IR 05000528/1986011
| ML17299B233 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 04/25/1986 |
| From: | Wagner W, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17299B232 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-86-11, 50-529-86-11, 50-530-86-09, 50-530-86-9, NUDOCS 8605120195 | |
| Download: ML17299B233 (14) | |
Text
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PDR ADOCK 05000528 Q
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U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos. 50-528/86-11, 50-529/86-11, 50-530/86-09 Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529, 50-530 License No. NPZ-41 Construction Permit Nos.
CPPR-142, 143 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P.
O. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 a
Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
-, Units 1, 2, and
Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection conducted:
March 24-28 and April 7-11, 1986 Inspector:
W.
ner, Rea r Inspector
. Youn
, Jr.,
C ef, En in ing Section Date Signed
-~-R ate Signed
~Summa r Ins ection on March 24-28 and A ril 7-11 1986 (Re ort Nos. 50-528/86-11 50-529/86-11 and 50-530/86-09)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspector of licensee action on 50.55(e) construction deficiencies and on inspector identified items.
NRC Inspection Procedures 92700, 92701 and 92702 were covered during this inspection.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identifie C A
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Arizona Nuclear Power Pro ect (ANPP)
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E. Ide, Director Corporate QA/QC Shriver, Manage'r Compliance Tweedy, Complianc'e Engineer Ferguson, Compliance Engineer Morita, Licensing, Engineer D. Bayless,,QA Engineer Gratza,'.QA Engineer, Daily, QA Engineer Sachs, Senior Mechanical Engineer (Metallurgist)
>Denotes those 'attending the exit meeting on April 10, 1986.
Licensee Action on,Previousl Identified Items AI I
(Closed) Notice of Deviation No. 50-530/85-09-05
"New Fuel Racks 'Not.
Procured Per CESAR Re uirements" This item addresses a potential discrepancy between the quality assurance requirements of FSAR Table 3.2-1 and the program used by Combustion Engineering (CE) to construct the new fuel racks.
In response to this concern CE in letter V-CE-32310 of 4/26/85 stated that the new fuel racks are designed to store new fuel in a non-critical configuration.
The new fuel racks were designed and constructed in accordance with the CE PSG Quality Class 2 specification -
WQC 5.1.
Therefore, the new fuel racks were correctly classified as PSG Quality Class 2A and qualified as Seismic Category I.
CE also states that the new fuel racks were not correctly identified in the PVNGS FSAR Table 3.2-1.
The licensee issued SAR Change Notice, Log No. 2052, to revise Table 3.2-1 to reflect the correct quality assurance requirements and seismic category for the new fuel racks.
The safety evaluation performed concluded that this SAR change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question per
CFR 50.59, or require a change to the Technical Specifications.
The licensee performed a detail review of all CE supplied Quality, Class Seismic Category I components, as defined in FSAR Section 3.2, to determine if any other quality classification inconsistencies exist.
The review of approximately 2000 components did not result in any classification inconsistencies between PVNGS and CE.
Based on the licensee's corrective actions taken and the inspector's examination of the licensee's stated actions, this deviation is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-528/83-36-01
"Corrosion of Buried Pi in "
The licensee submitted their final report on corrosion protection of buried piping in letter ANPP-31830-EEVB/WZQ dated January 31, 1985.
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report also provided a response to four action items the licensee c'ommitted to at, the NRC Meeting of August 13, 1984.
To protect the buried piping from corrosion the licensee has implemented programs to prevent direct contact between the soil and piping.
This program included enclosing buried sections of stainless steel piping in concrete tunnels, and the coating and wrapping of carbon steel piping.
In response to Action Item 1, the licensee defined five systems with nonsafety-related underground piping identified with isolatable safety-related components.
The conclusion is that failure of the nonsafety-related
'systems piping due to corrosion would not affect the safety-related systems.
For Action Item 2 the licensee compared the number of linear feet of safety-related carbon steel buried piping that will be inspected with the number of linear feet of carbon steel safety-related piping.
For Action Item 3, a schedule of inspection of safety-related lines was provided.
The excavations and inspections for Units 1, 2 and 3 are complete; all buried piping was found to be in satisfactory condition.
For Action Item 4, a final report IR-024 was provided.
X'his report addressed minor uniform corrosion of buried fire protection system hydrant and post indicator valves (PIV's).
