge, New Jersey 07095 Tenneco Oil "Company Box 2511 Houston, Texas 77001 The NuChem philosophy is to not simply to be selling a, product. We are prepared as may be necessary to provide the service to insure that the product(s) are effective. We are very pleased to submit this information to you and would hope that when it is appropriate, that you will introduce your customer(s) to us. If we can be of any further assistance," please do not hesitate to contact us. Regards, LeRoi R. Yaffey LRY/bl~~Enclosures:~~~~NuChem FC-101 cc: C. Grace 4 %p 't ). i~~~~9 Ai II 4~~NuChem Corporation Division St., P.O. Sox 120 Nu Chem Soonton, New Jersey 07005 201-334-8088 ( PROBLEMS BACTERIA BUILDUP) WATER IN FUEL LINE'l OF... PLUGGED F ILTERS7 RUSTING OF FUEL TANKS'NO CLOGGED SCREENS? HEAT", CALLS'"'NUCHEM FC'-101 I ONG TERM STORAGE I'Uel S / Mlt ITAav FUKl / MISSILE STATIONS /STANOSY Rgsg Rvg r~Q g5 KMKRQKNCVOISSKl S / GAS TURSINK FU'KLS / MARIN%, RES'f RVE CUggs f INTR RRUFTIISLE l'UKLS / OIKSEt VIALS 0 OOMCSTIC FURNACE OILS ' "KEEPS STORED FUEL 01LS REFlNERY.FRESH UP TO 10 YEARS 't.'OMPLETELY"ELIMlNATES.COSTLY PROTECTS FUEL STORAGE TANKS WASTAGE PROBLEM OF DUMPlNG AGAlNST Corro'sion ~ Bacteria I Destruction "AGED"FUELS ~ Siudged Fuet Oit ~ Acid 8u'itd uo ~ Water OrOII-Out ASSURES lNSTANT START-UP OF CURRENTLY 1N USE 8Y PRlYATE. EMERGENCY DlESELS, GAS TUR81NES TELECOMMUNICATlONS SYSTEMS and AUXILIARYPOSER SOURCES 'PPROVED FOR USE IN BELL SYSTEMS M Ib S J. ~A Il NuChem Corporation . NuChem Division St., P.O. Box 120 Boonton, New Jersey 07005 NucHEM Fc-101 201-334-8088 MULTIPURPOSE FUEL CONDITIONER ~ For Standby Fuels ~ For R'egularly Burned Fuels FOR USE WITH: Diesel Fuels, Kerosene, Furnace Oils, Jet Fuels, ¹4 ail and Bunker C A.preservative additive to keep the standby fuels in "ready to-fire" condition. Standby fuels are routinely inhibited with this product on an annual basis to keep the fuels in "refinery fresh" condition. The additive has been proven to have =the capability of keeping such fuels stable as long as 10 years, when reinhi5ited annually. MULTIFUNCTIONAL CO MP 0 N E NTS "'(1)iStabilizer -.'to.prevent the formation of organic sludge. (2) Dispersing agent - to prevent settling out of any sludge. (3) Rust preventive agent - to protect the storage tanks in'the water bottom layer, as we as >n t e air layer above the fuel oil. (4} Metal-Deactivators and Metal Suppressing Agents - to retard the oxidation 'n'd potymerization o the ue as a resu t o -trace amounts of copper that . - may be present ln the fuel. (5) Water absor tive a ent - to keep trace. amounts of water dispersed r'n the fuel and prevent burner flameout. "tel,Build:,.; . organisms'. b~~i d i f The'excellent 'rust protective piope'rties ot the fuel any existing conditioner also prevents bacteria from gaining a "foothold" in the fuel storage tanks.~~GENERAL PURPOSES OF FC-101 NuChem FC-101 will maintain the fuel oil in refinery fresh condition even for extended periods of time. By proper reinhibition of the fuels, storage stability of as much as 10 years can be obtained. This is particularly important for standby fuels to be used with emergency diesels or gas turbine generators. DISPERSANT 5 PENETRATING SOLVENT: "NuChem FC-1'01 is a penetrating solvent and dispersant for.gums, varnish and hard carbon buildup. It will: (1) Disperse sludge in fuel tank. (2) -Prevent layering (sludge-out) in <<4, <<5 and <<6 oils. (3) Clean fuel preheaters, fitters and screens. (4) Clean burner tips. (5) Promo te uniform a tomiz ation. 4 fp IL( '4 %'g &f J'Q gg r +P 1 I"J) A~ 4'+i -" p'l NuChem Corporation Division St., P.O. Box 120 Boonton, New Jersey Or 005 201-334-8088 FC-101 FOR USE WITH DISTILLATE FUELS: The petroleum refiners in preparing diesel fuel or ¹2 furnace oils add suf. ficient stabilizer to the fuel to protect it during the summer months, or at least until it is delivered to the fuel oil dealer or the consumer. However, the amount of stabilizer added to the fuel oil is limited. It is even more important to note that the refiner is not primarily concerned with tank rusting or tank failure from long term storage. Water-soluble inhibitors interfere with the storage stability of the fuel, and should not be used. ln order to keep stored fuel in "refinery fresh" condition, it is necessary that a supplementary inhibitor be added to the fuel. "*" The advantag'es 'of the FC'-101'nhibitor where used routinely with distillate fuels are: (1) Prevents tank failures due to rusting. It is estimated that an average lifetime for a fuel storage tank for distillate fuel is 5 to 10 years. The additive should extend this period to 10'to 20 years and indefinitely ,when treatment is started with a fresh tank. (2) Less maintenance is required since the fuel is always in ready con. dition for firing. The 'screens and .nozzles, require. less frequent cleanout on a continually= used basis'and,the jifetime of the, Fulflo filters is extended from one year to three years. (3) Permits'savings in fuel costs by making it possible to substitute lower cost '¹2'fuel oil'n place of kerosene or diesel fuel. To the above directly realizable economic advantages, one should consider the expenses that occur when a furnace is not operating correctty and loss of power results therefrom. Even if the inhibitor is viewed as a preventive pro-tection against potential failures, it provides a significant margin of safety. USES WITH HEAVY FUEL OILS: The FC-101 can also be used with <<4 fuel oils and residual fuel oils where advan-tage can be taken of its dispersing properties. It will prevent sedimentation as well as settle-out. Residual fuels are manufactured today as, a cutback of still bottoms with cutter stock. There are strong tendencies for settle-out to occur. This can be prevented by the use of FC-101. 'k ,4 I, 4 y4 I, t g ~'~se+~QXL 'y +-i l'i + q l' l i'll~jljl i ,1V Ql g4 ~ O'L "v [ l'yk Wt, ~ a PW NuChem Corporation Division St., P.O. Box 120 Boonton, New Jersey 07005 201-334-8088 POVR PO)NT DEPRESSANT: NuChem FC-101often functions as a pour point improver for ¹4, <<5 and ¹6 oils, 'although its effect is unpredictable. Generally it improves the pump. abilities of the fuels at low temperatures and will stabilize the pour point. ln some cases reductions of up to 40 F. pour point have been noted. D) SP E R SANT lNH I B lTOR: NuChem FC-101prevents wax and sludge deposits in storage tanks containing distillate fuels, ¹4, ¹5 and ¹6 oils. lt peptizes and disperses sludge deposits. TR EATMENT RATE: 1 gallon/2,000 gallons of fuel oil. Reinhibit the fuels at yearly intervals at the same rate of 1 gallon per 2,000 gallons. Any makeup fuel should be reinhibited 'at the same rate, i.e. each 1,000 gallons of makeup fuel will require 2 quarts of FC-101. Overtreating will not adversely affect either the storage, the flow, or the burning properties'of the fuel oil. CLASSlFlCATlON 5 CONTAlNER: NOIB - 55 and 30 Gallon containers, 5 Gallon Pails, 1 Gallon Cans (6 per case). 1 Quart Cans (12 per case), and 1 Pint Cans (24 per case). V V\ I* A )1 p~ ~ h y ~a~'rg- Qi+apPw'x* g p k 4~ k *8 ~ E ls (4 '4(-x ,l i~A. NuChem Corporation Division St., P.O. Box 120 Boonton, New Jersey 07005 201-334-8088 NUCHEM PRODUCT DATA SHEET NU HEM FC- 01 General Descri tion: NuChem FC-101 is one of a series of Fuel Conditioners manufactured and marketed by NuChem. It maintains the fuel oil in "refinery fresh" condition even for extended periods. of time. By proper inhibition of the fuels, storage stability of more than five (5),years can be obtained. This is particularly important for stand-by fuels to be used with emergency diesels or gas turbine generators. The telephone companies, utilities ahd bath small and larger consumer's of No. 2 oil are recognized users for NuChem Fuel Conditioners. Advantaaes: NuChem- 101 is a,-rigidly formulated multi-purpose a'dditive which when properly added and maintained in the fuel will:~~Insure the start-up of emergency diesels, gas turbines and auxiliary power sources.~~~~Prevent the formation of sludge.~~~~Prevent tanks failures due to rusting.~~~~Inhibit the oxidation and polymerization of the fuel.~~~~Prevent bacteria and slime formation and destroy any existing bacteria.~~~~Disperse. minute amounts of water in the fuel and,prevent burner flame-out.~~NuChem,FC-101 or a modified conditioner .can also be successfully used in . No. 4, No. 5 and No. 6 oils. Properly added,and,maintained, the, pour point can be depressed while preventing costly problems due to wax and sludge deposition. T ical Pro erties: Appearance Clear Amber Odor Mild Specific Gravity 860 F 0.94 Den'sity, lbs.(gal. 860 F. 7. 84 Viscosity 860 F< Cps. 85 Flash Point )OC F. 185 Pour Point, F. -15 Treatment Rate: The normal treatment rate requires one (1) gallon of NuChem 101 to 2,000 gallons of fuel oil. For stand-by fuels the reinhibition rate should be maintained on a yearly basis. Packaoin and Availabilit : Fuel Conditioners are 'uChem readily available in bulk, 55 gallon drums and 5 gallon pails, F.O.B., Boonton, New Jersey. I 'l 5LJ f'( ~ffll P "UI 4 g W 4 1 1 h I '!) 1'ine b Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.56 (9.5.4) In FSAR Section 1.8, you state that the fuel oil storage and transfer system will comply with Regulatory Guide 1.137, except for those portions dealing with oxidative stability and cloud point. This is not acceptable. The staff requires that you test for oxidative stability, and that the minimum acceptability cloud point be identified in accordance with ASTM D975. Revise your FSAR accordingly.~~RESPONSE~~~~See revised Table 1.8-1, Regulatory Guide 1.137. f 5'8 C~m~<~r~~~~".The response;is,.acceptabTe. App1,icant.shou1d identify the anticipated steady state temperature in the storage tanks. h~~/ 5th C o>ww w~+ ] ~ sY< dy s 4Te ( e~p~r~f'< S'~~~C5Wp QW~~ q,4~ g~~P *4~ l: qZ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430. 57 (9. 5. 4) Figures 9.5-40b and 9.5-40c show what appears to be a simplex strainer in the fuel oil transfer pump discharge lines for both the standby diesel'generators and the HPCS diesel generator. This is not in confoxmance with the xecommendations of ANSI N195, which recommends use of a 'duplex strainer with a pressure differential alarm. Revise your design to conform to ANSI N195, or pxovide justification for noncompliance. (SRP 9.5.4, Part II)~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 9.5.4.2. betimes. Psa co.. ~.ws Not acceptable. The system design is such that both transfer pumps are in'operation-at'all Therefore, it is logical to assume that both strainers will plug up at the same time, thereby causing loss of fuel flow to the OG's. The simplex strainers do not provide the instant change capability of duplex strainers. I M~ Q.4j l0 (~ p Gr~m 4~75 Amendment 7 QEcR F430.57-1 December 1983 I ~ gIg 'i I Q Ir, r+ ~ rc' jt0 'I'I P I I+i h 'l 'I t IIII ~ c I Nine Mile Point. Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.62 (9.5.4) .Assume an unlikely event has occurred requiring operation of a diesel generator for a prolonged period that would require replenishment of fuel oil without interrupting operation of the diesel generator. What provision will be made in .the design of the fuel oil storage fill creation of turbulence of the sediment in the bottom of, the system to minimize the storage tank. Stirring of this sediment during addition of new fuel has the potential of causing the overall quality of the fuel to become unacceptable and could potentially lead to the degradation or failure of the diesel generator. (SRP 9.5.4, Parts I, II, and III) ESPONSE See revised Section 9.5.4.2. $ 58 c ~~ Not acceptable. The following information and/or assurances must be provided before the response can be considered acceptable: (a) details of fuel tank construction (b) a .procedure is established to 'limit the ~'" "minimize turbulence"during filling fill rate so as to (c) it can be shown that. corrosion, products. will not form in the storage tanks (d) the fuel oil strainer question can be resolved. A,~( r~l( g,r~ p~v,W U~~m $ gur~i C. C OV g~ <) ~<a DIKING ThK r e.spa Ei~ sr ~ 1 o s6 Rr rc Qve>l 'o q~g)~ ~<8 Ce Q ~ ~6K~>E ~~Is +3> $ 5 ) 5'< q r< ape s< P'u+sW~ r Sr9 Cu~~~l a 93~< K7. Amendment 7 QGR F430.62-1 December 1983 a t ~ 4 Ca eel ~h ~ant c,mf A E a.= 4b J 4 4t ~ '3 <<4 \ (ghlg 44 Y ( Cr .J 4, ~l Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR oil by the pumps'ach fuel oil transfer pump dis-charge line is equipped with a simplex-type sediment strainer'ized for full pump flow. Al-though ANSI Standard N195-1976 recommends the use .of duplex strainers in diesel .fuel oil, systems,. one simplex strainer er - ump accomplishes the same intent. One simplex strainer and its associate ue ox transfer pump may be taken out of service for maintenance; this occurs subsequent to an alarm or control room annunciation indicating that the pressure drop across the strainer exceeds an alarm set point. Since each fuel oil pump; is -redundant and is capable of automatically starting after an associated pump failure, maintenance -'on the strainer will not discontinue the normal flow of fuel oil to that diesel. V~~3. Three diesel fuel oil day tanks, 'one for each~~~ .diesel'ngine. ,Each,day, .tank is 1'ocated in the day tank room above the'ngine" generator control panel room of its associated diesel generator. The elevated location. of the tank provides adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) to the engine-driven fuel pump of the diesel engine. Each day tank is supplied with a manho le . fo r maintenance access, an external vent, a sounding tube for manual con-firmation of fuel oil level, and an overflow line Pe/gpss <<c n cL JngcrT t for returning excess fuel oil to the fuel oil + f J~g~~f 2 storage tank. Even though each -fuel-oil'transfer-pump "is capable -of -sup-. .plying,the maximum, fuel demand of a standby diesel generator, each'uplex,,set of fuel oil transfer pumps is controlled..to .start..together,. automatically, when fuel oil in its respective day tank falls to the pump-on level and stops automaticall when fuel oil rises to the um -off levels Fuel oil from the day tank flows. by gravity to the suc son of the engine-driven fuel pump which boosts the pressure to that required by the fuel injection header. For the two standby diesel generators, fuel oil is supplied to the engine-driven booster pump and to,the standby booster pump through a four-element duplex strainer. The four-element duplex stra'ner is located on the base of the engine. Four shells with cleanable type wire mesh elements are attached to a common manifold. A control valve in the center of the manifold permits flow to two elements on .either side of the valve, or to all four elements. Nor-mal operating position of the valve'exists with two .elements in operation and two elements in standby. A differential Amendment 7 9.5-'24 December 1983 i r 'I y$ ~I J n I AP 'N g '~h bag }r( ~/pe~-,~>>Cgg)>> v~ Q4 I fpf l= t n,'e 4 'l $ 'P 7 sf l L)CAf A/g. A ~ WO. AI~. tzir 7 n'+IPZ .z .P~ dud~~77. inc'.HM &.<~~~~d. m.~.'5 x.. we. o ace .x- r.-",u.e~~~~~g g.,j'~ N J~~+ c r ggr &~>~< '- gg ~~o,'C ~ ~ ~'~D/ S'i l~ A <>g~xW e -, .-.IyP,qp~ a .c+ Mtl lpga =Fow ( ~~ A ~~~ ~C 'a n~~~~~~~~~r I' r I' ~ ~ ,kt E 4 +!.'<i'A>q+(+~+A 'W .: I ~ - e r- ~ ~'I e) L L't z 3eu nfl. g .g Qz. wZl7T ~~~Z~~~~p. z oFa o.S F 6+C uc L o~'j nS . u~ ~C a rg "W-~~~~~~j~ SA~ IgMi~f j~a,. p ~caecgc~~ p D.~~M . 4L~Ca.~ JlsW ~~~= dv~ ~~~~M I/~ ".. ~C ~s. sA~~ ~~~~8 0 a ~ ' m~$ >>~ sv gap4 jp ~4 '- <<')+AC u ~i +~'ip, r l k 5esrr ioQ'-',':psjM -w~LW~ 4 ."=~zz?4',~.;~;A:., --,t-E~ i, W.-, '.=:., "- -':.:.."~ -7@E4c~".."~<~.-. Rx~~jG a F, -"WUvg5: Q~U,icQVV~Q':":,-"-..:.:,.:: . '.'.,;. ;.:," '-,--,".-W~~-'-.'~'~= -A..",-maim ": -.-."-'--'.- '-'.""'8K,'8+7704 "'.;Ck~".':."'~quPr.,'. <<jMu327iS&,-.-W~AE'"'.':... '," '-'-,",";:::-.;:4j@C&","-.gd9WVRP';;,".~O'g. -.~.,~@,-,7': l..': w l~gflFED= -;,;.=y.==..--.:";, t -gESR>OSE.-- . QX . A3.SUEZ .QA5'.;. K,KPWiLE. ..;,"";:;+,"'C.~gt.f(MAGA;~~.-,"boRl4 b',-.+9~ Q(L~@gb.' .'. ';..-;,.QRCE,-,, ',"W~.-:.7l;L'VER;..;.;,HK,i A", Mt ( "EF ...-.- 4 o l '.","; "-. -;.;j'.","',">>.-".'," .":.".jap-;mc:., 0 ..'"Q: pC. gEV"EM,"-.- ".-' '-"".."'-- a = ~ E', ~ ~ ' r ~ ' " f ~ h 1 E Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.59 (9.5 ') In FSAR Section 9.5.4.4, you discuss periodic testing of fuel oil to ensure its quality meets the requirements of ASTM D975-1978. However, there is no discussion of testing of new fuel per ANSI N195, nor is the term "periodically" defined. The staff requires that all new fuel be analyzed and stored fuel be analyzed on a minimum quarterly basis, in accordance with ANSI N195 and Regulatory Guide 1.137 requirements. Revise your FSAR accordingly. (SRP 9.5.4, Part II)~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 9.5.4.4. Amendment 7 QBR F430.59-1 December 1983 gl'a ke t sp4 l,~ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR the diesel generator building which is designed for missile prot'ection. A sounding rod is utilized periodically to check the accuracy and operation of the tank level indicator by insertion into the sounding tube furnished in each storage and day tank. The possible accumulation of water at the bottom of each diesel fuel oil storage and day tank is also checked by applying a water-indicating paste to the sounding rod. The paste changes color when it comes in contact with water. Should the water level be excessive, water is removed from the storage tanks by the use of a portable pump and from the day tanks by opening a drain valve located near the bottom of each tank. Adequate sources of diesel quality fuel oil are available in the cities of Oswego (8 mi), Belgium {25 mi), and Syracuse {35 mi). Under extremely unfavorable environmental condi-tions, fuel oil will be delivered onsite via tanker truck .',escorted by highway .snow..removal.,equipment. This will permit each standby diesel generator system to supply uninterrupted emergency power. Fuel oil meets or exceeds the qualit re irements of ASTN D975-1978 and the diesel engine manufacturer s recommendaBons. The growth of algae in the fuel oil storage tank is determined by measuring the oxidative stability in accordance with ASTM D2274-74. If it is more than 2 mg/100 ml,'he fuel oil in the affected storage tank will be appropriately treated (filtration.,or biocides) to reduce the level to acceptable -concentrations. 9.5.4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The standby diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is designed to permit periodic inspection and maintenance of active components.. Local display and indicating devices are provided for periodic inspection of tank oil level and operating parameters such as pump discharge pressure and pressure drop across each fuel oil strainer. Fuel oil storage and day tanks and piping are hydrostatically tested prior to filling with fuel oil. System operability is tested in conjunction with the diesel generator. Continued system integrity is verified with periodic testing with the diesel generator. Amendment 7 9.5-25a December 1983 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR The quantity of diesel fuel oil available in storage is checked and logged periodically and after each operation of Amendment 7 9.5-25b December 1983 4 I V II -I I I g>>' ~ IJ ~ l I' II Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR the respective diesel generator fox a period of 1 hr or longer. Mater accumulation in the diesel generator fuel oil storage and day tanks is checked monthly and after each operation of the diesel engine. Samples of fuel oil from every tank are analyzed quarterly to ensure that, the fuel meets the quality requirements of ASTM D975-1978 and the diesel engine manufacturer's recommendations. .New fuel will be tested for specific gravity, the presence of water and sediment, and viscosity prior to addition to ensure that the limits of ASTM D975-1978 axe not exceeded. Analysis of the other properties of the fuel oil will be completed within two weeks of the fuel addition. 