IR 05000528/1986009
| ML17299B270 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1986 |
| From: | Ball J, Bosted C, Fiorelli G, Miller L, Zimmerman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17299B269 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-86-09, 50-528-86-9, 50-529-86-09, 50-529-86-9, 50-530-86-07, 50-530-86-7, NUDOCS 8606100625 | |
| Download: ML17299B270 (38) | |
Text
8606100625 860520 PDR ADOCK 05000528 G
PDR U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report,Nos:
i.
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
Licensee:
,Ins ection Conducte 50-528/86-09, 50-529/86-09, 50-530/86-07 50-528, 50-529, 5'0-530 NPZ 41 ~ NPF 46 ~
CPPR 143 Arizona. Nuclear Power Project P.
O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ. 85072-2034 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 6 3.
March 10, 198
- Ap il 13, 1986
Inspectors:
erman Resi nt Inspector G
or i, R Ins c or C.
o spe J.
a
, Resident Ins e t
$ ~gg+6 Date Signed Date Signed 2.O hb Date Signed Zo g, Date Signed Approved By:
L.
M ler, Chief, Re cto Projects Section
Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on March 10 1986 throu h A ril 13 1986 (Re ort Nos. 50-528/86-09 50-529/86-09 and 50-530/86-07)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, onsite, regular and backshift inspection by the four resident inspectors.
Areas inspected included: followup of previously identified items; review of plant activities; engineered safety system walkdowns; surveillance testing; plant maintenance; pre-operational and startup test witnessing; preoperational test procedure and test results review; followup of feedwater hanger failure; Licensee Event Report followup; startup quality assurance; Unit 2 license commitments; allegation followup; periodic and special report review; and plant tours.
During this inspection the following Inspection Procedures were covered:
30703, 37700)
61700, 61726, 62703, 70302, 70340B, 70540)
71302, 71707, 71710, 72564B, 90713, 92700, 92701 and 93702.
Results:
Of the thirteen areas inspected, no violations were identifie I II J
DETAILS Persons Contacted:
The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted:
Arizona Nuclear Power Pro ect (ANPP)
R. Adney,
+J. Allen, J.
R.
Bynum, B. Cederquist, J. Dennis, W. Fernow,
'>J.
G. Haynes, W. E. Ide, W. Jump, J. Kirby, A. McCabe, D. Nelson, R. Nelson, G. Perkins, J. Pollard,
-T. Shriver, L. Souza,
>'<E, E. Van Brunt, R. Younger,
>"O. Zeringue, Operations Superintendent, Unit 2 Operations Manager PVNGS Plant Manager Chemical Services Manager Operations Supervisor, Unit 1 Training Manager Vice President Nuclear Production Corporate Quality Assurance Manager Startup Manager, Unit 3 Project Transition Manager Assistant, Startup Manager, Unit 3 Operations Security Manager Maintenance Manager Radiological Services Manager Operations Supervisor, Unit 2 Compliance Manager Assistant Quality Assurance Manager Jr., Executive Vice President Operations Superintendent, Unit 1 Technical Support Manager Bechtel Power Cor oration (Bechtel)
'D. Anderson D. Hawkinson, G. Hierzer, T. Horst, W. Murphy, S. Nickell, H. Thornberry, Chief Resident Engineer Project Quality Assurance Manager Field Construction Manager Project Field Engineer Project Superintendent, Unit 3 Project Superintendent Area Project Field Engineer The inspectors also talked, with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
>Attended the Exit Meeting on April 16, 1986.
Previousl Identified Items a.
(Closed) Enforcement item 50-528/85-08-02:
Boration Flow Path Im ro erl Established.
The violation occurred when the "A" HPSI pump was considered operable, but Section XI surveillance testing of the pump had
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not been performed.
The licensee determined that the cause of
, the problem was personnel error on the part of the control room operators.
In addition to emphasizing to the operators the
'need to maintain awareness of the operability status of components; procedures 41AO-1ZZ01 "Emergency Boration" and 41ST-1CH02 "Boration Injection Flow Paths - Shutdown" were revised to provide improved guidance to the operations staff.
