ML092920127
| ML092920127 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach |
| Issue date: | 10/28/2009 |
| From: | Justin Poole Plant Licensing Branch III |
| To: | Florida Power & Light Energy Point Beach |
| Poole Justin/DORL/LPL3-1/ 301-415-2048 | |
| References | |
| TAC ME1081, TAC ME1082 | |
| Download: ML092920127 (45) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555*0001 October 28, 2009 LICENSEE: FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC FACILITY: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 SUB~IECT:
SUMMARY
OF THE SEPTEMBER 3, 2009, MEETING WITH FPL ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC, ON THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER MODIFICATION AMENDMENT (TAC NOS. ME1081 AND ME1082) On September 3, 2009, a Category 1 public meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and representatives of FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC (the licensee) at NRC Headquarters, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) modification and the location of AFW modification information in the licensee's Extended Power Uprate (EPU) submittal. A list of attendees is provided as Enclosure 1. The licensee's presentation is provided as Enclosure 2. DISCUSSION The meeting began with the licensee's presentation describing the relationship between the AFW modification and the EPU license amendment request (LAR). Specifically, the licensee described a matrix that listed the sections of the EPU where the AFW modification is proposed in the LAR. Also, the licensee listed the EPU Chapter 14 accident analysis for AFW flow requirements and the associated methodologies. The majority of public meeting focused on the design of the AFW modification. The licensee summarized the design and the design approach and then talked in detail to the different design features. During the remainder of the meeting, the licensee detailed specific portions of the AFW system design (seismic, flow, electrical, instrumentation and control, etc.) and the NRC staff asked clarifying questions to gain a better understanding of the licensee's proposed design changes. During the discussion on the electrical design, the NRC staff stated that further justification would be needed for the worst-case maximum voltage dip for emergency diesel generator transient loading. The NRC staff had previously asked this question in a request for additional information (RAI) prior to this meeting and the licensee was in the process of responding to the RAI. The NRC staff from the Balance of Plant Branch described a few draft questions that they had developed during their review and planned to submit as formal RAls.
- 2 Members of the public were not in attendance. Public Meeting Feedback forms were not received. Please direct any inquiries to me at 301-415-2048, or Justin.Poole@nrc.gov. Justin C. Poole, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 111-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301
Enclosures:
- 1. List of Attendees
- 2. Licensee's Presentation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv
LIST OF ATTENDEES FOR MEETING WITH POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT REGARDING AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AMENDMENT FOR UNITS 1 AND 2 Name Title Orqanization Ilrp~ LewIJ ~~f:;~ )ltZl2... J"j'm fuM,' D I./c* rnr;a PB NP c-' /1' JJv '. /~, 'j. Nt;'":ll i::fZ.,,/J r ~. ~bl'r' if.~.. -:",lpv RP /} -':. I q ((\\( f~ IV ", "./" (..... I tU()I~ MeCCA....,# // r:.-/p,h;h= I EnatSur IlJeIt/.t7E /r£E/l. '1(0 \\.( 1\\,'1 A-T \\i b v.J L~I I~.......\\. }J eel DE/~b.:~ J3R VC-E I-Ic10,4 ~"S-"'J Ke..Jc.... t"/,,,,,,,-, ~/Ul.l Of,5 /sc va j~rA' {jJ1 Jk f7 ),-1 <{hilll) i}DI, jt1~ ufu / Sr ~A.cJ.,y ~'fSJ.o.,-.: ~ <-<{!JAIJ ) S+., ~ / /J? \\.. }r'l.1Pfl t /Vt2 g liY3S. Jsi!/~ £:t1AN~'~ (1QJd4<- (fla"INU!L ~ Nrza/r:h<;/<._ StaNley GQ.r(Jo~: "'Rx Sys Cv3 N~IP-ss/ s 13 P13 L.rt.- A&6ou DI('L.trxuL -' t?f i)\\ Ncx\\Ee-.A L0 lS ~~r,<'..p\\ ~, 6e~tl'..', (';'1 ~ t-lCZ-R I DOC L I , PI.:) \\ tv\\ lcV-ae \\ n~ tV\\ ~*V't."'P;~tt Lui<:\\~ fro\\ ~a~ctaer S'C{fOOA! " L J N1",1j 1-0 \\L\\y\\ P;,o/~ (J16~J ;/1 ~ ~ /If~ / ()tl?t /7-1 SH £ U/L.-' pfllA f /fA" ~..-' A/~rx.v 07?A
