IR 05000528/1986005
| ML17299B182 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1986 |
| From: | Bosted C, Fiorelli G, Miller L, Zimmerman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17299B181 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-86-05, 50-528-86-5, 50-529-86-04, 50-529-86-4, NUDOCS 8604170268 | |
| Download: ML17299B182 (38) | |
Text
r'S0O<702SS 8Soa02 PDR ADOCY 05000528 PDR Report Nos:'ocket Nos:
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
50-528/86-05, 50-529/86-04 50-528.,
50-529 License Nos: NPF-41; NPF-46 Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.
O.i Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ. 85072-,2034 Ins ection Conducted:
February 3 - March 9, 1986 Inspectors:
R. i rma ior Resident Inspector Date Signed G. 'e i, R ent Inspector Date Signed sted, s
ent Inspector Date Signed Approved By:
Miller, h', Reactor Projects Section
Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on Februar 3 throu h March 9 1986 (Re ort Nos. 50-528/
86-05 and 50-529/86-04)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, onsite, regular and backshift, inspection by the three resident inspectors.
Areas inspected included: followup of previously identified items; review of plant activities; engineered safety system walkdowns; surveillance testing; plant maintenance; power ascension test witnessing; Licensee Event Report followup; Unit 2 operat-ing experiences; Unit 2 license commitments; Deficiency Evaluation Report followup; allegation followup; periodic and special report reviews; and plant tours.
During this inspection the following Inspection Procedures were covered:
30702, 30703)
61700, 61726, 62703)
71707, 71710, 72616, 72624, 92700, 92701, and 93702.
Results:
Of the 13 areas inspected, no violations were identifie I l
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted:
The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted:
Arizona Nuclear Power Pro'ect (ANPP)
R. Adney, Operations Superintendent, Unit 2
- J. Allen, Operations Manager J.
R.
Bynum, PVNGS Plant Manager B. Cederquist, Chemical Services. Manager J. Dennis, Operations Supervisor,.Unit,:1 W. Fernow, Plant Services Manag'er
- J. G. Haynes, Vice President Nuclear Production
'.
E. Ide, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager D. Nelson, Operations Security Ma'nager
- R. Nelson, Maintenance. Manager G. Perkins, Radiological Services Manager J. Pollard, Operatio'ns Supervisor,, Unit 2
- T. Shriver, Comp'li'ance Manager
- L. Souza, Assistant Quality Assurance Manager
- E. E.
Van Brunt, Jr., Executive Vice President R. Younger, Operations Superintendent, Unit
- 0. Zeringue, Technical Support Manager The inspectors also talked with o'ther licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
- Attended the Exit Meeting on March 11, 1986.
2.
Previousl Identified Items a.
(Closed)
Enforcement Item (50-528/85-08-03):
"Ineffective Corrective Action.
Repetitive instances of several Technical Specification time limits being exceeded were identified by the licensee for fire watch roving patrols and Procedure Change Notice (PCN) appro-vals by the Plant Review Board.
The licensee's corrective actions included changing the fire patrols from contractor personnel to plant employees and administratively changing the time limit for fire watch tours from 60 minutes to 40 minutes.
The Procedure Change Review check sheet that is used when procedures are revised was also changed to improve its efficiency.
The inspector reviewed several PCNs and noted the licensee's reviews were accomplished within the Technical Specification allotted tim P
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Similarly, roving fire patrol records were reviewed on a sampling basis by the inspector and were also found to have been performed within the required time frame.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Enforcement Item (50-528/85-26-01):
"Ineffective Corrective Action on LER 85-24."
LER 85-24 identified several fire doors that were not checked locked within the Technical Specification required time in-terval of seven days.
The surveillance procedure used to verify that. the fire doors were in fact locked closed had been changed with a Preliminary Change Notice (PCN), to add the doors which were inadvertently omitted.
However, when the procedure was revised, the FCN was not completely incorporated into the procedure revision.
This caused several fire doors to be left off the surveillance check list.