9.5.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements Safety-related instruments and controls are provided for automatic and manual control of the standby diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system. Except where noted otherwise, controls and the instruments described below are located in the associated diesel generator room. The contxol logic is shown on Figure 9.5-41. Each duplex set of standby diesel generator. fuel oil transfer pumps is controlled automatically by...the oil level ., in its associated day" tank. Each pump can also be controlled manually. Indication 'is provided for each of the following: Fuel oil storage tank level.~~2. Fuel oil day tank level.~~~~An alarm is provided for each of the following: Fuel system trouble (annunciated in main control room). 2 ~ Fuel system inoperable (annunciated in main control room).~~~~3. Fuel oil storage tank level low/high.~~Fuel oil day tank level low-low/high-high. Amendment 7 9.5-26 December 1983 .I' l i Nine Mile Point, Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 1.8-1 (Cont) Re lator Guide 1.137, Revision 1 October 1979 Fuel-Oil Systems 'for Standby Diesel Generators FSAR Section 9.5.4 Position The Unit 2 proj ect complies with the Regulatory Position (Paragraph C) of this guide with the following clarification. The minimum fuel temperature in the tank will be the basis for the acceptance criteria. Amendment. 7 152 of 169 December 1983 ~ ' l ~ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.61 (9.5.4) In Section 9.5.4.3 you state that diesel fuel oil is available from local distribution sources. Identify the sources where diesel quality fuel oil will be available and the distances required to be travelled from the source(s) to the plant. Also discuss how fuel oil will be delivered onsite under extremely unfavorable environmental conditions. (SRP 9.5.4, Part I) Discuss the precautionary measures that-will. be taken to assure the quality and reliability of the fuel oil supply for emergency diesel generator operation. Include the type of fuel oil, impurity and quality limitations as well as diesel index number or its equivalent, cloud point, entrained moisture, sulfur, particulates and other deleterious insoluble substances; procedure for testing ,newly delivered fuel, periodic sampling and testing of onsite fuel oil (including interval between tests), interval of time between periodic removal of condensate from fuel tanks and periodic system inspection. In your discussion include reference to industry (or other) standard which will be followed to assure a ,reliable fuel oil supply to the emergency generators. (SRP 9.5.4, Parts II and III)~~RESPONSE~~See revised "Sections 9.5.4.2 and 9.5..4..-3.and, Table 1.8-1, .--. Regulatory Guide 1.137. Amendment 7 QEcR F430. 61-1 December 1983 ~ I C t ,+r Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Provide fuel oil storage capacity for each diesel generator, based on continuous diesel generator operation at rated capacity (4,400 Kw for each of the standby diesel generators, and 2,600 Kw for the HPCS diesel generator) for 7 days, without interconnection to any other onsite fuel oil system.2. Provide pumps, piping, valves, and strainers that are designed, constructed, and tested in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Subsection ND, 1977 Edition. The fuel oil storage tanks and fuel oil day tanks are classified as ASME III,Section I, Class 3, and are constructed in accordance with the rules of ASME III,Section I, Subsection ND.~~3. Provide a system conforming to ANSI Standard N195-1976, Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators, and meeting Category I and Safety Class 3 requirements.~~9.5.4.2 System Description The standby diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is shown on Figure 9.5-40. The system consists of: Three diesel fuel oil 'storage .tanks, one for each diesel engine. Each storage tank (approximately 53,150 gal. for each of the standby diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks, and 46,850 gal. for the HPCS diesel generator fuel oil storage ,tank)...is.. sized...to store., sufficient fuel for continuous operation of its respective diesel engine at rated capacity for 7 days. Interior and exterior surfaces are not coated, but are prepared in accordance with ANSI N45.2.1 Cleaning of Fluid Systems and Associated Components during Construction of Nuclear, Power Plants June 1, 1973. The cleaning of the internal surfaces of these carbon steel vessels is in accordance with ANSI N45.2.1 (Class C) requirements. A diesel fuel oil stabilizer, such as SDI-35, is added to the fuel oil storage tanks to prevent oxidation of the fuel oil and the formation of guys and tars that would plug fuel lines. The water emulsifier component of SDI-35 keeps any water contamination suspended in the fuel oil and prevents it from settling out in the bottom of the tank where rusting would occur. SDI-35 also Amendment 9.5-23 December 1983 P f 4 i I~ ~ a tp , 1 A 1 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR contains agents to prevent internal storage tank corrosion and biotic growth in the fuel. The external surfaces of the fuel oil storage tanks require no special coating but are free from oil, grease, loose rust, and loose paint. The tanks are buried in concrete below the diesel generator building. Since galvanic reactions are unlikely to occur in such an environment, cathodic protection of the fuel oil storage tanks is not required. After the interior and exterior surfaces are cleaned, tested, and dried, they are inspected in accordance with Subsection 3.1 of ANSI N45.2.1. The fill generator of each tank extends below the diesel mat beyond the exterior wall line, thereby positioning the tank fill line, and vent line outside the building. Each line, sounding storage tank is filled from its own tank truck ,station located in the .yard. The storage tanks are fill constructed with baffles, 10 reinforcement stiffeners, 4 reinforcement rings, and 15-degree off-center drains to minimize turbulence within the tanks during filling. The 4-in. fill three divisional fuel oil storage tanks are located lines for the 51 ft 3 in. and 55 ft 3 in. from the first and second pump suctions, respectively. Seven 3/4 in. x 8 in. stiffener rings are evenly spaced between the fill line and,,the first pump suction..in. the Division I and II fuel oil storage tanks. Five, 3/4 in. x 8 in. stiffener rings are evenly spaced, between the fill, line and the first pump suction in the Division III fuel oil storage tank. Since the fill line and pump suctions are located on opposite ends...of...each...storage,....tank,, sediment agitated between the stiffeners during filling will not fill affect the pump suction inlets. The separate lines are capped when not in use and are each provided with a locked-closed isolation valve and a strainer capable of filtering out sediment. Minor stirring of the sediment may occur. in the fuel oil storage tank when fuel oil is recirculated through the 2-in. fuel oil day tank overflow line. For all divisions, the overflow line is located 3 ft 10 in. and 7 ft 10 in. from the first and second pump suctions, respectively. Two 3/4 in. x 8 in. stiffener rings are located in the vicinity of the two pump suctions., These stiffener rings, along with the fuel oil pump stabilizer assembly, minimize any turbulent effects around the pump suctions. .Each storage tank also has a manhole for maintenance access from within the diesel generator Amendment 9.5-23a December 1983 1 C ls Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR building, an external vent, and a sounding tube for manual confirmation of fuel oil level. Each storage tank has a 1/16-in. corrosion allowance.2. Six electric motor-driven, vertical, turbine-type fuel oil transfer pumps. The pumps are mounted in duplex sets on top of each fuel oil storage tank and each duplex set is connected in parallel to its respective day tank to permit the transfer of fuel Amendment 7 9.5-23b December 1983~w sj O M+I ~= 't W t J b i' 1 J 4 A gC A l I 8 '<v m sp Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR oil by the pumps. Each fuel oil transfer pump dis-charge line is equipped with a simplex-type sediment strainer sized for full pump flow. Al-though ANSI Standard N195-1976 recommends the use of duplex strainers in diesel fuel oil systems, one simplex strainer per pump accomplishes the same intent. One simplex strainer and its associated fuel oil transfer pump may be taken out of service for maintenance; this occurs subsequent to an alarm or control room annunciation indicating that'he pressure drop across the strainer exceeds an alarm set point. Since each fuel oil pump is redundant and is capable of automatically starting after an associated pump failure, maintenance on the strainer will not discontinue the normal flow of fuel oil to that diesel.3. Three diesel fuel oil day tanks, one for each diesel engine. Each day tank- is located in the day tank room above the engine generator control panel room of its associated diesel generator. The elevated location of the tank provides adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) to the engine-driven fuel pump of the diesel engine. Each day tank is supplied with a manhole for maintenance access, external vent, a sounding tube for manual con-'n firmation of fuel oil level, and an overflow for returning excess fuel oil to the fuel line . oil storage tank. Even though each fuel oil transfer, pump..is capable of sup-plying the maximum fuel demand of a standby diesel generator, each duplex set of fuel oil transfer pumps is in its respective day tank falls to the pump-on level oil .controlled to start"together, automatically;" when fuel and stops automatically when fuel oil rises to the pump-off level. Fuel oil from the day tank flows by gravity to the suction of the engine-driven fuel pump which boosts the pressure to that required by the fuel injection header. For the two standby diesel generators, fuel. oil is supplied to the engine-driven booster pump and to the standby booster pump through a four-element duplex strainer: The four-element duplex strainer is located on the base of the engine. Four shells with cleanable type wire mesh elements are attached to a common manifold. A control valve in the center of the manifold. permits flow to two elements on; either side of the valve, or to all four .elements.- Nor-mal operating position of the valve exists with two elements in operation and two elements in standby. A differential Amendment 7 9.5-24 December 1983 tf Ip 1 C kIAW % g h '5 Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR pressure indicator and alarm monitor this strainer with an annunciator on the unit control panel. When the alarm oc-curs at 5 psi differential, an operator turns the valve han-dle to clean the elements that were in operation while placing the two standby elements into operation. The engine-driven booster pump is located on the left side of the engine and is driven off the back of the jacket water pump drive at 1750 rpm. Pump output at full speed is ap-proximately 12.5 gpm at 50 psig. The standby booster pump is mounted on the left side of the engine near the filters and strainers and is driven by a 1-hp motor at 1800 rpm. Oil is circulated at 12.5 gpm I 50 psig. The pump starts and primes the engine-driven pump when the start signal is given for the engine to start. The pump stops from a speed signal given from the engine. The pump also starts if fuel pressux e in the main header at the -+ low'pressure.'control downstream of, .the engine-driven pump falls to 25 psi. A relief valve set at 50 psi directs oil from the pump outlet back to the inlet side. A bypass line and a check valve around this pump allow the main pump to pick up fuel from the main header. A 50-psi relief valve and a 35-psi relief valve in the booster pumps'ischarge lines regulate...the supply to the fuel pumps. A four-element duplex filter ensures clean fuel to the pumps and nozzles. Duplex fuel filters are located beside the- strainers on the engine and are alike except for =the. elements. Fuel oil is filtered just prior to entering the engine supply header. A differential pressure indicator and alarm monitor this -'filter" with an~annunciator.,on .the unit. control panel. When the alarm occurs at 10 psi differential, the operator will place the other filter in service and xeplace the other filter. Fuel injection nozzle injects high pressure fuel from the pump into the cylinder. Because of the timing of the fuel pump, this fuel is released in the cylinder during the com-pression stroke. Spray holes in the tip of the nozzle atomize the fuel into a very fine mist in a symmetrical pattern. This mist mixes with the air in the cylinder to form a combustible mixture. This mixture is then ignited by the heat of compression caused by the piston compressing the air and fuel in the cylinder., A small head tank (5-gal. capacity) is located on the generator end of the engine above and between the cylinder Amendment 7 9. 5-24a December 1983 lI 4 l ~ 7 b ~ J ~, eh '8 k' 4L +$ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR banks. A In the system it is between the fuel pump headers. flowing vent is located in the top of this tank and joins the flowing vents from the Xuel pumps at. the flowing vent reservoir to return draining fuel to the day tank. Fuel oil supply pressure, after the filter, is indicated by a pressure indicator on the engine gauge panel. A 1:1 ratio relay transmits a signal to another pressure indicator on the unit control panel located in the diesel generator con-trol room to indicate fuel oil pressure at the end of the injection pump fuel heater. A low-pressure alarm switch set. at 10 psig in the supply header announces a low supply pres-sure on the unit panel. A small shell-tube fuel oil cooler located on the end of the engine cools the fuel oil that is bypassed by the 35-psi relief valve. The .-fuel oil cooler is. located on the front of the engine below the engine-driven lube oil pump and is primarily required to, cool oil bypassed by the 35-psi relief valve when the engine is running at idle speed. The cooler will handle 6 gpm of fuel on the shell side and ll gpm of water on the tube side. Fuel entering at 170 F will exit at 125 F using 100 F water at full capacity. The fuel system for the high pressure core spray diesel , generator is similar .to the fuel, system for . the standby diesel generators as described above. Fuel oil is supplied tothe,.engine-mounted. fuel, pump from., the fuel oil day tank by gravity flow. Fuel under low pres-sure then passes through a 10-psi relief valve and the filter,.elements,to the, fuel manifold supply line and injec-tor inlet filter at each cylinder into the injector. A small portion of this fuel supplied to each injector is pumped into the cylinder at very high pressure through the needle .valve and spray tip.of the injector. The quantity of fuel injected depends upon the rotative position of the . plunger as set by the injector rack. and the governor. The-excess fuel not used by the "inje"tor -flows through the in-jector serving to lubricate and coal the working parts. The fuel leaves the injector through the return fuel filter. From the return fuel filter in the injector, the excess fuel, passes through the fuel return line in the manifold to the relief valve inlet of the "return fuel" through a swing check valve. This relief valve restricts the return fuel,~~-maintaining a 'back pressure on the injectors. The swing check valve prevents reversal of flow and .siphoning. The Amendment 7 9.5-24b December 1983~~its.id ~. dP 4=4 A 4 ~ sr ~ Nl wsa ' X. ~ r 4J' C Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR fuel continues into the "return fuel" sight glass, filling the glass, down through the standpipe under the glass and through the return line to the fuel oil day tank.. Any ex-cess fuel oil in the day tank is returned by gravity flow to the fuel oil storage tank through the day tank overflow piping. 9.5.4.3 Safety Evaluation The system is designed in accordance with Category I, Safety Class 3 criteria. The failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) of the standby diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is provided in the Unit 2 FSAR FMEA report. Details of the missile enclosures for Diesel Generator Divisions I, II, and III appear on Figure 1.2-17. The diesel generator divisions are designed to seismic and tor-nado criteria and are isolated from one another by a rein-forced, . concrete . harrier...-...The... barrier consists of a 2-ft-thick reinforced wall with No. 9 bars at 5 in. each way each face (EWEF) and is in compliance with SWEC 07703. SWEC 07703 is a Missile Barrier Interaction Stone and Web-ster Topical Report. submitted to the NRC in September 1977. An opening exists in the 12 1/2 column line wall which is closed off by. a hollow concrete block... Although this hollow concrete block is not designed to provide missile protection, missile -effects to an,. adjacent diesel are eliminated by the hollow concrete block's placement. in . . reference to the barrier. 'The opening does not introduce -a straight line from one diesel.,to an adjacent diesel or from one division's starting air receiver to another division's starting air receiver. Also, xg an mo e a '"'energy lanes ~are~not:in .,the line .of..possible ., missiles .through this opening. In the event. of fuel oil or cooling water leakage or flooding in the diesel generator building, fluid from all three divisions is collected in the floor drain system. Normally open drain valves direct the fluid to the valve pit. From the valve pit, other open drain valves direct the fluid to an oil separator. The following systems have lines in the diesel generator room: breathing air, air startup-standby diesel generator, standby diesel generator fuel, fire protection water, con-trol building chilled water, diesel generator building ventilation, instrument air, service air, service water, and water treating. All of these system lines are classified as moderate energy lines having design temperatures and design Amendment 7 9.5-24c December 1983 %J 3~- d 4 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR pressures less than 200OF and 275 psig, respectively. Since the diesel generator can operate in conjunction with the operation of the fire protection sprinklers, the diesel generator is also available under water spray conditions from surrounding moderate energy lines. The minimum fuel oil storage capacity for each diesel generator is based on continuous operation of the diesel generator for a period of 7 days at its rated capacity. Each diesel generator fuel oil day tank has a capacity in accordance with requirements of the National Fire Protection Amendment 7 9.5-24d December 1983 t f. J, "v l, 4 'A ~ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Association (NFPA) Standard 37, Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines (1979), which provides for over 1 hr of continuous operation of the diesel generator at full load. Earth day tank is isolated in a room enclosed by 3-hr rated fire barriers and protected by automatic sprinkler systems. Each diesel generator day tank room contains a curb sized to contain the 660-gal volumetric capacity of the fuel oil day tank in addition to an amount of fluid from the fire protection system (30,.gal per minute per square foot for a 10-min period). This curb precludes spilling fuel oil into the diesel generator room. Each day tank room curb can be emptied into the diesel generator building floor and equipment drain system. Once fuel oil or cooling water accumulates in the floor drain sump (one sump per diesel generator division), a level switch monitors the quantity of fuel oil or cooling water collected. This fluid is then .