ML17348B472

LER 92-002-00:on 920319,steam/feedwater Flow Mismatch Bistables Not Tripped within 1 H Action Statement When Steam Flow Testing in Progress.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure Revised to Add bistables.W/920420 Ltr

ML17348B472
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	04/20/1992
From:	Plunkett T, Tomonto R FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-92-111, LER-92-002-02, LER-92-2-2, NUDOCS 9204280056
Download: ML17348B472 (8)

Text

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

NBR:9204280056 DOC.DATE: 92/04/20 NOTARIZED: NO 'CCESSION DOCKET FACIL:50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION TOMONTO,R.J. Florida Power 6 Light Co.

PLUNKETT,T.F. Florida Power 6 Light Co. R RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 92-002-00:on 920319,steam/feedwater flow mismatch bistables not tripped, within 1 h action statement when steam D flow testing in progress. Caused by personnel error. Procedure revised to add bistables.W/920420 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES NRR RAGHAVANi L 05000250 D

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL D PD2-2 LA 1 1 PD2-2 PD 1 1 AULUCK,R 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1

1

/ T/SPLB8D1 02 1

1 1

1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 RGN2 FME 01 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G BRYCE i J ~ H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 , NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NSIC POOREiW 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTES: 1 1 D

D D

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 31 ENCL 31

P.O. Box 029100, IVliami, FL, 33102-9100 APR 2 0 1992 L-92-111 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 3 Docket No. 50-250 Reportable Event: 92-002 Date of Event: March 19, 1992 Failure to Tri Steam Flow Feedwater Flow Mismatch Bistables The attached Licensee Event Report 250-92-002 is provided pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (2)(i) (B) to provide information on .

the subject event.

Very truly yours, T. F. Plunkett Vice President Turkey Point Nuclear TFPNRJTNrt Attachment cc: Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant 920'4280056 920420 PDR ADOCK 05000250 8 PDR an FPL Group company Qg2 Z

~c'(

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) .

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUNSER (2) PACE (5)

TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 05000250 1 OF 3 FAILURE TO TRIP STEAM/FEEDWATER FLOW MISMATCH BISTABLES RPT DATE (1) OTHER FACILITIES INV. (Sl EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) 5EQ P RP NON DAY DOCKET P (S)

MON YR NAME 03 19 92 92 002 00 04 20 92 OPERATINC NODE (5) 10 CFR 50.73 2 i B (Speaity in Abetxeat belav end in text) 87 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

R. J. Tomonto, Licensing Engineer 305-246-7327 CONPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACN OONPONENT FAILURE DESCRISED IN TNI5 REPORT (15)

EXPECTED SUPPLENENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (Id) SUSNI 55 ION DATE (1$ ) MONTH DAY YEAR (II yee, aanplete EXPECTED SUSNISSION DATE)

ASSTRACT (14)

At approximately 1311 hours0.0152 days <br />0.364 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />4.988355e-4 months <br /> on March 19, 1992, with Turkey Point Unit 3 operating at 87 percent power and Turkey Point Unit 4 operating at 100 percent power, testing was being performed on the Unit 3 Steam Line High Flow Channels. Plant procedure 3-PMI-072.5, Turbine First Stage Pressure Protection Instrumentation Set IV Channel P-3-447, was in progress to test comparator setpoints for steam line high flow. The procedure required removal from service of the steam flow transmitter which also supplies input to Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch channels.

Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch channels were not removed from service.

At 1413 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.376465e-4 months <br /> on March 19, 1992, testing on the Steam Line High Flow channels was stopped, and the steam flow channels were restored to service. The Reactor Control Operator later determined that the Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch channels had not been removed from service at the same time as the steam flow channels.

Technical Specification 3/4.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, was violated, since the Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch bistables had not been tripped within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ACTION STATEMENT while steam flow testing was in progress.

LICENSEE ANT REPORT (LER) TEXT NTINUATION C

~FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE NO.

TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 05000250 92-002-00 02 OP 03 I. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT At approximately 1311 on March 19, 1992, with Turkey Point Unit 3 operating at 87 percent power and Turkey Point Unit 4 operating at 100 percent power, testing was being performed on the Unit 3 Steam Line High Flow Channels. Plant procedure 3-PMI-072.5, Turbine First Stage Pressure Protection Instrumentation Set IV Channel P-3-447, was in progress to test comparator setpoints for steam line high flow. The procedure required removal from service of the steam flow transmitter which also supplies input to the Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch channels. Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch channels were not removed from service. At 1413 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.376465e-4 months <br /> on March 19, 1992, testing on the Steam Line High Flow channels was stopped, and the steam flow channels were restored to service. When testing resumed at approximately 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br /> on March 19/ 1992'he Reactor Control Operator determined that the Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch channels had not been removed from service at the same time as the Steam flow channels. As a result, the Nuclear Plant Supervisor directed the Instrument and Control (I&C) supervisor to discontinue testing and return the equipment to normal. The I&C Field Supervisor informed the Nuclear Plant Supervisor that the procedure was complete. The Steam Flow channels were immediately returned to service.

At 2030 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.72415e-4 months <br /> on March 19'992'n investigation concluded that during testing between 1311 hours0.0152 days <br />0.364 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />4.988355e-4 months <br /> and 1413 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.376465e-4 months <br />, Unit 3 did not meet the requirements of Technical Specification 3/4.3.1.

Technical Specification Table 3.3-1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, ACTION STATEMENT 6, states the following:

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Technical Specification 3/4.3.1 was violated, since the Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch bistables had not been tripped within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> time restriction, while steam flow testing was in progress. The actual elapsed time was 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, two minutes.

II. CAUSE OF THE EVENT The cause of this event is personnel error during the review of the procedure. Technical Specification 3.3.1 and Table 3.3-1 item 12 requires that when the Steam Line Flow protection channels are removed from service when the unit is in Modes 1 or 2, bistables from Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch protection channels must be placed in the tripped condition within one hour.

Contrary to this requirement, plant procedure 3-PMI-072.5, Turbine First Stage Pressure Protection

LTCENSEE ANT REPORT (LER) TEXT NTXNURTZON FACZLZTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE NO.

TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 05000250 92-002-00 03 oF 03 Instrumentation Set IV Channel P-3 447I only required the First Stage Pressure Channel P-447 and Steam Line High Flow Channels F-475, F-485, and F-495 be removed from service by placing the respective bistables in the tripped condition.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT The reason for this discrepancy is that the original plant procedure for testing the Steam Line High Flow channels was specifically intended to be performed during refueling (Mode 6) and thus only specified that the bistables for the Steam Line High Flow protection be tripped. When this procedure was upgraded to a new format on October 8, 1987, only those bistables previously designated to be tripped were included in the new procedure, even though the new procedure is applicable in all operating modes. Since 1977, the procedure (or portions of the procedure) that govern this activity have only been performed during refueling.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Procedures 3-PMI-072.5 and 3-PMI-072.4 were revised to add bistables for the Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch protection function and annunciators to the removal of the Steam Flow channel from service.

2. All infrequently scheduled load threatening Instrument and Control (I&C) surveillance and calibration procedures were reviewed and found consistent with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements.

3. All load threatening I&C surveillance and calibration procedures will be modified to include review and written acknowledgement by the Reactor Control Operator of channels to be removed from service, and annunciators and status lights expected. These procedural modifications will be completed by 7/31/92. In the interim, I&C will include an Operations Briefing Checksheet with each Plant Work Order issued for infrequently scheduled load threatening maintenance activities.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION No similar LERs have been identified.

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