IR 05000528/1986030
| ML17300A626 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 10/23/1986 |
| From: | Ball J, Bosted C, Fiorelli G, Ivey K, Miller L, Zimmerman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17300A625 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-86-30, 50-529-86-29, 50-530-86-22, IEB-86-002, IEB-86-2, NUDOCS 8611140011 | |
| Download: ML17300A626 (40) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos:
Docket Nos:
License Nos:'icensee:
50-528/86-30)
50"529/86-29)
50-530/86-22 50-528, 50-529, 50"530 NPF-41, NPP-51, CPPR-143 Arizona Nuclear Power Project P. 0.
Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034
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3.
Inspectors:
G. 'elli, R t In pector C.
ted, Re i e Insp ctor J.
a l, Reside pec or Ins ection Conducte
September 8,
6 October 12, 1986 R.
Z mmerman, n
r Re dent Inspector I
IO-z z-gs Date Signed l o - <q-~e Date Signed l 0->3-8k Date Signed lO-2-~- ~
Date Signed 10. l,3-I4 K.
Approved By:
L.
, Residen y,
ector Date Signed
~xi-II lier, Chic eactor Projects Section
Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on Se tember
1986 throu h October
1986 (Re ort Nos. 50-528/86-30 50-529/86-29 and 50-530/86-22.)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, onsite, regular and backshift inspection by the five resident inspectors.
Areas inspected included:
followup of previously identified items; review of plant activities; plant tours; engineered safety system walkdowns; surveillance testing; maintenance; startup test witnessing and test results review; preoperational test witnessing and procedure reviews; quality assurance; Licensee Event Report followup; periodic and special report review; IE Bulletin/Temporary Instruction followup review; personnel errors; and allegation followup.
During this inspection the following Inspection Procedures were covered:
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Results:
Of the 14 areas inspected, no violations were identifie ~
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DETAILS Persons Contacted:
The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted:
Arizona Nuclear Power Pro ect (ANPP)
>R. Adney, Operations Superintendent, Unit 2
>J. Allen,, Op'erations Manager J. R.
Bynum, PVNGS Plant Manager B. Cederquist, Chemical Services Manager J. Dennis, Operations Supervisor, Unit 1 W. Pernow, Training Manager D. Gouge, Operations Superintendent, Unit 3
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G. Haynes, Vice President Nuclear Production
+W. E.
Xde, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager W, Jump, Startup Manager, Unit 3 J. Kirby, Project Transition Manager A. McCabe, Assistant Startup Manager, Unit 3 D. Nelson, Operations Security Manager-R. Nelson, Maintenance Manager G. Perkins, Radiological Services Manager J. Pollard, Operations Supervisor, Unit 2 P. Riedel, Operations Supervisor, Unit 3
+T. Shriver, Compliance Manager L. Souza, Assistant. Quality Assurance Manager
E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., Executive Vice President R. Younger, Operations Superintendent, Unit
"<0. Zeringue, Technical Support Manager Bechtel Power Construction (Bechtel)
D. Anderson, Chief Resident Engineer D. Hawkinson, Project Quality Assurance Manager G. Hierzer, Field Construction Manager J.
Houchen, Project Manager The inspectors also talked with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
- "Attended the Exit Meeting on October 9, 1986.
Previousl Identified Items Unit 1 a.
(Closed) Pollowu Item (528/85-06-08):
Increased Communications The licensee planned to reanalyze the adequacy of existing communications systems and to take corrective actions to improve the
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reliability of this support function to safe shutdown prior to exceeding 5g power.
A base station radio and two telephones have been-installed in each remote shutdown room.
The telephone circuits are isolated from the control room.
Through conversations with operations and shift supervisory personnel, the inspector determined that the operational staff appeared to understand how to operate the equipment.
This item is closed.
J (Closed) Followu Item (528/85-31-01):
Re uirement for Periodic Checks of Diesel Generation Overs eed Tri Set oint The licensee planned to establish the schedule fo'r the diesel generator periodic overspeed trip setpoint. checks of the 'engine governor mechanism.