The licensee's corrective actions included assuring all locked fire doors were added into the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> unlocked fire door surveillance procedure.
Additionally, a review of the station administrative controls was conducted by the licensee to identify steps necessary to prevent the omission of PCNs when procedures were revised.
The inspector reviewed the revised surveillance procedure, and confirmed the consolidation of the fire doors (locked and unlocked) into a single check list.
The inspector also re-viewed the revisions made to 70AC-OZZ02 "Review and Approval of Station Procedures" which give explicit directions on PCN processing, including carrying over any PCNs which may have been issued while the revised procedure was in the review cycle.
This item is closed.
I (Closed) Followu Item (50-528/85-21-02):
"Pire Team Member ualification."
Possible inconsistencies between training records and program requirements for the fire team members was left for further inspection in the areas of fire team staffing, training, and fire protection program changes.
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In November 1985, the fire team member composition was changed from unit staff'hift,'embers to a dedicated fire department.
The new fire 'team members are all certified by a state. agency and, a check of the. new fire team members training records indicated th'at.these individuals have been trained on the Palo Verde station systems.
The inspector's review of the fire team program records for the previous twelve months revealed that no significant changes in the program, other than the change to a dedicated team, had occurred.
This item is closed.
I (Closed) Followu Item (50-528/85-26-05):
"Modification to the Unit 1 Diesel Generator Governor Oil Coolin S stem."
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w fl This item related to a plant modification whi'ch utilized diesel generator ja'cket cooling water instead of spray pond cooling water in the diesel generator governox oil heat exchanger, to improve governor response and prevent overspeed trips.
The inspector observed that this design, change was completed by work orders 116226 and 105774 and"'that the engines were retested satisfactorily.
This modification" was also completed in Unit 2 as, reported in NRC Inspection Report 529/85-27.
The:
modification is also planned for Unit 3.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Followu Item (50-528/85-04-01):
"Review of Ade uac of Auxiliar 0 erator Io s."
I'h The auxiliary operator (AO) log was to be revised and the licensee committed to have an SRO review the logs on a shiftly basis.
The inspector reviewed the revised logs, revised administrative procedure 10AC-9ZZ02 "Conduct of Shift, Operations",
and implementing night order instructions.
The inspector also reviewed the AO shift log and noted that the assistant shift supervisor was reviewing and initialing the logs.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Followu Item (50-528/85-13-01):
"Conduct of Shift 0 eration Procedure Mill Be Revised".
Procedure 40AC-9ZZ02 "Conduct of Shift, Operations" was to be revised to include a statement that the unit log would be the official record of Technical Specification action statement times'he inspector reviewed the procedure and verified that it had been revised to include logging action statement times in the unit log.
This item is closed.
3. Review of Plant Activities a.
Unit
At the start of the reporting period, the unit was at 60$ power with the "B" Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) out of service to replace a cracked pump shaft.
The plant tripped from 60'/ power on February 3, 1986, on low steam generator level-'when the "A",
MFP turbine consol system malfunctioned.
Complications with steam bypass control system operation following 'the trip caused an overcooling of the reactor coolant system (RCS),
and the initiation of the safety injection actuation (SIAS), contain-ment isolation actuation (CIAS), and main steam isolation (MSIS) systems.
All engineered safeguards systems functioned as designed.
A notification of Unusual Event was declared at 12:07 PM and terminated at 1:ll PM.
The reactor was restarted on February 5 and power was increased to 2/ full power and held at that level.until the "B" MFP shaft and turning gear were
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aligned.
The licensee monitored critical parameters in the "A" MFP turbine control system in an effort to locate the malfunc-tion.
An intermittent fault was identified, and the licensee determined that further troubleshooting and repair efforts would be conducted during the upcomi'ng maintenance outage.
Power was raised to 18% on February 7, when the reactor tripped on low steam generator level, while attempting to hold power below 20%,
so that the "greater than 20% check sheets" could be completed.
Prolonged plant operation at the power level where the automatic switch over between the downcomers to economizer feed valves takes place, caused an underfeeding condition to occur and resulted in low steam generator levels.