>dispersed;to.;a.;common..oil .separator.. In...addition to the curb arrangement, a low-level storage tank alarm and a low-level day tank alarm also alert the operators to the possibility of a fuel oil leak in the day tank room. In summary, large leaks are detected by low-level alarms in the. day tanks. Small leaks are detected by a shorter than normal cycle of the floor drain pumps. The capped inlet of each storage tank fill line is located above the probable maximum flood level, thereby preventing. the entrance of water. *Each storage and day tank's vent. pipe is also located above the flood-level and is designed to prevent rain from entering. ',The, fuel.oil storage tank fill., vent, and sounding lines are located outside the diesel generator building and are exposed to the atmosphere after penetrating 5 ft of fill. In the event of a tornado missile resulting in the obstruction of these fill, vent, and sounding lines, the fuel oil storage tank is vented by a 4-in vacuum relief valve and' 4-in pressure'relief valve'mounted on a 4-in connection on the storage tank. The vacuum relief valve and pressure relief valve are within the diesel generator building which is designed for missile protection. The fuel oil day tank vent line is located in the diesel generator building day tank room and penetrates through the diesel generator building roof. In the event. of a tornado missile accident resulting in the obstruction of the vent line, the fuel- oil day tank is vented by a 4-in vacuum relief valve and a 4-in pressure relief valve mounted on the vent line. The vacuum relief valve and pressure relief valve are within , Amendment 7 9.5-25 December 1983 / ~i il t4 4 ~ t 1 si M~* * < 1 '4j I ~ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR the diesel generator building which is designed for missile protection. A sounding rod is utilized periodically to check the accuracy and operation of the tank level indicator by insertion into the sounding tube furnished in each storage and day tank.* The possible accumulation of water at the bottom of each diesel fuel oil storage and day tank is also checked by applying a water-indicating paste to the sounding rod. The paste changes color when level it comes in contact, with excessive, water is water. Should the water be of'-a removed from the storage tanks by the use portable pump and from the day tanks by opening a drain valve located near the bottom of each tank. Adequate sources of diesel quality fuel oil are available in the cities of Oswego (8 mi), Belgium (25 mi), and Syracuse (35 mi). Under extremely unfavorable environmental condi-tions; fuel oil .will .be del'ivered onsite via tanker truck escorted by highway snow removal equipment. This will permit each standby diesel generator system to supply uninterrupted emergency power. Fuel oil meets or exceeds the quality requirements of ASTM D975-1978 and the di'esel engine manufacturer's recommendations. The growth of algae in, the fuel oil storage tank is determined by measuring the oxidative stability in accordance with ASTM D2274-74. it If storage is more than tank will 2 mg/100 ml, the fuel oil in the affected be appropriately 'treated,(filtrati'on or.biocides) to reduce the level to acceptable concentrations. '.9.5.4';4- Inspection andHesting .Requirements The standby diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is designed to permit periodic inspection and maintenance of active display components'ocal inspection and indicating devices are provided for periodic of tank oil level and operating .parameters such as =- pump discharge pressure and pressure-"drop across each fuel oil strainer. Fuel oil storage and day tanks and piping are fuel oil. hydrostatically tested prior to filling with diesel System operability is tested in conjunction with the generator. Continued system integrity is verified with periodic testing with the diesel generator. Amendment 7 9.5-25a December 1983 4 'r ~ l 'ho Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 1.8-1 (Cont) Re lator Guide 1.137 Revision 1 October 1979 Fuel-Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators FSAR Section 9.5.4 Position The Unit 2 project complies with the Regulatory Position (Paragraph C) of this guide with the following clarification. The minimum fuel temperature in the tank will be the basis for the acceptance criteria. Amendment 7 152 of 169 December 1983 ~' NINE NILE POINT-2 UE STION Provide the results of a-failure mode and effects analysis to show that failure of a piping connection between subsystems (engine water jacket, lube oil cooler, governor lube oil cooler, and engine air intercooler) will not degrade engine performance or cause engine failure. (SRP 9.5.5, Part Il.~~RESPONSE~~Cross leakage of engine coolants resulting from minor. piping connection failure between diesel engine subsystems will not degrade the engine performance or reliability. Permissible leakage limits are discussed in question/response 430.73. Any major piping failure between line lube oil and jacket water subsystems could degrade engine performance or cause engine failure during standby or operating modes. This major piping failure that will cause substantial subsystem cross leakage will .be detected either by means of alarms. or during routine visual and laboratory checks of the engine oil or cooling systems Snouia a detrimental piping failure render a diesel .engine inoperable, the plant operating procedures will be followed to meet the applicable Technical Specifications. 4 ,I l 44 Ill~ I l: Epl ,,ek ~: ' f h 'I I/ V \ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR .QUESTION F430.68 (9.5.5) You state in Section 9.5.5.2 that the diesel engine cooling i water is treated with a corrosion inhibitor in accordance wi'th the manuf acturer ' - . recommendations. to preclude corrosion and organic fouling. Provide additional details of your diesel engine cooling .water system chemical treatment with regards to organic fouling and corrosion, and discuss how your treatment complies with the engine manufacturers recommendations. (SRP 9.5.5, Part I)~~RESPONSE~~'ee revised Sections 9.5.5.2.1 and 9.5.5.2.2. I ~6 c.o~~ ~Ps .- Not acceptab1e. No response provided., po P5'g (.'ea / ~g jcR5 J /7' (fgd t Amendment 9 QS<R F430. 68-1 March 1984 V ly "ho 4 M% f 4 ~ P ' 4 yl P 4 4 P a'g I ~g t y 1. U L I i I l ~ 4 i p* Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.69 (9.5:5) In FSAR Section 9.5.5.3, you provide a list of indicators and alarms ,associated with the Division I/II, and Division III diesel generators. For the .Division I/II system, control room alarms are provided for "diesel generator mechanical failure." The- function of these alarms is not clear. Expand your FSAR discussion to include an explanation of these alarms and how and when they function. If these alarmsforare thea type of "common trouble" alarm, such as provided Divison III diesel generator, then so state, and identify the alarms and/or trips associated with each. Also, identify how and where the Division III diesel generator trip(s) is/are annunciated. (SRP 9.5.5, Part I)~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 8.3.1.1.2 concerning Division III diesel trips annunciations. .For. Divisions I and II, see revised:Section 9.5.5.3. ~>6 . Co~~ <~Q Not acceptable. No response provided for Division I and II. The response for Division III will be acceptable when I8C logic diagrams are provided. Logic diagrams for- the Division system, and lube oil system'ave III air start system, cooling water been provided in the response to 430.92. Amendment 9 QGR F030.69-1 March 1984 - ~ 'h A4 1 '\ g ~ ' Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430. 71 (9. 5. 5) The diesel generators are recpxired to start. automatically on loss of all offsite power and in the event of a LOCA. The diesel generator sets should be capable of operation at less than full load for extended periods without degradation of performance or reliability. Should . a LOCA occur with availability of offsite power,'iscuss the design provisions and other parameters that have been considered in the selection of the diesel generators to enable them to run unloaded (on standby) for extended periods without degradation of engine performance, or reliability. Expand your FSAR to include and explicitly define the capability of your design with regard to this recIuirement. (SRP 9.S.S, Part III) PSB Comments on 430;71 .The question has been answered. However, the of the response has not been determined. The acceptability staff is concerned that operation of diesel generators, at rated speed and no load for .;prolonged periods during a.:LOCA"'with'offsite power available will result in diesel engine degradation to an extent that the diesel generators will not be able to accept load in the event of a sub-sequent LOOP. Therefore, the applicant must demonstrate Division I, II,and III diesel generators, can be adequately that the loaded to ensure continued reliable operation within 6 and 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months fol-lowing a SI signal, respectively.~~RESPONSE~~Division XXX deisel generator (DG) will be upgraded with.a .high capacity turbocharger, which is designed to withstand the rigor of light load operation.. This turbocharge is capable ..of 3000. cumulative .hours;of operation at less than 20% load befoxe overhaul is recpxired. The Division XXX DG can run four hours in no-load condition with a subsequent loading. as specified in manufacturer's,".engine light load operation instruction. Moreover, ~ pxocedures will be employed to control the DG during LOCA event with offsite power available. The procedures are consistent with the emergency operating procedure. See revised Section 9o5.5.5. a, tl ~' ~ ter' ll ~ .t y t~ IL 't la t 't t and the combustion air exhaust system piping. Failure of any of these systems can only affect the associated diesel generator. The moderate energy piping systems in the diesel generator building, not associated wi'th the diesel generators, are service air, fire protection, and floor drain -piping. Failure of 'ny ~ of these systems cannot jeopardize the safety function of the diesel generator packet water system. The Dxvxsxon I. and ~ 0 II diesel .."generators are ..-..designed .and built to .operate continuously during a discharge of the fire protection system. ~ The Division III diesel generator is retrofitted with,.the capability of operating continuously during a discharge of the fire protection . system. The moderate energy piping systems associated with the diesel generators themselves are the fuel oil system, starting air system, service water system, and combustion air intake system piping. Failure of the piping of any of these systems will affect the performance of the associated diesel generator alone. ZhlsE R.T Each standby diesel generator is capable of running in a no load condition for 4 hr for Division III and 6 hr for Divisions I and II. After this period they will be, loaded according to manufacturer recommendation (for Division III greater than 50 percent load for 30 min, and for Divisions I and II greater than 75 percent for 30.min). The failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) evaluation of the diesel generator is provided. in the .Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR FMEA Report. .9.5.6 Diesel Generator. Starting System 'Each -standby diesel generator has.,two independent, redundant 'compressed air " starting systems,. either .of which has adequate capacity -to assure quick, reliable, automatic start'ng of tne diesel generator 'following a loss of offsite power. 9.5.6 ' Design Bases "."-.',The.'. ~standby~diesel'-"'generator.'starting-;system is designed to meet the following safety. design bases:~~l. Each standby diesel generator has independent, redundant air starting systems either of which is capable-of starting the engine.~~2. The starting air receiver in each of the redundant starting systems has sufficient capacity to start the engine within 10 sec. Each air starting system can crank a cold diesel generator five times without recharging the receiver tanks.. Each Amendment 7 9.5-38 Decem 0gb'pIsjz~'7Q 'dI'easel cJe net far cvIll ka'>Pg~eoC. Lutgg n. hIg 4 ApacI'W~ Wre<eh~er, ~hIch f~ otcdzgneeC, +n cuI)'Pr~~ncL >e rig4p ofli~gt/~ opeI"ay hoofs I5 Wpab/w dW Z~a e~mugafvr /e/7, Qjj'r f h~Cflckfp8r a opoMPI~ ~>+> .~ huoG ~~ o vertu'g n g uired. 7C I,'j Wg 0 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.72 (9.5.5) You state in Section 9.5.5.1 and Table 9.5-2 of the FSAR that each diesel engine cooling water system is provided ~ with a standpipe or an expansion tank to provide for system expansion, for venting air from the system to provide for minor system leaks at pump shafts seals, valve stems and other components for up to 30 days. In addition to the. items mentioned, the ezpansion tanks are to maintain required NPSH on the system jacket water and intercooler water pumps. . Provide the location of the standpipes and expansion tank. Demonstrate by analysis that the standpipes and ezpansion tank size are adequate to maintain required pump NPSH and make up water for days continuous operation. of the diesel engine at full rated load without makeup, or provide a seismic Category I, safety Class 3 makeup water supply to the diesel generators (SRP 9.5.5, Parts I, II, and III)~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 9.5.5.2.2. cc . ~~fs Hot acceptable. The app1icant has not. provi<< . r a ba fo eye s a equate inventory of cooling water seven ays of opera ion of -the Division for and II DG's have cot .been addressed III DG. Also Di Sec-7 ~ 9.,S,Z,/ C $ s ogre 5 5,z.w the tank capacity will a equa e y maintain t e required pump NPSH and makeup water for 7 ~ days of continuous operation of the diesel engine at full load. / ~M HrAZM 7 cLc QO ~~g ~* t~ 4,. ww~ ~ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR through Ports B and C to maintain the temperature at approximately 170'F. The two-way thermostatic valve is designed to ensure circulation of water to coolers during startup. This valve is opened at startup and closes at approximately 165'F. This would not prevent the system from reaching operating temperature. This valve ensures proper jacket water circulation until the jacket water reaches operating temperature. From the coolers or thermostatic valve water flows 'into two main jacket. water headers. Jacket water flows from the main headers to each cylinder through individual connections and also to the turbocharger ,and the heater portion of the combustion air intercoolers. Water flows to the heater portion of the combustion air intercoolers constantly and provides cooling when the engine is in full operation. The motor-driven circulation pump and heater -circulate warm water through the engine j ackets, intercoolers, and turbocharger when the diesel generator is in standby condition. To preclude long-term corrosion,'"treatment of the water used in the jacket water system .:includes '";the . use .',".the ~ of silicate ~ nitrate .-:-inhibitors, -in -agreement, = .with -- engine manufacturer's recommendations, -and periodic testing of .the water -to ensure that the water quality is maintained at the level recommended by the manufacturer. Since the entire jacket water system is enclosed, mainta'ned in warm 'condition by the circulating pump and heater, and installed "'n a heated building, use of any antifreeze compound is not required. Any leakage in ,the system causes loss of jacket water pressure or low level in the jacket water standpipe and is annunciated by the low pressure or low level alarm. The capacity of the system will adequately maintain the required pump NPSH and makeup water for 7 days of continuous operation of the diesel engine at full load. y oss oz " water through seepage, leakage, or flow out of the system will be noticed through routine checks. If needed, the cooling water system can be manually refilled. Locating the jacket water standpipe on the engine provides a positive suction head for the jacket wate pumps. The two-way thermostatic valve passes jacket water to all coolers during engine startup. The butterfly valve bypasses water through the engine at all times during engine operation. These systems ensure that Amendment 9 9.5-31 Ma ch 1984 k ~(% (~ I ( II ~ w I( F >, h'( ~ , 'I III t~ E fg 't 'a Qm a~3 g.~tk ~ps~ ~~~ E ~~ ~~~8' <0 A~M %<~4 = '+ W ~ w l t .~pa p.y5 $ ,gA '4,. eq> 'F, ~ i' ~g II ~ 4 tf Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.73 (9.5.5) Recent licensee event repor re ortss have a shown that tube leaks are lt ft 'n the heat exchangers o d iese esel engine k o lang wa ter s y stems with resu an f 'l to start on demand. Pro v to detect tube leakage and corrective measures a-lude acket water leakage into e u system (standby mode), lube b ox t l leakage ea into the jacket water .(operating mode),), jacket wa er 1 ea k a ge into the engine ~ ~ air intake and governor systemss (opera (o crating ing or standby mode). '.'Provide the permissible inleeaka g e or outleakage in eac h of degrading engine performance e should also include the' 'd discussion ec s o water/service water systems leakage.~~RESPONSE~~'e .The response for Divisions I and II I is described in revised 'ection 9.5.5.5. " e res onse /or'ivision III wz Xc e yw~+ f58 po i a cepta le.. Thecapp i a plicant should expand the response to address detection of lube'.oil leakage nto e Amendment 11 QGR F430.73-1 June 19S4 ~ N I V Ja ~l 'I I d Nine Mile Point Unit 2'FSAR with additional cooling capacity,and .a conservative fouling factor to account for various service conditions. Each jacket. watex system has a separate loop with a heater to heat the circulating water -during engine standby. condition. This ensures that the engine is warm and increases first-try starting xeliability of the engine. For the Division I and II jacket water system, this loop . consists of a motor-driven cixculating pump and a heater. For the Division III system, this consists of an immersion heater. The, heater heats the jacket water that circulates through the" lube oil cooler by=thermosyphon action 'and heats the lube oil. The warm lube oil circulates through the engine and keeps it warm. The jacket water system operates within the xanges of pressure and temperature and at. the flow rate recommended by the engine manufacturer. jacket watex" quality is .maintained at the level ~ recommended by the engine manufacturer. The jacket water is 'he treated with inhibitor compounds recommended by the manufacturer to prohibit long-term corrosion and organic fouling. "Continued quality of the jacket water is ensured by periodic sampling and analysis of the water. The'*'ystem'is protected against any .leakage. Any external leakage will be detected by a visual inspection. Any leakage within the system is detected by a decrease in the Division III expansion tank water level or by a drop of pressure in the system: Any leakage *within,.Division I .and II is detected by a decrease in the jacket water. standpipe.. These'conditions're "automatically .monitored and annunciated in the diesel, generator control room as well as in the main control room. Divisions I and II, the jacket water pressure is always I'or lower than the lube oil pressures during both standby and operating mode. Therefore, any tube failure at this interface would cause leakage of oil into the jacket water. Sgervace whar Pressure is higher than the jacket water pressure. Thexefore, any tube leakage at the jacket water cooler would cause leakage of service water into the jacket watex. 