ML17342A877

LER 87-014-01:on 870711,water Dripping from Auxiliary Feedwater(Afw) Steam Line Discovered & on 870717,AFW Train 1 Declared Inoperable.Cause of Leak Unknown.Affected Piping & Fitting replaced.W/870825 Ltr

ML17342A877
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	08/25/1987
From:	Salamon G, Woody C FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
L-87-349, LER-87-014, LER-87-14, NUDOCS 8708280248
Download: ML17342A877 (6)

Text

REGULATORY ORMATION DISTRIBUTION SY. M (BIDS)

ACCESSION NBR 8708280248 DOC. DATE: 87/08/25 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FAC IL: 50-251 Turkey Point Plant> Unit 4> Florida Pacer and Light C 05000251 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SALAMONI G. Florida PoUjer 8c Light Co.

WOODY'. O. Florida Pomer 5 Light REC IP. NAME AFFILIATION Co.'ECIPIENT

SUBJECT:

LER 87-014-01: on 8707l.ii eater dripping from auxiliary feedeater(AFW) steam l'ine discovered Cc on 870717i AFW Train declared inoperable. Cause of leak unknoUjn. Affected piping fitting replaced. W/870825 ltT.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER) i i

Incident ENCL Letc.SIZE:

Rpti NOTES:

REC IP IENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-2 LA 1 PD2-2 PD 1 McDONALD. D 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/NAS 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEBT/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ELB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/ICSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 1 NRR/DEST/RSI3 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 1 1 N RPB 2 2 NRR/PMAS/ILRB 1 1 EG FILE 02 1 1 RES DEPY GI 1 RDi J 1 1 RES/DE/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EGGG GROHI M 5 5 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS' 1 1 NSIC MAYSI G 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REGUIRED: LTTR 43 ENCL 42

NRC Form 355 U,S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (0-53 I APPROVED OMS NO. 31504104 EXPIRES: SI31ISB LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

DOCKET NUMSER (2) PA E 3 FACILITY NAME (II Turkey Point Unit 4 0 5 0 0 0 2 11 OF 3 TITLE

"'uxiliary Feedwater Train Inoperability Due to Small Steam Su pp 1 y Leak In Excess, of Technical S ecification Time Limit Causes Unit Shutdown EVENT DATE (5I LER NUMBER IEI REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (EI MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR xtngt EEOUENTIAL 5n< REVS~ MONTH DAY YEAR FACI LIT Y NAMES DOCKFT NUMBER(SI ir.RP, N VMS E R NUMBE R 0 5 0 0 0" N/A OI 14 87 7 014 01 08 25 87 0 5 0 0 0

/ THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 C FR ()t (Conc one or more of tne Iolioriingl (11 OPERAT INC MODE (Sl 20.402(S) 10.405(c) 50.7 3(e)(1 I I Ir) 73.7)RII POWE R 20.405 (4 ) I 1)(l) 50.35(c) (I I 50.7 3(e I (2)(r) 73.71(cl I.EYEL OTHER ISpeClfy in ApstreCt 1 p p 20.405( ~ ) Ill(ill 50.35(c) (2) 50.73(el(2) (rEI orson end In Text, IVRC Form 20.405( ~ I (I l((BI 50.73(e)(2)(l) 50.73(el(2) (rill)(A) 35(IAI

~~gFAgj:,p,'., re~>'pp.,

20.405(e)(1)Ilr) 50.73(el(2) (5) 50.73(e)(2)(rlE) (5 I 20405 ( ~ I (1)(r) 50.73(e) 12)(ill) 50.73( ~ )(2)(xl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (11I NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE Gabe Salamon, Compliance Engineer 305 24 6- 65 60 COMPLETE ONE I.INE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS Erjj rV+(x)i CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TURER EPORTABLE X BA P SF SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

YES IIIyn. complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO ABSTRACT ILimrt tO f400 Sprtn, I A, epprOXimeteiy Iilteen Single SpeCe typewritten lrnnl (15)

On July 11, 1987 at approximately 0800, with Unit 4 in mode 1, water was discovered dripping from an Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) steam line.

A Plant Work Order (PWO) was generated to repair the leak. On July 14, at about 1100, the source of the leak was identified as a pinhole on a reducer. Subsequently, a Nonconformance Report was generated on July 17 at 1300, and AFW train )Itl was declared inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) 3.18.1 requires restoration of the inoperable AFW train to an operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or placing the unit in at least mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. As the source of the leak was identified on July 14, the Limiting Condition for Operation for operation with 1 train of AFW started on July 14. The unit entered mode 2 at 2233 on July 15 for an unrelated problem, and entered mode 3 at 1712 on July 17.

The cause of the leak is not known at this time. The fitting and a portion of the adjacent piping have been removed and FPL is performing an analysis of the fitting and the weld. A computerized list of quality/safety related components called the Q-list is maintained. For this PWO, the Q-list did not identify the connected valve as being quality or safety related. The valve was interpreted as non-safety related, and the PWO was treated as not requiring any engineering evaluation. The affected piping and fitting were replaced.

