NRC 2010-0022, License Amendment Request 261, Extended Power Uprate & Transmittal of Proposed Technical Specifications for Reactor Protection System & Engineered Safety Features Setpoints Not Associated with Extended Power Uprate

License Amendment Request 261, Extended Power Uprate & Transmittal of Proposed Technical Specifications for Reactor Protection System & Engineered Safety Features Setpoints Not Associated with Extended Power Uprate

ML100600576
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	02/25/2010
From:	Meyer L Nextera Energy, Point Beach
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NRC 2010-0022
Download: ML100600576 (165)

Text

February 25,201 0 POINT BEACH NRC 201 0-0022 10 CFR 50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Dockets 50-266 and 50-301 Renewed License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 License Amendment Recluest 261, Extended Power Uprate Transmittal of Proposed Technical Specifications for Reactor Protection Svstem and Enaineered Safetv Features Setpoints Not Associated with Extended Power Uprate

References:

( 1 FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC letter to NRC, dated April 7, 2009, License Amendment Request 261, Extended Power Uprate (ML091250564)

(2)

NRC letter to NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, dated June 29, 2009, Deferral of the Extended Power Uprate Acceptance Review and Acceptance Review of the Auxiliary Feedwater Modifications and Non Conservative Setpoint Technical Specifications (TAC Nos. ME1 044, ME1 045, ME1 081, ME1 082, ME1 083, and ME1 084) (ML091760338)

(3)

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC letter to NRC, dated December 8,2009, License Amendment Request 261, Supplement 3, Extended Power Uprate (ML093430114)

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (NextEra) submitted License Amendment Request (LAR) 261 (Reference I ) to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. The proposed amendment would increase each unit's licensed thermal power level from 1540 megawatts thermal (MWt) to 1800 MWt, and revise the Technical Specifications (TS) to support operation at the increased thermal power level.

After initial review of LAR 261, the NRC accepted the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) modifications and non-Extended Power Uprate (EPU) related reactor protection system (RPS) and engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) setpoints portions for review (Reference 2).

Supplement 3 to LAR 261 (Reference 3) was submitted to the NRC to provide revised proposed changes for the RPS lnstrumentation TS Table 3.3.1-1 and ESFAS lnstrumentation TS Table 3.3.2-1. The proposed changes provided in Reference (3) inclyded both EPU related and non-EPU related changes.

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 6610 Nuclear Road, Two Rivers, WI 54241

Document Control Desk Page 2 The proposed changes also included the addition of a new column, Nominal Trip Setpoint. This column was added in order to be consistent with the TS Table format in NUREG 1431, Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plant, and the joint NRC and industry efforts to clarify the application of setpoint methodology for Limiting Safety System Settings functions.

NextEra is requesting that NRC review and approve the proposed changes for non-EPU RPS and ESFAS setpoints prior to the NRC completing the review of LAR 261. Therefore, certain proposed changes for TS Table 3.3.1-1 and TS Table 3.3.2-1 associated with the non-EPU setpoints are provided for NRC review.

Enclosure I provides the basis for the selection of non-EPU RPS and ESFAS setpoints, for which NextEra request approval prior to the NRC completing the review of LAR 261. provides TS Table 3.3.1-1 and TS Table 3.3.2-1 proposed changes for non-EPU related setpoints. provides a markup of proposed TS Bases associated with the proposed changes listed in Enclosure 2. The bases are being provided for information. NRC approval is not being requested.

NextEra requests a 180-day implementation period for the proposed TS changes identified in.

This letter contains no new Regulatory Commitments and no revisions to existing Regulatory Commitments.

The proposed TS changes have been reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

The information contained in this letter does not alter the no significant hazards consideration contained in Reference (3) and continues to satisfy the criteria of 10 CFR 51.22 for categorical exclusion from the requirements of an environmental assessment.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this letter is being provided to the designated Wisconsin Official.

Document Control Desk Page 3 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on February 25,201 0.

Very truly yours, NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

,=u(il Larry Meyer Site Vice President Enclosures cc:

Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Project Manager, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC Resident Inspector, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC PSCW

ENCLOSURE I NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST 261, EXTENDED POWER UPRATE TRANSMITTAL OF PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SETPOINTS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH EXTENDED POWER UPRATE BASIS FOR SELECTION OF NON-EPU REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM SETPOINTS Supplement 3 to License Amendment Request (LAR) 261 (Reference I ) was submitted to the NRC to provide revised proposed changes for the reactor protection system (RPS) instrumentation Technical Specifications (TS) Table 3.3.1-1 and engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) instrumentation TS Table 3.3.2-1. The proposed changes provided in Reference (I) included both EPU related and non-Extended Power Uprate (EPU) related changes.

NextEra is requesting the NRC review and approve the proposed changes for the non-EPU RPS and ESFAS setpoints prior to the NRC completing the review of LAR 261.

Therefore, proposed changes for TS Table 3.3.1-1 and TS Table 3.3.2-1 associated with the non-EPU setpoints are required.

The following non-EPU proposed changes were submitted in Reference (1):

RPS Setpoints:

TS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 2.b, Power Range Neutron Flux - Low TS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 3, lntermediate Range Neutron Flux TS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 4, Source Range Neutron Flux TS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 8, Pressurizer Water Level - High TS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 9.a, Reactor Coolant Flow-Low - Single Loop TS Table 3.3.1 -1, Function 9.b, Reactor Coolant Flow-Low - Two Loops TS Table 3.3.1 -1, Function 1 1, Undervoltage Bus A01 & A02 TS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 12, Underfrequency Bus A01 & A02 TS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 14, Steam Generator Water Level - Low - Coincident With Steam FlowlFeedwater Flow Mismatch TS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 17.a, Reactor Trip System Interlocks, lntermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 TS Table 3.3.1 -1, Function 17.b(l), Reactor Trip System Interlocks, Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7, Power Range Neutron Flux TS Table 3.3.1 -1, Function 17.b(2), Reactor Trip System Interlocks, Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7, Turbine Impulse Pressure TS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 17.e, Reactor Trip System Interlocks, Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 Page 1 of 4

ESFAS Setpoints:

TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function I

.c, Safety lnjection - Containment Pressure - High TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function I

.dl Safety lnjection - Pressurizer Pressure - Low TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 2.c, Containment Spray - Containment Pressure -

High High TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4.c, Steam Line Isolation - Containment Pressure -

High High TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4.d, Steam Line Isolation - High Steam Flow Coincident with Safety lnjection and Coincident with Tavg - Low (Low Tavg lnterlock only)

TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 5.b, Feedwater Isolation on SG Water Level - High TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 6.d, Auxiliary Feedwater - Undervoltage Bus A01 and A02 TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 8, Safety lnjection Block - Pressurizer Pressure The proposed TS Table 3.3.1-1 and TS Table 3.3.2-1 changes associated with non-EPU related setpoints are provided in Enclosure 2. Six of the RPS and ESFAS setpoints were originally designated as non-EPU setpoints in Reference (I). Five of these six setpoints are non-EPU related setpoint changes that will be implemented with EPU related setpoints because implementing these TS changes is safer when the units are off-line. TS 3.3.2, Function 8, St Block - Pressurizer Pressure is EPU related and therefore not included in this submittal. NextEra requests approval of the following non-EPU RPS and ESFAS setpoints with the balance of EPU related RPS and ESFAS setpoints previously submitted in Reference (1).

o TS 3.3.1, Function 3, Intermediate Range Neutron Flux - Although the instruments are set conservatively, physical changes to the field instrument settings are required in order to implement the new TS.

a TS 3.3.1, Function 17.a, Reactor Trip System Interlocks, Intermediate Range Neutron Flux P Although the instruments are set conservatively, physical changes to the field instrument settings are required in order to implement the new TS.

e TS 3.3.1, Function 17.b(l), Reactor Trip System Interlocks, Power Range Neutron Flux - Low Power Reactor Trips Block P-7 lnterlock - Although the instruments are set conservatively, physical changes to the field instrument settings are required in order to implement the new TS.

TS 3.3.1, Function I7.b(2), Reactor Trip System Interlocks, Turbine Impulse Pressure - Low Power Reactor Trips Block P-7 lnterlock - Although the instruments are set conservatively, physical changes to the field instrument settings are required in order to implement the new TS.

TS 3.3.1, Function 17.e, Reactor Trip System Interlocks, Power Range Neutron Flux P-10 lnterlock - Although the instruments are set conservatively, physical changes to the field instrument settings are required in order to implement the new TS.

TS 3.3.2, Function 8, SI Block - Pressurizer Pressure - This setpoint has been determined to be EPU related because the TS change is associated with elimination of the capability to operate with the reactor coolant system (RCS) at 2000 psia.

Page 2 of 4

Based on the above, NextEra request approval of the following EPU RPS and ESFAS setpoints:

RPS Setpoints:

0 Function 2.b, Power Range Neutron Flux - Low e Function 4, Source Range Neutron Flux Function 8, Pressurizer Water Level - High Function 9.a, Reactor Coolant Flow-Low - Single Loop e Function 9.b, Reactor Coolant Flow-Low - Two Loops e Function 11, Undervoltage Bus A01 & A02 e Function 12, Underfrequency Bus A01 & A02 Function 14, Steam Generator Water Level - Low - Coincident With Steam FlowIFeedwater Flow Mismatch ESFAS Setpoints:

e Function 1.c, Safety lnjection - Containment Pressure - High Function 1. dl Safety lnjection - Pressurizer Pressure - Low e Function 2.c, Containment Spray - Containment Pressure - High High a Function 4.c, Steam Line Isolation - Containment Pressure - High High e Function 4.d, Steam Line Isolation - High Steam Flow Coincident with Safety lnjection and Coincident with Tavg - Low (Low Tavg Interlock only) e Function 5.b, Feedwater Isolation - SG Water Level - High 0 Function 6.d, Auxiliary Feedwater - Undervoltage Bus A01 and A02 The proposed changes to TS Table 3.3.1-1 and TS Table 3.3.2-1 for the non EPU related setpoints provided in Enclosure 2 are the same as the corresponding non-EPU RPS and ESFAS setpoints previously submitted in Reference (I). For'those RPS and ESFAS setpoints required to be implemented with EPU, administrative notes are provided in the Nominal Trip Setpoint column for the associated functions. These administrative notes are necessary because Nominal Trip Setpoints are not available for current licensed power level conditions for those functions associated with EPU.

Additionally, a single asterisk (*) footnote is provided in TS Table 3.3.2-1 to identify that TS 3.3.2-1, Function 7, does not have a Nominal Trip Setpoint TS established for current licensed power level and that Function 7 will be deleted as part of EPU implementation.

A double asterisk (**) footnote is included in TS Table 3.3.1-1 and TS Table 3.3.2-1 to identify that Nominal Trip Setpoints for EPU affected functions are proposed in EPU LAR 261, Supplement 3 (Reference I).

Page 3 of 4

References (I) NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC letter to NRC, dated December 8, 2009, Point Beach Units 1 and 2, License Amendment Request 261, Supplement 3, Extended Power Uprate (ML093430114)

Page 4 of 4

ENCLOSURE 2 NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS I AND 2 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST 261, EXTENDED POWER UPRATE TRANSMITTAL OF PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SETPOINTS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH EXTENDED POWER UPRATE PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES 13 pages follow

RPS instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 8 2)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation I

NOMlNAL FUNCTION APPLICABLE REQUIRED SURVEIWCE ALLOWABLE 22%!E MODES CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOlNT I. Manual Reactor

$ 2 2

B SR 3.3.1.13 N A t* -

Trip 3(a), 4(a), 5(a) 2 C

SR 3.3.1.13 N A

2.

Power Range Neutron Flux

a.

High

b.

Low 1 2 4

D SR 3.3.1.1 i 108% RTP SR 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 D

SR 3.3.1.1 5 245% RTP 29% RTP SR 3.3.1.8~

2!&

SR 3. 3. 1. 1 1 ~

3.

Intermediate Range I ( ~ ), 2 ( ~ )

2 F,G SR 3.3.1.1 i 40% RTP Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11

4.

Source Range Neutron Flux

5.

Overtemperature AT

6.

Overpower AT D

SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 1 SR 3.3.1.3 (Page 3.3.1-1 8)

SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 1 2 4

D SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 2 SR 3.3.1.7 (Page 3.3.1-20)

I SR 3.3.1.11 (continued)

(a)

With Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.

(b)

Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.

(c)

Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlock.

(d)

Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlock.

m laJ.e 3-3.1 4 are a Q D h k k were 761.

Point Beach Unit I - Amendment No. 2-M-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2Q6

RPS lnstrumentation 3.3.1 I

Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 8 9)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation NOMlNAL APPLICABLE REQUIRED SURVEIUANCE ALLOWABLE z!3!E FUNCTION MODES CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOlNT

7.

Pressurizer Pressure

a.

Low

b.

High

8.

Pressurizer 1 (el 3

K SR 3.3.1.1 1Q4%4qm Water Level -

SR 3.3.1.7""

High SR 3.3.1.I lW

9.

Reactor Coolant Flow-Low

a.

Single Loop

b.

Two Loops

10.

Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)

Breaker Position

a.

Single Loop

b.

Two Loops I

(9 3 per loop L

SR 3.3.1.I r 90%

SR 3.3.1.*

SR 3.3.1.11W 1(9) 3 per loop K

SR 3.3.1.I 2 90%

!%Qi SR 3.3.1.7""

SR 3.3.1.11""

I (0

1 per RCP M

SR 3.3.1.73 N A 1(g) 1 per RCP N

SR 3.3.1.13 N A 1 1.

Undervoltage Bus A01 & A02 1 (el 2 per bus K

SR 3.3.1.9 2 3120 V 2J=z!Ll SR 3.3.1.10""

I (continued)

Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.

Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.

Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock and below the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.

r 1905 psig during operation at 2250 psia, or 1800 psig during operation at 2000 psia.

1 2385 psig during operation at 2250 psia, or 12210 psig during operation at 2000 psia.

3.3.1-1 Notes 4 are d Power A

n d

l l

~t 8 Point Beach Unit I - Amendment No. 281 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS lnstrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 82) 1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation NOMlNAL FUNCTION APPLICABLE REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE zB!E MODES CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMEMS VALUE SETPOlNT

12.

Underfrequency 2 per bus E

SR 3.3.1.10~

2 55.0 Hz sz&Z Bus A01 & A02

13.

Steam Generator 1 2 3 per SG D

SR 3.3.1.I 2.20% of span (SG)

SR 3.3.1.7 Water Level -

SR 3.3.1.11 Low Low

14.

SG Water 1 2 2 per SG D

SR 3.3.1.I PIA Level -

Low SR 3.3.1.7'""

SR 3.3.1.11m Coincident with 1 2 2 per SG D

SR 3.3.1.1

< 1 E6 lblhr Steam SR 3.3.1.7W 1

FlowIFeedwater SR 3.3.1.I lW Flow Mismatch

15.

Turbine Trip

a.

Low 1 (i) 3 0

SR 3.3.1.I4 N A Autostop Oil I

Pressure

b.

Turbine 1 (i) 2 0

SR 3.3.1.14 N A Stop Valve I

Closure

16.

Safety Injection 1 2 2 trains P

SR 3.3.1.13 N A (St) Input from I

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

(continued)

(e)

Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.

(j)

Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.

m -I--

were 761.

Point Beach Unit I - Amendment No. 281 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24X

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 4 of 8 9)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation FUNCTION NOMlNAL APPLICABLE REQUIRED SURVEIMCE ALLOWABLE L!3!R MODES W N E L S CONDITIONS REQUlREMENlS VALUE sEJ2Q&I

17.

Reactor Trip System Interlocks

a.

Intermediate Range a@)

2 R

SR 3.3.1.I 1

> 1E-10 amp Neutron Flux, P-6 SR 3.3.1.12

b.

Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 (1)

Power Range 1

4 S

SR 3.3.1.1 1

< 10% RTP Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.12 (2)

Turbine 1

2 S

SR 3.3.1.11

< 10% turbine Impulse SR 3.3.1.12 power Pressure

c.

Power Range 1

4 S

SR 3.3.1.11

< 50% RTP Neutron Flux, P-8 SR 3.3.1.12

d.

Power Range 1 (k) 4 S

SR 3.3.1.11

< 50% RTP Neutron Flux. P-9 SR 3.3.1.12

e.

Power Range 1 2 4

R SR 3.3.1.11

> 8% RTP and Neutron Flux, P-10 SR 3.3.1.12

< 10% RTP

18.

Reactor Trip 1 2 2 trains Q

SR 3.3.1.4 N A Breakers (RTBs) 3(a), 4(a), 5(a) 2 trains T

SR 3.3.1.4 N A

19.

Reactor Trip Breaker 12-1 each per U

SR 3.3.1.4 N A Undervoltage and Shunt RTB Trip Mechanisms

$31, 4(a), 5(a) 1 each per T

SR 3.3.1.4 N A RTB (continued)

(a)

With the RTBs closed and the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.

(d)

Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlock.

(k)

With 1 of 2 circulating water pump breakers closed and condenser vacuum t 22 "Hg.

Point Beach Unit I - Amendment No. -281 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2433

RPS lnstrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 8 2)

I Reactor Protection System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE MODES CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOlNT

20.

Reactor Trip Bypass

?(I), ~(1) 1 V

SR 3.3.1.4 N A Breaker and associated Undervoltage Trip 3(0, 4(0, 5(1) 1 W

SR 3.3.1.4 N A Mechanism

21.

Automatic Trip Logic 1,2 2 trains P

SR 3.3.1.5 N A SR 3.3.1.15 I

3(a), 4(@, da) 2 trains X

SR 3.3.1.5 N A 1

(a)

With RTBs closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.

(I)

When Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers are racked in and closed and the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal.

were I

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 24%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 208 I

Table 3.3.1-1 (page 6 of 8 2)

Reactor Protection System lnstrumentation RPS lnstrumentation 3.3.1 I

Note I

Overtem~erature AT where (values are applicable to operation at both 2000 psia and 2250 psia unless otherwise indicated)

AT,

=

indicated AT at rated power, OF T

average temperature, OF T'

["]OF (for cores containings422V+ fuel assemblies)

I-'

I

[*]OF (for cores not containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

P pressurizer pressure, psig P'

["I psig (for 2250 psia operation)

P'

["I psig (for 2000 psia operation and cores not containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

KI

["I (for 2250 psia operation and cores containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

K,

["I (for 2250 psia operation and cores not containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

K1

["I (for 2000 psia operation and cores not containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

K2

["I (for 2250 psia operation and cores containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

K2

["I (for 2250 psia operation and cores not containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

K2

["I (for 2000 psia operation and cores not containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

K3

["I (for 2250 psia operation and cores containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

K3

[*I (for 2250 psia operation and cores not containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

K3

["I (for 2000 psia operation and cores not containing 422V+ fuel assemblies) 91

[*I sec 72

["I sec 93

["I sec for Rosemont or equivalent RTD

[*I sec for Sostman or equivalent RTD 94

[*I sec for Rosemont or equivalent RTD

["I sec for Sostman or equivalent RTD and f(A1) is an even function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range nuclear ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests, where qt and qb are the percent power in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and qt + qb is total core power in percent of rated power, such that:

(a) for qt - qb within -["I,

+["I percent, f(Al) = 0 for cores not containing 422V+ fuel assemblies; for qt - qb within -["I,

+["I percent, f(A1) = 0 for cores containing 422V+ fuel assemblies.

(b) for each percent that the magnitude of qt - qb exceeds +["I percent, the AT trip setpoint shall be automatically reduced by an equivalent of ["I percent of rated power for cores not containing 422V+ fuel assemblies and reduced by an equivalent of ["I percent of rated power for cores containing 422V+ fuel assemblies.

Point Beach 3.3.1-18 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 281-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 20.6

Table 3.3.1-1 (page 7 of 8 2)

Reactor Protection System lnstrumentation RPS lnstrumentation 3.3.1 I

Note 1 : Overtemperature AT [continued)

(c) for cores not containing 422V+ fuel assemblies, for each percent that the magnitude of qt-qb exceeds -[*I percent, the AT trip setpoint shall be automatically reduced by an equivalent of ["I percent of rated power; for cores containing 422V+ fuel assemblies, for each percent that the magnitude of qt - qbexceeds -[*I percent, the AT trip setpoint shall be automatically reduced by an equivalent of ["I percent of rated power.

The values denoted with [*I are specified in the COLR.

Point Beach Unit I - Amendment No. 281-Unit 2 - Amendment No. il-B(i

Table 3.3.1-1 (page 8 of I3 $3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Note 2: Overpower AT RPS lnstrumentation 3.3.1 I

where (values are applicable to operation at both 2000 psia and 2250 psia) indicated AT at rated power, O F average temperature, O F

[*]OF (for cores containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

[*]OF (for cores not containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

[*I of rated power (for cores containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

[*I of rated power (for cores not containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

["I for increasing T

["I for decreasing T

["I for T 2 T' (for cores containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

[*I for T 2 T' (for cores not containing 422V+ fuel assemblies)

["I for T < T'

[*I sec

[*I sec for Rosemont or equivalent RTD

[*I sec for Sostman or equivalent RTD

[*I sec for Rosemont or equivalent RTD

[*I sec for Sostman or equivalent RTD The values denoted with ["I are specified in the COLR.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS lnstrumentation Table 3.3.1-1 (oaae 9 of 9)

Reactor Protection Svstem lnstrumentation If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verifv that it is functionina as required before returnina the channel to service, The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-inal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at t left tolerance around the Nom he completion of the surveillance: otherwise. the channel shall be declared inoperable, Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable orovided that the as-found and as-left tolerances applv to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field settina) to confirm channel performance. The methodoloa~es used to determ~ne the as-found and the as-left tolerances are soecified in FSAR Section 7.2.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. ;381 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

ESFAS lnstrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 3 &)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation I

I NOMlNAL FUNCTION APPLICABLE REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE MODES CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOlNT

1. Safety Injection

a. Manual Initiation 1,2,3,4 2

B SR 3.3.2.7 N A

b. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C

SR 3.3.2.2 N A Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 and Actuation I

SR 3.3.2.5 Relays

c. Containment 1 2 3 Pressure-High

d. Pressurizer Pressure-Low 1,2,3(a)

e. Steam Line 1,2,3(b) 3 per Pressure-Low steam line D

SR 3.3.2.1 2 500(~)

psig SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.8

2.

Containment Spray

a.

Manual 1,2,3,4 2

E SR 3.3.2.7 Initiation

b.

Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C

SR 3.3.2.2 Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.5 Actuation Relays

c.

Containment 1,2,3 2 sets D

SR 3.3.2.1 I.-

Pressure-of 3 SR 3.3.2.3&

i2zSk4 High High SR 3.3.2.8@

siZLfX&

(continued)

(a)

Pressurizer Pressure > 1800 psig.

(b) Pressurizer Pressure > 1800 psig, except during Reactor Coolant System hydrostatic testing.

(c)

Time constants used in the leadllag controller are tq 2 12 seconds and t2 S 2 seconds.

&a I in Fxtended Power Point Beach Unit I - Amendment No. -281-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 2 of 3 9)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System lnstrumentation NOMlNAL APPLICABLE REQUIRED SURMILIANCE ALLOWABLE z!i!E FUNCTION MODES CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOlNT

3.

Containment Isolation 1,2,3,4 2

B SR 3.3.2.7 N A

a.

Manual Initiation 1,2,3,4 2 trains C

SR 3.3.2.4 N A

b.

Automatic Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.5 and Actuation Relays

c.

Safety lnjection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements, except Manual SI initiation.

4.

Steam Line Isolation

a.

Manual Initiation

,2(d),3(d)

I lloop F

SR 3.3.2.7

b.

Automatic 1,2(d),3(d) trains G

SR 3.3.2.2 Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.5 and Actuation Relays

c.

Containment 1,2(d),3(d) 3 Pressure-High High

d.

High Steam 1,2(d),3(d) 2 per D

SR 3.3.2.1 5 AP Flow steam line SR 3.3.2.3 corresponding SR 3.3.2.8 to 0.66 x 10' lblhr at 1005 Psi9 Coincident with Safety lnjection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

and Coincident with 1,2(d),3(d)

TaVg-Low

e.

High High I

,2(d),3(d) 2 per D

SR 3.3.2.1 5 AP Steam Flow steam line SR 3.3.2.3 corresponding SR 3.3.2.8 to 4 x 10' lblhr at 806 psig Coincident with Safety lnjection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

(continued)

(d) Except when all MSlVs are closed and de-activated.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2%

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

ESFAS lnstrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 3 of B 4J Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation I

APPLICABLE REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE NOMlNAL FUNCTION MODES CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE LBlLi SETPOlNT

5.

Feedwater Isolation

a.

Automatic 1,2(0),3(e) 2 trains G

SR 3.3.2.2 N A Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 I

Relays I

b.

SG Water

,2(8),3(8) 3 per SG D

SR 3.3.2.1

PIP, z&%

Level-High SR 3.3.2.3@

s..9Q!%

SR 3.3.2.8&

c.

Safety lnjection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

6.

Auxiliary Feedwater I

1,2,3 2 trains G

SR 3.3.2.2 N A

a.

Automatic Actuation Logic I

and Actuation Relays I

b.

SG Water Level-1,2,3 3 per SG Low Low SR 3.3.2.8 I

c.

Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

d.

Undervoltage 1 2 2 per bus H

SR 3.3.2.6 2 3120 V i3z3s.J Bus A01 and SR 3.3.2.8&

A02 I

7.

Condensate Isolation 3

D SR 3.3.2.1

a.

Containment I

,2(e),3(e) 1 6 psig Pressure-High SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.8

b.

Automatic 1,2(#),3@)

2 trains G

SR 3.3.2.2 NIA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 Relays

8.

SI Block -

1 2 3 3

I SR 3.3.2.1 5 1800 psig Pressurizer Pressure SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.8 I

(e)

Except when all MFRVs and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated.

Point Beach Unit I - Amendment No. 24%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS lnstrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 fpaae 4 of 4)

Enaineered Safetv Feature Actuation Svstem lnstrumentation Note 1:

If h

-f n

nel i

d tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verifv that it is functionina as required before returnina the channel to service.

The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within t h a - f P

e le c

r completion of the surveillance: otherwise, the channel shall be declared i

erable S oin r

are ac le s

provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apglv to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field settina) to ch el erfo I

e etermi e

as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in FSAR Section 7.2.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 24%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ENCLOSURE 3 NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST 261, EXTENDED POWER UPRATE TRANSMITTAL OF PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SETPOINTS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH EXTENDED POWER UPRATE PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES CHANGES (FOR INFORMATION ONLY) 143 pages follow

RPS lnstrumentation B 3.3.1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) lnstrumentation BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv a~plicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13, 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l), 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

BACKGROUND The RPS initiates a unit shutdown, based on the values of selected unit parameters, to protect against violating the core fuel design limits and Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary during anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) and to assist the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems in mitigating accidents.

The protection and monitoring systems have been designed to assure safe operation of the reactor. This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the RPS, as well as specifying LCO's on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance.

The LSSS, defined in this specification as the Allowable Value Setpoints, in conjunction with the LCOs, establish the threshold for protective system action to prevent exceeding acceptable limits during Design Basis Accidents (DBAs).

During AOOs, which are those events expected to occur one or more times during the unit life, the acceptable limits are:

1. The Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) shall be maintained above the Safety Limit (SL) value to prevent departure from nucleate boiling (DNB);

2. Fuel centerline melt shall not occur; and

3. The RCS pressure SL of 2750 psia shall not be exceeded.

Operation within the SLs of Specification 2.0, "Safety Limits (SLs)," also maintains the above values and assures that offsite dose will be within the 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 100 criteria during AOOs.