The licensee consulted with the vendor and the vendor recommended <hat the overspeed trip test be, performed on an 18 month basis.
The licensee is rewed.ting the surveillance procedure and will include the overspeed test in the next issuance of the 18 month diesel generator surveillance procedure.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Followu 'tem (528/85-31-02):.":
Valve Stroke Time The licensee committed to performing an engineering evaluation to determine the minimum allowable stroke times for valves that did not have a minimum acceptance criteria specified in the FSAR or Technical Specifications.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's efforts to evaluate the stroke time tests for all the valves used in the plant system.
The evaluation involved a complete rewrite of the valve and pump Section XI testing program for each unit.
The new Pump and Valve Program has been submitted to NRR in ANPP letter ANPP-37730.
The inspector also reviewed two EERs that evaluated stroke times for valves not expressly designated in the FSAR or Technical Specifications.
Th'ese EERs (86-SI-020, 86-XM-041) appeared to be based on a sound engineering approach.
The inspector considers that the effort performed by the licensee's staff to'ete'rmine valve stroke time requirements should be effective.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Followu Item (528/85-32-01):
Review Emer enc Procedures for Char in Pum Precaution The licensee committed to re-reviewing several procedures to include a precaution related to charging pump trips.
The precaution was to include isolating the trip and action taken should not result in a common mode failure which would prevent charging pump operation.
Specific procedures to be reviewed included 41RO-lZZ04, 41AO-1ZZ12 and 41A0-1ZZ13.
The inspector reviewed the referenced procedures and confirmed a caution statement had been included which identified that certain
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actions are to be taken when a charging pump trips.
This item is closed.
e.
(Closed) Enforcement Item (528/85-43-01):
Failure to Submit Re orts On Time Contrary to Technical Specification 6.6.1.a, two LERs were submitted 31 days after the events occurred.
This was a repeat, violation.
Management Corrective Action Report (CAR) MA-85-0002 was issued with a final action due date of Zanuary 10, 1986.
Corrective actions to preclude reoccurrence of this problem included the establishment of a Compliance Department having responsibility for the processing of LERs.
The inspector reviewed procedure 5N40409,
"Non-Routine Reports" and the Event Report Manual which outlined the new requirements related to the processing of LERs.
The inspector also reviewed the current compliance department, organization and manning charts.
The inspector concluded that the licensee had taken appropriate actions in revising the manner in which LERs are processed to correct this problem.
The inspector has not noted any late LERs since the new program was initiated.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Enforcement Item (528/85-43-03):
Failure to Maintain Pur e
Valves Closed Contrary to Technical Specification 3.6.1.7.b, the power access purge valves were allowed to remain open while not in use'.,
As"part of the corrective action, the licensee modified the release permit procedure to include a precaution statement to require that the power access purge valves be closed when they are not in use.
The inspector reviewed the precaution in procedure 75RP-9ZZ92, Revision 2, TCPN 06,
"Gaseous Radiological Effluent Release Permits and Offsite.Dose Assessments".
The inspector also reviewed -
Radiological Department Training records for procedure training on this procedure.
The records and precaution appeared to be implemented properly.
Also, during routine observations of
'Contro1'oom panels, the inspector observed that the power access purge valves were shut when containment purges were not in progress.
This item is closed.
Unit a
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(Closed) Followu Item (529/86-24-02):
Safet Anal sis of Mis ositioned Excore Detector This matter deals with a commitment.
made by the licensee to document its technical review in a matter associated with a mispositioned excore detector.
The inspector confirmed that the evaluation had been documented.
The analysis concluded that no Chapter 15 FSAR safety analyses were violated during the period the detector was mispositioned.
The Plant Review Board concluded that the matter was not reportable.
This item is close C I
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3.
Review of Plant Activities e
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At the start of the inspection period Unit 1 was operating at 100'/
power.
The turbine generator tripped on September 9, from a generator exciter fault.
Reactor power cutback and main steam bypass control systems operated appropriately and the plant was stabilized at 10% power.
On September 10, following repairs, the turbine generator was restarted and power was raised to 100/.
On September 12, a reactor trip was caused by false low steam generator pressure signals when the steam bypass valves opened at 100/ power with the turbine on line.
