ML18024A508

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Responds to 780915 NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in Inspec Repts#50-259/78-17,#50-260/78-18 &#50-296/78-16.Corrective actions:1B & 3A RHR Heat Exchanges Inspected & Task Test Initiated
ML18024A508
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 10/10/1978
From: Gilleland J
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
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NUDOCS 7811130013
Download: ML18024A508 (20)
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 3740t 830 Power Building October 10, 1978 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Enclosed is our response to J. T. Sutherland's September 15, 1978, letter, RII:GLT 50-259/78-17, 50-260/78-18, and 50-296/78-16, concerning an activity at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant which appeared to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements. Enclosed is our response to the item of noncompliance as described in your inspection report.

Ve have reviewed the above inspection report and find no proprietary information in it.

Very truly yours, I

J. E. Cilleland Assistant Manager of Power Enclosure

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0 ENCLOSURE BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 LETTER FROM J. T. SUTHERLAND TO N. B. HUGHES DATED SEPTEMBER 15, 1978, 50-259/78-17, 50-260/78-18, AND 50-296/78-16

~Findin Technical Specifications 3.8.A.1 requires that the radioactivity concentration in liquid effluents shall not exceed the values specified in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 2.

Contrary to the above, on July 15, 1978, an unplanned release of radioactive liquid occurred in which the concentration of iodine-131 and iodine-133 were 34.8 and 9.8 times the maximum permissible concentrations specified in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 2, respectively.

This is an infraction.

~Res ense The Licensee Event Report, BFRO-50-259/7823, detailed the event, the immediate action taken by Browns Ferry personnel, and the cause and corrective action taken concerning the 1A RHR heat exchanger. Subsequent to this report, the following actions have been taken.

1. The 1B and 3A RHR heat exchangers were inspected to determine if similar problems existed. RHR heat exchanger 2B will be inspected within the next two months. These heat exchangers were chosen on the basis of operating hours and equipment history. No indications of similar problems were found on the 1B and 3A.

2, An operational leak test has been initiated to ensure the heat exchangers are not leaking before being placed in service.

3. Installation of offline monitors is continuing and should be complete by the end of the current unit 3 refueling outage.
4. An inspection program to ensure tube integrity has been initiated. This program has utilized eddy current inspection of approximately 10 percent of the tubes in each heat exchanger. The frequency of this inspection will be based on the number of operating cycles as described in present WA procedures. This inspection is now taking place during the unit 3 refueling outage and will be performed during upcoming refueling

, outages of units 1 and 2.

The implementation of ASME Code, Section Xl, Hydrostatic Testing Requirements, within the next 18 months will provide assurance of system integrity.

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p,P REQO UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 AUG 1 8 1978

'In Reply Refer To:

RII:RFS 50-259/78-16 50-260/78-17 50-296/78-15 Tennessee Valley Authority Attn: Mr. N. B. Hughes Manager of Power 830 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Gentlemen:

This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. R. F. Sullivan of this office on July 17-20, 1978, of activities authorized by NRC Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3 facilities, and to the discussion of our findings held with Mr. J. G. Dewease at the conclusion of the inspection.

Areas examined during the inspection and our findings are discussed in the enclosed inspection report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.

Within the scope of this inspection, no items of noncompliance were disclosed.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice",

Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. If this report contains any information that you (or your contractor) believe to be proprietary, it is necessary that you office to withhold make a written application within,20 days to this such information from public disclosure. Any such application must include a full statement of the reasons on the basis of which it is claimed that the information is proprietary, and should be prepared so that proprietary information identified in the application is

Tennessee Valley Authority AUG 1 8 197B contained in a separate part of the document. If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified period, the report will be placed in the Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to discuss them with you.

Sincerely, F. J. Long, Chief Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

Enclosure:

Inspection Report Nos.

50-259/78-16 50"260/78"17 t 50-296/78-15 cc w/encl:

Mr. J. G. Dewease Plant Superintendent P. 0. Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35602

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos.: 50-259/78-16, 50-260/78-17 and 50-296/78-15 Docket Nos.: 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.: DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 830 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name: Browns Ferry Units 1, 2 and 3 Inspection at: Browns Ferry Site, Athens, Alabama Inspection conducted: July 17-20, 1978 Inspector: R. F. Sullivan Reviewed by:

H. C. Dance, Chi Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Ins ection Summar Ins ection on Jul 17-20 1978: Re ort Nos. 50-259/78-16 50-260/78-17 and 50-296/78-15 Areas Ins ected: Routine, unannounced inspection of reportable occurrences, followup on IE Bulletins and Circulars, followup on instrument line leak repair, and plant tour. The inspection involved 31 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: Of the four areas inspected no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

