IR 05000528/1986002
| ML17299B088 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 02/07/1986 |
| From: | Bosted C, Fiorelli G, Miller L, Zimmerman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17299B086 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-86-02, 50-528-86-2, 50-529-86-02, 50-529-86-2, NUDOCS 8603130013 | |
| Download: ML17299B088 (26) | |
Text
B*03i30013 86022i'DR ADOCK 05000528
PDR U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos:
50-528/86-02, 50-529/86-02 Docket Nos:
50-528, 50-529 License Nos:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P. 0.
Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ. 85072-2034 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 8 2 Ins ection Conducted.
December
19 5 -
ebruary 2, 1986 Inspectors:
R.
n, Qe o
e den nspector Date Signed 2-7-t',
Approved By:
G. i C.
s Resi pe I
e t, Date Signed A- /-Fb Date Signed z;Z-r~
L.
1i e
, Chief, ea tor Projects Section
Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on December
1985 throu h Februar
1986 (Re ort Nos. 50-528/86-02 and 50-529/86-02)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, onsite, regular and backshift inspection by the three resident inspectors (Unit 1 - 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />; Unit 2 - 75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> including 23 back shift hours).
Areas inspected included:
followup of previously identified items; review of plant activities; engineered safety system walkdowns; surveillance testing; maintenance; power ascen-sion test witnessing; personnel errors; Licensee Event Report followup; periodic and special report review; and plant tours.
During this inspection the following Inspection Procedures were covered:
56700, 61700, 61726, 71707, 71710, 72302, 90713, 92700, 92701, 93702 and 94703.
Results:
Of the ten areas inspected, one violation was identified.
(Instrument and Control testing error - paragraph 10.)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted:
The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted:
Arizona Nuclear Power Pro ect (ANPP)
R. Adney, Operations Superintendent, Unit 2
< J. Allen, Operations Manager J.
R.
Bynum, PVNGS Plant Manager B. Cederquist, Chemical Services Manager W. Fernow, Plant Services Manager R.
Gouge, Operations Supervisor, Unit 1
>'< J.
G. Haynes, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
>'. E. Ide, Corporate equality Assuran'ce Manager J. Minnicks, Instrumentation and Control Maintenance Supt.
D. Nelson, Operations Security Manager R. Nelson, Maintenance Ma'nager G. Perkins, Radiological Services Manager J. Pollard, Operations, Supervisor, Unit 2 L. Souza, Assistant equality 'Assuranc'e Manager
>> E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., Executive'Vi'ce Presi.'dent R. Younger, Operations Superintendent, Unit 1 O. Zeringue, Technical Support,'Manage'r
)
The inspectors also talked with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of'the inspection.
>"Attended the Exit Meeting'n February,4',
1986.
k 2.
Previousl Identified Items,,
a.
(Closed) Enforcement Item (50-528/85-08-01):
Essential Ventila tion S stem Ino erable Control Building doors J-317 and J-319 were propped open causing both control room essential -filtration systems to be inoperable.
The inspector verified th'at:
1)
a night order was issued to control room personnel describing the control build-ing ventilation requirements; and 2) permanent signs were attached to the doors that remind personnel to maintain the doors closed except for personnel passage.
This item is considered closed.
b.
(Closed) Enforcement Item (50-528/85-08-02):
Boration Flow Path Im ro erl Established The "A" high pressure safety injection pump was credited as a
portion of the designated boration flow path without having been tested in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler
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and Pressure Uessel Code as required by Technical Specifications.
I The inspector verified through log reviews that the 'boration flow path is logged daily.
,The inspector','also reviewed proce-dures 41AO-1ZZOl "Emergency Boxation" and,41ST-1CH02
"Boron Injection Flow Path - Shutdown",
and verified that reviews have been entered to provide improved'guidance to the Operations staff in ensuring boration flow path operability.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Enforcement Item (50-528/85'-'04-02):
Maintenance Failed to Remove Ta s Followin Maintenance Several instances we'e identified where "Mainten'a'nce Required" tags were not removed from equipment, following the completion of work.
This led to a condition where the outdated tag could cause plant operators to believe that a work request had alxeady been submitted, thereby having the potential to delay repair of defective equipment.
The inspector reviewed revised maintenance department instruc-tions which required the mechanic or technician to remove the
"Maintenance Required" tags and return them with the completed work package.
A sampling verification of maintenance tags during plant tours did not identify any further problems.