The main steam isolation system was also activated.
The plant was started up September 14 and synchronized to the grid on September 15.
The plant operated at 100% until October 6 when the generator output breakers in the switchyard tripped from a ground fault.
The reactor cutback and main steam bypass control systems again operated normally and power stabilized at 35%.
During the subsequent power reduction to 10%,
the reactor tripped on low DNBR while at'a power level of 20%.
Feedwater p'erturbations and manual control of fe'edwater control, valves produced a difference in cold leg temperatures and the core protection calculators generated a penalty factor of 'sufficient magnitude to produce the DNBR trip.
Following the reactor trip, additional cooling caused an automatic actuation of the safety injection system from a low pressurizer pressure condition.'
Notification of Unusual Event was declared and was terminated after plant conditions returned to normal.,
The plant remained shutdown through the end of the inspection period to perform maintenance on the main generator identified during an inspection.
b.
Unit 2 At the start of the period, Unit 2 was operating at 100% power.
A planned load rejection test conducted on September 11 resulted in a reactor trip from projected low flow DNBR.
The 'situation was caused by a voltage perturbation when the generator output, breakers were opened for the test causing pump speeds to decrease a few RPMs.
The reactor was restarted on September 13 and the load rejection test was successfully completed on September 13.
A 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> run involving continuous operation at near 100/ power was completed on September 22, 1986 at which time commercial operation.
was declared.
On September 22, during the performance of an engineered safety features surveillance test, a malfunctioning trip switch resulted, in the actuation of the safety injection system.
Plant operation was not affected by the event.
The reactor tripped on September 23, from a power level of 40/ due to low steam generator level caused by the tripping of the operating feedwater pump from low suction, pressure.
The low suction pressure was caused by the tripping of the condensate pumps which also tripped on low suction pressure.
The condition was created when the two heater drain pumps were shutdown to 'repair a steam leak.
With both heater
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drain tank pumps secured, a significant condensate inventory remained in the heater drain tanks for a period of time instead of being directed immediately into the hotwell, where it is pumped by the condensate pumps to the suction of the feedwater pumps.
The inventory in the hotwell was lower than normal during the leak testing of condenser tubes which was going on at the time.
The, lower inventory plus the absence of water from the h'eater drain tanks resulted in a low condensate pump'suction condition.
An Auxiliary Peedwater actuation also occurred because, of low steam.
generator level.
e The reactor was restarted on September 26'nd operated at 100'j for the remainder of the period.
Unit 3 During the inspection period, system prerequisite and preoperational testing continued.
Major test activities included the structural integrity test and preoperational integrated leak rate test of the Unit 3 containment; completion of initial tests of the plant protection system; and testing of components associated with the main steam and feedwater systems including the main steam and feedwater isolation valves and the main feedwater pump turbine controls.
Construction activities in Unit 3 were estimated to be 99.8 percent complete by the licensee with integrated hot functional testing anticipated to begin within the next reporting period.
Plant Tours The following plant areas at Units 1, 2 and 3 were toured by the inspector during the inspection:
Auxiliary Building Containment Building Control Complex Building Diesel Generator Building Radwaste Building Technical Support Center Turbine Building Yard Area and Perimeter The following areas were observed during the tours:
(1)
0 eratin lo s and Records Records were reviewed against Technical Specification and administrative control procedure requirements.
(2)
Monitorin Instrumentation Process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
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conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.(k), Technical Specifications, and administrative procedure iV lj
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(4)
E ui ment Lineu s
Valve and electrical breakers were verified to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and Administrative procedures for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.
(5)
E ui ment Ta in Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specified.
(6)
General Plant E ui ment Conditions Plant equipment was observed for indications of system leakage, improper lubrication, or other conditions that would prevent the system from fulfillingtheir functional requirements.
(7)
Fire Protection Fire fighting equipment and controls were observed for conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative procedures.
(8)
Plant Chemistr Chemical analysis results were reviewed for conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative control procedures.
(9)
~gecurit Activities observed for conformance with regulaL'ory requirements, implementation of the site security plan, and administrative procedures included vehicle and personnel access, and protected and vital area integrity.