'he inspector reviewed the above procedures, and during daily tours has reviewed the boration flow paths listed on the control room status board.
Based on conversations with the operators, the inspector was satisfied that the operators were aware of the status of components in the boration flow path, including the HPSI pump, and were aware of the performance schedule of the surveillance tests which pertain to the flow path components.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Followu Item 50-529/86-04-03:
Review Procedures Related to Controllin the Nitro en Su l to the NSSS.
This item related to a problem involving the presence of a nitrogen bubble in the reactor vessel head believed to have been caused by leaking vent valves that allowed nitrogen to be introduced in the reactor vessel head.
The procedures for Units 1 and 2 were revised to incorporate new precautions which require isolation and venting of the nitrogen distribution header when not in use, and minimizing the use of high pressure nitrogen when it is not used for pressurizer blanketing purposes.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Followu Item 50-529/86-04-01:
Review of Procedures Dealin with Modifications.
This item relates to a problem involving the inadvertent actuation of the control room essential filtration system as as result of a grounding jumper not being removed following work on the "A" converter.
The inspector confirmed that the licensee has modified work controls in its Maintenance Department Directive 05 by including a check sheet to be used when in-stalling jumpers.
This check sheet formalizes the checks to be documented when jumpers are used and requires a second party verification upon restoration.
This item is closed.
(Closed) 'Followu Item 529/85-22-01:
Unauthorized Tam erin of Reactor Controls.
This item involves the investigative followup by APS of a tampering incident which occurred at Unit 2 on July 8, 1985.
The incident was, associated with the unauthorized operation of control switches located in the remote shutdown room.
Licensee followup actions included interviews with a significant number of workers, the taking of polygraph tests of several workers, and the securing of fingerprints by the Maricopa County Sheriffs Departmen I hl Ih
I
The investigative results were inconclusive as to the direct cause of the incident.
Several security and access control programatic improvements were instituted as a result of the incident.
These controls included logging of personnel in and out of critical building areas by security, accounting of personnel to whom keys were issued, posting of additional security personnel, and an increase in patrols.
In addition, the inspector reviewed all of the licensee's investigative reports associated with past, potential tampering events.
The inspector was unable to identify facts associated with the licensee's investigative results which would indicate a possible connection or relationship between the events.
The events listed below are a subset of those reviewed which the
'licensee believed were acts of vandalism or for which investi-gative results were inconclusive.
Although, in general, the investigations were timely and thorough, in several instances the investigative reports lacked cohesiveness in that detailed supporting documentation was not provided, or a management position on the event.
was not evident.
The inspector discussed this matter with plant management, who in turn indicated that a
recent, change consolidating'he security organization should assist in ensuring consistently well detailed investigation reports.
The inspector will review any future tampering events to ensure they are adequately reviewed by the licensee and appropriate action is taken.
o
"
On February 7,
1984, numerous cut cables and wires (approximately.,40 total) were identified at Unit 3 on the 120', 140'nd 160'levations of the Control Building, and 120'levation of the Radwaste Building.
In addition, conduit associated with the local "A" Diesel Generator control panel was found pushed downward and bent.
The licensee performed a detailed followup investigation including polygraph tests.
Although the investigative results were inconclusive, one individual was considered to have deceptive responses during two polygraph examinations.
The individual was denied site access on March 8, 1984, following the initial polygraph results and resigned his position following the second 'polygraph.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was notified by the licensee of this'event.
On March 22, 1984, three cut wires were identified on the 140'levation of the Unit 3 Control Building.
The licensee's investigation was inconclusive as to the cause of the cut wires.
The licensee provided notification of this event to the FBI.
On May 3, 1984, a temporary cable not in use, but available for data acquisition during the hot functional test, was found cut on the 120'levation of the Unit 1
~ Containment.
The licensee's investigation was
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inconclusive as to the cause; however, it was believed not to be an act of vandalism.
o On April 13, 1985, oil was identified to have been removed
'from the outboard bearing reservoir for the "B" turbine cooling water pump.