8708280248 870825 PDR ADQCK 0500025k S PDR NRC Fornl 355 (0 531

NRC FOrrn 3BBA ISA) U.B. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM)$$ ION UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMB NO. 3)EOW)OS EXPIREBI B/3)/BB FACILITVNAME )1)

OOCKET NUMBER u) LER NUMBER IB) PACE LE)

VEAR v@ SEOUENTrAL 4)/M ER REVISION 4I/MS ~ 4 Turkey Point Unit 4 o s o o o 8 7 0 I 4 0 1 0 2 OF TEXT ///mors spsosis 0

~ Svt)rRE vss sr/r/r)iorrs/ilrRC Fomr Jr///A'/ I IT)

EVENT On July 11, 1987 at approximately 0800, with Unit 4 in mode 1, water was dis-covered dripping from a lagging covered Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) (EIIS:BA) steam supply drain line. The line is a branch to a steam trap from the steam line which supplies Unit 4 steam to the turbines for AFW train 1. This line is not capable of being isolated from the turbine steam supply. A Plant Work Order (PWO) was generated in order to repair the leak. As the most likely source of a leak would have been faulty valve packing, and the leak was small, resolution of the problem was not given the same attention as would a PWO for an inoperable valve. On July 14, at about 1100, the technician performing the repair identified the source of the leak as a pinhole on a reducer. On the morning of July 17, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Senior Resident Inspector noticed the PWO tag attached to the line, and questioned the fact that a non-safety related (NNS) PWO was hanging on the AFW system, which is a safety-related (SR) system. The Inspector s question initf.ated a re-evaluation of the PWO, and it was determined that the PWO should have been classified as SR.

Subsequently a Non-conformance. Report (NCR) was generated on July 17 at 1300.

Based upon the preliminary NCR disposition which stated that the leak was an operability concern, Auxiliary Feedwater train I/1 was declared inoperable at 1635 on July 17. Technical Specification (TS) 3.18.1 requires restoration of the inoperable AFW train to an operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or placing the unit in at least hot standby (Mode 3) within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Because the technician identified the source of the leak on July 14, it was determined that the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for operation with only 1 train of AFW started at 1100 on July 14. Unit 4 entered Mode 2 at 2233 on July 15, for an unrelated problem. In compliance with the action statement of TS 3.18.1, a unit shutdown was initiated at 1635 on July 17, and the unit entered Mode 3 at 1712 on July 17.  !

CAUSE OF EVENT The engineering evaluation performed as a result of the NCR which was generated on July 17 identified the leak to be pinhole leaks in a 2"xl" reducer weld and a

~

branch line to the steam trap sockolet weld. The c'ause of the pinhole leaks through the welds is not known at this time. The fitting and a portion of the ad)acent piping have been removed and FPL is performing an analysis of the fitting and the weld.

The failure to identify the leak as requiring immediate engineering attention is due to several interrelated factors. Turkey Point has a computer-assisted PWO generation program in place. The computer program which supports the effort is called the Nuclear Job Planning System (NJPS). NJPS fills in several fields on the PWO, however the field identifying the safety classification of the valve was left blank. Turkey 'Point maintains a computerized list of quality/safety related components which is referred to as the Q-List. Valve AFSS 4-043 did not appear on the Q-List. Based on the this, the valve was determined to be NRC FORM 3SSA

)94)3)

NRC Form 3ddA U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (94(31 r LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMB NO. 3150M(Cd EXPIRES: 8/31/dd FACILITY NAME (1) OOCKET NUMBER (31 LER NUMBER (SI PACE (3I YEAR  : SEOUENTIAL REVISION NUM ER .roo NUM ER Turkey Point Unit 4 o s o o o 2 5 1 7 014 0 1 0 oF03 TExT ///moro /poco /F ror/Irr/orL ooo or/did/Nro////Ic Form JEEAB/(IT)

Non-safety, and the PWO was treated as non-safety related and thus did not require an engineering evaluation. Additionally, the PWO identified the leak to be a "valve packing or piping leak." The planning and QC personnel focused in on the "valve" and failed to realize the potential consequences of the leak being in a safety related section of the pipe.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT The AFW system serves as a backup system for supplying feedwater to the secondary side of the steam generators for residual heat removal from the reactor when the normal feedwater and standby steam generator feedwater systems are not available.

The residual heat removal function is required for loss of main feed, loss of offsite power, and small break Loss of Coolant Accident.

At the time of this event, Unit 4 was at 100% power and Unit 3 was in Mode 5 (cold shutdown). No events requiring AFW system operation occurred following the discovery of the leak, and prior to unit shutdown. Even initiation had occurred, AFW train 2 was operable and capablean ofevent if requiring AFW performing its design function. Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1) The affected piping and fitting was replaced.

2) The section of pipe with the leak was removed and will be examined to determine the root cause.

3) Planning personnel were instructed to not assume that when a component is not listed on the Q-list that the component is therefore NNS. They are to determine through the use of an alternate method the actual safety classification of the item.

4) Valve AFSS 4-043 will be added to the Q-list.

5) Additional corrective actions will be evaluated, based on the results of the root cause determination of Corrective Action (2).

ADDITIONAL DETAILS Piping was welded by Bechtel Group.

Similar occurrences: none.

NRC FOAll 3ddA 19431

P. o. BOX 0, Juwo BEACH, FL 3340S 0:z.

AUGUST 2 5 198(

L-87-349 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk

.'-'~. Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 4 Docket No. 50-25 I Reportable Event: 87-I4 Revision I Date of Event: July l4, l987 Auxiliary Feedwater Train Inoperability Due To Small Steam Supply Leak In Excess of Technical S ecification Time Limit Causes Unit Shutdown The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of IO CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

This revision is being submitted to correct an incorrect Event Date in blank (5) and delete extra words inadvertently left in a sentence in the Cause of Event section in Revision 0, L-87-33 I.

Very truly yours, Group Vi resident Nuclear Energy COW/SDF/gp Attachment cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator, Region ll, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant an FPL Group company SDF I /052/I