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Point Beach Agenda
- Opening
- Purpose
- Applicable Safety Analyses
- AFW EPU LAR Review Matrix
- AFW Design
- Plan Going Forward
'era ENE~ RUOURCES 2
Point Beach Qpening
- Appreciate Staff support to date
- NextEra committed to resolving long standing items (RIS 2005-20) and improving the plant
- AFW System upgrade is very important to nuclear safety and is integral with improving overall plant safety margin as part of the extended power uprate
- NextEra committed to working with Staff to support and facilitate an efficient review
- Encourage active dialog between NextEra and Staff to gain the most benefit from the meeting 3
Point Beach Purpose
- Discuss applicable safety analyses related to AFW System design
- Summarize AFW EPU LAR review matrix
- Present AFW System design details
- Review schedule
'era ENE.RRGiX~ ~:I)URCES 4
Point Beach ~Iicable Safety Analyses
- AFW Flow Optimization
- EPU Chapter 14 accident analysis for AFW flow requirements LONF - Loss of Normal Feed LOAC - Loss Of all AC power to the station auxiliaries SGTR - Steam Generator Tube Rupture SBLOCA - Small Break Loss Of Coolant Accident MSLB - Main Steam Line Break Discuss applicable safety analyses related to AFW System design
- Revised Methodologies RETRAN GOTHIC rera ENS~
5
Point Beach AFW EPU LAR Review Matrix 2 long standing (RIS 2005-20) items Associated EPU LAR sections Auxiliary Feedwater/Condensate Storage Offsite, AC Onsite and DC Onsite Power Systems EDG Fuel Oil and Service Water RPS/ESFAS and Control Systems Setpoint Methodology SBLOCAlAccident and Transient Analyses Loss of Normal Feedwater/Loss of AC Power Steam Generator Tube Rupture Mass and Energy Releases/Containment Integrity Station Blackout/ATWS Fire Protectionllnternally Generated Missiles/EQ/Human Factors Safety Related Pumps and ValvesNentilation Systems RETRAN, GOTHIC methodology changes -- LONF, LOAC, Containment Integrity See review matrix handout '*'-era ENER0:tfa /fJ"ftf" RUI)URCU 6
Point Beach AFW System Desi9.!l
- Design Attributes of new MDAFW pump trains Unitize MDAFW pump trains 1000/0 capacity pumps Powered by 4 kV safety related switchgear Controls in control room and local Pumps will be automatically started for SG low low level, LOOP and SI signals and can be manually operated New suction line from Condensate Storage Tank (CST) supply for new MDAFW pumps Auto transfer of normal suction source from CST to Service Water (SW) for MDAFW and TDAFW pump Anticipated Transient Without SCRAM Mitigating System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) Start Signal
<<era EN~ 7
Point Beach AFW System Design - Summary Increased Flow Margin MDAFW Pump Flow Margin: -- New MDAFW train needs 275 gpm @ -2800 ft -- New MDAFW pump is capable of 275 gpm @ 3050 ft Flow limited to 385 gpm with single failure of a discharge control valve Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump Flow Margin -- TDAFW train needs 275 gpm @.... 2925 ft -- TDAFW pump is capable of 275 gpm @ 3010 ft Capable of -430 gpm with full open discharge valve 480 V System Margins Gained With Replacement Reduces operator manual action requirements Reduce risk of motor trip on start Retains original MDAFW pumps as SSG pumps Use for normal startup and shutdown Improves overall plant safety margin AFW reliability improved Reliability is dominated by Operator failing to switch AFW pump suction to SW Auto switch-over eliminates this operator action and interruption of AFW flow oorera EN~~~ 8