Accidents are events that are analyzed even though they are not expected to occur during the unit life. The acceptable limit during accidents is that offsite dose shall be maintained within an acceptable fraction of 10 CFR ?OD limits. Different accident categories are allowed a different fraction of these limits, based on probability of occurrence.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-1 Unit 1 - Amendment N 0. W Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS lnstrumentation.

B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to UPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6, 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 1O.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

BACKGROUND Meeting the acceptable dose limit for an accident category is considered (continued) having acceptable consequences for that event.

The RPS instrumentation is segmented into four distinct but interconnected modules as identified below:

1. Field transmitters or process sensors: provide a measurable electronic signal based upon the physical characteristics of the parameter being measured;

2. Signal Process Control and Protection System, including Analog Protection System, Nuclear lnstrumentation System (NIS), field contacts, and protection channel sets: provides signal conditioning, compatible electrical signal output to protection system devices, and control boardlcontrol room/miscellaneous indications;

3. Relay Logic System, including input, logic, and output devices:

initiates proper unit shutdown in accordance with the defined logic, which is based on bistable, setpoint comparators, or contact outputs from the signal process control and protection systems; and

4. Reactor trip switchgear, including reactor trip breakers (RTBs) and bypass breakers: provides the means to interrupt power to the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) and allows the rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs), or "rods," to fall into the core and shut down the reactor. The bypass breakers allow testing of the RTBs at power.

Field Transmitters or Sensors To meet the design demands for redundancy and reliability, more than one, and often as many as four, field transmitters or sensors are used to measure unit parameters. To account for the calibration tolerances and instrument drift, which are assumed to occur between calibrations, statistical allowances are provided in the Allowable Values. The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor can be evaluated when its "as found" calibration data are compared against its documented acceptance criteria.

Siqnal Process Control and Protection Svstem Generally, three or four channels of process control equipment are used for the signal processing of unit parameters measured by the field instruments. The process control equipment provides signal conditioning, comparable output signals for instruments located on the main control board, and comparison of measured input signals with Point Beach B 3.3.1-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I, 2.a. 3,

5. 6, 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13, 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.bi2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

BACKGROUND setpoints established by safety analyses. If the measured value of a unit (continued) parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint, an output from a bistable is forwarded to the logic relays.

Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits, three channels with a two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy. If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a partial Function trip, the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails, such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two logic.

Generally, if a parameter is used for input to the relay logic system and a control function, four channels with a two-out-of-four logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy. The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Again, a single failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation.

These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1968 (Ref. 3). The actual number of channels required for each unit parameter is specified in Reference 1.

Two logic channels are required to ensure no single random failure of a logic channel will disable the RPS. The logic channels are designed such that testing required while the reactor is at power may be accomplished without causing trip. Provisions to allow removing logic channels from service during maintenance are unnecessary because of the logic system's designed reliability.

Allowable Values To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment errors for those RPS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 4), the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1-1 in the accompanying LC0 are conservatively adjusted with respect to the analytical limits. A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the Trip Setpoints, including their explicit uncertainties, is provided in DGI-01, "Instrument Setpoint Methodology" (Ref. 5). The actual nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the bistable is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to account for changes in random measurement errors detectable by a COT. One example of such a change in measurement error is drift during the surveillance interval. If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the bistable is considered OPERABLE.

Point Beach B 3.3.1 -3 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6, 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13, 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.bf2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

BACKGROUND Setpoints in accordance with the Allowable Value ensure that SLs are not (continued) violated during AOOs (and that the consequences of DBAs will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the A 0 0 or DBA and the equipment functions as designed).

Note that in the accompanying LC0 3.3.1, the Allowable Values of Table 3.3.1 -1 are the LSSS.

Each channel of the process control equipment can be tested on line to verify that the signal or setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements. Once a designated channel is taken out of service for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument signal.

The process equipment for the channel in test is then tested, verified, and calibrated. SRs for the channels are specified in the SRs section.

The Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.1-1 are based on the methodology described in Reference 5, which incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable for each channel. The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into the determination of each Allowable Value. All field sensors and signal processing equipment for these channels are assumed to operate within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes.

Relav Loqic System The Relay Logic System equipment is used for the decision logic processing of outputs from the signal processing equipment bistables. To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of Relay Logic System, each performing the same functions, are provided. If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test purposes, the second train will provide reactor trip for the unit. Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence requirements. The system has been designed to trip in the event of a loss of power, directing the unit to a safe shutdown condition.

The Relay Logic System performs the decision logic for actuating a reactor trip, generates the electrical output signal that will initiate the required trip, and provides the status, permissive, and annunciator output signals to the main control room of the unit.

The bistable outputs from the signal processing equipment are sensed by the Relay Logic System equipment and combined into logic matrices that represent combinations indicative of various unit upset and accident transients. If a required logic matrix combination is completed, the system will initiate a reactor trip. Examples are given in the Point Beach B 3.3.1-4 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

v ap~licable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3, 5, 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

BACKGROUND Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability sections of this Bases.

(continued)

Reactor Trip Switchaear The RTBs are in the electrical power supply line from the control rod drive motor generator set power supply to the CRDMs. Opening of the RTBs interrupts power to the CRDMs, which allows the shutdown rods and control rods to fall into the core by gravity. Each RTB is equipped with a bypass breaker to allow testing of the RTB while the unit is at power.

During normal operation the output from the relay logic system is a voltage signal that energizes the undervoltage coils in the RTBs and bypass breakers, if in use. When the required logic matrix combination is completed, the relay logic system output voltage signal is removed, the undewoltage coils are de-energized, the breaker trip lever is actuated by the de-energized undewoltage coil, and the RTBs and bypass breakers are tripped open. This allows the shutdown rods and control rods to fall into the core. In addition to the de-energization of the undewoltage coils, each RTB is also equipped with a shunt trip device that is energized to trip the breaker open upon receipt of a reactor trip signal from the relay logic system. Either the undewoltage coil or the shunt trip mechanism is sufficient by itself, thus providing a diverse trip mechanism.

APPLICABLE The RPS functions to maintain the SLs during all AOOs and mitigates the SAFETY ANALYSES, consequences of DBAs in all MODES in which the RTBs are closed.

LCO, AND APPLICABILITY Each of the analyzed accidents and transients can be detected by one or more RPS Functions. The accident analysis described in Reference 2 takes credit for most RPS trip Functions. RPS trip Functions not specifically credited in the accident analysis are qualitatively credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit. These RPS trip Functions may provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance. They may also serve as backups to RPS trip Functions that were credited in the accident analysis.

The LC0 requires all instrumentation performing an RPS Function, listed in Table 3.3.1-1 in the accompanying LCO, to be OPERABLE. Failure of any instrument renders the affected channel(s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the affected Functions.

The LC0 generally requires OPERABILITY of four or three channels in Point Beach B 3.3.1-5 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paqes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv a~plicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 1O.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16, 17.a: 17.b(l). 17.b(2), 17.c. 17.d, 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE each instrumentation Function, one channel of Manual Reactor Trip in SAFETY ANALYSES, each logic Function, and two trains in each Automatic Trip Logic Function.

LCO, AND Four OPERABLE instrumentation channels in a two-out-of-four APPLICABILITY configuration are generally required when one RPS channel is also used (continued) as a control system input. This configuration accounts for the possibility of the shared channel failing in such a manner that it creates a transient that requires RPS action. In this case, the RPS will still provide protection, even with random failure of one of the other three protection channels.

Three OPERABLE instrumentation channels in a two-out-of-three configuration are generally required when there is no potential for control system and protection system interaction that could simultaneously create a need for RPS trip and disable one RPS channel. The two-out-of-three and two-out-of-four configurations allow one channel to be tripped during maintenance or testing without causing a reactor trip. Specific exceptions to the above general philosophy exist and are discussed below.

Reactor Protection System Functions The safety analyses and OPERABILITY requirements applicable to each RPS Function are discussed below:

1. Manual Reactor Trip The Manual Reactor Trip ensures that the control room operator can initiate a reactor trip at any time by using one of four reactor trip switches in the control room. A Manual Reactor Trip accomplishes the same results as any one of the automatic trip Functions. It is used by the reactor operator to shut down the reactor whenever any parameter is rapidly trending toward its Allowable Value.

The LC0 requires two Manual Reactor Trip channels to be OPERABLE. Each channel consists of two reactor trip switches (one in each train). Each channel activates the reactor trip breaker in both trains. Two independent channels are required to be OPERABLE so that no single random failure will disable the Manual Reactor Trip Function.

In MODE 1 or 2, manual initiation of a reactor trip must be OPERABLE. These are the MODES in which the shutdown rods andlor control rods are partially or fully withdrawn from the core. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, the manual initiation Function must also be OPERABLE with the RTBs closed and the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal. In this condition, inadvertent control rod withdrawal is possible. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, manual initiation of a reactor trip does not have to be OPERABLE if the Rod Control System is not capable of withdrawing the shutdown rods or control rods. If the Point Beach B 3.3.1-6 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 24H-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

T W

5. 6, 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.bll). 17.b(2), 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19, 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE rods cannot be withdrawn from the core or all of the rods are inserted, SAFETY ANALYSES, there is no need to be able to trip the reactor. In MODE 6, neither the LC0 AND shutdown rods nor the control rods are permitted to be withdrawn and APPLICABILITY the CRDMs are disconnected from the control rods and shutdown (continued) rods. Therefore, the manual initiation Function is not required.

2. Power Range Neutron Flux The NIS power range detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from the core. The NIS power range detectors provide input to the Rod Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Note that this Function also provides a signal to prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal prior to initiating a reactor trip. Limiting further rod withdrawal may terminate the transient and eliminate the need to trip the reactor.

a. Power Ranqe Neutron Flux-Hiqh The Power Range Neutron Flux-High trip Function ensures that protection is provided, from all power levels, against a positive reactivity excursion leading to DNB during power operations.

These can be caused by rod withdrawal or reductions in RCS temperature.

The LC0 requires all four of the Power Range Neutron Flux-High channels to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 1 or 2, the Power Range Neutron Flux-High trip must be OPERABLE. This Function will terminate the reactivity excursion and shut down the reactor prior to reaching a power level that could damage the fuel. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the NIS power range detectors cannot detect neutron levels in this range. In these MODES, the Power Range Neutron Flux - High does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is shut down and reactivity excursions into the power range are extremely unlikely. Other RTS Functions and administrative controls provide protection against reactivity additions when in MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-7 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2@&

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a, 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE The LCC! r 2

2 SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND APPLICABILITY (continued)

3. lntermediate Ranqe Neutron Flux The lntermediate Range Neutron Flux trip Function ensures that protection is provided against an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition during startup. This trip Function provides redundant protection to the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low Setpoint trip Function. The NIS intermediate range detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from the core. The NIS intermediate range detectors do not provide any input to control systems.

The LC0 requires two channels of lntermediate Range Neutron Flux to be OPERABLE. Two OPERABLE channels are sufficient to ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function.

Because this trip Function is important only during startup, there is generally no need to disable channels for testing while the Function is required to be OPERABLE. Therefore, a third channel is unnecessary.

In MODE 1 below the P-10 setpoint, and in MODE 2, when there is Point Beach B 3.3.1-8 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2436

' 3 a o n s!ql u! luasand slaAa1 uonlnau palap louue:, snol:,alap a6uen ale!pawnalu! SIN aql 'osl\\il 'yyas paseanau! paninban e sey ano:, ayl pue payasu! Allnj ane spon 11e '9 3 a o n ul.luap!:,:,e uo!l!ppe Al!~!pean a ~ ~ ! s o d e $0 sasuanbasuo:, aql ale6!l!w 01 yyas pan!nban ayl sey osle ano:, a q l -uo!ypuo:, s!yl u! dn payels aq louue:, nol:,ean a y l ' u ~ e n p q l ! ~

aq Aew spon uMoplnys ayl Ajuo pue payasu! Allnj aq lsnw spon lonluo:, ayl asne:,aq 3 7 a y ~ 3 d o aq 01 aAeq lou saop d!q xnlj uonlna~ a6uetj a)e!pawla)ul ' ~ j no 'v 'E: 3 a 0 ~

ul.luap!:,:,e (panu!yuo:,)

~ e ~ e n p y l ! ~

pon 1? no4 uo~:,alond ano:, sap!~ond d!nl lu!odlas y6!~-xnlj AllllaV3llddV UonlnaN a 6 u e ~

n a ~ o d ayl 'lu!odlas 0 C-d ayl aAoq\\i/ '=~18\\du=~do aq aNb' 0 3 7 lsnw din1 xnld uonlnaN a6ueu ale!pawJalul ayl 'dnyels nopean 6uinnp

' s = ~ s ~ l t / ~ y

~ l g - ~ y s luap!:,:,e

~ e ~ e n p y l ! ~

pon yueq y 3 3 ~

pa110~uo:,un ue no4 le!lualod e 318V3IlddV

' CZ Pue

'OZ '6 1 '8 1- 'a'L C 'P'L C '3'L 1 '(Z)q'L C '( 1)q'L C 'e'L C '9 1 'q'S 1 'e.5 C ' C '4'0 C 'e.0 C '4'L 'B'L '9 'Zj

=

310~---------------------------------------

s3sva I*' 8 uo!geluawnnlsul s d

~

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

T

5. 6, 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND APPLICABILITY (continued)

5. Overtemperature AT The Overtemperature AT trip Function is provided to ensure that the design limit DNBR is met. This trip Function also limits the range over which the Overpower AT trip Function must provide protection. The inputs to the Overtemperature AT trip include all pressure, coolant temperature, axial power distribution, and reactor power as indicated by loop AT assuming full reactor coolant flow. Protection from violating the DNBR limit is assured for those transients that are slow with respect to delays from the core to the measurement system. The Function monitors both variation in power and flow since a decrease in flow has the same effect on AT as a power increase. The Overtemperature AT trip Function uses each loop's AT as a measure of reactor power and is compared with a setpoint that is automatically varied with the following parameters:

0 reactor coolant average temperature-the Trip Setpoint is varied to correct for changes in coolant density and specific heat capacity with changes in coolant temperature; pressurizer pressure-the Trip Setpoint is varied to correct for changes in system pressure; and axial power distribution -f(Al),

the Trip Setpoint is varied to account for imbalances in the axial power distribution as detected by the NIS upper and lower power range detectors. If axial peaks are greater than the design limit, as indicated by the difference between the upper and lower NIS power range detectors, the Trip Setpoint is reduced in accordance with Note 1 of Table 3.3.1-1.

The Overtemperature AT trip Function is calculated for each channel as described in Note 1 of Table 3.3.1 -1. Reactor Trip occurs if overtemperature AT is indicated in two channels. Because the pressure and temperature signals are used for other control functions, the actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels Point Beach B 3.3.1-10 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 20 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv ap~licable to RPS Functions 1. 2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(1). 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE providing the protection function actuation. Note that this Function SAFETY ANALYSES, also provides a signal to generate a turbine runback prior to reaching LC0 AND the Trip Setpoint. A turbine runback will reduce turbine power and APPLICABILITY reactor power. A reduction in power will normally alleviate the (continued)

Overtemperature AT condition and may prevent a reactor trip.

The LC0 requires all four channels of the Overtemperature AT trip Function to be OPERABLE. Note that the Overtemperature AT Function receives input from channels shared with other RPS Functions. Failures that affect multiple Functions require entry into the Conditions applicable to all affected Functions.

In MODE 1 or 2, the Overtemperature AT trip must be OPERABLE to prevent DNB. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, this trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is not operating and there is insufficient heat production to be concerned about DNB.

6. Overpower AT The Overpower AT trip Function ensures that protection is provided to ensure the integrity of the fuel (i.e., no fuel pellet melting and less than 1 % cladding strain) under all possible overpower conditions. This trip Function also limits the required range of the Overtemperature AT trip Function and provides a backup to the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Setpoint trip. The Overpower AT trip Function ensures that the allowable heat generation rate (kW/ft) of the fuel is not exceeded.

It uses the AT of each loop as a measure of reactor power with a setpoint that is automatically varied with the following parameters:

reactor coolant average temperature-the Trip Setpoint is varied to correct for changes in coolant density and specific heat capacity with changes in coolant temperature; and rate of change of reactor coolant average temperature.

The Overpower AT trip Function is calculated for each channel as per Note 2 of Table 3.3.1 -1. Trip occurs if Overpower AT is indicated in two channels. The temperature signals are used for other control functions. The actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation and a single failure in the remaining channels providing the protection function actuation. Note that this Function also provides a signal to generate a turbine runback prior to reaching the Allowable Value. A turbine runback will reduce turbine power and reactor power. A reduction in power will normally alleviate the Point Beach B 3.3.1 -1 1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. XKI-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 1O.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE Overpower AT condition and may prevent a reactor trip.

SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND

-The LC0 requires four channels of the Overpower AT trip Function to APPLICABILITY be OPERABLE. Note that the Overpower AT trip Function receives (continued) input from channels shared with other RPS Functions. Failures that affect multiple Functions require entry into the Conditions applicable to all affected Functions.

In MODE 1 or 2, the Overpower AT trip Function must be OPERABLE.

These are the only times that enough heat is generated in the fuel to be concerned about the heat generation rates and overheating of the fuel. In MODE 3,4, 5, or 6, this trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is not operating and there is insufficient heat production to be concerned about fuel overheating and fuel damage.

7. Pressurizer Pressure The same sensors provide input to the Pressurizer Pressure-High and

-Low trips and the Overtemperature AT trip. The Pressurizer Pressure channels are also used to provide input to the Pressurizer Pressure Control System. The actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation.

a. Pressurizer Pressure-Low The Pressurizer Pressure-Low trip Function ensures that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due to low pressure.

The LC0 requires four channels of Pressurizer Pressure-Low to be OPERABLE.

In MODE I, when DNB is a major concern, the Pressurizer Pressure-Low trip must be OPERABLE. This trip Function is automatically enabled on increasing power by the P-7 interlock (NIS power range P-10 or turbine impulse pressure greater than approximately 10% of full power equivalent). On decreasing power, this trip Function is automatically blocked below P-7. Below the P-7 interlock, no conceivable power distributions can occur that would cause DNB concerns.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-12 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

'RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are only applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 1O.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16, 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.bl2). 17.c. l7.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE

b. Pressurizer Pressure-Hiah SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND The Pressurizer Pressure-High trip Function ensures that APPLICABILITY protection is provided against overpressurizing the RCS. This (continued) trip Function operates in conjunction with the pressurizer relief and safety valves to prevent RCS overpressure conditions.

The LC0 requires three channels of the Pressurizer Pressure-High to be OPERABLE.

For operation at 2250 psia, the Pressurizer Pressure-High LSSS is selected to be below the pressurizer safety valve actuation pressure and above the power operated relief valve (PORV) setting. This setting minimizes challenges to safety valves while avoiding unnecessary reactor trip for those pressure increases that can be controlled by the PORVs.

For operation at 2000 psia, a 50% load rejection with steam dump results in a peak pressure below the Pressurizer Pressure-High LSSS. Therefore, even though the PORV setting is above the reactor trip, the transient will not result in PORV actuation or a reactor trip on high Pressurizer Pressure.

In MODE 1 or 2, the Pressurizer Pressure-High trip must be OPERABLE to help prevent RCS overpressurization and minimize challenges to the relief and safety valves. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the Pressurizer Pressure-High trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because transients that could cause an overpressure condition will be slow to occur. Therefore, the operator will have sufficient time to evaluate unit conditions and take corrective actions. Additionally, low temperature overpressure protection systems provide overpressure protection when below MODE 4.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-1 3 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2J-I-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

'LZ DUB C'E'E a uo!jejuawn.qsul s d

~

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Pages B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6, 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13, 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.b(2). l7.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND APPLICABILITY (continued)

Thc LC9 r c

c

10. Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Breaker Position Both RCP Breaker Position trip Functions operate together on two sets of auxiliary contacts, with one set on each RCP breaker.

These Functions anticipate the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low trips to avoid RCS heatup that would occur before the low flow trip actuates.

a. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position (Single Loop)

The RCP Breaker Position (Single Loop) trip Function ensures that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due to a loss of flow in one RCS loop. The position of each RCP breaker is monitored. If one RCP breaker is open above the P-8 setpoint, a reactor trip is initiated. This trip Function will generate a reactor trip before the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Single Loop) Trip Setpoint is reached.

The LC0 requires one RCP Breaker Position channel per RCP to be OPERABLE. A channel consists of the RCP Breaker auxiliary contact and the associated RCP Loss of Power Trip Matrix Relay. One OPERABLE channel is sufficient for this trip Function because the RCS Flow-Low trip alone provides Point Beach B 3.3.1 -1 5 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES

---

NOTE TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3, 5, 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16, 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE sufficient protection of unit SLs for loss of flow events. The RCP SAFETY ANALYSES, Breaker Position trip serves only to anticipate the low flow trip, LC0 AND minimizing the thermal transient associated with loss of a pump.

APPLICABILITY (continued)

This Function measures only the discrete position (open or closed) of the RCP breaker, using a position switch. Therefore, the Function has no adjustable trip setpoint with which to associate an LSSS.

In MODE 1 above the P-8 setpoint, when a loss of flow in any RCS loop could result in DNB conditions in the core, the RCP Breaker Position (Single Loop) trip must be OPERABLE. In MODE 1 below the P-8 setpoint, a loss of flow in two loops is required to actuate a reactor trip because of the lower power level and the greater margin to the design limit DNBR.

b. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position (Two Loops)

The RCP Breaker Position (Two Loops) trip Function ensures that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due to a loss of flow in two RCS loops. The position of each RCP breaker is monitored. Above the P-7 interlock and below the P-8 setpoint, a loss of flow in two loops will initiate a reactor trip.

This trip Function will generate a reactor trip before the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops) Trip Setpoint is reached.

The LC0 requires one RCP Breaker Position channel per RCP to be OPERABLE. A channel consists of the RCP Breaker auxiliary contact and the associated RCP Loss of Power Trip Matrix Relay. One OPERABLE channel is sufficient for this Function because the RCS Flow -Low trip alone provides sufficient protection of unit SLs for loss of flow events. The RCP, Breaker Position trip serves only to anticipate the low flow trip, minimizing the thermal transient associated with loss of an RCP.

This Function measures only the discrete position (open or closed) of the RCP breaker, using a position switch. Therefore, the Function has no adjustable trip setpoint with which to associate an LSSS.

In MODE 1 above the P-7 interlock and below the P-8 setpoint, the RCP Breaker Position (Two Loops) trip must be OPERABLE. Below the P-7 interlock, all reactor trips on loss of flow are automatically blocked since no conceivable power Point Beach B 3.3.1-16 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2.04 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 1O.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16, 17.a. 17.b(l), 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18, 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE distributions could occur that would cause a DNB concern at this SAFETY ANALYSES, low power level. Above the P-7 interlock, the reactor trip on loss LC0 AND of flow in two RCS loops is automatically enabled. Above the P-APPLICABILITY 8 setpoint, a loss of flow in any one loop will actuate a reactor (continued) trip because of the higher power level and the reduced margin to the design limit DNBR.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-17 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2434-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13, 15.a. 15.b, 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.bf2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND

,-APPLICABILITY,

(continued)

13.

Steam Generator Water Level-Low Low The SG Water Level-Low Low trip Function ensures that protection is provided against a loss of heat sink and actuates the AFW System prior to uncovering the SG tubes. The SGs are the heat sink for the reactor. In order to act as a heat sink, the SGs must contain a minimum amount of water. A narrow range low low level in any SG is indicative of a loss of heat sink for the reactor. The level transmitters provide input to the SG Level Control System.

Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. This Function also performs the ESFAS function of starting the AFW pumps on low low SG level.

The LC0 requires three channels of SG Water Level-Low Low per SG to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 1 or 2, when the reactor requires a heat sink, the SG Water Level-Low Low trip must be OPERABLE. The normal source of water for the SGs is the Main Feedwater (MFW) System (not safety related). The MFW System is only in operation in MODE 1 or 2. The AFW System is the safety related backup source of water to ensure that the SGs remain the heat sink for the reactor.

During normal startups and shutdowns, the AFW System provides feedwater to maintain SG level. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the SG Point Beach B 3.3.1-1 8 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

'9 10 'S 'P 3a0w u! ISAS AS (UHU) ~ e ~ o w a t j (panu!guo~)

IeaH lenP!saU aY1 Aq PUG E 3aOW u! ~ a l s A ~

NUV ayl AlIll8V311ddV Aq pays!lduro33e s! l a ~ o w a ~

pay Ae~aa.le3!1!.~3 u a ~ a l o fiu!ye~ado aNV 031 IOU s! AopeaJ ayl pue uo!ye.iado u! IOU s! urajsAs ayt asneaaq

'S3SAlVNV Al3JVS 31gytj3do aq 01 a ~ e y IOU saop uo!g3unj M O ~

~ 0 1 - l a ~ a l J~$EN\\

319V3IlddV

'CZ Pus

'OZ '6 C '8 1- 'a'L 1. 'P'L C '3'L C 'IZ1q.L C 'I CN'L C 'E'L C '9 C '4.9 C 'e'S 1. 'E C '9'0 C 'e'O I- '9-L 'E'L '9 'S

'E 'e'z ' c suo!13unj s d u 03 alqea!laae ~ l u o ale 9%-C'E'E 8 y~no~y3 C-C'E'E: 8 saDed s3svt.7 SI

~_LON----------------------------------------------------------

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3, 5, 6, 7.a. 7.b. 1O.a, 10.b. 13, 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l), 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

I APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND APPLICABILITY (continued)

CPEMELE is

15. Turbine Trip

a. Turbine Trip-Low Autostop Oil Pressure The Turbine Trip-Low Autostop Oil Pressure trip Function anticipates the loss of heat removal capabilities of the secondary system following a turbine trip. This trip Function acts to minimize the pressureltemperature transient on the reactor. Any turbine trip from a power level below the P-9 setpoint (approximately 50% power, with at least one circulating water pump breaker closed, and condenser vacuum not high, will not actuate a reactor trip. Three pressure switches monitor the control oil pressure in the Turbine Electrohydraulic Control System. A low pressure condition sensed by two-out-of-three pressure switches will actuate a reactor trip. These pressure switches do not provide any input to the control system. The unit is designed to withstand a complete loss of load and not sustain core damage or challenge the RCS pressure limitations.

Core protection is provided by the Pressurizer Pressure-High trip Function and RCS integrity is ensured by the pressurizer safety valves.

Table 3.3.1 -1 identifies the Technical Specification Allowable Value for this trip function as not applicable (NA). No Analytical Value is assumed in the accident analysis for this function. The nominal setting required for the Turbine Trip - Low Autostop Oil Pressure trip function is 45 psig. This nominal setting was developed outside of the setpoint methodology and has been provided by the NSSS supplier.

The LC0 requires three channels of Turbine Trip-Low Autostop Oil Pressure to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P-9.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-20 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 294-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES

---

NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paqes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are only a~plicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6, 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l), 17.bf2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE Below the P-9 setpoint, a turbine trip does not actuate a reactor SAFETY ANALYSES, trip. In MODE 2, 3,4, 5, or 6, there is no potential for a turbine LC0 AND trip, and the Turbine Trip-Low Autostop Oil Pressure trip APPLICABILITY Function does not need to be OPERABLE.

