IR 05000272/1994016
| ML20071G803 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1994 |
| From: | Albert R, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20071G798 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-94-16, 50-311-94-16, 50-354-94-16, NUDOCS 9407130081 | |
| Download: ML20071G803 (9) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SAfELUALDS IfE0 ATI0tt
REGION I
DETE) M filATIOff EIBY Mir e
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SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT
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Signatur@le-of f ice-Dale License / Docket Nos : DPR 70/50-272; DPR '15/50-311; NPF-57/50-354 Report Nos:
50-272/94-16; 50-311/94-16; 50-3
- 4-15 Licensce
Public Service Electrie and Gas Company
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Facility Name:
Salem and Ilope Creek Generating Stations Inspection At:
llancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Dates:
J ne 1317,1994 Inspector:
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'R. J. A$rt, Physical Security Inspector Approved By:
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[ E! C. McCabe,6(ief, Safeguards Section SCOPE Announced physical security inspection of: Previously Identified Items; Protected Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and Communications; and Security Training.
RESULTS The licensee's security program was found to be directed toward public health and safety, However, a potential violation was identified in the area of vehicle searches. In addition, potential weaknesses were identified in personnel and package searches.
9407130081.940630 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
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DETAIIJi 1.0 Key Personnel Contacted 1.1 Licensee
- R. Binetti, Psychological Services Administrator
- R. Fisher, Screening Supervisor
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- J. Fleming, Senior Staff Enginect
- M. Ivanick, Senior Security Regulat?ry Coordinator
- L. Krajewski, Site Access Administrator
- J. Loed, Security Support Staff Assistant
- S. Mannon, Licensing Engineer
- P. Moeller, Manager - Site Protection
- D. Renwick, Nuclear Security Manager
- M. Samuels, Medical Administrator
- R. Savage, Lead Auditor
- B. Weiser, Senior Staff Engineer 1.2 Contractor
- R. Matthews, Security Program Manager, The Wackenhut Corporation 1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission - Region I
- C, Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector
- E. McCabe, Chief, Safeguards Sec8on
- present at the exit ineeting The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel.
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Previously Identified Iterns 2.1
~ Personnel with Infrequent Unescorted Station Access (Closed) Deviation (DEV) 50-272/93-11-01, 50-311/93-11-01, and 50-354/93-07-01:
Contrary to a commitment to the NRC, the licensee failed to consistently identify persons with infrequent unescorted station access and take appropriate action.- As a result, some individuals had continued unescorted station access even though they had not accessed th idon for more than 60 days and were not available for random testing. In accordance with the. licensee's commitment, those individuals' unescorted access should have ended at the 60-day rJark.
During this inspection, the inspector discussed this matter with the licensee and r viewed supporting documentation. Based on osseussions and documentation provided, the licen ee had -
tracked personnel with infrequent unescorted station access and suspended access in accodance i
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with its commitment to the NRC No further action is required. DEV 50-272/93-11-01,50-311/9311-01, and 50-354/93-07-01 is closed.
2.2 Supervisory Training (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-272/9311-02, 50-311/9311-02, and 50-354/93-07-02: Failure to train in a timely manner 20 newly appointed supervisors with responsibilities for implementing the Fitness for Duty (FFD) Frogram. Those supervisors should have received appropriate training before or within 3 months of being assigned those duties, in accordance with 10 CFR 26.22, Training of Supervisors and Escorts.
Through its auditing program, the licensee identified problerns with supvisory training in two separate audits, ne licensee's ultimate corrective measure was to modify General Employee Training (GET) so that everyone with unescorted station access would be trained at the supervisory level beginning on October 22,1992, and annually thereafter. The first cycle of this training was to occur by the end of October 199?. However, the NRC found tiat, since the training was being conducted as personnel cycled through annual requalification, a potential still existed for newly appointed supervisors to not be trained in a timely manner. Specifically, supervisors who were promoted efter October 22, 1992 without receiving modified-GET training, and who were promoted over three months before receiving that training, would have to be identified and trained before their requalification date. Such tracking and training would have had to occur until July 31,1993, at which time the requalification cycle would be within 3 months oi completion, and anyone appointed after that time would automatically receive training at the supervisory Ld During this inspection, the inspector discussed this matter with the licensee and reviewed supporting documentation. Based on discussions and documentation provided, the inspector determined that the licensee had appropriately tracked and trained supervisors who were responsible for implementing certain aspects of the FFD program. No further action is required.