Point Beach AFW System Design - Overall Design A(Wroach MDAFW TDAFW Power Supply Train B (Unit 1) Train A (Unit 2) Train A (Unit 1) Train B (Unit 2) Primarily AC
- DC for switchgear control power and pump and valve controls
- DC supply for SW Suction Supply Valve
- DC supply to inverters for 120 Vac vital instrumentation busses Primarily DC
- AC to battery chargers Tera ENER~
,".?........RHOURCU 9
Point Beach AFW System Design - Overall Design Al;Wroach MDAFW TDAFW Location 8 ft Elevation of PAS 8 ft Elevation of Control Building Hydraulic Design Pump design point 275 gpm at 3050 ft Flow control valves with backup pneumatic supply system Cavitating venturis to prevent excess flow on loss of controller Pump capability 275 gpm at 3010 ft Fixed position thrattle valves Initiation Signals Low-low water level in either steam generator, Loss of both 4.16 kV buses supplying the main feedwater pump motors, ATWS Mitigation System Activation (AMSAC) signal, or r\\IF)(Ter~ Safety Injection sequence ENER~ 10
Point Beach AFW System Design t~EX5J'.§.tfZ!I'L.:J1Q1Q[_LLQ~LE.Q1Jl§__E.fZr:.....UQjJ With Shored Standby Steam Generator {SSG) DUrrp System 10 ""11 2 $tDCml G.,,.,.,..Qttr ~E"YltE ** lEA.,,~*. o TO....11 2 5" IoIOICII 2 ~I" N ~~ TO UHfT 2 SR .HeR ----j lCEllm~~) WO"OROAIV[~Pt.M' I..... n) SSG PlM' i I I I ! r f 1(Jj 1 S(l..,.t~ ae'atec: PullP ~ ~ l:d CST 1:1 .'4 MAl" 'HO ...T[A "!'HRClhrO [. '~.!; t:::l-1--f'..J-----{X] I TO UIIl1 S1"l!tCft Clrf'lCIrc't-or lm-A>>SQ~=1~:*M~~ ~ ~ ....J.. a SSG fJ1lP tS ' I:; ~ cst I:! "I" ,,"YICl.AlE" CS1 "-I'l-- 0 I""~~"-'"...".",...,,,,,. SrqYlC£..... tER..... I -1 IOO'X. a ELECTRic CS TANK CS TANK O'lIYU PU'" ~I:~~~ ~ I 'era ENERGY@ ,'7.**C~ES 11
Point Beach AFW System DesiQ.!! LAKE SIDE Unit 2 TB tIIJlIiI
- c.
Unit 1 TB ~
- Tera ENEf3GVR
- ,~m 12
Point Beach AFW System Design - Single Failure Criteria
- Two 100% Capacity AFW Pumping Systems Per Unit One TDAFW One MDAFW
- Independent Power Supplies for Redundant Pumping Systems.
- No Active Components Shared Between Redundant Pumping Systems.
'era ENERG.'{~ /*""",", ~UOU~tU 13
Point Beach AFW System Design - Seismic Design Classification
- MDAFW Pumps, Motors, Piping, Valves, Electrical Components and Instrumentation are Seismically Qualified.
Pumps and motors qualified by supplier by analysis to PBNP specific g-values - Piping qualified by analysis per PBNP Design Guides - Valves qualified by suppliers to bounding g-values Electrical components qualified by analysis or testing to PBNP specific or bounding g-values or via SQUG methodology Instrumentation qualified by analysis or testing to bounding g-values Electrical raceway qualified by combination of analysis and SQUG methodology °Tera ENERCl~ ,<iA~""" .~ ./~V RESOURCES. 14
Point Beach AFW System Design - MDAFW Pumping System Environmental Conditions
- Temperatures Normal PAS maximum temperature 85°F Abnormal temperature less than 130°F 8 ft Elevation of PAS not subject to HELS temperatures
- Pressure Normal PAS pressure slightly above atmospheric 8 ft Elevation of PAS not subject to HELS pressurization
- Radiation Normal radiation level 1300 RAD 60 year TI D Abnormal radiation level in MDAFW pumps rooms due to CVCS demineralizer flushing operations less than 20-30 mRem/hr at the floor level. The elevated dose rates exist for approximately 10 hrs/year.