(10) Plant Housekee in Plant conditions and material/equipment storage were observed to determine the general state 'of cleanliness and housekeeping.
Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with 'respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
(ll) Radiation Protection Controls Areas observed'included control point operation, records of licensee's surveys~within the radiological controlled areas posting of radiation and high radiation areas, compliance with Radiation Exposure Permits, personnel monitoring devices being properly worn, and personnel frisking practices.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
En ineered Safet Feature S stem Walk Down - Units 1 and 2.
Selected engineered safety feature systems (and systems important to safety)
were walked down by the inspectors to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures.
During the walkdown of the systems, items such as hangers, supports, electrical cabinets, and cables were inspected to determine that they were operable, and in a condition to perform their required functions.
The inspectors also verified that the system valves were in the required position and locked as appropri'ate.
The local and remote position indication and controls were also confirmed to be in the required position and operabl f, t
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Unit Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on October 2, and October 6, 1986.
High Pressure Safety Injection, Trains "A" and B".
I,ow Pressure Safety Injection, Trains "A" and "B".
Containment Spray Systems, Trains "A" and "B".
Auxiliary Feedwater Systems, Trains "A" and "B".
Diesel Generator Systems, Trains "A" and "B".
Essential Cooling Mater, Trains "A" and "B".
125V DC Electrical Distribution Unit Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on September 8, 17, 25 and October 2, 7, 1986.
f Safety Injection Tanks Essential Spray Ponds, Trains "A" and "B" 125V DC Electrical Distribution, Channels
"A" and "B" Chemical Spray System, Channels
"A" and "B" No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
'.
Surveillance Testin
- Units 1 and 2.
a
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Surveillance tests required to be performed by the Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that:
1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule; 2)
a technically adequate procedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests; 3) the surveillance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in the TS; and 4) test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
b.
Portions of the following surveillances were observed by the inspector on the dates shown:
Unit 1
.,Procedure 41ST"1ZZ24 Descri tion I
Startup Channel High Neutron Flux Alarm.
Dates Performed September
36ST-9SB02 36ST-1SA06 Unit 2 PPS Bistable Trip Functional Test.
Log Power Functional Test September
October
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36ST-9SB02 PPS Bistable Trip Units Functional Test.
September
.16 n
36ST-9HP03 Containment Hydrogen'Monitoring System Calibration, Test.
September
'2ST-2ZZ33 Mode 1 Surveillance Logs.
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No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were
, September
- and October
identified.
6.
Plant Maintenance - Unit 1 and
a ~
During the inspection period, the inspectors observed and reviewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem investi'gation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures, required gA/gC involvement, proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, and proper retesting.
The inspector verified reportability for these activities was co'rrect.
b.
The inspectors witnessed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Unit 1 Descri tion Dates Performed Troubleshooting PPS Low Steam Generator Flow Trips on Channel "C".
Troubleshooting PPS Low Power Drawer.
September
October
Troubleshooting Switch and Breaker Controls.
October
Replacement of Current Transformer Wiring in Main Generator.
October
Non-Class Cable Tray Modifications in the Upper Cable Spreading Room.
October
Unit 2 Dates Performed 0,
Troubleshooting Nuclear Cooling Water Annunciator Alarm Problem.
September
Replacement of Defective Under Voltage Coil on Reactor Trip Breaker "A" Channel.
September
II
Troubleshooting AFA-POlA Feedwater Pump Low RPM.
October
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
7.
Licensee Event Re ort (LER) Followu
- Units 1 and 2.
a
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The following LERs associated with operating events were reviewed by the inspectors at the time of the occurrence.
In addition, the, inspectors performed in-office reviews and based on the information provided in the report concluded that reporting requirements had been met, root causes had been identified, and corrective actions were appropriate.
These LERs are closed.
Unit 1 LER NUMBER LER 85-38-00 LER 85-38-01 DESCRIPTION Failure to Monitor Containment Air Temperature.
h LER 85-56-00 LER 85-56-01 Intentional Isolation of Containment'pray.