The licensee concludes that corrosion has not affected the overall integrity of the buried piping to date, and that corrosion has not impacted safety-related or important-to-safety systems.
This item is closed.
(Closed)'Followu Item No. 50-530/84-07-16
"Reins ection of Pi e Han ers The licensee's pipe support reinspection program included inspection of installed pipe support t'ypes that utilize rear mounting brackets similar to the bracket identified by the NRC to be nonconforming.
This problem was do'cumented'in NRC Report Nos. 50-528/84-07 and 86-04.
At the request of the NRC, the'.licensee included statistics in the analysis of the Unit 3 reinspection program for heavily loaded supports attached to light structural members where the bracket weld orientation problem exists.
For Unit. 3 374 supports were inspected with 1/ being nonconformances.
All the nonconforming conditions were dispositioned acceptable to
"use-as-is".
These di'spositions were supported by engineering calculations that showed that the individual supports will'ot fail under the design 'loads.
This item is closed.
C (Closed) Unresolved Item No. 50-529/85-10-01
"Seismic Se aration Criteria" On March 21, 1985 the licensee met with the NRC in Region V to'discuss the seismic gap issue.
This is referenced in NRC Report No.
50-529/85-10.
At the request-of the NRC, the licensee committed to, provide additional infor'mation to further clarify why this problem
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occurred, whether other areas exist where the licensee failed to i'mplement des'ign,requirements, and to clarify when Engineering issues Nonconformance'Reports for discrepancies identified by engineering.
The licensee addressed these areas in their 50.55(e) Final Report submitted to NRC:RV on June 14, 1985.
The report states that Engineering does not write NCR's resulting from design errors.
Design errors or deficiencies are identified and corrected by design change documents.
If the error is safety significant then a Deficiency Evaluation Report (DER) is used to provide objective evidence for problem identification and corrective action.
The final report states that the root. cause of this deficiency is the failure to train other disciplines (other than civil/structural) as to the need to review civil drawings for applicability of cross discipline requirements or alternatively to include such requirements in other discipline drawings.
That is, design requirements included on the civil drawings were not being utilized by other Field Engineering disciplines.
Consequently, various discipline field installation and inspection procedures and additional engineering documents, have been revised to direct the field engineers'ttention to the gap requirement.
The licensee also performed a review of other deficiency documents to determine if similar design problems exist.
This included Investigation Reports and Non-Conformance Reports trend conditions.
No additional design problems were revealed.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
DER No. 84-41 "Cardinal Industrial Products Pro ram for Su lier ualification" - Unit 1 This potential problem arose from an NRC Region IV audit in October and November of 1983 of Cardinal Industrial Products (CIP).
The audit identified that under-sized coupons were used to perform Charpy impact tests, and that sub-suppliers were inadequately qualified.
Since CIP was on Bechtel's Approved Vendor Listing and had supplied materials to Palo Verde, NRC Region IV conducted an investigation at the Palo Verde jobsite during April 1984.
The NRC questioned CIP's quality documentation for materials supplied to the jobsite.
The licensee addressed these concerns during their evaluation of CIP and subsequently discussed their findings with the NRC during a presentation on CIP held in Region V on November 13, 1984.
The actions taken by the licensee which determined this item to be not reportable is documented in licensee letter ANPP-31474-TDS/TRB to NRC:RV dated December'l3, 1984.
The licensee investigated all purchase orders issued to CIP and identified the location of all ASME Section III Class 1 materials for the NSSS.
The licensee also performed an extensive material verification program which concluded that the delivered CIP material is acceptable for use at Palo Verde.
The investigation regarding the issue of impact testing with under-sized coupons revealed that no materials at Palo Verde were found to be affecte yh
The licensee states that the root cause for these problems is CIP's lack o'f control over their sub-suppliers and lack of attention to specify quality documentation requirements in acceptance/issuance of material certifications.
The licensee concluded this condition as not reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)
since no material was found to be unfit for use.
The inspector's review determined that the licensee took appropriate and adequate corrective action with respect to this item.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
DER No. 85-39 "Southern Bolt Pi e Sto Boltin Hardness Problem" - Unit 3 This deficiency, which concerns studs not, meeting the hardness requirements for ASTM A-,540 Grade B23 Class II studs, is discussed in NRC Report No. 50-530/85-29.