7w,'s ]e~K~e Mc~ld c-n->se. ds/vtr'o~ n6 /qh'blur C One&s<f<<P"on C~d <w'<'ll $ g dq P< J'8d da<s'~y P pr,'@JEST ~ ~'~ckel vc 5 <s << i'/J<'<i~ Any tube leakage at the heat exchanger interface between c ~d jacket water and combustion air would cause jacket .water c<,e<<s~P'5 ~S leakage into the combustion air system. of f4L6 >gl gv. Amendment 7 9.5-37 Decembe 1983 f-o<" 8 '4's<~ ~c<<Rcf Lvc tv' e ';+'Iu T~ tvt e o<'( d<4c.l< J CIVV'< usa I 8f'<c<d< C, c;(ySs~ cf Pw loke o.'I 4a 5 'K $ -~Qt'+ 4'%4 I ~l e 4~ ~I Pl I la 'L4 p ekegQss, ~ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR +3D.73 Qp pfyls tolls Xg %(~7K hould any of the above leakage occur, the operator would 'be alerted by one or more of the, following alarms prior to degradation of engine performance: Jacket water pressure low Jacket water standpipe/expansion tank level low Lube oil pressure low Diesel generator service water discharge pressure low In addition, the possibility of any tube leakage is minimized by periodic inspection, testing, and maintenance of the systems. Division I and II diesel generator jacket, water heat exchangers are provided with separate and independent service water supply headers and service water discharge-- headers. The Division III diesel generator jacket water heat exchanger is fed from both Division I and II supply and ~ discharge. headers., This arrangement insures that failure in any one division will not jeopardize the safety function of any. other division. The service water system design bases are described in Section 9.2.1. There is no high energy piping in the diesel generator building other than that. associated with the diesel generators .themselves. The high energy piping associated with the diesel 'generators is the starting air system piping 31 E Q(, 'h J II t Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FS'AR (O. QUESTION -.In FSAR F430.74 (9.5.5) Section 9.5.5.2, you state that antifreeze compounds are not used in the diesel generator cooling water, systems -because they are located in a heated building. Consider .a loss of heating to one or more diesel generator rooms, and describe the provisions in your system(s) design to prevent freezing of the diesel engine cooling. water.~~RESPONSE~~Each diesel generator room is provided with multiple nonsafety-related electric unit heate'rs, designed to . maintain a space temperature of not less than 65 F in the winter. The unit heaters are controlled with thermostats. Each room also has a separate QA Category I thermostat, with dual high (120 F) and low (65 F) temperature settings, for the purpose of annunciating an alarm in the main control room 120 F. if space temperature falls below 65 F or rises above 0 In the unlike1.y event that all'nit heaters in a given. room are inoperable due to *mechanical/electrical this concurrent with a fai lure, subfreezing and happens ., outdoor condition, 'either additional portable heating will be used or the associated diesel engine would be started and run to maintain the temperature. Should loss of offsite power~~occur," concurrent with 'a"subfreezing outdoor condition, engines will start automatically, thereby maintaining the'iesel temperature.~~~'hei'<6 C.~~~ ~Ps respon'se will be acceptable if (a) i the applicant will 'establish procedures to start and adequately load the DG's to maintain proper engine temperature in the event DG room heating is lost, and (b) the NNP design is such that DG's in test mode will isolate from the grid and revert to automatic mode, ready to accept safety loads, on a LOQP and/or SI signal. Amendment 7 QEcR F430.74-1 December 1983 ( ) ~ 'C J h /$ V% I 'L ~ gA I Y 'r ll I p2~. 7y' 3 ~ l 4 ~ f5+ 4J, C CP~.~ aJ f'~~.e.d .~~~ ~ d t mM Ao 89,.l l.a E K 4. )A pt 'kklI +k ~ g h V I 'll I I r c'+ j>> l l4 w>P pUR , ~ 4 b Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.78 (9.5.6) The air starting 'ystem for the Division I and I1 diesel generators"has two r'eceivers, each sized for three engine sta ts. However, the design of the system is for both redundant corn "essed air trains 'o operate in parallel, thereby giving only three start capability, total for the redundant trains. As stated in SRP Section 9.5..6, the .staff requires that each diesel. generator be provided with a starting system that is capable of providing . a minimum of five starts in the normal operation mode. Revise your design accordingly or justify the present design. (SRP 9.5.6, Part II)~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 9.5.6.2 '. Not acceptable. The applicant's response in FSAR Section is not clear. Additional information must be provided as 9.5.6.2.1 follows: (a) does each air receiver contain sufficient air to engine five times USING BOTH STARTING BANKS, or start the starting bank only one (b) the total no. of 10 second -starts-using only one the no. using both banks. in parallel bank, and (c) the .receiver pressure; from which"the'starting capability is determined: i.e., 240 psig, 245 psig 7 Amendment 7 QZcR F430.78-1 Decembe 1983 /'4 ~ 5 4 t' g %r V Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.79 (9.5.6) For -the Division I,, II, and III-diesel-generators, .expand 'your FSAR to provide the -following information: (a) De ine what constitutes a.-. successful engine cranking .. cycle, i. e., a given number of diesel engine revolutions, reaching -a.preset engine RPM, a specified period of cranking time,. a given receiver pressure drop, etc, and does this conform with manufacturer's recommendations. (b)" What is the minimum receiver pressure required to allow the requisite number of starts (i. e., 5) without recharging? (c) What is the. lowest point to which the receiver pressure can drop and still be capable of starting the diesel generator? (d) Assuming the diesel engine fails to start in the required 10 seconds, or at the conclusion of a "start cycle," does the engine, continue to, crank until compressed air is exhausted, or does cranking- stop automatically?~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 9.5.6.2. p5g ~~~~f~ 'The..applicant's response.addresathe;staff's question adequately. However, the following problems must be resolved; ',(a)" The Div',.~..'I.,and,.II~OG',s".air~ start, system, provides for five starts, but not all are 10 second starts: i.e., crank, fire, within 10 seconds.. and accelerate to rated speed and'vol.tage (b) The Div. III OG five start capabil.ity appears to be based on a receiver pressure of 250 psig. In normal operation, 'owever, the receiver pressure can drop as lowlonger as 225 psig, ~ and this means that five start capabil'ity no exists. Resolution of the above problems is required. Amendment 7 QZcR F430.79-1 December 1983 SC k 4g A ft' c) s~/'.~. <<~p. '.~~~.2<<~~ M spec.A'c yll. I> ~P co cL >.+~4 I /~P c c. p ~6. / ~l p oN I~~y. gje.~~~ C VJ Sw I~WC pl ~~ 5 ~C 1I 4 4 I' sf < 1 f 4 4 &a -x 0 C t I JE ~, I.4 a ~ 4 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QSD 77 ~ ponents fabricated from 'arbon 'steel. The piping on the engine is fabricated from stainless steel. The .entire starting air system-is designed:to".Category "I- requirements. 9.5.6.2.2 Division III Diesel Gen'erator Starting System The Division III standby diesel generator starting system consists of two independent", redundant subsystems, either of 'which is capable of starting, the diesel generator. Each subsystem 'consists mainly of the following equipment with interconnecting piping, v'alves, filters, or strainers: 1) an air compressor, 2) an aftercooler, 3) an air receiver . tank, 4) a starting air relay valve, and 5) two starting air motors. The air compressor, air receiver tank, and . aftercooler are located on the .starting air sti4.:whexeas .the starting air relay valve, and starting air motors are located on the engine. The Division III diesel generator starting system has one motor-driven air compressor and, one. diesel engine-driven air compressor. Each-air compressor-.is a two stage, air-cooled compressor with, a -20 scfm rating and is capable of recharging the associated 64-cu... ft air.receiver from 150 psig minimum operating pressure to 250 psig maximum operating pressure in less than 30 min. One of the 'u compressors is driven by a 7 1/2-hp, 575-V, .3-phase ac.motor fed from the Division III emergency 600-V ac bus. The other ~ q compressor is engine driven with a 125-V dc starting . ~ ' ~ circuit. The 125-V dc power is drawn from the Division III emergency 125-V dc bus. The air compressor supplies .compressed air to -the air re'ceiver through an aftercooler, a check valve," a relief valve, and a 'service valve. The check valve prevents depressurization of .the loop back. through the compressor when; it "is not operati'ng. 'The relief valve protects against system overpressurization. The service valve is provided for isolating the compressor from the rest of the system. The air-cooled aftercooler ensuies dry air .in the air receiver. Each - air receiver has a. volume of 64. cu ft. The air receivers are, initially charged to '50 psig and have . sufficient capacity to start the'en ine five times (normal starts) without recharging. e air receiver s pressure can drop to 100 psig and, still provide a single start of. the diesel generator. The air receivers are mounted vertically on the starting air skid. ,Each air receiver has a top-mounted pressure-relief - valve for protection against . overpressurization and a 'bottom-mounted..drain valve for' Amendment 7 9.5<<42 'ecember 1983 tft ~ recel per pre~sere o4 >zZ j)5f Qpz+zfgf aci'H l~ auuila h/~ 44>> ~ 4>> ~ 44 WC' I 14 41 ~ 1~~Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.80 (9.5.6)~~The design of the-air start systems for .the, Division I, II, and'IIX diesel 'generators-does not include air dryers. This is not acceptable. The staff requires air dryers in the system with the capability of producing dry air (to the receivers) at a dewpoint a minimum of 10 F below the lowest possible ambient temperature in the diesel generator rooms. Revise your design accordingly. (SRP 9.5.6, Part III)~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 1.12.2, Iicensing Issue 16. 'Sb ( o~~fp 5' ,Not acceptable. Air dtyers are required (Oiv. I 5 II). Air dryer design for Div. III will -be reviewed on receipt of information. ~The Div". III air start. system is not acceptable pending receipt of this information. c I oe 8.'v,'s r'~ ~ ~~~p ~cy Cf \ ] w5~/ g'r;>i-4'c.;1.W T p/'op~ tory bc g. + 1 f'y~H~ ) $ g ~par, g~ g > n S~c7 <~ /, Amendment 7 QBR F430.80-1 December 1983 ~i ll E 4 4j 'I 4 ~em M sg +i Cr ll WT" 'a P The Division IIX standby diesel generator aix start system is being ( 'retrofitted with aix'ryers. PSAR section 9.5.6.2.2 will be updated upon completion of the air dryer design. The following>is the description of the air dryer design: The air dryers to the air start system are provided to reduce gabe ~ moisture content of the air, and to minimize condensation in the starting air system. This is to improve the reliability of the air 'start function of the DG and to minimize the formation 'of the. rust and scale in the receiver and piping. DG starting air'ystem is. upgraded with, desiccant type, dual tower, air dryer system, each including two vessels, air after. cooler, moisture separator, pre-and post filters, absorbent medium, piping, valves and . necessary controls. A The main components of the air dryer system function as .follows: y .Aftercooler-Hoisture Se arator The air-cooler .type aEtercooler-moisture separator delivers the compressed air within 15-21 F above room ambient temperature. condenses up to 90X of the inlet air moisture content and The'eparator removes the condensate with an automatic trap and drain. Pre-filter The coalescing type pre-filter is used to, remove entrained liquid oil and water particles from the dompressed air. The pre-filter is capable of removing minimum of 98$ liquid oil from mist-laden air. Pre-filter is capable to withstand and perform efficiently up to maximum rated flow from air surges or backflow. The pre-filter is" furnished with the bypass valves for maintenance. if Jh> A tl t+@ 4 R -I *l Qa. A' t >x.r 0 Aii Drirer The heatlesa,type dual-tower air dryer systemis.furnished with active alumina type desiccant. ~ Incomiag compressed air is dried by passing ~ through the desiccant ia one -tower-.while. the other tower is The 'desi'ccant. regeneration, is accomplished by using a ~ '.regenerating. ~ "- small portion of the dried air exiting from the drying 'tower. The purge ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ air exhausts to the atmosphere. The drying time..and regeneration time ~ ~ ~ of 5 minutes each combine to complete the 10 minute cycle. The switching between towers is automatic.and.does not interrup the dry air, supply. Valves, controls and piping. required to accomplish automatic operation are furnished with the unit suitably mounted oa the equipment. Electrical controls and circuits are installed in NET Type 4 enclosure and wired in accordance with the National Electrical Code requirements. The dryer control, is electrically interlocked with the air compressor operation. The system is maintained at line pressure and ready to dry the compressed air upon restarting of the air compressor." The dryer is designed for 300 psi and hydrotested at 450 psig. Each set ', ..of air dryers is equipped with, a bypass piping and valves for maintenance. Pressure gages'are "furnished as required to monitor the dryer 4 operation. The air dryer is introduced between air compressor and an air receiver. The,.following is the 'design basis used for air dryer .performance requirements: Inlet'low Rate~~32 scfm~~-Inlet Pressure 250 psxg Inlet Temperature 125oF Inlet Moisture Coateat Saturated (at-inlet pressure) 'utlet Moisture Content -404F (Dew point at line pressure) Operation ,Automatic with locally mounted instrumentation and chamber pressure gauge Dryer Cycle 10 minutes (per NEMA Std. AD1-1964), Drying Time 5 minutes Absorbent Type 'Active alumina 10.8 Chamber Regeneration 5 miautes Purge Flow 2 scfm (nominal) Dryer Design Pressure 300 psi Vessel Design Pressure 300 psig ply P>> CN C > T t ~ 'f ~ 'pJ p4~ 'Xi f I y 'I Pq -il V 4 t After- filter A particulate type after-filter is furnished downstream of the air ...-dryers to, remove particulate matter .that may exc th -f'1 f ryer. he after-filter is capable to trap and remove particules of 1 micron and larger in size. The air dryer system is designed to ANSI(831.l code requirements. ~ l( W Y' (II~ () (T 'ill ( lip <<C f l ~ ~ Cg k( \ r ~r( 4' "r J. n r tg l Nine iNile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.81 (9.5.6) .Describe the instrumentations,,controls,, sensors, and alarms provided for monitoring'he- diesel engine air starting system, and describe their function. Describe the testing necessary to maintain a highly reliable instrumentation, control, sensors, and alarm system and where the alarms are annunciated. Identify the temperature, pressure, and level sensors which alert the operator when the parameters exceed the ranges recommended by the engine manufacturer and 'escribe any operator actions required during alarm conditions to prevent harmful effects to the diesel engine. Discuss system interlocks provided. Revise your FSAR accordingly. (SRP 9.5.6, Part III)~~RESPONSE~~See Sections 8.3.1.1.2, 9.5.6.4, 9.5.6.5, and revised Section 9.5.6.2. Operator actions and surveillance testing program are described in response to Question F430.92. (y)) . Ce The response is acceptab1e with regard to system description, P8ID's, and 1ogic diagrams. The response is not acceptab1e with regard'to system test and calibration. See comments for g 430.53. It+a~~ ~ I ~ ~ ~~>s 5'ew r e~g~s+ w~ H3o>3'mendment 7 Q&R F430.81-1 December 1983.- ~ \ +1 f~ t t'I l4 Nl'p I t Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.82 (9.5.6) The diesel generators at NMP II utilize, air.pressure or, air flow devices to control diesel generator operation and/or erne gency trip functions. The air for theseaircontrols .is s arting supplied from the emergency diesel generator system. Provide the following: (a) Expand your FSAR to discuss any diesel engine control functions supplied by the air starting system or any air system. The discussion should include the mode of operation for the control function (.air pressure and/or flow), a failure modes and effects analysis, and the necessary PScIDs to evaluate the system. (b) Since air systems are not completely air tight, there is a potential for slight leakage from the system. The air starting system uses a nonseismic air compressor to maintain>" air pressure in the seismic Category I air receivers" during the standby condition. In case of an accident, a seismic event, and/or loop, the air in the air receivers is used to, start the diesel engine. .After the engine is started, the air starting system becomes nonessential. to diesel generator operation unless the . air system supplie's air to the engine controls. In this case the controls must. relay in the air -stored in 'the air receivers,,since ,the lair compressor may 41 not be A Ivi 1 41Je 4 lo raziasJ aa.aao syavewL ~ t v r e eo aside] piesavse e savw ~ T C'YQJ,J,QQ your air starting system is used to control engine operation, with the compressor not available, show that a sufficient quantity of,air .,willremain in the air receivers, following a diesel engine start, to control engine operations for a minimum of seven days assuaging a reasonable leakage rate. If the air starting system is not used for'ngine control describe the air control system provided and provide assurance that it can perform for a period of seven days or longer.~~RESPONSE~~For Divisions I and II, the response is provided in revised Section 9.5.6.5. For Division III, the response is provided in revised Section 9.5.6.2.2. f5 p Ce wn evo1 >~ Not acceptab1e. The required PAID's are not provided. C< 5gm V C v" $ ~ cL f e Mp~ ~i 0 f+~ .f'r ~)~ <Qpg ~ g 4p +3a, >-u Amendment 8 QGR F430.82-1 January 1984 hW l < c y~~y~gg ~ ~ ,C'w i gK II r le H' V C Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.83 (9.5.6) .The Division I and II,diesel generator starting FSAR systems to utilize a number of "shuttle valves." Expand your these'alves include their purpose, and 'a discussion-of, and how they operate (a) with pressure balanced on both sides, and (b) with air pressure unbalanced on either side of the valves.~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 9 '.6.2.1. (56 ~~~~'f s Not acce start p, tabIe.. Ho r system:cannot esponse provided. The review of the air be;compIeted without .this. information. /sf c~~&s 2 / g, 4 Amendment 9 QZR F430.83-1 March 1984 Jg I, A E4 I Jj A t t<< 'qf,~ ' Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR 'UESTION F430. 84 { 9. 5. 7) Your 'description oof thee turbocharger u lubrication system for the Division I and diesel genera t or is not clear. Expand your FSAR to inclQ'de .a.-"more e az e Svrystem and its components ts as shown on a e turbocha r g er p ressure regu la t ory and desc ibe the.oil flow through the ratio r yr. Ident'fy the poost lube valve, as we po in this system, an to the turbocharger is precluded. d d R evise FSAR d PAID accordingly {SRP 9.5.7, Part III)~~RESPONSE~~See revised .Section 9 5.7.2.1 and revised Figure 9.5-47. t <6~a,~T> Thee response is accepta HI e. Howeverso, owe me additionaI Information is required: (a) Is the pilot valve air operated, spring return. (b) Qhat causes the post lube, valve too cclose ose-- control airT or fuel control air? 'cjj Assuming th e pilot valve is shifted to allow control air to tepos h t lube u ~ valve following engine shutdown, howw is the ~ turbocharger lubrication continued for two to three minutes. /gran~ Since the turbocharger is not lubricated during engine standby, provide ven d or d a t a w h i ch states that is acceptable, relative to bearing weai {turbocharger) on rapid starts. I This response must be coordinated with the response on engine air controls in Section 9.5.6. )c /'sg <) yeS; ~CCf a ~ V. S; T.z, I @j c...w~l aaa a Sg~ "'arvdv Sr.vf~g Se.