The plant was restarted on February 8, and power was raised to 100X.
The 100 consecutive hour full power run for commercial declaration was completed February 14, at 2:15 AM.
The plant remained at full power until March 1 when power was reduced to 60% to take a condenser train out of service to repair a condenser tube leak.
The tube was repaired and power increased to 100% on March 3.
On March 4, a bare wire on a steam/feedwater flow strip chart recorder was believed to have shorted to ground and caused a momentary decrease in generator load; reactor power remained nearly constant while the steam bypass control valves
"quick opened,"
then reshut in approximately 15 seconds.
This caused a 400 MWe decrease in generated megawatts.
The plant was returned to full power operation after a defective cable on the recorder was replaced.
The plant operated at full power until March 7 when the unit began a planned shutdown for the annual spring maintenance outage.
During the shutdown, at approximately 20% power, shortly after the "B" MFW pump was secured, the "A" MFW pump experienced a malfunction in the control system similar to that experienced on February 3, causing a low steam generator level condition that tripped the unit.
The unit was cooled down to Mode 5 on March 9 and the annual maintenance outage commenced.
Ma)or activities planned include diesel generator preventive maintenance; containment integrated leak rate testing; reactor coolant pump seal injec-tion piping modification and integrated safeguards system testing.
The outage duration is expected to be about 55 days.
Unit 2 Unit 2 continued in Mode 5 during this inspection period.
Work and test activities involved the completion of surveillance tests, design changes, and corrective maintenance to satisfy the equipment operability requirements for Mode 4 entry.
Plant Tours The following plant areas at Units 1 and 2 were toured by the inspectors during the inspection:
o Auxiliary Building o
Containment Building
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i o The Control Complex Building Diesel Generator Building Radwaste'uilding Technical Support 'Center Turbine Building Yard Area and Perimeter Emergency Operations Facility k
following areas were observed during the tours:
0 eratin Lo s and Records.
Records were reviewed against Technical Specification and administrative control pro-cedure requirements.
2.
Moenitorin Instrumentation.
Process instruments were observed'for correlation between channels and for con-formance with Technical Specification requirements.
observed for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.(k), Technical Specifications, and administrative procedures.
4.
E ui ment linen s.
Valve and electrical breakers were verified to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and by plant lineup procedures for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.
Details of system walkdowns are documented in paragraph 4.
5.
E ui ment Ta in
.
Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specified.
6.
Fire Protection.
Fire fighting equipment and controls were observed for conformance with Technical Specifica-tions and administrative procedures.
7.
Plant Chemist
.
Chemical analysis results were reviewed for conformance with Technical 'Specifications and admin-istrative control procedures.
8.
~Securit
.
Activities observed for conformance with regulatory requirements, implementation of the site security plan, and administrative procedures included vehicle and personnel access, and protected and vital area integrity.
9.
Plant Housekee in
.
Plant conditions and material/-
equipment storage were observed to determine the general state of cleanliness and housekeeping.
Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with
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respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
4.
En ineered Safet Feature S stem Walk Down Units 1 and
Selected engineered safety feature systems (and systems important to safety)
were walked down by the inspectors to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures.
During the walkdown of the systems, items such's hangers, supports, electrical cabinets, and cables were inspected to determine that they were operable, and in a condition to perform their required functions.
The inspectors also verified that the system valves were in the required positi'on and locked as appropriate.
The local and remote position indication and controls were also confirmed to be in the required position and operable.'q U
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I Portions of the following systems were walked down on February 6,
and February 14, 1986.
<
High Pressure Safety Injection" Trains "A" and B".
Low Pressure Safety 'Infection Train "B".
Containment Spray Systems Trains "A" and "B".
Auxiliary Feedwater Systems -Trains "A" and "B".
Diesel Generator'Systems'Trains
"A" and "B".
Unit 2 Portions of the following system were walked down on February 10,
and 25, 1986.