LER 85-60-00 LER 85-60-01 Containment Inner Air Lock Failed Surveillance Test and the Outer Door"was Not Maintained Closed.
LER 86-10-00 Personnel Error During Performance of Surveillance Test.
LER 86-14-00 Spurious Actuations of Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System.
LER 86-28-00 Surveillance Testing of Halon System Invalidated Due to Personnel Error.
IER 85-79"00 LER 85-79-01 Functional and Response Time Surveillance'Test Not Acceptable.
LER 86-12-00 Maximum Surveillance Interval Exceeded Due to Personnel Error.
LER 86-25-00 Unit 2 Unsealed AFW Pump Room Penetrations.
LER NUMBER LER 86"19 DESCRIPTION During Degasing Operations, Xnadequate Monitoring of Gaseous Radwaste System.
LER 86-20 Inadvertent Actuation of Balance of. Plant Engineered Safety Features Syste '4 1,
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LER 86-22 Surveillance Test Performed With a Superseded Procedure Due to Personnel Error.
LER 86-26 Reactor Trip Initiated by Main Turbine Generator Trip.
LER 86-29 LER 86-30 Surveillance Test Not Performed Within Required Time Due to Personnel Error.
h Engineered Safety Features Act'uation Due to Radiation Monitor Relay Malfunction."
LER 86-33 Incorrect Wiring in Generator Results in Reactor Trip.
LER 86-39 Engineered Safety'eature
',Actuation Due to Personnel Error.
LER 86-41 LER 86-45 LER 86-47 Unidentified Leakage,'Results in Unit Shutdown.
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Actuation of Control Room Essential Filtration System Due to Personnel'Error.
Invalid Floating Point Fault in CPC Caused Reactor Trip.
LER 86-48 Safety Injection Tanks Inoperable Due to Personnel Error.
b.
Followup was performed on the following LER immediately following the occurrence:
(Closed)
LER 528/86-04-00:
Entr into a S ecified Condition Contrar to Technical S ecification 3.0.4 - Unit
While in Mode 4, plant pressure was raised above 430 psia without first removing power to the key locked open safety injection tank (SIT) isolation valves as required by Technical Specification 3.5.l.a.
Plant procedures included conditions specified in Section 4.5.l.c that required the SITs to be checked operable at least once per 31 days when RCS pressure was above 700 psia by verifying that power is removed from the isolation valves.
The licensee took corrective action to modify the surveillance procedure to reflect that the valves were to be opened and power removed before a plant pressure of 430 psia is reached.
The inspector reviewed 41ST-1SI08 "SIT Isolation Valve Motor Power Removed" and confirmed that operators are directed to open the valves and remove power to the valves before plant pressure increases above 430 psia.
This LER is closed.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
8.
Startu Testin
- Unit 2
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Test Witnessin (
i The inspector witnessed portions of the following f
tests:,
Dates Performed 72PA-2RX50 Variable Tavg (1TC and Power September
Coefficient) Test - 100/
73PA-2ZZ07 73PA"2MAQl Unit Load Transient'Test
- 100%
Unit Load Rejection Test,-.
- 100/
September
September
The inspector verified that approved procedures were used, test.
personnel were knowledgeable of the test requirements, and data was properly collected.
Procedure changes and testexceptions were identified and significant events were recorded in the test log.
Other test. related activities such as the use of calibrated measuring and test equipment and completion of test prerequisites were also verified to have been accomplished in accordance with administrative control procedures.
b.
Test Results Review
The following test packages were reviewed:
Percent 73PA-2SF01 Control System Checkout 20/
72PA-2RX15 Variable Tavg (ITC and Power Coefficient) Test 50/
72PA-2RX16 Steady State Core Performance Test 50/
72PA-2RX19 Shape Annealing Matrix and Boundary 50/
Point Power Correlation 73PA-2ZZ05 Unit Load Transient Test 5 00/
The inspector confirmed that 75/ of the 20% plateau test results had been submitted and reviewed by the Plant Review Board (PRB) Test Review Group and that the other 20/ power level tests were being prepared for issuance to the PRB review group.