(continued)

b. Turbine Trip-Turbine Stop Valve Closure The Turbine Trip-Turbine Stop Valve Closure trip Function anticipates the loss of heat removal capabilities of the secondary system following a turbine trip. Any turbine trip with from a power level below the P-9 setpoint, approximately 50% power, with at least one circulating water pump breaker closed, and condenser vacuum not high, will not actuate a reactor trip. The trip Function anticipates the loss of secondary heat removal capability that occurs when the stop valves close. Tripping the reactor in anticipation of loss of secondary heat removal acts to minimize the pressure and temperature transient on the reactor.

This trip Function will not and is not required to operate in the presence of a single channel failure. The unit is designed to withstand a complete loss of load and not sustain core damage or challenge the RCS pressure limitations. Core protection is provided by the Pressurizer Pressure-High trip Function, and RCS integrity is ensured by the pressurizer safety valves. This trip Function is diverse to the Turbine Trip-Low Autostop Oil Pressure trip Function. Each turbine stop valve is equipped with one limit switch that inputs to the RPS. If both limit switches indicate that the stop valves are all closed, a reactor trip is initiated.

No analytical value is assumed in the accident analyses for this function. The LC0 requires two Turbine Trip-Turbine Stop Valve Closure channels, one per valve, to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P-9. Both channels must trip to cause reactor trip.

Below the P-9 setpoint, a load rejection can be accommodated by the Steam Dump System. In MODE 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, there is no potential for a load rejection, and the Turbine Trip-Stop Valve Closure trip Function does not need to be OPERABLE.

16. Safetv Injection Input from Enaineered Safetv Feature Actuation Svstem Point Beach B 3.3.1-21 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 334-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to UPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 1O.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l), 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18, 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE The SI Input from ESFAS ensures that if a reactor trip has not SAFETY ANALYSES, already been generated by the RPS, the ESFAS automatic LC0 AND actuation logic will initiate a reactor trip upon any signal that initiates APPLICABILITY SI. This is a condition of acceptability for the LOCA. However, (continued) other transients and accidents take credit for varying levels of ESF performance and rely upon rod insertion, except for the most reactive rod that is assumed to be fully withdrawn, to ensure reactor shutdown. Therefore, a reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present.

Allowable Values are not applicable to this Function. The SI lnput is provided by relay in the ESFAS. Therefore, there is no measurement signal with which to associate an LSSS.

The LC0 requires two trains of SI lnput from ESFAS to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2.

A reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present.

Therefore, this trip Function must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2, when the reactor is critical, and must be shut down in the event of an accident. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the reactor is not critical, and this trip Function does not need to be OPERABLE.

17. Reactor Protection Svstem Interlocks Reactor protection interlocks are provided to ensure reactor trips are in the correct configuration for the current unit status. They back up operator actions to ensure protection system Functions are not bypassed during unit conditions under which the safety analysis assumes the Functions are not bypassed. Therefore, the interlock Functions do not need to be OPERABLE when the associated reactor trip functions are outside the applicable MODES. These are:

a. lntermediate Ranqe Neutron Flux, P-6 The lntermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock is actuated when any NIS intermediate range channel goes approximately one decade above the minimum channel reading. If both channels drop below the setpoint, the permissive will automatically be defeated. The LC0 requirement for the P-6 interlock ensures that the following Functions are performed:

Point Beach B 3.3.1 -22 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 1. 2.a. 3,'

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 1O.a. 1O.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18, 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE 0

on increasing power, the P-6 interlock allows the manual SAFETY ANALYSES, block of the NIS Source Range, Neutron Flux reactor trip.

LC0 AND This prevents a premature block of the source range trip and APPLICABILITY allows the operator to ensure that the intermediate range is (continued)

OPERABLE prior to leaving the source range. When the source range trip is blocked, the high voltage to the detectors is also removed; and 0

on decreasing power, the P-6 interlock automatically energizes the NIS source range detectors and enables the NIS Source Range Neutron Flux reactor trip.

The LC0 requires two channels of Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 2 when below the P-6 interlock setpoint.

Above the P-6 interlock setpoint, the NIS Source Range Neutron Flux reactor trip will be blocked, and this Function will no longer be necessary.

b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 The Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 interlock is actuated by input from either Power Range Neutron Flux or Turbine Impulse Pressure. The LC0 requirement for the P-7 interlock ensures that the following Functions are performed:

(1) on increasing power, the P-7 interlock automatically enables reactor trips on the following Functions:

Q Pressurizer Pressure - Low; e Pressurizer Water Level - High; Q

Reactor Coolant Flow - Low (Two Loops);

RCP Breaker Open (Two Loops);

Q Undervoltage Bus A01 and A02; and e Underfrequency Bus A01 and A02.

These reactor trips are only required when operating above the P-7 setpoint (approximately 10% power). The reactor trips provide protection against violating the DNBR limit. Below the P-7 setpoint, the RCS is capable of providing sufficient natural circulation without any RCP running.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-23 Unit 1 - Amendment No. =1.81.

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2436

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv ap~licable to RPS Functions I, 2.a. 3,

5. 6, 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 1O.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.bfl). 17.bf2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE (2) on decreasing power, the P-7 interlock automatically blocks SAFETY ANALYSES, reactor trips on the following Functions:

LC0 AND Pressurizer Pressure - Low; APPLICABILITY e Pressurizer Water Level - High; (continued) e Reactor Coolant Flow - Low (Two Loops);

(P RCP Breaker Position (Two Loops);

e Undervoltage Bus A01 and A02; and 0

Underfrequency Bus A01 and A02.

The low power trips are blocked below the P-7 setpoint and unblocked above the P-7 setpoint. In MODE 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6, this Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the interlock performs its Function when power level drops below 10% power, which is in MODE 1.

Power Ranse Neutron Flux Power Range Neutron Flux is actuated by two-out-of-four NIS power range channels. The LC0 requirement for this Function ensures that this input to the P-7 interlock is available.

The LC0 requires four channels of Power Range Neutron Flux to be OPERABLE in MODE 1.

OPERABILITY in MODE 1 ensures the Function is available to perform its increasing power Functions.

Turbine Impulse Pressure The Turbine Impulse Pressure interlock is actuated when the pressure in the first stage of the high pressure turbine is greater than approximately 10% of the rated full power pressure. This is determined by one-out-of-two pressure detectors. The LC0 requirement for this Function ensures that one of the inputs to the P-7 interlock is available.

The LC0 requires two channels of Turbine Impulse Pressure interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 1.

The Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure interlock must be OPERABLE when the turbine generator is operating. The interlock Function is not required OPERABLE in MODE 2, 3, 4, Point Beach B 3.3.1-24 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 334 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2Q6

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 1. 2.a. 3,

5. 6, 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b!l). 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 27.

APPLICABLE "5, or 6 because the turbine generator is not operating.

SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND

c. Power Ranqe Neutron Flux, P-8 APPLICABILITY (continued)

The Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8 interlock is actuated at approximately 50% power as determined by two-out-of-four NIS power range detectors.

The P-8 interlock automatically enables the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Single Loop) and RCP Breaker Position (Single Loop) reactor trips on increasing power. The LC0 requirement for this trip Function ensures that protection is provided against a loss of flow in any RCS loop that could result in DNB conditions in the core when greater than approximately 50%

power. On decreasing power, the reactor trip on low flow in any loop is automatically blocked.

The LC0 requires four channels of Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8 interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 1.

In MODE 1, a loss of flow in one RCS loop could result in DNB conditions, so the Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8 interlock must be OPERABLE. In MODE 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, this Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the core is not producing sufficient power to be concerned about DNB conditions.

d. Power Ranqe Neutron Flux, P-9 The Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9 interlock, is actuated at approximately 50% power, as determined by two-out-of-four NIS power range detectors, if the Steam Dump System is available.

The LC0 requirement for this Function ensures thatthe Turbine Trip-Low Autostop Oil Pressure and Turbine Trip-Turbine Stop Valve Closure reactor trips are enabled above the P-9 setpoint.

Above the P-9 setpoint, a turbine trip will cause a load rejection beyond the capacity of the Steam Dump System. A reactor trip is automatically initiated on a turbine trip when it is above the P-9 setpoint to minimize the transient on the reactor.

The LC0 requires four channels of Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9 interlock, to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 with one of two circulating water pump breakers closed and condenser vacuum Point Beach B 3.3.1-25 Unit 1 - Amendment No. =1C)S-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1 -1 t h

r o

5 t

s and 21.

APPLICABLE greater than or equal to 22 "Hg.

SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND In MODE 1, a turbine trip could cause a load rejection beyond APPLICABILITY the capacity of the Steam Dump System, so the Power Range (continued)

Neutron Flux interlock must be OPERABLE. In MODE 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, this Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is not at a power level sufficient to have a load rejection beyond the capacity of the Steam Dump System.

e. Power Ranse Neutron Flux, P-10 The Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 interlock is actuated at approximately 10% power, as determined by two-out-of-four NIS power range detectors. If power level falls below 10% RIP on 3 of 4 channels, the nuclear instrument trips will be automatically unblocked. The LC0 requirement for the P-10 interlock ensures that the following Functions are performed:

on increasing power, the P-I 0 interlock allows the operator to manually block the lntermediate Range Neutron Flux reactor trip; o

on increasing power, the P-10 interlock allows the operator to manually block the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low reactor trip; 0

on increasing power, the P-10 interlock automatically provides a backup signal to block the Source Range Neutron Flux reactor trip, and also to de-energize the NIS source range detectors; on decreasing power, the P-10 interlock automatically enables the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low reactor trip and the lntermediate Range Neutron Flux reactor trip.

The LC0 requires four channels of Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2.

OPERABILITY in MODE 1 ensures the Function is available to perform its decreasing power Functions in the event of a reactor shutdown. This Function must be OPERABLE in MODE 2 to ensure that core protection is provided during a startup or shutdown by the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low and Point Beach B 3.3.1-26 Unit 1 - Amendment No. G9 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv a~plicable to RPS Functions 1.2.a. 3, 5, 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 1O.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.bl2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE Intermediate Range Neutron Flux reactor trips. In MODE 3, 4, SAFETY ANALYSES, 5, or 6, this Function does not have to be OPERABLE because LC0 AND the reactor is not at power and the Source Range Neutron Flux APPLICABILITY reactor trip provides core protection.

(continued)

18. Reactor Trip Breakers This trip Function applies to the RTBs exclusive of individual trip mechanisms. The LC0 requires two OPERABLE RTBs. Two OPERABLE RTBs ensure no single random failure can disable the RPS trip capability. These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, these RPS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the RTBs are closed and the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal.

19. Reactor Trip Breaker Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms The LC0 requires both the Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms to be OPERABLE for each RTB that is in service. The trip mechanisms are not required to be OPERABLE for trip breakers that are open, racked out, incapable of supplying power to the Rod Control System, or declared inoperable under Function 18 above.

OPERABILITY of both trip mechanisms on each breaker ensures that no single trip mechanism failure will prevent opening any breaker on a valid signal.

These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, these RPS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the RTBs are closed and the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal.

20. Reactor Trip Bvpass Breaker and associated Undervoltaae Trip Mechanism The LC0 requires the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker and its associated Undervoltage Trip Mechanism to be OPERABLE when the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker is racked in and closed. The bypass breaker and its associated trip mechanism are not required to be OPERABLE when the bypass breaker is open or racked out.

These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when a Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker is racked in and closed. In MODE 3, Point Beach B 3.3.1-27 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2.06

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1 -1 throuah B 3.3.1 -46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 1. 2.a. 3, 5, 6, 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13, 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.bl2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

APPLICABLE 4, or 5, this RPS trip Function must be OPERABLE when a Reactor SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND Trip Bypass Breaker is racked in and closed and the Rod Control APPLICABILITY System is capable of rod withdrawal.

(continued)

21. Automatic Trip Loqic The LC0 requirement for the RTBs (Functions 18 and 19) and Automatic Trip Logic (Function 21) ensures that means are provided to interrupt the power to allow the rods to fall into the reactor core.

Each RTB is equipped with an undervoltage coil and a shunt trip coil to trip the breaker open when needed. Each RTB is equipped with a bypass breaker to allow testing of the trip breaker while the unit is at power. The reactor trip signals generated by the RPS Automatic Trip Logic cause the RTBs and associated bypass breakers to open and shut down the reactor.

The LC0 requires two trains of RPS Automatic Trip Logic to be OPERABLE. Having two OPERABLE channels ensures that random failure of a single logic channel will not prevent reactor trip.

These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, these RPS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the RTBs are closed and the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal.

The RPS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

ACTIONS A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in Table 3.3.1-1.

In the event a channel's Trip Setpoint is found nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LC0 Condition(s) entered for the protection Function(s) affected.

When the number of inoperable channels in a trip Function exceed those specified in one or other related Conditions associated with a trip Function, then the unit is outside the safety analysis. Therefore, Point Beach B 3.3.1 -28 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2Q-I-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv ap~licable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6, 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.bf.l). 17.b(2), 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

ACTIONS (continued) LC0 3.0.3 must be immediately entered if applicable in the current MODE of operation.

Condition A applies to all RPS protection Functions. Condition A addresses the situation where one or more required channels or trains for one or more Functions are inoperable at the same time. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.1 -1 and to take the Required Actions for the protection functions affected. The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions.

6.1 and 6.2 Condition B applies to the Manual Reactor Trip in MODE 1 or 2. With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate to perform the safety function.

The Completion Time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering that there are two automatic actuation trains and another manual initiation channel OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

If the Manual Reactor Trip Function cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 additional hours. The 6 additional hours to reach MODE 3 is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power operation in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. With the unit in MODE 3, this trip Function is no longer required to be OPERABLE.

C.l and C.2 Condition C applies to the Manual Reactor Trip Function in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the RTBs closed and the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.

With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. If the Reactor Manual Trip channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status Point Beach B 3.3.1 -29 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3, 5, 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b, 16. 17.a. 17.blI). 17.bl2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

ACT 'IONS (continued) within the allowed 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the RTBs must be opened within the next hour.

The additional hour provides sufficient time to accomplish the action in an orderly manner. With the RTBs open, the Manual Reactor Trip Function is no longer required.

D.l and D.2 Condition D applies to the following reactor trip Functions:

o Power Range Neutron Flux-High; o

Power Range Neutron Flux-Low; a

Overtemperature AT; 0

Overpower AT; 0

Pressurizer Pressure-High; e

SG Water Level-Low Low; and SG Water Level - Low coincident with Steam FlowIFeedwater Flow Mismatch.

A known inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Placing the channel in the tripped condition results in a partial trip condition requiring only one-out-of-two logic for actuation of the two-out-of-three trips and one-out-of-three logic for actuation of the two-out-of-four trips.

If the inoperable channel cannot be placed in the tripped condition within the specified Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE where these Functions are not required OPERABLE. An additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is allowed to place the unit in MODE 3. Six hours is a reasonable time, based on operating experience, to place the unit in MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-30 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2434 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2 W

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a: 17.b!lI. 17.bl2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

ACTIONS (continued) E.l and E.2 Condition E applies to the Underfrequency Bus A01 and A02 trip function. With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Placing the channel in the tripped condition results in a partial trip condition requiring only one additional channel to initiate a reactor trip above the P-7 setpoint. The 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to place the channel in the tripped condition is necessary due to plant design requiring maintenance personnel to effect the trip of the channel outside of the Control Room. An additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER to below P-7 if the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the specified Completion Time.

Allowance of this time interval takes into consideration the redundant capability provided by the remaining redundant OPERABLE channel and the low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the protection afforded by this trip function.

F.l and F.2 Condition F applies to the lntermediate Range Neutron Flux trip when THERMAL POWER is above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint and one channel is inoperable. Above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint, the NIS intermediate range detector performs the monitoring Functions. If THERMAL POWER is greater than the P-6 setpoint but less than the P-10 setpoint, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER below the P-6 setpoint or increase to THERMAL POWER above the P-10 setpoint. The NIS lntermediate Range Neutron Flux channels must be OPERABLE when the power level is above the capability of the source range, P-6, and below the capability of the power range, P-I 0. If THERMAL POWER is greater than the P-10 setpoint, the NIS power range detectors perform the monitoring and protection functions and the intermediate range is not required.

The Completion Times allow for a slow and controlled power adjustment above P-10 or below P-6 and take into account the redundant capability afforded by the redundant OPERABLE channel, and the low probability of its failure during this period. This action does not require the inoperable channel to be tripped because the Function uses one-out-of-two logic. Tripping one channel would trip the reactor.

Thus, the Required Actions specified in this Condition are only applicable when channel failure does not result in reactor trip.

Point Beach B 3.3.1 -31 Unit 1 - Amendment No. &I-?-

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 1O.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.bll). 17.bi2). l7.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

ACTIONS (continued) G.l and G.2 Condition G applies to two inoperable lntermediate Range Neutron Flux trip channels in MODE 2 when THERMAL POWER is above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint. Required Actions specified in this Condition are only applicable when channel failures do not result in reactor trip. Above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint, the NIS intermediate range detector performs the monitoring Functions.

With no intermediate range channels OPERABLE, the Required Actions are to suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions immediately. This will preclude any power level increase since there are no OPERABLE lntermediate Range Neutron Flux channels. The operator must also reduce THERMAL POWER below the P-6 setpoint within two hours. Below P-6, the Source Range Neutron Flux channels will be able to monitor the core power level. The Completion Time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> will allow a slow and controlled power reduction to less than the P-6 setpoint and takes into account the low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the protection afforded by the NIS lntermediate Range Neutron Flux trip.

Condition H applies to one inoperable Source Range Neutron Flux trip channel when in MODE 2, below the P-6 setpoint, and performing a reactor startup. With the unit in this Condition, below P-6, the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. With one of the two channels inoperable, operations involving positive reactivity additions shall be suspended immediately.

This will preclude any power escalation. With only one source range channel OPERABLE, core protection is severely reduced and any actions that add positive reactivity to the core must be suspended immediately.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-32 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2Q-I-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES

---

NOTE TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3, t

and 21.

ACTIONS (continued) I.1 Condition I applies to two inoperable Source Range Neutron Flux trip channels when in MODE 2, below the P-6 setpoint and performing a reactor startup, or in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the RTBs closed and the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal. With the unit in this Condition, below P-6, the NIS source range perform the monitoring and protection functions. With both source range channels inoperable, the RTBs must be opened immediately. With the RTBs open, the core is in a more stable condition.

J.l and J.2 Condition J applies to one inoperable source range channel in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the RTBs closed and the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal. With the unit in this Condition, below P-6, the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. With one of the source range channels inoperable, 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is allowed to restore it to an OPERABLE status. If the channel cannot be returned to an OPERABLE status, 1 additional hour is allowed to open the RTBs.

Once the RTBs are open, the core is in a more stable condition.

K.l and K.2 Condition K applies to the following reactor trip Functions:

o Pressurizer Pressure-Low; Pressurizer Water Level-High; o

Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops);

o Undervoltage Bus A01 and A02.

With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Placing the channel in the tripped condition results in a partial trip condition requiring only one additional channel to initiate a reactor trip above the P-7 interlock and below the P-8 setpoint. These Functions do not have to be OPERABLE below the P-7 interlock because there are no loss of flow trips below the P-7 interlock. An additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER to below P-7 if the inoperable channel cannot be restored to Point Beach B 3.3.1 -33 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13, 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.bfl). 17.bf2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

ACTIONS (continued) OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the specified Completion Time.

Allowance of this time interval takes into consideration the redundant capability provided by the remaining redundant OPERABLE channel, and the low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the protection afforded by the Functions associated with Condition K.

L.l and L.2 Condition L applies to the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Single Loop) reactor trip Function. With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or the channel placed in trip within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, then THERMAL POWER must be reduced below the P-8 setpoint within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This places the unit in a MODE where the LC0 is no longer applicable. This trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE below the P-8 setpoint because other RPS trip Functions provide core protection below the P-8 setpoint.

M.1 and M.2 Condition M applies to the RCP Breaker Position (Single Loop) reactor trip Function. There is one breaker position device per RCP breaker.

With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, then THERMAL POWER must be reduced below the P-8 setpoint within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

This places the unit in a MODE where the LC0 is no longer applicable.

This Function does not have to be OPERABLE below the P-8 setpoint because other RPS Functions provide core protection below the P-8 setpoint.

N.l and N.2 Condition N applies to the RCP Breaker Position (Two Loop) reactor trip Function. With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, then THERMAL Point Beach B 3.3.1-34 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2Q-I-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 3""

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv ap~licable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.bfl). 17.bl2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

ACTIONS (continued) POWER must be reduced below the P-7 interlock within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. This places the unit in a MODE where the LC0 is no longer applicable. This function does not have to be OPERABLE below the P-7 interlock because there are no loss of flow trips below the P-7 interlock. The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to below the P-7 interlock from full power in an orderly manner without challenging unit systems.

0.1 and 0.2 Condition 0 applies to Turbine Trip on Low Autostop Oil Pressure or on Turbine Stop Valve Closure. With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be placed in the trip condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If placed in the tripped condition, this results in a partial trip condition requiring only one additional channel to initiate a reactor trip. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed in the trip condition, then power must be reduced below the P-9 setpoint within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

P.l and P.2 Condition P applies to the SI Input from ESFAS reactor trip and the RPS Automatic Trip Logic in MODES 1 and 2. These actions address the train orientation of the RPS for these Functions. With one train inoperable, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status (Required Action P.l) or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (Required Action P.l) is reasonable considering that in this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the safety function and given the low probability of an event during this interval. The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (Required Action P.2) is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows bypassing one train for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE.

Q.l and Q.2 Condition Q applies to the RTBs in MODES 1 and 2. With one R I B Point Beach B 3.3.1 -35 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2Q-I-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 1O.a. 1O.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16, 17.a. 17.bfl). 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

ACTIONS (continued) inoperable, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is allowed to restore the RTB to OPERABLE status or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Completion Times are equal to the time allowed by LC0 3.0.3 for shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of RPS Function. Placing the unit in MODE 3 removes the requirement for this particular Function.

The Required Actions have been modified by a Note allowing one channel to be bypassed for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

R.l and R.2 Condition R applies to the P-6 interlock (in MODE 2) and the P-10 interlock. With one or more channels inoperable for one-out-of-two or two-out-of-four coincidence logic, the associated interlock must be verified to be in its required state for the existing unit condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Verifying the interlock status manually accomplishes the interlock's Function. The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is based on operating experience and the minimum amount of time allowed for manual operator actions. The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Completion Times are equal to the time allowed by LC0 3.0.3 for shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of RPS Function.

S.1 and S.2 Condition S applies to the P-7, P-8, and P-9 interlocks. With one or more channels inoperable for one-out-of-two or two-out-of-four coincidence logic, the associated interlock must be verified to be in its required state for the existing unit condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. These actions are conservative for the case where power level is being raised. Verifying the interlock status manually accomplishes the interlock's Function.

The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is based on operating experience and the minimum amount of time allowed for manual operator actions. The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power in an orderly manner and Point Beach B 3.3.1 -36 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ZJ4-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 226

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3, 5, 6. 7.a:7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.bfl). 17.b12). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20.

and 21.

ACTIONS (continued) without challenging unit systems.

T.l and T.2 Condition T applies to the RTBs and the RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms in MODES 3, 4, or 5 with the RTBs closed and the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.

With one trip mechanism or RTB inoperable, the inoperable trip mechanism or RTB must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. The Completion Time is reasonable considering that the remaining OPERABLE trip mechanism or RTB is adequate to perform the safety function, and given the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

If the RTB or trip mechanism cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. This is accomplished by opening the RTBs within the next hour (49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> total time). The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> provides sufficient time to accomplish this action in an orderly manner and takes into account the low probability of an event occurring in this interval.

U.l and U.2 Condition U applies to the RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms, or diverse trip features, in MODES I and 2. With one of the diverse trip features inoperable, it must be restored to an OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or the unit must be placed in a MODE where the requirement does not apply. This is accomplished by placing the unit in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> total time).

The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is a reasonable time, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

With the unit in MODE 3, Condition T would apply to any inoperable RTB trip mechanisms. The affected RTB shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse features is inoperable except for the time required to perform maintenance to one of the diverse features. The allowable time for performing maintenance of the diverse features is 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for the reasons stated under Condition Q.

Point Beach B 3.3.1 -37 Unit 1 - Amendment No. W Unit 2 - Amendment No. 3""

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3, 5, 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.bf2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e: 18, 19. 20, and 21.

ACTIONS (continued) The Completion Time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering that in this Condition there is one remaining diverse feature for the affected RTB, and one OPERABLE RTB capable of performing the safety function and given the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

V.l and V.2 Condition V applies to the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker (RTBB) and associated Undewoltage Trip Mechanism in MODE 1 or 2, when the RTBB is racked in and closed. With the required RTBB inoperable, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is allowed to restore the RTBB to OPERABLE status or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit.systems. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> completion times are equal to the time allowed by LC0 3.0.3 for shutdown action in the event of a complete loss of RPS Function. Placing the unit in MODE 3 removes the requirement for this particular Function.

W.l and W.2 Condition W applies to the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker (RTBB) and associated Undervoltage Trip Mechanism in MODES 3, 4, or 5, when an RTBB is racked in and closed and the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal. With the required RTBB inoperable, 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is allowed to restore the RTBB to OPERABLE status or the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the requirement does not apply.

To achieve this status, the RTBs and RTBBs must be opened within the next 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> total time). The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> provides sufficient time to accomplish the action in an orderly manner.

With the RTBs and RTBBs open, this Function is no longer required.

X.l and X.2 Condition X applies to the RPS Automatic Trip Logic in MODES 3, 4 or 5 with the RTBs closed and the Rod Control System capable of rod

.. withdrawal. With one train inoperable, 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> are allowed to restore the train to an OPERABLE status. The Completion Time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering that in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the safety function, and given the low probability of an event occurring in this interval.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-38 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 243%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES

---

N()TE TS BASES Paqes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19, 20, and 21.

If the RPS Automatic Trip Logic cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the unit must be placed in a MODE where this Function is not required to be OPERABLE. To achieve this status, the RTBs must be opened within the next 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> total time). The additional hour provides sufficient time to accomplish the action in an orderly manner. With the RTBs open, the Automatic Trip Logic is no longer required.

SURVEILLANCE The SRs for each RPS Function are identified by the SRs column of REQUIREMENTS Table 3.3.1 -1 for that Function.

A Note has been added to the SR Table stating that Table 3.3.1-1 determines which SRs apply to which RPS Functions.

Note that each channel of process protection supplies both trains of the RPS. When testing Channel I, Train A and Train B must be examined.

Similarly, Train A and Train B must be examined when testing Channel II, Channel Ill, and Channel IV (if applicable). The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and COTS are performed in a manner that is consistent with the assumptions used in analytically calculating the required channel accuracies.

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.

Point Beach B 3.3.1 -39 Unit 1 - Amendment No. W Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES

---

NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuqti B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I, 2.a. 3, L

and 21.

SURVEILLANCE The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates REQUIREMENTS channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less (continued) formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LC0 required channels.

SR 3.3.1.2 compares the calorimetric heat balance calculation to the NIS channel output every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. If the calorimetric exceeds the NIS channel output by > 2% RTP, the NIS is not declared inoperable, but must be adjusted. If the NIS channel output cannot be properly adjusted, the channel is declared inoperable.

Two Notes modify SR 3.3.1.2. The first Note indicates that the NIS channel output shall be adjusted consistent with the calorimetric results if the absolute difference between the NIS channel output and the calorimetric is > 2% RTP. The second Note clarifies that this Surveillance is required only if reactor power is 2 15% RTP and that 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is allowed for performing the first Surveillance after reaching 15% RTP. At lower power levels, calorimetric data are inaccurate. The Frequency of every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is adequate. It is based on unit operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift. Together these factors demonstrate the change in the absolute difference between NIS and heat balance calculated powers rarely exceeds 2% in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.

