ML17347B018

LER 89-001-00:on 890209,emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable W/Rhr 4B out-of-svc.Caused by Miscommunication Between Operations Personnel.Procedure O-OSP-023.1 Revised to Require Operability of Required equipment.W/890313 Ltr

ML17347B018
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	03/13/1989
From:	Conway W, Lyons E FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-89-93, LER-89-001-01, LER-89-1-1, NUDOCS 8903200022
Download: ML17347B018 (6)

Text

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ACCESSION NBR:8903200022 DOC.DATE: 89/03/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251 AUTH. NAME . AUTHOR AFFILIATION

.LYONS,E; Florida Power 6 Light Co.

CONWAYFW.F. Florida Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 89-001-00:on 890209,emergency diesel generator inoperable w/RHR 4B out of svc due to miscommunication.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: ZE22D COFZES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, I ENCL Letc.SIZE:

NOTES:

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Turkey Point Unit 4 o s o o o 251 toF 03 A EmergencY D esel Generator Inoperable With 4B Resa.dual Heat Removal Pump Out of Service Due to Mis-Communication Between 0 erations Personnel EVtNT DATE ltl Lth NUMSER (El RESORT DATE (7) OTHER SACILITIKS INVOLVED /4)

YEAR EEOVENTtAL MONTH DAY YEAR SACILtTY NAMES OOCXKT NVM4KR(SI MONTH DAY YEAR NVMEE/t N A 0 S 0 0 0 09 89 89 0 0 1 00 03 1 3 8 9 0 5 0 0 0 THIS RESORT SUSMITTED SVRN/ANT TO THE RKOUIhtMtNTS OS 10 CSh gt /C/McA ono or more o/ the /o//<<t/nf/ (11)

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LICENSEE CONTACT SOR THIS Llh (12)

NAME TELKfHONt NUMSKR 305 24 6-6 731 AREA COOK Edward Lyons, Compliance Engineer

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On February 9, 1989, at approximately 0900, the operations staff was preparing to conduct an operability test of the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) prior to removing the "B" EDG from service . Unit 4 was in mode 6 (refueling) ~ The refueling cavity was filled with water to greater than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange'he 4B Residual Heat Removal pump was out of service for maintenance . At approximately 0926, the operability test of the "A" EDG was commenced. The air start system to the "A" EDG was isolated, and the "A" EDG was manually barred over. The air start system was isolated for approximately 20 minutes.

During the time that the air start system was isolated, the "A" EDG would not have started upon a loss of offsite power, and there would be no RHR available to cool the Unit 4 core . The cause of the event was a mis-co((tnunication between the Assistant Plant Supervisor-Nuclear and the Reactor Control Operator which resulted in the "A" EDG being barred over instead of performing a rapid start . The test procedure contributed to the event, in that, it did not identify that isolating the air start system would render the EDG inoperable. The test of the "A" EDG was successfully completed at approximately 1238. The procedure for EDG

'operability testing was revised to require verification that required opposite tra'in equipment is operable 'prior to barring the EDG.

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LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION AFFAOVSO OMS NO, 3150M)OS EXFIASSNI SISII FACILITYNAMS 11) OOCKST NUMOSA Ill LSA NIANSA (9) FAOS )31 YSAA SSOUSNTIAI. NSVtSlON NUM S II A.. NUM SII Turkey Point Unit 4 TEXT (ifmes S>>cs H ISSUE@, I>>S ~ HRC Fern) SSSA3 ) 117) o s o o o 251 0 0 I 0 2 OF 0 3 DESCRIPTION 0l) THE EVEHT On Pebruary 9, 1989, at approximately 0900, with Unit 4 in mode 6 (refueling),

the operations staff was preparing to perform an operability test of the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) (EIIS:EK, Component:DG) prior to removing the "B" EDG from service for preventive maintenance. The unit was in the process of being refueled, however, there was no fuel movement in progress at the time of the event. The refueling cavity was filled with water to greater than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange. Approximately 85 fuel assemblies had been reloaded into the core prior to the event. The 4B Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

(EIIS:BP, Component:P) pump had previously been removed from service for maintenance .