RZI RPS. Ross 50-259/78-15, 50-260/78-17 and 50-296/78-15 I-1 DETAILS I Prepared by: ~512 ~ T R. F. Sullivan, Reactor Inspector Date Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Section Dates of Inspection: July 17-20, 1978 Reviewed by:

H. C. Dance, Chic I D 1>

te Reactor Projects ection .No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

1. Persons Contacted

+J. D. Dewease, Plant Superintendent

  • H. L. Abercrombie, Assistant Plant Superintendent
  • J. L. Harness, QA Supervisor J. B. Studdard, Operations Supervisor R. Hunkapillar, Assistant Operations Supervisor G. Benauer, Electrical Engineer R. G. Metke, Results Section Supervisor J. R. Pittman, Instrument Engineer S. G. Bugg, Health Physics Supervisor R. Cole, QA Site Representative, Office of Power R. R. Smallwood, Shift Engineer A. L. Burnette, Shift Engineer T. Childers, Outage Mechanical Engineer T. G. Campbell, Outage Director
  • Denotes those present at the Exit Interview.
2. Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s Not inspected.
3. Unresolved Items No new unresolved items were identified during this inspection.
4. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on July 20, 1978.

RII Rpt. Nos. 50-259/78-16, 50-260/78-17 and 50-296/78-15 I-2

5. Re ortable Occurrence Review The below listed licensee event reports were reviewed in the office for potential generic problems, to detect trends, to determine if the information provided meets NRC reporting requirements and to consider whether corrective action discussed appeared appropriate.

Selected reports, as denoted, were further reviewed at the site to verify adequacy of information provided, corrective action taken, and compliance with Technical Specifications and other regulatory require-ments. The inspector examined selected Plant Operations Review Committee meeting minutes, internal correspondence, operating records and discussed events with appropriate personnel.

LER No. Date Event 259/789 3/31/78 Smoke detector in reactor building inoperative.

259/7810 4/20/78 Reactor pressure switch setpoint out of calibration.

  • 259/7813 5/17/78 T. S. limit on relief valves less conservative than analysis.

259/7814 5/26/78 Torus oxygen monitor inoperative.

259/7816 6/22/79 Turbine pressure switches setpoints out of calibration.

259/7817 6/22/78 Reactor water conductivity high.

  • 259/7819 7/5/78 Reactor water not monitored for conductivity.

260/788 5/8/78 Reactor ventilation monitor inoperative.

260/7810 5/30/78 Relief valve on standby liquid control pump opened below design setting.

  • 260/7811 6/7/78 Refuel interlock was defeated on 3 separate control rod drives.

296/789 4/28/78 Two smoke detectors in reactor building inoperative.

  • 296/7810 5/2/78 Both rod block monitor channels inoperative.

RII Rpt. Nos. 50-259/78-16, 50-260/78-17 and 50-296/78-15 I-3 296/7812 5/17/78 LPCI injection valve inoperative.

296/7813 5/31/78 MSIV closure time outside limit.

  • Denotes reports which were further reviewed at site.

Corrective action taken or being taken was determined to be satisfactory.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified by the inspector.

6. IE Circular and Bulletin Followu The inspector reviewed licensee action in the following circulars and bulletins:

IEC 78-02, Proper Lubrication Oil For Terry Turbines IEC 78-04, Installation Errors That Could Prevent Closing of Fire Doors IEC 78-06, Potential Common Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment Rooms IEB 78-05, Malfunctioning of Circuit Breaker Auxiliary Contact Mechanism IEB 78-06, Defective Cutler-Hammer, Type M Relays With DC Coils Discussions were held with licensee personnel and internal files were examined. Licensee action had either been completed or a schedule had been issued to take appropriate action. The inspector had no further questions.

7. Plant Tour A tour of the facility was made by the inspector. Included were areas of each reactor building and a visit to each control room.

Observations included operational status of systems and equipment, instrument readings, housekeeping and control room activities.

Informal discussions were held with operators and supervisors.

All questions developed by the inspector were satisfactorily answered.

" RII Rpt. Nos. 50-259/78-16, 50-260/78-17 and 50-296/78-15 I-4

8. Instrument Line Weld Failure An increase in the drywell unidentified leakage rate led to the discovery of a crack in a weld )oint in a one inch stainless steel sensing line on a recirculation riser in Unit 3. The unidentified leakage rate reached 5.4 GPM at midnight on July ll, 1978, which prompted the licensee to shutdown the reactor and make a drywell inspection to locate the leak. Visual observation revealed that a leak had developed in a weld joint at the third elbow in the sensing line downstream from the riser. The reactor was then placed in cold shutdown to evaluate the problem and effect repairs. The licensee made the initial report to IE, Region II by phone on July 12, 1978.