C02 Fire Protection System Halon Fire Protection System Emergency Boration Paths No violations of NRC requirements-or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Testin a
~
Surveillance tests required to be performed by, the Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that:
1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule; 2) a technically adequate procedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests; 3) the surveillance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in the TS; and 4) test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
b.
Portions of the following surveillances were observed by the inspector on the dates shown:
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Unit 1 Procedure 41ST-lDG02 Diesel Generator
"B" Start and Load.
Dates Performed February
41ST-9ZZ18 72ST-9SB02 41ST-1AF01 72ST-9RX11 Unit 2 Routine Surveillance Modes 1-4.
CPC/CEAC Auto Restart.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Test.
COLSS Margin Alarms.
February ll February
'February ll February ll February
Procedure Dates Performed 42ST"2DG01 Emergency Diesel Generator
"A" Start and Load.
February ll The following completed surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspector:
Unit 1 Procedure 41ST"1AF01 Title Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability.
Dates Performed January
February
72ST-9SB02 41ST-1ZZ18 41ST-1DG02 CPC/CEAC Auto Restart Test.
Routine Surveillance Mode 1-4.
Diesel Generator:"B" Started and Load.
February
February
February
February
February
41ST-1CH06 41ST-1CH01 41ST" 1AF02 Diesel, Generator "B!'ay Tank Fuel'Oil Purity Test.
t Charging Pump Operability Test.
Injection Flow Path.
Auxiliary Feedwater'ump Op'erability.
February
February
February
February
October 26, 1985
~ II
41ST-1CP02 Containment Pur'ge Supply and December 20,1985 Exhau'st Valves.
Unit 2 Procedure Title Dates Performed 42ST-.2ZZ19
, Routine Logs.
Surveillance Modes 5-6 January
January
February
42ST-2CH02 42ST-2ZZ16 Boron Injection Flow Paths-Shutdown.
Routine-Surveillance Daily Midnight Logs.
January
February
February
42ST-2ZZ24 Startup Channel High Neutron Flux.
January
February
February
73ST-9ZZ05 Section XI Valve Operability Testing Normal Operations Refueling.
February
73ST-9ZZ07 Section XI Valve Operability Testing.
February
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
6.
Plant Maintenance a.
During the inspection period, the inspector observed and reviewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures, required QA/QC involvement, proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel
,qualifications, and proper retesting.
The inspector verified reportability for these activities was correct.
b.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Unit 1 Descri tion Dates Performed o
Trouble shooting on NSSS ESFAS Aux-iliary relay 'cabinet "A".
February
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Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) "B" shaft alignment,.
Alignment of MFP "B" turning gear.
Control valve testing on main turbine-Procedure 410P-IMT02.
lt February
February
February
Unit o
Trouble shooting'n pressurizer code safety valve position acoustic monitors Work Orders 117086 and 123931 (see p'aragraph c'below).
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Replacement of personnel air lock door upper bearing and grease fitting - Work Order 133320.
,I It Trouble shooting and repair of safety injection valve SI-665 - Work Order 134241.
February
Dates Performed February
February
I o
Installation of charging pump vent system - Work Order 127639.
February
Repair of reactor head vent valve HV-108 - Work Order 136343.
February 19-February
C.
On February 19, 1986, the inspector observed an instrument and controls (ISC) technician working on the Unit '1 pressurizer code safety valve position acoustic monitor instrument.
At the time of observation, a instrument card had been removed and placed on an extension board and reenergized.
An oscilloscope had been attached to the board and testing was ongoing.
The inspector, based upon examining the work order and discussing the circumstances with the technician and both Operations and Maintenance management, determined the technician was working on the correct instrument; however, the work order being used remained open pending completion."of ongoing maintenance on a steam generator acoustic monitor, and did not govern work on the pressurizer, monitors.
Maintenance management's review of this occurrence revealed that neither the technician nor the technician's foreman had performed a detailed review of the work order package prior to the technician commencing work.
This occurrence appeared similar to instances documented in NRC Inspection Report 528/86-02 in which a violation was issued based on ISC technicians failing to follow procedures.
The licensee's response to the violation has not yet been sent to
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the NRC; and licensee management, committed to also addxessinxng this most recent event in the response to that violation.
This item will remain open pending review of the licensee's response letter and inspection followup of the adequacy of the correc-tive actions taken.
(528/86-05-01)
7.
Power Ascension Test Data Review
- Unit 1 The following power 'ascension test. data packages for the 80%
nd Oo
an 10 / plateaus,'hich represent a sizable sample of the performed tests, were reviewed to.confirm the 4'echnical adequacy of the test performance and the administrative adequacy of the post test re-views.
The inspector's review determined that:
the
~ test reviews were performed in accordance with 70AC-OZZ17 "Test Result Review Group."
the test changes were documented within the test package and were in accordance with 70AC-9ZZ16 "Temporary Approved Procedure Change."
all test deficiencies were resolved.
the test results packages reflected the data acquired during testing.
calculations were performed as required.
that the test summaries included the cognizant engineer's evaluation of the test results as compared to the design requirements.
The following test packages were reviewed:
o 72PA-lRX36, Revision 0 - Steady State Core performance Test, 80/.
o 72PA-lRX50, Revi'sion
Variable Tave (Isothermal Temperature Coefficient and Power Coefficient)
Test 100'/.
o 72PA-lRX55, Revision
CPC Static Thermal Power Calibration With CEA Insertion.
o 72PA-1RI16, Revision
o 72PA-lRXll, Revision
- Moveable Incore Detector Check 100/.
Adjustment, of COISS Secondary Pressure I.oss Terms.
o 72PA-1RX35, Revision 1 - Variable Tave (Isothermal Temperature Coefficient and Power Coefficient)
Test 80/.
o 72PA-lSBll, Revision
COLSS/CPC Verification at.
80%%,f
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o 73PA-lMA01, Revision 1 - Unit Load Rejection Test 100$ Power.
o 73PA-lSF05, Revision 0 - Control System Test at 80/ Power.
o 73PA-1ZZ07, Revision 0 - Unit I,oad Transient Test at 100/
Power.
72PA-lSB03, Revision 1 -
CPC Verification.
o 72PA-lRX58, Revision 0 - RCS Flow Measurement 80%.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
8.
Licensee Event Re ort (LER) Followu
- Unit 2 a
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b.
(Closed)
LER 529/85-02:
"Received Essential Filtration Actua-tion While Troubleshootin A Radiation Monitorin Unit".
This report documented the inadvertent actuation of the balance of plant train "B","'control room essential filtration system while troubleshootin'g a radiation. monitor unit. The cause of
,the 'event was determined to be the'alfunction of the low voltage power supply'to the radiation detector.
This condition was repaired and the channel satisfactorily tested.
(Closed)
IER 529/85-'06:<"Received Containment Pur e Isolation Actuation Due To 0 erator Error".
j The report documented the inadvertent actuation of the train
"A",
containment purge isolation actuation system which in turn tripped the other train.
The actuation was the result, of an improper'reset" by a control room operator.
The inspector confirmed the operator was recounselled on the importance of proper use of procedures.
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(Closed)
LER 529/86-05:
"Essential Filtration Actuation Due To Inade uate Control Of A Modification On Vital Power".
This report documented the inadvertent actuation of the control room essential filtration system due to the loss of power to the radiation monitoring unit when the fuses blew on the "A" inverter supplying power to the radiation monitoring unit.
The blown fuses were attributed to a grounding jumper used to discharge a capacitor in the inverter circuit,.
The jumper, used as a personnel safety action, was not removed following work on the inverter, causing repetitive. power transfers which resulted in the blowing of the fuses.
The licensee could not conclusively confirm the specific maintenance job which in-volved the use of the grounding jumper; however, the investiga-tion did identify one job which called for the use of a grounding jumper of a different resistance rating.
The immediate corrective action included the repair and retest-ing of the inverter, and the inspection of the other class IE
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inverters for unauthorized modifications.
Programatic correc-tive action will require the revision of control procedures which will emphasize the removal of equipment modifications prior to putting equipment back into service.
This item is closed for the purposes of this report.
The inspector will followup on the procedure changes to be made (86-04-01).
9.
0 eratin Ex eriences
- Unit 2 a
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Loss of Pressurizer Heaters
- Unit 2 Mhile attempting to draw a steam bubble in the pressurizer on February 15, three of four pressurizer heater banks tripped due to ground faults.
An investigation into the matter revealed that the pressurizer cold calibrated level instrumentation LI-103 was providing an erroneous level reading.
The actual level'as lower than the indicated level.
This abnormal condition was determined to be caused by a partially dry reference leg.
The level indication of 43't, was estimated to be actually 18'; the level at which the heaters would begin to be uncovered.
The other level indicators LI-llOX and LI-llOYwere erroneously off scale high.
These two instruments were hot calibrated and also believed to have partially dry reference legs.
The cause for the partially dry reference legs is not conclusively known by the licensee.
One licensee hypothesis was evaporation of the water to the dry nitrogen cover gas.
A check of the pressurizer level instrumentation for proper configuration or leaking valves did not disclose a problem.
Three pressurizer heaters were replaced.
The licensee will modify its operating procedures to include cautions that the three pressurizer level indicators correlate properly prior to drawing a steam bubble.
Cautions relating to proper correlation of steam generator level indications as well as safety injection tank level indications are. also-being incorporated into operating proce-dures.
An evaluation for additional actions to preclude a
similar event are ongoing and will be incorporated into pro-cedures when finalized.
The inspector will monitor the licen-see's actions.,
(86-04-02)
b.
Nitro en Bubble in Unik 2 Reactor Vessel Durin Pressurizer Bubble Draw - Unit 2 tl I
h, On February 28, 1986,'ith Unit 2 in Mode 5, Operations per-sonnel were in the process of drawing a steam bubble in the pressurizer in preparation for entry into Mode 4.
During the process, the operators noted that the pressurizer level changes in response to heater energization, charging pump operation and reactor head venting were more severe than expected.
In addition the amount of gas vented from the reactor vessel head to reactor drain'ank was much'ore than had been expected.
Based on these observations, it was concluded that a gas bubble
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existed in the reactor head.
An analysis of the head gas confirmed the gas to be nitrogen.
The, bubble was estimated by the licensee to be approximately 1260 cubic feet and extended to 77 inches above the top of the hot leg.
The licensee's investigation attributed the source of nitrogen to have'ome from the nitrogen supply used to maintain a cover gas on the pressurizer when in Mode 5.
An initial assumption that it may have been released from-solution as a result of absorption of nitrogen into the primary coolant was readily dismissed, by the licensee, based on gas solubility and tran-sport phenomenon, as well as the fact that. no gas was observed following the sweeping of the steam generator tubes by the reactor coolant pumps.
The exact period of time or valving configuration existing at the time of the introduction of gas into the head is not known; however, there were extended periods of time when the nitrogen manifold valves were left open but connected to the pressurizer with only the solenoid operated vent valves providing isola-tion.
This coupled with the repair and testing of one of the reactor vessel head vent valves is believed to have resulted in nitrogen introduction into the vessel either through valve cycling or valve leakage while the nitzogen manifold supply guard valves were open.
There was low safety significance associated with this in-cident.
The licensee's procedure modifications will include isolating and venting the nitrogen manifold when planned additions of nitrogen to the NSSS are stopped, and minimizing the times when higher nitrogen pressures are used to supply nitrogen to the NSSS for purposes of running the reactor coolant pumps.
The inspector will follow the licensee's actions to preclude recurrences.
(86-04-03)
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Unit 2 license Commitment/Safet Evaluation Re ort Su lement No.
9 Pollowu a
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Emer enc Li htin S stem (License Attachment
Item 5)
The inspector confirmed that this commitment which involved the satisfactory testing of Holophane Modular Emergency Power Stations and approximately 100 wall mounted battery powered lights was completed by the licensee.