The inspector verified that the tests were properly completed, test exceptions were properly addressed and resolved, and data acquisition was completed as required.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identifie >4 r
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Preo a.
erational Testin
- Unit 3.
Test Procedure Review The inspector reviewed the following preoperational test. procedures for technical and administrative adequacy:
Plant Protection System (Channel A) Test.
Plant Protection System (Channel B) Test.
Plant Protection System (Channel C) Test.
Plant Protection System (Channel D) Test.
Auxiliary Feedwater System Preoperational Test.
Feedwater System Preoperational Test.
Main Steam Isolation Valves and Bypass Valves Preoperational Test.
The inspector found the procedures provided a clear explanation of the purpose, prerequisites for performance, appropriate signoff steps, and quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria as required.
b.
Test Witnessin The inspector witnessed the performance of preoperational testing to,
'erify that the procedure in use was properly approved and adequately detailed to assure satisfactory performance; test instrumentation required by the procedure was, calibrated and in use; work was performed by qualified personnel; and results satisfied procedural acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
I The inspector witnessed the performance of portions of the following system preoperational testing activities:
Procedure 92PE35810 92PE35811 92PE35B12 92PE35B13 91PE3AF01 91PE3FW01 91PE3SG01 Plant Protection System (Channel A) Test.
Plant Protection System (Channel B) Test.
Plant Protection System (Channel C) Test.
Plant Protection System (Channel D) Test.
Auxiliary Feedwater System Preoperational Test.
Feedwater System Preoperational Test.
Main Steam Isolation Valves and Bypass Valves Preoperational Test.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
10.
Qualit Assurance for Prep erational Testin
- Review of Trainin and ualification Records - Unit 3 The licensee's quality assurance program for preoperational testing activities was reviewed by the inspector during two previous inspections (Reference:
Inspection Reports 50-530/85-31 and 86-04).
During this
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inspection the inspector reviewed the licensee's training and qualification program for personnel involved in the monitoring of preoperational testing.
Qualification requirements for test monitoring personnel have been outlined by the licensee in administrative procedure 6N417.03.00 Rev.
1.
The inspector's review of this procedure found it to adequately reflect the licensee's commitments regarding 'personnel qualification.
The inspector reviewed the qualification records of six individuals in the licensee's test monitoring group for conformance to the licensee's procedure and regulatory commitments.
No violations of NRC re uirements or deviations were identified.
Tem orar Instruction - Units
2 and 3 (Closed) TI 2515/77 Surve of Licensee's Res onse, to Selected Safet Issues The purpose of this temporary instruction was to determine what action the licensee had taken to address selected safety issues identified in IE Bulletins, Circulars, and Information Notices, and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Significant Operating Event Reports (SOERs).
The issue for the Palo Verde site was to determine what actions were taken to preclude biological fouling of cooling water heat exchangers.
This item was previously.identified in IEB 81-03 and XNPO SOER 84-1, and concerned safety-related equipment that was cooled by open cycle service water systems.
In their responses to the XEB and SOER the licensee stated that, Palo Verde does not use lake, sea, or any other open water system for either
"service" or safety-related cooling water.
The inspector noted, however, that the Essential Spray Pond (ESP)
system is open to the environment (air) and provides cooling for safety-related heat exchangers.
After discussing this concern with licensee personnel and reviewing procedures for control of the ESP, the inspector concluded that biological fouling was not a problem because the ESP system uses processed water which is chemically controlled.'n addition, the licensee has established a program to monitor various parameters in the ESP system due to concerns of microbiological corrosion.
This program (required by Technical Specifications)
includes routine pressure monitoring; visual inspection of piping and heat exchangers; test material samples; and also establishes ESP water level, temperature and chemistry standards.
This item is considered closed for all units.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts - Units 1 and 2.
Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspector p p
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This review included the following considerations:
the report. contained the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the validityeof'the reported information.
Within the scope of the above, the following reports were reviewed by the inspectors.
I t
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Unit l Monthly Operating Report for August, 1986.
Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report for August, 1986.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
13.