Accident radiation - AFW Pump are not required to operate during recirculation phase of a Loss of Coolant Accident and thus need not be qualified for post LOCA harsh radiation levels on 8 ft Elevation of PAS "!"era ENE.=RGYA ~~cu 15
Point Beach AFW System Design - MDAFW Performance Parameters
- Pump Performance Design Point 275 gpm at 3050 ft Flow control valves set to deliver minimum of 137.5 gpm flow to each steam generator Control valve approximately 55°~ open with design pump performance and steam generator pressure equal to lowest safety valve setting plus steam line losses
- Pump Motive Force 337 HP at 275 gpm Approximately 295 gpm at 350 HP (motor rating)
- Pump NPSH NPSH Required at 300 gpm < 12 ft absolute Water height to meet NPSH requirement - 4 ft 16
Point Beach Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Flow Rate
- Hydraulic model developed to determine AFW flow rates for various operating scenarios and single failures
- The minimum required AFW flow rate to two SGs is 275 gpm for LOAC and LONF events
- Minimum AFW established based on:
SG lowest pressure main steam safety valve lift setpoint plus steam line pressure losses Assumed single failure of a TDAFW or MDAFW Pump ~~~era ENER~i(~ -*#,~,jif'l"""* ' AE SiI)U ACES 17
Point Beach Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Flow Rate Maximum AFW flow rates established for MSLB mass and energy inputs Both MDAFW and TDAFW Pump operating Pump design curves MDAFW flow control valve failed open Maximum AFW flow rates established for SG tube rupture event Both MDAFW and TDAFW Pump operating Pump design curves AFW flow control valves set at upper flow control limit "Tera ENERG'{G ~RCES 18
Point Beach AFW System Design - Electrical System Impacts
- AC system analyzed for impact of new MDAFW pumps The MDAFW pump motors will not be the AC degraded grid safety limit voltage limiting components. The MDAFW pump motors can successfully start and run at the safety limit voltages.
AC degraded grid performance for the existing limiting safety related equipment improved by moving MDAFW pump from 480V to 4160 V. The maximum momentary asymmetrical and interrupting fault currents for 4160 V busses are within the ratings of the bus and breakers. - Short circuit duty reduced for 480 V safety buses during DBA.
- New MDAFW pump breakers sized to protect power cables and coordinate with upstream breakers
- Power cables have significant ampacity margin "era ENE~~
f'" WESOURCU 19
Point Beach AFW System Design - Electrical System Impacts
- EDG Static Loading G-01 / G-02 (Train A) - Continue to operate within 2000 hr rating of 2850 kW for the worst case design basis accident EDG electrical loading condition.
-- G-01 2801 kW -- G-02 2800 kW G-03 / G-04 (Train B) - Continue to operate within 200 hr rating of 2951 kW for up to 24 hours and remain within 2000 hr rating of 2848 kW after that for the worst case design basis accident EDG electrical loading condition. -- G-03 2877 kW -- G-04 2874 kW rera ENE~ >/,,- RESOURCES 20
Point Beach AFW System Design - Electrical System Impacts
- EDG Transient Loading Worst Case Maximum Voltage Dip - The resulting worst case calculated transient voltage dip is approximately 48%. Based on ETAP results, this voltage dip has no adverse affect on the ability of G-01 or G-02 to accept and accelerate all auto connected loads. For G-03 and G-04, EDG transient voltage dips remain above 75%.