~f'<~ 'V. >,7.2., ( c) 5~v d c a ~S~d 9.v,7, ~, t +O otJLV"Isg fUi'Lb CdnI~~ F430.84-1 Deceniaer I1983 laM* ~V $ S<R ~ CI161QOImani ~ PO aofHad"S SI'VOd{ dtrIII CnWnVWIl 6j 4 Ild aaV1% pAblvt)r,'eisa~~ ~F ~,y y4 h& ~ t V 3 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR A~ A. to the post-lube control valve. This pilot valve s con supply from the fuel .control panel overspeed shutdown. A spring force opposes this air pressure. ll. Turbochar er Low-Pressure Shutdown Valve The low oil pressure shutdown valve isvalvea located two-way, diaphragm-operated, normally open on the oil header to the turbocharger. The valve protects the turbocharger bearings by stopping the engine if oil pressure drops below 3 psi with zero bias pressure. The circulating oil pump and the main oil pump are piped in parallel. During engine startup and shutdown, the motor- "driven circulating oil pump takes oil from the engine sump and circulates it through the lube oil heater, the thermostatic valve, the lube oil cooler (if necessary,) the lube oil filter, the strainers, and to the main header in th'" engine. 'When the;-"engine 'starts 'and reaches 280 rpm, the Amendment 7 9.5-49a 'December 1983 ~ ' )V IAAF e, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR circulating oil pump stops and the main engine-driven oil pump takes oil from the sump and pumps it~~thermostatic valve. .The..thermostatic valve, which is set at to the~~..165 F, controls'the oil inlet, temperature to the engine. Oil entering the valve at 160.F or lower goes directly to the filter bypassing the cooler. ,Oil entering the valve at 170 F and higher goes to the cooler and.then to the filter. -Check valves prevent oil from flowing backwards through the circulating pump. From the filter, oil passes through the strainers to the engine main supply header. The main header runs the length of the inside of the engine. From this header, flexible lines supply oil to the main bearings through the bearing caps'rom the main bearings, oil -flows through drilled passages in the crankshaft to the connecting rod bearings and through the connecting rods and pins into the pistons for cooling. From the pistons, oil drains back to the sump. The cylinders and -pistons are lubricated by oil .,thrown from the crankpins and by oil vapor -'.in- theicrankcase;." Other.'.headers, tapped from the main header carry oil to the other moving parts of the engine including .'the turbocharger. Oil:,. from . all moving;parts, except the turbocharger, drains directly back to the..sump by gravity. l The turbocharger lube;oil=system,.provides. a,regulated .supp1y of lube oil whether the-engine is idling during a .test or running at "rated, speed.. Oil is supplied from the engine oil header at 50 psi to the 'urbocharger. filters. From the filters, oil flows to the'egulator. The, regulator is .the set at 5 psi -at zero bias. The bias pressure required for, regulator comes from the. 1:2-ratio relay.. Air pressure from. the left bank air pressure'header supplies a signal to the relay which doubles this signal in control air,and applies it to the shuttle valve and then to the regulator. From the , regulator, .oil-.. flows.":to':,the turbocharger via a post-lube valve which controls the flow of oil from the regulator to the turbocharger. During normal operation, the post-lube valve allows lube oil to flow straight to the turbocharger. When a shutdown occurs for any reason control air passe r e ue con ro vz.a t e vo ume bottle and the 'pilot valve.'his cuts off the oil flov, to the turbocharger. The post-lube valve allows oil to flow to the turbocharger for 2 to 3 min after an engine shutdown to cool the turbocharger bearings. During s ar zng, azr rom the pilot valve and the vo ume bottle is vented through a quick release valve. When air from the post-lube valve is ventedthe-through the pilot valve, this allows oil to flow to turbocharger. Air pressure from the right bank air .inlet. header is applied to the shuttle valve, and if control air i's lost, this pressure will reposition the shuttle valve: and flow to the regulator, Amendment 7 9.5-50 December 1983 Ti, ' ~, ~ I / 9 4 ~ V ~ 'h- ~~ LuJLu W% " 1 H I', Qj t> 'L ~ 7 '4 Nine Mile Point Unitd FSAR QUESTION F430.85 (9.5.7) In FSAR Section 9.5.7.3, you provide a list of indicators and alarms associated with the Division I/II and Division,III* diesel -generators. For the Division I/Zi system, control ro'om alarms are provided for "diesel generator shutdown, mechanical failures," and "diesel generator mechanical failure." The function of these alarms is not clear. Expand your FSAR to include an" explanation of these alarms and how and when they function. I f these alarms are a type o f "common trouble" alarm, such as provided for the Division III diesel, generator, then so state, and identify the alarms and/or trips associated with each. Also identify how and where the Division III diesel generator trips are annunciated. (SRP 9.5.7, Part III)~~RESPONSE~~See Section 8.3.1.1.2 for Division III diesel trip annunciations. For Divisions I'nd II, see Section 9.5.5.3. <&~m~~ I Not acceptable. "'No response, provided. Jo /< 8 Co y:v.y ~~ T-cu's~ y ey'~~ lo 0/ P'v<ssi o Jll o,4p'larms and indications associated with the Division.III DG Lubrication System are .described in Section 9.5.7.3. A complete description of all Division III alarms, trips and annunciators is given in revised Section 8.3.1.1.2. Amendment 10 QGR F430.85-1 April 1984 'I 4 e~- 9 / IfI P. I 4a' A' ~g Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430. 86 (9. 5. 7) f Your discussion of the prelubrication sys ems for the Division I/II and Division III diesel generators indicates that prelubrication is provided to the upper parts of %he diesel engines (valves, rocker arms,, rocker shafts, etc). For some diesel engine designs, excessive or continuous prelubrication to the upper engine areas could result in lube oil entering and collecting in the cylinders with the potential for causing extensive engine damage when called on to start. Revise your FSAR to specifically address the design of all diesel generators with regard to this potential problem, and the applicable design considerations to preclude this from occurring.~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 9.5.7 (22) for Division I and II,. nse for Division III< rove e y the secon Xce. f.S. 7,3 8b ~o~i,~rq Not acceptable. The revised FSAR Section referenced in the response does not address the question (for Division I 5 II) No is provided for the DivisionIII DG. .. response Ps> ~i ~f~ l +~ +'y,'c(~ J ~+ ~ 7 +rgr5 0'.'s'e ~ W~- d,'~ i c5e-( p Mo 8rh,f or / >e ~ ~~+~~ ~ C-Lpi"M Vi/KW~//gg Amendment 7 QZcR F430.86-1 Dece.."er 1983 '0 f I 'V lg ~ 'lifatOrtl Of RtRCthlCN. MKYKR5VPPLY SYIT fQs POWER SYSTEMS Nl OCLO~: KRT lÃhCC aDt t~ cliiCkllai)IQI aOCCl'KWNT, iiCRWW'l hCJNt trie 1v tfXIr nlIt SIOPJI 'teLc% IQsca too anno Aprt) 28, l9B} $ Q83$.QT; pg (E,m tabs oil ~iicaticnl PWP Systt tt tell: pygmy ~r~gcn Heater - Rube Oil Circulating Er..rgen~~ Fast Start Zrsta)loticns sbvdarO PO ?abc Ckl Systea: Fige ih - S-henaticaDy stew the Camshaft CWeight, Housing To Turbo Soslt Sack Oil Pump hlarm Switch Engine And Gauge. o~ Gauge 0- 500Psi Pickup 'witch ~Ci At l0psi v+ gP t.ube Oil Oropout At 5 pQ Fitter Tvtbo Soak Sac'k Oil fCA&N Filter Main Bearing ru~t Pressure Putttp e Outlet Elbow Pump -ln- il>> Lube ~ fScau. tom. Od To 7urbo 1 OO Steel Tube Ptu9 Strainer - Pump 80% 5" IPS Engine OKH Sump o~eaf utie 1" lPS s "ips i-1/2" IPS Q QPM Pump ~s tPS L3o ps 1 Strainer fletiel " ut" Plug Check Pump "S- Units Schematic Dtagrota. FiQ.SA Systems ~ VMmoOtC']f.Q It t' I S'. gf tIt gif I g* ~ ~ fPf "f<< + f 'g f tahe oL1 ~ is,d~ the engine soap by a 6 gpss soakback natar {a) driven ~ p~ ~ch Qmxe the fleas ~e fromm divichm lube ail through a Dne strairxx. to a point, (at starxhy oil tmymatures) approximated ~ ecyually into two systems. Part. of the oi3. C'Rwr goes to the preheat ~ Iyshsn thr~ a 30 psi "spcxAQ LocK3cKk chEK9c vhlv5 4fll &0 other part ~ of tha oil f car qces through the soakbac9c filter to the for turbo bearding lubrication. Dm part, that goes to the preheat ~ ~ system is R.mharged into a pipe cxenawtice he~an the scavenging pmp ant the mum lube oi1 tilter. scavenging perp is a gear type and acts ae a ch.'M valm so the lube chal does not flm back into the engine oil pan. 'Lhe tube oil then f~s thru the filter and then thru the Rube oil cccler ~re the oil picks up heat frcrn tbe mter end then back into the straixmr minted cn the engine strainer has a dam m that it acat~s a supply ot'il and access ail cnnmflaws back into the oh.l pan. Q) Ouxizg actensim test cerducted by B% and PSD, the oil ~ close to dp xatLng tecrperature (hot): it was found that ~ (Q ~ scave~ing pm@ no longer thru tt'-into'the oil acted 10ce a check valve ard oil ~M f1~ due back to the ~r ail vismsity. pan at a rate of aporadnetely 3 gpn '{2) 'Qm'pressure about LO psi m ~ all recyd~i to pury oil the 6 gpn thna the turM ~C to ~ reduced to the tutu and emcee to the preheat sysben. {3) Zt air @as which ~ foiind Chat during engine cqeratices, the lube oil picked Up urder pressuxe was not noticeabIe. But Ken the engine stepped, the pressure ~t essentially to atne.Meric and the air exg~hd inside the lube oil filter and the lube ail cooler dispLacing the oil. %Me air ccodes not escape and therefore, these ccrrponents ~re only 3/4 full of oil Hach had to be fiLLed during the next engine start. (c) ~ conditions stated in 1~2) mt result is that during fast start after a above caused HD to issue Mr 9644. 25 minutes of a shutdmi~ ~ prior to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months after shutdown, tl:e delivery of lube oil to the turlxi-chaxcjer +as delayed for 8 to l0 seconds and this couLd cause a Loss of the turbo hearings, particularly the thrust'earing.~~2. Figure 18 schmnatically s~~~overeats the cxxditions in l(b-2). the Ba nxx6ficaticn per MK 9644 designed to 1 tJ I (h>>' o fndicalas Sight Glass 51phen SraA gfertical Height Ctiticag g:onnoct To Side utiet Of Tea On ~ l/i"OO Steel Tube 5/8" QD Steel Tube On 20-64564 ~ 3/5" QD* Steal Tuba On $ 8-645E4 Oil Filter Vent Line ~ gr?" 09 Steel Tuba On $ 2-64%4 At Engine Aa Sheen) Camshah CWaight. Vent Housinl 4" u% 4/" Orifice To Turbo SoaR Engine 8c& Oil Pump Alarm 1/2". OD Switch'nd Gauge. Steef Mo Gauge 0 - f Qo psf Orifice Switch Picltup t.ube At l0 psl Oil Dropout At 6psi ge i~a,it W~~~i ( Filter Turbo Soalc h8aln Bearing ~ I Sactt Oil Pressure Pump Prima I Filter Out(at Below Plul 112" lPS Swing Lube Check Vafve I Pump "fn" Oil from~~ ~ To Turbo Pfu Scar. Oif 00 Stee) Tube Strainer Ce So)t Pump fngina 0 -1/4" lPS Sump lPS 1" lPS ) lPS lPS 3 QPM Pump 6 GPM Pump Pump 't" S" iPS Pfug Strainer 30 psi Relict Checfc 7S psl ttelfet Chactt Strainer To Circulating Ot Pump Afarin Pressure Switch Pickup At 20 psl Dropout At $ 5 pal Fig.l 5 System Schematic Diagram, "S" Units MOOtF l6,0 (a) First the fleas bo the preheat syshen and to the turbocharger thru separate pupils insure@ 6 gptt to the preheat system ard 3 gpn to ~ pass the turbocharger. 'The 30 psi spryly Jtxx$ ed cd~-valve is there to t4rnish a pressure 1eveX for uenitoriny purposes suioe the pressure 'during stanrRrg is arousal 3 ta 5 psi. 'Xhe chedr. valve also prevents back Elm during engine cparatice (30-50 psi) should the 6 gpn not be operating. ~ 7$ psi. spring laadcxi check valve is to provide a relief va?ve for ~' r> j'; 4 't '<\ K the. turbo pump. ft discharges tnto the preheat systea but also could-have been taken back to the oil pan. Yents xfth orfffces mre added to the 'b} Tuba oil ff)ter and lube oil coo1er to bleed'off entrapped air and the vents mre connected to the. engine camshaft housing and discharged whatever oil flowed back into the engine. A vent ~as a1so added to the )ube oil coo7er dfscharge pfpe to prevent a syphon effect that auld dra~ oil out of the coo1er into the strainer. (g)'nother ilttprovement is to flood the main ofl: ga)lery wHfc5 supplies oil. to the main bearing, the accessory drive, the turbo and the top deck. Thfs auld also mfn)ofhce the tfae for oil to reach these components durinIj a fast start as wall as mafntafn lubrication of the main bearings. To accomplish thfs, the head of opal in the cooler. fs used as the pressure to fill this forms an system. First, the cooler dfscharge pipe was changed inverted "0" connection to establish the hefght of oil fn and'et the cooler and therefore the pressure head. The head is sufficient'o flood the gallery,,but not high enough to get to the top deck. R small pfje is connected to.the battom of thc coo1er to pennft ofl f1'roe the cooler thru a check valve to the pressure pump:discharge connectfon and then into the gal-lery. The check valve prevents baok flmr when:the engine is fn operatfon. Two bul)s-eye sight glasses are added For. visual nenftoring of the oil level durfng standby. The loMer bu)1s-eye should'be full and the upper should'enpty. If'there 4s oi'1 fn the upper -bulls-cye, oil fs getting. to the top deck and the cause must be found..~~3. Figures 2A and 2$ shet the systems fn an )llustrativa manner and may provide a better visualfzatlon.~~r l I l W.To ~ I c SY~PAt% TVPC X WATf,i Tel TQJPghATIJN C O TR VALV ~ rATKR fILL. s LrP' r rra fL.. 8 ts 'I )i c ~ ? ~ ~ g Ql. COOL& Kgg an st WZH SKAT EXCIIANOCk APTC1 COOLChS gals PM','f, TvhSO OIL 5TNAIIICk fILTEh 11W TATEk CONNC CTIQII TAX 'tO PSI LMICOL . "R CssECa FILTCh rrV ~ Q TO Tu1$ 0 ~r ssS OIL ClhCa hJilP r 5r'I H INMKhSIOII ICATQI OsL PAk OkAIk ~ ~ WATCh COKVKCTIOItLOW~ IMiiEhtlQI.NCAA% O C rf H ~ SQIIP ~ I WATQI AMO LlkICOIL~ OPChAPMQ fat% WATCH I:l LVINICATINIOIL 1 lA C '~iP'i'W"'r' :rr" i rrr~irrrrrv ~vi&awsswr&N4ea rrr%4rlr&rd+shrvrrA L v h vrirA~+AQ"rr4++44+ Iw4 v~L~va E ~ ~ ~ rI h ~ ~ i ~~ ~ ~ rr' %rvr rr rrQr + Ir%4AV l1 ~ ~ r ~ A 4 h, M I ,r 11 P. t ~ ~ CAW S~ llOLN11l4' I VCNT L4NSS E K74 I o oiv ~ alp& Qf MIS 77PI NATEII T&II I IIIS tKlaPEAatIIAC COIIIE WATEII taL; r ~ I C YII VAL'b gp~~I Oil, COOL Kll I~~)o I ~ SCAV. PUMP:T. 'l ~ aEA7 AOMNiM TIIQM ~ ~ FILTE1 ilaw VITE U/IE OII. COIIIKQ CHAD 75PO uECII tgtfll e 0I, CIRC. ~ ~ ~ lAP Cr.m eVW~ IllilERIION ICATCO AIII OIL PAII SIIilt 5o tSI ~W17OI QieVECTIOII FLOW~ IQER jell taa7%1 CHIC% NATL1 4IIO LQIE Oll>> OPERAflh0 FLIC oa4 Wana CL~ -~; ~ LuakICAtflie OII. VllRP 3 C>ON 5%41tHEa 0 i( C J I kl ps,~a,g ~ 4 ~ ~ ~ I AINTENANCE NSTHUCTEON ~pi W~. ~ ~ I ~ MODERNIZATION RECOMMENDATION IMIVIERSION HEATER LUBE OIL CIRCULATING PUMP 'SYSTEM FOR EMERGENCY FAST START lNSTALLATIONS PURPOSE', To provide an improved immersionhrater lube oil circufating system, FigL l and lQ, that v'it! consistently supply oil ta the turbocharger and crankshaft in anticipation of. an emergency start. APPLICANT)ON: Atl turbocharged "S ~ "999", and M P4$ emergency fast start insta))attonL CUSS)0',4: Wear is minimired iflube oil is supp)led to engine and turi)ocharger bearings prior Io and during high speed emergency starts. EMD's original immersion heater system provided a paraltcl lube oil circuit whereby oil is supplied to the turbocharger beaAngs via one path and the oil'cooler and fitters arc Oooded via another path. ifowever, to)towing a load run, the branched oif f)o~'is unba)anced because of thethinneri~scosityofhotoil.hsa rcsu)t, theoi) levelin the coo'lcr and fi)(er is not replenished to the full level until the oil cools sufficiently (approiiirnatety 3 bours fol)o~ ing shutdown). High speed starts during this period do not have the uear minimizing benefits of continually abundant oil supply. Owners of EMD nuclear standby units have previously been notitsed of thc unnecessary wear caused by equipment exercise or test schedu)es that routine)y cal) for restarting engines without firss allowing for a cooling interva) from a previous load run, A)though a fcu; random starts under these adverse conditions are not ex pccted to cause difficulty, thc cumu)ative wear from repeated'routine starts is )i)iely to aAect eguipmcnt reliability. E)4D recommended that exercise and test schedules be revised'o avoid restarting engines until they have had a three hour cooiing period fottowing shutdowns. Yhe primary benefit to bc gained from this modiTication is continua) oil re plenis)Iment of the oil coo)er and filters Io the full level regardless of oil temperature and viscosity. 4 ivoufd also remove restart restrictions impnsed on exercise or test sc)iedu)es. nc e siilie loth ~ ~ Si " "i~I><<"~A/ ". ~ l I. t ~ ~ ~ \p l<owcver. other benefits provided by this improvement rn'abc this modification <<ttracti 'c even 'hcn exercise or test schedules can bee rcf ily controlfctt. Oil systems ntqdificd in accordance > it h this instruction provide consistent oil circulation through the engine crankshaft bearings in addition to the turbocharger. As a result, engines very rapidly approach operating oif pressures following start up. Trapficd air urhicft may impede oil ffov'a vented from the system. Proper performance of this improved system depends on operation of AC motor driven oil puntps. $ f start-ups are delayed for more than 5 seconds after loss of AC poorer, vre recommend that OC backup pumps be provided with suitabfe protcctiott against reverse Ao~ through the use of check valves. Although oil flows through the crankshaft bearings, the standby oil level itt the engine is kept befog the camshafts and valve rocker arm assembfics. Sight glass indicators. Fig. 2, are used so that thc operator can visually ascertain il'the system is operating properly under standby conditionL + indicates Sight Gfase Siphort sreak p/er tical Height Criticag [Connect To Side 0/2" OO Steel Tub ~ h Stl" OD Steel Tube On 20-64564 Outlet Ot Tee On 3/8" 00 Steel Tube On ) 5 64SE4 Oil F liter VentUne t/2" 00 Steel Tube Qn t2 646E4 At Engine As Shcnan) Camshaft C'Weight. Vent Housing fngine 4" fPS > ra" Orifice To Turbo Soak Sack Oil Pump ~ Alarm Swoctt 1/ 2" Ob And Gauge. Steel .060" Gauge 0- )Co psf Tube Orifice Switch Pickup e b lube At )0psi Oil Oropout At 8 ysi Filter Main Searing Turbo Soak Pressure Pump Prime Sack Oit Plug t/2 tPS Swing I Jilter Outlet Elbow t Check Valve I Pump "ln" LubeOit Frain--- J To Turbo Plug Strainer Scav. Oif 1" 00 Steel Tube Box Pump engine 0-l/4" lPS Sump 1" iPS t" iPS l.l/2" 0 "fPS 1" iPS 3 GPM Pump fPS 0" l S fumy ' 30 pei 75 pat Ptuy Strainer Re'lief Relief Strainer Check Check To Circulating Oif Pump Alarm Pressure Switch Pickup At 20 Osl Qiepout At )5 pai Fll,) - System Schematic Diagram, "S" Units ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ '0'l% ltt> '4a& y.'k'll I<IF1I I> ' "'i $i ~ gt ~ ~ ~ W 0 ~ ~ <<0 ~ ~ ~ COrnar 0A P.n4 Vahv Gu4t Lcm i, ') CQ ~ ~ r ..g) te '~OR GalfayIwe'. 'el Cr=~~b. ~~M -<~~Rg.t - Vont Ard Spat Q4n F~. ~mat Tntto)latoa ~O ~ facr:.y +tinder Une Onle tant.1. aa huis to o44i<tna ctaee aNrncrs t3S~0 tnt be aNr4 co cue 4'.e oP ceoke 4 fLiaiog ydtrcerI an remote in cn Fy phd, ~ ~ O ~ ~ a~ r w ~ ~ ~ ~ * ~ I.. Ip & ~ ~ ~ 4 3N( ~ ~~tilth t l 1t tll" ~ ~ QS 1;a- li+ '14 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ > ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Seatc e ~ ~ 0 ~ \~ w ~ +1! %4 j 17.1 r4 fy.i ~" Vng QQ Ceotor Tonk Stctronor Age&aten F y 3 - "S" Vne 0'1 Ccxd er tan@, %Ion+ kgpb~tiyn 0 q! 1 ) '\ ,~f s Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.76 (9.5.5) Division III diesel thegenerator, describe the For the diesel ;engine cooling piovisions made in 'the design of ~ and piping are that all components preclude water system to assure how your design will degradation. long f'lied with wate of. piping Show with attendant system term corrosion (SRP 9.5.5, Pa t I 6c II) l~ <s his ~~~RESPONSE~~l response 4 /SAN Cg~~~f will be provided in $ ~ the second quarter of-1984. ( 056 Ce~~ Not acceptabl e. c No response provided. C The, engine cooling water system is designed to operate as ~ ~ ~ ~ "flooded" system. Venting is provided between 'engine",coolant outflow ~ ~ ~ ~ piping, the lube oil cooler and =the cooling water expansion tank. As ~ ~ ,.shown ih, Figure 9.5-43 the.,entrapped air,is<vented via-vent lines from the engine block, lube oil'ooler water'.side piping and the expansion ,, tank. Venting of the heat. exchanger is not required. The engine cooling water is tr'eated with inhibitor. Thus each time the engine is run, all parts of the cooling system are wetted with inhibitor 1 which provides a protective coating-inside the pipes. Running the engine once a month, will provide adequate corrosion protection, and no = ..decrease in cooling'ystem life"is anticipated. F430.76-1 June 198< Anenc'-..ent 11 QScR l l 8 ~t 4 "O'er "JSQ 4 ( gt~'lgy ~ t Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUFSTiON'430. 