The inspector also reviewed the miniature caution tags used in the control room to identify control room indicator deficiencies, and found them to be current.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Ins ector Followu Item (50-528/85-04-03):
Assessment of Procedural Adherence.
Procedural adherence was previously observed by the inspector to be in need of management attention in the areas involving the use of "N/A" in procedural steps and the signing of steps for placing controls in automatic when they were left in manual.
The inspector verified that a department guideline has been implemented and that shift supervisors have been instructed in the approved manner to effect one time only changes to the procedures.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (529/85-44-01)
Instrument/Control Maintenance and Testin Errors This item relates to a series of personnel errors involving instrument/contxol activities.
A subsequent error which occurred on January 24, 1986, resulted in the inadvertent activation of the Unit 2 containment purge isolation system and the control xoom emergency ventilation system due to the'ailure of the technician to test the proper equipment.
This matter is discussed in paragraph 10 of this report.
Based on
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this new event, the unresolved item is now considered to be a
violation of regulatory requirements.
This item is assigned a new followup number in paragraph 10.
This item number is closed (superseded)
for tracking purposes.
3. Review of Plant Activities a
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The unit was at 100/ power at the'start of the, inspection period.
The plant remained" at approx'xmately 100/ power until January 7 when the 100/ load. rejection test;(pith the re'actor power cut back system (RPCS) ave.labl,e)
was jerformeg.," 'Reactor power decreased to approximately 4P/ during,,the 'successful test; the turbine generator was'q'uickly, re-synchronized to the grid, and power was returned to 100'g.,
lTLe bnit rema'ined at full power until the turbi'ne'rip hest,"(without the"RPCS available)
was performed on January;,9,->>, During that'est, immediately following the, manually initiate'd turbine generator trip, the plant lost power to the non-cia'ss 1E electrical loads, when the automatic fast transfei circuit blocked the transfer from the auxiliary transformer to the startup transformer.
This was due to a frequency mismatch between the generator output and the off site power'rid';-
The reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) deenergized, resulting in'a reactor trip on low DNBR (anticipated low RCP flow); the steam bypass control system (SBCS) quick opened, then closed on the loss of power; and, one main steam safety valve lifted.
After the operators restored non-class lE power, the SBCS valves opened to various positions between 30/ and 100/ full open.
A low steam generator pressure resulted, causing a main steam isolation system (MSIS) actuation that shut the main steam isolation valves, stopping the minor cool down.
After condi-tions were stabilized, the plant, remained in hot standby conditions while corrective actions for several problems identified during the transients were implemented.
b.
Unit 2 Unit 2 entered Mode 5 on January 4, 1986.
Activities during the period included the installation of the core internals, vessel head, incore instrumentation and the completion of final vessel head connections for plant equipment required for Mode 4 ~
Parallel activities involving design change completion and surveillance testing were also carried out in preparation for initial entry into Mode 4.
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Plant Tours The following plant areas at Units 1 and 2 were toured by the inspector during the course of the inspection:
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Auxiliary Building Containment Building Control Complex Building Diesel Generator Building Radwaste Building Technical Support Center Turbine Building Yard Area and Perimeter The following areas were observed during the tours:
0 eratin lo s and Records.
Records were reviewed against Technical Specification and administrative control pro-cedure requirements.
2.
Monitorin Instrumentation.
Process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for con-formance with Technical Specification requirements.
3.
observed for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54. (k), Technical Specifications, and administrative procedures.
4.
E ui ment lineu s.
Valve and electrical breakers were verified to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and by plant lineup procedures for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.
5.
E ui ment Ta in
.
Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specified.
6.
7.
Fire Protection.
Fire fighting equipment and controls were observed for conformance with Technical Specifica-tions and administrative procedures.
Plant Chemistr
.
Chemical analysis results were reviewed for conformance with Technical Specifications and admin-istrative control procedures.
8.
During the inspection period, the Unit 2 primary coolant chloride concentration'xceeded the Technical specifica-tion limits on three occasions.
Corrective actions were taken as required and the chloride concentrations reduced to acceptable limits in each case.
The'icensee is currently evaluating this problem in order to determine the source o'f the chlorides.
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Activities observed 'for,conformance with regulatory requirements, implementation of the, site security plan, and administrative procedures included
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vehicle and personnel access, and protected and vital area integrity.
9.
Plant Housekee in
.
Plant, conditions and material and equipment. storage were observed to determine the general state of cleanliness and housekeeping.
Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
4.
En ineered Safet Feature S stem Walk Down Selected engineered safety feature systems (and systems important to safety)
were walked down by the inspector to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures.
During the walkdown of the systems, items such as hangers, supports, electrical cabinets, and cables were inspected to determine that they were operable, and in a condition to perform their required functions.
The inspector also verified that the system valves were in the required position and locked as appropriate.
The local and remote position indication and controls were also confirmed to be in the required position and operable.
Unit 1 Portions of the following systems were walked down on January 8,
and January 9,
1986.
High Pressure Safety Injection Trains "A" and B".
Low Pressure Safety Injection Trains "A" and "B".
Containment Spray Systems Trains "A" and "B".
Auxiliary Feedwater Systems Trains "A" and "B".
Diesel Generator Systems Trains "A" and "B".
Fire Suppression System (Fire Pump Building) and Storage Tanks Unit 2 Portions of the following system were walked down on January 7 and January 8,
1986
'iesel Generator Air Start Systems Trains "A" and "B" Diesel Generator Day Tank Fuel Oil Supply Systems Trains "A" and "B" low Pressure Safety Injection System Train "B", Emergency Boration Path No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Testin
- Unit 1 a
kf Surveillance tests required to be performed by the Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed on a samplinq basis to verify
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that:
1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule; 2)
a technically adequate procedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests; 3) the surveillance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in the TS; and 4) test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
b.
Portions of the following surveillances were observed by the inspector on the dates shown:
Procedure Descri tion/Dates Unit 1 36ST-9SB02 Plant Protection System Monthly Function Test, performed on January 13, 1986.
41ST-1RC02 RCS Water Inventory Balance, performed on January 14, 1986.
Unit 2 36ST-9SB03 73ST-9CL04 Plant Protection System Calibration, performed on January 6,
1986.
Jl Containment Air Lock Overall Leak Test, perform-ed on January 23, 1986.
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The following inspector:
completed surveillance tests were reviewed by the Procedure Descri tion/Dates Performed Unit 1 72ST-9SB02 CPC/CEAC Auto Restart Check, performed on January 6,
1986 73ST-9ZZ01 Section XI Safety and Relief Valve Testing (valves V554, V561, V572 and V579) performed on January 11, 1986.
CWO 128988 including cali-bration of pressure gages JDA-458(9)
and dead-weight tester JAA-0105.
41ST-1ZZ16 Routine Daily Midnight Logs, performed on January 7,
1986.
41ST-1ZZ18 Routine Surveillance Log Mode (1-4), performed on January 7,
1986.
41ST-1ZZ23 CEA Position Verification Checks, performed on January 6,
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41ST-1RC02 RCS Water Inventory Balance, performed on January 5, 1986.
Unit 2
72ST-2RX09 Shutdown Margin, performed"on January 2, 5, and 6, 1986.
Jl 42ST-2ZZ16
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Routine Surveillance Daily Midnight: Logs, performed on December 29, 1985, and January
and 6, 1986.
C 42ST-2SE01 Source Range Flux Monitor Channel Checks, performed on December 29 and 30, 1985, and January 2,,and 6, 1986.
42ST-2ZZ19 Routine Surveillance Modes 5-6 I,ogs, performed on December 29 and 30, 1985, and January
through 6, 1986.
No violations of NRC requirements" or deviations were identified.
6.
Plant Maintenance - Unit 1 and
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During the inspection period, the inspector observed and re-viewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures, required QA/QC involvement, proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, and proper retesting.
The inspector verified reportability for these activities was correct.
b.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Unit 1 o
"Plant Protective System timing for CPC/DNBR" (CWO 129093),
performed on January 15, 1986.
Unit 2 o
Installation of Control Element Assembly reed switches (WO 123835),
performed on January 6, 1986.
o Installation of temperature element 162 in Reactor Coolant Pump lB (WO 118605), performed on January 7,
1986.
o Installation of reactor vessel heated junction thermo-couples (WO 114422), performed on January 8,
1986.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identifie *
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Licensee Event Re ort. (LER) Followu
- Unit 1 a'.
(Closed)
LER 528/85-09-00:
Inadvertent Reactor Tri While in Mode 5 I
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Ari inadtver'tent, opening of the reactor trip breakers occurred
,',due,to,technician err'or wkiiLe performing surveillance tests.
A
,pro'cedural'e'ficiency was also identified as a contributing
, factor.