VIO 50-272/93-11-02,50-311/9311-02, and 50 354/93-07-02 is closed.
2.3 Protected Area Assessment Aids
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(Open) Inspector Follow up Item (IFI) 50-272/93 28-01,50-311/93-28-01, and 50-354/93-28-01:
During a previous inspection. the insocctor determined that the protected area (PA)
assessment aids had deteriorated to a point where even aggressive maintenance was no longer properly effective. The licensee was in the final phase of upgrading assessment aids but had not finalized a start date.
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's progress in this area as follows:
Six existing fixed cameras were upgraded by February 1994.
- Another six fixed cameras were scheduled for upgrading by mid July 1994.
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Six more fixed cameras were expected to be on hand by the end of July 1994 and to be
installed by the end of October 1994 The upgrade of assessment aids will likely be suspended from October - December 1994
to support a refueling outage at Salem 2. Following the outage, upgrade work should resume. Certain alarm station monitors and two indoor cameras were expected to be upgraded between January and April 1995.
In Mzy 1995, firal fixed-camera upgrades should begin. The remaining five fixed
cameras stated for upgrade should be completed by the end of July 1995.
- ne final phase of the upgrade should begin in Jth 1995 with the replacement of seven
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pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras. The PTZs project should be completed by the end of September 1995.
The licensee indicated that the above assessment-aid-upgrade schedule is tentative, dependent on budgetary constraints, and may be impacted by a refueling outage for Salem 2 in 1995. IFI 50-272/93 28 01, 50-311/93 28-01, and 50-354/93 28-01 remains open pending completion of assessment-aid upgrades.
2.4 Vehicle Search (Open) IFI 50-271/93 28-02, 50-311/?3-28 02, and 50-354/93-28-02: During a previous inspection, the inspector noted that factory-seahd items were exempt from search but the guidance was not clear on how to verify factory seals. In addition, lesson plans and the instructors interviewed indicated that a vehicle was to be searched from start to finish by a single search officer when, in actuality, a team scarch approach had evolved.
During this and a previous inspection, the_ inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective measures, including a procedure change specifying one search officer per vehicle and enhanced training on vehicle searches. The licensee's corrective measures have effectively resolved vehicles being searched by a single search officer, but some concerns still remam with vehicle. searches in general and with guidance on what constitutes a factory seal. The licensee did not provide the inspector with definitive guidance for the security force on factory seals (see Detail 4.2 of this report). Further, the quality of vehicle searches continues to be an issue (see Detail 4.3 of this report). Therefore, IFI 50-271/93 28-02,50-311/93 28-02, and 50-354/93-28-02 remain open.
2.5 Performnnee Testing iCloser 'I 50-272/93 2843, 50-311/93-28-03, and 50-354/93-28-03.
The licensee's rethod wrformance testing appeared to be intimidating to the security force in some instance.__ - ___ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ ____ __ _ _ __
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During this inspection, the inspecter reviewed this matter with the licensee and reviewed the associated memorandum of understanding between security management and the auditing group.
This matter was found to have been adequately addressed. IFI 50 272/93-28-03,50-311/93 28-03, and 50-354/93-2843 is cloux!.
2.4 Alarm Station Operatois (Cheed) IFI 50-272/93 28&, 50 311/93-28@, and 50-354/93-28-04. During a previous inspection, some alarm station operators did not readily demonstrate knowledge of security equipment outages r.nd the compensatory measures in place. The licensee took immediate action to ensure that alarm station operators were mere sensitive to security equipment status and the compensatory measures in place.
During this itaspection, the inspector observed alarm station activities and talked with alarm
station operators. The operators were knowledgeable atout security equipment status and compensatory measures that were in place. In addition, operators were observed verifying the status of ahrm station equipment and reporting deficiencies when they were identified. IFI 50-272/93-28-04,50-311/9343-04, and 50-354/93-28 '14 is closed.
3.0 Physical Barriers, Intrusion Detection and Assessment Aids 3.I Protected Arta (PA) Physical Barriers
'Ihe inspector physically inspected the PA barriers on June 14, 1994, and determined by observation that the bairiers were insta' led and maintained in accordece with the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan (the Plan).
3.3 Intniston Detection System Yhe inspector observed the intrusion detection system (IDS) on June 14, 1994, and observed licensee-conducted operability testing of selected zones from the econdary alarm station (SAS)
s on June 15, 1994. Based on those observations, the inspector determined that the IDS was letalled and maintained as committed to in the Plan.