77 (9. 5. 5) For the Division I I d'sel generator, provide the results T. 'of test which demons rates...that the "thermosyphon" design in you" keep warm system w'l mainta' a uniform tem=erature a with'n the d'esel "engine jacket, water and,.th ough ut the cooling water system of at least 120 F. Provide th lowest ambient tempe ature (diesel generator room) at which the keep 'warm sys"em can mainta'n this temperature. Also, what provisions have been made to warn the'perator if room ambient falls below the above minimum temperature' i7 RKSPONSF. See revised Section 9.5.5.2.2. C - I'p Not acceptable.'he referenced FSAR Section does not answer the question. y $$ QQ~~ ~75 EMD's test data has shown that the EMD diesel can be started zn a 66 F environment while the engine jacket cooling water was heated by the immersion .heater: through~natural=circulation.'~ see Section 9.5.5.2.2. Amend Hen i 7 Q~R F430.77-1 Dece.-."er 1983 ~ ~, 11 a ~ 4 I Nine Mile Point Unit ~ 2 FSAR~~7. .An immersion heater to heat the jacket water when~~. the engine is in standby condition. A heater control switch turns the heater on when the water temperature'"falls, to 125 F =and off when water temperature rises . to 155'S. The heater is 15 kW, 575 V, 3 phase, ac. The jacket water system is a .closed loop system. During engine running condition, heated water from the engine discharge manifold flows to the temperature regulating valve. The temperature regulating valve regulates the flow -'of water through the jacket water heat exchanger and maintains the engine jacket water at a constant. temperature.. If the water temperature is below 165 F, all water passes directly to the lube oil cooler. At water temperatures between 165 F and 180 F, the valve regulates the flow through the jacket water cooler and the bypass line. Jacket water flows from the lube oil to the engine-driven centrifugal pumps that pump the water into the engine jacket water main headers. From the main headers, jacket water turbocharger enters the engine 'ir air also -flows ..through . the-.=. aftercoolers -'- located 'ischarge duct'to cool the air before box. in the it When'he engine is in .."standby condition, the immersion ,heater heats the jacket water. The . heated jacket water circulates through the lube oil cooler by thermosyphon action.to. warm the .lubricating .oil that is being circulated through the engine to- keep-the engine warm. The immersion heater maintains the lube.,oil;temperature.,between .125 E. and 155OF. For the keep-warm system to- maintain a uniform temperature within the diesel 'ngine jacket- water'nd throughout the cooling water system, the'Division III diesel generator ambient temperature is kept above 66 F. To -preclude long-term. corrosion, treatment of the water used in the'acket water system includes the use of silicate nitrate inhibitors, in agreement wi th the engine manufacturer's recommendations, and periodic testing of the coolant to ensure that the water quality is maintained at the level recommended by the engine manufacturer. Use of an antifreeze compound is not required since the entire cooling water system is enclosed, located indoors, and maintained warm by the immersion heater when the engine is in standby condition.Any loss of water through seepage, leakage, or flow out the pressure relief cap will be noticed through routine checks of the expansion tank sight glass. I f needed, the Cooling water system can be manually refilled through the filler opening at the top of the expansion tank; Amendment 9 9.5-33 March 19844 ~- c 'l 4 '4 tL Hl~" C' Nine Mile Point &nit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.87 (9.5.7) For all three diesel generators, provide additional information on the design of the crankcase breathers. Provide the piping quality, design standard and seismic. qualification, state where the breather is located on each engine, describe what happens to the vapors which are vented from the crankcase, and discuss the provisions in your design to prevent crankcase vapors from creating an explo'sion hazard in the diesel generator room. Also, describe the features included in your diesel engine design to prevent and mitigate a crankcase explosion.. (SRP 9.5.7, Part II)~~RESPONSE~~For Division I and II see revised Section 9.5.7.2. For Division III the response will be provided by second quarter of 1984. f 5'8 Co~~~.l g Not acceptable. The applicant has not addressed (a) the seismic and quality group classifications of the crankcase breather, and (b) design provisions to mitigate the consequences of a crankcase explosion. In addition, the applicant has not provided a response for the Division III DG. For .clarification, the applicant should provide. details on theand crankcase breather design, including location on the engine, design and operation of the "filters" and 'condensate drain trap. V 'P, 4'" I y1 l PEVlsEL) Wi INS Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAD TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont) Quality Electrical Group ')ua 1 it y Scope of Classifi- Seismic C lassi fi- Assur an ce +ornauo Suor lv Location cation CatQQoI'I cation Deguirem en t( 5 ~ ) Prot ect. ion 4 nt ~s Compressors, air startup S Non-1R 7 hA D NA I P Receivers, ai" startup DICe- S NA I C D ~Standby diesel-generators P,GE S 1E I B I P r HPCS diesel-qenerator GE S 12 I B I i HPCS Diesel Generator Cooling Later SIstam C P Heat exchanger GR S NA (25) Pipinq and valves, GF. S NA engine mounted Pipinq and valves, other NA HPCS Diesel Generator Lube Oil Svsten (25) ( 25) Heat exchanger GE S NA (25) ( 26) Piping and valves GE S (25) (2e) Pumps-, motors GE S 1E HPCS Diesel Generator Comhustior. Air Intake and Exhaust System fs Silencers GE S NA NA n P P Pipinq P S NA (25) (2(l Filter GE S NA D Anendnent 9 13a of 26 Narch 19 84 l 'h "p 1lfj '4, f4 8 = Q 4 4-I .~~4 ~~~J C) Q; g"k r. 't ~C 7 4 r P C Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.88 (9.5.7) In FSAR Section 9.5.7.2, you state that there is adequate lube oil in the sump of the Division I and II diesel generators for seven days of operation without adding, lube oil Expand your FSAR. discussion to include details as listed below. Also, provide similar information for the ~ Division III diesel generator. (a) Provide the normal lube oil usage rate for each diesel engine under full load conditions. Also provide the lube -oil usage rates which would be considered excessive. (b) Show with the lube oil in the, sump tank at the minimum recommended level that the diesel engine can operate without refilling the lube oil sump for a minimum of seven days at full rated load. If the sump tank capacity is insufficient for this condition, show that adequate lube oil will be stored onsite for each engine ,to-. assure seven days of operation. at rated load. Also provide the lube oil sump , capacity. (SRP 9.5.7, Parts II and III)~~RESPONSE~~~o j S3 wG'~ ~~/ s See revised Section 9.5.7.2. ('Sd c . is acceptable for Division I ainu ii. 'he no response for ~ response n Division III is provided. This is not acceptab1e. Amendment ll Q6R F430. 88-1 June 1984 E' I' '1 4f e rg <~ I, L r 4 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.89 (9.5.7) What measures have been taken to prevent entry of deleterious materials into the engine lubrication oil system due to operator error during recharging of lubricating oil or normal operation. (SRP 9.5.7, Part II)~~RESPONSE~~Iubricating oil in the Division III diesel generator (DG) is recharged with new oil qualified for use. Oil is added through a filter opening in strainer housing that prevents solid particles from entering ,,the engine 'lubricating oil system. Lubrication procedures are incorporated as a portion of the preventive maintenance program for the unit. Procedure steps include items for, safety of both the operator and the equipment during performance of the activity. Special instructions included in operating procedures for addition or checking ,of ,lubrication products . reference these instructions. "'reventive maintenance lubrication Steps include cleanliness of the equipment and fittings, pumps, hoses, etc, used to add the lube product;.verification of proper lubrication oil; and steps to properly add the oil to the equipment. /Q cs ~ ~&5 l I Not acceptable. Thi information regarding. the Division III DG is acceptable. However, there is no indication that the response is also applicable to the Division I and II DG's. 1~ (Sg ytoc,~J r ~q Pc 0 1 e d . 4v ~~ P,"~'si"o >, Z m~~ cL,'~> Pc:~ cn ~ l <<5 Amendment 7 QEcR F430.89-1 December 1983 E ~Oh 1l - >A F Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.92 (9.5.7) testing and calibration program that vill be e Describe the used to ensure a highly reliable instrumentation, control, sensors, and alarm system for the diesel generato s lubricating oil systems. (SRP 9.5.7, Part II)~~RESPONSE~~Descriptions of instruments, controls, sensors, and alarms associated with the Division I, -II, and III diesel generators and their auxiliary systems as well as their function and locations of annunciators as well as are described in Sections 8.3.1.1.2, 9.5.4 system'nterlocks through 9. 5. 8, and Tables 7. 3-15 and 7. 5-1. Operator actions to various alarm conditions will be included in the annunciator response sections of the associated operating procedures. Periodic testing to maintain and ensure highly reli able instrumentation will be scheduled in accordance with . surveillance;... test requirements,. specified in the technical specifications. P r Not acceptable..See comments for g 430.b~ ,/5P Ze qf~~~ g>u <"5, ~ (h) See the newly added Figure 9.5-4lc. (i) See the newly added Figure 9.5-4lb for cooling water system logic diagram. Item 16 is shown on Figure 9.5-43. (j) See the newly added Figure 9.5-4ld for the lubrication system logic diagram. Amendment 7 QGR F430.92-1 December 1983 e 4 f I ~ .Va'I h, )4t ."wL ~ ~ C ~' P l f 'V li )P l, ~ rr ~ t\.4% W E" 0 S1 S IM 't 1 ~~ l,'~ ~ '1g I Q gM t -SOURCE 140MI TOP, FIS 13A LOX LI FLOM MOTE % 2KC~>>85 %EL~I LIT la~1 IIA IIOTE 6 L I IOA EGFFCOI C (EGFFCDZ) LTTIOA LIX IOA ZCESiIPNL406 A 'LSSA 'LSTA SEL GEN ER PP ZCES0IPNL406 %9-2EGFAOI SEL 6EN ER PP ~CS'IPHI ~ 0 C TEL GEH '.R PP G ZCESilPNL406 ASPIC, NOTES: I.'LL INSTRUMENT AND EQUIPMEHT HUMBERS TO 2EGF EXCEPT %HERE A DIFFEREHT PREFIX 0 PCS'IPHli ASTERISK (') MILL REPLACE THE DASH (-) I EOUIPMEHT OR IHSTRUMEHTS RHICH ARE A PAI SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM.~~2. LOGIC SHORN FOR FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP OIL TRANSFER PUMPS ~PIB, AHD'UEL~~~~3. ASSOCIATEO EQUIPMENT MARK HUMBERS:~~DIV I DIV II TKI A 'TKIB TKZA 'TK3B 'LS5A 'LSSB 'LSTA 'LSTB F IS13A FIS13B sOURCE: 12177-LSK EV. 4 OPIA oPIC L IT IDA PI 0 oPIO LI TIDB FIGURE 9.5-41 ~ DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL STORAGE AND TRANSFER SYSTEM LOGIC DIAGRAM SHEET 1 OF 5 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPOR'ATION NINE MlLE POlNT-UNlT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT V 1 J'gal 1 p . fg)'p A, "'l I ~ jQ E y~h, Q ~ 1 HOHI TOR SOURCE HOHITOR flS L01 104 FLOR NOTE 3 A HOTE 4 II52313 L 1 101 EGFFC05 L I TI0 I 2CES IPNL413 'LSI06 'LSIOB~~.SEL GEN ER PP 8523 A 2EGF'IPNE112 49 HOTE 1 EGF'D~~~~!SEL GEH ER PP .G 2EGF'PNL112 LI . 2EGFAIPHLII2 102 2CES'IPNL413 NOTES:~~~~1. ALL .IHSTRUHEHT AHD EOUIPHEHT HUIIBERS TO RHERE A DIFFEREHT PREFIX IS SHOWN. AH AS~~~~( -), IH THE PREFIX FOR,EQUIPIIEHT OR IHSTR SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEII. ~~~~~2. LOGIC SHORN FOR FUEL OIL TRAHSFER PUIIP PUHP iP28 IS SINILAR.~~~~3. COHIIOH ANNUNCIATOR IS SH01H FOR OIY II I.QQRCE: q2177 LSK REy.4~~~~4. LOCATED OH BUILOIHG EXTERIOR IALL HEAR T~~~~5. THIS LOGIC IS fOR DIY I II NPCS DIESEL GE FIGURE 9 5 4q Q~~6. CONPUTER POINT EGFTC05 IS FOR ~P2A, EGFT DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL STORAGE AND TRANSFER SYSTEM LOGIC DIAGRAM SHEET 2 OF 5 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 FINAL'AFETY ANALYSIS REPORT'I' I 8 gtlkf P I ~ 'I I $ ~ It I I 'd ~ ~ ~ I I' ~ N M 1 O'PI ~ 'SOURCE HONITO NOHITOR EGFPCOI (EGFPC03: (EGFPC05. PDIS 20A EGfPC02 (EGf PC04; (EGFPC06 C 2CES'IPNL406 PDIS 20C EGFLCOI (EGFLC06, (EGFLC11, C A 2CFsoIPNL406 P852 'LSBA EGFLCO: (EGFLCOE (EGFLCI: EGFBC06 C C (EGFBC07 ,LSI2A (EGFBCOB) EGFLC04 (EofLC09) (EGFLC14: 852103 C HOTE 5 A (852205) (852304) DIV I EHER DSL GEH I FUEL STS INOP P852 A ACES'iPHl40 74- P852 2EGFAO A "2CES'IPNL406~~74. P 5 2EGFA02 HOLES:~~~~l. ALL IHSTRUNEHT AHD EOUIPHEHT NUll WHERE A DIFFERENT PREFIX ls SHOW I.OGic iS SNOwX FOR OIViSION i 01 SIIIILAR FOR DIVISIONS 2 ! 3.~~~~3. ASSOCIATEO EOUIPHEHT NARK HUIIBER OIV I DIV II 0LSBA 'LSBB oLS12A 0LSI28~~~ TKIA iTKIB iTK3A ~TK38 PDIS20A POIS208 OURCE. )2)77 LSK 8 Ey 4 POIS20C PD I 6200 'PIA FIGURE 9.5-41 'PIC 'Plo 74-2EGFAOI 74.2EGF8 74-2EGFA02 74 2EGfo, DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL STORAGE 2CES'PHL406 2CES0 IPH AND TRANSFER SYSTEM " 4. " COWNOH ANNUNCIATORS SHOWH FOR Dl~~5. ASTERISK IS SHOWN OH ~ LS12A DECA LOGIC DIAGRAM SHEET 3 OF 5 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT~~I p4 L t ~ t )4 4 ge'h J r ~ <<4 RESULTAHT XOHITOR SOURCE 10NITOR 'PSSA ROTOR DRIVEH STANDBY DIESEL GEHERATOR AIR ~e COXPRESSOR CIA START IDU325 XOTOR DRIVEN STANDBT DIESEL GENERATOR AIR 8 2CES'PHI.406 COXPRESSOR CIA AUTO XOTOR ORIVEH STAHDBY NOTE 6 DIESEL GEHERATOR AIR 6 2CES'OTE 4 COXPRESSOR CIA STOP 2CFS'PNL406 IPHL406,, 852112..., A A NOTE 9 48 2CES'PNL406 'PSIDA 852104 'PSTA A (852305) IIV I DIESEL AIR sTART IHOPERABLE EGABGOI NOTES:~~l. ALL IHSTRUXEHT AND EQUIPXEHT HUXBERS T(~~C (EGABC02) (EGABC03) = A DI FF E REHT PREFIX IS SHOWH. AH ASTERI.'. 'PREFIX'OR.EOUIPXENT OR. IHSTRUXEHTS WHI ~ fEATURES 'SYSTEX. LOGIC FOR XOTOR DRIVEN STANDBY DIESEL I 'E LOGIC FOR COXPRESSORS C2A ~ CIB 8 C28 IS A P852 3 ASSOCIATEO EDUIPXEHT HUXBERS: D I V I S ION I TKI A TKZA 'TKIDIVISION I I 8 ~TK28 D I VIS 1 01 ~TK3 ~TK4 iPSIDA ~PSIOB 'PS111 0PSTA iPSTB iPS111 iPSSA. BA iPSSB, 68 2CES'PHL406 2CES'PHL408~~4. CPXXOH ANHUHCIATOR FOR STANDBY DIESEL I~~~~5. i - IHOICATES FURHISHEO BY DIESEL GEHEI~~6. COXXOH AHHUNCIATOR FOR AIR COXPRESSOR I T. ASSOCIATED XOTPR PVERI.PAP COXPUTER PPIIbURCE: 12177-LSK REY. 5 DIVISION I DI VIS IDH I C I A E GAY Cp I 852112 CIB EGATCO. FIGURE 9.5-41 P C2A EGATC03 852112 C28 EGGTCOi~~8. ALL PRESSURE SWITCHES ARE OA CAT I (SE~~9. CoxxOK AHHUHCIATOR fOR AIR COWPRESSOR I DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING SYSTEM LOGIC DIAGRAM SHEET 4 OF 5 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MlLE POINT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPP1 hl I" ' *I I P E pl st +eegs~~v~ rci.vr c ~~ e'~ w ,* As> pC Wa: ~ 0 I ' 1 4'4'h gf f, 1't sr ~ ~ ~ 4 SOURCE MONITOR EGAPCDT (EGAPCDB) (EGAPC09) A 'PS22A N EGAPCDI 8 (EGAPC02) (8 (EGAPC05) (8 HOTE 5 C A <<PS20A EGAPCIO (E6APCII) ( (E6APC12) (. C A <<PS2IA I EGAPC03 I (EGAPC04) (I (EGAPC06) (I HOTE 5 C A <<PS19A" HOTES:~~1. All INSTRUMENT AND EQUIPllENT, HUIIBERS T DIFFERENT PREFIX IS SHOIN. AH ASTERISIt FOR EQUIPHEHT OR IHSTRUHEHTS 1HICN ARE~~~~.2, COMIIOH AHXUHCIATOR FOR STBY DSL 6EN AI~~~~3. ASSOCIATED EQUIPIIEHT HUHBERS:~~DI VIS IOH I OI YISIOH I I DI VIS I <<PS22A PS228 , PS122 <<PS20A <<PS208 PSI20 <<PS2IA <<PS218 'PS121 <<PSIBA <<PSI98 <<PS119 2CES<<IPNL406 2CES<<IPHL408 2CES ~ IOURCE: 12177-LSK REV.i5, 4. 5. ALL PRESSURE SIITCHES ARE OA CAT I (S L01 PRESSURE PLAQtS TO BE SET 10 PSIG STARTS FIGURE 9 5 41 ~ DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING SYSTEM LOGIC DIAGRAM SHEET 5 OF 5 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MlLE POINT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ','a ~ 1 y $ II A A , A~ "e LP LP CONTROL QNITCH COQTROL 5WITCH CONTROL 5WITCQ A lg WAG'PO5mOd IIJ"AUTO POSITION IU"OFF'" PO5LTIOIJ E22-5001-552 LP EZZ-SOOI.SSZ LP CZZ.-sooi-SSZ. LP HIGH COOLING PERMISSIVE. SEC,TIVE OELA I AFT'OO WTR. TEMP(~200'P) EIJGIIJE N07 E22 SOOI-SI2 LOCAL AUX DEV I P RLIIJIJ lhJG Aux OEu'P e~GIIJE 5PEE,P LP ~ ISO R.PA AUX DEV LP COOLlklG '<MATER CODLIIJG WATER TEHP ~ l25oF TEMP > Igqol= LP LOW COOLIIJG LOVJ 5'ERVIGC g LPg WTR. EXP. TAVE WTR. P RES.( lO P5 I EZ2. SOOI-535 LOCA EZZ-50OI-Q5 LOLL LEVKL-6 PZZ-5opl-Slf LOCA E22-SOOI-525 UX'A LOW COOuIJG COOL ILIA WATER 5Y5TKH Al ARhrt 5 WTR.PRE&5,09P5I) HEATER. C)IJ HEATER OFF H2-SOOI-SIS LOLL COOLIQG V/A'TKR IMMBRSIOkl HEATER, LCGBQD: LP- LOCAL 08 COIJTROL. PALIKL HIGH COOLIIJG LOCA L LOCA LLY MOULITKD OU WTR veHP(~208~) [OG VEIJDOR. I=UR.IJI SHED EQUI P I4ELIY. L'2Z;50DI +I I LCKA LU POT TO CONVICT)IJ 'DIESEL KLISIIJK, TROtJSLE " NPuT 'TO Bh!GLUE ALARNL IW COhlTRCX ROOV(, Flap E, ~ 5AFEVg SHVTOOWH COl lhl& WATE.R &Y5TEM AUX OEY LP DIVISION ll \ DIE~%I GE.'AE.RA'TOR NIASD Pl@ l4OHAWEC FCWGP, GoR~'T'ai NINE MLLE. PO(NT- UNL'T Q Fll4AI SA'FG'T7 A l4ALYClQ @%POP T ~L hf>> c l4 4 ny ~ tg ~> 4 N yawr.'kgb ~*L ew~ s~~g. t lg~~] y ~ P R aq ~2l P '4 n E E<6lue 5TART 5IGIJAL LP A A 5TARTIIJ6 AIR PRE-&5. ) IOOPSI AUX DKV LOCAL KLl6ILlB FAII LOW 5TARTIU6 AIR. KEG IMB 'gQT P 8 CSSVR6(+ICOSI RUIJlJ Ihld 5TART/ g.Uhl $ 00I -SIS 56A, I.P f22-500I4 L0CAL Auf Dn/ LP C2Z. LEAPT EQSIQK AIR ST'ART 5Y STRE P,I AR~S Bt46llJB CRAIIKI~ BJGIQE CRAQKILlG astor GYCI-B GOT rIHED cYci.e TINeo our ~ OVT (Za5ec> LEGEUO: AN OEV AIN QI'V LP LP- LOCAL Oa COIJTRCX PANEL LOCAL -, 1.OCALLY <CUNITED OLJ RIG HT SIOK SIDE DCI VENDOR. PORQI5tt~D SrAarI a CWCASeP 5TARTea ed6Aa e.a UIP e22-5OOl'-S5( LOCAL K2Z-SOOI.55gl LOCA IIJPVT TO COMNICId DIESEL eQGIIJ< 'TROU>L< RL~lh IIJ CALI TROL ROD ~ ~ LP~ R SPCED > ISO RPM J'<&IIJE EUCIIJR SVGCPSSFUL START eIJdlklF- AIR, STAPTIIJ6 SY5Te'.g FICUS Q AIR &TART &Y&-tE,M SH. I oC Z. OIVIXIOhL II'I DIE+&I C EHERAVnR, NIAGAIiIA hhOHAWW PoWER CoRfheazio4 N/NE. MILK FOINW-UNIT Z flhlAL &AI=EM ANAi Y5I& RE.POPV %1 f Wl 'I 4 'JC 1 45) p y 1f % l II'I COUTROL 6WITCH CQUTROL SWITCH COurROL BEWITCH IU "MARI'O5ITIOIJ Iv "&LITO PO5ITIOU Iu "STOP'r OSITIOIJ FZZ.50OI-555 LP EZZ 500l 55'5 LP P ZZ-SOOI - 55'0 LP L RECEIVKR. AIR. RECBIVER. AIR PRBSSURK cZZ5PSI PRtg50RK + 2SO PSI R EZZ-5oo[-538 LOCAL E2Z-500I-53B LOCAL STO P KLKCTR.IC DRIVEIJ AIR COMPRBSSCIR. COUTROL'"SWITCH COUTROL SWITCH CQUTROL SW ITCH LCGCLlD: ILJ"ITAL) PO5ITIOQ IU"AUTO FIXIT(c)Ll I< 'OPP "eOSI TIOIJ LP - LOCAL DG CCILITROL PAIJEL EZZ-SOOI-550 LP EZ2:&00I-&so I P E22-5OOI-.550 LP LOCAL- LOCALLY gOUUTe,D Od RECEIVER RECEIVER. AIR OG VEhlOOfZ, PaeeeuRB i AIR. 2Zgp5l PRC5$ UR5, k Z9OP51 FLIR.dl&HC,P FQLIIP MBIJT'. E22-5001-54') IPAL 'e22-5OOI-S~ LDCAL CRAUKIMG CYCLB 90T TIMKO OOT(< F16'ORE. ~ AUX DEV LP AIR +TART &Y&TEM m.2 oF 2. DIESEL EU6IUB gLPg DIVI'bI&W 'll '\ DIK&EG 6EAER4'T~ SuCCFSSPUL START . 6 IIIA6AQA <OHAvIK PCNVEK CoK~ATION N'ONE. MlLE. POlN7-UNVT Z E? 2-5OOI-54B LOCAL FlhlAl 6A'PE.~ ANALYSIS REPoRT, 'STOP PIE SKL KIJ C'IIIJK DRIVKQ AIR CCIMPRKSOOR II r C >2,eK ~ 4~~I IW C~~~~Pl' s ps w r a <<4g l ty 1 4C c& ~~~~~8 >p ~y" "~ ~ ~'~~C \ c~ P 4 <<'Jf p PQ STEtAT SICAJAL DG LOCKOUT " ~ COMTCOLSWIT(H IN DC LOCKOuv ENSNE LOVl LUBE HOT IRESr.d.T TRIPP Cb "AUTO'OS. , RESET'., OIL PINESS.