A procedur'e change 'n'otice (PCN) was issued to correct the pro'cedu're deficiency and the technicians were retrained.
Pf tf The inspectors r'evie'wed'-the PCN and noted that the licensee's retrai'ning was effective, in that over the past nine months no similar technician'e'rrors have occurred.
This LER is closed.
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.(Cl'osed)
LER 528/85-18-00 001: Diesel Generator Failure to
,,Start Within Technical S eciXication Time Both diesel generators failed to reach voltage and frequency, within~ the Technical Specification time limits.
A detailed review indicated that this was not a valid test, due to overly conservative test criteria, as well as slow communication between the test initiator and the test timers.
A change in criteria for voltage, frequency, and speed was implemented so that these parameters only need to attain their respective bands, and not to stabilize within these bands.
Under no load conditions, the diesel generators overshoot.
the upper limits before stabilizing within the specified band.
Also, the method used to determine the times was manual performed.
This was changed to the use of strip chart recorders for improved response.
The inspectors reviewed these actions and the results of numerous diesel generator starts from the strip chart data.
No discrepancies were identified.
This LER is closed.
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(Unresolved)
IER 528/85-79-00 Functional and Res onse Time Surveillance Tests Not Acce table In November 1985, the licensee identified that from April 30, 1985 to November 24, 1985, Unit 1 had operated in a condition outside the provisions of Technical Specification 3.5.2.
This condition involved the failure to satisfy the required Technical Specificatj.on 4.3.2 surveillance tests for the "I,oss of Voltage" and "Degraded Voltage" relays in the Class 1E 4160 V electrical busses.
In March 1985, while making preparations to enter Mode 3, calibration and response time surveillance tests were performed on only two of eight "Loss of Voltage" (LOV) relays.
A required functional test was not performed due to a procedural error.
Only two relays of the 16 required by Technical Specification 3.3.2 (eight LOV and eight degraded voltage relays)
were checked due to a misunderstanding within the electrical maintenance engineering group.
The group believed
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that only 10/ of the relays were required to be tested and had setup the surveillance test so that just two relays were tested.
During a review of the surveillance procedure, the licensee determined that the 18 month functional test, had 'not been addressed in the surveillance procedure and during the subsequent, investigation, it was discovered that only the two relays had been tested instead of all 16.
The licensee reviewed the preoperational tests that were performed in October 1983 and November 1984, to determine if these tests could have been used to satisfy the 18 month surveillance requirements.
Xn October 1983, functional tests had been performed on all 16 relays, and response time tests were performed on the degraded voltage relays.
The response times were within the requirements of the preoperational test (35 seconds plus/minus l0/); however, the more restrictive Technical Specifi'cations acceptance criteria (less than
seconds)
disallow'ed four of eight response times.
Only four relays, one on train "B" and three on train "A" were acceptable for consideration in satisfying the surveillance test.
Xn Novemberi1984, all,relays had been calibrated and the respons'e times had been 'measured on the eight LOV relays but not on the'
degraded voltage relays.
By September 1985, the 18 months plus 25/ extension time had expired on the functional and response times tests performed in the October
'1983 preoperational tests.,
.Preliminary indications reviewed by the inspectors indicated that the degraded voltage relays'ime response tests may have not;,been performed as 'required by Technical Specifications 4.3'.2 and the plant changed modes on the following dates:
o April 30,. 1985, entered Mode 3 and operated in Mode 3 until May 16,
, o May 25, 1985, entered Mode 2 for initial criticality, o
June 6, 1985, entered Mode 1 and operated until July 29, o
August 19, 1985, entered Mode 3, o
August 21, 1985, entered Mode 2 and Mode 1 and operated until October 29.
Additional information is required to determine the full extent of the circumstances associated with the matter.
This item will be considered unresolved until this action is completed.
(528/86-02-01)
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8.
Power Ascension Test Witnessin
- Unit 1 Power ascension testing at the 100/ power plateau was observed during the report period.
The 100'/ main feed water pump trip, 100/
load rejection,'nd 100% turbine trip tests were observed.
These tests were conducted under procedures 73PA-1SF10
"Loss of Feed Water Pump at 100/ FP",
73PA-1MA01 "Load Rejection with Reactor Power Cutback System",
and 73PA-1MT02 "Turbine Trip without RPCS".
The feed pump trip and 100/'oad rejection tests were performed satisfactorily,'eeting all the requirements of the test procedure.