IE Bulletin (Closed)
IE Bulletin 86-02 Static "0" Rin Differential Pressure Switches - Units
2 and
The licensee does not use SOR Model 102 or 103 differential pressure switches as electrical equipment important to safety.
This information was forwarded to the NRC in a communication on July 31, 1986.
This item is closed for all units.
14.
Alle ation Followu
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Alle ation RU-86-A-44.
Characterization In a letter to Combustion Engineering Inc., the Foxboro Company identified a duplication of serial numbers on two Model 226S-26 recorders which were returned to.Foxboro.
The serial number on one of the recorders was apparently not installed by the Foxboro Company.
lm lied Si nificance to Plant Desi n Construction or
~0 erations The serial numbers of recorders serve to identify equipment for accounting purposes.
Model numbers in turn identify the functional characteristics and service of the units.
All plant equipment is assigned a unique equipment tag number.
Qith minor exceptions tracking and identification of equipment subject to test, repair or operation is by equipment tag number not serial number.
Assessment of Safet Si nificance The inspector confirmed that the two recorders having identical serial numbers 397503 were the same models and were non-safety related" recorders.
One of the recorders was to be used in the e
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Unit 2 control room and the other in the Water Reclamation Facility, both in non-safety applications.
Based on discussions with plant staff and a review of documents, the inspector determined that, the serial number of one recorder which initially had no serial number was assigned the same serial number as another recorder by plant engineering staff during the preoperati'onal test program.
The recorder which had been given the duplicate number had been intended to be used in the water reclamation facility. It was removed from storage and installed in the Unit 2 control room for use in verifying circuit continuity, and replaced the previously used recorder (No. 3975703)
which was temporarily being used as a balance of plant trend recorder that had failed its generic test.
The licensee's representative informed the inspector that it is believed that during the walk down of the system for turnover, the recorder was noted to have a missing tag, and from available records, a second tag was fabricated with serial No. 3975703 and installed on the recorder
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Meanwhile, the repaired original recorder No. 3975703 which was returned by Fokboro was reassigned to be used in Unit 3.
The Unit 3 field engineer responsible for the system noted a Unit 2 designation and in following up on its disposition found that a second recorder installed in Unit, 2 had the same serial number.
Both recorders were returned to Foxboro for reserialization and recertification.
Both recorders were replace'd with updated recorder models.
Staff Position Two non-safety related recorders were confirmed to have identical serial numbers but the condition did not constitute a potential safety problem.
Actions taken to resolve the problem by the licensee are considered proper.
Action Re uired None.
Alle ation RV-86-A-051 Characterization On June 10, 1986, a member of the public, who had tested for a position as a mechanic, stated that four individuals who had been hired as mechanics into the Maintenance Department did not meet the experience requirements of ANSI 3.1, 1978.
He also stated that the time helpers spent sweeping floors was credited as work experience, and that the APS personnel qualification record was questionable.
Im lied Si nificance to Plant Desi n Construction or 0 erations Maintenance personnel without the necessary experience may not possess functional skill levels required to perform maintenance on
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mechanical co'mponents.
Improperly performed maintenance could lead to unexpected component failure or equipment damage.
Personnel records may not reflect actual qualifications of maintenance personnel'.
Assessment of Safet Si nificance The inspector reviewed the qualification records on three of four individuals named above.
The fourth individual had left the Maintenance Department.
Of the rem'aining three individuals one had been hired as a helper and was not required to meet ANSI 3.1 requirements until promoted to the "journeyman" level..
The other two individuals were hired as "journeyman" mechanics and were required to meet the requirement to have "three years of working experience in one or more crafts" as required by ANSI 3.1, 1978 paragraph 4.5.3 "Maintenance Personnel".
Both of these individuals exceeded the work experience requirement:
one had two years of military and four years in'dustrial experience as a mechanic, and the other had 27 months as a welder and 15 months as a heavy equipment mechanic.
In addition to the above individuals, the inspector selected a sample of approximately 10$ of all craft workers in the Maintenance Department and reviewed their qualification records.
A total of thirty records were reviewed.
The inspector also reviewed Maintenance Department Directive
which established the minimum requirements for selection and qualification of maintenance personnel.