Motor Acceleration Times - The most significant increase in motor acceleration time is associated with the new MDAFW pump, which is due to a worst case conservative lumped load of MDAFW pump/Sl/CCW/MCC loads at EDG breaker closure. The increase is from 2.72 seconds to 3.84 seconds with an acceptance criteria of - 5.0 seconds. Generator Frequency Response - The transient frequency response of all four EDGs remains above 57 Hz at all times. <<i'era EN~~~ 21
Point Beach AFW System Design - Electrical System RAls
- Information on cables routed through duct banks and design features to prevent cable submergence and periodic cable testing Duct bank inspections Cable testing
- Clarification of time delays for 4.16 kV and 480 V Loss of Voltage Relays and EDG design basis 22
Point Beach AFW System Design - Electrical System RAls
- Request for additional supporting documentation used in developing response to acceptance review questions 1 through 7
- Calculation List -- ETAP -- EDG Loading - Static - Dynamic -- EDG Fuel Oil -- Cable Ampacity -- Breaker Coordination -- Loss of Voltage Relay Calculations - Calculation Summaries -rera ENERG"L~ >~URCU 23
Point Beach AFW System Design - Instrumentation and Controls
- Flow Control Design Pump Status I - - - -
Switchgear Aux 1- - - - - - - I 1 Contact 1 r -1 1 1 I I 1 1 Flow Controller Fisher DVC6000 I.A. {f f/ II " Valve Positioner NUS PIDA700 I ~ - - - 1 Flow Transmitter Foxboro 3051 N '--.,-J~ -l I -I Analog Isolator I-- Plant Computer Input 'era ENERGY3 ~~... ,/" RESOURCES 24
Point Beach AFW System Design - Instrumentation and Controls
- Reg Guide 1.97 Indication Existing flow elements for "Auxiliary Feedwater Flow to Steam Generators" (Type A Category 2 indication) moved down stream of new MDAFW tie-in points. Existing scaling is acceptable for new flow rates.
New Indicators for "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Line Flow" (Type D Category 2 indication), "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Line Pressure" (Type 0 Category 3 indication) and "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Line Pressure" (Type o Category 2 indication) included in design to match commitments for existing MDAFW pumps. t, '.:- --'--era f \\lC' ENER~ ~;~oums 25
Point Beach AFW System Design - Instrumentation and Controls
- Alarms and Annunciation The existing common annunciation for AFW pump suction pressure low will be revised to remove the existing input SSG Feed Pumps input and replace it with the Unit 1 and 2 MDAFW pump suction pressure low input.
New annunication will be included for MDAFW pump suction pressure trip disabled and MDAFW pump low suction pressure trip. The existing common pump motor trouble annunciations will be revised to add inputs from the Unit 1 and 2 MDAFW pump switchgear. New annunciation will be included for AFW pump suction automatic switchover to Service Water ~era EN~~ 26
Point Beach AFW System Design - Instrumentation and Controls
- Human Factors Design Layout of Main Control Boards 1C-03 and 2C-03 modified to include new MDAFW pump controls and instrumentation.
Human factors assessment performed in accordance with existing PBNP Design Guidelines to maintain consistency with approach used for the PBNP Control Room Design Review. Operations comments on control board layout have been factored into the design. -~'era ENERGY~ 27
Point Beach AFW System Design - Instrumentation and Controls
- AFW Pump Suction Switchover Design TpL* Max Pump Suction Pressure Low Switchover Time Delay Open SW Suction Supply Valve Pump Trip Time Delay Trip AFW Pump TTrip J.lTrip TSetTrip IlTrip T
TTrip, Min
- 1 TSwitchover Complete SWFull Flow TSwitchover, Max I
JlSwitchover TSel Swilchover IlSwitchover TSwitchover, Min y TPL,Min Startup Transient T = a Seconds i era ENERC'~@ 28
Point Beach AFW System Design - Other Design Considerations
- Internal Flooding All new piping in safety related areas is seismically design and thus is not a source for internal flooding Area where new MDAFW pumps are being installed is not subject to flooding
- Fire Protection/Appendix R Design includes physical separation and fire wrap to create independence between redundant TDAFW and MDAFW trains For Control Room and Cable Spreading Room fire scenarios, the new MDAFW pumps will be isolatable and have local control capability but TDAFW pumps will remain the designated alternate shutdown components Operator manual actions for certain TDAFW functions unaffected by modification will remain Operator manual actions to restore AC power to DC battery chargers will remain
~rera ENERGX~ ~' 29
ITE1 ~ nw [ill} ~ ACC£SS/tt/IESS NOT bl~*-*----** k~ ill C()jTAlNIOT SPRAY & SArE,TY~~L J!oIJEC. I PlJI,f>S ~ [i"&Il [l1O] [ill] I [i64] I [il5J @tl [ill] @] Jilll ~ rrnl ~ illOl Iill.:ID -~-era ENEF3.G~e _,",<-iJ~'F HE 50U RC:ES 30