Plant conditions were restored by the operators at the conclusion of the test in a'ccordance,,with plant procedures.
The 100% turbine trip without the,,RPCS'available was unsatisfactory.
Conditions not expected t'o'ccur, during the test'ccurred.
A loss of power to the
, non-class electrical loads occurred when the "fast, transfer" system sensed that the 13.8 KV busses SOl and S02 were not synchronized with the off site electrical grid.
This loss of power caused a loss of,reactor coolan't pumps (RCPs), circulating water pumps, and caused the >stea'm bypass control system (SBCS) valves to close.
In a review of 'the RCP flow decrease, it was determined that the time for flow coastdown was less than assumed in the safety analysis.
The licensee's evaluation of this condition determined that dynamic breaking of the RCPs occurred, due to the RCP motors acting as generators while the motor-pump kinetic energy was converted back to electrical energy.
Another problem identified was that the SBCS automatic control de-energized on loss of power and the valves closed.
Upon return of power, the SBCS re-energized in manual operation with set points which the controller had assumed and the valves reopened to these positions.
This resulted in a slight over cooling condition that was terminated, when a main steam isolation system actuation occurred on low steam generator pressure and closed the main steam isolation valves.
During the test witnessing, the inspectors observed that:
o The procedures were used by the test and operations personnel, o
Adequate trained manpower was available, and all involved personnel were briefed before performance of the test, o
Data was obtained that represented conditions which were present in the plant.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Reactor Vessel Level Dro
- Unit 2 On January ll, during the performance of 41ST-2CH02 "Boron Injection Flow Paths - Shutdown",
the reactor vessel was inadvertently lowered eight feet over an approximate two hour time period.
This event occurred when an operator opened low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump recirculation valve UV 669 to the refueling water tank (RWT).
Permission was erroneously given to open this valve along
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with the "A" train high pressure safety injection (HPSX) valve, which the procedure required to be opened as part of the confirmation of one path of emergency boration.
At the time valve UV 669 was opened, the Technical Specification shutdown cooling operation was being carried out by the "A" LPSI train.
Opening of the valve created a path from the reactor vessel to the RWT allowing the reactor coolant to be pumped to the RWT.
The valving error was corrected when an operator noted anomalous pump motor amperage and pump pressure readings due to the level reaching the bottom to the hot leg (suction point of the LPSX pump).
While the incident involved an erroneous valve alignment condition that went unnoticed for approximately two hours, the resultant level decrease in the plant mode which existed at the time did not repre-sent an unsafe condition.
The error however, was recognized by the licensee as a violation of procedure and corrective actions involv-ing staff counseling and the issuance of a report to the shifts for their training were taken.
Past errors by Unit 2 plant operators have been infrequent.
Licensee management was informed that the inspector would continue to trend personnel errors during the implementation. of the routine inspection program and would be sensitive to any degradation of operator performance.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
10.
Instrument/Control Testin Error - Unit 2 On January 24, 1986, during the conduct of surveillance test 36ST-9S$ 01 "Radiation Monitoring System Functional Test Procedure",
an instrument/control technician inadvertently tested the containment purge radiation detection monitor RU-37 function instead of the fuel building radiation detection monitor RU-31 function.
Since the control room staff had been advised that the test, would involve RU-31 and the related channel had been bypassed, the testing of RU-37,caused an inadvertent actuation of the containment purge
'isolation system and a cross trip of the control room emergency ventilation system.~
H This-error "is,the latest of a simil'ar series related to instrument
- and control maintenance'nd testing activities.
These previous exper'iences,-are'documented in NRCinspection report 529/85-44.
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'I Failure':o bypass the radiation detector unit being tested is contrary to procedure requirements, paragraph 6.8.1 of the Technical Specification 'and 1'0 CFR Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and represents a
~ Severity Level IV violation (529/86-02-01).
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts
'I Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspecto l V
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Lg This review included the following considerations:
the report contained the informati'on required"to be reported by NRC require-ments; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the validity 'of the reported information.
Within the scope of the above," the following report was reviewed by the inspector.
o Monthly Operating Report for November 1985.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
12.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is re-quired to determine whether they are acceptable, violations or deviations.
An unresolved item is addressed in this inspection in paragraphs 3 and 7c of this report.
The inspector met with licensee management representatives period-ically during the. inspection and held an exit on February 4, 1986.
The scope of the inspection and the inspector's findings, as noted in this report, were discussed and acknowledged by the licensee representative II