(~IG PSI) hU5 OEV LP AUX 2IEV E22.5001 551 LP IIUXDEV LP E22.SOOI.59 LOCAL COHTAIIL-SW)VCH COUTIML5WITCII IN EMC IME. &TART' 'EUGIIJE SPCKO CONTROL 5WITII IH "hfAM" POS. IN AUTd.. P.OS: ~ Ocf POS. SICIIA PP. 6Wf S l5O RPH E22:SOOI-SSI LP ~ZR-SDOIG LP E22-SOOI-55I LP bV'h PEV LP,j AuÃ.OEV LP ~, I LP R LP 6 Ehl6IHE SAFE IY SttUTOOWN RUN oTOP AC C)RCULA'TING OIL PUMP . ewe awe. LUBE. OiL SYSTEM CGMTRoc&. ~ ~ LEGEND: LP I P LP- LOCAL DC COMTZOL PANEL LP','.' LOCAL-'LOCALLYMOUMTED OA DQ A A + VFMDOR TURMISttEO EGgtP. IS[POT 'TO COMMON LOW LUBE 0'lL D'IEGER,L BI4GII4E TRDUGLE, PEKMISSI'VE A'ER PERMISSIUE AA'ER LOIM TNOOt(SE eMP (~ 65'F') ALARM IhS COMXROL ROOD 50SEC 'TIME DELAY 50 SEC TIMC DELA ~ 01L PR'ES'b(-T.P51) AUX DEV LP AUX DEV E22-5001-55 LOCAL f22.500t SI4 LOCAL MOTE 'TO SweC/AthPC,: Zgts SIEVE DO~'5 <OT IQQJ3QE HX-9644 MOD-IF'ICA;TIO/4. AE/VI4PC VO MODIFY AS REEQUIPED uPOM i<WLaeSJTWION-rr Sl'EB P'50 RIM) ~ ENGIIIE SFEEP ('- I'50 Rf N) ENG)IIE LP ALIX DEV LP AUX'E.V. LP ~ A Fl 6UP 6. EI4GINE LOW LUSE RESTRICTED LUBE 01L IGII LUBE OIL . I uSRICA.TIDAL A'ATE C4 OIL PP,ESS(526PSI) FliTER(ea~ 5S I Sl) 1EMR (Z2<O r) QHr I OF Z. E22r SOOI.SZI ',LOCAL DIVISION. IIt DIESEL @EH RANCOR E22.5001.SIO lOCAL E2'2 5001 S42 LOCAL MI~ARA MOHAWK POWER QyRRAhTI NINE hA'll E. POlNT. UNl'T Z. EMGINE 'LUK OlL SYSTEM Al.AX+5, FINAL &APE:TY ANAI (Sl+ RE.POP T qt P R ~ A P>> 1~ J~ L4 +4'! T v 1 F'QGWE RUNNING SWITCH D4 FAMINE CIRC Oli PUMP c >5OR.PM i'MAW'OG &TOP UWiI4e E22.500I ~ 42. 4N DEV LP &22. AUX DEV LP H2.5002 TIME CIRC 01L PohAP DELAY klQT RUhlMIll& AQX.QEV 62-500'l STOP Dc TURBO 60AlcBAcv PURAP 'I&u&6. I uSCZ<CO'T>OA &Y&WKM, SH.Z OF' PW'I&ION \'Il D'IRKED CKNERA;TOP, NIAGARA MOHAWK POWEP, CORPoPAAON NlNE. MlLE. POINT-UNn Z FINAL ~FEWY A14ACYC i+ Q.Q.POP'T ~ ~ I Q' Q1 kACKl l I t+ P Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.90 (9.5.7) Assume an unlikely event has occurred requiring operation of . a diesel generator" for a,prolonged period that would require xeplenishment of lube'il without intexrupting operation of the diesel generator. 'Provide the. following: ga) What, provision has been made in the design of the lube: oil system to add lube oil t o the sump. These provisions shall include procedures or instructions available to the operator,on the proper addition of lube oil to the diesel generator as follows: How 'and equipment where -lube oil- -'can is in operation. ~ I .be...added..while. the~~2. Particular assurance that the wrong kind of oil is not inadvertently added to the lubricating oil system, and~~~ "'~",3. - "'That 'the"".~ expected.;..rise. -'.in, level 'occurs and is verified for each unit of lube oil added. (b) Verification that these operating procedures or instructions will be 'osted, locally .in the diesel c' generator rooms. ." (c)..Verification 'hat.. personnel; .responsible for .the ". operation and 'maintenance, of the 'diesel are trained in , the use of these procedures. Verification of the ability of the pexsonnel on:the use of .,the, pxocedures shall be 'demonstrated 'during preoperational tests and duxing operator requalification. "(d),Verification that the. color coded, or otherwise marked, ',~-'lines;~associated'with the. diesel. generator are correctly id'entified and that the line or point for adding lube oil (when the engine is on standby or in operation) has been clearly identified. (SRP 9.5.7, Part I'I)~~RESPONSE~~The diesel generator 'ube 'il, '.-sumps capacity such that. oil should not have to be added during are ,designed with operation for at least 7 days. Operation of all diesels for extended periods would not be required during loss of off-site power and a LOCA condition. Loads would be transferred .from one division diesel to'another. to -allow. for. addition, of lube oil, inspection of the unit, etc. Amendment 7 ,-.QGR F430.90-1 December 1983 ~~ Ijan>> >>,Ilj I>>I I "r >>+.I lw ' >> I'- >>I Nine Ni j.e Point Unit 'SA."-. In the unlikely event that lube oil must be added to a diesel while it is running, special instructions will be included in the procedures covering tne diesel generators.- Iube oil can be,added to the sumps, following, safe procedures" to prevent injury to the operator or damage to the diesels. Provisions are made on the diesel sump to allow the operator to observe the normal standby and the normal operating level of the lube oil. Lube oil is obtained from .qualified vendors in properly.>>~.- labeled drums. Iube oil is always transferred from these drums to the diesel and transfers to other holding devices are not utilized, to preclude .the possible mixing or use of improper oil. Instructions for adding lube oi1 require verification of the product prior to addition. Copies of -."..-,"procedures will not be posted locally to preclude the use of 'napproved or out-of-date procedures. Points of addition for lube oil will have a caution tag affixed directing'he operator to read the applicable portion of procedures prior to adding lube oil. Instructions will detail procedures for adding oil in the standby and.the operating condition. Training of personnel responsible for operation and ~ maintenance of the diesel is p o:id d in the response to Question E'430.37. PSB Comments on uestion 430.90. The response is acceptable for the Division.IIl II DG's.. However,~~the response is not" acceptable of the Div .III DG because no response is given for the Oiv III DG .in .Question 430.88.~~RESP01iSE To r 5b Co ~ ~T > See Question 430;88 for the Division III Diesel Generator. 1 qt 4. I '5s I gr'$ I Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.94 (9.5.7) The description lo '"of the Division III diesel generator circulating'nd soak back pumps operation is not clear. The piping arrangement shown on Figure 9.5-48 shows oil flow paths that are not consistent with the FSAR written description. Specifically, there is oil flow to the turbocharger at all times, rather than only on startup as indicated in the FSAR. Revise the FSAR and/or,. Figure 9.5-48, as recpxired, to correct this inconsistency.~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 9.5.7.2.2. '(sg (,~~n ~fg Not acceptable. The system as described. in the FSAR text and shown on Figure 9.5-48 does 'not provide diesel engine prelubrication in complianceewith the recommendations of NUREG/CR-0660. p5 p +EP~~ ~f5 See response to-guestion 430.86. "Amendment 7 Q&R .,F43O. 94-1 December 1983 0 4 ~ A ay ~ l ~t.i go t;> 't i~a 'W ~" 4 w r s( 4f',, P$ 'yf~ Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.95 (9.5.7) In, the FSAR, you state that the Division III lube oil -circulating pump is rated at 6 GPM and is used only when the diesel generator is in the standby mode. At 6 GPM, the amount of oil circulated through the engine during standby is substantially less than that circulated by the main lube . oil pump during operation. The purpose of circulating lube oil during standby is to enhance first try start reliability by ensuring an oil film on all moving parts, as well as-maintaining these parts at recommended preheated temperature. Therefore, demonstrate that'he standby circulating pump has "adequate capacity to:(1) maintain an adequate oil film, on the engine moving parts, and (2) that this capacity is sufficient to maintain the moving parts at recommended preheat, temperature. (SRP 9.5.7, Part II and III)~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 9.5.7.2.2. The system as described in the FSAR text and shown Hot acceptable. prelubrication in on'igure'9.5-48 does not provide diesel,.engine +compliance with the recommendations of HUREG/CR-0660. RESPONSE J o g<P <~~g See response to question 430.86. Amendment. 7 Q<R F430.95-1 December 1983 ,l S I I << I f g ~ l U I Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.96 (9.5.7) Discuss the interlocks on the Division I and II- standby circulating oil pumps, and the Division III standby circulating and soak back pumps. (SRP 9.5.7, Part III) ESPONSE See revised Sections 9.5.7.2.1 and 9.5.7.2.2 ~ PSB Comments The response will be acceptable pending resolution of guestion 430.94 and guestion 430.95. Some revision to the response may be required. I'5$ Co~~~fg See response to guestion 430.86. Amercement 7 QScR F430.96-1 December 1983 t <<T 1 % ~ 'ph 4\ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.97 (9.5.8) FSAR Figures 9.5-49 through 9.5-51, and 1.2-17 through 1.2-19, do not provide adequate details of the missile protection provided for the diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust systems. Provide additional plan elevation, and section views, as required, which clearly show what the missile protection consists of, where located relative to the intakes and exhaust, and the it is relationship of the protective devices with the diesel generator building and other buildings, as appropriate. (SRP 9.5.8, Part I)~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 9.5.4.3. c Not acceptab l e.. not clear from the FSAR text. or It iss still protect>on rovided for the >ss provi fi ures how asrtornado missile zn t a kee and exhaust systems. The requested " combustion e s have not been additional plan, elevation and/or sect>on views provided. Amendment 7 QBR F430.97-1 December 1983 ~+sr gh S Wl~ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTiON F430.100 {9.5.8) 'Discuss the provisions made in your design of the diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system to prevent possible clogging, during standby and in operation, from abnormal climatic conditions {heavy rain, freezing rain, dust storms, ice and snow) that could prevent operation of the diesel generator on demand. {SRP 9.5.8, Part li)~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 9.5.'8.1. ., Not acceptabIe. The response wsII be .tornado missiIe protection and, found,acceptabI e. acceptable when detaai I so (g 430.97 ) have been provided, f reviewed, ~l /s$ 'Amendment 7 GR Fgg0.100-1'ecember l98~ <<goal 1 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR I QUESTION 'F430. 105 and exhaust system. (9. 5. 8) Provide a P&ID for the diesel engine combustion air intake Identify all system components and provide the design classification for same. Identify the diesel engine inte face. (SRP 9.5.8,Section I) RESPONSE i' The PAID vill be provided by the third quarter of 198 5 c+ ) e g c/t"~ Not acceptable. The requested information has not been provided. Amendment 8 QGR F430.105-1 January 1984 AZ d S ~r Ih 'E I l Qj Fs 'V' -il 'l A ~ZcV 4o" ~ p g, /7 I'7'l PDMI z-Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR P g pgqppq7/ 4/gg lOO the exhaust piping melts upon exposure to these. operating temperatures.. If the while exhaust piping, is the diesel clogged. by, snow, ice, or dust generator is not in operation, the diesel exhaust valves function to open and relieve the excess pressure when the back pressure exceeds a preset level. Therefore, .abnormal climatic conditions will not prevent the operation of. the -diesels on demand. The missile enclosures appear in Figure 1.2-17 for diesel generator divisions I, II, and III. 9.5.8.2 System Description Each standby diesel generator associated with Divisions I, II, and III of the emergency onsite ac power system is shown on Figures 9.5-49 through 9.5-51. Each Division I and II system consists of a separate intake filter and silencer, a 'turbocharger,'"an'"intercooler heater," a diesel exhaust relief valve, an exhaust silencer, and associated piping. Division III consists of a separate intake filter and , silencer, a turbocharger, a diesel exhaust relief valve, an exhaust silencer, and associated piping. All intake and ex-haust piping and their-associated components are fabricated and installed in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 3 r'equirements, . and , are Seismic, Category. 1. . Missile en- i closures protect the intake piping, the intake components, and the exhaust piping associated-with ,the diesel exhaust relief valves. Division III "lieu"of is,,the ..same, except that a filter-silencer is provided, in a separate filter and silencer. The combustion air is drawn in by the turbocharger through "the;,'protective~'"overhang . area "'at.,el,.283 southern wall of the diesel generator building. The intake ft 6 in on the opening has a missile hood and a labyrinth wall to protect against missiles generated by tornados or any other source. The intake,.air passes,.through the intake air filter and silencer. The Division I and II intake air filters are,= located on the south wall. The filters are washable dry type. Division I and II filters have a capacity of Amendment 7 9. 5-57a December 1983 jiW 'J Ll)c'nf Zo. Wo. 4o. izi77 .2 A/gg gf30. 114 '60./cc A~~cL ~.4 x A IO.Me. ~iSSIC Carlos'u~S~y~/~~~~jt'u~~ 2=IW gi ~'~.~~ -4 S~D~MM Ji'<<~'n.e~-M~ '~ 5 " ~KS~, ~g'~~ '5 p'E~~iSS' ~ e '4 '\ A g4 ~ ( ( lf s 4 ft 1 0 ~1 ~ I V 0V 1 N v~ 0 -Ii r1 1 I"I I r LV ~ OIVI Cf 1CONCI.PNL 0 IVII OCN CONA.PNI. CIV tf 0't L CCCSN CCCSN CCOSV tCCSN tCt51 tCCS 1 tCCL'N ~ I SOAPS N SI PNL47t PNLTOI ~ IIL II PNLOOS IP1Lllt PNLSIS POLITI coNToa, I IIOOV t10 CONA. t Oc Slllltl fNC CON+ OC SILITIN CON'I I CNNa ~ I ~ Cl Pt 1 L PJNCL PSNIL C 0 I DIVISION I OIVISION II OSIINTITIO1 aNsat ILLI 0/G ROOM O/G ROOM TNOcsan vvL I I NVOONS lll I ~ VONSLC laSSL t LOS 0001 IflILNI CL IOI V aN alt Ol OOON ~ N I OIVISIONIII OCSCL P/G ROOM DICSCL I f ~ 1 NITOII ttlllffl f" U atstc ~ tNC1@TON tftlNCOS ( CCCL" NCNLTON (--NPT-- lCCSNfCt gra-I I (p I I ~ Nsa t eb N Lst l NI VOOL 1 o CNCaC OLCC PLICL I...I 'P b I I bb m p,o 8 I ~ ~ ILSI I ~ ~ tpJ 0 4v Vlllt taN aVOVLC IOC SOON II II ~ I I"I~~ I I 0 I g T I I FIGURE I 'I GENERAL AAAANGEMENT

~~) EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING PLAN SHEET I OF 3 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION ITIN a IV+~~

NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPQAT, 4 I 4 t 1 'A fW. I" IOITOO CL tlt'I KCTIOO IO CCO I II II%%I KCTIOI CO COIT IIOaaIL 'I IO'l.ttM LITT It'll COCCI CLtnl CTCOI ~L IIICL tllll KI tL tTC.V I'L ~ I III ~ KV O'L K\I IKL ~ %% TKtOI ~CTCL OD tTCL COOT I ~ ~ IOO'LCI I I CKD1 I I I I II T ~ ~ ~ ~ I I CL IIV O'CTOO LI KCIOO tt t IV CL IK'1 I KI'1 IA LlCL ~ l ~ ~ TIDt tl CTCV ~ ITIVE ~ LIWC IL COL4'L I KLLIOCL~ I 1 OTCODOO TLL V KOOT FIGURE 1.2-17 Tlt LOI ~ LNL KI OOCCOD Till '4 l LtIILCOlt GENERALARRANGEMENT ~ ~ LII EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ~ ~ ~ T BUILDING PLAN SHEET 2'OF 3 'l I I I I ~ I II MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION II 'IAGARA III'll NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 ~ KCTCK l ~ FNAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT I V QL .l ,c $ yf gN65ILE .ci.. H26 / 0 E il(.LD'be% (<4F. 3 ViAccS) 3J 5f cribs'-5 +e>EN ENA+4+E (iran llLACC~ i F.O.Ffg,2.'ll'{p ,$ Ti,aB'-. a" B~~>55 lo" 999<-CLYig!i~ W~ 'lani Xf+ air ~r.Iiv. Lpr l sccr>o4 4-4 FIGURE 1.2-17 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING PLAN SHEET 3 OF 3 tkllKT I NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE.POINT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT / ~ ~ II, It I~ 'I "., ~ ~' ~ ~ ~5~%+>k~:" (W".0"~++.~t++gWC~ ~yg~/- .P~SE$ z,:,-w- ~ gfpV r' A ~ ~ =*'5 4 '+ ~ - J +~+ 8! 8 +Ps < )~5~0r+r < ]s 9Q4g~ . gQ 4%~ Pj ~ '~ .'VP', '>>f u+< lg a.p@ % <<4++~~ 'Sv .'W 'p ', - <' '." yz . *:M;e,v "'c@PbQ im+."., ~.- =-'.: f~ Swl EM 0/Pl~A't~s 7VZ SPREE S CO&CGCM /S TA'4T A FIiZE IM ~ PIE~IC'( @E~gg r (~ID I~M J ~IMClgGU( 4d< TH QPIC~gF'~ 774E +IgE ~( EC.EZOM 573'1E~ FOR ~i mo~ couLlo EEsGL7 yM CcwSD~AM pl)UcJs E. scH +&36 y+QP so~EcstUEvl c'Y RQ7 EG'M& Camguf W<OiQ rttC l&I~CES ~ ~ ~&MIN& QIEJ& ( ~~K~$ / lll~EPw/ /~P~II+~$ ~~ g. P~~~o<. 7~5 ar Pucqu T- s~c.D Et.~a&~~ LD 7 g(g ~ILL (~ Pgg VCIJ l ~i> ~ I "'I g t IF IL 4 - ~ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.102 (9.5.8) Experience at some operating plants has shown that diesel engines have failed to start due to accumulation of dust and. other deleterious material on electrical equipment associated with starting of the diesel generators (e.g., auxiliary relay contacts, control switches, -etc.). Describe the provisions that have been made in your diesel generator, building design, electrical starting system, and combustion air and ventilation air intake design(s) to preclude this condition to assure availability of the diesel generator on demand. Also describe under normal plant operation what procedure(s) will be used to'inimize accumulation of dust .in the control.diesel generator room; specifically address concrete dust (SRP 9.5.8, Part II) Diesel -generators for nuclear power plants should be capable of operating at maximum rated output under various service conditions. For no load and light load operations, the diesel generator may not be capable of ,operating for extended periods of time under extreme .service; conditions;or= weather disturbances without serious degradation of the engine performance. This couldresult,.in, the. inability. of the diesel engine to .accept full load or..fail to perform on demand. Provide the following: ( a) The environmental service conditions for which your, diesel generator is designed,...to,,deliver rated .load including the following: Service Conditions (a) Ambient air intake temperature range - F (b) Humidity, max - % (b) Assurance that the diesel generator can provide full rated load r~~er the following weather disturbances: ( (1) A tornado pressure transient causing an atmospheric pressure reduction of 3 psi in 1.5 seconds followed "by a rise to normal pressure in 1.5 seconds. (2) A low pressure storm such as a hurricane resulting in ambient pressureiof not less than 26 inches Hg for a minimum duration of two (2) hours followed by a pressure of no less than 26 to 27 inches Hg for Amendment 7 QScR F430. 102-1 December 1983 &It 't II 1 ll f Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR an extended period of time (approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ). (c) Discuss the effects 1'ow 'mbient temperature (subzero* temperatures), will have on engine standby and operation and effect on its output particularly at no load and light load operation. Will air preheating., be required to maintain engine .performance versus ambient. temperature for your diesel generator at normal rated load, light load, and no load conditions. (SRP 9.5.8, Parts I, II, and III)~~RESPONSE~~Provisions have been made in the design of the diesel generator rooms to minimize entrance of dust. The diesel generator control panels are located in separate, temperature-controlled and ventilated rooms. The control 'anels,--~except" ,for...the:.;generator. high..voltage panels, have dust,-tight enclosures. See revised Section 9.5.8.5. Amendment 7 QEcR F430.102-2 December 1983 0 1~q I I C $ C ~ 1 N 'lh y t J'" 1t 4 l Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Division III Monitorin There is no specific air intake exhaust gas monitoring instrumentation. 9.5.8.4 Inspection and Testing Requirement The diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust sys-tem is designed to be readily accessible for visual inspection. System operability is tested during preoperational testing of the diesel generator. Continued integrity of the system is ensured through routine inspection, periodic cleaning of the inlet air filter, and the flushing of the intercooler and heater as recommended by engine manufacturer. The system is tested with periodic testing of the diesel generator as a whole. Periodic test-ing of the diesel generator is discussed in Section 8.3.1. 9.5.8.5 Safety Evaluation Each standby diesel generator has a combustion air intake and exhaust system independent of and separate from the com-.<<,. bustion air intake and exhaust system of the other diesel generators. Each component of the combustion aix,.intake and exhaust system is contained in the same section of the diesel generator building, as its associated diesel generator. Therefore any failure in one diesel generator combustion air intake or exhaust system cannot jeopardize the safety function of any other'diesel generator.