In addition, control room operators periodically monitor redundant indications and alarms to detect deviations in channel outputs.

SR 3.3.1.3 compares the incore system to the NIS channel output every 31 EFPD. SR 3.3.1.3 is performed by means of the moveable incore detection system. If the absolute difference is 2 3%, the NIS channel is still OPERABLE, but must be readjusted.

If the NIS channel cannot be properly readjusted, the channel is declared inoperable. This Surveillance is performed to verify the f(AI) input to the overtemperature AT Function.

Two Notes modify SR 3.3.1.3. Note 1 indicates that the excore NIS Point Beach B 3.3.1 -40 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 243%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16, 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.bf2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

SURVEILLANCE channel shall be adjusted if the absolute difference between the incore REQUIREMENTS and excore AFD is 2 3%.

(continued)

Note 2 clarifies that the Surveillance is required only if reactor power is 2 50% RTP and that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is allowed for performing the first Surveillance after reaching 50% RTP.

The Frequency of every 31 EFPD is adequate. It is based on unit operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift. Also, the slow changes in neutron flux during the fuel cycle can be detected during this interval.

SR 3.3.1.4 is the performance of a TADOT every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This test shall verify OPERABILITY by actuation of the end devices.

The RTB test shall include separate verification of the undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms. The independent test for bypass breakers is included in SR 3.3.1.I

3. The bypass breaker test shall include an undervoltage trip. A Note has been added to SR 3.3.1.4 to indicate that this test must be performed on the bypass breaker prior to placing it in service.

The Frequency of every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data.

SR 3.3.1.5 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST, every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The train being tested is placed in the bypass condition, thus preventing inadvertent actuation.

All possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection function. The Frequency of every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data.

SR 3.3.1.5 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 provides an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance for the Source Range Neutron Flux trip function instrumentation when power is reduced to Point Beach B 3.3.1 -41 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 24%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES

---

NOTE TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I, 2.a. 3, 5, 6. 7.a. 7.b. 1O.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.bll). 17.bi2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

I SURVEILLANCE delay for testing in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until the REQUIREMENTS RTBs are open and SR 3.3.1.5 is no longer required to be performed. If (continued) the unit is to be in MODE 2 below P-6 for > 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, this Surveillance must be performed prior to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after reducing power below P-6.

Note 2 excludes the RCP Breaker Position (Two Loop), Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loop) and Underfrequency Bus A01 and A02 Trip Functions, and the P-6, P-7, P-8, P-9 and P-10 Interlocks. These functions/interlocks are tested at an 18 month frequency via SR 3.3.1.I

5.

SR 3.3.1.6 is a calibration of the excore channels to the incore channels. If the measurements do not agree, the excore channels are not declared inoperable but must be calibrated to agree with the incore detector measurements. If the excore channels cannot be adjusted, the channels are declared inoperable. This Surveillance is performed to verify the f(AI) input to the overtemperature AT Function.

A Note modifies SR 3.3.1.6. The Note states that this Surveillance is required only if reactor power is > 50% RTP and that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is allowed for performing the first surveillance after reaching 50% RTP.

The Frequency of 92 EFPD is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift.

SR 3.3.1.7 is the performance of a COT every 92 days.

A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function.

Setpoints must be within the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1 -1.

The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology. The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit specific setpoint methodology.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-42 Unit 1 - Amendment No. W Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2Q6

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES

---

NOTE TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3, 5

j t

and 21.

SURVEILLANCE The "as found" and "as left" values must also be recorded and verified REQUIREMENTS to be within the required limits.

(continued)

SR 3.3.1.7 is modified by a Note that provides a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance for source range instrumentation when entering MODE 3 from MODE 2. This Note allows a normal shutdown to proceed without a delay for testing in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until the RTBs are open and SR 3.3.1.7 is no longer required to be performed. If the unit is to be in MODE 3 with the RTBs closed for > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> this Surveillance must be performed prior to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after entry into MODE 3.

SR 3.3.1.8 is the performance of a COT as described in SR 3.3.1.7, except it is modified by a Note that this test shall include verification that the P-6 and P-10 interlocks are in their required state for the existing unit condition. The Frequency is modified by a Note that allows this surveillance to be satisfied if it has been performed within 92 days of the Frequencies prior to reactor staqup and four hours after reducing power below P-I 0 and P-6. The Frequency of "prior to startup" ensures this surveillance is performed prior to critical operations and applies to the source, intermediate and power range low instrument channels.

The Frequency of "4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after reducing power below P-10" (applicable to intermediate and power range low channels) and "4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after reducing power below P-6" (applicable to source range channels) allows a normal shutdown to be completed and the unit removed from the MODE of Applicability for this surveillance without a delay to perform the testing required by this surveillance. The Frequency of every 92 days thereafter applies if the plant remains in the MODE of Applicability after the initial performances of prior to reactor startup and four hours after reducing power below P-10 or P-6. The MODE of Applicability for this surveillance is < P-I 0 for the power range low and intermediate range channels and < P-6 for the source range channels.

Once the unit is in MODE 3, this surveillance is no longer required. If power is to be maintained < P-10 or < P-6 for more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, then the testing required by this surveillance must be performed prior to the expiration of the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> limit. Four hours is a reasonable time to complete the required testing or place the unit in a MODE where this surveillance is no longer required. This test ensures that the NIS source, intermediate, and power range low channels are OPERABLE prior to taking the reactor critical and after reducing power into the Point Beach B 3.3.1-43 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 294 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2W

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6, 7.a. 7.b. 10.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b!l), 17.bl2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20.

and 21.

SURVEILLANCE applicable MODE (c P-10 or c P-6) for periods > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.9 is the performance of a TADOT and is performed every 31 days.

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the unit specific setpoint methodology. The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 18 months is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint methodology.

SR 3.3.1.I 0 is modified by a Note stating that this test shall include verification that the time delays are adjusted to the prescribed values where applicable.

SR 3.3.1.I 1 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as described in SR 3.3.1.I 0, every 18 months. This SR is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the power range neutron detectors consists of a normalization of the detectors based on a power calorimetric and flux map performed above 15% RTP. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the source range and intermediate range Point Beach B 3.3.1 -44 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES

---

N0TE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv apalicable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3, 5, 6. 7.a. 7.b. 1O.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.b(l). 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19, 20, and 21.

SURVEILLANCE neutron detectors consists of obtaining the detector plateau or preamp REQUIREMENTS discriminator curves, evaluating those curves, and comparing the (continued) curves to the manufacturer's data. This Surveillance is not required for the NIS power range detectors for entry into MODE 2 or 1, and is not required for the NIS intermediate range detectors for entry into MODE 2, because the unit must be in at least MODE 2 to perform the test for the intermediate range detectors and MODE 1 for the power range detectors. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed on the 18 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.1.I2 is the performance of a COT of RPS interlocks every 18 months.

The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the interlocks and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.3.1.I3 is the performance of a TADOT of the Manual Reactor Trip, RCP Breaker Position, SI Input from ESFAS, and the Condenser Pressure-High and Circulating Water Pump Breaker Position inputs to the P-9 Interlock. This TADOT is performed every 18 months. The test shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip circuits for the Manual Reactor Trip Function for the Reactor Trip Breakers and the undervoltage trip circuits for the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers.

The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the Functions and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-45 Unit 1 - Amendment No. %%I-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.............................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-1 throuah B 3.3.1-46 are onlv ap~licable to RPS Functions I.

2.a. 3,

5. 6. 7.a. 7.b. 1O.a. 10.b. 13. 15.a. 15.b. 16. 17.a. 17.bll). 17.b(2). 17.c. 17.d. 17.e. 18. 19. 20, and 21.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.14 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.1 -14 is the performance of a TADOT of Turbine Trip Functions.

This TADOT is as described in SR 3.3.1.4, except that this test is performed prior to exceeding the P-9 interlock whenever the unit has been in MODE 3. This Surveillance is not required if it has been performed within the previous 31 days. Performance of this test will ensure that the turbine trip Function is OPERABLE prior to exceeding the P-9 interlock.

SR 3.3.1.I5 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST on the RCP Breaker Position (Two Loop), Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loop) and Underfrequency Bus A01 and A02 Trip Functions, and P-6, P-7, P-8, P-9 and P-10 Interlocks every 18 months.

The 18 month frequency is based on the need to perform this surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

REFERENCES

1.

FSAR, Chapter 7.

2.

FSAR, Chapter 14.

4.

10 CFR 50.49.

5.

DG-I01, Instrument Setpoint Methodology.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-46 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 20-4 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS lnstrumentation B 3.3.1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) lnstrumentation BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.1-47 throuah B.3.3.1-82 are only applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12, and 14.

BACKGROUND The RPS initiates a unit shutdown. based on the values of selected unit parameters. to protect aaainst violatina the core fuel desian limits and Reactor Coolant Svstem [RCS) pressure boundary durina Anticbated Operational Occurrences (AOOs) and to assist the Enaineered Safety Features (ESF) Svstems in mitiaatina accidents.

The ~rotection and monitorinq svstems have been desianed to assure safe operation of the reactor. This is achieved bv specifvina limitinq safetv svstem settinas (LSSS) in terms of parameters directlv monitored bv the RPS. as well as specifvina LCO's on other reactor svstem parameters and eauipment performance.

Technical Specifications are reauired bv 10 CFR 50.36 to include LSSS for variables that have sianificant safetv functions. LSSS are defined by the reaulations as 'Where a LSSS is s~ecified for a variable on which a safetv limit has been placed. the settina must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safetv Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a protective action is initiated, as established bv the safetv analvsis. to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Anv automatic protection action that occurs before or upon reachina the Analvtical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded.

However. in practice. the actual settinas for automatic protection p

Limit to account for instrument loor, uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic ~rotective action would actuallv occur.

The Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) specified in Table 3.3.1-1 is predetermined settina for a protection channel chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the Drocess variable reachina the Analvtical Limit and thus ensurina that the SL would not be exceeded. As such, the NTSP accounts for uncertainties in settina the channel (e.a.

calibration), uncertainties in how the channel miaht actuallv perform 1e.a.. repeatabilitv). chanaes in the point of action of the channel over time [e.a.. drift durina surveillance intervals). and anv other factors Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. =281 Unit 2 - Amendment No. ZI.6

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4, 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

BACKGROUND which mav influence its actual performance (e.q.. harsh accident

{continued$

environments). In this manner. the NTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded. Therefore. the NTSP meets the definition of an LSSS.

Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equi~ment required for safe operation of the facilitv. OPERABLE is defined in the Technical Specifications as "...beina capable of performina its safetv functions(s)." Relvina solelv on the NTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overlv restrictive reauirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the 'as-found' value of a ~rotection channel settinq durina a problems. as well as reports and corrective actions required bv the rule which are not necessarv to ensure safetv. For example, an automatic protection channel with a settina that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some drift of the settina mav still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This ex~ected drift would have been s~ecificallv accounted for in the setpoint methodoloav for calculatina the NTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as-found" settina of the protection channel. Therefore. the channel would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safetv function and the onlv corrective action required would be to reset the channel to the as-left tolerance around the NTSP to account for further drift durina the next surveillance interval.

Durina AOOs. which are those events expected to occur one or more times durina the unit life. the acce~table limits are:

1. The Departure from Nucleate Boilinq Ratio (DNBR) shall be maintained above the Safetv Limit (SL) value to ~revent departure from nucleate boilina (DNB);

2. Fuel centerline melt shall not occur: and

3. The RCS pressure SL of 2750 psia shall not be exceeded.

Operation within the SLs of Specification 2.0. "Safetv Limits (SLs)," also maintains the above values and assures that offsite dose will be within the 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 100 criteria durina AOOs.

Point Beach B 3.3.1 -48 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2Q-4.

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS lnstrumentation BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12, and 14.

BACKGROUND Accidents are events that are analvzed even thouah thev are not lcontinuedl expected to occur durina the unit life. The acceptable limit during accidents is that offsite dose shall be maintained within an acceptable fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits. Different accident cateaories are allowed a different fraction of these limits. based on probabilitv of occurrence.

Meetina the acceptable dose limit for an accident cateaorv is considered havina acceptable consequences for that event.

The RPS instrumentation is seamented into four distinct but interconnected modules as identified below:

1. Field transmitters or process sensors: provide a measurable electronic sianal based upon the phvsical characteristics of the parameter beina measured;

2. Sianal Process Control and Protection Svstem. includina Analoq Protection Svstem, Nuclear lnstrumentation Svstem (NIS), field contacts. and protection channel sets: provides sianal conditioninq, bistable setpoint comparison, process alaorithm actuation, com~atible electrical sianal output to protection svstem channels, and control boardlcontrol room/miscellaneous indications;

3. Relay Loaic Svstem. includina input: loaic, and output devices:

initiates proper unit shutdown in accordance with the defined loaic, which is based on bistable. setpoint comparators. or contact outputs from the sianal process control and protection svstems: and

4. Reactor trip switchaear, includina reactor trip breakers (RTBs) and bvpass breakers: provides the means to interrupt power to the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) and allows the rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs), or "rods." to fall into the core and shut down the reactor. The bvpass breakers allow testina of the RTBs at power.

Field Transmitters or Sensors To meet the desian demands for redundancv and reliabilitv. more than one. and often as manv as four. field transmitters or sensors are used to measure unit parameters. To account for the calibration tolerances and instrument drift, which are assumed to occur between calibrations, statistical allowances are provided in the NTSP and Allowable Value.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11, 12, and 14.

BACKGROUND The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor is determined bv lcontinuedr either "as found" calibration data.evaluated durina the CHANNEL CALIBRATION or bv aualitative assessment of the field transmitter or sensor as related to the channel behaviour observed during performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.

Sianal Process Control and Protection Svstem Generallv. three or four channels of process control equipment are used for the sianal processina of unit Parameters measured bv the field instruments. The process control equipment provides sianal conditionina. com~arable output sianals for instruments located on the main control board. and comparison of measured input sianals with NTSPs derived from Analvtical Limits (ALs) established bv safety analvses. If the measured value of a unit parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint. an output from a bistable is forwarded to the loaic relavs.

Generallv. if a parameter is used onlv for input to the Protection circuits, three channels with a two-out-of-three loaic are sufficient to provide the required reliabilitv and redundancv. If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a ~artial Function trip. the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two loaic. If one channel fails. such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two loaic.

Generallv. if a parameter is used for i n ~ u t to the relav loaic svstem and a control function. four channels with a two-out-of-four loaic are sufficient to Provide the required reliabilitv and redundancv. The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control svstem, which mav then require the protection function actuation, and a sinale failure in the other channels providina the protection function actuation.

Again. a sinale failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation. These reauirements are described in IEEE-279-1968 {Ref. 3). The actual number of channels required for each unit Parameter is specified in Reference 1.

Two loaic channels are reauired to ensure no sinale random failure of a loaic channel will disable the RPS. The loaic channels are desianed such that testina reauired while the reactor is at power mav be accomplished without causina trip. Provisions to allow removina loaic channels from service durina maintenance are unnecessarv because of Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 20 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 336

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Papes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to UPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, BACKGROUND the loaic svstem's desianed reliabilitv.

lcontinued)

Allowable Values and Nominal Trir, Setpoints The trip setooints used in the bistables are based on analvtical limits established in the safetv analvses. The calculation of the Nominal Trip Setooints is such that adeauate protection is provided when all sensor and processina time delavs are taken into account. To allow for c

p s

and severe environment errors for those RPS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined bv 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 4),

the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1-1 in the accompanvinq LC0 are conservative-with resoect to the analvtical limits. A descriotion of the methodoloav used to calculate the Allowable Values. NTSPs. and as-left and as-found tolerance bands. is provided in FSAR Chaoter 7

/Reference 1 ). The maanitudes of the uncertainties are factored into the determination of each NTSP and correspondina Allowable Value in more conservative than that specified bv the Allowable Value to account for measurement errors detectable bv a COT.

The NTSP is the value at which the bistable is set and is the expected value to be achieved durina calibration. The NTSP value is the LSSS and ensures the safetv analvsis limits are met for the surveillance interval selected when a channel is adiusted based on the stated channel uncertainties. Anv bistable is considered to be properly adiusted when the as-left NTSP value is within the as-left tolerance band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION uncertaintv allowance (i.e. + rack calibration and comparator settinp uncertainties). The NTSP value is therefore considered a "nominal" value (i.e.. expressed as a value without ineaualities) for the purposes of COT and CHANNEL CALI BRATION.

A trip setpoint mav be set more conservative than the NTSP as p

O

~

setpoint and not the NTSP.

Nominal Trir, Setpoints. in coniunction with the use of as-found and as-left tolerances. toaether with the reauirements of the Allowable Value. ensure that SLs are not violated durina AOOs (and that the consequences of DBAs will be acceptable. providina the unit is Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4, 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

BACKGROUND ooerated from within the LCOs at the onset of the A 0 0 or DBA and the lcontinuedl equioment functions as desianed).

JVote that the Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.1-1 are the least conservative value of the as found setpoint that a channel can have durina a periodic CHANNEL CALIBRATION. CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TESTS, or a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST that requires trip setpoint verification.

Each channel of the process control equipment can be tested on line to verifv that the sianal or setpoint accuracv is within the specified allowance requirements. Once a desianated channel is taken out of.

service for testina. a simulated sianal is injected in olace of the field instrument sianal. The process equipment for the channel in test is then tested. verified, and calibrated. SRs for the channels are specified in the SRs section.

Relav Loaic Svstem The Relav Loaic Svstem equipment is used for the decision loaic processina of outouts from the sianal processina equipment bistables.

p c

Svstem. each performina the same functions. are provided. If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test ourposes. the second train will provide reactor trio for the unit. Each train is oackaaed in its own cabinet for ~hvsical and electrical separation to satisfv seoaration and independence requirements. The svstem has been desianed to trio in the event of a loss of power. directina the unit to a safe shutdown condition.

The Relav Loaic Svstem performs the decision loaic for actuatina a reactor trip. aenerates the electrical outgut sianal that will initiate the 1

output sianals to the main control room of the unit.

The bistable outputs from the sianal processina equipment are sensed bv the Relav Loaic Svstem equioment and combined into loaic matrices Jhat represent combinations indicative of various unit upset and accident transients. If a required loaic matrix combination is completed.

the svstem will initiate a reactor trip. Examples are aiven in the Applicable Safetv Analvses. LCO, and Applicabilitv sections of this Bases.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2Q Unit 2 - Amendment No. %

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

BACKGROUND Reactor Trip Switchaear The RTBs are in the electrical power supplv line from the control rod drive motor aenerator set power supplv to the CRDMs.

Openina of the RTBs interrupts power to the CRDMs. which allows the shutdown rods and control rods to fall into the core bv aravitv. Each RTB is equipped with a bvpass breaker to allow testina of the RTB while the unit is at power. Durina normal operation the output from the relav loaic svstem is a voltaae sianal that eneraizes the undewoltaae coils in the RTBs and bvpass breakers. if in use. When the required loaic matrix combination is com~leted. the relav loaic svstem output voltaae sianal is removed. the undervoltaae coils are de-eneraized. the breaker trip lever is actuated bv the de-eneraized undewoltaae coil, and the RTBs and bvpass breakers are tripped open. This allows the shutdown rods and control rods to fall into the core. In addition to the de-eneraization of the undewoltaae coils. each RTB is also equipped with a shunt trir, device that is eneraized to trip the breaker open upon receipt of a reactor trip sianal from the relav loaic svstem. Either the undervoltaae coil or the shunt trip mechanism is sufficient bv itself, thus providina a diverse trip mechanism.

APPLICABLE The RPS functions to preserve the SLs durina all AOOs and mitiaates SAFETY ANALYSES, the consequences of DBAs in all MODES in which the RTBs are LCO. AND closed.

APPLICABILITY Each of the analvzed accidents and transients can be detected bv one or more RPS Functions. The accident analvsis described in Reference 2 takes credit for most UPS trir, Functions. UPS trip Functions that are retained vet not specificallv credited in the accident analvsis are implicitlv credited in the safetv analvsis and the NRC staff-approved licensina basis for the unit. These RPS trip Functions mav provide protection for conditions that do not require dvnamic transient analvsis to demonstrate Function performance. Thev mav also serve as backups to UPS trip Functions that were credited in the accident analvsis.

Permissive and interlock setpoints allow the blockina of trips during plant start-ups and restoration of trips when the permissive conditions are not satisfied. but thev are not explicitlv modeled in the Safety Analvses. These permissives and interlocks ensure that the starting Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2434-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2QG

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to UPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8.

9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

APPLICABLE conditions are consistent with the safetv analvsis. before preventative SAFETY ANALYSES, or mitiaatina actions occur. Because these permissives or interlocks LCO, AND are onlv one of multiple conservative startina assumptions for the APPLICABILITY accident analvsis. thev are aenerallv considered as nominal values fcontinuedk with reaard to measurement accuracv.

The LC0 requires all instrumentation performina an UPS Function, listed in Table 3.3.1 -1 to be OPERABLE. The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.1-1 is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that the channel can have when tested. such that a channel is OPERABLE if the as-found setpoint is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value durina a CHANNEL CALIBRATION or CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT). As such. the Allowable value differs from the NTSP bv an amount areater than or equal to the exrsected instrument channel uncertainties. such as drift. durina the surveillance interval. In this manner, the actual settina of the channel INTSP) will ensure that a SL is not exceeded at anv aiven point of time as lona as the channel has not drifted bevond that expected durina the surveillance interval. Note that. althouah the channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trio setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance. in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in the referenced setpoint methodoloav (as-left criteria), and confirmed to be operatina within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assianed (as-found criteria).

If the actual settinq of the channel is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is bevond the as-found tolerance band. the channel is OPERABLE but dearaded. The dearaded condition will be further evaluated durina performance of the SR. If the channel is functionina as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel can be restored to service at the comrsletion of the surveillance. If the evaluation determines that the channel is not performina as exrsected. the channel operabilitv status cannot be verified. Therefore. it is inoperable because it mav not perform its protective function(s) if needed before the next surveillance test.

If the channel setpoint cannot be restored to the NTSP as-left tolerance. or if the actual settinq of the channel is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, the channel is Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Pages B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, APPLICABLE inoperable. For these conditions. after the surveillance is completed, SAFETY ANALYSES, the channel's as-found settina will be entered into the Corrective LCO. AND Action Proaram for further evaluation.

APPLICABILITY Lcontinued'j:

A trip setpoint mav be set more conservative than the NTSP as p

operabilitv of the channel must be verified based on the field trip setpoint and not the NTSP. Failure of anv instrument renders the affected channelis) inoperable and reduces the reliabilitv of the affected Functions.

The LC0 aenerallv requires OPERABILITY of four or three channels in each instrumentation Function. one channel of Manual Reactor Trip in each loaic Function. and two trains in each Automatic Trip Loaic Function. Four OPERABLE instrumentation channels in a two-out-of-four confiauration are generallv reauired when one RPS channel is also used as a control svstem input. This confiauration accounts for the possibilitv of the shared channel failina in such a manner that it creates a transient that requires RPS action. In this case. the RPS will still provide protection. even with random failure of one of the other three protection channels. Three OPERABLE instrumentation channels in a two-out-of-three confiauration are aenerallv required when there is no potential for control svstem and protection svstem interaction that could simultaneouslv create a need for RPS trio and disable one RPS channel. The two-out-of-three and two-out-of-four confiaurations allow one channel to be tripped durina maintenance or testina without causina a reactor trip. Specific exceptions to the above general philosophy exist and are discussed below.

Reactor Protection Svstem Functions The safetv analvses and OPERABILITY requirements applicable to each RPS Function are discussed below:

2. Power Ranae Neutron Flux The NIS Dower ranae detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leakina from the core. The NIS power ranae detectors provide input to the Rod Control Svstem. Therefore, the actuation loaic must be able to withstand an input failure to the Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

BASES RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are only apolicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

APPLICABLE actuation. and a sinale failure in the other channels orovidinq the SAFETY ANALYSES, protection function actuation. Note that this Function also provides LC0 AND sianal to prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal prior to APPLICABILITY initiatina a reactor trip. Limitina further rod withdrawal mav terminate icontinuedk the transient and eliminate the need to trip the reactor.

b. Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Low The LC0 requirement for the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low trio Function ensures that orotection is orovided aaainst 3 positive reactivitv excursion from low power or subcritical conditions.

The LC0 reauires all four of the Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Low channels to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 1. below the Power Ranae Neutron Flux (P-10 setpoint), and in MODE 2. the Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Low trip must be OPERABLE. This Function mav be manually blocked bv the operator when two out of four power ranae channels are areater than approximately 10% RTP (P-10 setpoint). This Function is automaticallv unblocked when three out of four power ranae channels are below the P-10 setpoint.

Above the P-10 setpoint. positive reactivitv additions are mitiaated bv the Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Hiah trip Function.

In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6, the Power Ranae Neutron Flux - Low trio Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is shut down and the NIS power ranae detectors cannot detect neutron levels in this ranae. Other RPS trip Functions and administrative controls provide orotection aaainst oositive reactivitv additions or power excursions in MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6.

4. Source Ranae Neutron Flux The LC0 requirement for the Source Ranae Neutron Flux trip Function ensures that protection is provided aaainst an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident from a subcritic4 condition durina startup.

This trip Function orovides redundant protection to the Power Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 243%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

i s t r ~ s E S raaes t~ 3.3.1-41 rnrouan tr 3. 3 1

. -62 are oniv an~iicanie ro nrs runcnons 2.n. 4. 6, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

APPLICABLE Ranae Neutron Flux-Low trip Function. In MODES 3. 4. and 5, SAFETY ANALYSES, administrative controls also prevent the uncontrolled withdrawal of LC0 AND rods. The NIS source ranae detectors are located external to the APPLICABILITY reactor vessel and measure neutrons leakina from the core. The lcontinued)

NIS source ranae detectors do not provide anv inputs to control svstems. The source ranae trip is the onlv RPS automatic protection function reauired in MODES 3. 4, and 5. Therefore. the functional canabilitv at the specified Trip Setnoint is assumed to be available.

The LC0 reauires two channels of Source Ranae Neutron Flux to be OPERABLE. Two o~erable channels are sufficient to ensure no sinale random failure will disable this trip function.

The Source Ranae Neutron Flux Function provides protection for control rod withdrawal from subcritical and control rod ejection events.

In MODE 2 when below the P-6 setpoint. and SET MODES 3, 4 and 5 when there is a potential for an uncontrolled RCAA bank rod withdrawal accident. the Source Ranae Neutron Flux trip must be OPERABLE. Above the P-6 setnoint. the Intermediate Ranae Neutron Flux trip and the Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Low Setpoint trip will provide core protection for reactivitv accidents. Above the P-6 setnoint. the NIS source ranae detectors are de-eneraized.

In MODES 3.4 and 5 with the Rod Control Svstem not capable of rod withdrawal. and in MODE 6. this Function is not required to be OPERABLE. The requirements for the NIS source ranae detectors to monitor core neutron levels and ~rovide indication of reactivitv chanaes that mav occur as a result of events like a boron dilution are addressed in LC0 3.9.2. "Nuclear Instrumentation." for MODE 6.

8. Pressurizer Water Level-Hiah The Pressurizer Water Level-Hiah trip Function provides a backup sianal for the Pressurizer Pressure-Hiah trip and also provides Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 20%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2C%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1 -47 throuah B 3.3.1 -82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8.

9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

APPLICABLE protection aaainst water relief throuah the oressurizer safety SAFETY ANALYSES, valves. These valves are desianed to pass steam in order to LC0 AND achieve their desian enerav removal rate. A reactor trio is actuated APPLICABILITY prior to the oressurizer becomina water solid. The LC0 requires lcontinuedk three channels of Pressurizer Water Level-Hiah to be OPERABLE.

