ML17345A376

LER 88-008-00:on 880815,Phase a of Containment Isolation Train a Actuated.Caused by Wire Bundle Bouncing Contacts of Relay 4-SIA2.Actuation Signal reset.W/880914 Ltr

ML17345A376
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	09/14/1988
From:	Conway W, Salamon G FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
L-88-397, LER-88-008-01, LER-88-8-1, NUDOCS 8809190120
Download: ML17345A376 (4)

Text

ACCELERATED I+TRIBUTION DEMONSXTION SYSI'ZM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8809190120 DOC.DATE: 88/09/14 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SALAMON,G. Florida Power & Light Co.

CONWAY,W.F. Florida Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 88-008-00:on 880815,inadvertent relay actuation relay examination causes Phase A containment isolation.

W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-2 LA 1 1 PD2-2 PD 1 1 EDISON,G 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/NAS 1 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 ARM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 10 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES TELFORD,J 2

1 1

2 1

1

~L NRR/J)R-

/D SIB 9A R DEPY 02 1

1 1

1 1

1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S 4 4 FORD BLDG HOY,A 1 1 I H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS,J 1 1. D NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 S

h D

D TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 46 ENCL 45

NRC Form 388 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94I3) APPROVED OMB NO. 31500(04 EXPIRESI 8/31/88 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)

DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA E FACILITY NAME (I)

Turkey Point Unit 4 o 5 o o o2 51'r-0.2

"'"'",Inadvertent Relay Actuation Following Relay Examination Causes Phase A Containment Isolation EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (8) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

YE'AR oTPPPAP SEQUENTIAL YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)

MONTH OAY YEAR esPI: N VMS E A N/A 0 5 0 0 0 8 1 5 8 8 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 9 1 4 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REOVIREMENTS OF 10 CFR ()I ICnec>> one or more of the IollovilnP/ (11)

OPERATING MODE (8) 20.402(IE) 20.405(cl 50.73(sl(2)(lv) 73.7)(O)

POWE R 20.405(s) (1)(i) 50.38(c)lll 50.73(s) (2)(v) 73.71(c)

LEYEL (10) 0 P P 20.405 I ~ ) (1)(il) 50.38(e)l2) 50.73(sl(2) (vill DTHER ISpeclry in peosrrect Oeiorv enr/In Teprt, NRC Form 20.405 I ~ I 0 l(iii) 50.73(s) (2)(i) 50.73(sl(2)(viiil(A) 3SSAI 20,405( ~ ) Ill(ivl 50.73( ~ l(2HSI 50.73( ~ ) (2)(vltil(BI 20.405(s) (I ) (v) 50.73(s)(2) (ill) 50.73( ~ )(2)(el LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE Gabe Salamon, Compliance Engineer 05 246 - 6 560 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANVFAC TURER IIEPBBTABLE vcIp <<+I CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC TVRER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS pgippjF!

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED l(4) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

YES IIIyeL complete EXPECTED SUSMISS/OIY DATE/ NO ABSTRACT /Limit to /400 sprees, l.e., epprosimeteiy Iilteen slnple specs typewritten lines/ (18)

On August 15, 1988, at 1114, with Unit 4 in mode 3, Phase A of Containment Isolation (CI) train A actuated. Prior to the actuation, a Reactor Control Operator opened the front door to safeguards relay rack QR-44 in order to permit an examination of certain relays by engineering personnel. At the conclusion of the examination, a wire bundle which'as wedged between the door and the relay cabinet was lifted in order to clear the door frame and permit the door to close . At this time, a relay was heard to pick up and train A CI actuated. All phase A CI relays on safeguards relay rack QR-51 actuated.

The most likely cause of the phase A CI was the wire bundle bouncing the contacts of relay 4-SIA2. Tugging on the leads to relays 4-SIA2 and 4-SIM2, which are the relays located closest to the wire bundle, did not result in CI actuation. The relay contacts on 4-SIA2 were inspected with no discrepancies being identified.

Upon confirming that containment conditions did not warrant a phase A CI, the phase A CI actuation signal was reset, and valves were opened as necessary.

Plant Change/Modification packages for the installation of guards to prevent the wire bundle from bumping relays 3-SIA2 and 4-SIA2 are expected to be issued prior to December, 1988. The guards will be installed during the next Unit 3 and Unit 4 outages of sufficient length, following issuance of the Pro)ect Change/Modification packages .

8807)17)0120 880'P)14 PDR ADOCK 050002 '1 S PD("

NRC Form 388

~ NRC Form 3BBA U.S< NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9431 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU ION APPROVEO OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/3l/88 FACILITY NAME (ll DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBE'R (BI PAGE (31 yEAA .'g<<'<< SEQUENTIAL M>42 REVISION NVMSEA ~or'VMSEA Turkey Point Unit 4 o s o o o 8 8 008 0 0 020F 0 2 Tm(T /8'm<<o <<rooo 1F EorE<ood, rroo a /r/Or/on/ HRC f<<rrr 30143/ (I7(

On August 15, 1988, at 1114, with Unit 4 in mode 3, Phase A of Containment Isolation (CI) (EIIS:JM) train A actuated . Prior to the actuation, a Reactor Control Operator (RCO) opened the front door to safeguards relay rack QR-44 in order to permit an examination of certain relays by engineering personnel . At the conclusion of the examination, a wire bundle which was wedged between the door and the relay cabinet was lifted in order to clear the door frame and permit the door to close . At this time, a relay was heard to pick up and train A CI actuated .

All phase A CI relays on safeguards relay rack QR-51 actuated. After determining that containment conditions did not warrant phase A CI, train A was reset.

CAUSE OF EVENT The most likely cause of the phase A CI was the wire bundle bouncing the contacts of relay 4-SIA2. Tugging on the leads to relays 4-SIA2 and 4-SIM2, which are the relays located closest to the wire bundle, did not result in CI actuation. The relay contacts on 4-SIA2 were inspected with no discrepancies being identified.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT Upon the phase A CI actuation, the relays on rack QR-51 actuated . The affected valves isolated, with several flow paths isolating, including letdown, Reactor Coolant Pump seal water return, and Steam Generators A and C blowdown. Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected .

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1) Upon confirming that containment conditions did not warrant a phase A CI, the phase A CI actuation signal was reset, and valves were opened as necessary.

2) Plant Change/Modification packages for the installation of. guards to prevent the wire bundle from bumping relays 3-SIA2 and 4-SIA2 are expected to be issued prior to December, 1988. The guards will be inst'alled during the next Unit 3 and Unit 4 outages of sufficient length, following issuance of the Plant Change/Modification packages.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Similar occurrance: LER 251-86-022 NAC FOAM ESSA *U.S.GPO:1988.0.824 538/455 (94LT I

SEPTEMBER 1 4 $ 988 L-88-397 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 4 Docket No. 50-251 Reportable Event: 88-07 Date of Event: August 15, 1988 Inadvertent Relay Actuation Following Relay Examination Causes Phase A Containment Isolation The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours, W. F. C ay

~~ Senior V ce President Nuclear WFC/TCG/gp Attachment cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant