IR 05000530/1986029
| ML17300A665 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1986 |
| From: | Jim Melfi, Richards S, Willett D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17300A664 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-***, TASK-TM 50-530-86-29, NUDOCS 8612240069 | |
| Download: ML17300A665 (14) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR 'REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No.
50-530/86-29 Docket No.
50-530 Construction Permit No.
CPPR-143 Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.
0.
Box 52034
'hoenix, Arizo'na 85072-2034 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 Inspection at:
Inspection conducted:
Inspectors:
Palo Verde, Mintersburg, Arizona November 17-21, 1986 dJ
)g-p'-w nnss M> 1 et
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eactor n pector ate sgne sm e fs, eactor pector Approved By:
Stuart R)chards, Chief, ng) neersng Sect)on Summary:
ate
)gned 2-V -$ 0 Date Soigne Ins ection on November 17 - November
1986 (Re ort No. 50-530/86-29 Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of MI Action Plan items.
This inspection covered, unit 3 of the:Pal'o Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) using NRC Inspection Procedures TI 2514/01, TI 2515/65, and 30703.
Results:
Of the areas inspected, no violations of NRC requirements were 8b122~0 g
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DETAIL'S Persons Contacted
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Van Brunt, Jr, Executive Vice President, ANPP
~J.
Haynes, Vice President, APS
"B. Albert, Licensing Engineer
~C.
Russo, gA Manager
~T.. Shriver, Compliance Manager
~R. Baron, Compliance Supervisor - Commitments R. Fountain, gA Engineer J.
Moreland, Operations Engineer R. Bernier, Supervisor Licensing M. Raines, Eg Electrical Engineer J. Matteson, guality Monitoring Supervisor
"Denotes those attending the final exit meeting on November 21, 1986.
Various other craft and maintenance personnel were also contacted during the course of this inspection.
The inspectors also talked with other plant personnel during the inspection.
These included plant staff engineers, technicians, administrative assistants, and document control personnel.
TMI NUREG-0737 Issues The close-out of the following TMI issues for Units 1 and 2 were reviewed.
Based on this review, the following TMI issues for Unit-3 have been closed out because of the identical design and physical nature of Units-l, 2, and 3,
and because of the uniform application of organizations, administrations,,policies and procedures at these units.
Closed for units TMI item ¹ 1 8 2 in IE R t.
NUREG Issue I. A. 1. 1. 1 I ~ A.1 ~ 1. 3 I.A.1.2 I.A.1.3 ~ 1 I.A.1 ~ 3. 2A 50-528/85-43 50-529/85-33 50-528/85-43 50-529/85-33 50-528/85"43 50-529/85.-39 50-528/85-42 50-529/85-45 50-528/84-25 50"529/85-33 Shift Technical Advisors (STAs)
STA Training Shift Supervisor Responsibilities Shift Manning (limit of Overtime)
Shift Manning (Minimum Shift Crew)
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I.A.2.1.4 50-528/84-54 Upgrade of SRO and RO Training and 50-529/85-35 qualifications I.B.1.2 I. C.l. 2B I. C.1.3B I..C. 1.,1 50-528/84-54 Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG)
50-529/85-33 50-528/85-19 Revise Procedures for Inadequate Core 50-529/86-01 Cooling 50-,.528/85-19 Revise Procedures for Transient and 50-529/86-01
.
"" Accidents
'50-528/84-54 Short Term Accident And Procedures Review 50-529/85-33 I.C.2 I. C. 3.
50-528/84"43 50-529/85-33 50-528/85,-42 50-529/85-39 Shi.ft and Relief Turnover Procedures Shift Supervisors Responsibilities I'.4 50-528/84-25 Control Room Access 50-529/85-33 I.C.5
,
50-528/84-60 Feedback of Operating Experience 50-529/85-33
I.C.6 50-529/84-47 Verification of Correct Performance of 50-529/85-33 Operating Activities II.B.2'
50-528/83-38 Plant Shielding 50-529/85-33 II.B.4.2 50-528/84-60 Training For Mitigating Core Damage 50-529/86-01 II.K.l. 5 50.-528/84-47 Review of ESF Valves 50-529/85-33 II.K.l. 10 50-528/84-47 Operability Status of Safety Related Trains 50-529/85-33 II.K.3.1.B 50-529/86-33 Auto.