This emergency lighting system provides lighting to the remote shutdown rooms, assoc-iated local control stations, and stairwells and corridors throughout the plant.
The inspector confirmed tests were conducted in accordance with test procedure 73TI-9QD01, "Holo-phane Emergency Power Stations" and work orders which iden-tified the battery powered wall units which required testin If
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Reactor Coolant Gas Vent, Valve 2J-RCB-HV-108 Test (License Attachment
Item 2)
'f This commitment. involved the repair and testing of reactor coolant gas vent valve HV-108.
The inspector confirmed this valve was repaired and s'atisfactorily tested in accordance with surveillance procedur'es, 73ST-PZZ05 "Section XI Valve Operabi-lity Testing Normal, Operations",
and 73ST-9ZZ07 "Section XI Valve Operability Testing Refueling".
Additional testing; will be performed in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and,pressur'e.
'The inspector will docu-ment the results, of the diode'
testing in a future NRC inspec-tion report.
Enlar e Pi e Penetration Where The Reactor Coolant Gas Vent Pi in Passes Throu h.The'ressurizer Blowout Panel - (License Attachment
Item 4)
This commitment" involve4 increasing the size of the penetration in the pressurizer blowout panel through which passes a
1 inch reactor coolant gas vent line.'nlarging the hole eliminated the potential for line stresses because of the minimal clearance between the pipe and panel.
The inspector observed that the work had been completed.
d.
Char in Pum H dro en Ventin Test - Safet Evaluation Re ort Su lement No.
Para ra h 5.4.3.
The inspector observed the test involving the venting of gas from the three Unit 2 charging pumps.
The test was conducted in accordance with procedures 73TI-2CH04 "Charging Pump Vent Test" and 42AO-2ZZ50 "Venting the Charging Pumps" and was performed to satisfy the commitment described in paragraph 5.4 '
of the Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement 9.
The initial test was unsuccessful due to a plugged liquid drain line.
The retest was successful and demonstrated the design change, which installed equipment to permit venting from the charging pumps, and the procedures to accomplish the venting were appropriate to accomplish the task.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
ll.
Deficienc Evaluation Re ort (DER) Followu
- Units
2 and 3.
a (Closed)
DER 85-42:
"Burned Wire Insulation in Hi h Process Tem erature Tar et Rock Valves".
This report documented the degraded condition of insulation on the wiring for valves 1J-S6B - 1135 A, B and 1136 A, B.
The insulation had melted due to contact with the stem nut or valve cover.
The wiring is part, of the cabling which provides solenoid coil power and valve position indication.
A survey conducted to determine the extent of potential wire insulation
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damage,was made of other Q Class Target Rock valves.
An additional 8 valves were identified as requiring wire replacement,.
b.
The resolutio'n of the problem involved the replacement of the low temperature rated insulation with a high temperature rated insulated wi're for the 12 valv'es involved.
The inspector confirmed through the review of work orders that the required corrective action had been taken at Unit 2.
This change will be compl'eted at. Unit:1 during the current outage and is also planned for Unit 3.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
DER 85-42: "Diesel Generator Fuel Linka e Lever Sli a e" - Units
2 and 3.,
This report describes a problem involving an overspeed trip of the Unit 2 "B" Diesel Generator.
The trip occurred due to the sluggish operation of the fuel rack which had slipped and rotated on the governor shaft, moving the rack out of its proper position.,
The final resolution of the problem will involve a design change which will use a fuel rack lever having serrations in the clamp area which mesh with the serrations on the shaft.
An interim resolution, which has been completed at both Units 1 and 2, incorporated the use of stronger clamp bolts which are larger and were torqued to a higher value than the"original installation.
The inspector noted that completed work orders and retest documents existed for the changes made to the Units 1 and
diesel generators.
Unit 3 modification will also be made when th'e final design change is issued.
This item is closed.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
12.
Alle ation - RV-85-A-067 a
Characterization:
A former electrician is now in charge of fixing damage incurred to an electrical bus (lack of qualification implied).