The licensee's investigation was inconclusive as to what. initiated the draining of the oil.
o On July 31, 1985, a rag was found in a reactor coolant pump breaker arc chute at Unit 3.
The licensee's investigation was inconclusive as to the cause; however, it was believed to be an act of construction mischief.
On October 5, 1985, paper towels were found forced into a Unit.3 charging pump breaker mechanism.
The breaker was
"in a storage area adjacent to the electrical bus at the time.
The licensee's investigation was inconclusive as to
. the cause; however, it was believed to be an act of construction mischief.
0'
On November 18, 1985, a wire was found cut in a disassembled motor operator to a valve located in the AuxiliaryFeedwater Pump Room at Unit 3.
The licensee's investigation was inconclusive as to the cause of the cut wire.
I On January 16, 1986, two wires were found cut in an instrument cabinet located in the outer periphery of the Unit 3 Control Room.
The wires were associated with a flow instrument for 'the essential spray pond system.
The licensee's investigation was inconclusive as to the cause of the cut wires.
o 'n January 18, 1986, a condenser hotwell level recorder cable was found cut in a cable tray located in the lower spr'eading room in Unit 3.
The licensee's investigation was inconclusive as to the cause of the cut cable.
Shortly after the conclusion of the inspection period, on April 23, 1986, a cut wire was found in an engineered safety system cabinet located in the outer periphery of the Unit 3 Control Room.
The licensee's investigation is ongoing; however, preliminary results indicate that the wire was accidentally cut during authorized work.
The inspector monitored the licensee's investigative efforts closely and considered the preliminary results reasonable.
This item will remain open pending the completion of the licensee's investigation and subsequent NRC review (50-530/86-07-01)
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
3.
Review of Plant Activities a.
Unit 1
a The unit was in Mode 5 for the annual, scheduled maintenance outage during the inspection period.
During the inspection period the reactor coolant pump motors
, and seals were r'emoved, the pump seal injection line flanges were modified to reduce leakage, and the seals and motors were reinstalled.
Modification to the safety injection tanks (SITs)
outlet lines was performed to allow recirculation to equalize boron concentrations during normal plant operation.
Local leak rate testing, was also performed on containment system penetra-tions in preparation for'he integrated leak rate test which is
, scheduled to be performed in early May, 1986.
Eighteen month and refueling interval Technical Specification surveillance tests were also performed.
Unit 2 The Unit entered Mode 3 on March 25, 1986.
Plant activities principally consisted of conducting post core hot functional tests which were completed on April 6, 1986, performing sur-veillance tests and completing maintenance work to support entry into Mode 2.
During the period, a satisfactory operational pressure test of the primary coolant system was performed as a followup to the replacement of several pressurizer heaters reported in NRC inspection report 50-,529/86-04.
One inadvertent actuation of the main steam isolation system occurred on March 25, 1986, as a result of a combination of personnel error and procedure deficiency during the performance of a surveillance test. on the system.
Unit 3 Construction completion of Unit 3 is estimated at 98/ by the licensee.
Major preoperational test activities in progress during the reporting period included flushing of the Safety Injection/Shutdown Cooling System, preoperational testing of the Chemical and Volume Control System, Balance of Plant Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Panel testing, and Balance of Plant system testing including a Main Condenser vacuum test.
Plant, Tours The following plant areas at Units 1, 2 and 3 were toured by the inspector:
Auxiliary Building Containment Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Radwaste Building
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Technical Support Center Turbine Building Yard Area and Perimeter The following areas were observed during the tours:
2.
0 eratin Lo s and Records.
Records were reviewed against Technical Specification and administrative control pro-cedure requirements.
k kfonitorin Instrumentation.
Process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for con-formance with Technical Specification requirements.
3.
observed for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.(k), Technical Specifications, and administrative procedures.
4.
E ui ment Lineu s.
Valve and electrical breakers were verified to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and Administrative procedures for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups as documented in paragraph 4 below.