The pressurizer level channels are used as input to the Pressurizer Level Control Svstem. A fourth channel is not required to address control/protection interaction concerns. The level channels do not actuate the safetv valves. and the hiah pressure reactor trip is set below the safetv valve settina. Therefore. with the slow rate of charaina available. pressure overshoot due to level channel failure cannot cause the safetv valve to lift before reactor hiah pressure

.tIJ&

In MODE 1. when there is a potential for overfillina the pressurizer, the Pressurizer Water Level-Hiah trip must be OPERABLE. This trip Function is automaticallv enabled on increasina power bv the P-7 interlock. On decreasina power. this trip Function is automaticallv blocked below P-7. Below the P-7 interlock, transients that could raise the pressurizer water level will be slow and the operator will have sufficient time to evaluate unit conditions and take corrective actions.

9. Reactor Coolant Flow-Low

a. Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Sinale loo^)

The Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Sinqle Loop) trip Function ensures that orotection is provided aaainst violatina the DNBR limit due to low flow in one or more RCS looos. while avoiding reactor trips due to normal variations in loor, flow. Above the P-8 setpoint. which is approximatelv 50% RTP. a loss of flow in anv RCS loop will actuate a reactor trip. Each RCS loop has three flow detectors to monitor flow. The flow sianals are not used for anv control svstem input.

The LC0 reauires three Reactor Coolant Flow-Low channels per loop to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P-8.

In MODE 1 above the P-8 setpoint. a loss of flow in one RCS loop could result in DNB conditions in the core. In MODE 1 below the P-8 setooint. a loss of flow in two loops is required to actuate a reactor trip (Function 9.b) because of the lower power Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. W Unit 2 - Amendment No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.6. 11, 12. and 14.

APPLICABLE level and the areater marain to the desian limit DNBR.

SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND

b. Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops)

APPLICABILITY icontinued)

The Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops) trip Function ensures that protection is provided against violatina the DNBR limit due to low flow in two or more RCS loops while avoiding reactor trins due to normal variations in loop flow.

A p

flow in two loops will initiate a reactor t r i ~. Each loor, has three flow detectors to monitor flow. The flow sianals are not used for anv control svstem input.

The LC0 reauires three Reactor Coolant Flow-Low channels per loor, to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 1 above the P-7 interlock and below the P-8 setpoint, the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops) trir, must be D

flow are automaticallv blocked since no conceivable Power 3

t this low power level. Above the P-7 interlock. the reactor trip p

the P-8 setpoint. a loss of flow in anv one loop will actuate a reactor t r i ~

because of the hiaher power level and the reduced marain to the desian limit DNBR.

11. Undervoltaae Bus A01 and A02 The Undervoltaae Bus A01 and A02 reactor trip Function ensures that protection is provided aaainst violatinu the DNBR limit due to a loss of flow in both RCS loops. The voltaae to Bus A01 and A02 is monitored. Above the P-7 interlock. a loss of voltaae detected on both buses will initiate a reactor trip. This trip Function will generate a reactor trip independent of Reactor Coolant Flow-Low

/Two Loops) Trip Setpoint. Time delavs are incorporated into the Undervoltaae Bus A01 and A02 channels to prevent reactor trips k

The LC0 reauires two Undervoltape channels per bus to be Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. XH-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

APPLICABLE OPERABLE. An Undervoltaae channel consists of the A01lA02 Bus SAFETY ANALYSES, Undewoltaae Relav and the associated Bus Undewoltaae Matrix LC0 AND Relav.

APPLICABILITY lcontinuedk In MODE 1 above the P-7 interlock, the Undervoltaae Bus A01 and A02 trip must be OPERABLE. Below the P-7 interlock. all reactor trips on loss of flow are automaticallv blocked since no conceivable power distributions could occur that would cause a DNB concern at this low power level. Above the P-7 interlock. the reactor trip on loss of flow in both RCS loops is automaticallv enabled.

12. Underfreauencv Bus A01 and A02 The Underfreauencv Bus A01 and A02 RCP breaker trip Function ensures that protection is provided aaainst violatina the DNBR limit due to a loss of flow in two RCS loops from a maior network freauencv disturbance. An underfreauencv condition will slow down the Dumps. therebv reducina their coastdown time followina a pump trip. The proper coastdown time is required so that reactor heat can be removed immediatelv after reactor trip. The freauencv of each RCP bus is monitored. Above the P-7 interlock. a loss of freauencv detected on two RCP buses will trip both RCP breakers.

Trippina both RCP breakers will aenerate a reactor trip before the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops) Trip Setpoint is reached.

Time delavs are incorporated into the Underfreauencv Bus A01 and A02 channels to prevent reactor trips due to momentary electrical power transients.

The LC0 requires two Underfreauencv Bus A01 channels and two Underfreauencv Bus A02 channels to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 1 above the P-7 interlock, the Underfreauencv Bus A01 and A02 RCP breaker trip must be OPERABLE. Below the P-7 interlock, this trip and all reactor trips on loss of flow are automaticallv blocked. because no conceivable power distributions could occur that would cause a DNB concern at this low power level. Above the P-7 interlock, the Underfreauencv Bus A01 and A02 RCP breaker trip is automaticallv enabled.

14. Steam Generator Water Level-Low.

Coincident With Steam FlowIFeedwater Flow Mismatch Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. X33

BASES RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

APPLICABLE SG Water Level-Low. in coniunction with the Steam SAFETY ANALYSES, FIowlFeedwater Flow Mismatch. ensures that protection is LC0 AND provided aaainst a loss of heat sink. In addition to a decreasing APPLICABILITY water level in the SG. the difference between feedwater flow and 4continued) steam flow is evaluated to determine if feedwater flow is siqnificantlv less than steam flow.

With less feedwater flow than steam flow. SG level will decrease at a rate deaendent upon the maqnitude of the difference in flow rates. There are two SG level channels and two Steam Flow/Feedwater Flow Mismatch channels per SG. One narrow ranae level channel sensing a low level coincident with one Steam Flow/ Feedwater Flow Mismatch channel sensina flow mismatch

&team flow areater than feed flow) will actuate a reactor trip.

LC0 3.3.1. Function 13. Steam Generator Water Level-Low Low. is used to bound the analvsis for a loss of feedwater event. The nominal settina required for the Steam Generator Water Level-Low trip function is 30% of span.

The LC0 requires two channels of SG Water Level-Low coincident with Steam FlowIFeedwater Flow Mismatch aer SG.

In MODE 1 or 2. when the reactor requires a heat sink. the SG Water Level-Low coincident with Steam FlowIFeedwater Flow Mismatch trip must be OPERABLE. The normal source of water for the SGs is the MFW Svstem (not safetv related). The MFW Svstem is onlv in oaeration in MODE 1 or 2. The AFW Svstem is the safetv related backup source of water to ensure that the SGs remain the heat sink for the reactor. Durina normal startups and shutdowns, the AFW Svstem provides feedwater to maintain SG level. In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. the SG Water Level-Low coincident with Steam FlowIFeedwater Flow Mismatch Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the MFW Svstem is not in operation and the reactor is not operatina or even critical. Decay heat removal is accomplished bv the AFW Svstem in MODE 3 and bv the RHR Svstem in MODE 4, 5. or 6. The MFW Svstem is in operation onlv in MODE 1 or 2 and. therefore. this tria Functio~

need onlv be OPERABLE in these MODES.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4, 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12, and 14.

ACTIONS A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarifv the apolication of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Soecification mav be entered independentlv for each Function listed in Table 3.3.1-1.

In the event a channel's NTSP is found non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. or the channel is not functionina as required. or the transmitter. instrument loop. sianal processina electronics. or bistable is found inowerable. then all affected Functions provided bv p

entered for the orotection Function(s) affected.

When the number of inoperable channels in a trip Function exceed those s~ecified in one or other related Conditions associated with a trip Function, then the unit is outside the safetv analvsis. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be immediatelv entered if applicable in the current MODE of operation.

Condition A applies to all RPS ~rotection Functions. Condition A addresses the situation where one or more reauired channels or trains for one or more Functions are ino~erable at the same time. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.1-1 and to take the Reauired Actions for the protection functions affected. The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions.

B.l and B.2 Condition B applies to the Manual Reactor Trip in MODE 1 or 2. With one channel inoperable. the inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate to oerform the safetv function.

The Completion Time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considerina that there 8

channel OPERABLE. and the low probabilitv of an event occurring durina this interval.

If the Manual Reactor T r i ~

Function cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Completion Time. the unit must be brouaht to a MODE in which the requirement does not applv. To achieve this status. the unit must be brouaht to at least MODE 3 within Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2436

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE----------------------------------------------

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

ACTIONS (continued) 6 additional hours. The 6 additional hours to reach MODE 3 is 0

power operation in an orderlv manner and without challenaina unit svstems. With the unit in MODE 3. this trip Function is no lonaer required to be OPERABLE.

C.l and C.2 Condition C ap~lies to the Manual Reactor Trip Function in MODE 3,

4. or 5 with the RTBs closed and the Rod Control Svstem capable of rod withdrawal.

With one channel inoperable. the inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. If the Reactor Manual Trir, channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Completion Time. the unit must be placed in-a MODE in which the requirement does not applv. To achieve this status. the RTBs must be opened within the next hour.

The additional hour ~rovides sufficient time to accomplish the action in an orderlv manner. With the RTBs open. the Manual Reactor Trip Function is no lonaer reauired.

D.l and 0.2 Condition D applies to the followina reactor trip Functions:

Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Hiah; e

Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Low; e

Overtemperature AT; Overpower AT; 0

Pressurizer Pressure-Hiah; SG Water Level-Low Low: and B

SG Water Level - Low coincident with Steam FlowIFeedwater Flow Mismatch.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. XH-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2.06

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

ACTIONS (continued)

A known inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Placina the channel in the tripped condition results in a partial trip condition reauirina onlv one-out-of-two loaic for actuation of the two-out-of-three trios and one-out-of-three loaic for actuation of the two-out-of-four trips.

If the inoperable channel cannot be placed in the tripped condition within the specified Com~letion Time. the unit must be placed in a MODE where these Functions are not required OPERABLE. An additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is allowed to place the unit in MODE 3. Six hours is a reasonable time. based on operatinu experience, to place the unit in MODE 3 from full power in an orderlv manner and without challenging unit svstems.

E.l and E.2 Condition E applies to the Underfreauencv Bus A01 and A02 trip function. With one channel inoperable. the inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Placina the channel in the tripped condition results in a partial trip condition reauirina only one additional channel to initiate a reactor trip above the P-7 setpoint.

The 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to place the channel in the tripped condition is necessary due to plant desian reauirina maintenance personnel to effect the trip of the channel outside of the Control Room. An additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER to below P-7 if the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the specified Completion Time.

Allowance of this time interval takes into consideration the redundant capabilitv provided bv the remainina redundant OPERABLE channel and the low probabilitv of occurrence of an event durina this period that mav require the protection afforded bv this trip function.

F.l and F.2 Condition F applies to the Intermediate Ranae Neutron Flux trip when THERMAL POWER is above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint and one channel is inoperable. Above the P-6 setooint and below the P-10 setpoint. the NIS intermediate ranae detector performs the monitorina Functions. If THERMAL POWER is areater than the P-6 setpoint but less than the P-10 setpoint. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is allowed to Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2QG

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

ACTIONS fcontinuedb reduce THERMAL POWER below the P-6 setpoint or increase to THERMAL POWER above the P-10 setpoint. The NIS lntermediate Ranae Neutron Flux channels must be OPERABLE when the power level is above the canabilitv of the source ranae. P-6, and below the capabilitv of the power ranae. P-10. If THERMAL POWER is areater than the P-10 setpoint. the NIS Dower ranae detectors perform the required. The Completion Times allow for a slow and controlled power adiustment above P-10 or below P-6 and take into account the redundant capabilitv afforded bv the redundant OPERABLE channel, and the low probabilitv of its failure durina this period. This action does not require the inoperable channel to be tripped because the Function uses one-out-of-two loaic. Trippina one channel would trip the reactor.

Thus. the Reauired Actions specified in this Condition are onlv applicable when channel failure does not result in reactor trip.

G.l and G.2 1 Flux trip channels in MODE 2 when THERMAL POWER is above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint. Required Actions specified in this Condition are onlv applicable when channel failures do not result in reactor trip. Above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint. the NIS intermediate ranae detector performs the monitorinq Functions. With no intermediate ranae channels OPERABLE. the Required Actions are to suspend operations involvina positive reactivitv additions immediatelv. This will preclude anv power level increase since there are no OPERABLE lntermediate Ranae Neutron Flux channels. The operator must also reduce THERMAL POWER below the P-6 setpoint within two hours. Below P-6. the Source Ranae Neutron Flux channels will be able to monitor the core power level.

The Completion Time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> will allow a slow and controlled power reduction to less than the P-6 setpoint and takes into account the low probabilitv of occurrence of an event durina this period that may y

Flux trip.

Condition H applies to one inoperable Source Ranae Neutron Flux trip channel when in MODE 2. below the P-6 setpoint, and performina a Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 24H-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES

---

NOTE TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv apolicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

ACTIONS (continued) reactor startup. With the unit in this Condition. below P-6. the NIS source ranae oerforms the monitorina and protection functions. With one of the two channels inoperable, operations involvina positive reactivitv additions shall be susoended immediatelv.

This will oreclude anv power escalation. With onlv one source ranae channel OPERABLE. core protection is severelv reduced and any actions that add oositive reactivitv to the core must be suspended immediatelv.

Condition I applies to two inoperable Source Ranae Neutron Flux trio channels when in MODE 2. below the P-6 setpoint and performina a reactor startup. or in MODE 3. 4. or 5 with the RTBs closed and the Rod Control Svstem caoable of rod withdrawal. With the unit in this Condition, below P-6. the NIS source ranae perform the monitoring and protection functions. With both source ranae channels inoperable, the RTBs must be ooened immediatelv. With the RTBs open. the core is in a more stable condition.

J;1 and J.2 Condition J ap~lies to one inooerable source ranae channel in MODE 3. 4. or 5 with the RTBs closed and the Rod Control Svstem capable of rod withdrawal. With the unit in this Condition. below P-6, the NIS source ranae performs the monitorina and protection functions. With one of the source ranae channels inoperable, 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is allowed to restore it to an OPERABLE status. If the channel cannot be returned to an OPERABLE status. 1 additional hour is allowed to ooen the RTBs. Once the RTBs are open. the core is in a more stable condition.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-66 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

ACTIONS (continued) K.l and K.2 Condition K applies to the followina reactor trip Functions:

0 Pressurizer Pressure-Low; a

Pressurizer Water Level-Hiah; Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops);

Undervoltaae Bus A01 and A02.

With one channel inoperable. the inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Placina the channel in the tripped condition results in a partial trip condition reauirina onlv one additional channel to initiate a reactor trip above the P-7 interlock and below the P-8 setpoint. These Functions do not have to be OPERABLE below the P-7 interlock because there are no loss of flow trips below the P-7 interlock. An additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER to below P-7 if the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the specified Completion Time.

Allowance of this time interval takes into consideration the redundant capabilitv ~rovided bv the remainina redundant OPERABLE channel, and the low probabilitv of occurrence of an event durina this ~eriod that mav require the protection afforded bv the Functions associated with Condition K.

L.l and L.2 Condition L applies to the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Sinale Loop1 reactor trir, Function. With one channel inoperable. the inoperable channel must be laced in the tri~ped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or the channel placed in trip within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. then THERMAL POWER must be reduced below the P-8 setpoint within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This places the unit in a MODE where the LC0 is no lonaer applicable. This trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE below the P-8 setpoint because other RPS trip Functions provide core protection below the P-8 set~oint.

Point Beach Unit 1 -Amendment No. ?@I Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2043

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

ACTIONS fcontinued) M.l and M.2 Condition M applies to the RCP Breaker Position (Sinale Loop) reactor trip Function. There is one breaker position device per RCP breaker.

With one channel inoperable. the inoperable channel(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. then THERMAL POWER must be reduced below the P-8 setpoint within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

This places the unit in a MODE where the LC0 is no lonaer applicable.

This Function does not have to be OPERABLE below the P-8 setpoint because other RPS Functions provide core ~rotection below the P-8 setpoint.

N.l and N.2 Condition N applies to the RCP Breaker Position (Two LOOD) reactor trio Function. With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. then THERMAL 1

hours. This places the unit in a MODE where the LC0 is no lonaer a~~licable.

This function does not have to be OPERABLE below the P-7 interlock because there are no loss of flow trim below the P-7 interlock. The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable. based on operatina experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to below the P-7 interlock from full power in an orderlv manner without challenaina unit svstems.

0.1 and 0.2 Condition 0 applies to Turbine Trip on Low Autostop Oil Pressure or on Turbine Stop Valve Closure. With one channel inoperable. the inoperable channel must be placed in the trip condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If placed in the tripped condition. this results in a partial trip condition reauirina onlv one additional channel to initiate a reactor trip. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed in the trip condition, then power must be reduced below the P-9 setpoint within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Point Beach Unit 1 -Amendment No. 24%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES

---

NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47' through B 3.3.1-82 are only applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4, 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11, 12. and 14.

ACTIONS [continued) P.l and P.2 Condition P applies to the SI Input from ESFAS reactor trip and the RPS Automatic Trir, Loaic in MODES 1 and 2. These actions address the train orientation of the RPS for these Functions. With one train inoperable. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status (Required Action P.1) or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (Required Action P.l) is reasonable considerina that in this Condition. the remainina OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the safetv function and aiven the low probabilitv of an event durina this interval. The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (Required Action P.2) is reasonable. based on operatina experience. to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly y

y bv~assina one train for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testina. provided the other train is OPERABLE.

(2.1 and Q.2 C

E S

I and 2. With one RTB inoperable. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is allowed to restore the RTB to OPERABLE status or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable. based on operating exrterience. to reach MODE 3 from full Dower in an orderly manner and without challenaina unit svstems. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Completion Times are equal to the time allowed bv LC0 3.0.3 for shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of RPS Function. Placina the unit in MODE 3 removes the requirement for this particular Function.

The Reauired Actions have been modified bv a Note allowina one channel to be bvpassed for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

R.1 and R.2 1 i

n t

e r

l o

c k

o u

t o

f t

w o

or two-out-of-four coincidence loaic. the associated interlock must be v

e r

i f

i e

d n

d i

t i

o n

within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 281-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv a~~licable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

ACTIONS (continued) Verifvina the interlock status manuallv accomplishes the interlock's Function. The Comoletion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is based on operating exoerience and the minimum amount of time allowed for manual ooerator actions. The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable. based on operatina experience. to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenaina unit svstems. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Completion Times are eaual to the time allowed bv LC0 3.0.3 for shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of RPS Function.

S.l and 5.2 Condition S applies to the P-7, P-8. and P-9 interlocks. With one or more channels inooerable for one-out-of-two or two-out-of-four coincidence loaic. the associated interlock must be verified to be in its required state for the existina unit condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or the unit l

e conservative for the case where power level is beina raised. Verifving g

The Comoletion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is based on o~eratina experience and the minimum amount of time allowed for manual operator actions. The r

g experience. to reach MODE 2 from full power in an orderlv manner and without challenaina unit svstems.

T.l and T.2 Condition T ap~lies to the RTBs and the RTB Undervoltaae and Shunt Trio Mechanisms in MODES 3. 4. or 5 with the RTBs closed and the Rod Control Svstem capable of rod withdrawal.

With one trip mechanism or RTB inoperable. the inoperable trip mechanism or RTB must be restored to OPERABLE status within p

remainina OPERABLE trip mechanism or RTB is adequate to perform p

q durina this interval. c within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the requirement does not applv. This is accomplished bv openina the RTBs within the next hour (49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> total time). The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> provides sufficient time to accomplish this action in an orderly Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12, and 14.

ACTIONS (continued) manner and takes into account the low probabilitv of an event occurrinq in this interval.

U.l and U.2 Condition U applies to the RTB Undervoltaae and Shunt Trip Mechanisms. or diverse trip features. in MODES I and 2. With one of the diverse trip features inoperable. it must be restored to an OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or the unit must be placed in a MODE where the reauirement does not a~plv. This is accom~lished bv placina the unit in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> total time).

The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is a reasonable time. based on operatina experience. to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderlv manner and without challenainq unit svstems.

With the unit in MODE 3. Condition T would applv to anv inoperable RTB trip mechanisms. The affected RTB shall not be bvpassed while one of the diverse features is inoperable except for the time required to perform maintenance to one of the diverse features. The allowable time for performina maintenance of the diverse features is 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for the reasons stated under Condition Q.

The Completion Time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considerinq that in this Condition there is one remainina diverse feature for the affected RTB, and one OPERABLE RTB capable of performinq the safetv function and aiven the low probabilitv of an event occurrina durina this interval.

V.l and V.2 Condition V applies to the Reactor Trip Bvpass Breaker (RTBB) and associated Undervoltaae Trip Mechanism in MODE 1 or 2. when the RTBB is racked in and closed. With the reauired RTBB inoperable, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is allowed to restore the RTBB to OPERABLE status or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable. based on operatina experience. to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderlv manner and without challenqing unit svstems. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> completion times are equal to the time allowed bv LC0 3.0.3 for shutdown action in the event of 3 complete loss of RPS Function. Placina the unit in MODE 3 removes the reauirement for this particular Function.

Point Beach B 3.3.1 -71 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 3111:

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to UPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

ACTIONS (continued) W.l and W.2 Condition W applies to the Reactor Trip Bvpass Breaker fRTBB) and associated Undewoltaae Trip Mechanism in MODES 3. 4. or 5, when an RTBB is racked in and closed and the Rod Control Svstem is capable of rod withdrawal. With the required RTBB inoperable. 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is allowed to restore the RTBB to OPERABLE status or the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the reauirement does not applv.

To achieve this status. the RTBs and RTBBs must be opened within the next 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> total time). The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> provides sufficient time to accomplish the action in an orderly manner.

With the RTBs and RTBBs open, this Function is no lonaer required.

X.l and X.2 Condition X aoplies to the RPS Automatic Trip Loaic in MODES 3. 4 or 5 with the RTBs closed and the Rod Control Svstem capable of rod withdrawal. With one train inoperable. 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> are allowed to restore the train to an OPERABLE status. The Completion Time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considerina that in this condition, the remainina OPERABLE train is adeauate to perform the safetv function. and aiven the low probabilitv of an event occurrina in this interval.

If the RPS Automatic Trip Loaic cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. the unit must be placed in a MODE where this Function is not required to be OPERABLE. To achieve this status. the RTBs must be opened within the next 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> total time). The additional hour provides sufficient time to accomplish the action in an orderlv manner. With the RTBs open, the Automatic Triw Loaic is no lonaer required.

SURVEILLANCE The SRs for each RPS Function are identified by the SRs column of REQUIREMENTS Table 3.3.1 -1 for that Function.

A Note has been added to the SR Table statina that Table 3.3.1 -1 determines which SRs applv to which UPS Functions.

Note that each channel of process protection supplies both trains of the UPS. When testina Channel I. Train A and Train B must be examined.

Similarlv. Train A and Train B must be examined when testing Channel 11. Channel Ill. and Channel IV (if apolicable). The CHANNEL Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

BASES RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv a~plicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

SURVEILLANCE CALIBRATION and COTS are performed in a manner that is consistent REQUIREMENTS with the assumptions used in analvticallv calculatina the reauired icontinued) channel accuracies.

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once everv 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that aross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normallv a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assum~tion that instrument channels monitorina the same parameter should read approximatelv the same value. Sianificant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of somethina even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect aross channel failure; thus. it is kev to verifvina that the instrumentation continues to operate properlv between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

A 0

combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readabilitv. If a channel is outside the criteria. it mav be an indication that the sensor or the sianal processina eauipment has drifted outside its limit.

The Freauencv is based on operatina ex~erience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal. but more frequent. checks of channels during normal operational use of the displavs associated with the LC0 reauired channels.

SR 3.3.1.2 comPares the calorimetric heat balance calculation to the NIS channel output everv 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. If the calorimetric exceeds the NIS must be adiusted. If the NIS channel out~ut cannot be properly adiusted. the channel is declared inoperable.

Two Notes modifv SR 3.3.1.2. The first Note indicates that the NIS channel output shall be adiusted consistent with the calorimetric results if the absolute difference between the NIS channel output and the calorimetric is > 2OA RTP. The second Note clarifies that this Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

SURVEILLANCE Surveillance is required onlv if reactor power is 2 15% RTP and that REQUIREMENTS 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is allowed for ~erformina the first Surveillance after reaching lcontinued) 15% RTP. At lower power levels. calorimetric data are inaccurate. The Frequency of everv 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is adeauate. It is based on unit operating experience. considerina instrument reliabilitv and o~eratina historv data for instrument drift. Toaether these factors demonstrate the chanae in powers rarelv exceeds 2% in anv 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.

In addition, control room operators weriodicallv monitor redundant indications and alarms to detect deviations in channel outputs.

SR 3.3.1.3 compares the incore svstem to the NIS channel out~ut everv 31 EFPD. SR 3.3.1.3 is performed bv means of the moveable incore detection svstem. If the absolute difference is 2 3%. the NIS channel is still OPERABLE. but must be readiusted.

If the NIS channel cannot be properlv readiusted. the channel is declared inoperable. This Surveillance is performed to verifv the f!AIi input to the overtemperature AT Function.

Two Notes modifv SR 3.3.1.3. Note 1 indicates that the excore NIS channel shall be adiusted if the absolute difference between the incore Note 2 clarifies that the Surveillance is required onlv if reactor power is p 50% RTP and that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is allowed for performina the first Surveillance after reachina 50% RTP.

The Freauencv of e v

e t

y

{

q historv data for instrument drift. Also. the slow chanaes in neutron flux durina the fuel cvcle can be detected durina this interval.

SR 3.3.1.4 is the werformance of a TADOT everv 31 davs on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This test shall verifv OPERABILITY bv actuation of the end devices.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. %

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

SURVEILLANCE T

c REQUIREMENTS lcontinuedl jncluded in SR 3.3.1.13. The bvpass breaker test shall include an undervoltaae trip. A Note has been added to SR 3.3.1.4 to indicate that this test must be oerformed on the bvpass breaker prior to placina it in service.

The Freauencv of evew 31 davs on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is a

s q

instrument reliabilitv and operatina historv data.

SR 3.3.1.5 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST, every 31 davs on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The train beina tested is placed in the bvoass condition. thus oreventina inadvertent actuation.

All possible logic combinations. with and without applicable permissives. are tested for each protection function. The Freauencv of everv 31 davs on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is adequate. It is based on industw operatina experience. considerina instrument reliabilitv and ooeratina historv data.

SR 3.3.1 -5 is modified bv two Notes. Note I provides an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance for the Source Ranae Neutron Flux trip function instrumentation when oower is reduced to below P-6. This Note allows a normal shutdown to oroceed without a D

e RTBs are open and SR 3.3.1.5 is no lonaer reauired to be performed. If the unit is to be in MODE 2 below P-6 for > 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. this Surveillance must be performed prior to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after reducina power below P-6.

Note 2 excludes the RCP Breaker Position [Two Loop). Reactor

)uencv Bus A01 and A02 Trip Functions. and the P-6, P-7. P-8. P-9 and P-10 Interlocks. These functions/interlocks are tested at an 18 month freauencv via SR 3.3.1.15.