Point Beach AFW System Design - SSG Design
- SSG Trains (Non safety related function)
Use in normal plant startups and shutdowns Available for beyond design basis postulated events Overall plant safety improvement
- SSG trains retain all manual control capability from the control room and AFW rooms AFW Auto initiation is removed from SSG trains AFW Auto initiation trips SSG pumps (if necessary)
- SSG Train powered from existing 480 VAC load centers May be loaded by operations using load management procedures
- Single pump is adequate to supply expected normal operating flow requirements (-220 gpm) 31
Point Beach AFW System Design - Testing Plan
- Pre-modification Testing Vendor shop tests and/or calibration activities Site breaker and relay checkouts
- Construction Tests NDE Cables testing Loop calibrations Motor rotation and uncoupled motor data gathering
- Pre-Operational Tests Pneumatic tests Leakage tests Valve tests Pump full flow test runs crera ENEF)G~~
RHI)URCfS 32
Point Beach AFW System Design - Testing Plan
- Operational Tests Pump performance testing System timing tests Valve stroke time tests Relay logic tests
'**:*era ENE.MR~GV~ ~50URm 33
Point Beach AFW System DesiQ!!
- Dominant operator action (switchover to service water) is eliminated
- Single MD or single TDAFW train per Unit capable of supporting post fire safe shutdown
- Two new MDAFW pumps located in separate fire area from existing TDAFW pumps and cabling protected, as required
- New AFW pump recirculation valves to be provided with backup air supply
- Better estimate analysis shows single SSG pump adequate for decay heat removal with atmospheric dump valves Tera ENEF30Y~
,,/ RESOURCE! 34
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Point Beach FMEA Component Failure Mode Effect Isolation valve for AFW safety related suction supply Fails to open Two AFW pumps provided; either one of the two AFW pumping systems provide the required feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat. Auxiliary feedwater pump Failure to start Two AFW pumps provided; either one of the two AFW pumps provide the required feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat. Auxiliary feedwater pump Failure to trip on low suction pressure Two AFW pumps provided; each AFW pump is provided with low suction pressure protection; separate suction supply headers for two pumps; either one of the two AFW pumps provide the required feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat. MDAFW Pump Recirculation Valve Fails to open Two recirculation paths provided per MDAFW pump; either recirculation path has sufficient capacity to support short term pump operation MDAFW Pump Recirculation Valve Fails to close Two AFW pumps provided; either one of the two AFW pumping systems provide the required feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat.
- era EN~~
37
Point Beach FMEA Component Failure Mode Effect MDAFW pump discharge control valve on either of the steam generator supply lines Fails to control flow Redundant flow path from TDAFW pump is available; either one of the two AFW pumping systems provide the required feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat. MDAFW pump discharge control valve on line leading to faulted steam generator Fails to close Operator to trip pump; two AFW pumping systems provided; either one of the two AFW pumping systems provide the required feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat. TDAFW Pump Recirculation Valve Fails to open Two AFW pumps provided; either one of the two AFW pumping systems provide the required feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat. TDAFW Pump Recirculation Valve Fails to close Two AFW pumps provided; either one of the two AFW pumping systems provide the required feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat. TDAFW pump discharge throttle valve on line leading to faulted steam generator Fails to close Operator to trip pump; two AFW pumps provided; either one of the two AFW pumping systems provide the required feedwater flow to remove sufficient decay heat. 38
Point Beach Local Controls of AFW for Decay Heat Removal Following Control Room Evacuation
- PBNP Licensing basis FSAR 7.1.2 "The plant is equipped with a common control room which contains those controls and instrumentation necessary for operation of each unit's reactor and turbine generator under normal and accident conditions. The control room is continuously occupied under all operating and accident conditions, except for the special case of a control room fire forcing evacuation and alternate shutdown from outside the control room. No other accident is required to be assumed during a control room evacuation due to fire."
