IR 05000528/1986010
| ML17299B225 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 04/18/1986 |
| From: | Miller L, Sorensen R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17299B224 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.C.7, TASK-1.C.8, TASK-1.G.1, TASK-2.E.3.1, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-TM 50-528-86-10, 50-529-86-10, 50-530-86-08, 50-530-86-8, NUDOCS 8605050410 | |
| Download: ML17299B225 (12) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.:
50-528/86-10, 50-529/86-10, 50-530/86-08 Docket Nos.:
50-528, 529, and 530 L'icense Nos.:
NPF-41 and NFP-46 Construction Permit No.:
CPPR-143 Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P. 0. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 and
Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection conducted:
March 10-28, 1986 Inspector:
R.
C. Sorensen, Reactor Inspector Date Signed L. F. Miller, Jr.,
hief Reactor Projects Section
Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on March 10-28, 1986 (Re ort Nos. 50-528/86-10, 50-529/86-10 and 50-530/86-08)
Areas Ins ected:
Unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector of TMI Action Plan Items in Units 2 and 3, preoperational test program implementation in Unit 3, and Licensee Event Reports (LER's) in Units 1 and 2.
NRC Inspection Procedures 25401B, 30703, 90712, 71707 and 70302 were covered during this inspection.
Results:
Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie ~
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DETAILS a.
Arizona Nuclear Power Pro ect (ANPP)
+T. Shriver, Compliance Manager R. Ozment, Startup Administration Manager
- T. Bradish, Compliance Supervisor
- R. Ferguson, Startup Compliance b.
Combustion En ineerin (CE)
Crawford Fountain, CE Test Results Review Group (TRRG) Member The inspector also talked with numerous other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
- Denotes those individuals attending exit meeting of March 21, 1986.
2.
TMI Action Plan Items (Closed) I. NSSS Vendor Review of Power Ascension and Emer enc Procedures This item provided guidelines for the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS)
vendor (Combustion Engineering at Palo Verde) to review the power ascension test procedures and emergency procedures to further verify their adequacy.
At Palo Verde, Combustion Engineering (CE) provided the power ascension test procedures, in draft form, to be performed on the NSSS they supplied.
They were reviewed and revised by the licensee, and reviewed again by CE to resolve licensee comments.
The procedures to be used in Unit 2 were essentially the same as those
'hat were used in Unit l.
However, lessons learned during the conduct of these procedures in Unit 1 were incorporated as improvements to the procedures to be used in Unit 2 and again in Unit 3.
In addition, CE had a full voting member, and an alternate, on the Test Results Review Group (TRRG).
The TRRG provided the review and approval function for post fuel load test procedures and the results of these test procedures.
The inspector concluded that the NSSS vendor at Palo Verde was sufficiently involved in the development and performance of power ascension test procedures.
The inspector previously verified that CE reviewed the licensee's emergency procedures for adequacy as documented in Inspection Report 84-42.
This item is closed for Units 2 and ) l Q )
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(Closed) II.E.3.1 Emer enc Power for Pressurizer Heaters This item directed licensees to install the capability to supply emergency power to a sufficient number of pressurizer heaters and associated controls to establish and maintain natural circulation in hot standby.
The inspector reviewed applicable drawings and examined installed hardware in the" Unit 2 control room.
The inspector determined that there were 150 kw of pressurizer heaters capable of being supplied from each diesel generator.
Control power for these heaters was also supplied from the diesel.
Also,',the heaters, were load shed during a safety injection and were manually reconnected to the diesel busses, which were recommendations established in NUREG-0737.
To determine if the licensed operators were trained in the operation of the emergency heaters, the inspector interviewed two licensed operators in Unit 2.
Both appeared to be knowledgeable in this area.
The inspector was satisfied with the licensee's implementation of this item. This item, is closed for Units 2 and 3.
(Closed) II.F.1.2E Containment Water Level Monitor e
This item required licensees to install a continuous indication of containment water level in the control room. 'll that remained from this item was for the licensee to preoperationally test the containment wide range water level indication.
This was accomplished for both channels, per procedure 36ST-9ZZ05.
Both channels were operable per Technical Specifications at the time of the inspection.
This item is closed for Unit 2.
(Closed)
I.C.S Pilot Monitorin of Selected Emer enc Procedures This item required licensees to correct emergency procedures as necessary, based on an NRC audit of selected plant emergency procedures.
As documented in Supplement 6 to the PVNGS Safety Evaluation Report (SER),
NRC has determined that a pilot monitoring review of selected emergency procedures was not required for licensing Palo Verde UNit 2 and 3 because the licensee developed emergency procedures-'per Action Plan Item I.C.1.
Therefore, this item is closed for Units 2 and 3.
(0 en) I.G.1 Trainin Durin Low-Power Testin n
This item required licensees to define and commit to a special low power test program to provide meaningful technical information and supplemental training.
The licensee committed to providing licensed operator training on their plant specific simulator in natural circulation operations in addition to
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normal training on the simulator.
In addition to conducting the normal startup test program, the licensee also committed to conducting a Loss of Offsite Power Test and a Total Loss of Flow Test from 80X Power with Natural Circulation Verification Test.
These tests would be used to verify and update the simulator's natural circulation model.