This item remained open pending the inspector's review of the licensee's data to assure that enough empirical data existed to provide assurance that the theoretical engineering calculations truly reflected the anchor bolts or studs actual pre-load value.
This information is provided in the licensee's Final Report submitted to NRC:RV on March 6, 1986.
The inspector revfewed Attachment 1 to the Final Report which presents a
summary of results of the predicted versus the actual preloads.
The data presented provides adequate confidence that the maximum predicted pre"load values corresponds to the actual pre-load values of the installed, anchor bolts.
I It wa's determined that the condition of the NSSS pipe stops is not safety significant based on an NRC exemption of the requirement for the use of pipe stops.
This condition was evaluated by the licensee as not reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) or 10 CFR Part 21.
The inspector's review determined that the licensee took appropriate and adequate corrective action with respect to this item.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
DER No. 85-03 "Seismic Ga " Unit 2 The licensee provided a chronology of events, regarding the seismic gap problem, to the NRC Region V at a meeting held in Walnut Creek, California on March 21, 1985.
During this meeting the licensee committed to provide additional information to clarify the root cause of this issue; this is addressed in this report under Unresolved Item No.
50-529/85-10-01.
The licensee's evaluation included performing calculations designed to determine anticipated seismic motions at various elevations and the corresponding gap requirement.
"In Unit 1, where the gap was less than
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the anticipated motion, a safety evaluation calculation was performed 'to demonstrate'hat they would not be safety-significant hazards.
Similar calculations were used to determine that no safety-significant hazard existed in Unit 2.
This information is contained in the licensee's final report submitted to NRC:RV on June 14, 1985.
The licensee concluded the seismic gap conditions detected during the walkdown of Units 1 and 2 are evaluated as not reportable under both
CFR 50.55(e)
and
CFR Part
since, if left uncorrected, they would not constitute a safety significant hazard.
The inspector's review determined that the license'e took appropriate and adequate corrective action with respect to this item.
This item is closed.
In addition to the above DER's, the inspector reviewed 16 Deficiency Evaluation Reports (DER's) which were determined by the license to be not reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
This review was performed 'in order to evaluate the thoroughness of the licensee's analysis and the validity of the conclusions.
The DER's reviewed were the following:
DER Notification No.
Date 83-10 2/28/83 Final Report Date 9/28/84 Descri tion Main Steam Relief Valves Tests Exceed Specified Five Percent Slowdown Limit 84-11 3/8/84 7/11/84 PVMP Instrument Conduit Contaminated with Chlorides 84-28 5/11/84 2/15/85 Diesel Fuel Lines Touching Penetration Sleeve 84-30 5/11/84 84-35 5/17/84 9/18/84 9/18/84 Improper Documentation of Diesel Generator Components Setpoint Potentiometers in PPS Drift Outside of Tolerance 84-40 6/5/84 II 84-42 6/18/84 I
12/14/84 10/30/84 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Corrosion-MXC Environmentally Qualified Torque Switches Replaced with'Unqualified Torque Switches 84-44 7/6/84 11/28/84 Fatigue Failure of Charging Pumps 84-57 8/22/84 9/19/84 Containment Isolation Valve Failed to Close within 10 Seconds
,84-63 8/31/84
.84-65 '/4/84 11/12/84 Target Rock Solenoid Valve Failed to Close During Testing 11/12/84 Instrument Leads Removed from the UGS Split 84-67 9/7/84 11/12/84 Inoperative Target Rock Solenoid Valves 84-74
'9/28/84 12/14/84 Blown Fuses On Class lE Inverters Supplied by Elgar
" 84-76 10/3/84 -',
12/12/84 Excessive Diesel Generator Stator Temperature
" " 84-84 9/28/84 84-89 j.l/6/84 11/2/84 Evaluation Relating to MSIV Closure Interface Requirements 12/6/84 Barton Model 764 Transmitters Mounted Incorrectly Each DER and its supporting documents provided complete description of the discrepant condition and the evaluation of safety -significance.
Also, the root cause and corrective action for each condition were appropriately identified.
The records'or each DER indicated that the
'orrective action had been completed or had been arranged.
These items are closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
'""""""a The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on April 10, 1986, The scope of the inspection and the inspectors'indings as described in this report, were discussed.
Licensee representatives acknowledged the inspectors'inding E I
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