SR 3.3.1.6 is a calibration of the excore channels to the incore channels. If the measurements do not aaree. the excore channels are 1

Point Beach B 3.3.1-75 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4, 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

SURVEILLANCE detector measurements. If the excore channels cannot be adjusted. the REQUIREMENTS channels are declared inoperable. This Surveillance is performed to Lcontinued);

verifv the f(Al) input to the overtemperature AT Function.

A Note modifies SR 3.3.1.6. The Note states that this Surveillance is required onlv if reactor power is > 50% RTP and that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is allowed for performina the first surveillance after reachina 50% RTP.

The Frequencv of 92 EFPD is adequate. It is based on industry oweratina experience. considerina instrument reliabilitv and operatinq historv data for instrument drift.

SR 3.3.1.7 is the performance of a COT everv 92 davs.

A COT is ~erformed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function.

Setpoints must be conservative with respect to the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1 -1.

The difference between the current "as found" values and the NTSP p

methodoloav. The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit specific setpoint methodoloav.

The "as found" and "as left" values must also be recorded and verified to be within the required limits.

SR 3.3.1.7 is modified bv a Note that provides a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> delav in the requirement to ~erform this Surveillance for source ranae instrumentation when enterina MODE 3 from MODE 2. This Note allows a normal shutdown to proceed without a delav for testina in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until the RTBs are open and SR 3.3.1.7 is no lonaer required to be werformed. If the unit is to be in MODE 3 with the RTBs closed for > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> this Surveillance must be performed prior to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after entrv into MODE 3.

SR 3.3.1.7 is modified bv two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found settinafor the channel setpoint is outside its Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 294 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a: 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

SURVEILLANCE as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable REQUIREMENTS Value. Evaluation of channel performance will verifv that the channel icontinued) will continue to behave in accordance with the safetv analvsis assum~tions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodoloav. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returninq the channel to service.

The performance of these channels will be evaluated under the station's Corrective Action Proaram. Entry into the Corrective Action Proaram will ensure required review and documentation of the condition jo establish a reasonable expectation for continued OPERABILITY.

The second Note reauires that the as-left settinq for the channel be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures. the as-left and as-found tolerances. as a~plicable. will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient marain to the Safetv Limit and/or Analvtical Limit is maintained. If the as-left channel settina cannot be returned to a settinq within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP. then the channel shall be declared inoperable.

SR 3.3.1.8 is the performance of a COT as described in SR 3.3.1.7, except it is modified bv a Note that this test shall include verification that the P-6 and P-10 interlocks are in their reauired state for the existing unit condition. The Freauencv is modified bv a Note that allows this g

f the Frequencies ~ r i o r to reactor startup and four hours after reducinq power below P-10 and P-6. The Freauencv of "prior to startup" ensures this surveillance is performed prior to critical operations and applies to the source. intermediate and power ranqe low instrument channels.

The Freauencv of "4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after reducina power below P-10" (applicable to intermediate and power ranqe low channels) and "4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after reducina power below P-6" (applicable to source ranae channels) allows a normal shutdown to be completed and the unit removed from the MODE of Applicabilitv for this surveillance without a delav to perform the testina required bv this surveillance. The Frequencv of everv 92 davs thereafter applies if the plant remains in the MODE of Ap~licabilitv after the initial performances of prior to reactor startup and four hours after reducina power below P-10 or P-6. The MODE of Applicabilitv for this Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. XH-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4, 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12, and 14.

SURVEILLANCE surveillance is < P-10 for the ~ower ranae low and intermediate ranae REQUIREMENTS channels and < P-6 for the source ranae channels. Once the unit is in (continued')

MODE 3. this surveillance is no lonaer reauired. If power is to be maintained < P-10 or < P-6 for more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. then the testinq required bv this surveillance must be performed orior to the exoiration of the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> limit. Four hours is a reasonable time to complete the reauired testina or dace the unit in a MODE where this surveillance is no lonqer reauired. This test ensures that the NIS source, intermediate. and power ranae low channels are OPERABLE prior to takina the reactor critical and after reducina power into the applicable MODE (< P-10 or <

P-6) for oeriods > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

SR 3.3.1.8 is modified bv two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1 -1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found settina for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. Evaluation of channel performance will verifv that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safetv analvsis assumptions and the channel performance assum~tions in the setpoint methodoloav.

The ourpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returnina the channel to service. The performance of these channels will be evaluated under the station's Corrective Action Proaram. Entrv into the Corrective Action Proaram will ensure required review and documentation of the condition to establish a reasonable expectation for continued OPERABILITY. The second Note y

as-left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures. the as-left and as-found tolerances. as applicable. will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient marain to the Safetv Limit and/or Analvtical Limit is maintained. If the as-left channel settina cannot be returned to a settina within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.

SR 3.3.1.9 is the performance of a TADOT and is performed evew 31 davs.

/I CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed everv 18 months. or Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 20.6

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE...........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

SURVEILLANCE a

REQUIREMENTS comolete check of the instrument loop. includina the sensor. The test jcontinued]

verifies that the channel resoonds to a measured parameter within the necessarv ranae and accuracv.

p assumptions of the unit specific setpoint methodoloav. The difference between the current "as-found" values and the NTSP must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodoloav.

The Freauencv of 18 months is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the maanitude of equipment drift in the setooint methodoloav.

SR 3.3.1.I 0 is modified bv a Note statina that this test shall include verification that the time delays are adiusted to the mescribed values where aoplicable.

SR 3.3.1.I0 is modified bv two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found settina for the channel setooint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. Evaluation of channel performance will verifv that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safetv analysis assumptions The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel p

p e

of these channels will be evaluated under the station's Corrective Action Proaram. Entty into the Corrective Action Proaram will ensurg reauired review and documentation of the condition to establish a, reasonable expectation for continued OPERABILITY. The second Note reauires that the as-left settina for the channel be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setooint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures. the as-left and as-found tolerances. as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient marain to the Safetv Limit and/or Analvtical Limit is maintained. If the as-left channel settina cannot be returned to a settina within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP. then the channel shall be declared inoperable.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 234-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1 -47 throuah B 3.3.1 -82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8, 9.al 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.I 1 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION. as REQUIREMENTS described in SR 3.3.1.lo. everv I 8 months. This SR is modified bv a (continued)

Note statina that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the power ranae neutron detectors consists of a normalization of the detectors based on a power calorimetric and flux map performed above 15% RTP. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the source ranae and intermediate ranae neutron detectors consists of obtainina the detector olateau or preamo discriminator curves. evaluatina those curves. and comparing g

for the NIS power ranae detectors for entrv into MODE 2 or 1. and is not required for the NIS intermediate ranae detectors for entrv into MODE 2. because the unit must be in at least MODE 2 to perform the test for the intermediate ranae detectors and MODE 1 for the power ranae detectors. The 18 month Freauencv is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that applv durina a plant outaae and the ootential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operatina experience has shown these components usuallv pass the Surveillance when performed on the 18 month Frequencv.

SR 3.3.1.I 1 is modified bv two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. The first Note reauires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found settina for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. Evaluation of channel performance will verifv that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safetv analvsis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the set~oint methodoloav.

1 performance prior to returnina the channel to service. The performance of these channels will be evaluated under the station's Corrective Action Proaram. Entrv into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition to establish a reasonable expectation for continued OPERABILITY. The second Note requires that the as-left settina for the channel be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures. the as-left and as-found tolerances. as applicable. will be aoplied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient marain to the Safetv Limit andlor Analvtical Limit is maintained. If the as-left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inooerable.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. =_ze Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1 -47 throuah B 3.3.1 -82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4, 8. 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.I2 REQUIREMENTS lcontinued)

)

v 18 months.

The Freauencv is based on the known reliabilitv of the interlocks and 1

acceptable throuah operatina experience.

SR 3.3.1.I 3 is the performance of a TADOT of the Manual Reactor Trip. RCP Breaker Position. SI Input from ESFAS. and the Condenser Pressure-Hiah and Circulatina Water Pump Breaker Position inputs to the P-9 Interlock. This TADOT is performed evew 18 months. The test 1

shunt trip circuits for the Manual Reactor Trip Function for the Reactor Trip Breakers and the undervoltaae trip circuits for the Reactor Trip Bv~ass Breakers.

D d

the multichannel redundancv available. and has been shown to be acceptable throuah operatina experience.

SR 3.3.1.I4 is the performance of a TADOT of Turbine Trip Functions.

This TADOT is as described in SR 3.3.1.4. except that this test is performed prior to exceedinq the P-9 interlock whenever the unit has been in MODE 3. This Surveillance is not reauired if it has been performed within the previous 31 davs. Performance of this test will ensure that the turbine trip Function is OPERABLE orior to exceeding the P-9 interlock. 9 RCP Breaker Position (Two Looo). Reactor Coolant Flow-Low {Two Loop) and Underfreauencv Bus A01 and A02 Trip Functions. and P-6, P-7. P-8. P-9 and P-10 Interlocks everv 18 months.

Point Beach B 3.3.1 -81 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES NOTE -------------------------------------------------

TS BASES Paaes B 3.3.1-47 throuah B 3.3.1-82 are onlv applicable to RPS Functions 2.b. 4. 8. 9.a. 9.b. 11. 12. and 14.

SURVEILLANCE The 18 month freauencv is based on the need to perform this REQUIREMENTS surveillance under the conditions that applv durina a plant outaae and jcontinuedl the uotential for an un~lanned transient if the surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

REFERENCES

1.

FSAR, Chapter 7.

2.

FSAR. Cha~ter 14.

3.

I EEE-279-1968.

4.

10 CFR 50.49.

Point Beach B 3.3.1-82 Unit I - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) lnstrumentation BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv ap~licable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

BACKGROUND The ESFAS initiates necessary safety systems, based on the values of selected unit parameters, to protect against violating core design limits and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary, and to mitigate accidents.

The ESFAS instrumentation is segmented into three distinct but interconnected modules as identified below:

o Field transmitters or process sensors and instrumentation: provide a measurable electronic signal based on the physical characteristics of the parameter being measured; o

Signal processing equipment including analog protection system, field contacts, and protection channel sets: provide signal conditioning, compatible electrical signal output to protection system devices, and control boardlcontrol room/miscellaneous indications; and e

Relay Logic Racks including input, logic and output devices: initiates proper Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation in accordance with the defined logic and based on the bistable outputs from the signal process control and protection system.

Field Transmitters or Sensors To meet the design demands for redundancy and reliability, more than one, and often as many as four, field transmitters or sensors are used to measure unit parameters. In many cases, field transmitters or sensors that input to the ESFAS are shared with the Reactor Protection System (RPS). In some cases, the same channels also provide control system inputs. To account for calibration tolerances and instrument drift, which are assumed to occur between calibrations, statistical allowances are provided in the Allowable Values. The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor can be evaluated when its "as found" calibration data are compared against its documented acceptance criteria.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2 W Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE....................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d [steam flow), 4.e. 5.a, 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

BACKGROUND Siqnal Processinq Equipment

.(continued)

Generally, three or four channels of process control equipment are used for the signal processing of unit parameters measured by the field instruments. The process control equipment provides signal conditioning, comparable output signals for instruments located on the main control board, and comparison of measured input signals with setpoints established by safety analyses. If the measured value of a unit parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint, an output from a bistable is forwarded to the logic relays.

Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits, three channels with a two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy. If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a partial Function trip, the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still

.OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two logic.

Generally, if a parameter is used for input to the Relay Logic Racks and a control function, four channels with a two-out-of-four logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy. The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation.

Again, a single failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation.

These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1968 (Ref. 3).

Allowable Values To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties and instrument drift, the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.2-1 in the accompanying LC0 are conservatively adjusted with respect to the analytical limits. A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the Allowable Values, including their explicit uncertainties, is provided in DGI-01, Instrument Setpoint Methodology (Ref. 5). The actual nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the bistable is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to account for changes in random measurement errors detectable by a COT. If the Point Beach B 3.3.2-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2Q-4.

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b: 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e: 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

BACKGROUND measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the bistable is (continued) considered OPERABLE.

Setpoints in accordance with the Allowable Value ensure that the consequences of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the DBA and the equipment functions as designed.

Each channel can be tested on line to verify that the signal processing equipment and setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements. Once a designated channel is taken out of service for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument signal. The process equipment for the channel in test is then tested, verified, and calibrated. SRs for the channels are specified in the SR section.

The Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.2-1 are based on the methodology described in Reference 4, which incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable for each channel. The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into the determination of each Allowable Value. All field sensors and signal processing equipment for these channels are assumed to operate within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes.

Relav Loqic Racks The Relay Logic Rack equipment is used for the decision logic processing of outputs from the signal processing equipment bistables.

To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of Relay Logic Racks, each performing the same functions, are provided.

The Relay Logic Racks perform the decision logic for most ESF equipment actuation; generates the electrical output signals that initiate the required actuation; and provides the status, permissive, and annunciator output signals to the main control room of the unit.

The bistable outputs from the signal processing equipment are sensed by the Relay Logic Rack equipment and combined into logic matrices that represent combinations indicative of various transients. If a required logic matrix combination is completed, the system will send actuation signals via master and slave relays to those components whose aggregate Function best serves to alleviate the condition and restore the unit to a safe condition. Examples are given in the Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

BASES ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions I

.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow), 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and BACKGROUND Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability sections of this (continued)

Bases.

The actuation of ESF components is accomplished through master and slave relays. The Relay Logic Racks energize the master relays appropriate for the condition of the unit. Each master relay then energizes one or more slave relays, which then cause actuation of the end devices.

APPLICABLE Each of the analyzed accidents can be detected by one or more ESFAS SAFETY ANALYSES, Functions. One of the ESFAS Functions is the primary actuation signal LCO, AND for that accident. An ESFAS Function may be the primary actuation APPLICABILITY signal for more than one type of accident. An ESFAS Function may also be a secondary, or backup, actuation signal for one or more other accidents. For example, Pressurizer Pressure-Low is a primary actuation signal for small loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) and a backup actuation signal for steam line breaks (SLBs) outside containment. Functions such as manual initiation, not specifically credited in the accident safety analysis, are qualitatively credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit.

These Functions may provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance. These Functions may also serve as backups to Functions that were credited in the accident analysis (Ref. 1).

The LC0 requires all instrumentation performing an ESFAS Function to be OPERABLE. Failure of any instrument renders the affected channel(s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the affected Functions.

The LC0 generally requires OPERABILITY of four or three channels in each instrumentation function and two channels in each logic function.

The two-out-of-three and the two-out-of-four configurations allow one channel to be tripped during maintenance or testing without causing an ESFAS initiation. Two logic channels are required to ensure no single random failure disables the ESFAS.

The required channels of ESFAS instrumentation provide unit protection in the event of any of the analyzed accidents. ESFAS protection functions are as follows:

1. Safetv Injection Point Beach B 3.3.2-4 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

APPLICABLE Safety Injection (SI) provides two primary functions:

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, AND

1. Primary side water addition to ensure maintenance or recovery APPLICABILITY of reactor vessel water level (coverage of the active fuel for heat (continued) removal, clad integrity, and for limiting peak clad temperature to

< 2200°F); and

2. Boration to ensure recovery and maintenance of SDM (keU < 1.0).

These functions are necessary to mitigate the effects of high energy line breaks (HELBs) both inside and outside of containment. The SI signal is also used to initiate other Functions such as:

0 Containment Isolation; o

Containment Ventilation Isolation; 0

Reactor Trip; Feedwater lsolation; Start of motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps; and e

Control room ventilation isolation.

These other functions ensure:

o lsolation of nonessential systems through containment penetrations; Trip of the reactor to limit power generation; o

lsolation of main feedwater (MFW) to limit secondary side mass losses; Start of AFW to ensure secondary side cooling capability; and lsolation of the control room to ensure habitability.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 281-Unit 2 - Amendment No. XE

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES

---

NOTE TS BASES Paaes 8.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a, 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and 8

.-A -

APPLICABLE

a.

Safetv Iniection-Manual Initiation SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, AND The LC0 requires one channel per train to be OPERABLE. The APPLlCABl LlTY operator can initiate SI at any time by using either of two switches (continued) in the control room. This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals with the exception of Containment Isolation.

The LC0 for the Manual Initiation Function ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual ESFAS actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual ESFAS initiation capability.

Each channel consists of one push button and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic cabinet. Each push button actuates both trains. This configuration does not allow testing at power.

b. Safetv Iniection-Automatic Actuation Loqic and Actuation Relavs This LC0 requires two trains to be OPERABLE. Actuation logic consists of all circuitry housed within the actuation subsystems, including the initiating relay contacts responsible for actuating the ESF equipment.

Manual and automatic initiation of SI must be OPERABLE in MODES 1,2, and 3. In these MODES, there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary systems to warrant automatic initiation of ESF systems. Manual lnitiation is also required in MODE 4 even though automatic actuation is not required. In this MODE, adequate time is available to manually actuate required components in the event of a DBA, but because of the large number of components actuated on a SI, actuation is simplified by the use of the manual actuation push buttons. Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays must be OPERABLE in MODE 4 to support system level manual initiation.

T h e s ~

Functions are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 because there is adequate time for the operator to evaluate unit conditions and respond by manually starting individual systems, pumps, and other equipment to mitigate the Point Beach B 3.3.2-6 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 281-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions I

.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

consequences of an abnormal condition or accident. Unit pressure APPLICABLE and temperature are very low and many ESF components are SAFETY ANALYSES, administratively locked out or otherwise prevented from actuating LCO, AND to prevent inadvertent overpressurization of unit systems.

APPLICABILITY (continued)

C. s Point Beach B 3.3.2-7 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 334 Unit 2 - Amendment No. =18fi

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b, 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and 8

--L -

APPLICABLE

d.

e r

n SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND APPLICABILITY (continued)

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND APPLICABILITY (continued)

e. Safetv Iniection-Steam Line Pressure-Low Steam Line Pressure-Low provides protection against the following accidents:

e SLB; a

Feed line break; and a

Inadvertent opening of an SG relief or an SG safety valve.

Steam Line Pressure-Low provides a signal for control of the main steam atmospheric steam dump valves. However, a failure in a steam line pressure channel will not create a control failure that would result in a low steamline pressure SI event.

Thus, three OPERABLE channels on each steam line are sufficient to satisfy the protective requirements with a two-out-of-three logic on each steam line.

With the transmitters located in the fan rooms and in the fuel pool area, it is possible for them to experience adverse environmental conditions during a secondary side break.

Therefore, the Allowable Value reflects both steady state and adverse environmental instrument uncertainties.

This Function is anticipatory in nature and has a leadllag ratio of 1212.

Point Beach B 3.3.2-9 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2434-Unit 2 -Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes 6.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, l.b, 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c, 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

APPLICABLE Steam Line Pressure-Low must be OPERABLE in MODES 1,2, SAFETY ANALYSES, and 3 (above the Pressurizer Pressure interlock) when a LCO, AND secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in the APPLICABILITY rapid depressurization of the steam lines. This signal may be (continued) manually blocked by the operator below the Pressurizer Pressure interlock. This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4, 5, or 6 because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the unit to cause an accident.

2. Containment Spray Containment Spray provides three primary functions:

1. Lowers containment pressure and temperature after an HELB in containment;

2. Reduces the amount of radioactive iodine in the containment atmosphere; and

3. Adjusts the pH of the water in the containment recirculation sump after a large break LOCA.

These functions are necessary to:

Ensure the pressure boundary integrity of the containment structure; Limit the release of radioactive iodine to the environment in the event of a failure of the containment structure; and e Minimize corrosion of the components and systems inside containment following a LOCA.

The containment spray actuation signal starts the containment spray pumps and aligns the discharge of the pumps to the containment spray nozzle headers in the upper levels of containment. Water is initially drawn from the RWST by the containment spray pumps and mixed with a sodium hydroxide solution from the spray additive tank.

When the RWST reaches the low low level setpoint, the spray pump suctions are shifted to the containment sump if continued containment spray is required. Containment spray is actuated Point Beach B 3.3.2-1 0 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 24%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

I TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions I

.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and 8,

APPLICABLE automatically by Containment Pressure-High High.

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, AND

a. Containment Sprav-Manual Initiation APPLICABILITY (continued)

The operator can initiate containment spray at any time from the control room by simultaneously depressing two containment spray actuation pushbuttons. Because an inadvertent actuation of containment spray could have such serious consequences, two pushbuttons must be pushed simultaneously to initiate both trains of containment spray.

The LC0 requires two channels to be OPERABLE. Each channel consists of one pushbutton and two sets of contacts, with one set of contacts in each train. Therefore an inoperable channel fails both trains of manual initiation.

b. Containment Sprav-Automatic Actuation Loqic and Actuation Relavs Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b. Manual and automatic initiation of containment spray must be OPERABLE in MODES 1,2, and 3 when there is a potential for an accident to occur, and sufficient energy in the primary or secondary systems to pose a threat to containment integrity due to overpressure conditions. Manual initiation is also required in MODE 4, even though automatic actuation is not required. In this MODE, adequate time is available to manually actuate required components in the event of a DBA. However, because of the large number of components actuated on a containment spray, actuation is simplified by the use of the manual actuation push buttons. Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays must be OPERABLE in MODE 4 to support system level manual initiation. In MODES 5 and 6, there is insufficient energy in the primary and secondary systems to result in containment overpressure. In MODES 5 and 6, there is also adequate time for the operators to evaluate unit conditions and respond, to mitigate the consequences of abnormal conditions by manually starting individual components.

Point Beach B 3.3.2-1 1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 281-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2Q6

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-I throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions I

.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and 8

4 APPLICABLE C

s S

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, AND APPLICABILITY (continued)

3. Containment Isolation Containment Isolation provides isolation of the containment atmosphere from the environment. This Function is necessary to prevent or limit the release of radioactivity to the environment in the event of a large break LOCA.

Containment Isolation signals isolate all automatically isolable process lines, except component cooling water (CCW), main feedwater lines and main steam lines. The main feedwater and main steam lines are isolated by other functions because forced circulation cooling using the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) and SGs is the preferred (but not required) method of decay heat removal.

Point Beach Unit 1 -Amendment No. W Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes 8.3.3.2-1 throuqh B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a.

1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a, 4.b. 4.d [steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and 8

d APPLICABLE Since CCW is required to support RCP operation, not isolating CCW SAFETY ANALYSES, enhances unit safety by allowing operators to use forced RCS LC0 AND circulation to cool the unit. Isolating CCW may force the use of feed APPLICABILITY and bleed cooling, which could prove more difficult to control.

(continued)

a. Containment lsolation (1) Containment Isolation-Manual Initiation The LC0 requires two channels to be OPERABLE. A channel' consists of one pushbutton and two sets of contacts, with one set of contacts in each train.

Manual Containment lsolation is actuated by either of two switches in the control room. Either switch actuates both trains. Note that manual initiation of Containment lsolation also actuates Containment Ventilation Isolation.

(2) Containment Isolation-Automatic Actuation Loqic and Actuation Relavs Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b.

Manual and automatic initiation of Containment lsolation must be OPERABLE in MODES 1,2, and 3, when there is a potential for an accident to occur. Manual initiation is also required in MODE 4 even though automatic actuation is not required. In this MODE, adequate time is available to manually actuate required components in the event of a DBA, but because of the large number of components actuated on a Containment Isolation, actuation is simplified by the use of the manual actuation push buttons. Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays must be OPERABLE in MODE 4 to support system level manual initiation. In MODES 5 and 6, there is insufficient energy in the primary or secondary systems to pressurize the containment to require Containment Isolation. There also is adequate time for the operator to evaluate unit conditions and manually actuate individual isolation valves in response to abnormal or accident conditions.

Point Beach B 3.3.2-1 3 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 294 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8.

APPLICABLE (3) Containment Isolation-Safety Injection SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND Containment Isolation is also initiated by all Functions that APPLICABILITY initiate SI except Manual SI initiation. The Containment (continued)

Isolation requirements for these Functions are the same as the requirements for their SI function. Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. Instead, Function 1, SI, is referenced for all initiating Functions and requirements.

4. Steam Line lsolation lsolation of the main steam lines provides protection in the event of an SLB inside or outside containment. Rapid isolation of the steam lines will limit the steam break accident to the blowdown from one SG, at most. For an SLB upstream of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), inside or outside of containment, closure of the MSIVs limits the accident to the blowdown from only the affected SG. For an SLB downstream of the MSIVs, closure of the MSlVs terminates the accident as soon as the steam lines depressurize.

Steam Line lsolation also mitigates the effects of a feed line break and ensures a source of steam for the turbine driven AFW pump during a feed line break.

a. Steam Line Isolation-Manual Initiation The LC0 requires one channel per loop to be OPERABLE. A channel consists of the control switch and two sets of contacts, with one set of contacts in each train.

Manual initiation of Steam Line lsolation can be accomplished from the control room. There are two switches in the control room, one for each MSIV.

b. Steam Line Isolation-Automatic Actuation Loqic and Actuation Relavs The LC0 requires two trains to be OPERABLE. Actuation logic consists of two trains, with each train providing output to each MSIV through individual relays.

Manual and automatic initiation of steam line isolation must be OPERABLE in MODES 1,2, and 3 when there is sufficient Point Beach B 3.3.2-1 4 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

-A6~aua 40 sa!pluenb lue:,!j!u6!s 6u!sealal luap!:,:,~ laylo l o 81s ue a:,ua!~adxa 01 sos pue s 3 ~

ayl u! A6laua lua!:,!gnsu! s! alayl

'9 PUB '9 'p szaofi UI 'pale~!l:,e-ap pue pasol:, ale s/\\lsyy (panu!luo:,)

lie ssalun g pue Z. s3aofi u! pa~!nba~

s! uo!l:,und uo!g~losl AlllI8V3IlddV au!g Meals a y l.utalsAs heutyd ayl 40 u~opplo:, e asne:, pue aNV 031 A6laua 40 sa!yluenb lue:,!4!uB!s 40 asea1a.i ayl u! qnsal plno:, s!yl

'S3SAlVNV Al3dVS

'luap!:,:,~

laylo 10 81s ue a ~ e y 01 s

~

s pue s 3 ~

ayj u! A6~aua 318V3llddV pus 'q-L ' e. ~

'3-9 '9.9 'e-g *:,-s

'e"; 'a-p '(~014 ureajs) p.p 'q-p 'e-p ' 3 ' ~

'9-E -eeg 2 'e-Z.*am 1 '4' 1.

'e. C suo!lDund SVJS3 01 alqRD!laae Aluo ale t.E-Z'E'E'8 yrJno-41 I--Z'E'S'8 SaDed S3SV8 S l

~_LON-------------------------------------------------------------

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions I

.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and 8

2 APPLICABLE NOTE..........................................

SAFETY ANALYSES, For a description of the Coincident with LC0 AND Function 4.d ao to ESFAS lntrumentation Bases Paae B 3.3.2-48.

APPLICABILITY (continued)

d. Steam Line Isolation-High Steam Flow Coincident With Safetv lniection and Coincident With Tav0-Low This Function provides closure of the MSlVs during an SLB or inadvertent opening of an SG relief or safety valve to maintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy release to containment.

Two steam line flow channels per steam line are required OPERABLE for this Function. These are combined in a one-out-of-two logic to indicate high steam flow in one steam line. The steam flow transmitters provide control inputs, but the control function cannot cause the events that the function must protect against. Therefore, two channels are sufficient to satisfy redundancy requirements. The one-out-of-two configuration allows online testing because trip of one high steam flow channel is not sufficient to cause initiation.

The High Steam Flow Allowable Value is a AP corresponding to 20% of full steam flow at no load steam pressure.

With the transmitters (dlp cells) located inside containment, it is possible for them to experience adverse environmental conditions during an SLB event. Therefore, the Allowable Values reflect both steady state and adverse environmental instrument uncertainties.