During a tour of the Unit 1 containment,,
the inspector observed a temporary hose connecting the demineralized water header to the drain line between the pressurizer surge sample line containment isolation valves.
The inspector reviewed the related work order and determined that the demineralized water was being used to flush the sample line following an unsuccessful local leak rate test.
The work order did not include restoration steps for removal of the temporary hose.
The licensee representative acknowledged the inspector's comment and added the appropriate restoration steps to be performed following completion of the flush.
The inspector will be reviewed in the future for proper equipment. restoration steps following maintenance activities.
This item is unresolved.
(50-528/86-09-03)
5.
E ui ment Ta in
.
Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specified.
6.
Fire Protection.
Fire fighting equipment and controls were observed for conformance with Technical Specifica-tions and administrativ'e procedures.
7.
Plant Chemist
.
Chemical analysis results were reviewed for conformance with Technical Specifications and admin-istrative control procedure I U
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.~decurit
.
Activities observed for.conformance with regulatory requirements, implementation of the site security plan, and administrative procedures included vehicle and personnel access, and protected and vital area integrity.
9.
Plant Housekee in
.
Cleanliness and housekeeping were observed.
Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
Control and storage of unused anti contamination clothing within the radiological controlled area (RCA) was observed to be disorderly in several locations.
Potentially contaminated items were also observed in trash receptacles that were not marked as contaminated waste.
The inspector informed the radiological supervisor of these deficiencies.
The licensee stated that these deficiencies would be promptly corrected.
The licensee's efforts to minimize the volume of radwaste will continue to be examined as part of the routine inspection program.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
4.
En ineered Safet Feature S stem Walk Down - Units 1 and 2.
Selected engineered safety feature systems (and systems important to safety)
were walked down by the inspector to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures.
During the walkdown of the systems, items such as hangers, supports, electrical cabinets, and cables were inspected to determine that they were operable, and in a condition to perform their required functions.
The inspector also verified that the system valves were in the required position and locked as appropriate.
The local and remote position indication and controls were also confirmed to be in the required position and operable.
Unit
Portions of the following systems were walked down on March 26, 1986.
High Pressure Safety Injection Trains "A" and B".
low Pressure Safety Injection'rain "B".
Diesel Generator Systems Trains "A" and "B".
Unit 2 Portions of the following systems were walked down on March 19, 1986.
Containment Spray Systems Trains "A" and "B".
Chemical Spray Systems Trains "A" and "B".
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identifie r 0'
Surveillance Testin
- Units 1 and 2.
a.
Surveillance tests required to be performed by the Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that:
1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule; 2) a,technically adequate procedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests; 3) the surveillance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in the TS; and 4) test results satisfied accept'ance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
b.
Dates Performed Portions of the following surveillances were observed by the inspector on the dates shown:
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Unit
D~
36ST-1SB01 32ST-'9PEOl PPS Monthly Surveillance Diesel Generator
"A" 18 Month Surveillance March 25, 1986 March 25, 1986 March 26, 1986 Unit 2 Procedure 73ST-9CL03 Containment Air Lock Seal Leak Test Dates Performed March 20, 1986 32ST-9PK03 18 Month Surveillance Test of Station Batteries March 21, 1986 42ST-2RCOl Reactor Coolant: System
- Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown March 28, 1986 42ST-2SG01 Main Steam Isolation Valve Surveillance March 28, 1986 C.
