ML17349A555

LER 92-010-00:on 921121,an Automatic Start of 4B EDG Occurred During 3B EDG Safeguards Test.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Administrative Procedure 0-ADM-501 Will Be revised.W/921217 Ltr

ML17349A555
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	12/17/1992
From:	Knorr J, Plunkett T FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-92-335, LER-92-010-02, LER-92-10-2, NUDOCS 9212220363
Download: ML17349A555 (10)

Text

ACCEI Etu.T DOCUMENT DIST UTION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM (RIDS)

~ ACCESS"ON'BR:9212220363 DOC.DATE: 92/12/17 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION KNORRtJ.E. Florida Power & Light Co.

PLUNKETT,T.F.. Florida Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 92-.010-.00:on 921121,an automatic start of 4B EDG occurred during 3B EDG safeguards test. Caused by inadequate D procedure..Administrative Procedure 0-ADM-501 wil be revised.W/921217 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: ZE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL / SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident. Rpt, etc.

NOTES: NRR RAGHAVANPL 05000251 A D

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES'TTR ID CODE/NAME ,LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME ENCL 'D PD2-2 LA 1 1 PD2-2. PD 1 1 AULUCKPR 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP ,2 2 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPBll 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 1 1 NRR'ST SPLB8D1 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 G FIL 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN2 LE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G BRYCE s'J H 2 2 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHYPG.A 1 1 NSIC POORE,W. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTES: 1 1 D

-D D

NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTEl CONTACI'HE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM'DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEEDl FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 30 ENCL 30

0 P.Q. 6ox 029100, Miam>, FL, 33102-9100 i=PL L-92-335 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 4 Docket No. 50-251 Reportable Event: 92-010-00 Automatic Start of 4B Emer enc Diesel Generator The attached Licensee Event Report 251'-92-010-00 is being provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv) .

If there are any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours, my~/-

T. F. Plunkett g+

Vice President Turkey Point Nuclear TFP/JEK/jk enclosure cc: Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Ross C. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant

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92f2220363 92f2f7 PDR ADQCK 0500025i 8 PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER}

DOCKET NUMBER l2) PAGE l3)

FACILITY NAME l1)

TURKEY POINT UNIT 4 05000251 oF 3 Automatic Start of 4B Emergency Diesel Generator EVENT DATE l5) LER NUMBER l6) RPT DATE l1) OTHER FACILITIES INV l8)

MON DAY YR SEO 6 MON DAY YR FACILITY NANES DOCKET 6 lS) ll 21 92 92 010 00 12 17 92 TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 05000250 OPERATING MODE {B) THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE RE UIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 10 CFR 50.73 a 2 POllER LEVEL l10) 100%

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12}

James E. Knorr, Licensing Engineer TELEPHONE NUMBER 305-246-6757 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT l13).

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT NPRDST caUEE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER NPRDS?

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED {14) NO X YES 0 EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE l15)

MONTH DAY

{If yes, coeplete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DaTE)

ABSTRACT l16)

On November 21I 1992I at 1412 ESTF an automatic start of the 4B emergency diesel generator occurred during the 3B emergency diesel generator safeguards test. During this testing, procedure 3-0SP-203.2, Train B Safeguards Integrated Test, required the lifting of leads to prevent the start of the Unit 4 diesel "B" generators upon the initiation of a safety injection signal on Train of Unit 3. Incorrect leads were lifted, due to an inadequate procedure, resulting in the automatic start of the 4B emergency diesel generator upon the injection of a simulated safety injection signal on Unit 3 Train "B". The lead that was lifted resulted in no unexpected action other than the automatic start of the 4B emergency diesel generator. Therefore, the test of the 3B emergency diesel generator was successful.

Corrective actions require the inclusion of applicable wire numbers fo lifted leads in procedures requiring leads to be lifted.

0 I

LXCENSEE ENT REPORT (LER) TEXT NTXNUATZON FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE NO.

TURKEY POINT UNIT' 05000251 92-010-00 02 or 03 EVENT DESCRIPTION On November 21I 1992I at 1412 EST, and automatic start of the 4B emergency diesel generator (EIIS-EK) (IEEE-DG) occurred during the 3B emergency diesel generator safeguards test. At Turkey Point, four safety injection pumps (EIIS-BJ) (IEEE-P) are shared between Units 3 and 4. Each safety injection pump is supplied power from its own safeguards bus (EIIS-EB) (IEEE-BU) . Therefore, upon a valid or simulated safety injection signal from either unit, all four emergency -diesel generators automatically start. During safeguards testing of the 3B emergency diesel generator, test procedure 3-OSP-203.2, Train B Safeguards Integrated Test, required the lifting of leads to prevent the start of the Unit 4 emergency diesel generators upon the injection of a simulated safety injection signal on Train B of Unit 3. The terminal location for the lifted leads was specified; however, the specific lead to be lifted of three leads on the terminal was not specified. The wrong lead was lifted resulting in the 4B,emergency diesel generator automatically starting on the injection of a simulated Unit 3 safety injection signal. Given the configuration of the jumpers at the time of the test, the 4B emergency diesel generator started as designed.

This event was reported to the NRC operations center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)'(2) (ii)-

ZI. EVENT CAUSE The root cause of the automatic start of the 4B emergency diesel generator was an inadequate procedure. As discussed above, operations surveillance procedure 3-0SP-203.2 did not specify in sufficient detail the actual jumper to be lifted to prevent the 4B emergency diesel generator from starting during the test.

IZI. EVENT SAFETY ANALYSIS The 4B emergency diesel generator operated as designed during the integrated safeguards test procedure. The automatic start would not have prevented the 4B emergency diesel generator from performing its intended function had a loss of offsite power occurred concurrently.

Therefore, the health and safety of plant personnel or the general public were not compromised by the automatic start of the 4B emergency diesel generator.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Administrative procedure O-ADM-501, Duties and Responsibilities of System Engineers, will be revised to require the field verification of the adequacy of work operations. This revision is scheduled to be completed by January 31, 1993.

Ot LICENSEE EINT REPORT (LER) TEXT 4NTINUATION FACILE'TY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE NO.

TURKEY POZNT UNIT'4 05000251 92-010-00 03 or 03

2. Administrative Procedure O-ADM-101, Procedure Writers Guide, will be revised to ofrequire the originator of procedure steps or installation of jumpers to field requiring lifting leads verify. the adequacy'of terminal and or wire identification steps in the procedure steps added. This procedure change is scheduled to be complete by January 31, 1993.

3. An internal memo was issued to all'department heads. The memo directed managers to inform personnel of their responsibility when writing a procedure step, which requires the or installation of a jumper, to provide detail lift sufficient of a wire to result in a unique description of the work location.

V. ADDZTZONAL ZNFORMKTZON No other unexpected actuations of engineered .safety features from opposite train testing have occurred in the past two years.