The main steam line isolates only if the high steam flow signal occurs coincident with an SI and low RCS average temperature.

The Main Steam Line Isolation Function requirements for the SI Functions are the same as the requirements for their SI function.

Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1.

Instead, Function 1, SI, is referenced for all initiating functions and requirements.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 24%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2433

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

I TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah 8.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and 8

...-I BASES I

APPLICABLE

=

a SAFETY ANALYSES, 9

LCO, AND

-rh V CPEWLE. T T

p.-

APPLICABILITY (continued)

---I-

'Nwi

-I This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3, when a secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in rapid depressurization of the steam lines. The Steam Line Isolation Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 unless all MSlVs are closed and de-activated.

This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4, 5, and 6 because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the unit to have an accident.

e. Steam Line Isolation-Hiqh High Steam Flow Coincident With Safetv Injection This Function provides closure of the MSlVs during a steam line break (or inadvertent opening of a relief or safety valve) to maintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy release to containment.

Two steam line flow channels per steam line are required to be OPERABLE for this Function. These are combined in a one-out-of-two logic to indicate high steam flow in one steam line. The steam flow transmitters provide control inputs, but the control function cannot cause the events that the Function must protect against.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2.04 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

BASES ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 NOTE..........................................................

I TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

BASES APPLICABLE Therefore, two channels are sufficient to satisfy redundancy SAFETY ANALYSES, requirements.

LCO, AND APPLICABILITY The Allowable Value for high steam flow is a AP, corresponding (continued) to 120% of full steam flow at full steam pressure.

With the transmitters located inside containment, it is possible for them to experience adverse environmental conditions during an SLB event. Therefore, the Allowable Value reflects both steady state and.adverse environmental instrument uncertainties.

The main steam lines isolate only if the high steam flow signal occurs coincident with an SI signal. The Main Steam Line Isolation Function requirements for the SI Functions are the same as the requirements for their SI function. Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. Instead, Function 1, SI, is referenced for all initiating functions and requirements.

This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1,2, and 3 when a secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in rapid depressurization of the steam lines unless all MSlVs are closed and de-activated. This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4, 5, and 6 because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the unit to have an accident.

5. Feedwater Isolation The primary function of the Feedwater Isolation signal is to stop the excessive flow of feedwater into the SGs. This Function is necessary to mitigate the effects of a high water level in the SGs, which could result in carryover of water into the steam lines and excessive cooldown of the primary system. The SG high water level is due to excessive feedwater flows.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. XH-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES

---

NOTE..........................................................

I TS BASES Paaes 8.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and 8,

BASES APPLICABLE The Function is actuated on an SI signal, or when the level in either SAFETY ANALYSES, SG exceeds the high setpoint.

LCO, AND APPLICABILITY An SI signal results in the following actions:

(continued)

MFW pumps trip (causes subsequent closure of the MFW pump discharge valves); and 0

MFRVs and the bypass regulating valves close.

A SG Water Level-High in either SG results in the closure of the MFRVs and the bypass regulating valves.

a. Feedwater Isolation-Automatic Actuation Loqic and Actuation Relavs Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 336

BASES ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuqh B.3.3.2-34 are onlv a~plicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow), 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, AND APPLICABILITY (continued)

c. Feedwater Isolation-Safety lniection Feedwater Isolation is also initiated by all Functions that initiate SI. The Feedwater Isolation Function requirements for these Functions are the same as the requirements for their SI function.

Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1.

Instead Function 1, SI, is referenced for all initiating functions and requirements.

Feedwater Isolation Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2 and 3 except when all MFRVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, the MFW System is not in service and this Function is not required to be OPERABLE.

6. Auxiliarv Feedwater 1

The AFW System is designed to provide a secondary side heat sink for the reactor in the event that the MFW System is not available.

The system has two motor driven pumps and a turbine driven pump, making it available during normal unit operation, during a loss of AC power, a loss of MFW, and during a Feedwater System pipe break.

The normal source of water for the'AFW System is the condensate storage tank (CST) (not safety related). Upon a low level in the CST, the operators can manually realign the pump suctions to the Service Water System, which is the safety related water source.

The AFW System is aligned so that upon a pump start, flow is initiated to the respective SGs immediately.

a. Auxiliarv Feedwater-Automatic Actuation Loqic and Actuation Relavs Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function I

.b.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. W Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah 8.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow), 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

APPLICABLE

6. Auxiliarv Feedwter SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, AND The AFW System is designed to provide a secondary side heat sink APPLICABILITY for the reactor in the event that the MFW System is not available.

(continued)

The system has two motor driven pumps and a turbine driven pump, making it available during normal unit operation, during a loss of AC power, a loss of MFW, and during a Feedwater System pipe break.

The normal source of water for the AFW System is the condensate storage tank (CST) (not safety related). Upon a low level in the CST, the operators can manually realign the pump suctions to the Service Water System, which is the safety related water source.

The AFW System is aligned so that upon a pump start, flow is initiated to the respective SGs immediately.

a. Auxiliarv Feedwater-Automatic Actuation Lonic and Actuation Relavs Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b.

b. Auxiliarv Feedwater-Steam Generator Water Level-Low Low SG Water Level-Low Low provides protection against a loss of heat sink. A loss of MFW would result in a loss of SG water level. SG Water Level-Low Low in either SG will cause both motor driven pumps to start. The system is aligned so that upon start of the pumps, water immediately begins to flow to the SGs.

SG Water Level-Low Low in both SGs will cause the turbine driven AFW pump to start.

With the transmitters (dlp cells) located inside containment and thus possibly experiencing adverse environmental conditions (feed line break), the Allowable Value reflects the inclusion of both steady state and adverse environmental instrument uncertainties.

Point Beach B 3.3.2-21 Unit 1 - Amendment No. W Unit 2 - Amendment No. Zl6

BASES ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes 8.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

APPLICABLE

c. Auxiliarv Feedwater-Safetv lniection SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, AND An SI signal starts the motor driven AFW pumps. The AFW APPLICABILITY initiation functions are the same as the requirements for their SI (continued) function. Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. Instead, Function I, SI, is referenced for all initiating functions and requirements.

Functions 6.a through 6.c must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that the SGs remain the heat sink for the reactor. SG Water Level-Low Low in any operating SG will cause the motor driven AFW pumps to start. The system is aligned so that upon a start of the pump, water immediately begins to flow to the SGs. SG Water Level-Low Low in both SGs will cause the turbine driven pump to start. These Functions do not have to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 because there is not enough heat being generated in the reactor to require the SGs as a heat sink. In MODE 4, AFW actuation does not need to be OPERABLE because either AFW or residual heat removal (RHR) will already be in operation to remove decay heat or sufficient time is available to manually place either system in operation.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. GW3

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes 8.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv ap~licable to ESFAS Functions I

.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, AND APPLICABILITY (continued)

7. Condensate Isolation The Condensate Isolation, Function serves as a backup protection function in the event of a Main Steam Line Break inside containment with a failure of the Main Feedwater lines to isolate. An evaluation of IE Bulletin 80-04 showed that a single failure of a MFRV to close on a SI signal could allow feedwater addition to the faulted SG, leading to containment overpressure.

a. Containment Pressure-Condensate lsolation (CPCI)

The Condensate lsolation Function is actuated when containment pressure exceeds the high setpoint, and performs the following functions:

a Trips the condensate pumps; and Trips the heater drain pumps.

The Condensate lsolation Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1,2 and 3, except when all MFRVs and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated. This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4,5 and 6, because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the unit to have an accident.

b. Condensate lsolation - Automatic Actuation Loqic and Actuation Relavs Automatic Actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function I

.b.

Point Beach B 3.3.2-23 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 20 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-I throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow), 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

APPLICABLE

8. Pressurizer Pressure Safetv Injection Block SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, AND To allow some flexibility in unit operations, the Pressurizer Pressure APPLICABILITY SI Block is included as part of the ESFAS.

(continued)

The block permits a normal unit cooldown and depressurization without actuation of SI. With two-out-of-three pressurizer pressure channels (discussed previously) less than the setpoint, the operator can manually block the Pressurizer Pressure-Low and Steam Line Pressure-Low SI signals. With two-out-of-three pressurizer pressure channels above the setpoint, the Pressurizer Pressure-Low and Steam Line Pressure-Low SI signals are automatically enabled. The operator can also enable these trips by use of the respective manual reset buttons. The Allowable Value reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties.

This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1,2, and 3 to allow automatic initiation of SI actuation on Pressurizer Pressure-Low or Steam Line Pressure-Low signals. This Function does not have to be OPERABLE in MODE 4,5, or 6 because system pressure must already be below the setpoint for the requirements of the heatup and cooldown curves to be met.

The ESFAS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of Pd%y

-1 OCFR 50.36(c)2(ii\\.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 24%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes 8.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

ACTIONS A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed on Table 3.3.2-1.

In the event a channel's Trip Setpoint is found nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or the transmitter, instrument Loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LC0 Condition(s) entered for the protection Function(s) affected. When the Required Channels in Table 3.3.2-1 are specified (e.g., on a per steam line, per loop, per SG, etc., basis), then the Condition may be entered separately for each steam line, loop, SG, etc., as appropriate.

When the number of inoperable channels in a trip function exceed those specified in one or other related Conditions associated with a trip function, then the unit is outside the safety analysis. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 should be immediately entered if applicable in the current MODE of operation.

Condition A applies to all ESFAS protection functions.

Condition A addresses the situation where one or more channels or trains for one or more Functions are inoperable at the same time. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.2-1 and to take the Required Actions for the protection functions affected. The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions.

B. 1, B.2.1 and B.2.2 Condition B applies to manual initiation of:

0 SI; and 0

Containment Isolation.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2434-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah 8.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

BASES ACTIONS (continued) If a channel is inoperable, 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> are allowed to return it to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering that there are two automatic actuation trains and another manual initiation train OPERABLE for each Function, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> total time) and in MODE 5 within an additional 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> total time).

The allowable Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C.l, C.2.1 and C.2.2 Condition C applies to the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for the following functions:

0 SI; o

Containment Spray; and a

Containment Isolation.

If one train is inoperable, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering that there is another train OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> total time) and in MODE 5 within an additional 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br /> total time). The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No. W

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes 9.3.3.2-1 throuqh 9.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a.

1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a, 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d fsteam flow), 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and 8,

BASES ACTIONS (continued) D.l, D.2.1 and 0.2.2 Condition D applies to:

Containment Pressure-High; 0

Pressurizer Pressure-Low; Steam Line Pressure-Low; 0

Containment Pressure-High High; 0

High Steam Flow Coincident With Safety Injection Coincident With TaVg-Low; 0

High High Steam Flow Coincident With Safety Injection; 0

SG Water level-Low Low; and 0

SG Water level-High.

If one channel is inoperable, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is allowed to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the tripped condition. Placing the channel in the tripped condition is necessary to maintain a logic configuration that satisfies redundancy requirements.

Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status or place it in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> requires the unit be placed in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

In MODE 4, these Functions are no longer required OPERABLE.

E.l, E.2.1, and E.2.2 Condition E applies to manual initiation of Containment Spray. If one or both channels are inoperable, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is allowed to return the inoperable Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 29%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-I throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv ap~licable to ESFAS Functions I

.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

ACTIONS (continued) channel(~) to OPERABLE status. The Completion Time of one hour is reasonable considering that there are OPERABLE automatic actuation functions credited to perform the safety function and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the inoperable channel(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> total time) and in MODE 5 within an additional 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br /> total time). The allowable Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

F.l, F.2.1, and F.2.2 Condition F applies to Manual Initiation of Steam Line Isolation.

If a channel is inoperable, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is allowed to return it to an OPERABLE status. The Completion Time of one hour is reasonable considering the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

If the Function cannot be returned to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required-unit conditions from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4, the unit does not have any analyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection functions noted above.

G.1, G.2.1 and G.2.2 Condition G applies to the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for the Steam Line Isolation, Feedwater Isolation, Condensate Isolation and AFW actuation Functions.

Point Beach B 3.3.2-28 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2434 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-I throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions I

.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b, and

8. -

ACTIONS (continued)

If one train is inoperable, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status. The Completion Time for restoring a train to OPERABLE status is reasonable considering that there is another train OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the train cannot be returned to OPERABLE status, the unit must be brought to MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. Placing the unit in MODE 4 removes all requirements for OPERABILITY of the protection channels and actuation functions. In this MODE, the unit does not have analyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection functions noted above.

H.l and H.2 Condition H applies to the Undervoltage Bus A01 and A02 Function.

If one channel is inoperable, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> are allowed to restore one channel to OPERABLE status or place it in the tripped condition. If placed in the tripped condition, this Function is then in a partial trip condition where one-out-of-two logic will result in actuation. The 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to place the channel in the tripped condition is necessary due to plant design requiring maintenance personnel to effect the trip of the channel outside of the control room. Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status or place it in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> requires the unit to be placed in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 3, this Function is no longer required OPERABLE.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

BASES ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are only applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, l.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

ACTIONS (continued) 1.1, 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 Condition I applies to the Pressurizer Pressure SI Block.

With one or more channels inoperable, the operator must verify that the interlock is in the required state for the existing unit condition. This action manually accomplishes the function of the block. Determination must be made within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is equal to the time allowed by LC0 3.0.3 to initiate shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of ESFAS function. If the block is not in the required state (or placed in the required state) for the existing unit condition, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. Placing the unit in MODE 4 removes all requirements for OPERABILITY of the Pressurizer Pressure SI block.

SURVEILLANCE The SRs for each ESFAS Function are identified by the SRs column REQUIREMENTS of Table 3.3.2-1.

A Note has been added to the SR.Table to clarify that Table 3.3.2-1 determines which SRs apply to which ESFAS Functions.

Note that each channel of process protection supplies both trains of the ESFAS. When testing channel I, train A and train B must be examined.

Similarly, train A and train B must be examined when testing channel 11, channel Ill, and channel IV (if applicable). The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and COTS are performed in a manner that is consistent with the assumptions used in analytically calculating the required channel accuracies.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

I TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and reliability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LC0 required channels.

SR 3.3.2.2 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST on all ESFAS Automatic Actuation Logic every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This test includes the application of various simulated or actual input combinations in conjunction with each possible interlock state and verification of the required logic output. The Frequency of every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data.

Point Beach B 3.3.2-31 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2863.

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes 8.3.3.2-1 throuah 9.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, I.b, 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.2.3 is the performance of a COT.

A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function. Setpoints must be found within the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.2-1.

The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology. The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit specific setpoint methodology.

The "as found" and "as left" values must also be recorded and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of the surveillance interval extension analysis (Ref. 5) when applicable.

The Frequency of 92 days is justified in Reference 5.

SR 3.3.2.4 is the performance of a MASTER RELAY TEST. The MASTER RELAY TEST is the energizing of the master relay and verifying contact operation. This test is performed every 18 months.

SR 3.3.2.5 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST. The SLAVE RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment that may be operated in the design mitigation MODE is either allowed to function, or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equipment. This test is performed every 18 months.

SR 3.3.2.6 is the performance of a TADOT every 31 days. This test is a check of the Undervoltage Bus A01 and A02 Function.

The Frequency is adequate. It is based on industry operating Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 20%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-1 throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d fsteam flow), 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

SURVEILLANCE experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data.

REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.7 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions. It is performed every 18 months. The Frequency is adequate, based on industry operating experience and is consistent with the typical refueling cycle.

SR 3.3.2.8 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology. The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 18 months is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint methodology.

This SR is modified by a Note stating that this test should include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values where applicable.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 24%

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2Q6

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE..........................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-I throuah B.3.3.2-34 are onlv ap~licable to ESFAS Functions I

.a, 1.b. 1.e. 2.a. 2.b. 3.a. 3.b. 3.c. 4.a. 4.b. 4.d (steam flow). 4.e. 5.a. 5.c. 6.a. 6.b. 6.c. 7.a. 7.b. and

8. -

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapter 14.

2. FSAR, 7.3.3.2.

3. IEEE-279-1968.

4. 10 CFR 50.49.

5. DGI-01, Instrument Setpoint Methodology.

6. NUREG-1218, April 1988.

Point Beach B 3.3.2-34 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 234-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS lnstrumentation B 3.3.2 B 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) lnstrumentation TS BASES Pages 8.3.3.2-35 throuah 8.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

BACKGROUND The ESFAS initiates necessarv safetv svstems. based on the values of selected unit ~arameters. to protect aaainst violatina core desiqn limits and the Reactor Coolant Svstem (RCS) pressure boundaw. and to mitiaate accidents. This is achieved bv specifvina limitina safetv svstem settinas fLSSS1 in terms of parameters directlv monitored by the ESFAS. as well as s~ecifvina LCOs on other reactor svstem parameters and equilsment performance.

Technical S~ecifications are required bv 10 CFR 50.36 to include LSSS for variables that have sianificant safetv functions. LSSS are defined bv the reaulations as 'Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which 8 safetv limit has been placed, the settina must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before 8 Safetv Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analvtical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a protective action is initiated. as established bv the safetv analvsis. to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Anv automatic protection action that occurs on reachina the Analvtical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. However. in practice, the actual settinas for automatic ~rotection channels must be chosen to be more conservative that the Analvtical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the settina at which the automatic protective action would actuallv occur.

The Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) specified in Table 3.3.2-1 is a predetermined settina for a protection channel chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the Drocess variable reachina the Analvtical Limit and thus ensurina that the SL would not be exceeded. As such, the NTSP accounts for uncertainties in settina the channel (e.a.

calibration). uncertainties in how the channel miaht actuallv perform 1e.a.. re~eatabilitv). chanaes in the point of action of the channel over time (e.a.. drift durina surveillance intervals). and anv other factors which mav influence its actual performance (e.a.. harsh accident environments). In this manner. the NTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded. Therefore. the NTSP meets the definition of an LSSS.

Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facilitv. O~erable is defined in the Technical Specifications as "...beina capable of performina its safetv functions(s)." Relvina solelv on the NTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical S~ecifications would be an overlv Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2.04.

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE-------------------------------------------------

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

BACKGROUND restrictive reauirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for lcontinued) the 'as-found' value of a protection channel settina during a, surveillance. This would result in Technical Seecification compliance problems. as well as reports and corrective actions reauired bv the rule which are not necessarv to ensure safetv. For example, an automatic protection channel with a settina that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some drift of the settina mav still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specificallv accounted for in the setpoint methodoloav for calculatina the N

l that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as-found" settina of the protection channel. Therefore. the channel would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safetv function and the onlv corrective action required would be to reset the channel to the NTSP to account for further drift durina the next surveillance interval.

Durina AOOs. which are those events expected to occur one or more times durina the unit life. the acceptable limits are:

1. The Departure from Nucleate Boilina Ratio (DNBR) shall be maintained above the Safetv Limit (SL) value to prevent p

2. Fuel centerline melt shall not occur. and

3. The RCS Dressure SL shall not be exceeded.

Operation within the SLs of Specification 2.0. "Safetv Limits (SLs)," also maintains the above values and assures that offsite dose will be within the 10 CFR50 and 1 OCFR 00 criteria durina AOOs.

Accidents are events that are analvzed even thouah thev are not exeected to occur durina the unit life. The acceptable limit during accidents is the offsite dose shall be maintained within an acceptable fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits. Different accident cateaories are allowed 0

Meetina the acceptable dose limit for an accident cateaorv is considered havina acceptable consequences of the event.

The ESFAS instrumentation is seamented into three distinct but interconnected modules as identified below:

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2.04 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

BACKGROUND e

Field transmitters or process sensors and instrumentation: provide lcontinuedj:

a measurable electronic sianal based on the phvsical characteristics of the parameter beina measured; 0

Sianal ~rocessina eaui~ment includina analoa protection svstem, field contacts. and Protection channel sets: provide sianal conditionina. com~atible electrical sianal output to protection svstem channels. and control boardlcontrol roomlmiscellaneous indications; g2.J o

Relav Loaic Racks includina input. loaic and output devices: initiates proper Enaineered Safetv Feature (ESF) actuation in accordance with the defined loaic and based on the bistable outputs from the sianal process control and protection svstem.

Field Transmitters or Sensors To meet the desian demands for redundancv and reliabilitv. more than one. and often as manv as four, field transmitters or sensors are used to measure unit parameters. In manv cases. field transmitters or sensors that input to the ESFAS are shared with the Reactor Protection Svstem (RPS). In some cases. the same channels also provide control svstem inputs. To account for calibration tolerances and instrument drift. which are assumed to occur between calibrations. statistical allowances are provided in the NTSP and Allowable Value. The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor is determined bv either "as found" calibration data evaluated durina the CHANNEL CALIBRATION or bv aualitative assessment of field transmitter or sensor. as related to the channel behaviour observed durinq performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.

Signal Processina Equipment Generallv, three or four channels of Drocess control eaui~ment are used for the sianal processina of unit parameters measured bv the field instruments. The Process control equipment provides sianal conditionina, comparable output sianals for instruments located on the main control board. and comparison of measured input sianals with NTSPs derived from Analvtical Limits established bv the safetv analvses. If the measured value of a unit parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint. an out~ut from a bistable is forwarded to the loaic relavs.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions I

.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

BACKGROUND Generallv, if a parameter is used onlv for input to the protection circuits, lcontinuedl three channels with a two-out-of-three loaic are sufficient to provide the required reliabilitv and redundancv. If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a ~artial Function trip. the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two loaic. If one channel fails such that a partial Function trir, occurs. a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two loaic.

Generallv, if a parameter is used for input to the Relav Loaic Racks and a control function. four channels with a two-out-of-four loaic are sufficient to provide the required reliabilitv and redundancv. The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control svstem, which mav then require the protection function actuation. and a sinale failure in the other channels providina the protection function actuation.

Aaain, a sinale failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation.

These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1968 (Ref. 3).

NTSPs and ESFAS Setpoints The trip setpoints used in the bistables are based on analvtical limits established in the safetv analvses. The calculation of the Nominal Trip Setpoints specified in Table 3.3.2-1 is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensors and processina time delavs are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances. instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environments as defined bv 10 CFR 50.49 (Reference 4). the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.2-1 in the accompanvina LC0 are conservative with respect to the analvtical limits. A description of the methodoloqv used to calculate the Allowable Values and Nominal Trip Setpoints fincludina their explicit uncertainties). as well as the as-left and as-found tolerances. is provided in FSAR Chapter 7. Reference 1. The maanitude of the uncertainties are factored into the determination of each NTSP and correspondina Allowable Value in desian basis calculations. The field trip setpoint entered into the bistable is equal to or more conservative than that specified bv the NTSP to account for chanaes in random measurement errors detectable bv a COT. The Allowable Value serves as the as-found trip setpoint Technical S~ecification OPERABILITY limit for the purpose of the COT.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes 6.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv an~licable to ESFAS Functions I

.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

BACKGROUND The NTSP is the value at which the bistables are set and is the icontinuedi expected value to be achieved durina calibration. The NTSP value is the LSSS and ensures the safetv analvsis limits are met for the surveillance interval selected when a channel is adiusted based on stated channel uncertainties. Anv bistable is considered to be pronerly adiusted when the "as-left" NTSP value is within the as-left tolerance for CHANNEL CALIBRATION uncertaintv allowance fi.e.. +. rack calibration and comparator settina uncertainties). The NTSP value is therefore considered a "nominal value" for the purposes of the COT and CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Nominal Trip Setpoints. in coniunction with the use of the as-found and as-left tolerances toaether with the reauirements of the Allowable Value ensure that the consequences of Desian Basis Accidents (DBAsl will be

)

onset of the DBA and the equinment functions as desianed.

Note that the Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.2-1 are the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have durina a Periodic CHANNEL Calibration. COT. or a TADOT that requires trip setpoint verification.

Setnoints in accordance with the Allowable Value ensure that the consequences of Desian Basis Accidents fDBAs) will be acceptable, providina the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the DBA and the equinment functions as desianed.

Each channel can be tested on line to verifv that the sianal processing eauipment and set~oint accuracv is within the specified allowance requirements. Once a desianated channel is taken out of service for w

t sianal. The process eauinment for the channel in test is then tested, verified. and calibrated. SRs for the channels are specified in the SR section.

Relav Loaic Racks The Relav Loaic Rack equipment is used for the decision loaic processina of outputs from the sianal processina eauipment bistables.

To meet the redundancv requirements. two trains of Relav Loaic Racks, each performina the same functions, are provided.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. W Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuph B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava), 5.b. and 6.d.

BACKGROUND The Relav Loqic Racks perform the decision loaic for most ESF lcontinued) eauioment actuation: generates the electrical output sianals that initiate the required actuation: and orovides the status. permissive. and annunciator output siqnals to the main control room of the unit.

The bistable outputs from the sianal processina equipment are sensed bv the Relav Loaic Rack eauipment and combined into loaic matrices that reoresent combinations indicative of various transients. If 8 required loaic matrix combination is completed. the svstem will send actuation sianals via master and slave relavs to those components whose aqareqate Function best serves to alleviate the condition and restore the unit to a safe condition. Examples are aiven in the Applicable Safetv Analvses. LCO. and Aoplicabilitv sections of this Bases.

The actuation of ESF comoonents is accomplished throuah master and slave relavs. The Relav Loaic Racks eneraize the master relavs aporopriate for the condition of the unit. Each master relav then eneraizes one or more slave relavs. which then cause actuation of the channels.

APPLICABLE Each of the analvzed accidents can be detected bv one or more ESFAS SAFETY ANALYSES. Functions. One of the ESFAS Functions is the orimarv actuation sianal LCO. AND for that accident. An ESFAS Function mav be the primaw actuation APPLICABILITY sianal for more than one tvpe of accident. An ESFAS Function mav also be a secondar\\r. or backuo. actuation sianal for one or more other accidents. For example. Pressurizer Pressure-Low is a primary actuation sipnal for small loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) and a backup actuation sianal for steam line breaks (SLBs) outside containment. Functions such as manual initiation, not specifically credited in the accident safetv analvsis. are implicitlv credited in the safetv analvsis and the NRC staff aoproved licensina basis for the unit.

These Functions mav provide protection for conditions that do not require dvnamic transient analvsis to demonstrate Function performance. These Functions mav also serve as backups to Functions that were credited in the accident analvsis (Ref. 2).

Permissive and interlock setpoints allow the blockina of trips during plant start-ups and restoration of trips when the permissive conditions are not satisfied. but thev are not explicitlv modeled in the Safety Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

APPLICABLE A

c g

SAFETY ANALYSES, conditions are consistent with the safetv analvsis. before oreventative LCO. AND or mitiaatina actions occur. Because these permissives or interlocks APPLICABILITY are onlv one of multiole conservative startina assumptions for the (continuedl accident analvsis. thev are aenerallv considered as nominal values with reaard to measurement accuracv. (i.e. the value indicated is sufficiently c

svstem to turn the AOO).

The LC0 requires all instrumentation performina an ESFAS Function listed in Table 3.3.2-1 in the accomoanvina LCO. to be OPERABLE.

The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.2-1 is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that the channel can have when tested, such that a channel is OPERABLE if the as-found setooint is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value durina a CHANNEL CALIBRATION or CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT). As such, or equal to the expected instrument channel uncertainties. such as drift, durina the surveillance interval. In this manner, the actual settina of the channel (NTSP) will ensure that a SL is not exceeded at anv aiven point of time as lona as the channel has not drifted bevond that expected durina the surveillance interval. Note that. althouah the channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances. the trip setpoint must be left adiusted to a value within the as-left tolerance, in accordance with uncertaintv assumotions stated in the referenced set~oint methodoloav (as-left within the statistical allowances of the uncertaintv terms assianed (as-found criteria).