The following completed surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspector:
Unit 1 Procedure Descri tion Dates Performed 32ST-9ZZ04 18 Month Motor Operated Thermal Overload Relay Protection Bypass September 9,
1984 November 14, 1984 32ST-9ZZ34 Battery Charger'urveillance Test November 3,
1984 32ST"9SBOl
',18 Month Surveillance of Reactor Trip February 11, 1985 February 21, 1985
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32ST-9ZZ07 36ST-9SA02 36ST-9SA03 36ST-9SA04 e
32ST-9ZZ34 32ST"9PK04 32ST-9ZZ04 32ST-9ZZ05 32ST-9ZZ06 Unit 2 Procedure Breakers 60 Month Molded Case Circuit Breaker ESFAS Inspection Train
"B" Subgroup Relay Monthly Functional Test ESFAS Inspection Train
"A" Subgroup Relay
Month Functional Test ESFAS Inspection Train
'<<B" and Preventive Maintenance Surveillance Test Subgroup 18 Month Functional Test Battery Charger Surveillance Test 60 Month Battery Capacity Test 18 Month Thermal Overload Bypass Check 60 Month Containment Circuit Breaker'nspection 60 Month Containment 13.8KV Breaker Inspection May 1,
1985 May 13, 1985 May 14, 1985 April 2, 1985 April 8,
1985 March 22, 1985 April 12, 1985 April 4,
1985 November 3,
1984 November 6,
1984 June 24, 1984 September 9,
1984 April 2, 1985 June 24, 1984 September 17, 1984 Dates Performed 32ST-9ZZ01 32ST-9SF02 32ST-9ZZ02 18 Month Containment Penetrations Protective Relay Surveillance Test 18 Month Containment Penetration Conductor Iow Voltage/Overcurrent Protection Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) Circuit Breaker Surveillance Test February 4,
1986 December 18, 1985 November 16, 1985
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32ST-9ZZ74 32ST-9ZZ04 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Surveillance Test 18 Month Motor Operated Valve Thermal Overload Relay Protection and/or Bypass Device Operability October 23, 1985 December ll, 1985 December 17, 1985 32ST-9ZZ34 Battery Charger Surveillance Test November 1,
1985 November 5,
1985 November 6,
1985 November 7,
1985 November 12, 1985 32ST-9SB01 18 Month Surveillance Test February 8,
1986 of Reactor Trip Breakers 42ST-2RC02 Reactor Coolant System March 27, 1986 Mater Inventory Balance 32ST-9PK03 18 Month Surveillance Test March 21, 1986 of Station Batteries 42ST-2ZZ16 Routine Surveillance Midnight Logs March 27, 1986 No The inspector reviewed the surveillance tests that the licensee performed to satisfy Technical Specification surveillance requirement 4.8.4.1 involving the testing of contaiument pene-tration conductor overcurrent protection devices.
The in-spector noted that for both Units 1 and 2, the decision by the licensee that the Technical Specification requirement had been met was based on inconclusive information.
The licensee was ultimately able to locate all of the tests to satisfy the Technical Specification requirement; however, this required extensive time and research.
During this review it was also noted that, for Unit 2 an insufficient number of breakers had been identified to satisfy the testing of the subsequent 10/
sample of breakers required by Technical Specifications, indicating 'a need for the licensee to review the testing program.
Again, sufficient tests were found to satisfy the requirement.
These findings were discussed with the licensee who was informed that future decisions involving the acceptance of tests required to satisfy Technical Specification requirements should be more thorough.
Licensee representatives agreed to evaluate improvements in their review process.
violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
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Startu Testin
- Unit 2.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following tests:
Dates Performed
J
73HF-2SF08 Post Core Control 'Element April 4,
1986 Assembly Drop Time Test 73HF-2SF02 Control Element Drive Mechanism Performance March 12, 1986 73'-2RC09 Reactor Coolant System Flow Measurement March 3,
1986 The inspector verified that approved procedures were used, test personnel were knowledgeable of the test requirements, and data was properly collected.
'Procedure changes and test exceptions were identified'and significant events were recorded in the test log.
Other test related, activities such as the use of calibrated measuring and test, equipment and completion of test prerequisites were also verified to have been accomplished in accordance with administrative control procedures.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
7.
Plant Maintenance - Units
2 and 3.
a ~
During the inspection period, the inspector observed ongoing maintenance and reviewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures, required QA/QC involvement, 'proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, and proper retesting.
The inspector verified reportability for these activities was correct.
b.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Unit
Descri tion Dates Performed Main Condenser Modification Separator/Reheat Valve Repair Reactor Coolant Pump Modification Contxol Room B01 Modification Valve Repacking on Primary Valves March 19, 1986 March 19, 1986 March 19, 1986 March 20, 1986 March 14, 1986 Unit 2 o
Low Pressure Safety 'Injection Seal Repair and Retest - Work Order 0142000.