-- The combustion air intake system is sized to..supply suf-ficient air for continuous operation of the diesel loss generator below at".'maximum "-..rated, capacity...with, system,.pressure the maximum pressure drop recommended by the engine manufacturer. The exhaust system is sized to discharge the exhaust gases from the diesel engine when the diesel generator is operating continuously at the rated capacity with exhaust backpressure maintained below that recommended by the engine manufacturer. The combustion air intake and exhaust outlets are located to minimize the possibility of recirculating the exhaust gases. The intake openings are located at el 283 ft 6 in on the southern wall of the diesel generator building. The exhaust outlets are located above the roof at el 303 ft 3 in. from The exhaust gas discharges are horizontal and directed away the intake openings. The horizontal and vertical separation, high discharge velocity of the exhaust gasesin away from the intake openings, and the labyrinth wall~~9. 5-60~~0 I I ~4 II Jf 0 1 ~* P / Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR front of the intake openings minimize the possibility of recirculating the exhaust gases. Emergency diesel generators are not protected by Unit 2 gaseous (CO<) fire extinguishing systems. Preaction water spray systems are used. There is no storage of gas or any other, substance in the vicinity of the intake openings whose intentional or accidental release can dilute and reduce the oxygen content of the intake air below acceptable levels. The emergency diesel generators are separated from each other .and from all, other areas by 3-hour rated fire barriers.. Separate air intakes, located at the south end of the diesel generator building, are provided for each generator. No credible fire in any generator room should affect the air intakes for the remaining two diesels. The combustion air intake system has an air filter that is designed to .reduce .airborne, particulate .material over the entire time period that the diesel generator can operate continuously assuming maximum concentration of airborne particulate at the intake. All engine-mounted'lectrical/electronic ,components are . . enclosed in dusttight, enclosures. The diesel generator room and- control panel room ventilation air. is filtered through medium '- 'efficiency 'filters. ' The '-combustion intake air filters are high efficiency filters designed to reduce airborne particulate material over the entire time period that the diesel generator-'can-operate- continuously-assumixg maximum concentration of .airborne. particulate at the intake. Division I and II intake air filters will arrest 100 percent . of particles 7 microns insize and 90=percent of particles 3 .microns.,in.,size...Division.,III intake . air filter will arrest 96 percent of particles 7 microns in size and 75 percent of particles 3 microns in size. There are no flow control devices (louvers, dampers, etc) in the intake air system. The air intake system has a combustion air intercooler-heater to cool the compressed air so that it density to provide enough oxygen for combustion. The heater has adequate portion warms the intake air at starting to increase first-try starting reliability. Amendment 7 9.5-61 December 1983 I, l.a J' ~ %l %a~ b~ ~ J l "f. '1.I I t j J ~ y+4fJ I 't Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR The Division I and II diesel generators are designed for the following service conditions: Ambient air intake temperature range: -20 F to 100 F Maximum humidity: 100/ They are designed for tornado pressure transient causing. an atmospheric pressure reduction of 3 psi in .3 sec. Being of ~ == turbocharged design, they will be able to provide full-rated load when, subjected to a low-pressure storm, such as a-=hurricane, resulting in ambient pressure of not less than 26 in. Hg for a minimum duration of 2 hrs followed by a pressure of no less than 26- to 27 in. Hg for an extended period of time (approximately 12 hrs).The effects of high and moderate energy piping in the. diesel generator building are discussed in Section'9.5.5.5. The failure modes and effects analysis. (FMEA) of the .balance-of-plant .instrumentation and .controls components .of=- - the diesel generator combustion...air.. intake.;.';and exhaust.. system is provided in the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR FMEA report. 9.5.9 Auxiliary Electric Boiler 9.5.9.1 Design Bases 9.5.9.1.1 Safety .Design Basis "..support..unsafe>> The auxiliary electric.-boiler, is not requir'ed to effect or shutdown *of"the "reactor" or 'o " p'erform in the operation of reactor safety features. 9.5.9 '.2 Design Basis The auxiliary boiler system is designed for use during plant shutdown conditions and is=not normally required to supply steam during normal plant operation. The auxiliary electric boilers (2ABM-BlA, B1B) are cap'able of supplying 40,500 lb/hr of 'team 'ach for a total of Amendment 7 9.5<<61a December 1983 ll IC ~ v I ~ I8 I, It t~ Xt~ ~ t I t i k 'll I I t ' I ~ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.107 (10.2) In the turbine generator section discuss: 1) the valve closure times and the arrangement for the main steam stop and control and the reheat stop and intercept valve in relation to the effect of a failure of a single valve on the overspeed control functions; 2) .the valve closure times and extraction steam valve arrangements. in relation to stable operation after a turbine generator system trip; - 'urbine~~3) effects of missiles from a possible turbine generator failure on safety related systems or components. (SRP 10.2, Parts II,- III and IV)~~~~RESPONSE~~See revised Section 10.2 ' for the response to 1) and 2). A refe - of '%heence to Section 3.5.1.3 exists in Section 10.2.2 for 3) 'cpxestion. C The turbine control diagram, and:,.logic. diagram are being . provided under separate cover for .the NRC's use and information. The response is acceptab1e.*~~C1osure time for CIV's shou1d be provided. '~~ig. z.. ~ Amendment 7 QScR F430.107-1 December 1983 \ ~ ~ l jrII A f 'l t Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR supplied from the turbine extraction steam system (Figure 10.1-7 and Section 10.4.10). To show that a single steam valve, failure cannot disable the turbine overspeed trip from functioning, the following discussion is offered. Main Stop and Control Valves The main stop and control valves are arranged in series, four sets in parallel. On a turbine-generator trip all stop and control valves close. If, for example, a stop valve was not to close, the corresponding control valve would interrupt steam flow. Zikewise, if a control valve fails to close, corresponding stop valve would interrupt steam flow. the The valves close in 0.2 sec on a turbine-generator trip. Thus, a single valve failure cannot contribute to an overspeed trip. Combined Intermediate, Valves - The combined intermediate valves are arranged six.in parallel, however each CIV has a stop valve function and a control valve function powered by separate actuators and control loops effectively making .each CIV a stop valve and a control valve in series. As such, the overspeed protection . system is not disabled based on the discussion above./ffd qadi-(~7 @<as.r~'g +cPld FcrJ'A'g-QZP g rS .I5 sM Bypass Valves There are five bypass valves arranged in 'parallel capable of passing 25'ercent 'NO flow. The opening time for a bypass valve is 0.25 sec. If one 20 percent, of VWO" flow- can condenser, 'till bypass valve fails to open on a turbine-generator trip, be bypassed"to the and'o not adversely affect overspeed protection. The above..discussion ,is necessary,.'for, generator-related trips only. On all other trips the main generator breaker remains closed after the trip initiation keeping a load on the turbine thus acting to "brake" it. The main breaker remains closed until the generator begins to motor. The turbine overspeed protection system is designed to fail safe upon damage to electrical wiring or hydraulic lines such as would result from a moderate or high energy line break. The fail safe action is a turbine trip. Turbine generator overspeed protection is provided in the extraction steam lines in accordance..with. the turbine manufacturer's requirements. These take the* form of testable, power-assisted nonreturn valves in the extraction lines to the sixth, fourth, and third point feedwater Amendment 7 10.2-3 December 1983 $+ r<i E wa pt / C C \ 'r4, Wy '" I jl J C Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.109 (10.2) Your FSAR discuss ion of the turbine generator, Section 10.2.2, does not include any reference to inservice inspection and exercising of the turbine .main.st'earn stop,and control and reheater stop and intercept valves. Expand your CESAR to inc'lode"w'<@tailed description of (1) the turbine main steam stop and control and reheat stop and intercept valves, and (2) the inservice inspection and testing program for these valves. (SRP 10.2, Part II) ESPONSE See revised Section 10.2.2. " The turbine control diagram and logic diagram are being provided under separate cover . for the .NRC's use arid information. Co ~ ~ ~'~5 of one of ""-Me require disassembly and inspection bl of main steam valve at~pproximate t / yea inte vals 1 y 3 1I3 each type Revise the FSAR accordingly. (see SRP 10.2, Part II.5.a) states that "The Section 10.2.2.'The applicant 'efer to FSAR 'c'corn tested weekly." main s t op an d mbined intermediate valves'are 'h this, test includes th e main (O nt should .confirm that ~ > 1 stop valves an control valves as well as the main Io.z. 2, Amendment 7 Q&R F430.109-1 December 1983 1 F4 E M- .y ~ ~ 4 \ ~ .Y 'C1 ~ g h +i Vr 4 a C. = 4A j Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR heaters and in the1 feeds to the auxiliary steam system. These valves are - swing check valves with external counterweighted lever arms and air cylinders and have a closing time of 0.1 sec. The air cylinders use air pressure to maintain a spring in compression. Upon release of the air pressure the spring provides enough force at the start of the stroke to overcome sticking and to place the swing disc in the flow stream. The spring will not close the valve against flow, but will provide sufficient motion to confirm operability. The air cylinder/spring does not prevent the disc from closing on reverse flow. Additionally, the extraction steam system is designed so that the total unrestrained energy in the piping and equipment volume is less than the turbine manufacturer' maximum value limit. Nonreturn valves are not supplied in the extraction lines to the fifth point feedwater heaters since the steam is prevented from expanding through any . turbine stages by the combined intermediate valves. Nonreturn valves are not. needed, on the extraction lines to the second .,-and first . point heaters, since they contain insufficient stored energy to produce an unacceptable overspeed event. UAcv@'oA, go<. vAcc5 @so Iog. The main stops and combined intermediate valves.'are tested [ weekly. The need for- inspection will be dictated by deviation from a baseline curve of travel versus time as shown on an X-Y plotter. .'The extraction valves are tested for movement weekly. .Internal inspection and maintenance will be performed in accordance with- the five refueling cycle turbine and valve maintenance and inspection program. The=- generator is a direct coupled, 'hree-phase, 60-Hz, 25-kV, 1,800-rpm 'synchronous generator with a hydrogen-cooled rotor and a water-cooled stator., The generator is rated at '1,348,"400'Va"," 0.'90 power 'actor (p.f.), with a short circuit ratio of 0.58 and a maximum hydrogen pressure of 75 psig. The .exciter system is the Alterrex type. The alternator-exciter is a three-phase, 1,800-rpm, 60-Hz, air-cooled machine rated at 3,385 kW, 555 V with a response ratio of 0.5. The turbine utilizes an EHC system consisting of conventional governing devices regulators, (two initial pressure speed . governor, startup control devices), emergency devices for --turbine and plant protection (overspeed governor, backup overspeed, master trip, low vacuum trips, motoring protection, thrust bearing wear. Amendment 7 10.2-3a December 1983 ~ f .f I >> f ~,'\ 'P>> gl i Ip 'I'>>>> I~ II V ~ + 1D. I Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430. 115 ( 10. 4. 4) Provide the results of an analysis indicating that failure of the'urbine bypass system high energy line will not have an adverse effect or preclude operation of the turbine speed control system or any safety related components or systems located close to the turbine bypass system. (SRP 10.'4.4, Parts I and II)~~RESPONSE~~See ~ (ss ~ Section 10.4.4.3. Not acceptab1e. FSAR Chapter 15. The referenced FSAR Section, in Neither section turn, references an-,answer':to "the speci ic,questi contains information which provides f on .. /st /o. 'f. f, 3 Amendment 7 QScR F430.115-1 December 1983 g4 1r t, ~%pe ll'l gl JK Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR The bypass valve disk is of the globe type, and the stem is arranged to reach the outside through the discharge chamber of the valve. Thid arrangement minimizes the steam leakage when the valve is closed. It is necessary only to seal the stem against condenser vacuum. Each bypass valve has its actuator arranged underneath the. valve chest and fastened to the valve chest by a yoke-type structure. The actuator for each bypass valve is a double-acting hydraulic cylinder moved by 1,600 psig EHC fluid from the power unit controlled by a servo valve. Attached to the cylinder is a spring that opposes the opening motion so that the valves fail closed upon loss of .hydraulic fluid pressure. To supply hydraulic fluid dur'ing fast opening of the bypass valves, or for a limited time in case of failure of the hydraulic pumping system, gas charged hydraulic accumulators are connected to the hydraulic supply lines on the bypass valve .assembly (Figure-10.4-5) ~ 10.4 '.3 Safety Evaluation The turbine bypass system is not safety related. The turbine bypass valves are designed to fail closed on loss of main condenser vacuum (a pressure greater than 23 in Hg abs) or.,loss 'of the turbine EHC .system. iy<-CYSTS u< 4 Pr4//@i/4'f add . ~~ IA Vga'8P>ss sp'Mph /5'ISct/$ $ /4 Salle+ /F. C . P The effects of a turbine bypass system valve malfunction, as well as the effects of such failures on other systems and components, are evaluated in Chapter 15. The effects of postulated piping failures in the turbine 'bypass system are. evaluated in Section 3.6. 10.4.4.4 Tests, and Inspections The opening and closing of the turbine bypass system valves are checked during refueling outages for performance arid timing. 10.4.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements Descriotion Instruments and controls are provided to automatically adjust bypass steam flow and thereby -control reactor pressure. The controls and monitors described below are located in the main control room.~~10. 4-14~~~i I 7i 4 q, gQ, <~A;p Sp, ~ NINE t1ILE POINT UNIT 2 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORHATION 430.118 FSAR Figures 8.3-3 and 8.3-11 shows a '120 VAC automa.ic and (SRP 8.3.1) several 125 VDC manual load transfers between non Class lE power supplies'which are in turn fed from redundant 4160 VAC Class lE buses'during operation on the diesel"generators. The configuration of the'circuits is such that a single -failure of the tran'sfer'device','open'fuse holder, or fault between a'djacent power'panel buses'co'uld potentially affect the redundant Class'lE buses'. In light of the fact SRP Section 8.3.1.III.2;b 'and R:G. 1.6 does not allow these configurations for connection of Class 1.E l.oads to redundant Class 1E supplies, justify the -'acceptabil'ity of this configuration for non Class lE loads which are'ot vital to ,.plant. safety...'The. intercohneciions in question is shown in Figure 8.3-3 between the OPS "B" supply and "A" supply, and those shown'in Figure 8.3-1.1'-between switchgear 2 BYS-SMG001A and 001B to the th'ree control bus power panels. Also identify all other'non Class,l.E transfers..or -,interconnections .which..are connected to redundant Class 1E power supplies. P5g ~ ~ ~ ~~ f p Open. ";.question ~and'response missing .from, FSAR. ~AN~ +0 /56 C. I.s.l 4 J k 4 ~ 'Q v K4 I ~ y ~ ~ Nine Mile Point Unit 2,FSAR 8.3.1.4.1 Electrical Isolation .The three divisions of the plant onsite power system are electrically independent of each other. This independence is maintained through the loads the divisions feed; each division feeds a separate load group and there is no chance of interconnecting independent divisions through the loads. Each division has its dedicated standby power source that is independent of the standby power source of any other division. There is no provision for paralleling the standby power sources of different divisions or ,for using the standby power source of one division to feed the loads of any other division. Each division uses its own control power sources for instrumentation and control, and the con-trol power source of each division is independent of the control power of any other division. There is no provision for interconnecting these control power sources or for feeding the control circuits of one division from the con-trol power, sources of any. other division. lI ~* ~~ 'I Each division is also isolated from the associated 4 nonsafety-related systems. Whenever a safety-related power or control circuit is. connected, with any. nonsafety-related circuit, appropriate isolation devices as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.75 and IEEE 384 are used. Nonsafety power loads are not fed from safety buses except the stub bus loads (see Tables.8..3-1 and 8.3-2). The stub buses a e tripped on LOCA signal. The associated circuits are treated as Class 1E associated circuit cables meet .all.,the requirements, of .. circuits'he Class lE cables. 8.3.1.4.2 Physical. Separation Ph sical Se aration of the Class lE E i ment The items of equipment associated with each of the three in-dependent divisions of the Class lE onsite power systems are located in separate Seismic Category I structures to phys-ically isolate them from each other. The Class 1E 4.16-kV switchgear buses of the three divisions are located in the Division I, II, and III emergency switchgear rooms in the control building at el 261 ft. The Class 1E 600-V load cen-ters associated with Divisions I and II are located in the emergency switchgear room of the respective division. The Class 1E MCCs associated with Divisions I and II are located in the emergency switchgear rooms of the respective division, in separate rooms in the screenwell building (el 261 ft), and in the reactor auxiliary building auxiliary Amendment 7 8.3-49 December 1983 jl 1" t4 J h r l f t \ 't 'll l 40 J ~ I~ ,A /la Iy g g gyp,p imp~~ ~p g,zG r~.y~ y ~..(. d'g~ &cf-y<~p Qt~i sq -US~j Q. gjjj.g~ urvJ +~CAg. s < Nv S Us5' x~ Gapa~ 5~ ~>< Y 2~ Yg- a ~Pfg 0018, ~ ~ gr<~u. ~ lp.LL~DLl ~m~~( ~~ ~ i+Pi ~~~ ~ A-~~~~ 4 +~ n WJ~ wcvA- l~-'MZ~-'~"="- ~~l/~<~wM ~ ~~~ (Pg Ld 0 Z.Qzs- Usg, F~ UPS ~verb -uF~ib, +>~ ~4~~ AQ ~v -5.. t3 ~ kP, "P e r '1 iE '.2.NZS USE: > C44 &we ~~ C,d (s) ~ r~ p.~ -An.w~ n~v~d~~ ~z.~ ~ ~ wn g,',QW+QQ )~ g~ g~~G-v. ~~ C ~,Q"i~ ~m~ LQ ~> i 'I Gl 6, ~vt4~~ ~i,~ ~i 8: g y"~t'r~ 2 tgg5- US', C ~ (+) g '+Q -,~~.>pAAv tp 7~ C l k) Q Q- US'c 'S < &f'-~ .Vt~v g J-c.~.~ '.r. ) !w 7" p 1 M-Cs i B~ i r r." l r.'! & E (fI !t'r .ti (. i'~t3'm~.t ~ v-~l gt.)>, W)r,M I ~- g~.z 5>,i>~<vv.i d (~..=(i,-~- ' ~ ~ ~~v~>~> ~ W ~ ~ ~U Qr lt '.~ ~ ~i. l, ~y I'-~3 (p) ~ ~m y g 4 P"M~-p. hatt-~~u t3rt q ~ 44'pvP~W-t )y uh.k A.< r~~, ld, 'LN1 -U-g~~ e Nv'S- UC 4 ..4'~~>~ UPS w 2.'J p,p-L)Pa IL ~~+ >vSE -uI st&. bC t. ~u~itrt ~p pRr. kt3 I l4 t-V ~v~ g~~t,'7~brig du~ 2 INQ~- <~CzQf /~ gP+ Q(g Qggtl ~i Q ~~M~ %MES US~i fkn.Cru l 2NzS- LlSlO, CwM I>,8 t-V r~"-'-~ ~ALPS- S<tBiQQK C'r 3 ~NIPS-S~t305'a. ~~~" w( J.~v ~l( 2.5/5- s'~(~~ ur~ P~- ~ I g~'f< sH3 QQl& i Q~~ /"pM+"Wn~m~4 +~-1 ~ trttW~& +-V g~~~ ~C p.C ~'-~-& ~ n~~ pig~ ~~~ Oy g> ~~ ~~ ~~ +~~ ~,~ ~ l ~r)~p "~/ ~ jr'7~ ' lli I', (.z4 ~ I; ~ / j g tLb 7 'E 1 ~ I i J l (r h Wf P f 2 k pL t 1 '<</ <-'. 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