PORV Isolation (N/A to PV 1,2 8 3)
3.
TMI Issues Ins ected Durin Site Follow-u A.
II.B.l (Closed Reactor Coolant S stem RCS Vents The purpose of this TMI item is to enable the operators in the control room to vent noncondensible gases from the RCS.
The reason for venting noncondensible gases from the RCS is that the presence of these gases could inhibit a natural circulation cooldown.
Additionally, the installation of design of these vents should not
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lead to an unacceptable increase in, the probability of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or a challenge to containment integrity.
The possible locations for vents in the RCS are in the pressurizer, the vessel head, and in the tube side of, the steam generators.
The licensee has proposed a design for the Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System (RCGVS) which will vent the pressurizer and the vessel head.
These 2 vents may be aligned to vent to containment or the reactor drain tank.
This design was reviewed by NRR and documented in Safety Evaluation Report (SER),
NUREG-0857,, related to the operation of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS), Units 1, 2, and 3, dated November, 1981.
The operating procedures, test procedures and human factors analysis for these vents are discussed in-supplement 5 to the SER, (November, 1983),
and supplement 6, (October, 1984) under TMI item I.C.l.
A description of the vents and the original commitment for the vents may be read in the PVNGS TMI-2 Lessons Lear ned Implementation Report (LLIR).
The inspector noted that the valves in the RCGVS had position indication and were operable from the control room.
The inspector also inspected the installed hardware of the pressurizer vent valves in containment.
The valves were installed as shown in PAID drawing 13-M-RCP-001.
Based on the above, and the similari.ty to the other 2 units, this item is closed.
II.D.3 (Closed) Valve Position Indication for Pressurizer Safet a ves This TMI item requires licensee's to install direct indication of valve position for safety valves and PORV's.
The licensee has installed an acoustic monitoring system (downstream of the four pressurizer safety valves),
which will give the individual valve positions (OX, 20K, 100K).
Palo Verde Units are not required to have PORV's.
II.E. l. 1 Closed) Auxiliar Feedwater (AFM Evaluation This TMI item required licensee's to perform an AFM system reliability analysis, perform a deterministic review of the AFM system, and reevaluate the AFM system flowrate design basis and criteria.
In addition, implementation schedules for the short and long term recommendations of NUREG-0578, section 2.1.7 were given.
NRR reviewed the licensees reliability analysis, deterministic
.review, AFM system design and proposals for implementation of short and long term recommendations.
This NRR review is documented in SER'UREG-0587 for 'Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3.
The inspectors walked down the AFW emergency trains and the non-essential AFM system and their associated control and indication in the control room to verify that the hardware requirements of this item were me't.
While the emergency trains can take a suction from I
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ei,ther the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) or Reactor Makeup Mater Tank (RMMT), the. non-,essential AFM system is supplied by only the CST (the CST can makeup from the Demineralized Mater Tank next to it). The inspectors verifi'ed redundant low level alarms/indication for the CST.
These low level'ndications are LT-36B (to the gSPDS)
and LT-36A to the control room computer and alarm, panel.
The following procedures for transfer of supply from the CST to the RNMT were reviewed
- 410P-1AFOl, Essential AFM System, 43AL-3RK6A, CST Alarm Response.
II.E. l. 2 (Closed) Auxiliar Feedwater S stem Automatic Initiation and low Indscatson This TMI item requires licensee's to provide for the automatic initiation of the AFM System and to provide testable safety grade initiation and control circuits for indication and control, which are powered from the emergency buses.
The inspectors verified that the AFM system had automatic initiation.
During the inspectors walkdown of the AFM trains, the inspectors looked at the local installation of controls and indication, reviewed power sources with the operations engineer, and reviewed provisions made for redundancy and testability.
The inspectors reviewed the Environmental qualifications of flow transmitters FT-41A 8 B (Aux Feed to header for Steam Generator EOlB) at the corporate offices in Deer Valley.
II.E. 4. l. (Closed) Dedicated H dro en Penetrations This item requires licensee's, who use external recombiners for postaccident combustible gas control, to provide dedicated safety grade penetrations that meet redundancy and single failure criteria.