PBNP strategy for Alternate Shutdown due to Control Room fire relies on the TDAFW pumps for decay heat removal The new MDAFW pumps include local controls to start and stop the pumps and manual valve controls. Remote shutdown instrumentation is not provided near the new MDAFW pumps. rera ENER(i'L~ ~/~ RUI)URCES 39
AFW Review Matrix Licensing/Tech Associated LR LR Section Title Reason Sections Spec Change Systems and Components 2.5.4.5 2.4.1 2.11.1 2.2.4 2.5.4.2 2.3.2 2.3.3 2.5.7.1 2.3.4 TS 3.3.2-1, ESFAS 2.7.6 Item 6.e, AFW Pump Suction Transfer on Suction 2.7.5 Pressure Low TS 3.7.5, AFW TS 3.7.6, CST 2.6.3.2 2.6.1 2.8.5 2.8.5.2.2 2.8.5.2.3 2.8.5.6.2 2.8.5.6.3.3 2.3.5 2.8.5.7 2.5.1.2.1 Auxiliary Feedwater Reactor Protection, Safety Features Actuation, and Control Svstems Human Factors Safety-Related Valves and Pumps Station Service Water System Offsite Power System DC Onsite Power System Engineered Safety Feature Ventilation System Subject LR Section Discusses AFW associated setpoints and controls Discusses control room changes for AFW. Discusses safety-related pumps and valves. Discusses AFW interface changes. Discusses impact of AFW modifications on electrical svstem. Discusses impact of AFW modifications on AC Onsite Power System electrical system. Does not specifically discuss AFW, however Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil does discuss increase on fuel consumption Storage and Transfer due to increase in EDG load Discusses impact of AFW modifications on electrical system. Discusses AFW room ventilation. Discusses PAB ventilation - location of new AFW pumps. Auxiliary and Radwaste Area and Turbine Areas Ventilation Systems Safety Analyses Mass and Energy Release Analysis for Secondary System Pipe Ruptures Primary Containment Functional Design Accident and Transient Analvsis Loss of Non-Emergency AC Power to the Station Auxiliaries Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow Steam Generator Tube Rupture Technical Evaluation-SBLOCA Discusses transients that credit new AFW system. New AFW configuration used in analysis. Discusses AFW input to accident analyses. Discusses transients that credit new AFW system. Discusses transients that credit new AFW system. Discusses transients that credit new AFW system. Discusses transients that credit new AFW system. Discusses transients that credit new AFW Station Blackout sYstem. Anticipated Transients Without Discusses transients that credit new AFW system. Addresses internally generated missiles for Scram Internally Generated Missiles SR equipment. Page 1 of 2
AFW Review Matrix LicensinglTech Spec Change Associated LR Sections LR Section Title Reason TS 3.3.2-1, ESFAS Item 6.e, AFW Pump Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure Low TS 3.7.5, AFW TS 3.7.6, CST Programs/Other 2.3.1 Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Discusses EQ requirements. 2.5.1.4 Fire Protection Discusses conditions that credit new AFW system. 2.13.1 Risk Evaluation Discusses AFW modifications to enhance PRA Page 2 of 2
Methodologies Review Matrix Methodology/Code Associated LR Sections LR Section Title Appendix A Safety Evaluation Report Compliance 2.8.4.2 Overpressure Protection During Power Operation 2.8.5.1.2 Steam System Piping Failures Inside and Outside Containment RETRAN 2.8.5.2.1 Loss of External Electrical Load, Turbine Trip, and Loss of Condenser Vacuum 2.8.5.2.2 Loss of Non-Emergency AC Power to the Station Auxiliaries 2.8.5.2.3 Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow 2.6.3.1 M&E Release for a Postulated LOCA GOTHIC 2.6.1 Primary Containment Functional Design Appendix A Safety Evaluation Report Compliance VIPRE 2.8.3 Thermal and Hydraulic Design 2.8.5.1.2 Steam System Piping Failures Inside and Outside Containment Page 1 of 1
Meellng N' eellnq summary ML092920127 OFFICE DORLlLPL3-1/PM DORLlLPL3-1/LA DORLlLPL3-1/BC DORLlLPL3-1/PM NAME JPoole THarris RPascarelli JPoole DATE 10/28/09 10/28/09 10/28/09 10/28/09}}