The inspector reviewed with the cognizant engineer the repair of the weld. The crack was in the weld and extended to about 30% of the circumference. The instrument line provided pressure sensing informa-tion for the LPCI loop selection logic function. The licensees initial analysis concluded that the crack was induced by vibration. TVA design will determine the need for additional support which if needed will be installed during the refueling outage scheduled to begin within two months. The inspector indicated his intention to further review the long-term corrective action. Since the instrument line was not isolable, the repair procedure involved the application of a freeze plug. The repair procedure (MMI 14.4. 1. 3.G) was prepared, reviewed and approved to cover the repair work. Data sheets accompanied the procedure which verified that the welder was qualified, and that dye-penetrant, visual and full pressure inspection was performed by a Level II inspector.

4ECI UNITED STATES (4~Pg I ~o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION lu c REGION II 101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 NOV 09 1978 In Reply Refer To:

RII:NJM 50-259/78-15 50-260/78-16 50-296/78-14 Tennessee Valley Authority Attn: Mr. N. B. Hughes Manager of Power 830 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Gentlemen:

This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. M. J. Millsap of this office on June 26, 1978, of activities authorized by NRC Operating License Nos.

DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry 1, 2 and 3 facilities. The results of this inspection are discussed in our Inspection Report Nos.

50-259/78-15, 50-260/78-16 and 50-296/78-14 which was enclosed with our letter to you dated August 31, 1978.

During the inspection, members of your staff measured the amount of radioactive material in an NRC phantom on the mobile whole body counter.

This measurement was also made by other NRC licensees and three Department of Energy laboratories. The results of these measurements are given in the enclosures to this letter.

Enclosure 1 gives the results of the measurements made by your staff, the actual amount of each radionuclide present in the phantom at the time of this measurement, and the ratio of measured to actual amounts. Enclosure 2 gives the ratio of each measurement result to the amount actually present in the phantom at the time of the measure-ment for all measurements made by DOE laboratories and NRC licensees.

Power reactor facility values are denoted by single letters; Department of Energy laboratory values are denoted by double letters. Enclosure 3 discusses general recommendations based on the inspector's observations of these measurements.

'.;:::e 4 Tennessee Valley Authority Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to discuss them with you. No reply to this letter is required.

Sincerely, T. Sutherland, Chief Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/encl:

Mr. J. G. Dewease Plant Superintendent Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35602

0 Enclosure 1 Facility: Browns Ferry Facility Designation: A Date of Measurement: June 26, 1978 Measurement Ratio Result Actual (Measured/Actual)

1. Co-60 0.31 pCi 0.24 pCi 1.29
2. Cs-137 0.21 pCi 0.13 pci 1.62
3. Co-57 0.04 pCi 0.54 pCi 0.07
4. Cs-134 Not Reported 0.58 nCi
5. Cr-51 0.10 pCi Not Present

' Enclosure 2 Ratios (Measured/Actual)

Facility Co-60 Cs-137 Co-57 Cs-134

l. A* l. 29 1. 62 0. 07
2. B 1. 08 l. 92 l. 22
3. C l. 42 l. 31 0. 66
4. D l. 46 0. 85 NR**
5. E 2. 04 2. 77 NR
6. 1. 25 0. 85 l. 22
7. G l. 42 l. 62 l. 33
8. 0. 88 l. 62 0. 63
9. I l. 63 2. 38 0. 23
10. J 2.42 2.62 NR
11. AA 1.36 1.38 2. 97
12. BB 0. 78 0. 92 0. 67
13. CC l. 13 1. 38 l. 00
  • Facility A reported Cr-51 present in the amount of 0.10 pCi.

This was not present in the phantom.

    • NR Not Reported

' Enclosure 3 Observations by the inspector during the course of all phantom measurements suggest three general recommendations for the improvement of the whole body counting programs.

1. The spectrum resulting from each whole body count should be observed in its entirety in order that the presence of unexpected radionuclides will be recognized. Several licensees failed to recognize the presence of the, Co-57 apparently because its gamma energy falls outside a predetermined region of interest.
2. Each licensee should determine the energy response (energy/channel) of his detector over the full range of the spectrum. Several licensees had difficulty identifying the Co-57 once the presence of a low energy emitter was recognized because of the unexpected response of the detectors at low energies.
3. Each licensee should consider some sort of intercomparison or independent standard test of his whole body counter(s). A test of this nature might reveal problems not immediately apparent to an individual group working independently of all others.

'L 0 ~

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