Dates Performed March 21, 1986 o
Troubleshooting Electrical Ground March 24, 1986
"B" Channel of Plant Protection System - Work Order
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0 Repair Steam Generation Level Narrow Range Instrument - Work Order 8143518.
March 25, 1986 Installation of the Second Reference Leg on Volume Control Tank Level Instrumentation - Work Orders f131916 and
$/141373.
March 14, 1986 Unit 3 Dates Performed o
Destructive testing of three hour rated fire door (G-101) to ensure proper construction.
March 28, 1986 No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
8.
Weld Failure on Pi e Su ort Structure Unit 1 During a snubber surveillance inspection on March 13, 1986, the licensee identified a failed pipe support (1SG-005-H008)
on a 24 inch main feedwater line to the Number 2 steam generator.
The failure occurred at a welded connection between the flanges two I-beams, resulting in a total separation of the two beams.
Licensee metallurgical analysis determined the weld failed due to overloading.
The root cause of,the failure was evaluated by the licensee and Bechtel to have resulted from an imp'roper design consideration of localized flange bending as well 'as inadequate allowance for lateral thermal motion.
As a result of the failure, Bechtel initiated a review of all large bore pipe safety related supports of a similar design.
As a result of that review, modifications to ten additional supports were initiated at all three units.
The modifications primarily consisted of adding stiffeners to the existing support structures.
Further, Bechtel performed a sampling review of small bore pipe safety related supports, and concluded the supports had adequate designs.
This item will remain unresolved pending the inspector's completion of review into the cause of the original support design control
'roblem.
(50-528/86-09)
9.
Licensee Event Re ort (LER) Followu
- Units 1.
a
~
(Closed)
LER 528/85-19:
Reactor Tri on June
1985.
A reactor trip occurred from 19'/ on high Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure following a loss of the operating Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) on low suction pressure.
The "B" MFP was operating, the "A" MFP was being started up, and the "A" Mini Flow control valve was not properly controlling recirculation flow to the condenser.
This caused a low suction pressure trip of the "A" and "B" MFPs.'ollowing the reactor trip, a slight overcooling
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,of the RCS occurred due to automatic opening of the main steam drain valves on the turbine trip.
Licensee corrective actions implemented after the trip included:
o identifying and correcting a malfunctioning electrical board associated with the malfunctioning miniflow control valve.
o initiation of an engineering analysis to determine whether the automatic opening of the steam line drain valves is desired.
o issuance of a night,, order that directed the operators to manua11y shut the steam line drain valves after they open automatically.
b.
The inspector reviewed these actions at the time of occurrence, and later in a review of the post trip review report.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
LER 528/85-24: Failure to Verif Fire Door Position.
Unlocked fire doors were discovered.
on the locked fire door list and were not being inspected every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as required by Technical Specifications'
Procedure Change Notice (PCN) was generated to correct: the problem.
The procedure was subsequen-tly revised to include the PCN.
As a result of followup of this event, Violation 528/85-20-01 was previously issued.
The licensee's corrective actions were reviewed; found acceptable,'nd the violation was closed out in NRC Inspection Report 528/86-05.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
IER 528/85-25:
Lack of Verification of Ade uate Boration In ection Flo ath.
As a result of followup of this event, violation 528/85-08-02
. was previously issued and was closed out in paragraph 2 of this report.
This item is closed.
d..
(Closed)
LER 528/85-28:
Inadvertent Actuation of En ineered Safet Feature (ESF)
S stems.
In Mode 5, while performing surveillance test procedure 41ST-1ZZ20
"Remote Shutdown'Disconnect Switch and Control Circuit Operability", the "B" and "D" battery chargers were not properly returned to service in accordance with the procedure.
This deenergized the "B" and "D" 125V DC buses and,caused the
,inverter pow'ered "B" and "D" 120V AC buses also to deenergize.
This resulted in a 2 out of 4 logic actuation of the reactor
'protective system and ESF systems.
Since personnel error was the 'cause of the event, a caution was added to the procedure to
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verify the correct steps when the battery chargers are taken in and out of service.
The operators were all xetrained on the proper method of.performance of this and similar surveillance tests.
The inspector has reviewed the revised procedure and has
,discussed the training with several operators.
This item is closed.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
93EG-OZZ27 93EG-OZZ28 93PE-3PK01 93PE-3PNOl 93GT-OZZ49 10.
Prep erational Test Procedure Review - Unit 3.
r The-inspector reviewed the following preoperational test procedures for technical and administrative adequacy
Battery System Checkout Battery System Chargers Class lE 125V DC Power System Class 1E Instrument AC Power 4.16 KV and 13.8 KV Switchgear Breaker Control Circuit, Initial Functional Test 93GT-OZZ52 Control Circuit Functional and Energization Test 92PE-3SA01 Balance of Plant (BOP) Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Panel Test The inspector found the procedures provided a clear explanation of the purpose, prerequisites for performance, appropriate sign-off steps, and quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria as required.
During this review, the inspector did find that the 2-hour battery discharge curves used in the testing of the Class lE
, 125V DC Power System were not consistent with the design loads currently contained,in the facility FSAR Table 8.3.6.
The licensee acknowledged these 'inconsistencies and stated that the profiles used were conservative with regard to the above table and were based upon calculations performed by the licensee's contractor which reflect the actual design basis emergency loads.
The licensee committed to submit these curves as an amendment to the facility FSAR.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
11.'rep erational Test Witnessin
- Unit 3.
The inspector witnessed the performance of preoperational testing to verify, that the procedure in use was properly approved and adequate-ly detailed to assure satisfactory performance; test instrumentation required by the procedure was calibrated and in use; work was performed by qualified personnel; and results satisfied procedural acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
The inspector witnessed the performance of portions of the following
'system testing activities:
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Flushing of the. Safety Injection/Shutdown Cooling System.
Reactor Makeup Water, Boric Acid Makeup, and Volume Control Tank Preoperational Testing.
3. 'OP Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Panel Test.
4.
~ Initial Control Circuit Functional Test for Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor Switchgear Cubicle 3-E-PBB-S04S.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Prep erational Test Results - Unit 3 The inspector reviewed the completed test procedures and preliminary test results report for preoperational tests on the following systems:
93PE-3PKOl Class 1E 125V DC Power System 93PE-3PNOl Class lE Instrument AC Power The inspector observed that the procedure test results had been reviewed by two level III test engineers and had been submitted to the Test Working Group 'for initial evaluation.
The inspector noted that test exceptions had been properly documented and had either been resolved or formally issued to engineering for resolution.
Test changes, test data, and summary reports appeared consistent with administrative controls.
The inspector verified on a sampling basis that acceptance criteria either had been met or documented as a test exception for further resolution.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Startu ualit Assurance - Unit2 A review by the inspector of quality'ssurance activities related to startup testing revealed a significant involvement by the quality assurance monitoring group.
Since fuel load over 100 quality monitoring actions have been taken at Unit 2.
Check sheets which identify a series of tasks and confirmations are used in, the moni-toring effort.
Significant problems which are identified are communicated through the issuance of Corrective Action Reports (CARs) and Non Conformance Reports (NCRs).
Minor problems are identified to responsible staff members and are usually closed out within a short time period.
A review of a sample of monitoring reports by the inspector did not reveal any problems.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Facilit License/Safet Evaluation Re ort Followu
- Unit 2.
The following items, which are identified in paragraph 5.4.3 of the facility Safety Evaluation Report, were reviewed by the inspector.
The effort included a combination of work document, test results and
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technical drawing reviews in order to verify completion of the work.
The modifications included in the reviews were:
1.
Testing reactor coolant system gas vent valve 2J-RCB-HV-108 during Mode 3 (Attachment 1, item 2).
(This action also closes TMI item II.B.1.)
2.
Powering valves CH 501 and CH 536 powered from a Class lE motor control center.