The design of this system has been reviewed and accepted by NRR.
The licensee has installed dedicated hydrogen penetrations for external re-combiners.
The operating procedures for hydrogen control and purge exhaust have been reviewed and this review is documented in inspection report 50-29/85-33.
The recombiner control panel and recombiner/purge isolation valve trains on. the control room control boards were examined while the operating logic was reviewed.
II.F. 1 Additional Accident-Monitorin Instrumentation The following two sub-items were inspected against the licensee's commitments.
The items were addressed in chapter 6 of both the original NUREG-0857, and in supplement 4 to NUREG-0857.
The design was deemed accepted by NRR for these 2 items.
(.2E)
Closed Containment Mater Level Monitor The NUREG-0737 requirement for this item is to have continuous indication of containment sump water level in the control room.
The inspector verified that the indicators for containment sump water level were installed
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in the control room.
The operating procedures are the same for all three units.
This. item is closed.
(Closed Containment H dro en Monitor This NUREG-0737 item requires continuous indication of the hydrogen concentration in the containment atmosphere be provided in the control room.
The measurement range shall be a minimum of 10K of the hydrogen concentration under both positive and negative.ambient pressure.
This indication was inspected in the control room and the measurement range was verified.
I, II.F. 2 0 en) Ins'trumentation for Detection of
. Inade uate Core
~Cool z o a
The purpose of this:NUREG-0737 item was to provide additional, unambiguous indication of Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC).
The design was discussed in the original SER, and in supplements 5 and 6 to,the SER and confor'ms.to the de'sign requirements of. NUREG-0737.
The procedures; were reviewed in previous inspection reports for the other units and found to be acceptable.
Due to the similarity between units', the procedures portion of this item can be closed.
The following parameters would be checked in the recovery operation procedures:
,r 1)
Subcool ing 'Margin 2)
Reactor Vessel Level 3)
Core Exit Thermocouples Only the subcooling margin was available to be displayed on the qualified Safety Parameter Display System (gSPDS).
The reactor vessel level and the core exit thermocouples will be installed after fuel load.
The inspector interviewed ROs to ensure that the operators were trained to recognize ICC.
The operators were able to recognize ICC by other instrumentation, and were 'knowledgeable that the reactor vessel level and core exit thermocouples were not yet installed.
This item will remain open until the reactor vessel level and core exit thermocouples are demonstrated operable.
The procedures portion of this item is closed.
II.K. 3. 25.A (Closed Power for Coolin Reactor Coolant Pum RCP)
ea e
This TMI item requires licensee's to demonstrate that the RCP'eals can withstand a complete loss of offsite.power (resulting in a loss of cooling to these seals), tor a period of two hours,, without damaging the seals.
Tests performed by the reactor vendor, Combustion Engineering, demonstrated the ability of the seals to withstand a
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NRR's review and acceptance is documented in revision 1 to the CESSAR Safety Evaluation Report.
Regardless of the pump seals ability to withstand a loss of offsite
,power, upon a loss of offsite power, Nuclear Cooling Mater pumps fail, but Essential Cooling Mater pumps, which operate from Class lE power supplied by the emergency diesel generators, can be manually cross-connected (via EMA-UV-145 and EWA-UV-65) to supply the RCP seal coolers.
This evolution is described in procedure 41A0-1ZZ05, "Loss of Nuclear Cooling Mater".
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II.G. 1.1 Closed)
Power Su lies for PORV Block Valves and. Level Ind)cat)on This TMI item requires licensees'for pressurizer level indication)
to supply pressurizer level indication instrument channels from vital instrument busses which are capable of being supplied from the emergency power source.
The inspector reviewed applicable drawings (13-E-PNA-001), for unit 3, and verified that two separate Class lE channels of pressurizer level instrumentation (LT-110
), which provide indication in the control room and remote shutdown panel, are
.powered from the vital instrument busses.
These busses are E-PNA-D25,
-D26, -D27, 8 D28.
4.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
on November 21, 1986.
The scope and findings of the inspection, which were discussed during the exit interview, are set forth in paragraphs
through 3 of this repor )1 Cl