Retraining on the simulator would be conducted following this verification and updating.
The inspector reviewed the lesson plans for both simulator training and classroom training in natural circulation cooldown operations.
The training provided appeared to meet the commitments stated in the PVNGS Lessons Learned Implementation Report (LLIR).
The inspector reviewed the training records for a sample of licensed operators at PVNGS to determine if the operators had received this training. It appeared to the inspector, based on the licensee's list of licensed operators, that all of them had received it.
This completed 'the licensee's commitments to be implemented prior to exceeding 5X power.
Special natural circulation testing committed to had been completed as part of first-of-a-kind plant startup testing in Unit l.
However, incorporation of test data into simulator training and retraining of licensed operators had not yet occurred at the time of the inspection.
This item will remain open for all three units until these actions are completed (forecast by the licensee to be completed by December, 1986).
(Closed) II.F.2 Instrumentation for Detection of Inade uate Core Coolin The licensee was required to install a primary coolant saturation meter and other post-accident monitoring instrumentation in the control room as aids to operators in detecting inadequate core cooling.
These systems had been extensively examined previously in Unit l and found to have been satisfactorily installed,. tested, and operated, as documented in, Inspection Report 85-07.
The inspector verified installation of these systems,,in Unit 2 by examining indicators for these systems'in the Unit 2 control room with the assistance of a licensed operator.
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Separate indications were provided for primary coolant saturation and for the Reactor Vessel Level Mea'surement System (RVLMS).
However, the primary indication for thes'e systems and for Core Exit Thermocouples, was located on the Qualified Safety Parameter Display System (QSPDS).
Two channels of QSPDS were provided, each with the above indications available for display.
The inspector questioned the accompanying licensed operator concerning his knowledg'e of information available from'SPDS.
He appeared to be adequately knowledgeable.
A review was conducted by the inspector of the completed QSPDS preoperational test procedure (36ST-9ZZ09 for Channel A and 36ST-9ZZ10 for Channel B).
No violations or deviations were identifie '
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The licensee appeared to have satisfactorily implemented the guidelines of this TMI Action Plan Item.
This item is closed for Unit 2.
3.
Preo erational Test Pro ram Im lementation in Unit 3 Two the separate aspects of startup testing administration were examined by inspector.
a.
Document Control The inspector selected a small sample of drawings used by startup test personnel to verify that the revisions and drawing change notices (DCN's) against the drawings were current with the Daily Notification Log (DNL).
The DNL was a list of drawings issued daily to document control personnel to ensure drawings were updated to reflect the latest DCN's and revisions.
The inspector then selected a small sample of vendor technical manuals used by startup test personnel and compared the revisions contained in them to the Supplier Document Register (SDR).
The SDR was a listing of all vendor supplied technical manuals with the latest revisions.
It was issued weekly to document control personnel to ensure technical manuals were current.
Finally, a small sample of recently approved preoperational test procedures were examined to verify that the review and approval of these procedures was conducted in accordance with the governing administrative control procedure.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Desi n Chan es The inspector interviewed key personnel in the startup department involved with implementing design changes, and reviewed applicable documentation to determine how design change packages (DCP) were processed during preoperational testing.
The inspector verified that systems that had DCP's implemented were retested by reviewing the Discipline Test Schedule (DTS).
The DTS was a schedule that tracked the status of all preoperational tests and was updated on a weekly basis.
The Principal Startup Engineer (PSE)
was responsible "for initiating the authorizations to implement DCP's in the system he ha'd responsibility for and determining the retest requirements.
DCP's were placed on a Master Tracking System,(MTS)
as open items by the DCP group.
The MTS was reviewed several times a week by the PSE who then initiated the authorizations for each DCP.
This was how the PSE was made aware of design changes taking place on systems for which he had responsibilit Itf4
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Licensee Event Re orts (LER's)
t The following LER's were reviewed'and closed.
The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, root causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared to be appropriate, and violations of Technical Specifications had been identified.
Unit i 85-46 85-47-85-51 85-62 85-64-85-68 85-69 85-73-85-77-85-84 85-86 85-87 85-92'-
85-97-86-16 Continuous Fire Watch Requirement Not Met Fire Watch Performed Late Inoperable Charging Flow Paths Automatic Actuation of Control Room Essential Filtration Actuation Signal (CREFAS)
Automatic Actuation of CREFAS ASME XI Quarterly Surveillance Not Performed Inoperable Snubbers in Steam Generator Blowdown System Surveillance Missed During Mode Change Contrainment Purge Isolation Actuation System (CPIAS) and CREFAS While Removing Channel Bypass Inadvertent CREFAS Inadvertent Main Steam Isolation System (MSIS) in Mode
Failure to Identify Surveillance Discrepancy Due to Inadequate Review Personnel Error Results in Termination of Continuous Fire Watch Spurious CPIAS and CREFAS Initiated by a Failure of a Radiation Monitor Computer Card Surveillance Not Performed Within Allowable Time Limit Due to Personnel Error Unit 2 86-03 Log Power Level Channel Check Missed During Surveillance Test 86-04
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Inadvertent Actuation of CPIAS and CREFAS Due to Personnel Error The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1'n March 21, 1986.
The scope of the inspection and the inspector's findings as noted in this report were discusse ~r
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