3.
Automatic realignment of the charging pump suctions to the Refueling Water Tank gravity feed line via valve CH 536 on lo-lo Volume Control Tank level and a loss of off-site power.
4.
Installation of a separate reference leg on the second Volume Control Tank level transmitter.
One level transmitter uses a
dry reference leg and, one uses a wet reference leg.
Also a signal,comparator was added to provide an alarm in the Control Room when a level difference of 6 inches exists between the level transmitters.
In addition, the following commitments made by the licensee were confirmed by the inspector to have been completed:
1..
Performance'f base line nondestructive examination of all three charging, pump blocks using liquid penetrant testing.
No abnormal indications were observed.
2.
Weekly inspections of the charging pumps have been included in the maintenance PM check sheet.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
15.
Containment H dro en Recombiner uglification.
The licensee committed to environmentally qualify the containment hydrogen recombiners by March 30, 1986.
This commitment was made to allow relief from Technical Specification 3.6.4.2.
The inspector reviewed the following Plant Change Packages (PCPs)
and Construction Work Orders (CWOs) and verified that, environmental qualification was completed by March 30, 1986, following modifications to the control panels.
The inspector also noted that the PCPs were finished and signed off April 1, 1986.
The PCPs and CWOs were:
PCPs 85"01-HP-011-00 AON-HP-035 85-AO-HP-026-00 CWOs 119200 119198 No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
16.
Alle ation Number RV-86-A-01 I k
g
Characterization Engineering Evaluation Requests (EERs) are not all tracked because a
tracking number is not assigned to all EERs.
Two examples were provided.
)
Xm lied Si nificance to Plant Desi n Construction and 0 eration.
Failure to properly track the EERs could result in untimely or improper resolution of potential problems.
Assessment of Safet Si nificance The inspector's review'f this matter revealed the licensee's Quality Assurance (QA) staff had confirmed that a problem with the control and timely review and processing of an EER by system engin-eers did in fact exist,.
As a result of this problem identification, the licensee's QA staff issued a corrective action report (CAR) on December 31, 1985, requiring Operations Engineering to develop a
tracking system which would provide positive control for timely resolution of EERs.
Based on discussions with the licensee's staff, the inspector concluded that this action had been undertaken by Operations Engineering and that procedure revisions to improve control and tracking of EERs had been developed and were ready for review by the Plant Review Board.
As of April 13, 1985, the tracking system improvements still had not been implemented.
The inspector also determined that one of the two EERs provided to the NRC as examples of EERs which had not been properly tracked was associated with the boric acid evaporator tank temperature element.
According to the system engineer who located the EER, the matter which involved the sensor calibration should have been resolved via a maintenance request action not by an EER.
A maintenance request had been issued by the system engineer.
The second EER was assoc-iated with a pressure transmitter on the liquid radwaste evaporator.
According to the system engineer, the stated EER concern, which dealt with an inability to backfill the transmitter sensing leg was not considered valid since this action was possible.
The inspector confirmed that the licensee's QA staff was following this matter through to resolution.
Staff Position The lack of control involving the tracking and control of EERs was substantiated by the licensee and subsequently by the NRC.
Although program corrections are in progress, the inspector concluded that their implementation has not been timely and should be expedited.
This allegation is close r
The inspector will continue to follow the licensee's'esolution of this issue, including a review of the revised procedures upon issuance.
(528/86-09-02)
17.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts - Units 1 and 2.
Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the report contained the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the validity of the reported information.
within the scope of the above, the following reports were reviewed by the inspector.
Unit
o Monthly Operating Report for February, 1986.
Unit 2 o
Monthly Operating Report for February, 1986.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
l8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are those identified during an inspection for which further inspection will be required to determine whether a violation of a requirement occurred.
Sufficient, information was not available during the inspection to make this determination.
The inspector met with licensee management representatives period-ically during the inspection and, held an exit on April 16, 1986.
Th'e scope of" the inspection and the inspector's findings, as noted
'
in this report, were discussed and acknowledged by the licensee representative P l
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