Im lied Si nificance to Plant Desi n Construction or 0 era tion:
Although the equipment referred to is non-safety related, improper repair could result in a malfunction which could challenge the start and operation of other plant safety related systems unnecessarily, including the plant protection system.
Assessment of Safet Si nificance:
The electrical repair work referred to was received by the NRC in correspondence from and anonymous person and is related to
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the phase to ground fault on the non-safety related Calvert bus lE-NANA03 at Vnit 1 on October 29, 1985.
The fault resulted in a minor explosion which damaged the bus as well as the housing covers in the immediate location.
Prior to the repair of the equipment, an inspection of the damage was performed by staff engineers from the Outage Management Group (OMG) electrical discipline, as well as the field engineer from the vendor who supplied the, electrical bus equipment.
Following the inspec-tion two repair techniques were provided by the vendor's representative.
The technique chosen was incorporated into a repair instruction which became a part of the work package.
This work package included formal instructions for repair and retest which included instructions from the vendor's represen-tative as well as the use of plant procedure 32MT-9ZZ65 "Main-tenance of Non-Segregated Bus".
The repair work was performed by Arizona Public Service (APS) electrical maintenance.
The repairs were overviewed by the vendor's representative, and the final inspection and tests involved both the vendor's field engineer and representatives from the OMG staff electrical engineers.
I A review of,the qualifications of the personnel supervising the craft indicated that they were qualified to level II of ANSI 45.2.6 1978 "Qualifications of Inspection, Examination, and Testing Personnel. for the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants" which is consistent with maintenance procedure 30GA-OZZ02 "Certification 'and Qualifications".
A review of 4 of the OMG staff engineers showed 3 to have degrees in electrical engineering with many years 'of construction and test experience and a 4th to 'have 23 years of experience in construction and testing 'of electrical equipment and power supply systems.
Staff Position:,
The inspector was unable 'to substantiate the allegation.
Based on a review of documents and discussions with APS staff the bus was considered to have been properly repaired.
Action Re uired:
None.
Characterization:
Corrective Action Report (CAR) 85-0180 was not. responded to.
Im lied Si nificance to Plant Desi n Construction or 0 era tions:
The referenced corrective action report issued by Arizona Public Service (APS) Quality Assurance (QA) department dis-cusses the need for APS to establish in writing the job re-responsibilities and authorities for the Outage Maintenance
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Group (OMG).
This group is involved in directing and co-ordinating much of the corrective and facility change work at.
the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
Failure to respond to the CAR could result in avoidable admin-istrative problems regarding the efficient delineation of maintenance task responsibilities at the site.
Assessment-of Safet Si nificance:
A review of the status of the followup actions recommended by the corrective action'eport indicated that.
APS policy docu-ments and project procedures delineating the responsibilities and functions'f the OMG have been developed and are in the final stages of the approval process.
Upon issuance of the procedures APS QA will close out corrective action report 85-0180.'he implementation of the corrective action report
'ollowup by APS was considered consistent with program provisions.
Staff Position:
Xt appears that at the time the concern was presented to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, APS had not completed all of the action needed to close out the corrective action report.
This status was known to APS QA and was being tracked as an open item.
Based on a review of the draft documents and discussions with APS staff, the resolution of this matter appears imminent.
Action Re uired:
None.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
13.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts - Units
and 2.
~f Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspector.
Unit 1 o
Notification of'nusual Event on December 9,
1985.
"o Monthly Operating'Report,for January, 1986.
Unit 2
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Monthly Operating Report for January, 1986.
This review included the following considerations:
the report contained the information required to.be reported by NRC require-ments; test results, and/or supporting information were consistent
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with design predictions and performance specifications; and the validity 'of the reported information.
No violations of,NRC requirements'r deviations were identified.
The inspector met with licensee management representatives period-ically during the inspection and held an exit on March 11, 1986.
The scope of the inspection and the inspector's findings, as noted in this report, were discussed and acknowledged by the licensee representative it C
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