At approximately 0926, procedure O-OSPW23.1s "Diesel Generator Operability Test" was commenced. This procedure allows for testing the EDG by performing a rapid start, or by manually barring the EDG over prior to start. A mis-communication between the Assistant Plant Supervisor-Nuclear (APSN) (licensed utility employee) and the Unit 4 Reactor Control Operator (RCO) (licensed utility employee) resulted in the "A" EDG being manually barred over prior to starting. The RCO did not realize that this would result in the EDG being inoperable concurrent with the opposite train RHR loop being out of service.

Prior to the EDG being barred over, the air start system is isolated. While the air start system is isolated, the EDG will not start on a loss of offsite power.

The air start system was isolated for approximately 20 minutes.

At Turkey Point Unit 4, the "A" EDG provides emergency power for the 4A RHR pump and the "B" EDG provides emergency power for the 4B RHR pump. Therefore with the 4B RHR pump out of service for maintenance, and the "A" EDG out of service for testing, there would be no RHR available during a loss of offsite power.

The test of the "A" EDG was successfully completed at approximately 1238.

CAUSE OP THE EVENT The event was caused by a mis-communication between the APSN and the Unit 4 RCO, in that, the APSN directed the RCO to perform a rapid start test, which does not require isolation of the air start system, liowever, the RCO performed a test which does require isolation of the air start system. The procedure used to test the EDG contributed to the event, in that, the procedure did not identify that isolating the air start system will render the EDG inoperable .

ANALYSIS Throughout the event, offsite power was available, and cooling was provided for the Unit 4 core by the 4A RHR pump. The Unit 4 core had approximately 85 fuel assemblies loaded at the time of the event, therefore, decay heat levels were very low. The refueling cavity was filled with water to greater than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange. If a loss of offsite power had occurred while the "A" EDG air start system was isolated, the "A" EDG would not have started NIIC FOIIM SSSA 194)3)

NRC Posm 3SSA UA. NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSIOSS (SS3I UCENSEE ENT REPORT(LER) TEXT CONTINU ON APPROVEO OMS NO. 3I 50-0104 EXPIRES: S/31/ES P*CILITY NAME (Il f OOCS T NUMSE h (31 Lfh NUMSfh (SI PACE (3(

YEAR ~.'. SEOVSNTIAL ~'Q

@5 NVM R ....

SION NVM SR Turkey Point Unit 4 o s o o o ,9 001 00 3 OF TE(T /I/msss SMss /e /ssuiNE IMP a4SSsss///hC %%dnII 3SPA's/ (Ill automatically. However, with the low decay heat level, and the high water level, adequate time would be available for an operator to realign the air start system and manually start the "A" EDG. Based on the above, the health and safety of the public was not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The test of the ."A" EDG was successfully completed at approximately 1238.

2) Procedure OWSP-023.1, "Diesel Generator Operability Test" was revised to require that operability of required equipment in the opposite train be verified prior to isolating the air start system for the EDG to be tested.

3) A communications policy formalizing repeat backs has since been issued which should minimize occurrences of this type.

ADDITIONAL IRPOITIO1 Similar events: LER 250-89-001 describes an event involving an EDG and opposite train equipment, however, the circumstances are different NIIC SORM 360A 19431

P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408 0420 APL MARCH 1 3 1989 L-89-93 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 4 Docket Nos. 50-251 Reportable Event: 251-89-01 Date of Event: February 9, 1989 "A" Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable With 4B Residual Heat Removal Pump Out of Service Due to Mis-Communication Between 0 erations Personnel The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 .CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours, g SenioF.

W. nway ice President Nuclear WFC/RHF/gp Attachment cc: Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant an FPL Group company