In reviewing the qualification records, the inspector noted that several individuals had been hired into the mechanical and electrical sections as helpers.
ANSI 3.1, 1978 states that "individuals in training or apprentice positions are not considered technicians or maintenance personnel for purposes of defining qualifications in Section
'Qualification', but are permitted to perform work for which qualification has been demonstrated".
These individuals must meet the ANSI requirements before they are promoted to a "journeyman" level.
Five individuals in the sample group were hired as helpers and four of the five had been promoted since being hired. oAll four had met the experience requirement before promotion.
Of the remaining 25 individuals in the sample, the qualification records indicated that all the individuals met the requirements of ANSl 3.1, 1978.
The inspector reviewed PVNGS Manual Procedure 30AC-9ZZ04
"Housekeeping" which states,
"The supervisor of a work area is responsible for establishing and maintaining specific levels of housekeeping... in his assigned area".
Zone V procedure requirements include "maintain shop and work areas in a clean and orderly manner so that routine accumulation of waste materials will not affect efficiency and quality".
In discussions with Maintenance supervisors and management, the inspector was told that cleanup and sweeping floors was part of a journeyman's job.
Certain areas are designated by procedure to be maintained by the craft group that
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inhabited the area.
Since the journeymen swept'floors, the helpers also swept floors and cleaned up after a job was completed.
Maintenance management felt that by 'being'responsible for cleaning
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up after themselves the journeymen
'and, helpers produced less waste and performed a more professional appearing work effort.
The inspector noted that the records contained the required information, but the records were occasionally informal (e.g.,
initials rather than signatures).
The licensee's QA department had also reviewed these records, reached similar conclusions, and two Quality Assurance observations (QAQ 85-79, QAO 85-82)
and a
Corrective Action Request (CAR 86-130)
had been generated addressing the conditions of records in the Maintenance Department.
Staff Position The allegation that (1) nuclear plant mechanics had been hired who did not have the required experience as set forth in ANSI 3.1, 1978 was not substantiated; (2) time helpers spent sweeping floors was credited as work experience was substantiated; (3) maintenance personnel qualification records were questionable, was substantiated.
The time spent by the helper in cleaning up was considered to be part of the assigned job, and the maintenance of the Shop work area cleanliness are normal duties expected of an employee of that craft.
The personnel qualification records contain the required information, however the QA organization has identified record keeping practices that could be improved.
No evidence of incorrect or erroneous information was noted.
None.
15.
Personnel Error Instances of significant personnel error have been topics of previous discussions with licensee management and in two cases resulted in the issuance of Notices of Violation by the NRC.
The licensee's response to the most recent Notice of Violation included actions which would be taken to correct the problem of personnel error and stated that program
'rovisions would be in place and implemented by October 1, 1986.
Three additional instances of personnel error have occurred subsequent to that response, but prior to October l.,
On September 3, 1986, during the performance of a surveillance test on the balance of plant engineered safety features system, a control room essential filtration system actuation occurred when an operator failed to reset a trip signal before removing a channel from bypass.
On September 18, the licensee identified the failure to perform all of the required surveillance tests following the performance of maintenance on a reactor trip breaker undervoltage coil.
This omission was identified N
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during the licensee's final package review several days after restoring the breaker to operation.
The subsequent testing was completed satisfactorily.
On September 26, 1986, the turbine driven pump room was'illed with steam when an auxiliary feedwater actuation signal was received during a reactor trip from low steam generator level.
The steam was released to the room through two open one-inch bypass valves around excess flow valves in the steam trap system, because an operator had previously failed to close the valves after draining the condensate line.
Qhile all equipment operated as required, entry into the room was delayed.
Even though the licensee informed the NRC that the corrective action's were scheduled to be in place by October 1,
1986, in view of these repeated errors the inspector reemphasized the need for both expediting the program implementation and monitoring its effectiveness.
The licensee responded positively to the comments.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
The inspector met with licensee management representatives periodically during the inspection and held an exit on October 9, 1986.
The scope of the inspection and the inspector's'findings, as noted in this report, were discussed and acknowledged by the licensee representative I I
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