If the actual settina of the channel is found to be conservative with resoect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as-found tolerance band. the channel is OPERABLE but a dearaded condition has been identified. Durina the SR performance. the condition of the channel will

)

to pass the next surveillance. then the channel can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. If anv of the above described evaluations determine that the channel is not performina as exoected. the channel is dearaded because it mav not oass its next surveillance test. If the channel setpoint cannot be reset to the as-left tolerance around the NTSP. it is inoperable. After the surveillance is completed. the channels as-found settina will be entered into the Corrective Action Proaram for further evaluation.

Point Beach Unit 1 -Amendment No. 2Q-I-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

APPLICABLE A trip setpoint mav be set more conservative than the NTSP as SAFETY ANALYSES. necessaw in resDonse to ~ l a n t conditions. However, in this case. the LCO. AND operabilitv of this instrument must be verified based on the field trip APPLICABILITY setpoint and not the NTSP. Failure of anv instrument renders the lcontinued) affected channelfs) inoperable and reduces the reliabilitv of the affected Functions.

If the actual settina of the channel is found to be non-conservative with resoect to the Allowable Value. the channel would be considered inoperable. This requires corrective action including those actions reauired bv 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protection channels do not function as reauired. The LC0 aenerallv requires OPERABILITY of y'

channels in each loaic function. The two-out-of-three and the two-out-of-four confiaurations allow one channel to be tri~ped durinq maintenance or testina without causina an ESFAS initiation. Two loaic channels are required to ensure no sinale random failure disables the ESFAS.

The required channels of ESFAS instrumentation provide unit protection in the event of anv of the analvzed accidents. ESFAS protection functions are as follows:

1. Safetv Injection Safetv lniection (SI) Drovides two primarv functions:

1. Primary side water addition to ensure maintenance or recoverv of reactor vessel water level fcoveraae of the active fuel for heat removal. clad intearitv. and for limitina peak clad temperature to

< 2200°F): and

2. Boration to ensure recovew and maintenance of SDM fkd < 1.0).

These functions are necessarv to mitiaate the effects of hiqh eneray line breaks (HELBs) both inside and outside of containment. The SI siqnal is also used to initiate other Functions such as:

Point Beach Unit 1 -Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2Q-6

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c, 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

APPLICABLE

• ContainmentIsolation:

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO. AND e

Containment Ventilation Isolation; APPLICABILITY lcontinuedj:

e Reactor Trip; e

Feedwater Isolation:

e Start of motor driven auxiliaw feedwater fAFW) pumps: and e Control room ventilation isolation.

These other functions ensure:

lsolation of nonessential svstems throuah containment penetrations; o

Trip of the reactor to limit power aeneration; e

lsolation of main feedwater (MFW) to limit secondarv side mass losses; Start of AFW to ensure secondarv side coolina capabilitv: and e

lsolation of the control room to ensure habitabilitv.

c. Safetv Injection-Containment Pressure-Hiah This sianal ~rovides protection aaainst the followina accidents:

e SLB inside containment: and LOCA

• -..---A Containment Pressure-Hiah provides no input to anv control functions. Thus, three OPERABLE channels are sufficient to satisfv protective requirements with a two-out-of-three loaic.

The transmitters and electronics are located outside of containment with the sensina lines passina throuah containment penetrations to sense the containment atmosphere in three different locations.

Point Beach B 3.3.2-43 Unit I

-Amendment No. =28t Unit 2 - Amendment No. 20.63

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes 8.3.3.2-35 throuah 8.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

APPLICABLE Thus, the hiah pressure Function will not experience any SAFETY ANALYSES, adverse environmental conditions and the NTSP reflects only LCO. AND steadv state instrument uncertainties.

APPLICABILITY lcontinuedi Containment Pressure-Hiah must be OPERABLE in MODES 1,

2. and 3 when there is sufficient enerav in the primary and secondarv svstems to pressurize the containment followina a pipe break. In MODES 4. 5. and 6. there is insufficient enerav in the primarv or secondarv svstems to pressurize the containment.

d. Safetv Injection-Pressurizer Pressure-Low This sianal provides protection aaainst the followina accidents.

o lnadvertent o~enina of a steam aenerator (SG) relief or safetv valve; o

A spectrum of rod cluster control assemblv eiection accidents (rod eiection);

o lnadvertent o~enina of a pressurizer relief or safetv valve; o

LOCAs: and 0

SG Tube Rupture.

Pressurizer pressure provides both control and protection functions: input to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Svstem, reactor t r i ~.

and SI. However. two independent PORV open sianals must be present before a PORV can open. Therefore. a sinale pressure channel failina hiah will not fail a PORV oDen and triaaer a de~ressurization/SI event. Additionallv. in the event of a failed open sprav valve. RCS depressurization would be slow enouah to be recoanized bv the operator and mitiaated throuah manual actions to close the sprav valve and eneraize the ~ressurizer heaters prior to reachina saturated conditions in the RCS. Therefore, there would be no uncontrolled loss of RCS inventorv and no need for boron iniection.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. %

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS

,, Functions 1.c. 1.d, 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

APPLICABLE Therefore. onlv three protection channels are necessaty to SAFETY ANALYSES, satisfv the protective reauirements.

LCO. AND APPLICABILITY This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1.2. and 3 (continuedl dabove the Pressurizer Pressure interlock) to mitiaate the conseauences of an HELB inside containment. This sianal mav be manuallv blocked bv the operator below the Pressurizer Pressure interlock. Automatic SI actuation below this pressure setpoint is then performed bv the Containment Pressure-Hiah sianal.

This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 3 below the Pressurizer Pressure interlock. Other ESF functions are used to detect accident conditions and actuate the ESF s

k s

not needed for accident detection and mitiaation.

2. Containment Spray Containment Sorav provides three primaw functions:

1. Lowers containment oressure and temperature after an HELB in containment:

2. Reduces the amount of radioactive iodine in the containment atmosohere: and

3. Adjusts the pH of the water in the containment recirculation sumo after a larae break LOCA.

These functions are necessaw to:

0 e

t structure; 0

Limit the release of radioactive iodine to the environment in the event of a failure of the containment structure: and o

Minimize corrosion of the components and svstems inside containment followina a LOCA.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2-06

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions I

.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO. AND APPLICABILITY lcontinuedi The containment sprav actuation sianal starts the containment sprav pumps and alians the discharae of the pumos to the containment sprav nozzle headers in the upper levels of containment. Water is initiallv drawn from the RWST bv the containment sprav pumps and mixed with a sodium hvdroxide solution from the sorav additive tank.

When the RWST reaches the low low level setooint. the sprav pump suctions are shifted to the containment sumo if continued containment sprav is reauired. Containment sprav is actuated automaticallv bv Containment Pressure-Hiah Hiah.

c. Containment Sorav-Containment Pressure-Hiah Hiah This sianal orovides protection aaainst a LOCA or a SLB inside containment. The transmitters are located outside of containment with the sensina lines oassina throuah containment penetrations to sense the containment atmosphere in three different locations. The transmitters and electronics are located outside of containment.

Thus. thev will not experience anv adverse environmental conditions and the NTSP reflects onlv steadv state instrument uncertainties.

This is one of the onlv Functions that require the bistable output to eneraize to perform its reauired action. It is not desirable to have a Joss of power actuate containment sorav. since the consequences of an inadvertent actuation of containment sprav could be serious.

The Containment Pressure-Hiah Hiah Function consists of two sets with three channels in each set. Each set is a two-out-of-three loaic where the outputs are combined so that both sets tripped initiates Containment Sprav. Since containment oressure is not used for control. this arranaement exceeds the minimum redundancy requirements. Additional redundancv is warranted because this Function is eneraized to trip. Containment Pressure-Hiah Hiah must be OPERABLE in MODES 1.2, and 3 when there is sufficient enerav in the primarv and secondarv sides to pressurize the containment followina a pipe break. In MODES 4. 5. and 6. there is insufficient enerav in the primarv and secondarv sides to pressurize the containment and reach the Containment Pressure-Hiah Hiah setpoints.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2 W Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes 6.3.3.2-35 throuah 6.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions I

.c. I.d, 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

APPLICABLE

4. Steam Line Isolation SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0 AND Isolation of the main steam lines ~rovides protection in the event of APPLICABILITY a SLB inside or outside containment. Ralsid isolation of the steam jcontinuedl 1 SG. at most. For a SLB u~stream of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). inside or outside of containment, closure of the MSlVs limits the accident to the blowdown from onlv the affected SG. For a SLB downstream of the MSIVs. closure of the MSlVs terminates the accident as soon as the steam lines depressurize.

Steam Line lsolation also mitiaates the effects of a feed line break, and ensures a source of steam for the turbine driven AFW pump durina a feed line break.

c. Steam Line Isolation-Containment Pressure-Hiah Hiah This Function actuates closure of the MSlVs in the event of a, LOCA or a SLB inside containment to maintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor. and to limit the mass and enerav release to containment. The transmitters are located outside containment with the sensina lines as sing throuah containment penetrations to sense the containment atmos~here in three different locations. Containment Pressure-Hiah High provides no input to anv control functions.

T P

y protective reauirements with two-out-of-three loaic. The transmitters and electronics are located outside of containment.

Thus. thev will not experience anv adverse environmental conditions. and the NTSP reflects onlv steadv state instrument uncertainties. /

MODES 1.2, and 3. when there is sufficient enerav in the primaw and secondaw side to pressurize the containment t

in the containment pressure. thus allowina detection and closure of the MSIVs. The Steam Line lsolation Function remains OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 unless all MSlVs are closed and de-activated. In MODES 4. 5. and 6. there is not enouah enerav in the ~rimaw and secondaw sides to pressurize the containment to the Containment Pressure-Hiah Hiah setpoint.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

ESFAS lnstrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions I

.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

APPLICABLE NOTE ------------- -.........................

SAFETY ANALYSES, For a description of the Hiah Steam Flow portion of ESFAS Function LC0 AND 4.d so to ESFAS Instrumentation Bases Paae B 3.3.2 16.

APPLICABILITY (continued) ;

Safetv lniection and-This Function provides closure of the MSlVs durina a SLB or inadvertent openina of an SG relief or safetv valve to maintain at s

t the mass and enerav release to containment.

The main steam line isolates onlv if the hiah steam flow sianal occurs coincident with an SI and low RCS averaae temperature.

p Functions are the same as the reauirements for their SI function.

Therefore. the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1.

Instead. Function 1, SI. is referenced for all initiatina functions and requirements.

The T v

loop), providina input to both trains in a two-out-of-four loaic c o n f i a u r a t i o f i OPERABLE. The accidents that this Function protects aaainst in the entire primarv svstem. Therefore, the ~rovision of three OPERABLE channels ensures no sinale random failure disables the T,,-Low Function. The Ta channels ~rovide control inputs. but the control function cannot initiate events that the Function acts to mitiaate. Therefore, additional channels are not reauired to address control protection interaction issues.

With the T= -

resistance temperature detectors [RTDs) located inside the containment, it is possible for them to experience adverse environmental conditions durina a SLB event.

Therefore. the NTSP reflects both steadv state and adverse environmental instrumental uncertainties.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes 8.3.3.2-35 through B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c. I

.d, 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

APPLICABLE This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2. and in SAFETY ANALYSES, MODE 3. when a secondarv side break or stuck open valve LCO. AND could result in rapid depressurization of the steam lines. The APPLICABILITY Steam Line Isolation Function is reauired to be OPERABLE in lcontinuedk MODES 2 and 3 unless all MSlVs are closed and de-activated.

This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4. 5, and 6 because there is insufficient enerav in the secondarv side of the unit to have an accident.

5. Feedwater Isolation The primarv function of the Feedwater lsolation sianal is to stop the excessive flow of feedwater into the SGs. This Function is necessaty to mitiaate the effects of a hiah water level in the SGs, which could result in carryover of water into the steam lines and 4

is due to excessive feedwater flows.

The Function is actuated on an SI sianal. or when the level in either SG exceeds the hiah setpoint.

An SI sianal results in the followina actions:

6 MFW pumDs trip fcauses subsequent closure of the MFW pump discharae vales) and 6

MFRVs and the bv~ass reaulatina valves close.

A SG Water Level-Hiah in either SG results in the closure of the MFRVs and the bvpass reaulatina valves.

b. Feedwater Isolation-Steam Generator Water Level-Hiah 3

flow. The ESFAS SG water level instruments provide input to the SG Water Level Control Svstem. If this i n ~ u t to the SG Water Level Control Svstem fails low. it would cause a control action to open the Feedwater Control Valves for the affected SG. -

Point Beach B 3.3.2-49 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 24%-

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES

---

NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d ITava). 5.b. and 6.d.

APPLICABLE The remainina channels. in a two-out-of-two confiauration. would SAFETY ANALYSES, be reauired to detect a hiah SG Water Level condition and LCO. AND initiate a Feedwater Isolation to prevent an overfill condition.

APPLICABILITY Therefore this confiauration does not meet the sinale failure lcontinuedk criteria of Reference 2. However. iustification for a two-out-of-three Feedwater Isolation-SG Water Level-Hiah Function is provided in NUREG-1 21 8. Reference 5.

Feedwater Isolation Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2 and 3 except when all MFRVs, and associated bvpass valves are closed and de-activated. In MODES 4. 5. and 6. the MFW Svstem is not in service and this Function is not required to be OPERABLE.

6. Auxiliarv Feedwater The AFW Svstem is desianed to provide a secondarv side heat sink for the reactor in the event that the MFW Svstem is not available. The svstem has two motor driven pumps and a.

turbine driven pump. makina it available durina normal unit operation. durina a loss of AC power. a loss of MFW. and during a Feedwater Svstem pipe break. The normal source of water for the AFW Svstem is the condensate storaae tank (CST) (not safetv related). Upon a low level in the CST. the operators can manuallv realian the pump suctions to the Service Water Svstem. which is the safetv related water source. The AFW Svstem is alianed so that upon a pump start. flow is initiated to the respective SGs immediatelv.

d. Auxiliarv Feedwater-Undervoltaae Bus A01 and A02 The LC0 requires two channels per bus to be OPERABLE. A channel consists of an undervoltaae relav and one set of associated contacts.

Point Beach B 3.3.2-50 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2@

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are only ap~licable to ESFAS Functions 1.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

APPLICABLE A loss of power on the A01 and A02 buses provides indication of SAFETY ANALYSES, a pendina loss of both Main Feedwater ~ u m ~ s and the LCO. AND subseauent need for some method of decav heat removal. A APPLICABILITY loss of power to Buses A01 and A02 will start the turbine driven jcontinuedl AFW pump to ensure that at least one SG contains enouah water to serve as the heat sink for reactor decav heat and sensible heat removal followina the reactor trip.

Function 6.d must be OPERABLE in MODES I and 2. This ensures that at least one SG is provided with water to serve as the heat sink to remove reactor decav heat and sensible heat in the event of an accident. In MODES 3. 4. and 5. the MFW pumDs mav be normallv shut down. and thus a Dump trip is not indicative of a condition reauirina automatic AFW initiation.

The ESFAS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)2(iil.

ACTIONS A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarifv the ap~lication of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this S~ecification mav be e

h t

i o

n listed on Table 3.3.2-1.

In the event a channel's NTSP is found non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. or the Channel is not functionina as reauired. or the transmitter. instrument LOOD. signal processina electronics. or bistable is found inoperable. then all affected Functions ~rovided bv that channel must be declared inoperable and the LC0 Condition(s) entered for the ~rotection Functionfs) affected. When the Required Channels in Table 3.3.2-1 are specified fe.a.. on a per steam line. per loop. per SG, etc.. basis). then the Condition mav be entered separatelv for each steam line. loo^. SG. etc.. as appromiate.

When the number of inoperable channels in a trip function exceed t

j function. then the unit is outside the safetv analvsis. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 should be immediatelv entered if applicable in the current MODE of operation.

Condition A applies to all ESFAS protection functions.

Point Beach Unit 1 -Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c. 1.d. 2.cl 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

ACTIONS !continued)

Condition A addresses the situation where one or more channels or trains for one or more Functions are inoperable at the same time. The Reauired Action is to refer to Table 3.3.2-1 and to take the Reauired Actions for the protection functions affected. The Completion Times arethose from the referenced Conditions and Reauired Actions.

B.1. B.2.1 and 8.2.2 Condition B applies to manual initiation of:

0 SI: and o

Containment Isolation.

If a channel is inoperable. 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> are allowed to return it to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considerina that there are two automatic actuation trains and another manual initiation train OPERABLE for each Function. and the low probabilitv of an event occurrina durina this interval. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status. the unit must be placed in a, MODE in which the LC0 does not a~plv. This is done by placina the unit in at least MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> total time) and in MODE 5 within an additional 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> total time).

The allowable Completion Times are reasonable. based on operatinq ex~erience, to reach the reauired unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderlv manner and without challenaina unit svstems.

C.1, C.2.1 and C.2.2 Condition C applies to the automatic actuation loaic and actuation relays for the followina functions:

o Containment Sprav: and Containment Isolation.

If one train is ino~erable. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considerina that there is another train OPERABLE. and the low Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes 8.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions I

.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

ACTIONS (continued) probabilitv of an event occurrina durina this interval. If the train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status. the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the,LCO does not applv. This is done by placina the unit in at least MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> total time) and in MODE 5 within an additional 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br /> total time). The Completion Times are reasonable. based on operatina experience. to reach the reauired unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderlv manner and without challenaina unit svstems.

D.1. D.2.1 and 0.2.2 Condition D applies to:

o Containment Pressure-Hiah; o

Pressurizer Pressure-Low; P

Steam Line Pressure-Low:

o Containment Pressure-Hiah Hiah; o

Hiah Steam Flow Coincident With Safetv Injection Coincident With L - L o w ;

o Hiah Hiah Steam Flow Coincident With Safetv Injection; SG Water level-Low Low: and SG Water level-Hiah.

If one channel is inoperable, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is allowed to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the tripped condition. Placina the channel in the tripped condition is necessaw to maintain a loaic confiauration that satisfies redundancv reauirements.

it in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> requires the unit be placed in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Point Beach B 3.3.2-53 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c. l.d.2.c. 4.c.4.d (Tava),5.b.and6.d.

ACTIONS (continued) The allowed Comoletion Times are reasonable. based on ooerating ex~erience. to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderlv manner and without challenaina unit svstems.

In MODE 4. these Functions are no lonaer required OPERABLE.

E.1. E.2.1. and E.2.2 Condition E ap~lies to manual initiation of Containment Sprav. If one or both channels are inoperable. I hour is allowed to return the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status. The Completion Time of one hour is reasonable considerina that there are OPERABLE automatic actuation functions credited to perform the safetv function and the low orobabilitv of an event occurrina durina this interval. If the inoperable channel(s1 cannot be restored to OPERABLE status. the unit must be laced in EI MODE in which the LC0 does not applv. This is done bv placina the unit in at least MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> total time) and in MODE 5 within an additional 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br /> total time). The allowable Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience. to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderlv manner and without challenaina unit svstems.

F.1. F.2.1, and F.2.2 Condition F ap~lies to Manual Initiation of Steam Line Isolation.

If a channel is inoperable. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is allowed to return it to an OPERABLE status. The Com~letion Time of one hour is reasonable considerina the low probabilitv of an event occurrina durina this interval.

If the Function cannot be returned to OPERABLE status. the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the followina 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The allowed Comoletion Times are reasonable, based on operatina experience, to reach the reauired unit conditions from full power in an orderlv manner and without challenaina unit svstems. In MODE 4. the unit does not have anv analvzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection functions noted above.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. XJ Unit 2 - Amendment No. Z36

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c. 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

ACTIONS (continued) G.1. G.2.1 and G.2.2 Condition G applies to the automatic actuation loaic and actuation relavs for the Steam Line Isolation. Feedwater Isolation. Condensate Isolation and AFW actuation Functions.

If one train is inoperable. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status. The Completion Time for restorina a train to OPERABLE status is reasonable considerina that there is another train OPERABLE. and the low ~robabilitv of an event occurrina durina this interval. If the train cannot be returned to OPERABLE status. the unit must be brouaht to MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the followina 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The allowed Com~letion Times are reasonable, based on operatina experience. to reach the required unit conditions from full Dower conditions in an orderlv manner and without challenainq unit svstems. Placina the unit in MODE 4 removes all requirements for OPERABILITY of the protection channels and actuation functions. In this MODE. the unit does not have analvzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection functions noted above.

H.l and H.2 Condition H applies to the Undervoltaae Bus A01 and A02 Function.

If one channel is inoperable, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> are allowed to restore one channel to OPERABLE status or place it in the tripped condition. If placed in the tripped condition. this Function is then in a partial trip condition where one-out-of-two loaic will result in actuation. The 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to place the channel in the tripped condition is necessarv due to plant desian requirina maintenance personnel to effect the trip of the channel outside sf the control room. Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status'or place it in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> requires the unit to be placed in MODE 3 within the followina 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable. based on operatina experience. to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderlv manner and without challenaina unit svstems. In MODE 3. this Function is no lonaer required OPERABLE.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. XM-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2?6

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions I

.c. I

.d, 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

ACTIONS (continuedl 1.1. 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 Condition I applies to the Pressurizer Pressure SI Block.

With one or more channels inoperable. the operator must verifv that the interlock is in the required state for the existina unit condition. This action manuallv accomplishes the function of the block. Determination must be made within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is equal to the time allowed bv LC0 3.0.3 to initiate shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of ESFAS function. If the block is not in the reauired state (or placed in the required state) for the existina unit condition, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the followina 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable. based on operatina experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderlv manner and without challenaina unit svstems. Placina the unit in MODE 4 removes all requirements for OPERABILITY of the Pressurizer Pressure SI block.

The SRs for each ESFAS Function are identified bv the SRs column of Table 3.3.2-1. 1 determines which SRs applv to which ESFAS Functions.

Note that each channel of process protection supplies both trains of the ESFAS. When testina channel I. train A and train B must be examined.

Similarlv. train A and train B must be examined when testina channel II, channel Ill. and channel IV (if applicable). The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and COTS are performed in a manner that is consistent with the assumptions used in analvticallv calculatina the required channel accuracies.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. GXH-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE-------------------------------------------------

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions I

.c, I

.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

SU RVEl LLANCE SR 3.3.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once everv 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a aross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normallv a com~arison of the'oarameter indicated on one c

D e

e should read approximatelv the same value. Sianificant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of somethina even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect aross channel failure; thus. it is kev to verifvina the instrumentation continues to ooerate properlv between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Aareement criteria are determined bv the unit staff. based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties. includinq indication and reliabilitv. If a channel is outside the criteria. it mav be an indication that the sensor or the sianal processina equipment has drifted outside its limit.

The Freauencv is based on operatina experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal. but more frequent. checks of channels durinu normal operational use of the dis~lavs associated with the LC0 reauired channels.

SR 3.3.2.2 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST on all ESFAS Automatic Actuation Loaic everv 31 davs on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This test includes the application of various simulated or actual input combinations in coniunction with each possible interlock state and verification of the required loaic out~ut. The Freauencv of everv 31 davs on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is adequate. It is based on industw operatina experience. considerina instrument p

SR 3.3.2.3 is the performance of a COT.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 204-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c, 1.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava), 5.b. and 6.d.

SURVEILLANCE A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire REQUIREMENTS channel will perform the intended Function. Setpoints must be found lcontinuedl conservative with respect to the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.2-1.

The difference between the current "as-found" values and the previous test "as-left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodoloav. The set~oint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit specific setpoint methodolopv.

The "as-found" and "as-eft" values must also be recorded and reviewed for consistencv with the assum~tions of the setpoint methodoloav.

The Frequencv of 92 davs is iustified in Reference 5.

SR 3.3.2.3 is modified bv two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.2-1. The first Note reauires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found settina for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. Evaluation of channel performance will verifv that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with the safetv analvsis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodoloav. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returnina the channel to service.

The performance of these channels will be evaluated under the station's Corrective Action Proaram. Entrv into the Corrective Action Proaram will ensure required review and documentation of the condition to establish a reasonable expectation for continued OPERABILITY.

The second Note requires that the as-left settina for the channel be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (field trip setpoint). the as-left and as-found tolerances. as applicable. will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient marain to the Safety Limit and/or Analvtical Limit is maintained. If the as-left channel settina cannot be returned to a settina within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP. then the channel shall be declared inoperable.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2Q4 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c, 1.d, 2.c. 4.c. 4.d (Tava). 5.b. and 6.d.

SURVEILLANCE The second Note also reauires that the methodoloaies for calculating REQUIREMENTS the as-left and as-found tolerances be in the FSAR Chaoter 7, lcontinuedl Reference 1.

SR 3.3.2.4 is the ~erformance of a MASTER RELAY TEST. The MASTER RELAY TEST is the eneraizina of the master relav and verifvina contact operation. This test is performed every 18 months.

SR 3.3.2.5 is the oerformance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST. The SLAVE RELAY TEST is the eneraizina of the slave relavs. Contact operation is verified in one of two wavs. Actuation eauipment that mav be operated in the desian mitiaation MODE is either allowed to function, or is placed in a condition where the relav contact operation can be verified without operation of the eauipment. This test is performed every 18 months.

SR 3.3.2.6 is the ~erformance of a TADOT evew 31 davs. This test is a check of the Undervoltaae Bus A01 and A02 Function.

The Freauencv is adeauate. It is based on industrv operating exoerience. considerina instrument reliabilitv and operatina history data.

SR 3.3.2.7 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions. It is performed every 18 months. The Frequencv is adequate. based on industrv operatina experience and is consistent with the tvpical refuelina cvcle.

SR 3.3.2.8 is the oerformance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Point Beach B 3.3.2-59 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 24M Unit 2 - Amendment No. 24%

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c, 1.d. 2.c. 4.12. 4.d (Tava), 5.b. and 6.d.

SURVEILLANCE A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed evew 18 months. or REQUIREMENTS approximatelv at everv refuelina. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a lcontinued) complete check of the instrument loop. includina the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to measured parameter within the necessary ranae and accuracv.

CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint methodoloav. The difference between the current "as-found" values and the ~revious test "as-left" values must be consistent with the drift allowance used in the setpoint methodoloav.

The Freauencv of 18 months is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of eauipment drift in the set~oint methodoloav.

This SR is modified bv a Note statina that this test should include verification that the time constants are adiusted to the prescribed values where applicable.

SR 3.3.2.8 is modified bv two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.2-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found settina for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. Evaluation of channel performance will verifv that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with the safetv analvsis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodoloav. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returnina the channel to service.

The performance of these channels will be evaluated under the station's Corrective Action Proaram. Entw into the Corrective Action Proaram will ensure required review and documentation of the condition to establish a reasonable exoectation for continued OPERABILITY.

The second Note reauires that the as-left settina for the channel be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance proceduresffield trip setpoint). the as-left and as-found tolerances. as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setooint. This will ensure that sufficient marain to the Safety Limit and/or Analvtical Limit is maintained. If the as-left channel settina cannot be returned to a settina within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. W Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2QG

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES NOTE.................................................

TS BASES Paaes B.3.3.2-35 throuah B.3.3.2-61 are onlv applicable to ESFAS Functions 1.c. I

.d. 2.c. 4.c. 4.d fTava), 5.b. and 6.d.

SURVEILLANCE The second Note also requires that the methodoloaies for calculatinq REQUIREMENTS the as-left and as-found tolerances be in the FSAR. Chapter 7, 4continued)

Reference 1.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR Cha~ter 7

2. FSAR. Chapter 14.

3. IEEE-279-1968.

4. 10 CFR 50.49.

5. NUREG-1 21 8, April 1988.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2Q4 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2QG