3.4 Assessment Aids The inspector observed the PA perimeter assessment aids and determined that they were installed and operated as ceramitted to in the Plan. Upgrades to the assessment aids were a noted improvement, but much remains to be done to further enhance performance.
3.5 Isolation Zones The inspector verified that the isolation zones were adequately maintained tc permit observation of activities on both sides of the PA barrier.
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4.0 PA and Vital Area (VA) Access Control 4.1 Personnel Access Control Le inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA and VAs. THs determination was based on the following:
The licensee properly identified persocel and checked authorization prior to issuance of
badges and key cards.
He licensee was implementing a search program for firearms, explosives, }ncendiary
devices and other unauthorized materials as committed to in the Plan.
Individuals in the PA and VAs displayed their badges as required.
positive control of an authorized escort, llowever, during observation of access control functions during a peak period, the inspector observed a personnel search officer fail to respond to an individual who had generated an alarm from a portal metal detector. A security supervisor who was overseeing access control activities recognized what the officer had allowed to occur, intervened and resolved the alarm. This is an inspector follow-up item (IFI 50-272/94-16-01, 50-311/94-16-01 and 50-354/94-15-01) and will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
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4.2 Access Control of Packages The inspector determined that the licensee was generally exercising positive control over packages and material brought into the PA at the main access point and the warehouse. The inspector observed package and material processing and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about package and material control procedures. No deficier.cies were identified in this rea at the main access control point.
15$ PARAERAPil CORAR$ SAFERMS
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y This matter was brought to the licensee's attention and appeared to involve inadequate guidance for the warehouse search offcer. This is an inspector follow-up item (IFI 50-272/94-16-02,50-
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311/94-16-02, and 50-354/9415-02) for review during subsequent inspections.
4.3 Access Control of Vehicles
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The inspector assessed control of vehicle access into and within the PA. Vehicles were properly
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authorized prior to being allowed to enter the PA. Identification was verified by a security force
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member (SFM) at the main vehicle access control point.
This was consistent with the commitments in the Plan The inspector also reviewed the vehicle search procedures and t
determined that they were consistent with commitments in he Plan.
THl3 PARAGRs.Pil CONTAlllS SAFEGIAR$
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INFORMAil0N AND IS NOT FOR FIRB d
DISr FURE, IT IS INTENTIONALLY LEri 4 S
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IM PARAlt#il CollTANi$ SAFERIlgt NFORMAil0N AND IS NOT FOR PUKit DISCt09%,iili,IEENil0NilLY LEFT BLANX.
Physical Security Plan Section 4.2.2.4, Vehicle Search, states that " Vehicles are scarched for weapons, explosives, incendiary devices and other co:baband by an SFM (Security Force
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Member) at a guardhouse prior to entering the protected ava. The search consists of inriecting the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo arm."
Failure to perform an adequate vehicle search at the main vehicle access control point as required by the Plan was an apparent violation of NRC requin:mants (VIO 50-272/94-16-03,50-
~ 11/94-16-03, and 50-354/94-15-03).
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5.0 Alarm Stations and Communications The inspector observed cperations o' the central alarm station (CAS) and the secondary alarm station (SAS) and determined that they were maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.
The inspector verined that CAS/SAS operators were not involved in operational activities that would not interfere with the executier. of assessment and response functions. The operators maintained internal comnmn'. cations and communications with the security force. The inspector also verined that each statioa maintained communications with local law enforcement authorities.
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6.0 Security Training and Qualification The inspector observed a training class complete initiai firearms qualifications. That trairug was conducted in accordance with the licensee's Training and Qualification Plan. The inspector obsuved two members from the class receive remedial training after they were unsuccessful at initial attempts to qualify with eithe a handgun or shotgun. The instructors persevered, and b# udividuals successfully qualineu The inspecto: painted out ") the lictnsee a inconsistency in shotgun-placement after a shooting string All shotguns were presumed to be uni oded when they were removed from the firing line. Sona were placed in shooting cases while others were laid atop barrels used as barricades at the firing line, with the shotguns pointing toward personnel who were down range scoring targets. The licensee agreed to review this matter.
7.0 Exit t ausview The inspector met with the licensee representatives indicated in Detail 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection on June 17, 1994. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were
reviewed and the prelimin( ecytion findings were presented. The licensee representatives-present acknowledged the inspection find!ngs.
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